Monday, October 31, 2011

Preconditions for a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement

Preconditions for a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2011

Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou has proposed a cross-Strait peace agreement. His proposal spread shockwaves, at home and abroad. It has become a political football. Is his proposal feasible? It depends on whether the conditions, objective and subjective, are ripe. It is not something that can be achieved unilaterally, through wishful thinking. The time must be ripe. Only then can the two sides successfully sign a peace agreement.

Full Text Below:

President Ma Ying-jeou has proposed a cross-Strait peace agreement. His proposal spread shockwaves, at home and abroad. It has become a political football. Is his proposal feasible? It depends on whether the conditions, objective and subjective, are ripe. It is not something that can be achieved unilaterally, through wishful thinking. The time must be ripe. Only then can the two sides successfully sign a peace agreement.

From this perspective, President Ma's proposal appears too rooted in subjective wishes, and not enough in objective facts. Ma mentioned three preconditions for a peace agreement: public support, a national need, and legislative oversight. But all three were internal matters on the Taiwan side. They ignored external factors on the Mainland side. President Ma later added another precondition. He said any peace agreement would require a public referendum. This triggered a fierce debate between the Blue camp and the Green camp, But debate over the cross-Strait peace agreement was confined to its impact on the Taiwan side. For Taiwan, it was a tempest in a teapot. No wonder more and more people saw this as the main theme of the 2012 presidential election campaign. They concluded that the truth would be revealed only after the election. Amidst the uproar, Beijing calmly sat on the sidelines and watched. That was even more interesting.

Cross-strait peace is something everyone on Taiwan wants. If a piece of paper signed by both sides can bring peace and stability to the Taiwan Strait, why are people even arguing about it? The problem is inadequate discussion and an narcissistic perspective. That is why people are skeptical about its feaibility.

To compensate for this deficiency, President Ma must flesh out his framework. He must systematically address the objective preconditions. One of the most important preconditions, one that must be clarified, is that our side must first coordinate our internal and external resources. This will strengthen our bargaining position during future negotiations, and enable us to receive better political treatment.

The most obvious objective precondition pertains to Taiwan's economic and trade relationship with the Mainland. Is Taiwan's relationship to the Mainland one of dependence, or interdependence? If it is one-sided dependence on the Mainland, then Taiwan's political status will be negatively impacted once the two sides sign a peace agreement. It may even be degraded. If, on the other hand, Taiwan's relationship with the Mainland is one of interdependence, then the two sides signing of a peace agreement will be a pragmatic affair. It will merely reflect the status quo, in which there is no call for [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. In other words, it will merely stabilize the current cross-Strait peace by writing it into law. It will establish a solid foundation for a win-win relationship.

Therefore during our current stage of economic development and planning, we must promote cross-Strait economic interdependence. Taiwan urgently needs the vast Mainland domestic market. On the other hand, it must also preserve its long-term economic advantages, The Mainland values and seeks cutting-edge technology, advanced management techniques, and superior cultural creative ability. To this end, our government has long called for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific operations center, to be Implemented as soon as possible.

More importantly, Taiwan must become the economic hub that links the Mainland with the outside world. It must help the Mainland economy to internationalize. It must help the international economy to penetrate the Mainland market. To this purpose, the government must integrate Taiwan's international web of human and economic connections. It must make a concerted effort to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with other nations. It must actively participate in the system of international economic cooperation. The full internationalization of Taiwan's economy will increase our say in our own affairs. It will help maintain reciprocity in cross-Strait political negotiations. This basis for cross-Strait economic relations and trade is mutual interdependence. Only with mutual interdependence, can there be mutual trust. Only with mutual trust, can there be genuine equality.

President Ma's cross-Strait peace agreement proposal is courageous. and demonstrates unexpected initiative. He seized the intiative. He may have enabled our side to strike a more favorable deal. Seizing the initiative is better than passively sitting at the negotiating table. But seizing the initiative requires detailed follow up. Detailed follow up increases our bargaining power. Otherwise, initiative alone, without preparation for aggressive negotiations, is unlikely to achieve positive results. Foremost is the need to integrate economic power and autonomy. If this is carried out successfully, other matters, such as arriving at a domestic consensus, or agreement between political parties, will be easy.

The objective preconditions for a cross-Strait peace agreement are more important than the subjective preconditions. Our government must strengthen our bargaining position. It must solicit public support. Without public support, then all of its efforts will be for naught.

兩岸和平協議簽署所應具備的條件
2011-10-30 中國時報

馬英九總統日前拋出「洽簽兩岸和平協議」的構想,其震撼力瞬間穿透海內外,成為高度發燙的政治話題。但這項構想將來能否實現,主要取決因素是「主客觀條件是否充分配合」,而非單方面的「主觀願望」乃至「一廂情願」。換言之,將來必須要有「天時地利人和」的環境,兩岸和平協議才能簽得成又簽得好。

從這個角度看,馬總統提出的上述構想,其內涵似乎偏於「過度主觀」,主要表現在他所強調的三個前提,就是「民意支持、國家需要、國會監督」,這些通通是我方的「內生變數」,而無關於外部客觀因素的影響。特別是,馬總統事後又追加了「通過公投」之條件,因而引發了藍綠兩大陣營的激烈論戰,益使兩岸和平協議洽簽話題之討論趨於「內化」,彷彿是台灣內部一場「茶壺裡的風暴」。難怪有越來越多的人,把上述構想視為2012年總統大選的選戰話題,認為它在選完才會「見真章」。其中,中共方面之對該構想保持「冷眼旁觀」態度,更是耐人尋味。

無論如何,「兩岸和平」畢竟是台灣所有民眾共同的期盼。如果將來透過兩岸簽署一紙協議,就可以帶來兩岸穩定的和平局面,那人們還有什麼好去質疑和爭論的?現在的問題是,相關構想的論述不足,且立場過於「自我」,因而人們對它的「可操作性」頗有疑慮。

為了彌補這項缺憾,馬總統有必要強化該項構想的論述架構,主要應增加「客觀條件」的系統化表述。其中最重要的,是要清楚表明,我方如何統籌內部及外部資源,以作為將來和中共洽簽和平協議的籌碼,並藉此來爭取較好的政治待遇。

關於上述的客觀條件,最顯而易見的是,台灣對大陸的經貿關係,究竟是「依賴關係」還是「互賴關係」。如果是一面倒的依賴大陸,那將來兩岸雙方一旦洽簽和平協議,台灣的政治地位一定會受衝擊,而有降階的可能。反之,如是雙方互賴,則彼此所簽署的和平協議,就很可能會務實反映當前「不統不獨不武」的形勢,也就是把現時兩岸和平的態勢,加以制度化和穩定化,那就是兩岸雙贏的堅實基礎。

所以,我方現階段的經濟發展規劃,在兩岸經貿部分,一定要抓緊「促成兩岸互賴」的主軸。台灣誠然迫切需要大陸龐大的內需市場,但另方面,也應長期保有一套經濟優勢條件,而被大陸所珍視及積極爭取,如尖端的產業科技、先進的經營管理技術、高超的文化創意能力等。為此,我政府喊了很多年的「建立亞太營運中心」口號,應儘速落實執行。

更重要的是,台灣要努力扮演「大陸經濟與國際經濟連結樞紐」的角色,而得以高效率協助大陸經濟走出國際,及幫助國際經濟走進大陸。為了達到這樣的目的,我政府應大力整合台灣的國際經濟人脈和錢脈,全力對外洽簽自由貿易協定(FTA),積極參與國際性的經濟合作體系。台灣經濟的充分國際化,可以提高我方的「發言權」,也有助於未來兩岸政治性談判維持「對等」格局,因為它是兩岸經貿互賴的基礎。有互賴,才有互信。有互信,才有真正的對等。

總的來看,馬總統之提出洽簽兩岸和平協議構想,可謂勇氣十足,況且是在各方意料之外主動提出。這樣的作法,有「掌握先機」的效用,因此有可能簽出對我方比較有利的協議,總比被動坐上談判桌為好。但是,在「主動出擊」之後,還要趕緊進行一系列的「配套工作」,以充實自身的談判實力。否則,空有積極的動機,卻無積極的談判準備,到最後也難以談出什麼好結果。而在各種準備工作中,經濟力的整合和自主是最重要的。這項工作做好了,其他的事項,如國內共識、政黨協調等,都容易解決。

要言之,在洽簽兩岸和平協議這件大事上,客觀條件其實比主觀條件更重要。我政府一定要把現實的談判實力加以強化了,再去問民意為何。如果還沒有具備這樣的條件,再怎麼講都不算數。

Thursday, October 27, 2011

Shifting Political Winds in Seoul: The Third Force

Shifting Political Winds in Seoul: The Third Force
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 28, 2011

Summary: In the Seoul, South Korea mayoral by-election, Park Won-soon, a political novice with no party affiliation and no political experience, defeated the ruling party candidate and scored a stunning victory. His campaign paved the way for a joint opposition party challenge in the presidential election. It also proved that Ahn Cheol Soo is a credible challenger to the ruling party in the presidential race. Is there room for a "third force" on Taiwan? The shifting political winds in South Korea provide an interesting basis for comparison and contrast.

Full Text Below:

In the Seoul, South Korea mayoral by-election, Pu Yuanchun, a political novice with no party affiliation and no political experience, defeated the ruling party candidate and scored a stunning victory. His campaign paved the way for a joint opposition party challenge in the presidential election. It also proved that Ahn Cheol Soo is a credible challenger to the ruling party in the presidential race. Is there room for a "third force" on Taiwan? The shifting political winds in South Korea provide an interesting basis for comparison and contrast.

Park Won-soon is a lawyer. He has been involved in popular protests for years, He has the same experience as former President Roh Moo-hyun, who committed suicide. He is electable. He successfully united the opposition parties. He persuaded them to nominate a single candidate, He united a number of smaller forces to strike at a single larger force. He reflects the public's aversion to the political establishment, He is the embodiment of new hope. The public expects him to be a herald for reform.

An even more important trend is apparent in next year's South Korean presidential election, one that parallels Park Won-soon's upset victory in Seoul. One of the highest profile candidates is Ahn Cheol Soo, Dean of Seoul National University's School of Integrated Technology. Ahn Cheol Soo also planned to run for Seoul mayor. As soon as he declared his candidacy, his political momentum built rapidly. Voter support made him a shoo-in. But he suddenly announced his withdrawal from the mayoral race and threw his support behind Park Won-soon. Park Won-soon originally ranked fifth among the candidates, with only 3% of the vote. But once Ahn Cheol Soo gave him his blessing, Park Won-soon's momentum built. Other opposition parties were willing to make concessions. The Ahn Cheol Soo whirlwind was the reason for the changing political winds in Seoul.

According to South Korean media analysts, Ahn Cheol Soo's momentum poses a serious threat to the Grand National Party. He abandoned the campaign in Seoul. He did so in order to enter the presidential race. The Seoul mayoral by-election represents Ahn Cheol Soo's masterful restructuring, transformation, and training of South Korea's "third force." Some think that after the Battle of Seoul, an "Ahn Cheol Soo New Party" is in the offing.

Park Won-soon had no political experience. Yet he defeated the ruling party and other opposition parties. He seized the mayorship of the nation's capital. Ahn Cheol Soo is merely a management and research scholar. Yet he instantly amassed enormous political momentum. This reveals the extent of the South Korean peoples' political discontent. South Korea's economic performance in recent years has been impressive. But the wealth found its way into the hands of huge conglomerates. The public is critical of these conglomerates. The lack of opposition parties enabled the ruling party to engage in incessant corruption. This provoked public outrage, That is why the public has powerful expectations about a third force outside the traditional political establishment.

James Soong bills himself as Taiwan's "third force." But any comparison of Soong with Pu Yuanchun and Ahn Cheol Soo is unlikely to be flattering to Soong. Puyuan Chun and Ahn Cheol Soo exploded on the scene. Their faces were fresh. Their images were clean. Their professional reputations were the product of long years of hard work. James Soong has been in politics his entire life. His political record and public image are already fixed. He is a horse of a different color. When a political novice assumes office, he is "tabula rasa." He leaves much to the voters' imagination. This of course includes the possibility of failed expectations. That said, Ahn Cheol Soo has made his debut. He has stunned the nation by taking a wide lead. By contrast, James Soong continues bringing up the rear. This shows that he is not the public's idea of a "third force."

Voters on Taiwan expect little from James Soong. That does not mean Taiwan has no third force. Blue vs. Green confrontation persists. If a third force were to break the deadlock, if Taiwan was no longer caught in this vicious internal power struggle, the public would welcome it with open arms. The problem is that James Soong had a key role in the Blue Camp. He forfeited the opportunity of transcending Blue and Green. On the one hand James Soong offers Deep Blue pro reunification rhetoric. On the other hand he relied on the Green Camp for his petition drive. This was not transcending Blue and Green. This was playing both sides against the middle. As a result, the only role he could play was a destructive one.

The turnout in Seoul was less than 50%. Just how much charisma does Park Won-soon actually command? It must not be over-estimated. Just how long will the Ahn Cheol Soo cyclone last? That must be subjected to the test of time. The public expects much from these political novices, who know how to win people's hearts. They have united the opposition parties, and increased their collective impact. Contrast this with James Soong, who blindly played up his person charisma, The results were just as different. The Democratic Party is the largest opposition party in South Korea. Yet it forfeited the opportunity to nominate its own candidate, and instead supported political novices without any party affiliation. Some ridiculed it for doing so. But when the election results were announced, the excitement within the Democratic Party was palpable, This model for cooperation can now be applied to the presidential election.

The Seoul mayoral by-election was precipitated by Mayor Oh Se-hoon's rash promise to step down over the issue of free school lunches. One person's miscalculation cleared away a thousand layers of political dust. The result was something the ruling party could never have imagined.

從首爾變天看第三勢力的想像
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.10.28

南韓首爾市長補選,無黨籍且毫無從政經歷的朴元淳一戰功成,擊敗執政黨對手。此役,不僅開啟了在野勢力聯手進軍總統大選之門,也證明「安哲秀旋風」挑戰總統大位的威脅強勁。對於正在探討「第三勢力」空間的台灣,南韓的變化提供了殊堪玩味的對照。

朴元淳是律師出身,長年從事公民運動,經歷和自殺身亡的前總統盧武鉉類似。他能當選,一方面是在野陣營整合成功,集中力量共推一人出征,發揮了「集小擊大」之功。另一方面,也反映了首爾市民對現有政治架構的厭惡,因而寄希望於背景清新的新人,期望帶來改革契機。

與朴元淳在首爾出線平行發展的,還有一條更重要的軸線在推進,那就是明年的南韓總統大選布局;其中最受注目的人選,就是首爾大學融合科技院長安哲秀。安哲秀原先也宣布角逐首爾市長,他一現身即飆出超高人氣,支持度遙遙領先;但他卻隨即戲劇性地宣布退出戰局,改為支持朴元淳主戰。在他加持下,原本排名第五、僅百分之三支持度的朴元淳聲勢大漲,讓其他在野政黨自甘退讓。這股「安哲秀旋風」,才是首爾變天的觀盤重點。

根據南韓媒體的分析,安哲秀目前的聲勢,對大國家黨已構成嚴重威脅;他捨棄首爾之戰,目的即是放眼總統大選,首爾補選堪稱是以安哲秀為核心的「第三勢力」重組、改造、練兵之巨作。甚至有人研判,首爾之戰揭曉後,可能就是「安哲秀新黨」登場的時刻。

朴元淳從無從政經歷,卻一舉擊敗朝野政黨,奪下首都市長寶座;安哲秀不過是一名有經營及研究聲譽的學者,卻瞬間凝聚了龐大的人氣。這些,都反映南韓人民對政治的不滿。近年南韓經濟表現不俗,但財富流向大財團、大企業的現象讓人詬病;政治上,在野黨缺乏作為和執政黨屢斬不絕的腐敗現象,也讓人民痛恨,也因此對來自傳統政治領域以外的第三勢力懷有強烈期待。

然而,朴元淳和安哲秀現象,對於宣稱要成為台灣「第三勢力」的宋楚瑜而言,卻恐怕不是一個正面的比照。朴元淳和安哲秀的爆發力,來自其清新形象,包括長年專業耕耘累積的聲譽;而宋楚瑜一生從政,政績和形象在社會上已有固定評價,兩者截然不同。新人從政,因為白紙一片,提供了選民更多的想像空間,其中當然也包括了可能「失察」的莫大風險。但無論如何,安哲秀一出現,即以舉國驚艷之姿遙遙領先;相形之下,宋楚瑜始終無法擺脫民調殿後的困境,說明他並非民間渴盼的「第三勢力」。

台灣選民對宋楚瑜缺乏期待,並不表示台灣不需要第三勢力。相反的,以台灣的藍綠對峙,若能有第三勢力打破這個僵局,使台灣不再陷於惡鬥內耗,應該很受民眾歡迎。問題是,宋楚瑜在泛藍陣營有過的關鍵角色,使他失去「超越藍綠」的客觀地位;且如今宋的操作,一方面舉深藍的統派論述,另一方面卻拉綠營連署,這已絕非「超越藍綠」,而只是想要一手玩弄藍綠雙方,因此使他最多只能扮演「成事不足,敗事有餘」的角色。

不過,這次首爾投票率不到五成,朴元淳真否有那麼大的魅力,其實不必高估;而安哲秀旋風的威力能維持多久,也有待時日考驗。但關鍵在,民間對新人有殷切期待,他們也懂得捕捉民氣,並極力和在野黨合縱連橫,擴大了集體效應;這和宋楚瑜還一味打「個人牌」的作法大異其趣,效果也明顯不同。最特別的是,民主黨作為主要在野黨,竟放棄提名本黨候選人而去支持無黨籍新人,甚至遭到「失格」之譏;但選舉結果揭曉後,民主黨興奮之情溢於言表,即可知此一合作模式將沿用至總統大選。

話說回來,這次首爾市長補選,是因為市長吳世勳為了學童免費午餐問題草率承諾而下台所引發。一個人的一時失算,竟然捲起了政治的千堆雪,這又豈是執政黨所能預料得到的事?

Look Beyond the Election, Consider Taiwan's Future

Look Beyond the Election, Consider Taiwan's Future
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27s, 2011

Summary: President Ma's proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement has provoked intense controversy between the ruling and opposition parties. Yesterday, during a KMT Central Standing Committee meeting, Ma reiterated that his cross-Strait peace agreement would write the status quo into law, thereby precluding the use of force. He wondered why the opposition Democratic Progressive Party opposed the two sides moving towards peaceful development. He noted in particular how former President Chen Shui-bian and DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen made similar proposals. He said the DPP should not attempt to paint his proposal red, and accuse him of "selling out Taiwan." President Ma has turned the peace agreement into the central theme of this election. He has enabled the public to vote not just for the candidate of its choice, but also for the cross-Strait policy of its choice.

Full Text Below:

President Ma's proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement has provoked intense controversy between the ruling and opposition parties. Yesterday, during a KMT Central Standing Committee meeting, Ma reiterated that his cross-Strait peace agreement would write the status quo into law, thereby precluding the use of force. He wondered why the opposition Democratic Progressive Party opposed the two sides moving towards peaceful development. He noted in particular how former President Chen Shui-bian and DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen made similar proposals. He said the DPP should not attempt to paint his proposal red, and accuse him of "selling out Taiwan." President Ma has turned the peace agreement into the central theme of this election. He has enabled the public to vote not just for the candidate of its choice, but also for the cross-Strait policy of its choice.

President Ma has proposed a public referendum. Perhaps he hopes to emphasize that any cross-Strait peace agreement will be decided by the people. Perhaps he hopes to neutralize any concerns and accusations. Whether his initiative has had a positive or negative impact on the election is hard to say. Some think he foolishly poked a stick into a hornet's nest. Others think that turning the election into a debate over cross-Strait issues will work to Ma Ying-jeou's advantage.

The KMT once feared accusations it was "selling out Taiwan." Political negotiations or political agreements with the Chinese mainland were seen as box office poison. But President Ma has defied the Conventional Wisdom. He has put himself to the test. He hopes to see whether a president, elected by a democratic republic via the democratic process, can withstand allegations of "selling out Taiwan" based on provincial origin. He wants to see whether members of the public on Taiwan have sufficient confidence in themselves, as masters of their own country.

Actually Ma Ying-jeou made it clear from the very beginning that any peace agreement would be subject to three prerequisites: national need, public support, and legislative oversight. If any of the three were missing, if the time was not ripe, no peace agreement would be signed, even if the golden decade was up. The government would not sign merely for the sake of signing. It had no timetable. Nor was it the government's highest priority.

Nevertheless, as expected, the proposed peace agreement was greeted by wave upon wave of DPP attacks. DPP spokesmen accused him of having a timetable for reunification. Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen even said that Ma's peace agreement would subject the public on Taiwan to four dangers. One. It would sacrifice "Taiwan's sovereignty," because sovereignty was not a prerequisite. It would push Taiwan into Beijing's "peaceful reunification" framework. Two. It would change the status quo. A cross-Strait political agreement would require clearly defining the two sides' position on sovereignty. That would inevitably change the half-century long cross-Strait status quo, under which neither side asserts its sovereignty over the other. Three. It would threaten democratic values. President Ma is turning the issue into a political football. He does not respect the public will, and is inciting controversy and confrontation. Four. It would reduce strategic depth. He clearly stated he would like the matter settled within ten years. This is tantamount to setting a timetable for political negotiations. This would reduce the bargaining chips Taiwan has during cross-Strait negotiations.

But a chasm looms between this and what Ma Ying-jeou actually said. One. Ma did not equate a peace agreement with reunification. He said that if any of his three prerequisites were missing, or if the time was not ripe, there would be no rush to sign. Therefore allegations about timetables are utterly baseless. A peace agreement has yet to be drawn up. Not even a rough draft exists. How can anyone say that "Sovereignty was not a prerequisite?" Where is the evidence that it is certain to change the cross-Strait status quo? Ma made clear that any peace agreement would require public approval. How can it possibly endanger democratic values? Nor did he say it must be signed within ten years. If the public does not support it, it can drag on well past ten years.

Let us review the past. Tsai Ing-wen said that if she is elected president, she would establish a "Taiwan consensus." She would solicit public opinion, while adhering to democratic processes. She said this would ensure peaceful and stable cross-Strait interaction. She said her "Taiwan consensus would not rule out any possibility." As long as the public on Taiwan supported it, any relationship with the Chinese mainland was possible.

Ma Ying-jeou said a public referendum would determine whether or not to sign a peace agreement. Tsai Ing-wen said a "Taiwan consensus" was a precondition for a cross-Strait peace agreement, She said that as long as the public on Taiwan supports it, the DPP is open to closer relations with the Chinese mainland. Both stressed that cross-Strait policy must be determined by the democratic process. So why is Ma Ying-jeou's proposal being singled out for attack as "pro reunification?" Even when he has repeatedly said, "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force?" Meanwhile Tsai Ing-wen has adopted a "nothing is being ruled out" posture toward Chinese reunification. Why is she not being challenged regarding her position?

President Ma has gone a step further and proposed a public referendum. It is a renewed commitment to democratic institutions. It is not easy to pass a public referendum. The threshold is extremely high. But a peace agreement has yet to be drafted. Not a single word has been committed to paper. For the ruling and opposition parties to squabble over a public referendum at this moment is utterly pointless.

Reality tells us the world is constantly changing. But most politicians on Taiwan have no vision. They stare at the present, and assume that is how it will be in the future. They extrapolate the future based on the present. But that is not the way the world works. Today's Taiwan is different from Taiwan ten years ago. Ten years from now, it will undergo even more changes. The same is true for the Chinese Mainland. Today's cross-Strait relations will not be cross-Strait relations a decade from now. The question is, can we make changing cross-Strait relations work to our advantage in the coming decade and beyond? Ensuring opportunities for ourselves tomorrow, requires hard work and planning today.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2011.10.27
社論-跳開選舉思維 放眼台灣未來發展
本報訊

馬總統自提出兩岸和平協議,連日來引發朝野爭論,日昨他在國民黨行動中常會中再次強調,和平協議是把兩岸不武的現狀制度化,他質疑在野的民進黨,難道不希望見到兩岸邁向和平發展?特別是包括前總統陳水扁和民進黨主席蔡英文都提出過類似構想,民進黨不應該把他的主張抹紅、抹煞為賣台。可以說馬總統已經將這次選戰的主軸議題,設定在和平協議上,讓民眾不只是要選總統個人,還要選擇兩岸關係的走向。

馬總統拋出公投,也許是為了強調兩岸和平協議一定會交由人民決定,藉此破除外界的疑慮並反擊指控,此一倡議對選情的影響是正是負,還很難說,有人認為沒必要冒險捅這個馬蜂窩,但也有人認為主打兩岸政策對馬英九有利。

往昔國民黨總怕被扣上「賣台」的紅帽子,和大陸進行政治談判或簽政治協議都被視為票房毒藥,但現在馬總統顯然想挑戰政治人物對台灣社會的既定想像,也讓自己接受試煉,看一個民主國家經由民主機制產生的總統,是不是可以不會因為其省籍背景而必須承擔出賣台灣的指控,也看台灣人民是不是對自己作為國家主人的地位有足夠自信。

其實,馬英九一開始話就講得很清楚,簽署和平協議有「國家需要、民意支持、國會監督」三大前提,其中任何一項不具備、不成熟,即使黃金十年到了,擺著也沒關係,不會簽署。政府不會為簽而簽,也沒時間表,更不是目前最優先的項目。

不過一如預料,和平協議的提出引來了民進黨的連番抨擊,不但被指為是統一時間表,黨主席蔡英文更表示它將使台灣人民面臨四個危險:一、犧牲台灣主權,沒有以主權堅持為前提,形同將台灣推入中國設定的「和平統一」政治框架中。二、改變台海現狀:簽署兩岸政治協議的前提,必須先明確認定兩岸雙方的主權定位,這必然將改變過去半世紀兩岸主權互不隸屬的現狀。三、危及民主價值:馬總統將此操弄成為選舉的議題,不尊重民意且製造社會的爭議和對立。四、破壞戰略縱深:言明要在十年內處理,無異設定了政治談判的時間表。讓台灣失去了兩岸折衝時所需要的籌碼。

但這似乎和馬英九說的話有一段差距。首先,沒有證據顯示和平協議可以和統一畫上等號。如果三前提有一項不成熟就不急著簽,所以指這就是統一時間表也說不過去。現在協議連個影子都沒有,哪裡知道它「沒有以主權堅持為前提」了?又有什麼證據說它必然改變兩岸主權互不隸屬的現狀?何況講明了要民意支持,又怎麼會危及民主價值?而且也不是說十年內一定要簽,如果民意不支持,再多個十年都可以繼續拖。

回過頭看看,蔡英文之前曾經表示當選總統後,會透過透明政治作為與民主程序,匯集朝野與社會意見形成「台灣共識」,成為兩岸建立和平穩定互動關係時最關鍵性的條件,「台灣共識不會排除任何可能性」,只要台灣人民支持,跟中國的關係都是可以開放的。

馬英九說公投決定要不要和平協議,蔡英文說匯集「台灣共識」成為兩岸和平的條件,而只要台灣人民支持,民進黨對未來與中國的關係態度開放,二者都強調兩岸政策要由民主機制決定,為什麼馬英九的主張被指控為統一,儘管他早已再三說過任內「不統不獨不武」,而蔡英文對統一採取「不排除」的開放態度,卻不會遭到質疑?

現在馬總統進一步提出公投,是對民主機制的再度承諾。以現行公投過關難度之高,其實這是相當嚴格的門檻。不過眼前和平協議真的八字都還沒一撇,朝野爭執如何公投,沒有太大實質意義。

儘管事實告訴我們,世事不斷變化,但台灣的政治人物經常缺乏想像力,往往看到眼前的狀況,就認定未來也是如此,用現況來推想未來,但世事並非如此。現在的台灣和十年前不同,十年後也會有新的變化,中國大陸亦然,今天的兩岸關係,不會是十年後的兩岸關係,問題是,我們能不能在未來十年、廿年乃至更長久的時間裡,讓兩岸關係朝向有利於台灣的方向發展。台灣未來的發展機會,必須今天就開始規劃耕耘。

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

South Korea's FTA Encirclement: A Breakthrough is Up to Us

South Korea's FTA Encirclement: A Breakthrough is Up to Us
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 26, 2011

Summary: Everyone is concerned about the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) scheduled to go into effect next January. According to the agreement, 99% of all industrial products manufactured by the U.S. and South Korea will be tariff free. Many products manufactured on Taiwan and sold in the US are in intense competition with products manufactured in South Korea. Once the FTA between the US and South Korea goes into effect, many products manufactured on Taiwan will be at a disadvantage the moment they come ashore, The FTA South Korea signed with the EU goes into effect this July, This leaves the government and industry deeply worried.

Full Text Below:

Everyone is concerned about the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) scheduled to go into effect next January. According to the agreement, 99% of all industrial products manufactured by the U.S. and South Korea will be tariff free. Many products manufactured on Taiwan and sold in the US are in intense competition with products manufactured in South Korea. Once the FTA between the US and South Korea goes into effect, many products manufactured on Taiwan will be at a disadvantage the moment they come ashore, The FTA South Korea signed with the EU goes into effect this July, This leaves the government and industry deeply worried.

The South Korean FTA is taking shape. Our government must break through the encirclement. The United States is Taiwan and South Korea's main export market, The two economies manufacture many of the same products. Therefore the advantage belongs to South Korea. Our side is at a comparative disadvantage. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the financial impact may amount to US$11.8 billion, Textiles, clothing, machinery, and rubber and plastic products will suffer the most. The cost and quality of these products is similar to the cost and quality of products manufactured in South Korea. South Korea's gross margins are lower. In which case, the presence or absence of tariffs is often the determining factor. In fact, FTAs affect more than just exports. Taiwan and South Korea also compete for foreign investment. South Korea's FTAs will also have an effect on foreign investment. Therefore, our government is not alone in sounding the alarm. The Japanese public is urging Japan's government to accelerate the signing of FTAs.

The government has proposed a number of responses. President Ma says the cross-Strait economic agreement (ECFA) is an effective weapon against South Korea's FTAs. But lest we forget, in this Great Game of FTAs, South Korea's trump card is not confined to Europe and the US. It also signed an FTA with ASEAN that went into effect in 2007. It has completed a feasibility study and expects to sign an FTA with the Chinese mainland by the end of this year. Once the FTA between South Korea and the Chinese mainland is signed, any advantages conferred by ECFA could be lost.

FTA negotiations between South Korea and Europe and between South Korea and the US took an average of 15 months. Contrast this with the snail's pace for follow-up consultations over ECFA between Taipei and Beijings. South Korea began negotiating with the Chinese mainland later, but finished negotiating earlier. This is even more worrisome.

South Korea's web of FTAs is increasingly complete. Our own government has responded by undergoing industrial upgrading. and by adopting long-term measures such as market segmentation. It has also accelerated the pace of negotiations over ECFA and FTAs. Taipei has been attempting to sign an FTA with Washington for some time, Countless feasibility studies have been completed, all with positive results, But no concrete progress has been made. In recent years progress was stalled by disagreements over US beef imports. Domestic controversy over FTAs inside the United States over the past few years also had an impact. The US congress waited five years before approving the FTA between Washington and Seoul. Therefore an FTA between Taipei and Washington may be difficult at the moment. Taipei is holding FTA negotiations with the EU, But the EU has 27 countries. Each of them has different views. Much work remains to be done.

Asia has become a hotspot for FTAs in recent decades. Nearly 70% of the new FTAs have been signed in this region. The government is not oblivious to this development. But it has yet to make any practical breakthroughs. In the past, it deliberately erected barriers. But in recent years cross-strait economic and trade relations have eased markedly. Yet the government keeps turning in lousy report cards, A foreign investment protection agreement has been signed between Taipei and Tokyo. But bilateral consultations with ASEAN countries have made little progress. We can no longer blame poor cross-Strait relations. Other countries also need time to explore the Chinese mainland's stance. This may result in slow progress. But little progress has been made in the four follow-up talks over ECFA, especially over goods and services covered in most FTAs. That is even more disturbing.

Leave aside external factors such as international political and economic relations. The crux of the matter is that Taipei has been lacklustre in its efforts to promote FTAs. Everything points to the governnment, and its reluctance to liberalize. A government's determination is not exactly something that can be quantified. But the number of FTA talks held and the time allocated to FTA negotiations gives us a clue. Taipei is already negotiating ECFA with Beijing. Taipei is already negotiating an FTA with Singapore. But it lacks a clear timetable. Taipei has begun negotiating with Seoul. But it lacks a master plan. By contrast, South Korea has both a blueprint of potential FTA signatories, and a strict timetable for FTA signings. The difference between Seoul and Taipei is obvious.

In short, the key to breaking out of South Korea's FTA encirclement, is not entirely in other peoples' hands. We must strengthen our commitment to liberalization, accelerate cross-strait talks and establish a comprehensive strategy for promoting FTAs. These are all within our power. Therefore we must not blame our lack of FTAs on others. Instead, we must boldly seize the initiative.

突破韓國FTA包圍的關鍵操之在我
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.10.26 02:00 am

各界都很關注美韓自由貿易協定(FTA)將於明年元月生效的情勢發展。按照這個FTA的約定,美韓雙方將有百分之九十九的工業產品關稅,將自生效之日起降為零。由於我國許多工業產品,在美國市場都與韓國產品具有高度的競爭關係,美韓FTA的生效,意味著我國許多產品從到岸那一刻起,就已經處於不利地位,加上韓國與歐盟的FTA已於今年七月生效,凡此皆令政府及產業界憂心忡忡。

面對韓國FTA布局儼然成形之際,我政府應速擬突圍之道。美國是台、韓的主要出口市場,加上兩國產品的替代性很高,因此韓國的優勢,相對我方就是劣勢。依據經濟部的估計,總影響金額可能高達一百十八億美元,並以紡織、成衣、機械及橡塑膠類產品所受衝擊最為明顯。在這些產品中,若與韓國同類產品的成本、品質接近,而毛利率又偏低時,關稅之有無往往成為勝負的關鍵。事實上,FTA的影響不只是出口貿易而已,台韓在吸引外資上也具有競爭關係,FTA的布局也將對韓國在招商引資上產生加分效果。因此,不僅我國拉起警報,日本輿論界也開始催促其政府加速FTA的洽簽工作。

對於此一情勢,政府提出許多對策;馬總統則指出,兩岸經濟協議(ECFA)是對抗韓國FTA網絡的利器。但是千萬別忘了,在這場FTA的賽局中,韓國手中的王牌不是只有與歐、美的FTA而已,還有早於二○○七年即生效的東協FTA,並預計在今年底完成與中國大陸洽簽FTA的可行性評估。一旦韓國與中國大陸完成FTA,那麼兩岸ECFA所提供的優勢就有可能全部喪失。更令人憂心的是,以韓國與歐、美洽商FTA平均只需要十五個月的決心,再對照兩岸的ECFA後續協商慢如牛步,韓中FTA後發但先至,絕非杞人憂天!

面對韓國日趨完整的FTA網絡,除了產業升級、市場區隔等長期措施外,政府最直接的回應,當然也是加速兩岸ECFA及FTA的洽簽。台灣推動與美國的FTA已有相當時日,各種呈現正面結果的評估研究也已不知進行幾回,但一直沒有具體進展;這幾年受到美牛事件的影響,加上美國內部過去幾年對FTA的爭論不休,導致美韓FTA延宕近五年才獲得國會批准,因此,此時此刻推動台美FTA有一定的難度。至於與歐盟的FTA協商,因其成員多達廿七國,而且立場分歧,也還需要相當的努力。

除了歐、美之外,近十年亞洲地區已是全球FTA的熱點,有接近七成的新FTA都發生在這個區域內的國家。對於此一趨勢,政府並非無感,卻也未見突破的作法;過去以對岸從中作梗交代也就罷了,但近幾年兩岸經貿關係已明顯和緩,政府還是沒有交出好看的成績單,除了台日投資保障協議外,與東協國家的雙邊協商也未有具體進展,恐已不能再完全歸責於兩岸關係。再者,即使其他國家還需要時間摸索中國大陸的立場,以致進展緩慢,但屬於兩岸間的ECFA四大後續協議談判,尤其是與一般FTA性質接近的貨品貿易及服務貿易協商,一樣也是未見進度,就更令人不安。

排除國際政經關係的外部因素,歸納台灣推動FTA乏善可陳的內部癥結,其實都指向政府自由化決心的不足。儘管政策決心的高低難以完全數據化,但洽簽FTA的數量及談判所需時間的長短,卻提供了一些客觀指標。台灣一方面對於如兩岸ECFA及台星FTA等幾個已經啟動的談判,都欠缺明確的時間表,另方面在洽簽對象上,除了隨韓國起舞外,也沒有通盤、具體的規劃。相反的,韓國無論在洽簽對象及完成時間上,非但都有藍圖,而且嚴格按表操課。相較之下,便可明顯感受到台灣的落差。

簡單地說,突破韓國FTA包圍困境的關鍵,並非絕對操之在人;強化自由化決心,加速兩岸協商,並展開全方位的FTA推動戰略,都是操之在我的方向。所以,對於FTA,我們不必怨天尤人,而應挺起腰桿,主動出擊。

Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Three Principles of the Peace Agreement: Tsai's Internal Contradictions

Three Principles of the Peace Agreement: Tsai's Internal Contradictions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 25, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP oppose Ma Ying-jeou's peace agreement. They are adopting the same approach toward it that they adopted against ECFA. Can Taiwan independence advocates sign a peace agreement? Tsai Ing-wen is running for president on behalf of the Taiwan independence movement. She asserts that "The Republic of China is Taiwan." In fact, she is merely engaging in "backdoor listing." She is attempting to claim that "The Republic of China is the Nation of Taiwan." Tsai and the DPP need to reflect on the past. Their high-minded rhetoric about "sovereignty, democracy, and peace" is nothing more than self-delusion. How can such a fraudulent concept of "sovereignty" possibly represent democracy? How can it possibly bring peace?

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP oppose Ma Ying-jeou's peace agreement. They are adopting the same approach toward it that they adopted against ECFA.

One. Substantively speaking, Tsai and the DPP oppose ECFA. They denounce ECFA as a "candy-coated poison pill," as "demeaning," as "forfeiting our national sovereignty" and as "a sellout of Taiwan." They say they intend to lead four million unemployed people onto the streets to oppose any peace agreement. They denounce Ma Ying-jeou's peace agreement as a "one China peace agreement." They say "It will begin the reunification process" and introduce "four major dangers." Two. procedurally speaking, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP oppose ECFA. They say "A referendum is also an option." Tsai opposes a peace agreement. She echoes President Ma's call for a referendum. But she raised the ante by demanding an amendment to the referendum law. She wants "all cross-strait political negotiations subject to public referenda."

Tsai Ing-wen led the Democratic Progressive Party onto the streets and opposed ECFA by throwing Molotov cocktails. Now however, she no longer denounces ECFA as "humiliating." Now she seems happy to swallow that "candy-coated poison pill." Now she declares that "If the DPP returns to power it will carry on the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Now she declares that if the DPP returns to power it will march in lockstep with Ma Ying-jeou. It will support ECFA. It will "become chummy with [Mainland] China." It will "sell out Taiwan." Tsai even warned Beijing against unilaterally suspending ECFA.

Such flip-flopping demonstrates Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP's ignorance. Otherwise, why were they so critical of ECFA earlier? It demonstrates Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP's shamelessness. Otherwise, why warn Beijing against unilaterally suspending ECFA? Actually such ignorant and shameless flip-flopping has been standard operating procedure for the DPP for at least a decade. With the peace agreement, it has merely revealed its ignorance and shamelessness yet again.

In February Tsai Ing-wen announced that her cross-Strait policy was "peace with differences, peace while seeking agreement." She referred to Ma Ing-jeou's cross-Strait policy as "peace while seeking reunification, peace that demands reunification." She flagrantly created a straw man. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy calls for "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." When did he ever say "peace while seeking reunification, peace that demands reunification?" If Tsai and the DPP did not know this, then they were ignorant. If they knew this, but deliberately put words in Ma's mouth, then they were shameless. Ignorance is inexcusable. Shamelessness is even more inexcusable.

Ma Ying-jeou's peace agreement is not based on Beijing's "one China" scenario, It is based on "one China, different interpretations." It is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is not "the beginning of the reunification process." It is an effort to stabilize cross-Strait relations by writing "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" into law. In sum, Ma's Peace Agreement does not talk about reunification. For Taipei, it is a firewall standing in the way of forcible reunification by Beijing, For Beijing, it is a face-saving measure that enables Beijing to shelve the issue of reunification until later. Its main function is to reduce the pressure to reunify and to reduce the need to address issues of reunification. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP do not know this, then they are ignorant, If they know this but deliberately conflate a peace agreement with forcible reunification by Beijing, then they are shameless.

Tsai Ing-wen says cross-Strait negotiations must be based on "sovereignty, peace, and democracy." Ma Ying-jeou's peace agreement is based on one China, different interpretations. Therefore, it upholds the principle of sovereignty. It attempts to stabliize cross-Strait relations by writing "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" into law. Therefore it upholds the principle of peace. It is subject to a public referendum. Therefore it upholds the principle of democracy. What reason do Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have to accuse Ma's peace agreement of violating the principles of sovereignty, peace, and democracy?

The Democratic Progressive Party wants to amend the referendum law. It wants to make all cross-Strait political negotiations subject to public referenda. Ma's peace agreement would be subject to a referendum. According to the current referendum law, if the two major parties have reached a consensus, then a bill in the legislature can begin the referendum process. What need is there to amend the law? The DPP wants all cross-Strait political negotiations to be subject to public referenda. Wasn't ECFA political in nature? Why is the DPP no longer demanding that ECFA be subject to a public referendum, in the event the DPP returns to power? If the DPP's interest is undiminished, why not subject "flexible diplomacy," or "wartime diplomacy" to public referenda? For that matter, why not reintroduce the DPP's Taiwan independence referendum?

The fact is Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou differ little on the three principles of the peace agreement. They differ little on the principles of peace and democracy. Their differ mainly on the principle of sovereignty. Ma Ying-jeou upholds the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations. Tsai Ing-wen repudiates the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations. The two also have differences at a deeper level. Ma Ying-jeou upholds "one China, different interpretations." He upholds the Constitution of the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen is running for president on behalf of Taiwan independence. She says she opposes "one China, different interpretations." But in fact she has been hijacked by the Taiwan Independence movement. Taiwan independence is at the heart of all DPP rhetoric. Therefore when the DPP says "sovereignty" it actually means "Taiwan independence." Naturally this makes cross-Strait peace impossible, A tiny number of Taiwan independence zealots have hijacked the Republic of China's constitutional framework. As a result, democracy is suffering a slow death at the hands of Taiwan independence.

Can Taiwan independence advocates sign a peace agreement? Tsai Ing-wen is running for president on behalf of the Taiwan independence movement. She asserts that "The Republic of China is Taiwan." In fact, she is merely engaging in "backdoor listing." She is attempting to claim that "The Republic of China is the Nation of Taiwan." Tsai and the DPP need to reflect on the past. Their high-minded rhetoric about "sovereignty, democracy, and peace" is nothing more than self-delusion. How can such a fraudulent concept of "sovereignty" possibly represent democracy? How can it possibly bring peace?

和平協議三原則:以蔡之矛,攻蔡之盾
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.10.25 03:03 am

蔡英文及民進黨反對「和平協議」,用的仍是與反對ECFA一模一樣的公式。

一、就實體面言:蔡英文及民進黨反ECFA,指ECFA是「糖衣毒藥」、「喪權辱國」、「傾中賣台」,會帶來四百萬人失業;反「和平協議」,則稱馬英九要簽的是「一個中國」的「和平協議」,是「啟動統一進程」,會帶來「四大危險」。二、就程序面言,蔡英文及民進黨反對ECFA,主張「公投也是一個選項」;她反「和平協議」,則非但呼應馬總統所主張的付諸公投,又加碼稱應修「公投法」,規定「一切兩岸政治協商皆須公投」。

蔡英文曾帶民進黨上街用汽油彈反ECFA,如今卻不再指ECFA「喪權辱國」,反而似乎已經甘之如飴地吞下了那顆「糖衣毒藥」,謂「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」;也就是宣告,「若再執政」,將步武馬英九「支持ECFA/傾中賣台」的路線,甚至警告北京「屆時不得片面中止ECFA」。

這樣的反覆,非但證實蔡英文及民進黨的無知(否則當初為何如此批判ECFA?),更彰顯了蔡英文及民進黨的無羞恥心(否則為何警告北京不得片面中止?)。其實,無知無恥的反覆變化,正是民進黨幾十年來兩岸論述的一貫公式;如今在「和平協議」上,其論述之無知無恥依然故我。

二月間,蔡英文宣示她的兩岸綱領是「和而不同/和而求同」;竟指馬英九的兩岸政策是「和而要統/和而必統」,即完全是構陷栽贓的手法。因為,馬英九的兩岸政策主軸是「不統/不獨/不武」,何嘗說過「和而要統/和而必統」?蔡與民進黨若不知,是無知;若明知卻還要故意玩這種先射箭再畫靶的手法,即是無恥。無知已不可恕,無恥更是等而下之。

馬英九的「和平協議」,絕非根據北京的「一個中國」設想,而是基於「一中各表」的中華民國憲法原則;亦非「啟動統一進程」,而是欲將「不統/不獨/不武」的兩岸關係法制化固定化。總而言之,「和平協議」非但不是談「統一」,且在台灣是統一的「防火牆」,在北京是統一的「下台階」,其主要功能即在降低統一壓力及轉移統一的議題。蔡英文及民進黨若不知,是無知;若明知,卻竟故意將「和平協議」操作成等同「統一」,那就是無恥。

蔡英文說,兩岸協商應當基於「主權/和平/民主」三原則。據此以論馬英九「和平協議」的構想,因基於「一中各表」,故無違「主權」原則;鞏固「不統/不獨/不武」,則正是「和平」原則;並主張付諸公投,即是「民主」原則。蔡英文及民進黨,有何理由指馬英九的「和平協議」違反主權、和平、民主?

至於民進黨主張公投法修法,規定「一切兩岸政治協商皆須公投」;則以「和平協議」言,既然將付諸公投,只要兩大黨有此共識,依現行「公投法」,立院提案即可進入公投程序,又何必修法?而謂「一切兩岸政治協商均付公投」,則ECFA豈無政治性質?民進黨如今何以不再主張若執政將對ECFA付諸公投?如果興致不減,也何妨將「活路外交」或「烽火外交」付諸公投?更何不乾脆恢復台獨公投?

其實,說穿了,蔡英文與馬英九,在所謂「和平協議三原則」上,於「和平」與「民主」二項並無太大歧異,主要的區別是在對「主權」的認知。馬英九主張「九二共識/一中各表」,蔡英文則否認「九二共識/一中各表」;二人更深一層的差異則在於,馬英九持守「一中各表」的憲法戰略,蔡英文則是代表台獨參選總統,表面上只說反對「一中各表」,其實是被台獨挾持。由於台獨是民進黨一切論述的根源,則在「主權」的概念既是「台獨」,則兩岸「和平」自難維持,而以少數台獨挾持了中華民國的憲政正常化,則「民主」亦受台獨凌遲。

台獨能簽和平協議嗎?蔡英文代表台獨參選總統,主張「中華民國就是台灣」,其實是「借殼上市」,是在說「中華民國就是台灣國」。蔡英文及民進黨應回頭反省:其「主權/民主/和平」三原則其實是自欺欺人;以此種「主權」概念,是否代表「民主」?能否帶來「和平」?

Monday, October 24, 2011

Cross-Strait Peace is the Long-Held Consensus

Cross-Strait Peace is the Long-Held Consensus
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 24, 2011

Summary: With the presidential election only 80 days away, KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou announced his "golden decade" campaign platform. The cross-strait peace agreement he set forth provoked widespread debate. It has many supporters, but also many critics. From an election strategy perspective, President Ma should not have raised this issue. But cross-Strait relations is an issue that Taipei cannot avoid. President Ma has shifted the focus of the election back to the issues. That is a positive development.

Full Text Below:

With the presidential election only 80 days away, KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou announced his "golden decade" campaign platform. The cross-strait peace agreement he set forth provoked widespread debate. It has many supporters, but also many critics. From an election strategy perspective, President Ma should not have raised this issue. But cross-Strait relations is an issue that Taipei cannot avoid. President Ma has shifted the focus of the election back to the issues. That is a positive development.

As early as 2003, President Chen Shui-bian suggested that the two sides establish a "peace and stability interaction framework agreement," predicated upon peace, the establishment of consultative mechanisms, reciprocity, constructive political relations, and the avoidance of military conflict. The Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council at the time was current Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen.

In 2004, the People First Party proposed a "Cross-Strait Peace Promotion Law," and submitted a draft to the legislature for approval. Predicated upon the "five noes" and the 1992 consensus, the draft proposed that "If Taipei does not declare independence, Beijing will not use force." The two sides would sign a peace agreement maintaining the cross-Strait status quo for 50 years.

In 2005, KMT party chairman Lien Chan led a delegation on a "journey of peace" to the Chinese mainland. He and CCP leader Hu Jintao reached a "five visions" agreement, based on the 1992 consensus. They proposed cross-Strait talks, and hoped the two sides could reach a peace agreement.

The premise of the Lien/Hu summit became the basis of Ma Ying-jeou's 2008 presidential campaign platform. President Ma has provided fairly clear insights into his thinking. When inspecting the nation's defenses or meeting with foreign guests, he has invariably "put Taiwan and the public welfare first." He has insisted that a high degree of mutual trust between the two sides is a prerequisite for cross-Strait negotiations. He has demanded equality. dignity, and a win/win scenario. He has demanded that cross-Strait negotiations meet the expectations of other nations in the region, as well as the international community. His preconditions were even stricter than Chen Shui-bian's.

In other words, the content of the three presidential candidates' campaign platforms may be different. But none of the three presidential candidates have any reason to characterize a peace agreement as a scourge against humanity. Why have different groups within society arrived at such different conclusions about Ma's peace agreement? It is undoubtedly because Ma Ying-jeou chose this moment to raise the issue. Ma stepped into a political minefield. Ma Ying-jeou campaign committee chief King Pu-tsung made similar comments while visiting the United States. But the Office of the President issued a solemn statement repudiating King's statement. President Ma reemerged to clarify the matter, only to become the target of criticism.

President Ma's proposed peace agreement has three prerequisites: a national need, public support, and legislative oversight. Tsai Ing-wen blasted Ma's peace agreement. She said it posed four dangers. She said it sacrificed sovereignty, changed the status quo, endangered democracy, and undermined strategic depth.

Tsai Ing-wen underscored the fact that the DPP's peace agreement was not predicated on the 1992 consensus. The DPP refuses to acknowledge the 1992 consensus, Tsai allowed herself to be painted into the DPP's rhetorical corner. Lest we forget, the cross-Strait agreements signed by the Ma administration over the past three years are all based on the 1992 consensus. The DPP has avoided one of the most important aspects of the 1992 consensus, namely "shelving disputes" and "one China, different interpretations." Since the premise is different interpretations, sacrificing sovereignty or changing the status quo is not really a concern. Tsai Ing-wen is free to interpret one China with the Republic of China, and the Republic of China with Taiwan.

Tsai Ing-wen has not precluded the possibility of cross-Strait political negotiations. But she has set three preconditions: sovereignty, democracy, and peace. But how are her preconditions any different from President Ma's? President Ma even conceded that a public referendum is one way of expressing the public will. The DPP was in power for eight years. It proposed one referendum after another. It equated referenda with the Will of the People. It treated public referenda as instruments by which to assert sovereignty, President Ma has adopted some of the DPP's thinking. Shouldn't the DPP welcome his move?

Let's take an even more realistic look at the issue. If the two sides wish to reach a peace agreement, they must reach a consensus on complex and sensitive issues such as the two sides' political status, military confidence-building mechanisms, and international participation. Prolonged study will be needed before conditions on Taiwan are ripe, before a consensus can be reached, and a referendum can be held. Besides, President Ma stipulated that no peace treaty would be signed without a public referendum. As one can imagine, the referendum law has a high threshold. The distance between Ma Ying-jeou's "vision for the decade" and a peace agreement is vast.

But on Taiwan, big things start small. The ruling administration had enough initiative and goodwill to propose a peace agreement. It hopes a new decade can replace the last, This is an important matter, conducive to stable, peaceful, long term cross-Strait development.

Ever since the lifting of martial law, the biggest political difference on Taiwan has been reunification vs. independence. Practically speaking, given the current situation, neither peaceful reunification nor peaceful independence is possible. Forceful reunification or forceful independence would start another war. This is not something either side looks forward to. Maintaining the status quo, establishing a long-term framework for peaceful development and prosperity, is the best option for cross-Strait relations. Most importantly, a peace agreement is not the ultimate goal of cross-Strait relations. The ruling and opposition parties should arrive at a consensus through debate. Changes in ruling party must not lead to sudden changes in cross-Strait policy. The ruling and opposition parties must conduct themselves responsibly.

尋求兩岸和平早就是朝野共識
2011-10-24 中國時報

總統大選倒數八十天,國民黨參選人馬英九總統在「黃金 十年」系列政見發表會中,拋出推動兩岸和平協議的想法 ,引起廣泛討論,支持者有之,批評者也不少,從選舉策 略分析,馬總統有沒有必要提出此議題是一個觀點,但兩 岸關係與政策確是台灣不能迴避的重要課題,把選戰拉回 關鍵議題的戰場,未始不是好事。

事實上,早在二○○三年前總統陳水扁就提出兩岸之間有 建立「和平穩定互動架構協議」的必要性,其前提是:和 平原則、建立協商機制、對等互惠交往、建構政治關係、 防止軍事衝突。當時的陸委會主委正是此刻民進黨的總統 參選人蔡英文。

此外,親民黨在二○○四年也曾提出《海峽兩岸和平促進 法》草案送交立法院審議,草案主張在「四不一沒有」與 九二共識的前提下,以「台灣不獨,中共不武,雙方保證 維持兩岸現狀五十年」的條件,簽署兩岸和平協議。

國民黨則在二○○五年由當時的黨主席連戰率團赴大陸進 行和平之旅時,與大陸領導人胡錦濤達成「五大願景」, 以九二共識為基礎,推動兩岸復談,希望能達成兩岸和平 協議。

連胡會的基礎,甚至在二○○八總統大選時,成為馬英九 的政見。馬總統在任期之內,不論是視察軍事防務、或者 接見外賓都曾經提及,馬總統相當完整地詮釋過他的想法 :一定要「以台灣為主,對人民有利」,兩岸之間要有高 度互信,符合兩岸協商各項協議的要求,絕對要對等、尊 嚴與互惠,同時也得符合區域或者國際社會的期待。其前 提甚至比陳水扁有過之而無不及。

換言之,即使內容有異,但總統大選可能的三組候選人都 沒有道理對和平協議視若洪水猛獸,何以會引爆各界如此 歧異的解讀?無庸置疑,因為馬英九此刻拋出此一議題, 已經落入選舉操作的陷阱,馬英九競選辦公室執行長金溥 聰訪美時即曾有過類似說法,卻遭總統府嚴正澄清,此刻 馬總統再出面自陳其見,徒然惹人非議。

但就實質內涵而言,馬總統所提和平協議有三個前提:國 家需要、民意支持、國會監督,就不至於落入蔡英文嚴詞 批評的會讓台灣人民面臨四個危險:犧牲主權、改變現狀 、危及民主、以及破壞戰略縱深。

蔡英文認為民進黨的和平協議沒有九二共識的一中結構, 又讓自己陷入民進黨堅拒九二共識的泥淖,不要忘了:馬 政府三年多來簽署各項兩岸協議都是以九二共識為基礎; 此外,民進黨始終迴避九二共識最重要的內涵是「擱置爭 議,一中各表」,既已各表,就不必擔心犧牲主權改變現 狀,因為我們的「一中」正是蔡英文口中的「中華民國是 台灣」。

蔡英文並不否定兩岸政治協商的可能性,但以「三個堅持 」為前提:堅持主權、堅持民主、堅持和平,這和馬總統 的堅持何異?遑論馬總統還強調公投也是表現民意的一種 方法。民進黨執政八年,動輒公投,不但把公投視為民意 ,更把公投做為彰顯主權的工具,馬總統向民進黨靠攏, 應該表示歡迎才對。

更貼近現實來看,兩岸要達成和平協議,至少要在彼此定 位、軍事互信機制、國際參與空間等複雜敏感的問題取得 共識,在台灣內部從從條件成熟、凝聚共識、到交付公投 ,更需要極長的時間研商,再加上馬總統說公投不過就不 會簽署,以公投法的高門檻,可想而知,和平協議距離馬 英九的「十年願景」還遠得很。

但是,做為以小事大的台灣,由主政者主動提出和平協議 的想法和善意,以一個十年換取下一個十年,卻是非常重 要的事,而且有利於兩岸長久、穩定的和平發展。

統獨是台灣解嚴廿多年來,政治上最大的歧見,務實地看 ,當前兩岸既無和平統一的可能,也無和平獨立的希望, 至於武力統一或獨立,都將再掀戰禍,絕非兩岸所樂見, 維持現狀,建立長期和平發展繁榮的架構,是兩岸關係的 最佳模式。最重要的,和平協議既非兩岸關係的終極結局 ,朝野從辯論中逐步建立共識,甚至避免政黨輪替對兩岸 關係動盪的影響,才是朝野政黨負責任的作為。

Friday, October 21, 2011

Politicians, Stop Using Elderly Farmers as Election Fodder

Politicians, Stop Using Elderly Farmers as Election Fodder
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2011

Summary: Each time an election rolls around, politicians reenact the same old charade. They demagogue the issue of subsidies for elderly farmers. This time however, the KMT refused to take part in the bidding war. Instead, it proposed indexing subsidies for elderly farmers to consumer prices. It sought an alternative to the annual mudslinging. But Green Camp legislators, joined by some Blue Camp legislators, remain committed to subsidies for elderly farmers. They oppose any such change. As a result, reformers still face a tough battle in the legislature.

Full Text Below:

Each time an election rolls around, politicians reenact the same old charade. They demagogue the issue of subsidies for elderly farmers. This time however, the KMT refused to take part in the bidding war. Instead, it proposed indexing subsidies for elderly farmers to consumer prices. It sought an alternative to the annual mudslinging. But Green Camp legislators, joined by some Blue Camp legislators, remain committed to subsidies for elderly farmers. They oppose any such change. As a result, reformers still face a tough battle in the legislature.

From a purely strategic perspective, this move by the ruling KMT was unwise. One. Elections are at hand. The DPP will surely seize the opportunity to accuse the Ma administration of "demeaning farmers." This charge alone will be enough to give the Ma administration indigestion. Two. Farmers assumed their subsidies would be increased by several thousand dollars. Now they are being increased by only 300 dollars. Their expectations have been shattered. They are certain to be disgruntled. Three. The Executive Yuan proposal excludes wealthy farmers, non-agricultural income, and new farmers who own 50 million dollars or more in real estate. The higher eligibility threshold is not going to win any votes among new elderly farmers. Four. Internal dissent within the Blue Camp has been endless. A powerful backlash among legislators from southern Taiwan agricultural counties is making policy decisions particularly difficult.

The pressure has been overwhelming. But for that very reason, the Ma administration was able to set aside "winning is everything" thinking. It was able to consider the plight of every disadvantaged group within society. It was able to devise a rational system for increasing subsidies. The decision-making process was not easy. By contrast, when Tsai Ing-wen was in office, she threatened to engage in "tax resistance" against subsidies for elderly farmers. But now she is in the opposition. Now she resorts to underhanded tactics to sabotage her political opponent. Now she has no qualms about damaging the nation's fiscal health. This reveals her opportunism and her lack of principles. The DPP's strategy is to raise a hue and cry over subsidies for elderly farmers every four years. Elderly farmers have become political pawns for demagogues seeking political office. Who really cares about their dignity?

Consider the new system. Some elderly farmers understand the issues. They feel that having subsidies indexed to consumer prices is fair and reasonable. They support the exclusion of wealthy farmers. But other elderly farmers have angrily denounced the new system. They say civil service salaries have increased by several thousand dollars, whereas subsidies for elderly farmers have increased by only 300 dollars. They say the gap between the two is too wide. But these elderly farmers do not understand the difference between subsidies and salaries. They do not understand that subsidies are government-issued social welfare. Salaries, on the other hand, are payment for work performed by civil servants. The two are completely different. They cannot be compared. Long term vilification by politicians has persuaded many farmers that civil servants and teachers are a privileged elite. In fact, what right does Kunbinbo (Uncle Kun-bin) have to complain about civil servants and teachers?

Elderly farmers complain that they earn less than civil servants and teachers. But compared to other disadvantaged groups, they enjoy far more visibility and have receive far more attention. Over the past decade, subsidies for elderly farmers have been increased three times, once during each election. The total amount of subsidies has doubled. By contrast, other subsidies for low-income households have been neglected, because no one speaks on their behalf. This is another sort of social injustice. This is why the KMT increased subsidies for eight other disadvantaged groups when it increased subsidies for elderly farmers. It indexed subsidy increases to rising consumer prices. This is not merely more reasonable. It is also more just. Elderly farmers complain that their subsidy increases have been too meager. But how many elderly people are even poorer? How many of them envy the elderly farmers' good fortune?

Subsidies for elderly farmers has long been a political football for the ruling KMT and opposition DPP. Observers assumed the current presidential race would degenerate into the usual bidding war. They assumed the Blue Camp would join the Green Camp in sacrificing the nation's fiscal health. They assumed the KMT would join the DPP in writing blank checks to buy votes. But to everyone's surprise, the Ma administration resolved to break this vicious cycle. It refused to go along with the DPP. It refused to engage in a bidding war. It refused to wave a magic wand. Instead it considered the need for fairness. It considered the need for fiscal accountability. It devised a convincing system for indexing subsidy increases. The Ma administration's decision has enabled other disadvantaged segments of society to share in the social welfare pie. Most importantly, it has broken the vicious cycle. It has put an end to the politicians' bidding war. Political opportunists can no longer use elderly farmers to advance their political agenda.

If democracy on Taiwan is to progress, someone must stand up. Someone must point to the things that are wrong and say, "Enough!" Elderly farmers have worked hard their entire lives. The state should provide them with a reasonable safety net. But it should not give them money and be done with it. It should not think of them only every four years. It should not think only of buying their votes. Over the past decade, the issue of subsidies for elderly farmers has been like a phantom. It has appeared and reappeared during each election. It has been a projection of our social tragedy. Every election season, it has been the DPP's ATM machine. Only when people tire of the charade, will they consent to its systematization. The best solution is for Blue and Green Camp politicians to stop making elderly farmers their poster child.

Some have ridiculed the Executive Yuan's proposal as deceptive, as "one fish, prepared three ways." They accuse the Executive Yuan of trying to be all things to all people. But first, the Executive Yuan's proposal hardly pleases elderly farmers. Second, it runs the risk of inviting an internal backlash, leading to unfavorable election results. How can it possibly be considered "one fish, prepared three ways?" The important thing is that the Ma administration Insists on doing the right thing, And by doing the right thing, it has enabled the people to see the ruling administration's sincerity and wisdom. This is a true "blue ocean strategy."

The systematization of subsidies for elderly farmers is a courageous, wise, and just move. It deserves the public's support.

政客勿再挾老農為選舉人質
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.10.21

每逢大選必上演的津貼加碼大戲,這次國民黨揚棄了跟進喊價的戰法,另行開闢了「隨物價調整」的制度化路線,為連年糾纏不休的泥巴戰打開一條新思路。然而,在綠營和藍營老農派立委的共同反對下,此案在立法院仍有一場硬戰要打。

若純粹從戰略利益估量,執政黨此舉,恐怕難稱明智。原因是:第一,選舉在即,民進黨趁機指控馬政府以賤價「侮辱老農」,這項罪名就夠馬政府吃不完兜著走;第二,農民原本預期津貼調升千元,如今卻僅調三百多元,期待落空,勢必心生不滿;第三,政院版本更增列「排富條款」,將非農業所得在五十萬元以上或擁有房產五百萬元以上的新進富農排除在外;新門檻阻擋一批新老農的領取資格,當然不利吸票。第四,藍營內部亦雜音連連,尤其南部農業縣市立委反彈強烈,更增決策困擾。

但也正因為壓力罩頂,馬政府能拋開「選票第一」的思維,考量各類不同弱勢民眾的狀況,整合出一個制度化的津貼調整機制,更凸顯其決策之不易。對比之下,蔡英文執政時揚言以「抗稅」抵制老農津貼,如今在野卻不惜採取不入流的戰術來干擾對手、侵蝕財政,反映其投機與缺乏原則。在民進黨的戰略中,四年一度的津貼喊價,老農其實已被政客當成選舉人質,誰真的關心他們的尊嚴?

對於新機制,比較理解的老農認為,隨物價調升「有公道」,也支持要「排富」。但也有老農怒稱,公務員調高薪資幾千元,老農才調三百多,「差天甲地」。老農分不清「津貼」和「薪資」的差異,無可厚非;但「津貼」是政府發放的社會福利,而「薪資」是公務員的工作所得,兩者性質完全不同,不能相提並論。若不是政治人物長期醜化,將「公教人員」塑造成農民待遇的「反差」,像崑濱伯這樣的樸實農民怎會對公教懷有那麼多怨懟?

再說,雖然「老農」自怨待遇不如「公教」,但比起其他身分的弱勢群體,其能見度和關注度其實已遙遙領先。過去十年,老農津貼三度選舉加碼,已經翻了一倍。相形之下,其他各類低收入戶的補助,卻因無人代他們發聲而受到忽視,這是另一種社會不公。正因為如此,這次國民黨在調整老農津貼時,也將另八類弱勢社福補助一併納入,規定皆依物價指數調整;這不僅更具正當性,也更符合公平正義原則。當老農在怨嘆加碼太少時,有不少更貧困的老人卻羨慕著他們的「好命」,不是嗎?

這次老農津貼議題進入朝野角力清單時,外界原以為將一如以往演成加碼大賽,藍綠均將不惜以國庫為代價,大開選舉支票。令人意外的是,馬政府這次決心要擺脫惡性下沉漩渦,不僅未隨民進黨喊價的魔棒起舞,還在兼顧公平精神及國庫收支的前提下,設計出一套具有說服力的調整機制。馬政府這項決策,除了讓更多弱勢民眾分享社福大餅,最大的意義是打破「政客叫價」的惡質風氣,讓政治投機客無法再假藉老農名義遂行個人政治目的。

台灣的民主要再進化,就要有人站出來向不對的事說:「夠了!」老農勤苦一生,國家應該提供他們合理的生活照護,但這不應該只是發錢了事、不是每四年才想到他們一次,更不該只是為了他們的選票。十幾年來,老農津貼的問題像幽靈一樣,如影隨形地浮現在台灣每一場選舉的天空,既像是社會的悲情投影機,更像是民進黨的選舉提款機。當民眾早已看膩了這樣的老戲,讓它回歸制度化,是最好的解決,藍綠政治人物也請停止再綁架老農。

有人譏政院版的津貼案妄想「一魚三吃」,其實,這首先就討好不了老農,二則要冒內部反彈及選舉不利的風險,如何奢想三吃?重要的是,堅持做對的事,讓民眾感受到執政者的誠意和智慧,那才是真正的藍海策略。

這次老農津貼制度化方案,跨出了勇敢、明智、正當的一大步,值得肯定。

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Will the DPP Win at Least 42% of the Vote?

Will the DPP Win at Least 42% of the Vote?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 19, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric regarding national identity and cross-Strait policies is duplicitous and dangerous. News reports about Su Jia-chyuan and Hung Heng-chu reek of corruption and scandal. But support for the Tsai/Su ticket remains solid. The Conventional Wisdom is that support will not fall below 42%. They may even be elected. Eighty days from now, on January 14 of next year, 23 million people on Taiwan may watch as Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan win "a victory with an even bigger question mark."

Full Text Below:

If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP win the upcoming presidential election, it will constitute a national catastrophe. But even if Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP lose the presidential election, Taiwan's political and economic problems will remain insoluble.

Three years ago, Tsai Ing-wen became DPP Chairman, People assumed she would transform the DPP. That did not happen. On national identity, Tsai remains trapped within the framework of Taiwan independence. She is still taking the "backdoor listing" approach toward Taiwan independence. If she is elected president, her victory will be considered a defeat for the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. It will result in an immediate showdown with Beijing, The two sides will collide, head on. Su Jia-chyuan and Hong Heng-chu are already the symbol for corruption in the new DPP. Suppose a DPP victory whitewashes Su Jia-chyuan and his wife. Suppose they are allowed to squeak by merely because they were elected to office? The Tsai/Su regime will assume power with this symbol of corruption stamped on its forehead. How can it establish any political legitimacy? The global economy is in dire straits. The US-ROK FTA threatens. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, Taiwan will be uable to hold its head up on either side of the Strait. The result will be a national disaster.

Even if the DPP is defeated in the presidential election, Taiwan's political and economic problems will remain insoluble. The DPP Tsai Ing-wen leaves behind at the end of the election will be a DPP that recognizes only "18% of the ROC." It will be a DPP that wants only to seize the presidency. It will be a DPP that refuses to recognize one China, different interpretations. It will be a DPP that refuses to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. It will be a DPP that whitewashes the corrupt practices of Chen Shui-bian, Wu Shu-cheng, Su Jia-chyuan, and Hong Heng-chu. The DPP can engage in brazen corruption, yet still be assured of receiving 42% of the vote. Even if it is defeated in the coming election, Taiwan's political and economic problems will remain insoluble.

The DPP may win or lose. Either way it will divide society over national identity, It will undermine cross-Strait harmony. It will abet political corruption. None of this will change. Tsai Ing-wen may win due to the James Soong Factor. But even if she loses, she will probably still receive 42% of the vote. The DPP she leaves behind will still be a pro Taiwan independence party. It will still be a corrupt political party that inverts right and wrong. It will still be a political party that commands die-hard support from 42% of the electorate. Unless the DPP can be reborn, Taiwan's political and economic problems will remain insoluble.

This newspaper pointed this out in 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory. We said Ma Ying-jeou's victory in the presidential election was "a victory with a giant question mark."

We pointed out. even as the votes were being counted, that Taiwan's rise or fall would depend upon Ma's ability to govern. It would depend on the 42% of the electorate that supported Frank Hsieh and the DPP. If that 42% of the electorate allows itself to be held hostage by the DPP, if it fails to extricate itself from the trap of Taiwan independence, if it supports the DPP blindly, and remains indifferent to right and wrong, then Taiwan's fate will be in its hands. If the DPP continues promoting its current values, whether it is the ruling party or the opposition party will make no difference. It will remain a force for destruction instead of construction.

Recent developments confirm that the victory Ma Ying-jeou won three years ago was indeed "a victory with a giant question mark." Ma Ying-jeou's governance has been less than completely satisfactory, The Ma administration can be criticized on many issues. But on two issues, promoting peaceful development and fighting political corruption, Ma's achievements have been considerable. Tsai Ing-wen is in an attempting to undermine the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy by repudiating the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. She has thrown her full support behind Su Jia-chyuan and Hong Heng Chu. This election will test the electorate's political conscience, and its tolerance for political corruption. This election paints a giant question mark besides the Ma administration's four years in office. It paints a giant question mark besides Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan, in the event they win the election.

History is full of paradoxes. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew won "a victory with a giant question mark." Will Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan win "a victory with an even bigger question mark?" The question we must ask Tsai Ing-wen is not "Are you ready?" but "Are you ready for a major disaster?"

The current posture of Tsai Ing-wen, Su Jia-chyuan, and the DPP is twofold. One. Repudiate the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, even if it means colliding head on with Beijing. Two. Excuse Su Jia-chyuan and Hong Heng-chu's brazen corruption. Refuse to admit wrongdoing or express repentance. In the event Su and Hong are forced to relinquish their luxury farmhouse, insist that everything was "legal." Their attitude borders on brutish. If they win the general election, will disaster ensue? If they lose, can the ruling administration overcome the obstacles erected by the DPP, and solve Taiwan's political and economic problems?

Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric regarding national identity and cross-Strait policies is duplicitous and dangerous. News reports about Su Jia-chyuan and Hung Heng-chu reek of corruption and scandal. But support for the Tsai/Su ticket remains solid. The Conventional Wisdom is that support will not fall below 42%. They may even be elected. Eighty days from now, on January 14 of next year, 23 million people on Taiwan may watch as Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan win "a victory with an even bigger question mark."

四十二%起跳 台灣的大問號!
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.10.19

可以斷言,蔡英文與民進黨若贏得這次總統大選,將是國家大災難的開始;然而,即使蔡英文與民進黨若輸掉這次總統大選,台灣的政經難題也恐怕仍難解決。

因為,蔡英文並未如國人在她三年前就任黨主席時所期待的帶領民進黨轉型。在國家認同上,她依舊未走出台獨的框架,所採仍是「借殼上市」的路線;她若當選總統,將被視為「否認九二共識/一中各表」的政策獲勝,而立即與北京攤牌,直接對撞。再者,蘇嘉全、洪恆珠夫婦已成為民進黨新的貪腐象徵;民進黨若勝選,蘇嘉全夫婦經選票漂白,「當選過關」,則帶著這一大塊貪腐胎記上台的「蔡蘇政府」,如何建立統治的正當性?如今,眼看著世界經濟局勢凶險萬狀,台灣在美韓FTA威脅下更是前景堪憂;蔡英文若當選,而竟在兩岸關係及清廉形象上皆不能立足,豈不是宣告一場國家大災難必將爆發?

然而,即使民進黨在這次總統大選再度落敗,卻也未必能解決台灣的政經難題。因為,蔡英文經此次大選留下的民進黨,將仍是一個只承認「十八%中華民國」的民進黨(只是搶當總統,但不承認「一中各表」的中華民國憲法),也仍將是一個像當年力挺陳水扁、吳淑珍貪腐一般地力挺蘇嘉全、洪恆珠貪腐的民進黨。因而,民進黨倘能再獲四十二%以上選票的穩定支持,即使在此次大選敗北落選,台灣的政經難題必是仍難化解。

因為,不論民進黨勝選或敗選,它在撕裂國家認同、惡化兩岸關係,及包庇貪腐三大問題上,皆是依然故我;且蔡英文若因宋楚瑜等因素而當選固無論矣,即使敗選而若仍能獲四十二%起跳的選票支持,則她留下的民進黨仍是一個台獨黨,也仍是一個顛倒是非的貪腐黨,又是一個無論如何皆有四成二以上選票死忠支持的鐵桿黨;則民進黨即無可能脫胎換骨,台灣的政經難題亦必是仍難解決。

其實,本報社論在二○○八年馬英九以壓倒性優勢贏得總統大選時即曾指出:馬英九的勝利是「一個帶著問號的勝利」。

當年,我們在開票首日及次日的社論指出:台灣的興衰存亡,固然將決定於馬英九的執政能力,也更將決定於那四十二%支持謝長廷及民進黨的選民之手。如果那四十二%起跳的選民,仍然挾持民進黨(或被民進黨挾持)而走不出台獨的框架,或力挺民進黨到了完全不問是非黑白的地步,台灣的命運將決定於這四十二%起跳的選民手中。而民進黨若繼續維持這樣的內涵,則不論是執政或在野,對台灣而言,皆可謂是「成事不足,敗事有餘」。

如今已可證實馬英九在三年前所獲確實是一個「帶著問號的勝利」。不過,馬英九的執政績效雖未能盡如人意,有甚多可以批評之處;但他在重建兩岸「和平發展」關係,及洗刷貪腐兩大議題上,皆有可觀的成就。現在,蔡英文欲以否定「九二共識/一中各表」,來推翻馬政府的兩岸政策,又以力挺蘇嘉全、洪恆珠夫婦來測驗國人良知對政治貪腐的忍耐度;這非但使馬政府四年的努力掛上了一個問號,也更為蔡英文、蘇嘉全如果當選勝出,畫下了一個天大的問號。

歷史充滿弔詭。馬英九、蕭萬長在二○○八年的「帶著問號的勝利」,會不會在二○一二年變成蔡英文、蘇嘉全的「帶著更大問號的勝利」?現在要問蔡英文的,不是:「妳準備好了嗎?」而應當是:「妳準備好若當選要面對的大災難了嗎?」

蔡英文、蘇嘉全及民進黨目前的姿態顯然是:一、否定「九二共識/一中各表」,不惜與北京撕裂對撞;二、對蘇嘉全、洪恆珠夫婦如此不忍卒睹的貪腐形象,迄仍拒絕認錯悔過,縱使捐出豪華農舍,仍堅稱原本一切「合法」。這種跡近強橫野蠻的姿態,若贏了大選豈非大災難?若輸,又豈能解決民進黨及台灣的政經難題?

眼前的事實是,無論蔡英文的國家認同與兩岸政策如何詭詐虛無及危險,亦無論蘇嘉全夫婦的貪腐醜聞如何不堪聞問,蔡蘇配的支持度皆十分穩固,一直被認為至少可從四十二%起跳,且頗有當選的可能。那麼,且讓台灣兩千三百萬人,在八十幾天後的明年一月十四日,看著蔡英文與蘇嘉全攜手贏得「帶著更大問號的勝利」吧!

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Promote Cross-Strait Peace, Increase Public Welfare

Promote Cross-Strait Peace, Increase Public Welfare
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2011

Summary:In his "Golden Decade, National Vision" press conference, President Ma Ying-jeou set forth his proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement, to be signed some time in the coming decade. A decade seems far away. But establishing a foundation for peaceful cross-Strait coexistence is a vast and difficult undertaking. We have a responsibility to the nation's future and to the public welfare. Therefore we must begin thinking seriously about how we can make it happen.

Full Text Below:

In his "Golden Decade, National Vision" press conference, President Ma Ying-jeou set forth his proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement, to be signed some time in the coming decade. A decade seems far away. But establishing a foundation for peaceful cross-Strait coexistence is a vast and difficult undertaking. We have a responsibility to the nation's future and to the public welfare. Therefore we must begin thinking seriously about how we can make it happen.

President Ma proposed a peace agreement. He also listed three prerequisites: a high degree of public support, a pressing national need, and legislative oversight. These three prerequisites are essential in any democracy. The Republic of China is a democratic republic, Any policy must be endorsed by the public. It must be subject to legislative oversight. This goes without saying. President Ma said the government's approach to any cross-Strait peace agreement would be "gradual, prudent, and discrete." He said it would not sign for the sake of signing, and that it has no timetable. A peace agreement is not the government's highest priority item at the moment. But by raising the subject, he has effectively linked cross-Strait policy to the presidential election. He has encouraged voters to choose between progress toward a cross-Strait peace agreement or inaction, uncertainty, and the continued possibility of a cross-Strait war.

Most people on Taiwan support peaceful cross-Strait exchanges. But when it comes to a peace agreement, many still lack confidence in Beijing. A peace agreement affects national security. It requires mutual trust. President Ma Ying-jeou was willing to advance his vision before the election. This required considerable courage. The Green Camp is certain to accuse him of "selling out Taiwan." But President Ma Ying-jeou believes no leader elected by a democratic system of government may be slandered in such a fashion. This election will be a test of Taiwan society. It will reveal whether Taiwan society has transcended its bigotry vis a vis provincial origins.

History continues to advance. Society continues to evolve. This is true on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Before the two sides can sign a peace agreement, they must overcome numerous obstacles. They must clarify their goals. They must come to terms with each other's sovereignty. Their military forces must be willing to forsake the use of force. They must agree on how negotiations will be conducted. On the surface, Taipei wants peace, Beijing wants reunification. But at a deeper level both sides what both sides need is a peaceful and stable environment that permits shared development, that permits their children and grandchildren to grow up in an atmosphere of harmony and happiness. What both sides need is a vibrant and progressive civil society for the Chinese nation as a whole.

Therefore a peace agreement must be more than a quid pro quo. It must be more than a Machievellian power struggle. The two sides must share a commitment to a better future. If the two sides continue to engage in a battle of wits, then the basic conditions for a peace agreement do not exist. Signing a peace agreement is not the most important thing. The most important thing is creating an environment in which a peace agreement is possible. The hard part is creating the benign environment necessary for a peace agreement. Once such a benign environment has been created, a peace agreement is a forgone conclusion. Even without a peace agreement, peace would already be a reality.

When will such a day arrive? This should not be perceived as a problem. It should be perceived as a goal. How do we make such a day possible? Changing the nation's future is an important matter. To treat it as something unknowable, to sit back and allow the situation to evolve on its own, is not merely wrong, but irresponsible.

Given existing cross-Strait relations, such a goal seems impossible. But given the progress made in cross-Strait relations, and the liberalization taking place on the Chinese mainland, significant changes will take place, internally and across the Strait over the coming decade.

President Ma said that over the next decade, the government must continue affirming the sovereignty of the Republic of China, It must continue increasing its strength. It must encourage healthy cross-Strait relations. It must build long-term peace and stability. The two sides may not recognize each other's sovereignty. But they must not deny each other's jurisdiction. We hope the government will establish cross-Strait administrative mechanisms. We hope it will promote the Republic of China's core values: freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. We hope that interactions between officials and civilians on both sides of the Strait gradually move toward consensus.

A stable and peaceful environment will enable the two sides to continue vigorous exchanges. Such exchanges will showcase Taiwan as an alternative model for the development of the Chinese nation. It will inspire the public on the Chinese mainland. Militarily Taipei cannot to prevail against Beijing. But morally, Taipei has greater respect for the human individual, therefore much to be proud of. The longer peaceful cross-Strait exchanges continue, the more benign society on the Chinese mainland will become. This is an opportunity for Taiwan. It is also an opportunity for the Mainland, It is an opportunity for the Chinese nation as a whole.

Ensuring the welfare of the people is the foremost responsibility of both governments. Both sides must promote peace and mutually beneficial exchanges. They must set aside matters of political conflict and address matters of public welfare. They must demonstrate wisdom and courage. They must join hands to create a peaceful and prosperous future for the public on both sides of the Strait.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2011.10.19
社論-打造兩岸和平 為人民謀福祉
本報訊

馬英九總統在「黃金十年,國家願景」記者會上,提出在未來十年洽簽兩岸和平協議的構想。從現在看,十年似乎很遙遠,但為兩岸打造一個穩固的和平環境、締造共存共榮的基礎,是一項非常巨大艱難的工程,基於對國家前途和人民福祉的責任感,的確應該開始慎重思考並持續經營。

馬總統在提出和平協議的同時,也設下了「民意高度支持、國家確實需要、國會監督」等三項前提。這三項前提,都是一個民主國家必然存在的政策制約機制,台灣既然已是民主國家,任何政策都要取得民意的背書及接受國會監督,這點毋庸置疑。馬總統同時表示,政府對兩岸和平協議會「循序漸進、審慎斟酌」,不會為簽而簽,也沒有時間表,更不是目前最優先的項目。不過既然提出來,實質上等於把兩岸路線和總統大選明確地綁在一起,要選民在兩岸朝和平協議方向前進或兩岸和戰未卜之間作個選擇。

若問民意,台灣民眾絕大多數支持兩岸和平交流,但談到和對岸簽協議,可能仍有不少人對中國缺乏信任,而和平協議涉及國家安全,尤其必須建立在互信之上。馬英九總統願意在大選前明白提出這個願景,是需要相當勇氣的,因為綠營可能會提出「賣台」的質疑。但馬英九總統卻相信,一個由民主機制產生的政府,無論其領導人的省籍背景,都沒有理由、也不應該再被扣上這樣的帽子。對台灣社會跨越省籍情結的進程而言,這將是一次考驗。

歷史前往邁進,社會也不斷演變進化,兩岸皆然。兩岸要簽署和平協議,必須克服許多障礙,包括目標為何、對彼此主權地位的認知、軍方是否願意放棄訴諸武力、談判的形式等等。表面上看來,台灣要的是和平,中國要的是統一,但其實更深遠來說,兩岸要的應該是一個和平穩定的共同發展環境,讓彼此的子孫都能在安和樂利中成長,從而為整個民族開創更充滿活力的進步文明社會。

因此,一個和平協議,不應該只是利益的交換乃至爾虞我詐的角力,而是雙方對一個更美好未來的共同承諾,如果還要繼續搞鬥智拚角力,那就根本沒有簽署的基本條件了。最重要的,與其說是簽署和平協議,不如說是締造一個可以簽署和平協議的兩岸環境。難就難在經營出這樣的一個良性環境,一旦達成,不要說和平協議水到渠成,即使沒有協議,和平也已經獲致了實質的存在。

那樣的一天會不會來臨呢?這不應該是個問題,而應該是一個目標:我們要如何創造出那一天。把這樣重要的國家未來課題拋給未知,消極坐待情勢演變,是不對、也是對自己不負責任的。

如果以現在的兩岸態勢來思考,也許覺得難如登天,但看看現在兩岸社會發展的狀況,以及中國大陸面對的開放風潮,十年之內,無論在各自內部及彼此交流上,都一定會有很大的變化。

馬總統表示,在未來的十年當中,政府要繼續鞏固中華民國的主權,壯大台灣的實力,引領兩岸的關係良性發展,建構台海長期和平穩定。「雙方互不承認主權,但互不否認治權」,希望循序推動兩岸互設辦事的機構。並且要發揚台灣核心價值,就是自由、民主、人權、法治;不論是兩岸當局的互動或是人民的互動,都希望這些核心價值能逐漸變成雙方的共識。

的確,一個穩定的和平環境,將有助於兩岸持續的蓬勃交流;而隨著交流,台灣作為中華民族另一種發展模式與生活方式,可以對中國民眾帶來新的想像。比軍力,台灣也許贏不了中國;但比起人的價值所得到的尊重,台灣確實有值得驕傲的地方。兩岸和平交流的時間愈長,台灣就愈有機會看見中國社會出現良性進化,這不只是給台灣機會,更是給中國、給整個民族機會。

說到底,對人民福祉有利,才是兩岸政府最重要的責任。和平互利,放下政治對立,回歸人民利益,以兩岸的智慧與勇氣,共同創造和平繁榮的未來,是兩岸都需要開始積極思考的課題。

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Cross-Strait Peace Agreement is No [Immediate] Reunification, No Independence, No Use of Force

Cross-Strait Peace Agreement is No [Immediate] Reunification, No Independence, No Use of Force
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2011

Summary: Yesterday President Ma Ying-jeou boldly set forth a proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement. This is an explosive issue that could transform the election into a vote of confidence in the president, and whether he should sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. How will the DPP respond to President Ma's peace agreement? It should think before reacting. It should reconsider its blind opposition to ECFA. It should consider how it painted itself into a corner, It should think about sparing itself any further embarrassment.

Full Text Below:

Yesterday President Ma Ying-jeou boldly set forth a proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement. This is an explosive issue that could transform the election into a vote of confidence in the president, and whether he should sign a cross-Strait peace agreement.

This issue is highly sensitive and potentially explosive. Probably few people ever imagined President Ma would include such a sensitive and explosive plank in his campaign platform, After all, the potential backlash is difficult to gauge. But President Ma had the audacity to include the "golden decade" plank in his campaign platform. This shows his confidence in his campaign platform, It shows his confidence in public opinion. Objectively speaking, the measured promotion of a cross-Strait peace agreement is the very least a future Republic of China presidential candidate should promise the nation, It is the best and most essential policy contribution a future president can make.

The real meaning of the peace agreement is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It rejects Taiwan independence. Its theme is peaceful development. In fact the peace agreement is merely "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" written into law. This newspaper has long argued that the two sides should sign a peace agreement, as either an ultimate solution or interim solution.

For Taipei, a peace agreement would diminish the pressure to embark on immediate reunification. For Beijing, a peace agreement would help resolve internal disagreements over how to cope with Taiwan independence. Conversely, for Beijng, a peace agreement would extricate it from the "reunification quagmire." For Taipei, a peace agreement would diminish internal frictions over Taiwan independence. Both sides would benefit from a long term framework for peaceful development. It would be a mutally beneficial, win/win situation.

Over the past three years, authorities on both sides have taken full advantage of the opportunity provided by the outcome of the 2008 presidential election. They have dedicated themselves to cross-strait peaceful development. But the current election is having a negative impact. Tsai Ing-wen says she does not recognize the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. James Soong and Lee Teng-hui are singing a duet, saying "Topple Ma, Protect Taiwan." The fruit of three years of blood, sweat, and tears could be destroyed overnight. The cross-Strait status quo is to vulnerable to unpredictable political developments on Taiwan. This shows how much. The past three years of peaceful development are a pocket filled with gold coins. All it takes is a single hole, and no matter how many more coins one adds to one's pocket, they will all fall through the hole.

If we want to accumulate more gold coins, i.e., promote peace, we must stitch the hole in the pocket. The needle and thread that will stitch the hole is the peace agreement. Only a peace agreement will enable the two sides to accumulate more gold coins. Only "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use force" will enable the two sides to promote peace. Only a peace agreement will ensure that the fruits of peaceful development are preserved, and not lost to the vagaries of a presidential election.

From another perspective, a peace agreement is more than "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force," written into law. It is "one China, different interpretations," written into law. This newspaper has long held that any peace agreement requires the two sides to recognize each other as both combatants and peace signatories. Therefore they should sign the treaty in their capacity as "President of the Republic of China" and "President of the Peoples Republic of China." After the agreement is signed, cabinet-level officials on both sides can establish a permanent "cross-strait peaceful development conference" framework. Such a peace agreement would write "one China, different interpretations" into law.

Such an agreement is in the interest of both parties. There is no better ultimate or interim solution than the aforementioned peace agreement. The public on Taiwan has endured 60 years of cross-Strait turbulence. President Ma is now offering a peace agreement, Most people should favor it, The only possible criticisms are that "Beijing may not agree to it," or "It may not be feasible." Will Beijing agree to it? Actually a peace agreement is is one of the highest priorities in "Hu Jintao's Six Point Proposal." Beijing has no reason to refuse or reject President Ma's proposal. Is it feasible? It will be if people on Taiwan are sufficiently united. We must insist on such terms as "combatants" and "peace signatories." This will ensure that negotiators for our side have sufficient maneuvering room.

In sum, the key to President Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform is the peace agreement. To make such a daring proposal during a presidential reelection campaign was a risky move. It was a show of political responsibility, political vision, and political courage. President Ma has elevated the importance of this election. It is now a vote of confidence in Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait peace agreement. On the one hand, he is appealing to the electorate, On the other hand he is asking Beijing to follow his lead. If he wins the election on this basis, he will be in a position to advance cross-Strait relations, and move it into previously uncharted territory. He will be in a position to turn "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force," into the law of the land. Conversely, if he is unsuccessful and loses, he will have to answer to history. The outcome will be determined by the electorate.

How will the DPP respond to President Ma's peace agreement? It should think before reacting. It should reconsider its blind opposition to ECFA. It should consider how it painted itself into a corner, It should think about sparing itself any further embarrassment.

兩岸和平協議就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.10.18 02:29 am

馬總統昨在「黃金十年」兩岸篇提出的爆炸性議題,可能使這次總統大選成為「是否審酌推動兩岸商簽和平協議」的信任投票。

此一議題極為敏感,且具高度的爆炸性,恐怕很少人會想到馬總統居然會以此為大選政見,因為畢竟不易估量其後座力;但馬總統竟在其「黃金十年」政綱中提出,足見其對此一政見具有自信,亦對民意深具信心。因為,客觀而論,「審酌推動兩岸商簽和平協議」,應是未來任何中華民國總統所能為台灣做的最正確、最有利,也是最必要的政策貢獻。

「和平協議」的實質意義就是:不統、不獨、不武。它不是統一(不統),也排除了台獨(不獨),和平發展尤為基調(不武);其實「和平協議」就是「不統/不獨/不武」的法制化與固定化。因此,本報社論一向主張兩岸應當簽訂「和平協議」;無論作為「終極方案」或「中程方案」皆可。

台北得以「和平協議」來迴避或減低統一的壓力,北京則得以「和平協議」化解台獨的爭議;反過來說,大陸方面得以「和平協議」而免於困在「統一的陷阱」;台灣方面則可藉「和平協議」降低內部受台獨撕裂的痛苦與消耗。這將使兩岸皆可獲得一可大可久的「和平發展」架構,可謂是對大陸及台灣兩利的局面。

三年來,兩岸當局利用「二○○八機遇」為兩岸「和平發展」作了極多且極大的努力;但經過此次大選的衝擊,出現蔡英文「否定九二共識/一中各表」,及宋楚瑜與李登輝合唱「倒馬保台」,竟使三年來的心血努力可能毀於一旦。由此可見台灣政情的莫測與兩岸現狀的脆弱,這好比兩岸三年來一同朝一只口袋裡放了許多和平金幣,但詎料這只口袋竟有一個破洞,即使放了再多的金幣,也可能從破洞漏掉。

若欲積蓄兩岸的「和平金幣」,就要縫補這只破口袋;而縫補的針線,就是「和平協議」。也唯有「和平協議」能使兩岸能在「不統/不獨/不武」的口袋中,繼續積蓄「和平金幣」,使每一分努力皆可望保住,不致因一次意外的總統大選而流失。

從另一角度看,「和平協議」非但是「不統/不獨/不武」的法制化與固定化;亦應當是「一中各表」的法制化與固定化。本報社論過去一再申論,「和平協議」的前提是兩岸必須相互承認為「交戰主體」及「議和主體」;亦即簽署者應為「中華民國總統」及「中華人民共和國主席」,簽約後並由雙邊內閣層次建立「兩岸和平發展會議」之類的機制,作為常設的運作機構。倘係如此,「和平協議」自是「一中各表」的法制化與固定化。

我們認為,對於兩岸的各自利害而論,皆不可能再有比前述「和平協議」更佳的終極方案或中程方案。台灣民眾經歷六十餘年心知肚明的兩岸動盪,對於馬總統在此時提出「和平協議」的方案,應當以同情及同意者居多,唯一可挑剔者則是「北京未必同意」或「未必做得到」。先談「北京未必同意」,其實「和平協議」本是「胡六點」的重中之重,北京對馬總統的提議沒有拒絕或否決的理由。再談「未必做得到」,則只要台灣民眾夠團結,例如在「議和主體」及「簽署者落款」方面共同堅持,則進退之間自可操持主動且操之在我。

歸納而言,馬總統在選戰方殷之際提出「和平協議」的關鍵政見,頂冒選舉失利的風險,應可視為極負責任與極具遠見及魄力的表現。馬總統應可將此次大選升高為「兩岸商簽和平協議」的信任投票,一者訴諸選民,一者引導北京。如果因此而贏得選舉,即可能將兩岸關係帶向「不統/不獨/不武」法制化的新境界;反之,倘若因此敗北落選,自己亦已可向歷史交代,一切交由國人共同承當。

至於民進黨如何因應馬總統的「和平協議」?勿再盲動,且先想一想反ECFA竟反到作繭自縛、無地自容的窘態吧!

Monday, October 17, 2011

Su Jia-chyuan's Plight: The Consequence of His Corruption in Pingtung County

Su Jia-chyuan's Plight:
The Consequence of His Corruption in Pingtung County
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 17, 2011

Summary: The DPP boasts of its contribution to Taiwan's democracy. But whenever it runs into trouble with the law, it immediately adopts an entirely different set of standards. It pretends that democracy does not require the rule of law. In recent months people have gotten a good look at the Su Jia-chyuan family. They have gotten a good look at the violations of law and abuses of power the Su family committed in Pingtung. The Su family's brazenness is mind-boggling. Yet the Pingtung County Government did nothing. For years, it covered up Su family crimes. To the Pingtung County Government, the rule of law and public authority are meaningless. This is merely the most obvious example.

Full Text Below:

The DPP boasts of its contribution to Taiwan's democracy. But whenever it runs into trouble with the law, it immediately adopts an entirely different set of standards. It pretends that democracy does not require the rule of law. In recent months people have gotten a good look at the Su Jia-chyuan family. They have gotten a good look at the violations of law and abuses of power the Su family committed in Pingtung. The Su family's brazenness was mind-boggling. Yet the Pingtung County Government did nothing. For years, it covered up Su family crimes. To the Pingtung County Government, the rule of law and public authority are meaningless. This is merely the most obvious example.

The Su Jia-chyuan luxury farmhouse scandal has been in the news for over a month. During this period, Pingtung County officials vigorously defended Su Jia-chyuan. They ignored outside doubts and official Council of Agriculture case files, They stonewalled, hoping the problem would go away. The most absurd development occurred when outsiders learned that the Su family had constructed an illegal metal shed in Pingtung City. The Su family hired workers and had it demolished it, virtually overnight. The Su family has been under investigation for tax evasion for years. When the National Tax Administration Bureau Chief in Pingtung City heard what the Su family had done, he laughed aloud and said: "If the crime scene has been demolished, and the previous tenant cannot be found, we can hardly prosecute." Bureaucrats are contemptible. But are there any bureaucrats more contemptible than this?

This metal shed in the downtown area was constructed by Su Jia-chyuan when he first became Pingtung County Chief. Over the past ten years or so, it has shown up sporadically on Control Yuan property declaration records. Not only was it constructed in Pingtung City, it was rented out to incense sellers. The Pingtung County Government watched as this metal shed repeatedly underwent changes. It repeatedly turned a blind eye. Where was the law? Neighbors knew this shop was being leased to others by Su's wife, Hung Heng-chu. Recently the media has published graphic details explaining the ins and outs of the case. Yet National Tax Administration officials lied through their teeth. They said "no crime scene, no prosecution." Are the officials who wield public authority merely asleep at the wheel? Or are they involved in some sort of quid pro quo?

Pingtung City officials say no one in the past ever reported the metal shed. Therefore they never checked the records. But do building officials act only when someone reports illegal construction? Aren't building officials expected to use their own initiative? Besides, Su Jia-chyuan's luxury farmhouse was reported repeatedly by members of the public over the years. But the Pingtung County Government merely issued fines and went through the motions. For years it helped him cover up his illegal behavior. It never urged him to do the right thing. County Chief Tsao Chi-hung lashed back at the COA. Had he devoted his time and energy to enforcing the law, the farmhouse would not be the focus of current public attention. It would not have become a sore spot for the DPP and for Su Jia-chyuan.

Back then Wu Tse-yuan and Cheng Tai-chi, working together, changed Pingtung. People referred to Pingtung as a "county ruled by gangsters." When Su Jia-chyuan took office, he put on an impressive show about cleaning up Pingtung County and ridding it of its stigma. As a result, Tsai Ying-wen and Su Jia-chyuan, two members of the political elite from Pingtung, eventually joined hands in their quest for higher office. They demonstrated their southern Taiwan charisma. Who knew it would lead to today's scenario? Su Jia-chyuan's corrupt rule in Pingtung involved not merely illegal conduct and material greed. It involved the abuse of power and the bullying of the weak. Pingtung was once a "county ruled by gangsters." It has now become a "county ruled by tyrants." Does the DPP still care to explain how much progress democracy has made under DPP rule?

People speak of Taiwan's "North-South gap." Su Jia-chyuan's example shows people how little the rule of law means in Pingtung. It is something people in the north cannot imagine. Just imagine. A private cemetery could be built on public land, Public grazing land could be paved with concrete and rented out as night market stalls. The stalls could be hooked up to electrical power restricted for agricultural use. A metal shed could be constructed on urban land. The owner could flagrantly evade property taxes. Compared to this, a luxury mansion built on agricultural land is probably nothing to the Pingtung County Government. The officials exploiting these gray areas include former Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Agriculture officials who were members of the cabinet. Who would dare to defy these members of the nomenklatura? Su Jia-chyuan felt he had nothing to fear during the current scandal. The main reason was that these violations of the law were raised previously, but the scandal had already blown over. Su assumed he was "home safe." He miscalculated. This time he was a vice presidential candidate, subject to scrutiny under national standards, and not just Pingtung standards. This was another kind of North-South gap.

For years Pingtung has served as an important base for the Green Camp. The entire nation has been been given the chance to see what the Green Camp has been doing there. This is refreshing indeed. The Su Jia-chyuan scandal has stunned the public. It has allowed them to see another side of Pingtung. It has allowed them to see widespread political favoritism and indifference toward the rule of law. Pingtung is a major agricultural county. Its officials sat back and watched the wanton destruction of its farmland, water, and soil. Major flooding in recent years probably bears a relation to this.

Lest we forget, Su Jia-chyuan may have dismantled his metal shed, but his luxury mansion still stands. Will the Pingtung County Government classify the kumquat seedlings planted by Su Jia-chyuan family workers as "agricultural crops," and legalize his luxury mansion with the stroke of a pen?

蘇嘉全今日是歷任屏東縣府造成
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.10.17

民進黨一向喜愛誇稱台灣民主有多進步,但當自己遇上法治問題時,他們立刻換上另一套標準,彷彿民主不需要法治的支撐。近月來,人們看到蘇嘉全家族在屏東的種種違法、濫權行徑,膽大妄為到匪夷所思的地步;而屏東縣府多年來竟一路縱容、坐視和包庇,視法令和公權力如無物。這即是最明顯的例子。

蘇嘉全的豪華農舍風波沸沸揚揚超過一個月,這段期間,屏東縣府官員除了極力為蘇嘉全辯護,對外界的質疑和農委會的公文均不理會,以拖待變。最荒謬的是,蘇家在屏東的鐵皮屋被揭發是大違建後,連夜自行僱工拆得一乾二淨;對於其間涉及逃漏稅多年的問題,國稅局屏東分局長聽說現場已拆光,竟喜不自勝地說:「如果沒有現場,又找不到過去承租人,就無法追了。」官僚之顢頇可鄙,還有更甚於此的嗎?

這座鬧區鐵皮屋,在蘇嘉全就任屏東縣長之初即已興建,十多年來,在監察院的財產申報紀錄上忽隱忽現;但它在屏東市區不僅實體存在,還出租給他人經營香鋪。十多年來,屏東縣府眼睜睜看著這座鐵皮屋在那裡不斷變身,卻始終視若無睹;這是什麼法治?再說,街坊鄰居都知道這間店鋪是洪恆珠租予他人,近日媒體報導也都有圖文詳述來龍去脈;國稅局官員卻睜著眼睛說瞎話,說「沒現場就無法追」;國家公權力是讓官員抱著睡覺?還是用來交換利益的?

屏東市官員說,過去一直沒人「檢舉」這座鐵皮屋,因此從無查報紀錄。但違建的認定,難道只是以檢舉為要件,建設官員都不必主動出擊嗎?再說,蘇嘉全老家的豪華農舍,多年來不是一再經人檢舉嗎?但屏東縣府除了開出一張罰單,完成行政的虛應故事後,這麼多年來一直在幫他遮掩圓謊,並未督促他改善。事實上,縣長曹啟鴻如果把他反嗆農委會的時間和精力拿來落實執行,這座農舍何致被追打不休,成為蘇嘉全及民進黨的痛腳?

當年屏東因為伍澤元和鄭太吉變調的合作,被譏為「黑道治縣」;蘇嘉全上任後,施展作為洗刷屏東汙名,一度讓人刮目相看。也因此,蔡英文和蘇嘉全兩位出身屏東的菁英聯手角逐大位,得以一展南台魅力。誰知,今天布幕逐一揭開,蘇嘉全經營屏東的真相卻是臭不可聞,除了違法、貪婪,還充滿濫權、欺壓的情節。屏東從過去的「黑道治縣」,變成今天的「白道治縣」,在民主里程上究竟有多少進境,請民進黨好好向選民解釋一番吧!

要談台灣的「南北差距」,從這次蘇嘉全的例子,人們看到了屏東法治的鬆弛狀態,那是北部人無法想像的事。試想,既然私人墓園可以蓋到公有土地上,既然農牧地可以鋪上水泥經營夜市收租、卻還接上農用電力,既然市區土地可以公然興建違建鐵皮屋還漏稅出租;那麼,在屏東縣府眼中,在農地上興建豪宅,恐怕真算不上什麼了不起的罪惡。更何況,在這些灰黑色地帶遊走的,是一個曾任內政、農業兩部的內閣大臣,誰敢動這樣穿了朝服的「白道」?這次風波,蘇嘉全之所以表現得有恃無恐,主要是這些違法情事先前在地方已被炒過一回,他自認已「安然過關」;唯一失算的是,他這次選的是副總統,他必須接受全國民眾以有別於屏東的標準重新檢驗。那又是另一種南北差距。

這些年,屏東作為綠營的重要基地,確有讓全國耳目一新的發展及能見度。但從這次蘇家風波,人們也愕然驚見屏東的另一面,包括嚴重的行政偏袒不中立和與法治的不作為,作為農業大縣卻坐視農田及水土任意破壞。近年屏東多次大淹水,恐怕與此不無關係。

更別忘了,蘇嘉全拆了鐵皮屋,但他的豪宅都還昂然矗立在那裡。屏東縣府該不會認定蘇家僱工趕種的金桔苗即等於「有耕作事實」,就大筆一揮認定為合法了吧?

Thursday, October 13, 2011

Heavy Sentence: Chen Shui-bian Profited from his Position as President

Heavy Sentence: Chen Shui-bian Profited from his Position as President
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2011

Summary: The High Court has delivered its second instance verdict in the Chen family "Second Financial Reform" corruption and bribery scandal. It overturned the Not Guilty verdict rendered by the Full Court of the Taipei District Court presided over by Chou Chan-chun. It ruled that Chen Shui-bian abused the power of the presidency to extort money from the financial industry. It found Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng and other accomplices guilty of corruption and imposed stiff sentences upon them.

Full Text Below:

The High Court has delivered its second instance verdict in the Chen family "Second Financial Reform" corruption and bribery scandal. It overturned the Not Guilty verdict rendered by the Full Court of the Taipei District Court presided over by Chou Chan-chun. It ruled that Chen Shui-bian abused the power of the presidency to extort money from the financial industry. It found Ah-Bian, Ah-Cheng and other accomplices guilty of corruption and imposed stiff sentences upon them.

The court of the second instance found that while Chen Shui-bian was Republic of China President, he "abused his power to amass wealth. He treated the office of the president as a tool for conferring political advantages in exchange for cash payments from wealthy conglomerates." He "betrayed the public trust. Nothing could be worse than that." Addressing Wu Shu-cheng's corruption, the court said she "secretly colluded with industry heads, abused political power, exceeded her authority, and accepted bribes from businesses. Hundreds of millions of dollars came and went. The presidential palace was turned into a trading center." This is what the public collectively witnessed during the trial. This is what Chou Chan-chun conceded took place. Yet, incredibly, Chou Chan-chun handed down a Not Guilty verdict. Fortunately, the court of second instance was around to remedy Chou's travesty of justice.

Chou Chan-chun ruled that the "Second Financial Reforms" were not constitutionally mandated presidential powers. Chou ruled that the vast sum of 500 million dollars was comprised entirely of campaign contributions, Chou ruled that when the president pocketed the money, his conduct bore no relation to his presidential duties. Therefore he was not guilty of political corruption. His ruling was so mind-boggling it provoked a nationwide uproar. Soon afterwards, the High Court handed down another ruling on the Chen family corruption scandal. It adopted an entirely different view than Chou Chan-chun regarding the conduct of the president, It soon became clear that once the "Second Financial Reform" scandal was reviewed by the court of second instance, Chou Chan-chun's ruling would be overturned.

The Supreme Court and the High Court both ruled that as long as the president's conduct bears a relationship to his official duties, it is substantially affected by his official position. Therefore it amounts to job related conduct. The High Court further pointed out that seven constitutional amendments have been passed and presidential powers have been steadily expanded. Constitutional Interpretation No. 520 states that the President has the right to appoint and remove the Premier. Constitutional Interpretation No. 61 interprets and explains the powers of the executive, from top to bottom. Furthermore, when Chen Shui-bian was president, the Chen family was implicated in four scandals, including the Longtan Land Purchase scandal, and the Diana Chen scandal. During a television interview, Chen himself declared that the president has substantial authority to formulate Executive Yuan policy and make personnel appointments. Therefore the "Second Financial Reform" was well within the purview of the president, Chen Shui-bian took advantage of his official position to extort and receive bribes. Of course this qualifies as job related conduct.

Chou Chan-chun's ruling was utterly divorces from reality in other ways. Chen Shui-bian extorted 500 million dollars from Cathay Financial Holdings and the Yuanta Ma family. Chou ruled that the entire sum was campaign contributions. But during the second instance trial the High Court found that Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Hung-tu reached a bribe agreement in May 2002. The High Court found that later Chen Shui-bian abused his official powers to help Cathay Financial Holdings acquire United Bank. In September 2002, October 2003, and September, 2004, Chen demanded and received 100 million dollars in bribes from Tsai Hung-tu. On two occasions Ma Yung-cheng went to Tsai Hung-tu's home to obtain the bribes. On the remaining occasion Tsai Cheng-yu visited the presidential mansion and delivered the money to Wu Shu-cheng. This 300 million bore a direct relationship to Chen Shui-bian's official position. Chen Shui-bian argued that Tsai Hung-tu's 300 million dollars were campaign contributions, His claim was less than credible.

While addressing the role of the Yuanta Ma family, the court ruled that Tu Li-ping told Ma Chi-ling that Wu Shu-cheng demanded 200 million dollars in bribes. Ma Chi-ling blurted out "This is a total rip-off!" But the Ma family paid up anyway, in exchange for Chen family assistance in acquiring Fuhua. Therefore the High Court determined that Chen family claims that the funds were merely campaign contributions were simply not credible.

The High Court found Chen Shui-bian guilty of corruption and money laundering. It sentenced him to 18 years in prison and fined him 180 million dollars. It ruled that 500 million dollars in illicit gains amassed via corruption must be recovered and confiscated. It found Wu Shu-cheng guilty in the Yuanta Ma family scandal and sentenced her to 11 years in prison, It fined her 120 million dollars. She and Chen Shui-bian will have 200 million dollars confiscated from them. Other accomplices will also be prosecuted. Chen Shui-bian will have to serve a lengthy sentence. But no matter what sentence Wu Shu-chen receives, she is unlikely to actually serve any real time. Attempts to recover the money from the Chen family will probably be unsuccessful. Therefore, although the court has imposed a heavy sentence, the real world impact will be light. All it will do is proclaim to the nation that justice has been served.

Chen Shui-bian has the right to appeal the High Court ruling, Therefore we are still a long way from the final verdict. We saw Chou Chan-chun's ruling overturned by the High Court. We saw the courts perform a complete about face. Different level courts arrived at different opinions. Some of the opinions reflect the opinions of some officials within the justice system. Some of the opinions reflect the feelings of the public and their common sense understanding of the law, This goes without saying. But the reversals generated controversy and confusion. They blurred the standards of right and wrong. We sincerely hope, that in future cases that attract public attention, justice can prevail.

重判理由:陳水扁藉總統職務牟利
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.10.14

扁家二次金改弊案,台灣高等法院二審宣判,徹底推翻了台北地方法院周占春合議庭的無罪見解,認定陳水扁向金融界索賄乃總統職務上受賄,將扁珍及相關人員以貪汙罪判處重刑。

二審判決指出:陳水扁擔任中華民國總統,卻「以權生錢,將總統職務上行為作為牟利工具,換取財團金錢之支付」,「背棄民意,莫此為甚」。在論及吳淑珍時則說:「與企業主私相來往,操弄權勢,失所分際,且收受企業給款,億來億去……,一時總統官邸宛如金融交易中心。」以上皆是國人透過審判共見的情狀,其實亦是周占春大體認定之事實;但周占春竟能判為無罪,今幸有二審予以匡正。

周占春的判決見解,認為二次金改非總統憲法上列舉的職權,所收五億巨款全部是政治獻金,而認定總統拿錢非職務上行為,不能治以貪汙罪;如此脫離現實的判決一出,舉國譁然。但不久之後,最高法院另就扁家四大弊案作出判決,關於總統職務上行為,採取了與周占春截然不同的見解,當時已可預見二次金改弊案上訴至二審,周占春的見解必遭推翻。

最高法院與高等法院皆認為,只要總統的行為與其職務具有關連性,實質上為該職務影響力所及,就算是職務上行為。高等法院二審判決更進一步指出,歷經七次修憲,總統職權不斷擴大,釋字五二○號解釋說明總統藉任免行政院長之權而得以推行政見,釋字六一三號解釋又說明行政權上下一體;況且,陳水扁擔任總統期間,就扁家四大弊案之中的龍潭購地案、陳敏薰案,接受電視台專訪時,自己也表示,總統對於行政院各部會政策及人事均具有實質決定權。因此,二次金改當然為總統職務影響力所及,陳水扁藉此索賄、受賄,當然是職務上行為。

周占春另一個脫離實際的看法,是將陳水扁向國泰金控蔡宏圖和元大馬家索取的共計五億元巨款,全部都認定是政治獻金。但高等法院在二審判決中指出,陳水扁與蔡宏圖於九十一年五月間就達成期約賄賂的協議;之後,陳水扁以其職務上行為協助國泰金控合併世華銀行,再於九十一年九月,九十二年十月,九十三年九月,各向蔡宏圖要求並收受各一億元賄賂,兩次由馬永成前往蔡宏圖住處取款,一次由蔡鎮宇持往總統官邸交付吳淑珍。這三億元與陳水扁職務上行為具對價關係,陳水扁辯稱蔡宏圖所交付之三億元係政治獻金,不足採信。

至於元大馬家的部分,判決指出,杜麗萍將吳淑珍索討二億元賄款之意轉達予馬志玲、馬維建、馬維辰等人,馬志玲當場曾脫口而出「這簡直是在敲竹槓」;但馬家仍決定給付,以換得扁家的協助,合併復華。因此,高等法院認為,政治獻金的說詞根本不可採信。

高院判處陳水扁貪汙、洗錢等共應執行有期徒刑十八年,併科一億八千萬元罰金,貪汙所得五億元應追繳沒收。吳淑珍也就共犯元大馬家部分判處十一年,併科一億兩百萬元罰金,與陳水扁連帶追繳沒收二億元。其他一干人犯當然也各判刑。不過,陳水扁固將長期服刑,但吳淑珍判多少刑都是白判,且追繳扁家的錢恐怕也不會順利;因此,法院雖判重刑,實質上能執行的部分不多,只能算是召告國人,宣示正義。

高院判決之後,陳水扁有權上訴,因此距判決確定還有一段長路要走。只是在這段實現司法正義的過程中,我們看到了由周占春到高等法院的判決大轉彎,見解大轉折。兩個審級的見解,何者與多數司法人員的看法相同,何者更貼近一般國民的常識和法律感情,相信不言可喻。但轉折的過程,仍然帶來社會的爭議和紛擾,模糊了是非的標準和價值的判斷。就此而言,我們懇切期望,未來眾所矚目的官箴大案,皆能表現出這個國家的公理是非。