Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Mainland Establishes Sansha City in the South China Sea, Japan to "Buy Diaoyutai"

Mainland Establishes Sansha City in the South China Sea, Japan to "Buy Diaoyutai"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2012


Summary: The situation in the South China Sea and Diaoyutai is strange and turbulent. It is hard to tell whether one is at peace or at war. The biggest variable is Beijing. This enables Taipei to remain silent. But if the situation explodes, Taipei's position and its relationship with Beijing could become a major issue. Taipei has become the springboard for expressions of sovereignty on the Diaoyutai Islands, At any moment it could be caught up in the dispute. The above disputes now endanger national security. The ruling and opposition parties must not take the matter lightly.

Full Text below:

Mainland China recently established Sansha City in the South China Sea, to preside over Xisha Island, Dongsha Island, and Nansha Island. The jurisdiction of Sansha City was upgraded to the division level. Administratively this means little. Politically this means a lot. Not long ago Vietnam approved the Law of the Sea. It claimed the Xisha and Nansha Islands as part of its sovereign territory. It established an administrative region. The Mainland is merely reacting. Nothing more. 

The dispute between several Southeast Asian countries and Mainland China over sovereignty in the South China Sea is already burning white-hot. Recently fishing boats from Vietnam and the Philippines  clashed with fishing boats from Mainland China. Diplomatic disputes erupted during the Asia-Pacific foreign ministers' meeting. Tensions ran high.

Conflicts over the islands have led to complex interactions pertaining to sovereignty. The South China Sea is not unique. Many parts of the world have similar problems. Other regions have both peaceful negotiations and military solutions. But the South China Sea disputes have become the focus of world attention. This is due to the rise of China and the United States' return to Asia.

The United States recently announced its return to the Asia-Pacific region. Naturally this encouraged countries with South China Sea sovereignty disputes with Mainland China to take a hard line. They now refuse to compromise with Mainland China. they hope to the United States will chime in or even join the party. The U.S. may be happy with this development, but so far it has adopted a wait and see stance. Washington's stance on the South China Sea is to remain neutral, to not favor any particular party, to settle any disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, to safeguard freedom of navigation and aviation, and to support the creation of a Code of Conduct. The United States hopes to become the arbiter in the South China Sea and Asia-Pacific region. It does not want to be dragged into the fight by these countries.

The United States has a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. It has held joint exercises with the Philippines. It has even held a two plus two summit. But the Huangyan Island incident shows that the US is unwilling to commit to assisting the Philippines in the defense of Huangyan Island in the event of a conflict. The United States is unwilling to go to war with Mainland China over this uninhabited island. Reports are that when U.S. National Security Adviser Thomas E. Donilon visited Beijing, he made this clear.

Mainland China has also taken a hard line. It has made clear that if necessary, it will engage in another "Xisha Sea Battle." The establishment of the three municipalities drew a line in the sand, and expressed its determination.

Meanwhile the Japanese government and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government have threatened to "buy Diaoyutai." This dispute over the sovereignty of the waters is more complex than the South China Sea dispute. First of all, control in the East China Sea is not in Mainland China's hands. Japan's Coast Guard and Self Defense Force naval ships and aircraft have de facto control of Diaoyutai Island waters and airspace. Secondly, Japan is more powerful than the Southeast Asian countries. In an actual shooting war the People's Liberation Army would not necessarily prevail. Finally, the United States Japan Security Treaty includes the Diaoyutai Islands. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to this treaty.

Japan and China have historical grievances. Their relationship is more complicated than the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. Past Japanese administrations have carefully avoided the Yakasuni Shrine and history textbook issues. But current Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda's approval ratings are down. To divert attention from his own administration's problems, he has echoed Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara's call. He has proposed "buying the Diaoyutai Islands" and making them Japanese government property. When responding to questions in the Diet last week he said if other countries invade the Diaoyutai Islands, "Japan will consider dispatching its Self-Defense Forces." This was of course a response to recent tough statements by Mainland China.

The East China Sea situation is tense. But the US, Mainland China, and Japan are closely matched in strength. Therefore they will avoid military conflict. The South China Sea situation is unclear. If one misjudges the situation, one could ignite a powderkeg. This makes it even more dangerous.

The South China Sea situation is dangerous. Many people are calling for a halt to the incitement of nationalistic sentiments. Each of the nations should be realistic and shelve the issue of sovereignty. They should lower the temperature. They should consider joint development and resource sharing. Several governments are exploring the region. Taipei is not among them. It has been marginalized.

Taiping Island is the largest island in the South China Sea. The Republic of China has occupied it for over six decades. The island has runways and fresh water. It is strategically located. It is under the jurisdiction of Cijin District, Kaohsiung City. In recent years, South China Sea disputes have erupted, one after another. But no country or international forum has invited Taipei to participate in consultations. This is how matters stand. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have proposed "cross-Strait cooperation in defense of sovereignty." But for Taipei, such moves could cause more problems than they solve. It must be extra cautious.

The situation is strange and turbulent. It is hard to tell whether one is at peace or at war. The biggest variable is Beijing. This enables Taipei to remain silent. But if the situation explodes, Taipei's position and its relationship with Beijing could become a major issue. Taipei has become the springboard for expressions of sovereignty on the Diaoyutai Islands, At any moment it could be caught up in the dispute. The above disputes now endanger national security. The ruling and opposition parties must not take the matter lightly.

大陸設三沙市 日本買釣魚台
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.31

中國大陸日前在西沙、中沙、及南沙群島設立三沙市,下轄的三沙警備區亦提升為師級單位,此一動作的行政意義小,政治意義大;其實,早此一步,不久前越南也通過海洋法,將西沙南沙列為主權疆域,設立行政區,大陸只是反制而已。

東南亞各國與中國大陸間,為南中國海主權歸屬,已進入白熱化的爭執,近來越南、菲律賓分別與中國發生漁船衝突、外交糾紛,甚至在亞太外長會議的會場上,亦見劍拔弩張。

犬牙交錯的島嶼引發非常複雜的主權關係,並非南中國海所特有,世界上許多地方都有類似的問題;但其他地區或由和平協商,或經強力解決,卻很少像南中國海的紛爭這樣時常成為全球矚目的焦點。這與中國的崛起有關,也與美國重返亞洲有關。

美國宣布要重返亞太,這自然鼓舞了與中國有南海主權爭端的國家,強硬起來,拒絕與中國妥協;想要「作球」給美國,或引美國加入賽局。然而,美國雖樂觀其變,卻亦止於靜觀其變,華盛頓對南中國海的原則是:保持中立,不偏向任何一方;依照國際法和平解決爭端,維護航海航空自由權,支持達成行為準則。美國希望成為南海或者亞太地區的仲裁者,不願被這些國家拖下水。

從黃岩島事件可以看出,美國雖與菲律賓有共同防禦條約,也與菲律賓聯合演習,甚至召開二加二的高層會議,但對黃岩島可能衍發的衝突,卻不願意承諾協防;美國不會為了這個無人島,而不惜與中國開戰。據說,近日美國國家安全顧問多尼隆特地訪問北京,就特別清楚地表達了這一點。

中國方面則姿態強硬,已經擺明必要時可以再來一次「西沙海戰」,設立三沙市的意思,就是在劃定紅線,表達決心。

與此同時,日本政府及東京都政府皆揚言可能購買釣魚台列嶼,此一海域的主權爭議,其實比起南海問題要複雜許多。首先,東海控制權並不是在中國手中,日本海上警視廳與海上自衛隊的船艦與飛機,事實上控制著釣魚台附近海域與空域;其次,日本的戰力比東南亞國家強大許多,真要衝突起來,解放軍未必佔得了便宜;最後,美國與日本的共同防衛承諾包括釣魚台,美國近日也重申此項承諾。

日本與中國之間的歷史情結,也較中國與東南亞複雜許多。過去幾屆日本政府,都小心翼翼的避開靖國神社參拜、歷史教科書問題,但現任首相野田佳彥支持率低落,為了轉移焦點,呼應東京知事石原,提出要收購釣魚台群島為國有,且在上週國會答詢時,更表示如果釣魚台遭到別國違法侵犯時,「必要時日本將考慮出動自衛隊」,這當然是針對中國近來數度強硬宣示的回應。

然而,東海情勢雖然看起來緊張,但因為美中日三國實力相當,大家都會小心翼翼,避免軍事衝突;南海則狀況不明,誤判形勢,擦槍走火的機會不小,反而更為危險。

面對南海凶險,許多人都呼籲不要再對民族情緒搧風點火,各國應該實事求是的擱置主權,放下爭端,合作開發,資源共享,目前各國還在試探階段,但台灣卻無從參與,被邊緣化。

中華民國在南海領有最大的太平島超過六十年,島上有跑道、淡水,是戰略要地,隸屬高雄市旗津區管轄,近年來南海爭議迭起,但沒有國家或任何國際論壇邀請台灣參加協商。在這樣的情勢下,台海兩岸都有人提出「兩岸合作共同捍衛主權」的主張,但對台灣而言,此類主張所引發的新問題,可能比要解決的舊問題更多,恐應格外謹慎。

在詭譎動盪、和戰難定的情勢中,主要的變數是由中國大陸掌握,這使台灣可以不須表態;但在情勢萬一破裂之時,台灣自處的立場及與大陸的互動關係,即可能立即成為重大難題。尤其,台灣已成兩岸三地對釣魚台表態的跳板,隨時都可能捲入紛爭。凡此,皆已成為「不怕一萬,只怕萬一」的嚴峻國安課題,朝野不可掉以輕心。

Monday, July 30, 2012

ROC National Flag Taken Down on Regent Street: Su Tseng-chang "Protests"

ROC National Flag Taken Down on Regent Street: Su Tseng-chang "Protests"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2012

Summary: The Republic of China flag that was flying on London's Regent Street has been taken down. This reveals the plight of our national flag on the international stage. DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang spoke out on Facebook, saying "Those who love this country must fight for the dignity of its flag." This reveals the plight of our national flag in domesic disputes. Both provide food for thought.

Full Text below:

The Republic of China flag that was flying on London's Regent Street has been taken down. This reveals the plight of our national flag on the international stage. DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang spoke out on Facebook, saying "Those who love this country must fight for the dignity of its flag." This reveals the plight of our national flag in domesic disputes. Both provide food for thought.

The London Olympics have begun. Regent Street in downtown London is welcoming visitors. The flags of 206 participating countries line the street. The red, white, and blue flag of the Republic of China was among the flags fluttering in the breeze.

The flag flew there for three days. Republic of China citizens in the Taiwan Region were delighted but fearful. Sure enough, on the third day, their fears were confirmed. The flag was taken down. Instead, a "Chinese Taipei" Olympic Team flag was hung in its place.

The "Olympic Committee Model" is a sore spot for Republic of China citizens on Taiwan. It is also a cross-Strait time bomb. In the early years, Beijing's attitude was rude and unreasonable. It even denigrated the Republic of China flag when it was flown on Taiwan. In 2008, the Olympic torch was supposed to pass through Taiwan. But Beijing demanded that the Republic of China flag not appear along the route of the Olympic torch. Therefore the planned torch run fell through. Fortunately this led to a more rational reevaluation.

In 2009 the World Games in Kaohsiung encountered this problem. The parties reached a tacit agreement. Official events would follow the "Olympic Committee Model." But outside official venues the public would not be subject to controls or interference. Since then, on Taiwan and overseas, cross-Strait conflicts have seldom arisen over the presence of red. white, and blue ROC flags in the viewing stands. This development has been positive for cross-Strait relations, and should be affirmed.

Logically speaking, the hanging of flags on Regent Street was the responsibility of the neighborhood association. It was outside official Olympic venues. It was not put up by an official Olympic Committee entity. There should have been more latitude. Perhaps the flag was a little too eye-catching. As a result, the flag flew for only three days. This was an unfortunate development for cross-Strait relations.

The core issue for both sides is national identity. Beijing must realize that defending the flag of the Republic of China is an important part of defending a "one China, different interpretations" national identity. If the Mainland rejects the ROC national flag, it insults much of the public on Taiwan, for whom the flag is an object of reverence. Who benefits from this?

Therefore the Olympic Committee Model is best limited to official events. The 2009 World Games in Kaohsiung established a tacit understanding. Beijing should strive to abide by this understanding, in order to garner goodwill. It should avoid rubbing salt into this wound of the public on Taiwan.

Consider Su Tseng-chang's response on Facebook. He said "The ROC national flag is the symbol of the nation. Those who love this country must fight for the dignity of its flag. We must fight to ensure it a foothold."

Su Tseng-chang's words were astonishing. One netizen said "Didn't the DPP insist that only the [green and white]"yam flag" can be considered the national flag of the "Nation of Taiwan?" He said, "The DPP should display the ROC national flag at all official DPP events. Otherwise this Facebook posting is going to strike people as more than a little strange."

As everyone on Taiwan knows, Su Tseng-chang's declaration was indeed strange. The Democratic Progressive Party has long used the [green and white] "yam flag" to oppose the red, white, and blue ROC Flag. The "dang wai" movement began over 40 years ago. Since then the ROC national flag is almost never seen at DPP mass rallies. One could even say the fundamental problem with politics on Taiwan is that at DPP mass rallies one never sees a single ROC national flag.

That said, Su Tseng-chang's "defense of the flag" deserves recognition. Is the DPP truly in pain because the ROC national flag was taken down on Regent Street? If so, then why not hang the ROC national flag at DPP party headquarters? Why not fly the ROC national flag at DPP mass rallies?

The DPP is reevaluating its cross-Strait policy. It is time that the DPP reevaluated its position on national identity. Su Tseng-chang has issued his "defend the flag" statement. Hopefully this means the DPP intends to "come home to the Republic of China." Hopefully this means the DPP will defend the flag consistently.

Actually Taiwan's political problems have two causes. One, Beijing cannot tolerate the red, white, and blue ROC national flag. Two. The DPP also rejects the red, white, and blue ROC national flag. The removal of the ROC national flag on Regent Street rubbed salt into our wounds. This wound has not healed for decades. One of the main reasons is the DPP's relentless attempt to purge all traces of the Republic of China from the island, and its futile attempt to promote Taiwan independence.

Su Tseng-chang said we must seek dignity and seek a foothold for the Republic of China and the ROC national flag. If so, the public must first seek internal consensus. Everyone on Taiwan must defend the dignity of the ROC as a nation, and seek a place for the ROC national flag on the international stage. At the very least, the DPP must treat the ROC and the ROC national flag with dignity during DPP mass meetings.

The ROC national flag has been taken down on Regent Street. We protest Beijing's unreasonable and unwise attitude. Su Tseng-tsang has issued his "defend the flag" statement. We will now "listen to what he says, and watch what he does."

國旗故事:攝政街撤旗 蘇貞昌護旗
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.29

倫敦攝政街上原本掛出的一面中華民國國旗被撤去,民進黨主席蘇貞昌在臉書上主張「愛這個國家就要為這面國旗爭取尊嚴」;前者反映了國旗對外的處境,後者則顯現了國旗對內的糾葛,皆是發人深省。

倫敦奧運開幕。鬧區攝政街為迎接盛典,在街區懸掛二○六面參賽國家的國旗,中華民國青天白日滿地紅的國旗亦在其中,迎風招展。

國旗掛了三天,台灣人見到,又高興,又擔心;到了第三天,擔心的事還是發生了,國旗被移去,經交涉換上了「中華台北」的奧會團旗。

「奧會模式」是台灣之痛,也是兩岸的不定時炸彈。早年,北京對此的態度極盡蠻橫無理,連在台灣本地的看台上出現國旗也以惡形惡狀相向;二○○八年奧運聖火原本打算經過台灣,北京竟提出沿途不可見到國旗的主張,因此告吹,但亦因而觸發了較趨理性的思考。

二○○九年,高雄世運又面對這個問題。當時得到的各方默契是:大會程序按「奧會模式」進行,但在大會官方程序外,民眾持旗不受限制及干涉。自此以後,不論在台灣,或海外,已極少在看台上持青天白日滿地紅旗而發生兩岸衝突的情事;此一發展,對兩岸關係有正面意義,值得珍惜。

照理說,攝政街懸旗,由街區協會主持;既在奧會場外,更非奧會官方主事,此中應有可以緩衝的空間。但或許因目標太過醒目,國旗只掛了三天,這其實對兩岸而言皆是可惜之事。

兩岸的核心問題是在認同問題。北京應知,維持中華民國國旗,是維繫「一中各表」政治認同的重要憑藉;倘不此之圖,卻以傷害台灣人民對中華民國國旗的感情為能事,豈為得計?

因此,奧會模式仍以限於奧會官方程序為宜;二○○九年高雄世運建立的默契,北京應努力維持,以累積善意,勿三不五時在這台灣人最痛的傷口上撒鹽。

回過頭來看蘇貞昌對此事的回應。他在臉書說:「國旗是國家的象徵,愛這個國家就要為這面國旗爭取尊嚴、爭取立足空間。」

蘇貞昌的這一段言語,令人驚異。網友說:「民進黨不是說『地瓜旗』才是『台灣國』國旗嗎?」「最好以後民進黨的活動都要有國旗,不然這篇(臉書)文章顯得有點怪怪的。」

蘇貞昌的表態確實有點「怪怪的」。因為任人皆知,民進黨的一貫主張就是以「地瓜旗」對抗「青天白日滿地紅旗」;自「黨外」至建黨以後四十餘年來,在民進黨的群眾集會中幾乎未見一面國旗。其實,甚至可以這麼說,台灣政治的根本問題,可以歸結反映到只因民進黨的群眾集會中見不到一面國旗!

但是,蘇貞昌的「護旗宣言」,仍是值得肯定與期待的。倘若民進黨真正心痛在攝政街的一面國旗被撤去,何不把國旗掛回民進黨黨部?何不讓國旗飄揚在民進黨的群眾集會中?

民進黨正在進行兩岸政策的研議,這也是民進黨對國家認同重新整建的時機;希望蘇貞昌的「護旗宣言」,是民進黨「回歸中華民國」的一篇序言,不日就能讓國人見到其護旗護國一以貫之的全文。

其實,台灣的政治難題,始終是糾纏在北京容不下這一幅青天白日滿地紅旗,與民進黨也不願扛起這一幅青天白日滿地紅旗。攝政街的撤旗事件宛如被人傷口撒鹽;但這個幾十年來未曾癒合的大傷口,主要原因之一,卻是民進黨的「去中華民國化」及倡議台獨所造成。

如蘇貞昌所說,中華民國和中華民國國旗,若欲對外「爭取尊嚴、爭取立足空間」,則首先應在台灣內部爭取到全民共同護守的尊嚴與立足空間,至少應在民進黨的集會場合中爭到尊嚴與立足。

對於攝政街的撤旗事件,我們抗議北京的無理與不智;對於蘇貞昌的護旗宣示,我們聽其言,觀其行。

Thursday, July 26, 2012

U.S. Beef Imports: Classic DPP Political Farce

U.S. Beef Imports: Classic DPP Political Farce
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2012


Summary: Remember the U.S. beef imports farce. It reveals the true nature of the DPP. It enables one to understand the DPP's deceit. Because it is the one thing that never changes. Everything the DPP does is a variation on the U.S. beef imports farce. Our only question is, when will the DPP search its conscience and change its ways? When will it forsake its U.S. beef imports tactic and get serious about governing the nation?

Full Text below:

The U.S. beef imports bill has passed its third reading. Future generations must remember this farcical chapter in our political history. Otherwise, we will have learned nothing from the experience.

The U.S. beef imports farce began six years ago, with an absurd decision. In 2006, a number of people on the Chinese mainland died from Clenbuterol treated pork. The Chen Shui-bian government seized the opportunity to show that Taiwan's food safety was superior to Mainland China's. On his personal whim, he banned Ractopamine. As it turned out however, the people on the Mainland died from highly toxic Clenbuterol. The Chen Shui-bian government in its befuddlement, had banned Ractopamine treated U.S. beef imports. The government had never before banned U.S. beef imports. The Chen government took office in 2000. The public continued to ingest Ractopamine treated US beef for the next six years. The ban made no sense whatsoever. It merely created friction between Taipei and Washington. The Chen Shui-bian government responded to Washington. In 2007, it informed the World Trade Organization (WTO) that it was allowing the import of US beef, pork, and organ meats, on condition Ractopamine residues did not exceed 50 pbb. It also ordered quarantine agencies to "inspect pork but not beef." As a result, consumers on Taiwan ingested at least 100,000 tons of Ractopamine treated beef.

The DPP bent over backwards to abet the import of U.S. beef products. But as soon as it fell from power, it did a complete about face. It totally disowned its own policy. It now referred to U.S. beef as "poisoned beef." It now demanded a "zero tolerance" policy on Ractopamine. Eventually this farce reached its climax. The DPP staged a brute force, five day four night long occupation of the Legislative Yuan podium. It threatened to draw blood. It vowed to resist "poisoned beef." It swore to protect the lives of fellow citizens.

The U.S. beef imports bill passed its third reading on the 24th of this month. Suddenly we heard nothing more from the DPP about "shedding blood to resist poisoned beef." Suddenly, events took another turn. The United Nations Codex Alimentarius (CAC) voted on July 5. It set a 10 ppb limit on Ractopamine residues.

The DPP used this vote as a pretext to backpedal. Its behavior was ludicrous and shameless. First the DPP referred to U.S. beef as "poisoned beef." It demanded a "zero tolerance" policy. The DPP used the CAC vote to miraculously relabel "poisoned beef" as "approved beef." Suddenly the DPP no longer considered the 10 pbb approved by the CAC "poison." It no longer demanded a "zero tolerance" policy. Yet the day before, it denounced the 10 pbb called for by the KMT as "poison." It demanded a "zero tolerance" policy. The CAC has long been the EU livestock industry's political barricade against U.S. beef imports. The DPP knew this. It also knew Taipei's political situation. It knew we could not afford to play the same game as the EU. Suppose the CAC failed to arrive at a conclusion this year, just as it failed to arrive at any conclusion for the past four years? Would the DPP have occupied the Legislative Yuan podium in perpetuity?

The DPP has packed up its sleeping bags and decamped from legislature floor. It has abruptly changed its tune. It now says "The party has agreed to adopt international standards, and remain apace with the international community." The past six years have been a mockery. They have torn society apart. They have forced society to pay an inestimable social cost. In fact, the "international standards" were already in place. Over 100 countries and 300 million U.S. consumers already amounted to "international standards." The CAC standard was merely a belated reaffirmation of the existing standard. The entire process was a monumental charade. The real reason it occurred was that the DPP has no standards. For six long years, the DPP treated the public like idiots and played them for fools.

The U.S. beef imports issue is a classic example of DPP absurdity. ECFA is another. Between November 2nd and November 7th, 2008, ARATS President Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan. The DPP waved banners reading "Communist bandits, go home!" They launched a seven day long protest. They eventually occupied the lobby of a luxury hotel. Protestors outside threw Molotov cocktails, rocks, and even human excrement. They injured 164 police officers. Even the ambulances could not keep up. Since then, the DPP has continued to launch large scale demonstrations and protests, opposing direct links, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, and ECFA. It refers to these as "Trojan Horses," as "forfeiting sovereignty and demeaning the nation," as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." But when Tsai Ing-wen ran for president this year, she did a 180 degree about face. She declared that "The DPP accepts ECFA, in toto." She declared that "if the DPP returns to power, it will continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration." What was this, if not another U.S. beef imports farce?

First the DPP vowed to "shed blood resisting poisoned beef." Then it agreed to "accept international standards." First the DPP denounced ECFA as "pandering the [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Then it vowed to "continue the cross-Strait policy of the previous administration." First it drew blood from police officers in the streets of Taipei, in November 2008. Then it occupied the Legislative Yuan podium in June 2012 and held an impromptu slumber party on the Legislative Yuan floor. Why is the DPP able to insult the public's intelligence? Why is the public on Taiwan willing to tolerate such abuse from the DPP?

Actually, inconsistency and flip-flopping is part of the DPP's makeup. When it was in power, it sang the praises of the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant Project. When it found itself out of power, it reneged on everything it said. When it was in power, it supported the Number Four Nuclear Plant, and rushed to meet construction deadlines. When it found itself out of power, it sang the praises of a "nuclear-free homeland." When it was in power, it proclaimed the "Five Noes." When it found itself out of power, it changed its tune and spoke of "one country on each side." Every one of these is an iteration of the U.S. beef imports farce. Only the name of the play has changed. Only the scenery has changed. The plot is the same. If the DPP is not reneging on its word, then it is throwing up a smoke screen. Such is the nature of the DPP.

Remember the U.S. beef imports farce. It reveals the true nature of the DPP. It enables one to understand the DPP's deceit. Because it is the one thing that never changes. Everything the DPP does is a variation on the U.S. beef imports farce. Our only question is, when will the DPP search its conscience and change its ways? When will it forsake its U.S. beef imports tactic and get serious about governing the nation?

勿忘美牛案:台灣政治的荒謬經典
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.27

美牛案三讀通過。後人應當記取台灣政治史上極度荒謬的這一頁,否則台灣人的政治智慧將永遠不得長進。

美牛事件在六年前就是從一個荒謬決策開端的。二○○六年,中國大陸發生瘦肉精豬肉吃死人事件;扁政府為顯示台灣的飲食管理高於中國,遂心血來潮下令禁止瘦肉精。誰知在大陸吃死人的乃是劇毒的「克倫特羅」,扁政府卻糊裡糊塗地把美牛使用的「萊克多巴胺」也禁掉了;在此之前,台灣對美牛從未檢禁,亦即扁政府在二○○○年就任以後,當時的台灣人至少已吃了六年的萊劑美牛。然而,無厘頭的禁令既下,台美的摩擦及交涉即交錯發生;扁政府為回應美方,在二○○七年通告世貿組織(WTO),台灣將在萊劑殘留容許量五十pbb的標準下,開放牛肉、豬肉及內臟進口,且又通令檢疫單位「驗豬不驗牛」,因此至少又有十萬噸萊劑牛肉進了台灣人的胃囊。

如此這般為美牛護航放水的民進黨,至下野後,竟陡然翻臉不認人也不認帳,改口指美牛為「毒牛」,堅持萊劑「零檢出」;最後將這場荒謬劇推至最高潮的是,民進黨五天四夜霸占立院主席台,揚言不惜流血,誓死抵制毒牛,捍衛國民生命安全。

然而,美牛案於二十四日臨時會三讀,已經完全不見民進黨「流血抗毒牛」的瘋狂嘴臉。事態的轉折,緣於聯合國「國際食品法典委員會」(CAC)在七月五日票決,訂定萊劑殘留容許量為十pbb。

民進黨藉此下車,非但荒謬,而且無恥。首先,民進黨將美牛指為「毒牛」,堅持「零檢出」;但難道民進黨只憑CAC的票決,就可把「毒牛」改認「無毒」?又難道CAC主張的十pbb不是「毒」,不必「零檢出」;而國民黨版原本即主張的十pbb就是「毒」,就須「零檢出」?再者,CAC一向是歐盟畜牧業用以對抗美牛的政治槓桿,民進黨亦明知此事,也知以台灣的政治處境,絕無跟隨歐盟的條件;然則,倘若CAC今年仍像過去四年一樣對此沒有結論,民進黨難道仍要占著立院主席台到天長地久?

民進黨剛收拾起立院地板上的睡袋,忽又改口「本黨同意採取國際標準、與國際同步的立場」;這是何其荒謬的六年,撕裂了社會,付出了難以估計的社會成本!然而,「國際標準」其實早已存在,百餘美牛進口國及三億美國人皆是「國際標準」,CAC的「標準」反而是遲到的「標準」;這場翻天覆地的荒謬劇,最根本的原因其實是在民進黨完全沒有「標準」,把全體國人當作瘋子白癡而戲弄了整整六年!

美牛案是民進黨的荒謬經典,其實ECFA何嘗不也是異曲同工?二○○八年十一月二日至七日,海協會長陳雲林來訪,民進黨揮舞「共匪滾回去」的大纛,一連發動七天的抗爭;最後鬧到占據酒店大廳,在街頭丟汽油彈、石塊、排泄物,砸傷了一六四名員警,連救護車都不夠用。此後,民進黨又不斷發動巨型示威抗議,反直航,反陸客來台、反ECFA;謂這些皆是「木馬屠城」、「喪權辱國」、「傾中賣台」。然而,到了今年蔡英文競選總統,居然一百八十度改口稱「民進黨將對ECFA概括承受」,「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」。這豈不是另一個「美牛案」?

從「流血抗毒牛」,到「同意採取國際標準」;從ECFA「傾中賣台」,到「延續前朝兩岸政策」;從二○○八年十一月台北街頭的警察濺血,到二○一二年六月立法院地板上的立委睡袋。民進黨為何敢於如此玩弄羞辱台灣人的智商?而台灣人又為何一再容忍民進黨如此蹂躪作踐台灣?

其實,出爾反爾、顛三倒四已是民進黨的DNA;在朝唱國光石化,下野一口否定;在朝促核四趕工,在野唱非核家園;上任唱「四不一沒有」,失勢改口「一邊一國」……。這些皆是一次又一次的「美牛案」,換個名目,換個場景,一次又一次地上演。如果不是出爾反爾、不是顛三倒四,就不是民進黨。

記住了美牛案這一部荒謬劇,即可看透民進黨的本性,並看懂民進黨的一貫伎倆;因為,萬變不離其宗,一切皆可謂是「美牛案」的異曲同工。我們的疑問是:民進黨何時能夠洗心革面,「超越」美牛案的荒謬?

A Third Ruling Party Change?

A Third Ruling Party Change?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 26, 2012


Summary: If President Ma hopes to save the day, and turn the tide, he can no longer hem and haw. Between 2000 and 2008, the DPP "won the election, but lost its direction." Its eight years in office proved that the "rectification of names" Taiwan independence route is infeasible. Ma Ying-jeou must stay the course. He must remind himself that "we lost the election, but found our direction." The KMT may lose the general election in 2016. Nevertheless it must create a well-thought out cross-Strait policy and ECA Roadmap. The big picture will not change in 2016. As long as his direction is correct, Ma Ying-jeou's historical legacy is assured.

Full Text below:

The U.S. beef imports and capital gains tax bills have finally passed their Third Readings. But the big picture in the legislature has changed.

These two bills are basically reasonable. But the ruling administration has grossly mishandled them. The result has been a disaster, and has dealt a serious blow to President Ma Ying-jeou's reputation. It has given the public a negative impression of hapless KMT cabinet members. Worst of all, the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal has dragged in Wu Den-yih. The KMT's public image has taken repeated hits. One cannot help wondering whether a third ruling party change is in the offing for 2016.

The first hurdle the ruling KMT must clear is the 2014 Seven-in-One Elections. The key is the Five Cities Elections. The DPP is the incumbent in Tainan City and Kaohsiung City. The damage the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal has wreaked upon the KMT's election prospects in southern Taiwan is inestimable. The KMT will not have an easy time winning back these two southern cities. It cannot afford to have its voter base reduced even further. Can Yang Chiu-hsing and Su Jun-pin hold down the fort? Can they maintain the Kuomintang's foothold in the south in 2016? That remains a giant question mark. In Taipei City, Hau Lung-bin's two terms are about to expire. He has no choice but to step down. Lien Sheng-wen has some name recognition. He may be a viable successor. Xinbei City has Eric Chu. But he may have presidential ambitions in 2016. He may replace the premier. He is probably thinking about how he can withdraw from Xinbei City. If Chu does not run for re-election, a successor may be difficult to find. Chu could be stigmatized for "eating out of one bowl while eyeing another." That could be detrimental to his political ambitions. If Chu is groomed for the premiership in 2016, that means the premier is already cannon fodder. Is that a plus or a minus? We really don't know. Taichung has Jason Hu. Hu is like the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike. He has laid down his life for the cause. But the threat still looms. Frank Hsieh might stand for election. His relatively enlightened cross-Strait proposals could be a diversion. In the 2014 Five Cities Elections, the KMT will have a hard time winning back the two southern cities. On the other hand, they could lose the other three.

For the DPP, Hau Lung-bin's conspicuous absence, Eric Chu's staunch support, and Jason Hu's arduous vigil, are opportunities for a Green Camp comeback. One possible strategy is for Su Tseng-chang to take Xinbei City, and Tsai Ing-wen to take Taipei City. This could build Democratic Progressive Party momentum over all of Taiwan. The two could run for mayor during the first stage. In 2016, during the second stage, they could enter the presidential race. This would not present a problem. Their supporters would support such a two-stage strategy. If the Democratic Progressive Party adopts this strategy, the KMT will find it difficult to parry.

Now take the 2016 general election. Wu Den-yih has been dragged into the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal. The truth has yet to fully emerge. But Wu's integrity has already been cast in doubt. Wu's response so far shows that if he hopes to climb the political ladder, he must work on his deportment, his speech, his image, his rhetoric, and his logic. If Wu loses his footing, the KMT's bid for the presidency in 2016 will be even more difficult. The KMT's candidates for president and vice president in 2016 may be late bloomers. They may lack a firm footing in the community.

By contrast, the DPP's candidates for 2016 are already finalized. It will either be Su Tseng-chang or Tsai Ing-wen. Wang Jin-pyng has paid a late night visit to Tsai Ing-wen. Yao Li-ming has joined the Xiao Ying Foundation. The DPP has put popular approval ahead of internecine rivalry. Tsai has moved faster than Su. She also has a lead on potential KMT competitors. The DPP's problem is not with its 2016 candidates, but with its cross-Strait policy. If the DPP can forsake its outdated cross-Strait policy, a third ruling party change in 2016 is entirely possible.

The U.S. beef imports bill, the capital gains tax bill, and the gasoline and electricity rate hike bill are all reasonable and legitimate bills. Rebels within the KMT sabotaged the party from within. They thought they were merely bickering within the party. They thought they were merely provoking a tempest in a teapot. But their meaningless infighting created a grossly misleading impression of "Ma Ying-jeou incompetence." It exacted a terrible social cost. It made many people contemptuous and resentful of the KMT. In 2016 the KMT candidates will be late bloomers. They will undergo a difficult birth. The party may have trouble undoing the negative impression people have of it. It may not be able to rehabilitate its image. It lacks outstanding candidates. How is it going to clear the hurdles in 2014 and 2016?

If President Ma hopes to save the day, and turn the tide, he can no longer hem and haw. Between 2000 and 2008, the DPP "won the election, but lost its direction." Its eight years in office proved that the "rectification of names" Taiwan independence route is infeasible. Ma Ying-jeou must stay the course. He must remind himself that "we lost the election, but found our direction." The KMT may lose the general election in 2016. Nevertheless it must create a well-thought out cross-Strait policy and ECA Roadmap. The big picture will not change in 2016. As long as his direction is correct, Ma Ying-jeou's historical legacy is assured.

會不會第三次政黨輪替
【聯合報╱社論】
 
2012.07.26

美牛案及證所稅案終於完成三讀,但整個政局的大勢卻已改變。

這兩個案子,皆是在本質上正當合理,但因執政團隊在操作上極度荒腔走板而致使下場慘不忍睹;這不僅造成馬英九總統統治威信的重創,更使國人對莫名其妙的國民黨團隊留下難以磨滅的惡劣印象。不僅如此,林益世涉及貪污與吳敦義被捲入烏賊戰中,亦皆使國民黨的社會評價不斷消損。二○一六年會不會出現第三次政黨輪替?

第一關是二○一四的七合一選舉,而五都的市長換屆則是關鍵。民進黨在台南市及高雄市的現任優勢不墜,而林益世案對國民黨南部選情的進一步傷害更不可輕估;國民黨不易贏回南二都,且亦禁受不起選票再趨縮減,楊秋興、蘇俊賓之屬能否撐住形勢,保全國民黨二○一六在南部的最低動能,誠是一個難題。在台北市,郝龍斌兩屆任滿退場,也許連勝文是較有民氣的接繼者。新北市的朱立倫,由於可能問鼎二○一六,亦可能是閣揆的替補人選,也許正考慮如何從新北市抽身;但朱若不選連任,不但接手者不易尋覓,朱立倫自己亦可能陷於「吃碗內/看碗外」的負面評價中,不利其進一步的政治生涯規劃。再者,若欲安排朱立倫從閣揆轉戰二○一六,但閣揆儼然就是砲灰,則究竟是加分或減分,其實亦是未定之天。台中市的胡志強,則有如以手掌捂住堤防破口的荷蘭小男孩,雖是捨命力撐,但決堤的危機仍在;例如,謝長廷可能參選,他的兩岸開明主張,也就成了聲東擊西。也就是說,二○一四的五都選舉,國民黨不易贏回南二都,但大有可能輸掉其他三都。

對民進黨而言,郝龍斌的出缺,朱立倫的強撐,及胡志強的苦守,皆是綠營反敗為勝的機遇。其中的可能戰略之一,是蘇貞昌戰新北市、蔡英文打台北市,以點燃民進黨在全台的選舉動能;至於二人若在第一階段選上市長,至第二階段二○一六欲再投入總統大選,似亦不成問題,至少其支持者應會支持「兩階段」的戰略。倘若民進黨採此策,國民黨將更難招架。

再談二○一六大選。吳敦義捲入烏賊煙幕中,雖然尚不知真相究竟如何,但對吳的形象已造成模糊及質疑的效果;再者,吳在這個階段的應對,顯示他若欲更上層樓,其儀態、談吐、形象管理、詞彙選擇,及思維邏輯等,皆有待基本訓練。吳的腳跟動搖,將使國民黨內競逐二○一六的情勢更趨複雜難測;此亦顯示,二○一六代表國民黨出線競選正副總統者可能「晚熟」,也就是在社會上立足定位的時間將可能不夠寬裕。

相對而言,民進黨的二○一六候選人可謂已經定案:不是蘇貞昌,就是蔡英文,而王金平夜訪蔡英文,及姚立明加入小英基金會,更顯示其社會經營已經先於黨內競逐;蔡的腳步比蘇快,也領先潛在的國民黨競爭者。民進黨如今的問題不在二○一六的候選人,而在兩岸政策;只要民進黨能走出兩岸政策的瓶頸,二○一六即極有可能出現第三次政黨輪替。

美牛案、證所稅案,及油電雙漲的「選後三案」,皆是合理正當的政策;國民黨內的造反派對三案扯後腿,以為他們只是在玩黨內「茶壺裡的風暴」,實際上卻是以莫名其妙的內訌,親手「製造」了馬英九的「無能」,並付出了可怕的社會成本,遂致多數人民對整個國民黨產生輕蔑與憤恨。面對二○一六,國民黨非但候選人恐將「難產晚熟」,且整個黨又不易扭轉社會的普遍惡感;若不能重建國民黨的整體形象,再加上缺乏亮眼優異的候選人,二○一四、二○一六這兩關將如何闖過?

對馬總統而言,若欲扶大廈之將傾、挽狂瀾於既倒,更無猶豫瞻顧、踟躕躊躇的餘地。二○○○至二○○八年,民進黨政府是「贏了選舉/輸了路線」;以八年執政,證實了「正名制憲」的台獨路線不可行。如今,馬英九則應抱持「輸了選舉/贏了路線」的破釜沉舟之決志,即使國民黨可能輸掉二○一六大選,也要在兩岸政策及「經濟合作協議策略藍圖」(ECA Roadmap)上作出一個深耕厚植的框架;只要使國家大局大勢的路線在二○一六之後能持續不變、正向發展,馬英九或許也就差堪維持其歷史定位了。 

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

The Emergency Session Must End the National Nightmare

The Emergency Session Must End the National Nightmare
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2012

Summary: Today the Legislative Yuan convened an emergency session. The ruling KMT and opposition DPP proposed dozens of bills in back and forth battle. Among the most important of these were U.S. beef imports and the capital gains tax. The Legislative Yuan must arrive at a decision. It cannot allow these two nightmares to continue to haunt society.

Full Text below:

Today the Legislative Yuan convened an emergency session. The ruling KMT and opposition DPP proposed dozens of bills in back and forth battle. Among the most important of these were U.S. beef imports and the capital gains tax. The Legislative Yuan must arrive at a decision. It cannot allow these two nightmares to continue to haunt society.

U.S. beef imports and the capital gains tax have provoked intense controversy, in part because the ruling KMT failed to seize the moment. Even more frightening is the militant political culture on Taiwan, with its habitual aggressiveness, in which demagogues toy with national policy just for the fun of it. This is the biggest stumbling block to political progress on Taiwan. The ruling KMT lacks determination. The opposition DPP lacks integrity. Together they have mired society in controversy for half a year. Is this not enough?

Take U.S. beef imports. The Codex Alimentarius has set residue standards for Ractopamine. The opposition DPP's sole justification for opposing US beef imports has evaporated. The ruling KMT and opposition DPP are now more concerned about winning or losing the vote. So why the half year long battle? The opposition DPP insisted on "zero tolerance" under the guise of national health. It wasted everyone's time and energy. It brought the debate down to an anti-science level. The DPP resorted to every means at its disposal. But what about its own political convictions when it was in power? It has been making all sorts of baseless allegations. It staged a brute force occupation of the podium in the legislature for five days and four nights. It exacted an incalculable cost on society. Who will be the one to pay?

The ruling and opposition parties are using the emergency session to wage war. The DPP will continue to vote nay. It says it will not change its obstructionist stance. It is saying no just for the sake of saying no. Can such a political party prove it is rational and progressive? What about the KMT? This bill must be submitted to a vote before it can be passed into law. But the Blue Camp already has the seats to achieve this goal. Why the weakness, hesitation, and bickering? First they resisted the instructions from the party leadership. Now they must bow and give in. What sort of political party is so lacking in resolve?

Now take the capital gains tax. The bill was changed again and again. It missed its window of opportunity. It even caused the stock market to plummet. Today the Executive Yuan version of the bill takes 8500 points as its baseline. This is tantamount to announcing a postponement. This may not be the best time to introduce the capital gains tax. But society has already endured six months of turmoil. We can dismiss the lessons of this tragic experience?

They say a bear market is not the time to impose a capital gains tax. But neither is a bull market. They no longer require justifications. The legislature should not cavalierly surrender on the capital gains tax. It may as well pass the bill. It may as well let everyone know the bottom line. A major investor in the stock market earning huge profits must know that he will pay capital gains tax. Small investors must know their rights will not be affected. Ordinary citizens outside the loop must know the government will not allow the wealthiest businessmen to make unearned profits. This will kill three birds with one stone.

A government incapable of promoting its policies is shameful. An opposition party incapable of finding its own direction is pitiful. Both major political parties have let the people down. The Ma administration began its second term in January. This was a golden opportunity to begin anew. But his party and administration wavered, hesitated, and bickered over U.S. beef imports, the capital gains tax, and gasoline and electricity price hikes. The KMT and the Ma administration wasted half a year and allowed a golden opportunity to slip through their fingers.

Meanwhile the opposition DPP thinks all it needs to do is trip up the Ma administration. It thinks any Ma administration loss will be a DPP victory. But as we all know, those who suffer the most amidst the fog of war, will be ordinary folk and innocent business people. During the U.S. beef imports controversy, opposition DPP politicians insulted the peoples' intelligence with their bigoted and inflammatory language. Worse, they deprived consumers of their freedom of choice. DPP politicians must cease their obstructionism. During the capital gains tax controversy, the DPP repeatedly stressed "taxation based on ability to pay." Now it is claiming "The timing is not right" and calling for a postponement. Does it intend to betray peoples' expectations for fairness and justice? Or does it intend allow this collective wound to heal?

The ruling KMT lacks the courage of its convictions. The opposition DPP knows only how to tear down, not how to build up. Neither is able to establish a healthy democracy. Today the Legislative Yuan will convene an emergency session. The ruling and opposition parties are waging offensive and defensive campaigns on both the tactical and strategic level. They must not forget the original purpose of politics -- the management of public issues. They must not forget the political battlefield is filled with more than their rivals. It is also filled with ordinary citizens. Consider the timeline. The U.S. beef imports and capital gains controversies have plagued society for six months. Taiwan has been a hostage to decades of Blue vs. Green infighting. Politicians must be wise, and not become the object of people's nightmares.

臨時會必須終結全民兩大噩夢
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.25 02:55 am

立法院今天召開臨時會,朝野共提出數十個法案展開攻防衝刺。其中最重要的當然是美牛和證所稅兩案,立法院無論如何必須作出決議,不能讓這兩大噩夢繼續纏繞台灣社會。

美牛案和證所稅之所以引發重重爭議,與執政黨無法妥善掌握決策分寸與時機,有絕對關係。但更可怕的,則是台灣政治文化中那種好戰、好鬥的習氣,竟到了「以蹂躪國政為樂」的地步,這才是阻礙台灣進步的最大絆腳石。執政黨的缺乏意志,反對陣營的出爾反爾,共同織造了社會半年的紛紛擾擾,還不夠嗎?

先談美牛案。在國際食品法典委員會通過萊克多巴胺殘留標準後,在野黨反對的支點已經消失,朝野勢必轉由表決決定輸贏。但必須追問的是,過去半年的漫天戰火,在野黨假藉國民健康為由堅持「零檢出」,不僅虛耗國家能量,更將議論辯證層次降到了「反科學」的地步;民進黨使出渾身解數時,想過自己的從政信仰何在嗎?而種種毫無根據的指控,與五天四夜霸占議場,浪費難以計數的社會成本,要誰支付?

如果在臨時會的表決大戰中,民進黨仍將投下反對票,以宣示其杯葛立場不變;那麼,除了為反對而反對,這個政黨還能向人民展現什麼理性和進步?同樣的問題,也要反問國民黨:如果此案終須透過表決一較高下,那麼在上會期藍軍即可憑席次優勢達到目的,當時為何卻是怯弱、猶疑、雜音四起?先前拚命抗拒黨中央的指令,如今又得俯首就範,這又是什麼樣一支缺乏中心意志的政治隊伍?

再看證所稅。此案一修再修,不僅錯失了推動的黃金時間,更導致股市一路動盪縮水;如今政院版草案設定八千五百點方才起徵,也已形同宣布「緩徵」。關鍵就在,眼前或許非開徵證所稅的最佳時機,但台灣社會既已經歷半年刻骨銘心的折騰,我們能輕易放棄這段慘痛經驗換來的教訓嗎?

如果股市走跌不是開徵證所稅的良好時機,股市上揚時討論開徵必然也是票房毒藥;其中道理,已不需多作辯證。因此,國會與其以證所稅歲入不多而隨意放棄,還不如趁此通過法案,讓各界心理上有個底定與澄清:股市鉅子知道將來賺大錢必須繳稅,一般散戶知道自己權益不受影響,局外小民則認知政府並未放任富商鉅賈不勞而獲,這才是一舉三得之計。

一個無法推動決策的政府,是可恥的;而一個找不到自己方向的在野黨,則是可悲的,兩種政黨都對不起人民。馬總統元月連任後,原本有絕佳的機會為台灣開創新局,他的黨政團隊卻因游移、觀望、內訌,在美牛、證所稅、油電雙漲等議題上耗掉半年,平白喪失了大好情勢。

反觀在野黨,以為在政治上牽絆住馬政府的腳步,就是自己政黨的勝利;殊不知,在朝野對決的煙硝戰場,受苦受難的都是普通百姓、無辜企業。在美牛案,政治人物以其褊狹的語言粗暴踐踏了民眾的知識,更剝奪了消費者選擇的自由,今天不能再拗下去。而在證所稅案,先前不斷強調要「量能課稅」的民進黨,如今卻又以「時機不宜」要求緩議;如此作法,是要背叛民眾期待的公平正義,還是想讓這個集體傷口一直疼痛下去?

缺乏魄力的執政黨,加上只破不立的在野黨,不可能建構成一個健康的民主政治。今天的立院臨時會,朝野政黨在研擬政黨攻防戰術戰略之際,不要忘了政治的初衷是在「管理眾人之事」,不要忘了政治沙場上除了敵手,還有人民。從時間的軸線看,美牛和證所稅案已經折磨台灣社會半年之久,而台灣被藍綠挾持已十幾年;明智的政治人物,請勿把自己變成操縱人民噩夢的幽靈。

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Capital Gains Tax: A Fight to the Bitter End

Capital Gains Tax: A Fight to the Bitter End
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2012


Summary: The capital gains tax bill must make the final mile. The Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan must not relax. They must fight every step of the way. The political implications must be considered. Nothing must be accidental. They must communicate better with the public. They must seek consensus. In particular they must address the concerns of the business community over economic development. After all, the domestic economy is weakening. Growth prospects are deteriorating. Therefore after the government promotes the capital gains tax, it must concentrate on strengthening the economy. It must must come up with ways to grow the economy and inspire public confidence. The capital gains tax, which can start small and grow big, can do just that.

Full Text below:

Can the 24 year curse on the capital gains tax be lifted? We will know soon. The result of the prolonged tug of war will be announced tomorrow.

Tomorrow the Legislative Yuan will convene an extraordinary session. The Income Tax Amendment and the Basic Tax Rate Amendment represent the Capital Gains Tax. This Alternative Minimum Tax Amendment is first on the legislative agenda. It has been given priority over U.S. beef imports and NCC appointments. That means President Ma is determined to see it pass. On March 28, the Ministry of Finance Financial Efficiency Improvement Group listed the capital gains tax as the number one item on its tax reform agenda. Various parties have debated the issue for nearly four months. Hundreds of versions have been proposed. But one was selected. It is time for advocates of the capital gains tax to lay their cards on the table. Recently the economic situation has worsened. Voices of dissent can be heard from within the KMT. Can the bill go the distance? This remains to be seen.

The capital gains tax has long been a bone of contention. The initial dispute was over whether it should be imposed. Later the dispute was how it should be imposed. Eventually the dispute was over whether to postpone it or withdraw it from consideration. Three major sources of resistance now stand its way. Storm clouds have gathered. The first source of resistance is industry and business leaders who oppose a capital gains tax at this time. TSMC chairman Morris Chang is a prime example. He favors the levying of a capital gains tax. But he considers a tax increase during the current economic downturn "the worst possible timing." This argument assumes that the overall economic situation at home and abroad will get worse. Last week the Academia Sinica cut its economic growth estimate to 1.94%. This provided those opposed a capital gains tax on the grounds of bad timing additional ammunition. This strengthened the opposition.

The second source of resistance was idealists who wanted comprehensive tax reform. Most of these were academics. But some were politicians. Some of these people felt the newest version of the capital gains tax was too compromised by concessions to political and economic realities. They felt the tax base was too narrow, that it failed to tax people on the basis of their ability to pay, and that it strayed too far from their original goal of tax justice. The result was a capital gains tax that is neither fish nor fowl. Better not to promote it. Better to start anew. Some felt this way from the very beginning, and resistance has steadily increased. The ruling administration's version of the tax bill has been changed repeatedly. One concession has followed another. The Ma administration has lost credibility. Naturally this has invited heavy criticism.

The third source of resistance is less visible. It is unlike the first two sources of resistance, which are vocal. But often sneak attacks are harder to guard against. The capital gains tax bill does more than fulfill the government's goal of tax justice. It also symbolizes President Ma's leadership. If the capital gains tax dies a natural death, the Ma administration will become a lame duck -- ahead of schedule. The impact on government operations and economic growth will exceed even the impact on fairness and justice. That is why the capital gains tax must pass. The political significance of the capital gains tax bill is immense. That makes it instrumental in a political struggle against the Ma administration. Add to this arguments that the timing is not right and that the bill is flawed, and the capital gains tax bill may not survive.

When climbing a mountain, the fear is that one may just fail to reach the peak. Since it began promoting the capital gains tax, the Ma administration has lost a Minister of Finance and suffered market turbulence induced by policy uncertainty. Its credibility on policy has been repeatedly challenged. This has thrown the entire government off its stride. If it gives up after paying such a high price, the Ma administration will find it difficult to justify itself. Its leadership and prestige will suffer. The blowback should not be underestimated. By contrast, on the positive side, the capital gains tax bill in its current form may not be perfect. But it has already reduced the impact on the capital market. This is the closest it has come to passage since its introduction 24 years ago. Miss this opportunity and it is unlikely to return. Even if people are not fully taxed according to their ability to pay, at least the capital gains has been included in the tax base. Unearned income is no longer tax-free. We will have taken a step toward tax justice. Most importantly the success or failure of the capital gains tax bill affects the stability of the regime. President Ma Ying must use his leverage. He must ensure solidarity. He must rebuild his credibilty. He must move the country forward.

The capital gains tax bill must make the final mile. The Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan must not relax. They must fight every step of the way. The political implications must be considered. Nothing must be accidental. They must communicate better with the public. They must seek consensus. In particular they must address the concerns of the business community over economic development. After all, the domestic economy is weakening. Growth prospects are deteriorating. Therefore after the government promotes the capital gains tax, it must concentrate on strengthening the economy. It must must come up with ways to grow the economy and inspire public confidence. The capital gains tax, which can start small and grow big, can do just that.

證所稅拚最後一哩
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.24 01:52 am

纏繞政府稅制廿四年的證券交易所得稅開徵魔咒能否解除,即將揭曉;正反勢力拔河的最終戰,且看明朝!

立法院明天召開臨時會,代表開徵證所稅的所得稅法及所得基本稅額條例(即最低稅負制)修正案列為第一案,優先性更甚於美牛案及國家通傳會(NCC)人事任命案,宣示馬總統非過不可的決心。從三月廿八日財政部財政健全小組將資本利得稅列為稅制改革第一案迄今,各方激辯近四個月,版本百出卻也終定於一尊,如今的證所稅案可說已進入圖窮匕現的掀牌階段,但近日經濟情勢急轉直下,加以國民黨內雜音不斷,究竟能不能衝過這最後一哩,顯然仍是疑慮重重。

目前證所稅案廣受議論的焦點,已從初期的「應不應該開徵」、中期的「如何開徵」,轉進到「緩議或撤案」,而且三大阻力加速匯聚,猶如山雨欲來風滿樓。第一大阻力就是反對此時開徵的工商業界人士,並以素負眾望的台積電董事長張忠謀最具代表性,他贊成開徵證所稅,但認為現在經濟不景氣,是增稅「最壞的時機」。這樣的論點其實打從一開始就存在,只是國內外總體經濟情勢日趨惡化,中央研究院又在上周大舉調降經濟成長率至百分之一點九四,更是給足「時機論」者需要的子彈,反對砲火也愈發猛烈。

第二個阻力是期望證所稅一步到位的稅改理想派,以財稅學者居多,但也不乏附此而議的政界人士,認為經過多方折衝後的證所稅最新開徵版本已過度向政治與經濟現實妥協,不只課稅範圍大幅縮減,也未展現量能課稅的精神,悖離租稅正義的政策初衷,故與其強行通過一個「四不像」的證所稅,不如不推或重議。這樣的主張也是自始即在,惟於今尤烈,因為執政黨的證所稅版本確是一修再修、一讓再讓,馬政府自失立場在先,自是授人以柄於後了。

第三個阻力若有似無,不像前二者那般旗幟鮮明,但「暗箭難防」的殺傷力恐怕更大。眾所周知,證所稅一案不只負有實踐政府租稅公平正義的政策使命,更承載了展現馬總統領導威信的政治任務,證所稅案如果無疾而終,馬政府也將提前跛腳,對政府運作及國家發展的衝擊更甚於公平正義的挫敗,所以證所稅案非過不可。然而,也正因為證所稅案的政治效應如此巨大,使它非常可能淪為反馬勢力的政爭工具,若再藉著時機不宜、方案不全等兩面大旗順桿而上,證所稅案的最後一哩勢難平靜。

為山九仞,最怕功虧一簣,證所稅案推動以來,馬政府已折損一位財政部長,也經歷政策不確定下的市場動盪,政策公信力更是一再遭到挑戰,拖累整個政府的施政節奏,如此高昂的代價下若就此罷手,馬政府不只難以自圓其說,領導威信更將掃地,其反作用力實不容小覷。相對的,從積極面去看,現今的證所稅開徵版本縱然不完美,但已降低對資本市場的衝擊,是廿四年來距離開徵最接近的時刻,錯過此次,再也難議;縱然未能完全量能課稅,但至少已將資本利得納入課稅基礎,讓不勞而獲的所得不再免稅,向租稅正義跨出了一步;最重要的是,證所稅的成敗,攸關政權的安定與否,馬總統應借力使力,由此凝聚團結、重建威信,推動國家大步向前。

證所稅要拚過最後一哩,此時此刻的府院絕對不能放鬆,更須步步為營,除了政治面須得縝密規劃安排、不容任何意外,亦須持續加強社會溝通,務求最大共識,尤其要關照工商企業界對當前經濟發展的憂慮,畢竟國內經濟表現確實愈來愈差,成長前景大不如前。因此,政府推動如同加稅的證所稅之後,當須心無旁鶩地全心全力拚經濟,拿出真正足以振興企業及民眾信心的發展經濟良策,則證所稅「開低走高」可期矣。

Monday, July 23, 2012

New Cross-Strait Argument: Mutual Non-Denial of Each Other's Sovereignty. Mutual Recognition of Each Other's Jurisdiction

New Cross-Strait Argument: Mutual Non-Denial of Each Other's Sovereignty. Mutual Recognition of Each Other's Jurisdiction
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2012

Summary: The Ma administration's cross-Strait legal argument is "non-recognition of each other's sovereignty, but non-denial of each other's jurisdiction." Beijing has yet to comment on this position. But in practice it appears to have accepted this formulation. We believe however, that the cross-Strait deadlock must be broken. It must be elevated to a higher level. The cross-Strait legal argument should be "non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty, and recognition of each other's jurisdiction."

Full Text below:

The Ma administration's cross-Strait legal argument is "non-recognition of each other's sovereignty, but non-denial of each other's jurisdiction." Beijing has yet to comment on this position. But in practice it appears to have accepted this formulation. We believe however, that the cross-Strait deadlock must be broken. It must be elevated to a higher level. The cross-Strait legal argument should be "non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty, and recognition of each other's jurisdiction."

Since 2008, the two sides have signed 16 agreements. Differences over the Investment Agreement and Customs Agreement appear to have to been resolved. The agreements will soon be signed. These agreements have been successfully signed and implemented, because both sides recognize each other's executive and legislative authority. In particular, they recognize each other's jurisdiction. The recognition of each other's jurisdiction is a fait accompli. To characterize it as "non-denial of each other's jurisdiction" is convoluted political rhetoric.

The fact is, without the recognition of each other's jurisdiction, none of these agreements could have been signed. None of them could have been implemented. Current interaction between the two sides is based on recognition of each other's jurisdiction. The two sides' executive, legislative, and judicial authority equals their jurisdiction. It is also their source of autonomy. Without sovereignty, whither jurisdiction? Since we have already accepted each other's jurisdiction, how can we deny each other's sovereignty? Therefore we should change "non-recognition of each other's sovereignty," to "non-denial of each other's sovereignty."

Today's problem is that both sides of the Strait are sovereign states. But this contravenes the concept of "one China." In the past, the government of the Republic of China and the government of the People's Republic of China both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China. The Republic of China has not voiced this claim in a long time. The People's Republic of China has also refrained from making this claim. Today the PRC says instead that "Both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China." Therefore we must solve the sovereignty issue, in which the two sides are governed separately, without dividing the nation. We must create a sovereignty framework at a higher level. We must construct a concept of China as a giant roof. This will maintain cross-Strait sovereignty. This will enable the two sides to avoid denying each other's sovereignty, but instead establish a legal framework for China's sovereignty as a whole.

In fact, sovereignty is an artificial construct. It is not a product of the natural world. Sixteenth century political philosopher Jean Bodin was the author of "Les Six livres de la Republique." In it he argued that sovereignty is absolute, permanent, supreme, unrestricted, and inseparable. Bodin fabricated the concept of sovereignty out of thin air. Since then thinking about sovereignty has assumed myriad forms. They include "the divine right of kings," and "L'etat c'est moi," which represent an absolute monarch's concept of sovereignty. They include Rousseau's "social contract," which gradually evolved into "popular sovereignty." This shows that concepts of sovereignty are changeable, and the content of sovereignty is changeable as well. Therefore the two sides ought to be able to create a "giant roof" framework for China. They can overcome cross-Strait problems by "not denying each other's sovereignty, while recognizing each other's jurisdiction."

The two Germanies experienced divided rule. But they never viewed each other as a foreign country. The Berlin Wall fell, and overnight they were reunified. This shows that sovereignty can be divided, combined, or changed. The 27 nations of the European Union have a common constitution, parliament, currency, and borders. Sovereignty is a product that can be transferred and restructured. Confederations are historical facts as well. One can construct "giant roof" concept for China. One can create a third concept of a higher level China. This is not unimagineable. This is not inconceivable. One must not remain mired in traditional thinking, in the law of the jungle. These merely stifle one's imagination and creativity.

The cross-Strait deadlock is mainly due to Beijing, which thinks it must repudiate the Republic of China and reunify the nation under the banner of the People's Republic of China. Only that is considered "one China." But this strategy requires an inconceivable resort to force. Such a reunification would be difficult to achieve. The process would be nightmarish. The two sides would never have peace.

Beijing has changed its thinking and mended its ways. It now says "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless both part of one China." It now talks about "peaceful development," about how the "Constitution of the Republic of China is the bottom line." Examine the process. The two sides are moving towards "non-denial of each other's sovereignty, and recognition of each other's jurisdiction." This framework can help maintain an "in progress One China." Beijing may not be willing to state this explicitly. But Beijing is well aware that this is the only way it can stabilize the cross-Strait status quo and future developments. This sort of thinking is the basic framework for "divided rule without a divided nation." All it takes is a change in perception. One can create an environment conducive to cross-Strait development and provide a "giant roof" sovereignty framework. Such a framework would bolster cross-Strait relations. They would help the two sides address international issues such as events in the South China Sea and the Diaoyutai Islands.

As we can see, cross-Strait interaction is based on the recognition of jurisdiction, and the non-denial of sovereignty. Cross-Strait coopetition over sovereignty must be resolved or overcome based on the two sides' recognition of each other's sovereignty and a "giant roof" framework for China.

兩岸新論:主權互不否認 治權相互承認

【聯合報╱社論】

2012.07.23

馬政府的兩岸法理關係論述是「主權互不承認/治權互不否認」,北京對此迄未表態,卻在兩岸實務上儼然已接受此說。但我們認為,若要使兩岸關係突破僵局、再推上一個台階,兩岸的法理論述應當轉為「主權互不否認/治權相互承認」。

二○○八年以來,兩岸已密集簽署了十六個協議,最近《投保協議》及《海關協議》的歧見似已化解,不日亦可簽定;這些協議之所以能夠完成簽署且有效執行,真正的憑據是在兩岸皆承認對方的行政權、立法權,特別是承認對方的司法權,亦即承認了對方的「完整治權」。因此,「治權相互承認」已是兩岸現存的事實;至於故意說成「治權互不否認」,其實是迂迴曲折、拐彎抹角的政治語彙。

事實是:倘非「治權相互承認」,這些協議無一可以簽成,且無一可以執行。進一步說,兩岸現今之互動,既是建立在「治權相互承認」的基礎上,而兩岸各自的行政權、立法權及司法權,也就是「完整的治權」,當然是源自主權;倘無主權,何來治權?則既然接受了對方的治權,豈能否認其主權?因而,「主權互不承認」之說,應當改為「主權互不否認」。

如今的問題是,兩岸皆是主權國家,卻與「一個中國」的概念發生牴觸。在過去,中華民國與中華人民共和國的政府,皆自稱是代表中國的唯一合法政府;如今,中華民國對此早已閉口,而中華人民共和國亦久不持此說,而改稱「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」。於是,若要解決「兩岸分治但不分裂」的「主權問題」,即必須創造一個更高層次的主權架構,亦即建構一個「屋頂中國」,來維繫「兩岸主權互不否認並相互含蘊及合成了『整個中國的主權』」的法理關係。

「主權」其實是一種人造物,而非天生自然的東西。「主權」之說起於十六世紀布丹的《國家論六卷》;他主張,主權是絕對的與永久的,至高、不受限制,不可分割。布丹使「主權」這個概念從無到有,但此後主權思想卻變化萬端。從君權神授、朕即國家,以專制君權為「主權」;至盧梭的「契約論」,又漸漸轉向「主權在民」。由此一過程可見,「主權」是思想的產物,而思想是可變的,所以「主權」的內涵亦是可變的。因此,兩岸應可協力共創一個「屋頂中國」的主權架構,透過「主權互不否認/治權相互承認」,來作為兩岸關係的解決或過渡。

兩個德國曾互以「不是外國的國家」分裂分治,又在一夕之間牆倒統一,充分反映出主權的可分、可合、可變;而歐盟二十七國發展至有共同憲法、議會、貨幣的境界,更是主權可以切分、讓渡及重組的真實成品;何況,如邦聯制度的主權組合,更是歷史事實。因此,若要在兩岸之上建構一個「屋頂中國」,亦即創造一個「第三概念」的「上位中國」,不是不應想像,也不是不可想像,而是卡在弱肉強食的傳統政治思維中,扼殺了人們的想像力與創造力。

兩岸今日僵局,主要緣於北京似乎認為,一定要否認中華民國,而統一在中華人民共和國的旗幟下,才算是「一個中國」。但此一策略,除非訴諸武力(豈可訴諸武力?),難以實現;因而夜長夢多,攪得兩岸皆不安寧。

所以,北京方面近年亦思改弦易轍,遂有「雖然還未統一/仍是一個中國」、「和平發展」、「中華民國憲法底線論」等新政策出台,究其底蘊,其實皆是朝「主權互不否認/治權相互承認」的方向移動,希望能夠維持「現在進行式的一個中國」的架構。這雖是北京說不出口的話,但北京深知,非此不能穩定兩岸的現狀及走向;而此類思維,其實皆是「分治而不分裂」的基本架構,只要一念之轉,必可創建一個有利兩岸發展與整合的「屋頂中國」的新主權體系。倘能成立,不僅兩岸關係架構即可確立,在南海或釣魚台之類的對外事件上,也可找到兩岸的共同定位。

有目共睹:兩岸今日的互動,是建立在「治權相互承認」之上,因此也是建立在「主權互不否認」之上。至於兩岸主權的競合,必須以「兩岸的主權相互含蘊並合成的屋頂中國」之思想與體制,來化解或過渡。

Thursday, July 19, 2012

DPP: Black Gold or Clean Government?

DPP: Black Gold or Clean Government?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 20, 2012


Summary: This is a watershed moment for the DPP. A single intraparty power shuffle has compromised the DPP's integrity. How many power struggles and temptations does the future hold? How many opportunists crawl out from under the rocks in the event the DPP returns to power? Will the Democratic Progressive Party have the ability to clean house? Will it have the slightest desire to do so?

Full Text below:

We generally assume that political parties and politicians are rational. But often they behave like moths before a flame. Often they find themselves mired in scandal, unable or unwilling to extricate themselves. This was true of the KMT, with its past links to Black Gold. This is equally true of the DPP, with its current links to Black Gold, revealed over the past two days. These links have created a foul atmosphere at the very heart of the "new" DPP power structure.

The Democratic Progressive Party recently held its National Party Congress. It held Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee elections. DPP elections have always been about power, never about ideals. The public expected little from the current National Party Congress power struggle. But the results have been even worse than expected. Rumors of vote buying preceded the elections. Following the elections, Central Executive Committee member Hong Chi-kun delivered the bad news. Underworld figures took part in the election. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu helped Li Ching-fu, an underworld figure convicted of corruption, win election to the DPP Central Standing Committee. Hong called on the DPP Central Standing Committee to conduct a thorough investigation.

The DPP's first reaction was to ignore the vote-buying. The DPP's official spokesman airily dismissed the charges, saying, "The party has no past record of vote buying." In response to revelations that a member of the Central Standing Committee was guilty of corruption, the DPP did not blink. It said simply that "The elected candidate was fully qualified."

Were underworld figures involved in the DPP party elections? DPP spin doctors insisted there was no evidence. They said they would conduct an in-depth investigation. But when Li Ching-fu was Kaohsiung County Qiaotou Village mayor, he was indicted for accepting bribes from vendors. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Last year the Kaohsiung High Court reduced his sentence to six years. This is all spelled out in black and white. This is all a matter of public record. DPP officials often use "political persecution" as a shield against charges of corruption. But Hong Chi-kun blew the whistle on DPP corruption. He noted the timeframe for Li Ching-fu's corruption. it occurred during 2000, under a DPP central government. The DPP cannot cite KMT political persecution as an excuse.

The DPP Central Standing Committee and DPP officials' handling of the matter has made it even more controversial. First, the DPP Party Official Election Procedures stipulate that anyone "indicted for the crime of embezzlement" may not register as a candidate in party elections. Li Ching-fu was not merely indicted. He was convicted. His conviction was upheld on appeal. Yet somehow he was able to pas review and register as a candidate. The DPP clearly has no checks on eligibility. Was the DPP deliberately giving Li a free pass? How can people not wonder?

The DPP Central Executive Committee and Central Standing Committee elections are equally controversial. These elections have long relied on factional quid pro quo deal making. They have never been predicated upon the power of individual candidates. Li Ching-fu's power within the party is limited. Without help from the Chen Chu camp, he could not have been elected to the Central Standing Committee. Even Liu Shih-fang and Chen Chu faction leaders do not dispute this. They discovered problems with Yu Cheng-hsien's ballots. That is why they abruptly switched their support to Li Ching-fu.

This was the key. Hong Chi-kun revealed the truth. Li Ching-fu threatened Chen Chu. She was forced to support him. But the Chen Chu faction made this decision on its own. How much local support does Li Ching-fu have? Why was Chen Chu unable to turn him down? Why did she feel she had no other choice?

DPP officials may feel that colluding with controversial local strongmen is a necessary evil in politics. They may argue that this does not mean the DPP is involved in corruption. But have DPP officials forgotten? The year 2000 change in ruling parties was the result of a photograph of Wu Tse-yuan standing next to Lien Chan during a campaigning rally. As a result, the Kuomintang was labeled a Black Gold regime. The DPP blew the significance of the photo far out of proportion. Now however, convicted criminals can take part in DPP party elections. They can register as candidates. They can be elected to the DPP Central Standing Committee. They can become members of the top ranks of the DPP. If the DPP is subsequently denounced as a Black Gold political party, they can hardly say they were wronged.

President Ma Ying-jeou has long boasted of his integrity. The Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal erupted nevertheless. Under Ma Ying-jeou's chairmanship, incidents of vote buying erupted during Central Standing Committee elections. But here is where the KMT parts company with the DPP. Ma Ying-jeou ordered investigations. Those suspected of vote buying were suspended. The Central Standing Committee elections were held over. Ma Ying-jeou was criticized as undemocratic for his actions. But the party had its bylaws. Taiwan's two major parties are democratic centralist. Cleaning up the party and cleaning up oneself is something that must be done.

Similarly, the DPP factions rule. If they turn a blind eye to their own corruption, what kind of message are they sending the outside world? What kind of impression are they leaving the outside world? They are announcing to the world that they are just as tainted by their Black Gold connections as the KMT was in its time.

So far, DPP officials have been denouncing whistleblowers for harboring ulterior motives. They have been dismissing charges of corruption as part of an internal power struggle. They have been dismissing the controversy as a tempest in a teapot. This pattern of denial is the DPP's sorrow. When the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal erupted, the public recalled the KMT's past history of Black Gold involvement. DPP leaders have apparently forgotten this. The DPP could have seized the opportunity to restore integrity within the party. After all, this is the main reason the public supported the 2000 change in ruling parties.

This is a watershed moment for the DPP. A single intraparty power shuffle has compromised the DPP's integrity. How many power struggles and temptations does the future hold? How many opportunists crawl out from under the rocks in the event the DPP returns to power? Will the Democratic Progressive Party have the ability to clean house? Will it have the slightest desire to do so?

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2012.07.20
社論-民進黨要擁抱黑金還是找回清廉?
本報訊

     我們總以為政黨或政客是理性的,但是他們有時就像飛蛾撲火,身陷醜聞或困境而難以自拔,或是不願自拔;過去,國民黨黑金掛鉤是如此,這兩天鬧得烏煙瘴氣的民進黨權力改組亦是如此。

     民進黨日前舉行全代會、進行中常委、中執委改選,民進黨的選舉向來只有權力、沒有理念,大家對這場爭權奪利的全代會,原來並無太高的期待,但結果竟然更糟;不但選前就是賄聲賄影,選後中執委洪智坤大爆料,痛批黑道介入選舉,他點名高雄市長陳菊支持涉貪的李清福當選中常委,要求黨中央必須徹查。

     民進黨第一時間的回應,完全避重就輕,針對賄選傳聞,發言人輕描淡寫的說,「過去黨內選舉沒有賄選紀錄」;至於涉貪者成為中常委一事,更睜眼說瞎話,「當選資格沒問題」。

     確實,是否嚴重到有黑道介入黨內選舉,口說無憑,有待民進黨深入調查;但是,李清福在前高雄縣橋頭鄉長任內,涉嫌收受廠商賄款被控,一審被判二十年,高雄高分院去年更一審改判六年,這卻是白紙黑字、有法律文書為據;洪智坤更拆穿民進黨涉貪人士常使用的「政治迫害」擋箭牌,直指李清福涉案被起訴時間點,是民進黨執政的二千年,完全不能拿被國民黨迫害當藉口。

     因此,黨中央及民進黨要員的處理就更顯爭議,首先,依照民進黨黨職人員選舉辦法明定:「曾犯貪汙罪、經起訴者」,不得登記為黨職人員候選人。而李清福不但遭起訴,一、二審都被判刑,卻能通過參選資格審查,民進黨中央黨部完全沒有把關,如何不令人質疑這是有意的放水!

     同樣爭議的是,民進黨中執委、中常委選舉,向來靠派系集體換票操作,不可能靠個人實力當選;因此單憑李清福在黨內實力、如果沒有陳菊陣營奧援,他絕無當選中常委的實力,這點連菊營大將劉世芳都不否認,他們是發現余政憲的票有問題,所以才臨時改變轉而支持李清福。

     所以,真正的關鍵在於,如果真相不是如洪智坤所說,陳菊是受李清福要脅、不得不支持,而是陳菊陣營自主的決定,那麼,李清福究竟有多麼了不得的地方實力,讓陳菊無法拒絕、非支持不可?

     民進黨人士可能會認為,和有爭議的地方實力派人士結合,這是政治上的必要之惡,也不代表民進黨就會涉貪;只是,民進黨人士可別忘了,二千年政黨輪替的關鍵,也就是因為一張涉貪的伍澤元站在連戰身旁輔選造勢的照片,國民黨因此被打成黑金政權,舉輕以明重,現在涉貪人士可是登堂入室,晉身民進黨中常會,成為民進黨高層,民進黨若因此也被批為黑金,能說自己冤枉嗎!

     馬英九總統標榜清廉,卻還是爆發林益世貪腐的大醜聞,但是觀諸馬英九擔任黨主席這幾年,也曾發生中常委選舉的賄選情事,馬英九不但下令調查,對涉賄者停權,更大動作的重選中常委;馬英九此舉可能遭批為不民主,但是,黨有黨的規範,更別說台灣的兩大黨都是民主集中制,清黨以自清,有時是必要的宣示。

     同樣的,民進黨這次如果在派系共治的大帽子下,眾人睜一隻眼、閉一隻眼,這將給外界什麼樣的訊息,會讓外界有何種觀感?這無疑是昭告世人,就如國民黨,民進黨也開始有了黑金包袱。

     到目前為止,民進黨要員傾向以動機論來看待這次的爆料,視為是黨內權力競逐的茶壺風波;這樣的小格局,是民進黨的悲哀,他們忘了,林益世貪瀆案爆發,民眾重新回憶起國民黨過去與黑金牽扯不清的歷史,民進黨原本可以掌握時機、重新尋回清廉政黨的令名,畢竟,這正是二千年人民支持政黨輪替的關鍵因素。

     可以說,這是民進黨的關鍵時刻,如果只是一次的權力改組,就輕易的讓民進黨清廉破功,未來還有許多權力競逐及誘惑,只怕海畔的逐臭之夫將群擁而至,那時的民進黨,還有自清的能力及意願嗎?

Blue Camp Lin Yi-shi, Green Camp Li Ching-fu

Blue Camp Lin Yi-shi, Green Camp Li Ching-fu
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 19, 2012


Summary: Lin Yi-shi has been expelled from the KMT. The KMT has only itself to blame. But don't the DPP's own Anti-Black Gold Articles forbid Li Ching-fu from becoming a Central Standing Committee member? Lin was a Red Faction member. Li is a Black Faction member, This is the ugly truth about Blue Camp and Green Camp Black Gold corruption. Does Su Tseng-chang intend to do something about this ugly blemish? Or does he merely intend to slap a band-aid over it and cover up the problem?

Full Text below:

The DPP National Party Congress recently proclaimed that it was entering a new "Su Tseng-chang Era," one free from vote-buying. This was immediately followed by revelations that underworld figures plying the sex, gambling, and drug trades participated in the DPP's party elections. These underworld figures helped Li Ching-fu, who was sentenced to six years imprisonment for bribery, to become a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee. This scandal is the Green Camp counterpart to the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal. It is also the first test of Su's leadership.

On the surface, this is merely a factional power struggle. But at a deeper level, it reveals the DPP's "Black Gold" character. The DPP is cultivating political support at the local level. But it is merely displacing the KMT. It is merely replacing the KMT's Black Gold criminal elements with its own DPP Black Gold criminal elements. This being the case, what is to become of Taiwan's democratization?

Hong Chi-kun risked his life to expose this scandal. Before that, the Chen Chu faction in Kaohsiung was engaged in both overt and covert infighting. Countless signs of corruption were already visible. Chen Chu originally planned to force Yu Cheng-hsien to withdraw his candidacy. Chiu Yi-ying fell ill and was forced to withdraw. Liu Shih-fang lost his election bid. The situation was highly unusual. The power behind the throne turned out to be underworld figures plying the sex, gambling, and drug trades. These underworld figures forced politicians to bow to the triads. This was a sad and frightening development.

Li Ching-fu was elected to the Central Standing Committee. This was highly controversial for two reasons. One. His election is illegal. According to the DPP's own "Anti-Black Gold Articles," those under prosecution for corruption are ineligible to run for office. When Li Ching-fu was Mayor of Qiaotou Village, he accepted bribes exceeding 8 million dollars from several vendors on small scale construction projects. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 on appeal. The Anti-Black Gold Articles explicitly state that he is not qualified to be a candidate in the Standing Committee election. Yet he sailed through the process with no objections. He has become a member of the prestigious Central Standing Committee. This is a flagrant violation of the Anti-Black Gold Articles, and is totally illegal.

Two. His election is illegitimate. As Hong Chi-kun noted, on the eve of the DPP National Party Congress, local Kaohsiung triad heads actually accompanied other Chen Chu faction party representatives to Taipei. They appeared at election rallies to canvas votes. They attended banquets to consolidate voter support. , They may have been covertly engaged in intimidation. They may have been overtly engaged in deal-making. Either way, they undermined the legitimacy of the DPP election. This was a DPP power center election. It was held at the luxurious International Conference Hall. But behind the scenes it was a Dionysian bacchanal involving the criminal underworld and the political nomenklatura. In the end the criminal underworld prevailed. It undermined the legitimacy of the DPP Central Committee election.

The Li Ching-fu corruption scandal is the Green Camp counterpart of the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal Among the local factions in Kaohsiung, Lin Yi-shi is the new generation Red Faction Boss. Li Ching-fu meanwhile, is considered the Black Faction Godfather. Each of them has his own power base. Both of them are guilty of extortion and bribery. The Black Faction was founded by Yu Teng-fa, a "dang wai era" figure. Yu Cheng-dao is the grandson of Yu Teng-fa. Can he retain his hold on the empire his grandfather founded? If not, so be it. But he was forced to withdraw from the National Party Congress election under pressure from Black Gold forces. Isn't this intolerable? The Green Camp has been relentlessly laughing and pointing the finger at Lin Yi-shi. The DPP should look at itself in the mirror, at the sickening spectacle of DPP party factions making deals with Black Gold underworld figures. Do DPP leaders see the four fingers pointing back at itself?

Hong Chi-kun opened this can of worms. Exactly what was his motive? That is not our concern. What the public wants to know is why the DPP deliberately allowed this to happen. Why did it allow a Black Gold underworld figure, ineligible as a candidate, to become a member of the prestigious Central Standing Committee? The Democratic Progressive Party has ruled for many years in the Kaohsiung area. Why has it condoned this "home invasion" by underworld figures? Why enable them to erode the political process? Chen Chu has long been concerned about her political image. Why allow people such as Li Ching-fu to become the sole representative of the Chen Chu faction on the Central Standing Committee?

Hong Chi-kun came forward to defend the Anti-Black Gold Articles. The DPP Central Committee refused to support him. It did just the opposite. It threatened him. It accused him of "inappropriate behavior" and "possible violations of party discipline." The DPP Central Standing Committee is in flagrant violation of the party's own Anti-Black Gold Articles. Committee members have become accomplices to Black Gold underworld figures. How is Hong Chi-kun supposed to express his objections through "normal channels?" The DPP Central Standing Committee has revealed its arrogance, cowardice, and stupidity. It is utterly unworthy of the support party reformers and non-party supporters have given it.

Green Camp supporters have proposed a number of solutions to the Li Ching-fu problem. Some suggest that Li Ching-fu voluntarily resign from the Central Standing Committee. Some suggest that Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang come forward and persuade Li to step down. But Li Ching-fu has already made clear he has no intention of resigning. Su Tseng-chang is merely bobbing and weaving. He is merely paying lip service, saying that "Any allegations must be backed by solid evidence." DPP spokesman Lin Chun-hsian even claimed that Li Ching-fu was a "qualified candidate," and that "his election was valid." But what are the violations of the party's own Anti-Black Gold Articles, but "solid evidence?" How can he be a qualified candidate? How can his election be valid? Su Tseng-chang's response was poles apart from the KMT's response to the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal. The KMT immediately expelled Lin from the party. Su Tseng-chang cannot even compare with Tsai Ing-wen. When Cheng Shu-hua, a suspect in a corruption case was nominated for Legislator without Portfolio, Tsai Ing-wen forced her to pull out. If this is what we can expect from Su Tseng-chang, is that not frightening?

Lin Yi-shi has been expelled from the KMT. The KMT has only itself to blame. But don't the DPP's own Anti-Black Gold Articles forbid Li Ching-fu from becoming a Central Standing Committee member? Lin was a Red Faction member. Li is a Black Faction member, This is the ugly truth about Blue Camp and Green Camp Black Gold corruption. Does Su Tseng-chang intend to do something about this ugly blemish? Or does he merely intend to slap a band-aid over it and cover up the problem?

藍有林益世,綠有李清福
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.19 01:43 am

民進黨全代會剛在賄選聲中宣告進入「蘇貞昌時代」,隨即爆出「黃/賭/毒」各路黑道人物介入黨內選舉,扶助收賄判刑六年的李清福當選中常委。此一醜聞,無異是「綠版」的林益世事件,也成為考驗蘇貞昌領導形象的第一道試煉。

表面上看,此事似乎只是黨內派系爭權的內訌;深一層看,這卻揭露了民進黨「黑金化」布幕之一隅。如果民進黨在地方的深耕,只是挖掉了國民黨的樁腳,並取而代之與地方黑金勢力掛?,請問台灣的民主化將走向什麼境地?

在洪智坤「冒著生命危險」揭露此一醜聞之前,高雄「菊系」人馬在全代會的明爭暗鬥,其實已有諸多蛛絲馬跡可尋。包括:陳菊原規劃人選的余政憲遭逼退、邱議瑩的臨陣抱病替補,以及劉世芳的中箭落馬,情況都顯得極不尋常。而這些變化,幕後最主要的黑手竟然是「黃賭毒」等黑道勢力的介入施壓,迫使政治向「角頭」屈服,這是多麼可悲可怕的一幕。

李清福當選中常委的主要爭議有二。其一,是合法性的問題:依民進黨的《反黑金條款》,凡犯貪汙罪被起訴者,即根本失去參選資格。李清福在橋頭鄉長任內,辦理各種小型工程招標收受廠商八百多萬元賄款,一二審各依貪汙罪判十二年及六年徒刑。依《反黑金條款》的明文規定,他連參選中常委的資格都沒有,如今卻一路過關斬將,晉身成為中常委,顯已違反《反黑金條款》,根本不合法。

其二,是正當性的問題:如洪智坤所指控,民進黨全代會前夕,高雄地方角頭竟然偕同其他菊系黨代表北上,並現身選前拉票、固票餐會,不論是意在暗暗威嚇,或公然介入喬事,對選舉的公正性都構成了威脅。民進黨的權力中樞選舉,選在豪華的國際會議廳舉辦,但幕後竟是黑道、白道雜處一室的景象,而且最後由黑道勢力得逞,這使得黨中央的正當性蒙上污穢,受到質疑。

「李清福事件」其實是綠版的「林益世事件」。在高雄地方派系中,林益世是高雄「紅派」新生代掌門人,而李清福則有「黑派新教父」之稱,都是各據一方的人物,都犯下了索賄貪汙之罪。何況,「黑派」是黨外人物余登發所創,而如今余登發之孫余政道鞏固不住祖父的基業也就罷了,竟然在黨全代會遭黑金勢力連手逼退,何其不堪?對照綠營指著林益世案百般譏嘲,民進黨回首看看自己黨內派系黑金掛?的猖狂景象,它能看見正指著自己的四隻手指嗎?

洪智坤揭開這頁內幕,究竟出於什麼動機,不是國人關切的事。民眾想知道的是,民進黨為何故意開啟巧門,讓一個根本沒有資格參選的黑金人物一步步登上中常委寶座?民進黨長年在高雄地區執政,為何縱容黑道勢力侵蝕政治到這種「侵門踏戶」的地步?陳菊素來在意個人政治形象,又為何接受李清福這樣的人成為代表菊營的唯一中常委?

尤其可議的是,洪智坤挺身捍衛《反黑金條款》,黨中央非但不予支持,反而語帶威脅地稱其「行為實屬不當/可能違反黨紀」。試問,如今黨中央公然違反《反黑金條款》,成為護擁黑金人物變成中常委的共犯結構,將教洪智坤如何循「黨內既有機制」議論此事?黨中央如此倨傲、怯懦、昏庸,如何對得起黨內改革者及黨外支持者的期待?

目前,綠營內部對於李清福的去從,提出了多項解決方案,有人建議李清福主動辭去中常委職務,有人建議由黨主席蘇貞昌出面勸退。但李清福已聲明不會辭職,蘇貞昌則仍在打太極拳,只說了「任何指控都要有憑有據」的無關痛癢言論,民進黨發言人林俊憲還說李清福「候選資格合法」、「當選資格有效」。但《反黑金條款》豈不就是「憑據」?豈能「合法」?豈會「有效」?蘇貞昌的這種種反應,和國民黨立即開除林益世黨籍不能相比,甚至也不如蔡英文當初逼退涉案的不分區立委提名人鄭素華。如果這就是蘇貞昌的風格,豈不令人駭異?

林益世被逐出國民黨,咎由自取;但難道民進黨《反黑金條款》所禁止的李清福竟能晉身中常委?一個紅派,一個黑派,映照出高雄藍綠陣營的黑金真相。這塊大瘡疤,蘇貞昌究竟是要認真挖除,或是只想貼張狗皮膏藥遮醜了事?

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

The 25th Anniversary of the Lifting of Martial Law: Constitutional Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations

The 25th Anniversary of the Lifting of Martial Law:
Constitutional Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2012


Summary: On July 15, 1987, the Chiang Ching-kuo administration officially lifted 38 years and 56 days of martial law. Chiang Ching-kuo had an uncanny sense of history. He knew cross-Strait relations were inextricably intertwined with the Taiwan Region's constitutional democracy. For 25 years, Taiwan has remained on this road paved by Chiang Ching-kuo. When it comes to cross-Strait relations, even Beijing must walk this road

Full Text below:

Today is the 25th anniversary of the lifting of martial law. Let us relive this storm-tossed quarter century.

On July 15, 1987, the Chiang Ching-kuo administration officially lifted 38 years and 56 days of martial law. It declared constitutional democracy. It lifted the ban on political parties and the publication of new newspapers. It allowed cross-Strait exchanges. It allowed people to visit relatives in the Mainland Region of the nation. Chiang Ching-kuo had an uncanny sense of history. He knew cross-Strait relations were inextricably intertwined with the Taiwan Region's constitutional democracy. On the one hand, the public demanded cross-Strait exchanges. On the other hand, it demanded separation between the two sides. For 25 years, Taiwan has remained on this road paved by Chiang Ching-kuo. When it comes to cross-Strait relations, even Beijing must walk this road.

Taiwan's greatest challenge is cross-Strait relations. During martial law, cross-Strait relations were dealt with using martial law methods. Upon the lifting of martial law, cross-Strait relations were dealt with using constitutional and democratic methods. The methods may be different, but cross-Strait relations remain Taiwan's greatest challenge.

History is full of ironies. Chiang Ching-kuo's cross-Strait path could be implemented only because Lee Teng-hui sabotaged the KMT from within, leading to its defeat in 2000. It was replaced by Chen Shui-bian's DPP government, which clung to power for the next eight years. Had Lee Teng-hui not engineered the Kuomintang's defeat, Lien Chan would not have visited the Mainland in 2005 as KMT Chairman. He would not have had the opportunity to open the doors to cross-Strait exchanges. Had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian not demagogued Taiwan independence, Beijing would never have reconsidered its stance on cross-Strait policy. It would never have gone from saber rattling to peaceful development. This tortuous history was in part a consequence of the Lee and Chen dynasties' Taiwan independence demagoguery. This demagoguery provoked a public backlash which expressed itself at the ballot box. Beijing also learned a lesson from its mistaken strategies for dealing with Lee and Chen. It learned the Taiwan public's bottom line.

The lesson to be learned from this is that constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably intertwined. If cross-Strait relations meet with public approval, they are considered rational cross-Strait relations. Conversely, rational cross-Strait relations require the support of constitutional democracy. Taiwan's rulers and the authorities in Beijing cannot deviate from this principle. These are the cross-Strait rules of the game established by Chiang Ching-kuo 25 years ago.

As mentioned above, Chiang Ching-kuo's lifting of martial law involved two strands. One strand was the promotion of constitutional democracy. The other strand was the opening of cross-Strait exchanges. These two are intertwined like the strands of a rope. For 25 years democratic constitutionalism has been evolving. Lee Teng-hui is a clear example. He enacted the "National Unification Guidelines." He said "I have said 300 times that I am opposed to Taiwan independence." Later he denounced the KMT government as a "foreign regime." He argued that the Mainland Region and the Taiwan Region were "two states." He claimed that "The Republic of China perished long ago." More recently he reversed himself again. He said "Shouting Taiwan independence is pointless." He even said "I never advocated Taiwan independence." These are Lee Teng-hui's flip-flops on the ROC Constitution. They are a microcosm of 25 years of constitutional crises.

Now look at cross-Strait relations. For 25 years, Lee Teng-hui trumpeted his "Coming Collapse of [Mainland] China Theory." For 25 years, his prophecy failed to materialize. Just the opposite. The world now talks about the "Rise of a Great Nation." Lee Teng-hui's "be patient, avoid haste" policy turned out to be unsustainable. Under the Chen Shui-bian regime, the Mainland market accounted for 40% of Taiwan's exports. ECFA has become Taiwan's most successful economic and trade agreement. Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan increased annual pineapple cake production from 1 billion to 25 billion units.

As we can see, constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably intertwined. Those who argue that "The Republic of China is a foreign regime" will advocate the "Coming Collapse of [Mainland] China Theory." They will advocate "be patient, and avoid haste." They will advocate the "rectification of names." Those who champion and defend the Republic of China on the other hand, will advocate "three links." They will advocate ECFA. They will advocate a peace agreement. They will advocate "one China, different interpretations." They will advocate "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force." This is why the Republic of China's constitutional democracy is rooted in cross-Strait relations. This is why cross-Strait relations constrains the Republic of China's democracy and constitutional government. Constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably intertwined. This has remained true since martial law was lifted 25 years ago.

For 25 years, constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations have undergone one crisis after another. But even major derailments contributed to inextricably intertwined relations. For example, had Lee Teng-hui not sabotaged the Kuomintang, and caused it to lose power, Lien Chan would never have visited the Mainland. Had Chen Shui-bian not thoroughly discredited Taiwan independence, the public would never have appreciated the hollowness of its demands for the "rectification of names." Had Beijing's actions during the 1996 missile crisis not backfired, Beijing's cross-Strait policy would not have evolved into today's "peaceful development." The past 25 years have taught the Blue, Green, and Red camps that constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably interwoven.

Over the past 25 years, some people on both sides of the Strait have attempted to deviate from the rules of the game established by Chiang Ching-kuo. But those who tried, failed. In the future, perhaps someone on one side or the other will make another such attempt. But they too will have a difficult time overcoming Chiang Ching-kuo's rules of the game.

解嚴廿五周年:民主憲政與兩岸關係的交纏
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.15 03:22 am

今天是解嚴二十五周年,可對這四分之一世紀的雷電風雨作一回顧。

一九八七年七月十五日,蔣經國政府公告解除實施了三十八年又五十六天的戒嚴令,宣布進入民主憲政(解除黨禁、報禁),並開啟兩岸交流(開放赴陸探親);蔣經國的歷史感是準確的,此一架構使得兩岸關係與台灣的民主憲政出現麻花式的交纏,一方面因民意而維持兩岸交流,另一方面也因民意而建立兩岸區隔。二十五年來,台灣一直走在蔣經國鋪設的這條道路上,北京在兩岸關係上也不能跳出此一道路。

台灣最重要的生命課題就是兩岸關係。在戒嚴時代,是以戒嚴統治來處理兩岸關係;在解嚴之後,則是改以民主憲政來處理兩岸關係。方法雖異,但兩岸關係作為台灣最重要生命課題的地位並未動搖改變。

然而,歷史也充滿諷刺,促成蔣經國路線之所以能在兩岸間初告確立,其關鍵事件其實是二○○○年李登輝輸掉了國民黨政權,改由民進黨的陳水扁政府主政八年。如果不是李登輝輸掉國民黨的政權,連戰就不可能在二○○○五年以國民黨主席身分訪問大陸,開啟了兩岸的機會之窗;又如果不是李登輝及陳水扁的台獨操作,北京亦不可能對兩岸政策痛切省思,從「文攻武嚇」轉為「和平發展」。這一段曲折的歷史是:一方面,李扁兩朝的台獨操作,經台灣民眾以民主程序給予否定;另一方面,北京亦從與李扁對應的失敗中,領悟了台灣民意的底蘊。

其中的啟示是:在台灣,民主憲政與兩岸關係是交纏的麻花,若是符合民意的兩岸關係,就是合理的兩岸關係;而合理的兩岸關係,又必須獲得民主憲政的支撐。台灣的執政者與北京當局皆不易背離此一法則,這是蔣經國在二十五年前預設的兩岸遊戲規則。

如前所述,蔣經國解嚴,有兩條主線。一是推進民主憲政,一是開放兩岸互動;這正是麻花的兩股。二十五年來,就民主憲政的演化言,李登輝就是一個顯例:他從頒行「國家統一綱領」、「說了三百次的反台獨」,到「外來政權」、「兩國論」、「中華民國已經滅亡」,最近又變成「喊台獨沒有用」,甚至說「我沒有主張台獨」……。這是李登輝的「憲法履歷」,也是台灣二十五年憲政風潮的濃縮版。

再看兩岸關係,二十五年來,李登輝預言的「中國崩潰論」並未實現,反而「大國崛起」成了舉世的話題;李登輝的「戒急用忍」也難以為繼,扁政府將大陸市場推到占台灣外銷總額的四十%,而如今ECFA又成為台灣最成功的經貿談判,大陸來台觀光客更使原本年產值十幾億的鳳梨酥飆到二五○億。

由此可見,民主憲政與兩岸關係是一個麻花。主張「中華民國是外來政權」者,就會主張「中國崩潰論」,就會主張「戒急用忍」,就會主張「正名制憲」;但選擇維持及護衛「中華民國」者,就會主張「三通」,主張ECFA,主張「和平協議」,主張「一中各表」,主張「不統、不獨、不武」。正因如此,台灣的民主憲政是以兩岸關係為主要的課題,而兩岸關係這個課題也制約了台灣的民主憲政;此一民主憲政與兩岸關係的麻花架構,遂成為解嚴二十五年的歷史主軸。

二十五年來,在民主憲政及兩岸關係屢屢出現驚濤駭浪;但即使是一些重大的脫軌事件,也對這個麻花關係的推進作出了貢獻。例如:若不是李登輝輸掉國民黨政權,連戰不可能訪陸;若不是陳水扁把台獨搞砸搞臭,國人不知「正名制憲」的虛無;若不是一九九六年的「飛彈危機」計不得售,北京的兩岸政策不會走到今日的「和平發展」。二十五年間,兩岸藍綠紅三黨的領導階層,應皆領悟到台灣「民主憲政與兩岸關係」的麻花效應。

二十五年來,兩岸都有人嘗試背離這一套蔣經國設定的遊戲規則,但皆告失敗。未來,也許兩岸仍有人會作此嘗試,但恐怕還是不易跳出蔣經國的宏觀擘劃。
          

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Is the US Abandoning Taiwan? TPP trumps Arms Sales

Is the US Abandoning Taiwan?
TPP trumps Arms Sales
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 17, 2012


Summary: Rumors have suddenly emerged from Washington saying that Washington is "abandoning Taiwan." This may be a non-mainstream view. But it shows that such rumors persist. Therefore they cannot be completely ignored. AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt said the United States is willing to support Taiwan's accession to the TPP. He said that President Ma has already shortened the TPP waiting time from ten years to eight years. But he said the wait could be even shorter.

Full Text below:

Rumors have suddenly emerged from Washington saying that Washington is "abandoning Taiwan." This may be a non-mainstream view. But it shows that such rumors persist. Therefore they cannot be completely ignored.

The reason cited for the alleged abandonment is that Taipei is an obstacle to improved Washington-Beijing relations. A reduced commitment to Taipei, means more Washington has more freedom and latitude regarding Washington-Beijing relations. This argument is expressed in various forms. Some say Washington is abandoning Taipei in exchange for Beijing forgiving Washington's one trillion dollars in debt to Beijing. Some say Taiwan has been "Finlandized," and Washington no longer supports Taipei's challenges toward Beijing.

The "Abandoned Taiwan Hypothesis" has a blind spot. It sees the relationship between Taipei and Washington as all or nothing. But Taipei-Washington relations is not a choice between "total coverage" and "total abandonment." This was not Taipei's relationship to Washington yesterday. It is not its relationship today. And it will not be its relationship in the future.

Even the Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty, in force between 1954 and 1980 had conditions. It only covered defense and containment. It did not cover Taiwan retaking the Mainland. The Chen Shui-bian government incited Taiwan independence. It provoked conflict between the two sides. The Bush administration said Taiwan independence elements were butting their heads up against a wall. They contributed nothing to Taiwan's democracy. Instead they undermined Taiwan's larger interests. As we can see, the US is not about to defend Taiwan unconditionally. Conversely it is unlikely to sever relations with Taiwan totally and "abandon" it.

The global situation and the cross-Strait atmosphere have changed, dramatically. Taipei-Washington relations have changed as well. In the 1950s, Taiwan was seen as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," in the first line of defense. Washington formed a military alliance with Taipei against the threat from Beijing. This gradually changed. Today Washington supports Taipei because of its free economy and democratic politics. It helps Taipei use peaceful and democratic means to deal with Beijing. Taipei-Washington relations have diminished military significance. But they have increased ideological significance. Taipei and Washington uphold the same democratic values. This ideological significance is greater than the military significance.

Washington's cross-Strait policy is a "one-China policy." It has two bottom lines. It will not allow Beijing to destroy Taiwan's free economy and democratic politics by force. To wit, its intervention during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Two. It will not allow Taiwan independence elements to undermine cross-Strait peace. To wit, its labeling of Chen Shui-bian as a "troublemaker."

To focus solely on the military significance of Taipei-Washington relations misses the point. Taiwan independence elements cannot achieve Taiwan independence through war. If Taiwan independence elements do not implement de jure Taiwan independence, Beijing has no reason to use force against Taiwan. Even if Beijing succeeded in occupying Taiwan, it would find it difficult to justify itself in the annals of Chinese history, and in the eyes of world. Washington is treading a middle way between "no Taiwan independence" and "no Mainland use of force." It has no reason to stir up cross-Strait enmiity. Taipei-Washington military relations, including arms sales, are ideological in nature, and not the real focus.

Will Washington "return to Asia?" Beijing has not been "exporting revolution." Instead, it has stressed "peaceful development." It is fully integrated into the world trade system. If Washington uses force against Beijing, it will lack a just cause. This is true even for the recent altercations in the South China Sea and surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands, Each of the parties claiming sovereignty has spoken his peace. Would Washington really risk war and intervene? From a global perspective, the chances that Washington would provoke a war with nuclear armed Beijing are nearly zero.

Under these international and cross-Strait circumstances, Washington no longer views Taiwan as an anti-Communist outpost in a showdown with Beijing. It is doing its utmost to prevent Taiwan from becoming a fuse that ignites conflict in the region. Taipei should have no illusions that in a conflict between Washington and Beijing, it would be Washington's vanguard. It should have no illusions that it can drag Washington and Beijing into a war and profit from the conflict.

The US "one China policy" offers Taipei some maneuvering room. Taipei must work at remaining economically free and politically democratic. This will enable it to stand its ground. This will enable it to remain independent and interact with Beijing. This will enable it to establish a peaceful win/win relationship. The US cannot "abandon Taiwan." Conversely, Taiwan independence elements must not entertain fantasies. They must not assume the U.S. will continue to see Taiwan as an anti-Communist outpost. They must not assume the U.S. will sympathize with the Taiwan independence movement. They must not assume the U.S. will "return to Asia," and therefore need Taiwan as military leverage. That would be naive in the extreme. That is a check the US would not be likely to honor.

Consider the prospects for Washington-Taipei relations. The TPP (Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement) is actually more important than arms sales. Arms sales involve battlefield weapons that cannot be used. Their sole purpose is ideological. If they are actually used, it would mean mutual destruction for both sides. If Taipei can join the US led TPP, it can integrate itself into the international community. It can then enjoy both economic and political security.

AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt said the United States is willing to support Taiwan's accession to the TPP. He said that President Ma has already shortened the TPP waiting time from ten years to eight years. But he said the wait could be even shorter.

美國棄台論:TPP比軍售重要
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.17 01:48 am

華府三不五時傳出「棄台論」,這雖係非主流的觀點,但至少顯示這種論調陰魂不散,不能全然聽若罔聞。

棄台論的觀念主軸認為:台灣是美中關係的障礙,美國若能降低對台灣的承諾,可以增加美國在美中關係上的自由與空間。這類論述以多種形式呈現:等而下之的是有人主張,以美國放棄台灣,交換中國取消美國的一點一四兆美元債務;形而上者則主張,台灣「芬蘭化」,美國不再支持台灣挑戰中國大陸。

棄台論有一盲點,就是欲將台美關係作「零與一百」的二分法;好像台美關係,不是「全保」就是「全棄」,不是「全棄」就是「全保」。但是,台美關係過去不曾如此,現在不是如此,未來也不會如此。

即使在台美的《中美共同防禦條約》生效期間(1954-1980),美國的「保台」也是有條件的;只在防禦及牽制,不容台灣「反攻大陸」;再如,陳水扁政府操弄台獨,在兩岸之間開釁,布希政府直指這是台獨分子「推車撞壁」(hitting into a wall),不但不能增添台灣的民主內涵,反而違反了台灣的整體利益。由此可知,美國不會無條件地「保台」;但是,若謂美國會一刀兩斷地「棄台」,亦為不可想像。

隨著世界情勢與兩岸氛圍的丕變,台美關係也逐漸推移變化。變化的主軸是:由50年代美國將台灣視為第一島鏈的不沉的航空母艦,與台灣結為軍事同盟,對抗中國大陸的威脅;逐漸轉移至今日,支持台灣為自由民主的政經體制,協助台灣以和平民主的方法去處理與中國大陸的關係。台美關係,在軍事意義上降低,但在共同維護民主價值的共識上則升高,這猶勝於軍事上的意義。

美國的兩岸政策主軸是「一個中國政策」。有兩條底線:一,不容中共以武力消滅台灣的自由民主政經體制,1996年台海危機可證;二,但也不容台獨挑釁兩岸關係,陳水扁被指為「麻煩製造者」即是例證。

因此,若將台美關係盯在軍事意義上,這是失焦。因為,台灣不可能以戰爭贏得台獨的實現;而台灣若不主張法理台獨,北京即無其他開戰動武的理由;且北京即使硬要以戰爭奪下台灣,其在中國歷史上及世界評價上將無以立足;而美國在「台灣不獨/大陸不武」的平衡中,亦無在兩岸尋釁的理由。因此,台美的軍事關係,包括軍售,主要只是用於政治上的表態及宣示,已非焦點。

再者,不論美國是否「重返亞洲」;中國既未「輸出革命」,又強調「和平發展」,並已完全融入世界經貿體系,美國真要對中國動武,恐亦師出無名;即使以最近南海及釣魚台的風潮而論,相關的主權爭議各說各話,美國難道真敢冒大不韙地以戰爭手段介入?事實上,就全球觀點而言,美國無端挑起與核子中國開戰的機率也幾乎是零。

在這樣的國際及兩岸情勢下,美國非但不會再將台灣視為與中國對抗的反共前哨,且更會全力促使台灣不再成為區域衝突的引信;而台灣方面,亦不必幻想能在美中兩大的敵對中,重新扮演美國尖兵的角色,更不必以為台灣能將美中拖入戰爭而從中獲利。

換句話說,台灣若在美國的「一個中國政策」的既有空間中,努力以自由民主的政經成就,站穩腳跟,自主且有效地與中國大陸建立和平雙贏的互動,美國即不可能「棄台」;相對而言,台灣若幻想美國仍將台灣視作反共前哨,或美國同情台獨,或美國「重返亞洲」需要台灣作為軍事槓桿,那恐怕就失之天真,未必能兌現美國「保台」的支票。

準此而言,瞻望美台關係的前景,TPP(跨太平洋經濟夥伴協議)其實比軍售重要。軍售只是以不可能真正用於戰場的武器,作政治表態(若真用上,必是兩岸的相互毀滅);但台灣若能加入由美國主導的TPP,則可藉以融入國際社會,並獲得經濟上及政治上的平衡與安全。

對此,美國在台協會(AIT)主席薄瑞光說:美國願意支持台灣加入TPP;他還說,儘管馬總統已將加入TPP的時程由十年縮短為八年,但他認為還可以再快一點。

Monday, July 16, 2012

DPP National Party Congress: No Policy Platform, but Plenty of Vote-Buying

DPP National Party Congress: No Policy Platform, but Plenty of Vote-Buying
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2012


Summary: Yesterday the Democratic Progressive Party held its National Party Congress. The starting price for one vote was 300,000 New Taiwan Dollars. This heralded the advent of the "Su Tseng-chang Era." Ironically, the theme of this National Party Congress was "Go forth, Taiwan!" Community expectations for the DPP were placed under the spotlight. What sort of issues were raised? None. What sort of atmosphere prevailed? One of utter indifference. Factions attempted to get the jump on each other in their quest for ever more political power. The party did nothing to respond to society's aspirations.


Full Text below:

Yesterday the Democratic Progressive Party held its National Party Congress. The starting price for one vote was 300,000 New Taiwan Dollars. This heralded the advent of the "Su Tseng-chang Era." Ironically, the theme of this National Party Congress was "Go forth, Taiwan!" Community expectations for the DPP were placed under the spotlight. What sort of issues were raised? None. What sort of atmosphere prevailed? One of utter indifference. Factions attempted to get the jump on each other in their quest for ever more political power. The party did nothing to respond to society's aspirations.

The results of yesterday's Central Executive Committee and Standing Committee elections are in. Su Tseng-chang relied on his new invisible network to consolidate power. The Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun camps gained strength. Tsai Ing-wen was the only one who kept her distance from the party leadership. But this distance was virtual, not actual. What does this tell us? It tells us Su Tseng-chang, Frank Hsieh, and Yu Shyi-kun remain the "party princes." Their factions have seized power. The DPP has made zero progress since Chen Shui-bian's rampant corruption and reckless Taiwan independence antics led to its loss of power in 2008. All it has left behind is black marks and an empty resume. The players may have changed, but not the game.

The Special Investigation Unit is currently investigating the Lin Yi-shi case. Meanwhile, the price of one vote in the DPP Central Executive Committee election has been bid up. It has increased from 300,000 dollars a vote to 700,000 or even 800,000 dollars a vote. This is something hard to imagine. One. The Executive Council and the Central Standing Committee are the highest authorities within the party. If its members are elected through vote-buying, how can their future decisions possibly be fair and objective? Two. The DPP has been castigating Lin Yi-shi for taking bribes. So why is it ignoring vote-buying within its own party? Three. Local KMT city and county council elections were often occasions for "night after night of free food, sale upon sale of bought votes." Now such scenes are being reenacted by the DPP at luxury hotels throughout Taipei City. The participants think the asking price of 300,000 dollars per vote is "very reasonable." Given such attitudes, what is one to make of Su Tseng-chang's promise to "lead the DPP and win the public trust?

The nation and the world are in dire straits. The public hoped the DPP National Party Congress would offer suggestions on how to save the nation and the world. But party representative proposals lacked insight into party and national affairs. Worse, their proposals betrayed a pattern of bigotry. All in all, it was deeply disappointing. For example, Trong Chai proposed recalling Blue Camp legislators who supported the importation of US beef containing Clenbuterol. He promptly obtained 50 signatures from party representatives. Some proposed that the DPP Central Committee establish a "Save Ah-Bian Group." Su Tseng-chang signed Ko Wen-je's "Medical Parole for Ah-Bian" petition. DPP party representatives demagogued the "Support Ah-Bian" and "Save Ah-Bian" movements to the hilt. The former merely increased political squabbling. The latter merely pandered to diehard Ah-Bian supporters. Neither did anything to improve the DPP's public image. Yet these became the utterly repellent themes of the entire party congress.

President Ma's approval rating has plummeted to a mere 15%. The KMT's approval rating following Lin Yi-shi's corruption scandal has reached a nadir. The DPP is feeling self-satisfied and smug. But the DPP must realize that its opponent's infirmity will not enhance its own vitality. The DPP must remedy its own weaknesses. DPP leaders must persuade voters of their own ability. When they mount the podium, they will inevitably reveal their true colors. The memory of Chen Shui-bian era Taiwan independence antics and rampant corruption will resurface in the public consciousness. If Su Tseng-chang cannot get through even this bottleneck, how can he talk about breaking the deadlock for Taiwan?

When news of DPP party representatives flagrantly buying votes emerged, a few DPP members engaged in soul-searching. But most voiced no objections whatsoever. They considered these bribes "merely the cost of doing business." Most disgusting of all, some Green Camp faithful rationalized this vote-buying. They argued that "This is not a public election. It's perfectly legal to buy votes." Do Su Tseng-chang and the DPP consider this "vote-buying is legal" argument acceptable?

Ironically the National Party Congress debated whether party members should be allowed to vote in the party primaries. Party leaders objected, saying "the Kuomintang might meddle," or "prosecutors might meddle." Meanwhile, they turned a blind eye to machine voting and vote-buying. Does the DPP see its own shortcomings? Or does it only know how to point the finger at others? Vote-buying in the National Party Congress has become this flagrant. If party members are once again allowed to vote, how high will machine voters bid up the price of a single vote in the party primaries? Does the DPP even know?

The public wants "Go forward, Taiwan!" to be a reality. But when people look at the DPP's behavior, they see no leadership. They see no forward movement. The DPP National Party Congress was yet another occasion on which the DPP failed to offer a political vision. Even Su Tseng-chang's own speech was vague and incomprehensible. This suggests that the DPP's vision for Taiwan is more constricted than ever. This suggests that its ability to lead Taiwan is more feeble than ever.

The DPP must transform its cross-Strait policy. Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, and Frank Hsieh remain locked in political struggle. The only news emerging from the DPP National Party Congress concerns vote-buying, not political vision. This tells us the DPP is on trial. The jury is still out, and the verdict is still unknown. 

未聞政見卻聞買票的民進黨全代會
【聯合報╱社論】

2012.07.16

民進黨昨天的全代會,在「一票卅萬起跳」的買票風聲伴奏下,宣告了「蘇貞昌時代」的來臨。諷刺的是,這次全代會主題標榜「前進吧!台灣」,還把各界菁英對民進黨的期許拍攝得意境深遠;但觀察場上的議題和氣氛,除了派系卡位奪權,卻看不出整個黨有多少回應台灣社會的作為。

昨天的中執委及中常委選舉結果,蘇貞昌靠隱形的新系鞏固權力中樞;謝長廷和游錫?人馬斬獲突出,唯蔡英文選擇暫與黨中央保持距離,卻未實際遠離。這個結構,說明黨內權力目前仍為「蘇謝游天王」及派系奪權的格局;但深一層看,自2008年民進黨因扁貪瀆與台獨操作而丟掉政權後留下的汙點及空白,除了人的變化,黨的轉型在基本上毫無進展。

正在特偵組偵辦林益世案之際,這次民進黨中執委的價碼,從一票卅萬元起跳喊到七、八十萬元,這是令人難以想像的事。第一,中執會及中常會是黨的最高權力機關,如果委員竟是靠買票產生,決策還能公正客觀嗎?第二,民進黨先前對林益世索賄極盡冷嘲熱諷,為何竟放縱黨內買票、賣票?第三,「連夜宴飲、固票換票」過去是國民黨地方議會選舉常見的景象,現在竟由民進黨全本照搬到台北的大飯店演出,且當事人還振振有詞覺得開價卅萬「很合理」。這種心態,要如何實現蘇貞昌所說的「引導民進黨更被人民信賴」?

世局國情艱險嚴峻,國人原想在民進黨的全代會上能夠聽到經世救國的大政方針;但看各路黨代表在會上的提案,不僅缺乏事關黨政大局之創見,有些簡直格局偏狹,令人失望。例如,蔡同榮提案罷免支持開放美牛瘦肉精等之藍軍立委,立即獲得五十名黨代表連署;有人提案在黨中央成立「救扁小組」,蘇貞昌則簽署了柯文哲所提的「挺扁保外就醫」連署,把挺扁、救扁行動推上高潮。前者無非旨在深化政治惡鬥,後者則為應付挺扁勢力,其實無助於提升民進黨的社會形象,卻變成了全代會的「主菜」,簡直倒盡胃口。

不難想像,正當馬總統聲望跌至百分之十五,而國民黨氣勢被林益世敗到谷底,民進黨此刻不免有「自我感覺良好」的飄飄然。但民進黨不會不知道,對手身上的膿瘡,不能當成自己的維生養分;如果不修補自己的弱項,拿出讓選民信服的作為,一輪到自己站上舞台就現出原形,扁政府時代「台獨與貪汙」的記憶又會浮現民眾腦海。若連此一瓶頸都無法突破,蘇貞昌又奢談什麼帶領台灣突破僵局?

黨代表買票、賣票的歪風傳開後,民進黨固有若干反省的聲音,但許多人卻不以為意,認為經營黨員本來就有「成本」。最可怕的是,有些挺綠網友竟然幫腔說:「又不是公職選舉,買票是合法的。」請問蘇貞昌:民進黨認同這種「買票合法論」的主張嗎?

尤其弔詭的是,這次全代會也討論了黨內初選要不要恢復「黨員投票」的機制,而黨內的反對意見都集中在「國民黨介入」或「檢調介入」的問題,卻故意將內部「人頭黨員」及「黨內賄選」因素略而不談。這是民進黨沒有自知之明,或者只懂得嫁禍栽贓?試想,如果全代會都買票買成這樣了,若恢復黨員投票,人頭黨員將初選中被賣到什麼價碼,民進黨自己能想像嗎?

對國人而言,「前進吧!台灣」確實是一個令人渴望的憧憬,但觀察民進黨的整體行動,卻讓人看不到領導台灣前進的動力。這場全代會,幾是民進黨歷屆中僅見的未能凸顯政見架構的一次,連蘇貞昌的講辭也極度空泛,不知所云;這是否顯示民進黨思考台灣出路的努力越來越小,領導台灣前進的能量也越來越小。

民進黨正陷於兩岸政策轉型困難,與蘇蔡謝政治角力不可開交之中;這一場未聞政見只聞賄選的全代會,顯示民進黨面臨的考驗正是方興未艾。