Friday, October 29, 2010

Official Salaries: Do Not Put the Cart Before the Horse

Official Salaries: Do Not Put the Cart Before the Horse
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 29, 2010

Yesterday the Control Yuan held a press conference. Control Yuan Members Chao Yung-yao and Ko Yung-kuang pointed out that the annual salary of the Director of the Department of Health, National Health Research Institute was 8.41 million NT. The annual salary of the President of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Industrial Technology Research Institute, was 7.8 million NT. Both were higher than the 6.24 million NT annual salary of the President of the Republic of China. The Control Yuan pointed out that these foundations had no objective salary scale, and that their salaries were much too high. The Control Yuan said the Executive Yuan had failed to properly supervise and manage them, therefore the Control Yuan should address this oversight.

The Control Yuan's corrective move is consistent with the public's desire to "stick it to the fat cats." Legislators have demanded answers. Pundits have raised a stink. Fat cat salaries have become a hot issue. The Control Yuan has officially intervened. It appears the Executive Yuan has no choice but to deal with the problem. But we do not approve of the Control Yuan's populist logic vis a vis salary evalution. We do not think the salaries government agencies provide these foundations should be dealt with in such a crude manner.

First let's address their logic. Why must the salary of the Director of the Industrial Technology Research Institute or the Director of the National Institute of Health be lower than that of the president or a ministry head? Control Yuan members explained their reasoning during their press conference. "Who has a busier schedule? The Minister of Economic Affairs, or the Chairman of the Industrial Research Institute?" The implication was that salaries should be directly related to how busy the individual is. Because ministry heads are busier than the chairmen of research institutes, therefore ministry heads' salaries ought to be higher. Based on the same logic, the president must attend to hundreds of matters each day, therefore his salary ought to be the highest of all. But this reasoning is utterly inconsistent with the basic principles of personnel management.

Economic theory tells us that the salary a person receives, depends on his economic contribution. Textbooks refer to this as their "productivity." Highly productive people receive high salaries. Less productive people receive lower salaries. Busy high officials are not necessarily economically productive. They are likely to be busy with ribbon-cutting ceremonies, busy giving speeches, busy attending weddings and funerals, and busy sucking up to their superiors. They may be busy dealing with unending, pointless issues that legislators have raised. These ministry heads run about like chickens with their heads cut off. What reason do we have to reward them with high salaries?

By contrast, when Morris Chang, the Director of the Industrial Technology Research Institute, planned and promoted Taiwan's semiconductor industry, he may have been in his office all day, poring through technical data. He may have been recruiting talent. He may or may not have been all that busy. But his contribution to our economy was enormous. What's wrong with paying him a higher salary? If every president of the Industrial Research Institute was comparable to Morris Chang, the taxpayers would be ahead even if they paid them five or ten times as much as the president. What would be wrong with that? The first mistake the Control Yuan members made was to compare the salaries of foundation heads with ministry heads. Their second mistake was to correlate their salaries to how busy they were. What right to they have to "correct" the Executive Yuan?

Secondly, our legislators and Control Yuan members, in criticizing the salaries received by certain people, have ignored the underlying cause. With hindsight, a high-paying job can be a featherbed for incompetents. But high-paying jobs can also attract highly capable talent. Even if we believe the current job holder does not deerve the salary he is being paid, that does not mean the government should reduce the salary for the job as such. If the Republic of China hopes to once again achieve new heights of industrial achievement, akin to those once pioneered by the ICT industries, we must not cut salaries. On the contrary, we must increase salaries for these industries. Only then can be attract the next batch of Morris Changs.

If the government allows itself to be corrected by the Control Yuan, and reduces the salaries of the President of the National Institute of Health in half, then the government will no longer be able to attract first-rate talent. We believe the salary of the President of the Industrial Technology Research Institute should not be reduced. We believe the salaries of senior government officials are on the low side. Everyone on Taiwan wants to emulate Singapore, but not when it comes to salaries for ministry heads. Singapore's ministry heads receive annual salaries amounting to 40 million NT, approximatly 18 times the salary of ROC ministry heads. It is precisely because public officials receive such excellent treatment, that Singapore is able to attract the best people to work in its government.

Government ministries are the entities that manage private enterprises. The ability of managers is supposed to be superior to the ability of those being managed. That is the only way management can work. But the situation is exactly the opposite on Taiwan. The salary of the Chairman of the FSC is far less than the salary for the general manager of any financial conglomerate. Is it necessary to ask how an individual of ability will decide when choosing between a public sector job, or a private sector job in the financial sector? The Minister of Economic Affairs is paid far less than the executive vice president of a computer company. Is anyone who understands the industry going to want to enter government service? It is precisely because the salaries of ministry heads on Taiwan are too low, that legislators and Control Yuan members do not respect them. Our society is unable to recruit competent people to become ministry heads.

The Control Yuan is not thinking about increasing the benefits for ministry heads in order to attract talent. Instead, it is using low salaries as a reference point, in the hope of cutting the salaries of the heads of the Industrial Research Institute and the National Institutes of Health. This is truly astounding. It is nothing less than putting the cart before the horse.

討論職位薪水,不要本末倒置
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.10.29

監察院日前召開記者會,監委趙榮耀與葛永光均指出,衛生署所屬國家衛生研究院院長的薪水每年841萬、經濟部所屬「工業技術研究院」院長的薪水780萬,都比總統年薪624萬還高。監委指出,這些財團法人薪資待遇漫無標準,且有過高現象,而行政院未能監督管理,監察院遂應提出糾正。

這一次監察院的糾正案,可以說是配合社會上「打肥貓」的運動而提出。立委質詢、名嘴吵鬧肥貓議題已是喧騰熱鬧,如今監察院又正式提糾正案,看樣子行政院非要處理不可。但是坦白說,我們並不贊成監委如此民粹式的比薪邏輯,也不認為部會所屬財團法人的薪水,該這樣粗糙地處理。

首先要談的是邏輯問題。工研院或國衛院院長的薪水,為什麼一定得比總統或部長低?監委在記者會上所提的理由是:「是經濟部長忙還是工研院董事長忙?」言下之意薪水是該與忙碌程度成正比的。由於部長比工研院長忙,所以部長的薪水應該高一些。依照同樣的推理,總統日理萬機,所以他的薪水該最高。但是這樣的邏輯完全不合薪給與人事管理的基本原理。

經濟學的理論告訴我們,一個人薪資的多寡,要看他的貢獻(教科書上稱作「生產力」)大小;生產力高的人薪水高,生產力低的人薪資低。要注意的是,工作忙碌的大官未必有什麼生產力,很可能是忙碌於剪綵、致辭、紅白帖、拍馬屁,以及應付立委監委沒完沒了的調查等不營養的事。若是這種沒頭蒼蠅式的忙碌,有什麼理由領高薪?

相反的,當年工研院院長張忠謀規畫構思推動台灣的半導體產業,說不定整天在辦公室讀資料、募人才,說忙未必,但是對台灣經濟貢獻卻極大,台灣付他高一點的薪水又有什麼不對?若是工研院每一任的院長都能找到像張忠謀這一級的A咖,就算薪水是總統的五倍十倍,台灣人民也是賺到了,又有什麼不可以?監察委員把財團法人首長的薪水與部長比是第一個錯誤,再將薪水與忙碌程度比是第二個錯誤,又憑什麼去糾正行政院呢?

其次,我們的立委、監委批評若干職位的薪水,都忽略其背後的因果推理。一個高薪職位事後看來有可能養了個無能廢人,但事前看來高薪卻有機會吸引到能力極強的幹才。即使我們認為現任的在位者都不夠資格領那份薪水,但這卻並不表示國家該據此而做減薪的思考。如果台灣還期盼再創產業高峰、再開拓類似當年ICT產業的輝煌前景,則我們就不但不該砍薪,還該把與這些產業相關若干職位的薪水拉高,如此才有可能找到下一批的張忠謀。

假若政府真的接受監察院的糾正,將國衛院院長等職位的薪水減半,則台灣就可能再也請不到一流的人才返國加入。反過來說,此處主張不應扣減工研院院長的薪水,但也同時認為我國高層政府首長的薪給偏低。台灣什麼都想學新加坡,偏偏對部會首長的薪水不肯學。星國部長年薪約四千萬台幣,大約是台灣部長年薪的十八倍。正由於該國公職人員待遇極佳,遂能吸引最好的人才去政府工作。

政府部會是管理民間企業的單位,而管理者的能力照理說要高於被管理者,這樣管理才會上軌道。但台灣的情形卻剛好相反;金管會主委的薪資遠不如任何一家金控業者的總經理,請問有能力的幹才在公職與私人金融主管之間,會選哪一邊?經濟部長薪水遠不及電腦公司的執行副總,請問懂產業的人才誰要去政府服務?正因為台灣部長的薪水太低、立委監委對部長太不尊重,我們的社會就找不到真正能幹的人去做部長。

如今,監委們不思為部會首長增加待遇以吸引幹才,卻以這偏低的待遇為標竿,想要刪減工研院與國衛院等其他具有潛在貢獻職位的薪水,令人驚異。本末倒置,斯之謂也。

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Wang Cho-chun Represents Official Policy, Jiang Ping Represents Individual Conduct

Wang Cho-chun Represents Official Policy, Jiang Ping Represents Individual Conduct
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 28, 2010

Two incidents have provided answers to questions surrounging recent cross-Strait controversies. They offer important indicators for future cross-Strait exchanges. First, National Police Administration Chief Wang Cho-chun led a delegation to the Mainland. This tells us the direction cross-Strait policy will be taking. Secondly, we have confirmation that the bizarre words and deeds of Mainland delegation leader Jiang Ping during the Tokyo Film Festival incident was merely a case of "individual conduct."

Yesterday Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi responded to the Tokyo International Film Festival controversy. He said it "may have been due to a lack of communication between the two parties. It precipitated "a situation we do not want to see." The "we" Yang Yi referred to, is the central government in Beijing. The "do not want to see," Yang Yi referred to, was the consequences of Jiang Ping's words and deeds. Yang said, "Cross-strait relations are continually developing and improving. Under such circumstances, the two sides should avoid both external and internal frictions." His statement implied that Jiang Ping's conduct was a form of internal friction that ran counter to "continually developing and improving cross-Strait relations."

Most observers on Taiwan concluded that the Tokyo International Film Festival last weekend was the result of "individual conduct." They concluded that it could not have been an "offically sanctioned act by Beijing." This suggests that the two sides have established considerable mutual trust. No one believed that the central government in Beijing could possibly have committed such and ignorant and irrational act, given "continually developing and improving cross-Strait relations." Today, Yang Yi's remarks have confirmed that this mutual trust is real and well-founded. The two sides have struggled for two years on behalf of better relations. This should be an enormous relief to those with high hopes for improved cross-Strait relations. It is also a test of those relations, one whose result has not let them down.

Some Mainland netizens consider Jiang Ping a hero for the waves he generated during the film festival. But this is not the official position represented by Yang Yi. Even members of the Mainland delegation to the Tokyo Film Festival were displeased with Jiang Ping's conduct. Some feel his words and deeds did not represent the views of the delegation, but was merely a case of 'Jiang Ping directing a "Love Song of Kangding",' and backing out of the Tokyo International Film Festival. One delegation member said, "It was absurd. I cannot believe it represented the attitude of the [Mainland] Chinese government. It was merely a case of individual conduct." Turn the clock back two years, and it is unlikely delegation members would have been so free in expressing their opinions. As we can see by the attitudes expressed by Mainland delegation members, most people on the Mainland currently have a much better understanding of cross-Strait relations, and much deeper trust.

Contrast their views with Jiang Ping's faux pas. National Police Administration Chief Wang Cho-chun's visit to the Mainland constitutes an affirmation of our policy direction. The 17 member delegation will tour Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang over eight days. Mainland Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu will refer to Wang Cho-chun as "Taiwan's National Police Administration Chief." There will be no "white gloves." They will not refer to each other by such euphemisms as, "administrative experts." This may constitute only "one small step" in formal protocol. But it represents "one giant leap" in substantive progress. It deserves recognition, and should be encouraged. Jiang Ping shrilly insisted that "the Taiwan delegation to the Tokyo International Film Festival is part of the [Mainland] China delegation." Beijing's Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu on the other hand, greeted Taipei's National Police Administration Chief Wang Cho-chun on a basis of equality. Contrasting the two gives us a better understanding of what Mainland political advisor Zheng Bi-jian meant when he said, "Ideas determine one's path, Vision determines one's horizons."

In September Mainland Culture Minister Cai Wu visited Taiwan. His counterpart, Council for Cultural Affairs Chief Emile C. J. Sheng greeted him. More and more unprecedented, direct, face to face meetings between central government officials have taken place. Wang Cho-chun met with a Mainland delegation in his official capacity, using his official title. This should be considered a milestone. It also suggests a bold breakthrough on the part of Beijing. After all, they must deal with leftists such as Jiang Ping. In fact, both sides have Jiang Ping counterparts. When Cai Wu visited in September, we hoped Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi could meet. The two sides' economic leaders have met frequently. The two sides' premiers have also met. Beijing is able to accept "Taiwan's National Police Administration," and may be able to accept "Taiwan's premier." In other words, through our deeds, we can change the attitudes of Jiang Ping counterparts on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We can gradually persuade them to accept a reasonable and legitimate "framework of equality." In that case, a "Ma Hu Summit" would no longer be an impossibility.

Jiang Ping's words and deeds have been rejected by most people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This shows that most people share the same views, and hope to improve cross-Strait relations. Jiang Ping's individual conduct can only lead to a dead end. Wang Cho-chun's official visit represents official policy, and a way out of the previous impasse. The waves generated by Jiang Ping were not something the two sides were happy to see. Wang Cho-chun's visit, on the other hand, represents a trend that everyone is happy to see.

王卓鈞是政策指標,江平是個人行為
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.10.28

這兩件事可以澄清近日兩岸的爭議與疑慮,也為未來兩岸交往帶來重要的啟示。一、警政署長王卓鈞率團赴大陸訪問,這標誌著兩岸當局認同的政策取向;二、東京影展風波,大陸團團長江平的奇異言行,可以證實是「個人行為」。

國台辦發言人楊毅昨日就東京影展風波表示:「可能是當事各方溝通不夠所致,因此引發的狀況是我們不願看到的。」話中的「我們」,是指北京官方,「不願看到的」則是指江平的言行及所造成的後果。楊毅並說:「在兩岸關係不斷改善和發展的新形勢下,兩岸雙方應在涉外事務中避免內耗。」引伸其意,是指江平的行徑違反了「兩岸關係不斷改善和發展的新形勢」,是一種「內耗」。

上周末東京影展風波發生後,台灣方面的主流評論在第一時即認為這是「個人行為」,而不可能是「北京官方操作」。這顯示兩岸關係的政策目標及內涵已經建立了相當程度的相互信任,沒有人相信北京官方會「在兩岸關係不斷改善和發展的新形勢下」,做出那種無知無理之事。如今,楊毅的談話證實了此種互信有其成立與存在的基礎,可謂差堪告慰對兩岸關係有憧憬者,也算是對兩岸兩年來的共同努力作了一次令人不致完全失望的驗收。

大陸網民對此次影展風波起鬨,有人將江平捧為英雄。但楊毅所代表的官方立場顯非如此。甚至大陸東京影展代表團的團員,亦不齒江平所為。有人甚至認為,他的言行不具代表團的身分,而只是「《康定情歌》的導演江平」退出了東京影展。團員說:「那太荒唐,我相信這不是中國政府的態度,完全是個人行為。」然而,倘若時間倒退兩年,代表團內恐怕不會聽到這類開明的聲音。由團員的表態可見,大陸方面的一般人對兩岸現行關係的認同與信任,亦有顯著的加強與進展。

與江平的脫軌演出相較,警政署長王卓鈞率團訪問大陸則是值得肯定的政策取向。訪問團一行十六人,將赴北京、上海、江蘇、浙江訪問八天;大陸公安部長孟建柱是以「台灣的警政署長」之身分及職稱接待王卓鈞。沒有「白手套」,也不必相互化名「行政專家」。這雖只是在形式及稱謂上「一小步」的調整,但仍蘊含著在實質上「一大步」的進展。值得肯定,值得鼓勵。江平叫囂「東京影展台灣團是中國團的一部分」,孟建柱則以大陸公安部長的身分,對等接待台灣警政署長王卓鈞;兩相對照,更使人領會大陸智囊鄭必堅所說:「思路決定出路,眼界決定境界。」

自九月大陸文化部長蔡武來台,我對口部會文建會主委盛治仁出面相迎以來,兩岸中央政府部會首長直接見面的紀錄不斷被刷新,此次王卓鈞能以政府職銜率團訪問大陸更可視為一個新的里程碑。這也是北京對台單位頗具膽識的一項突破,畢竟他們也必須面對寧左勿右的「江平們」。其實,兩岸都有「江平們」。九月蔡武來訪時,我們即曾希望,陸委會主委賴幸媛及國台辦主任王毅能互訪,兩岸經濟部門首長能互訪,然後兩岸閣揆也能互訪;既能接受「台灣的警政署長」,也就有可能接受「台灣的行政院長」。也就是說,要用行為實踐來改換兩岸「江平們」的腦袋,使之漸漸接受「對等身分架構」的合理正當性,那麼,「馬胡會」也就不是不可能。

江平的言行可謂已被兩岸主流意見所否決,這也顯示了兩岸主流意見對兩岸關係發展改善的大方向已經存有同一的準則與共識。江平是個人行為,是倒退到死路;王卓鈞的正式出訪則是官方政策,才是活路。江平風波是兩岸「都不願意看到的」,王卓鈞訪問所指出的發展趨勢則是大家「都願意看到的」。

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Suhua Highway Improvement Project: Proceed with Caution

Suhua Highway Improvement Project: Proceed with Caution
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27, 2010

The Suhua Highway has experienced its most serious landslide ever. Hundreds of people were trapped in their vehicles. As of today, 25 people are still unaccounted for. Typhoon rains struck the Suhua Highway. They shook public confidence in highway safety along the Hualien/Taitung scenic route. Local governments are demanding that construction on the Suhua Highway Improvement Project begin as soon as possible.

Hualien County Chief Fu Kuen-chi uttered some harsh words. He demanded that the central government begin construction on the Suhua Highway Improvement Project immediately. Otherwise, he might lead people the long way around to the nation's capital, as a gesture of protest. Fu Kun-chi said that "The construction of the Suhua Highway Improvement Project is not an economic issue, but a humanitarian issue." The central government must not continue making excuses. The Suhua Highway landslide was not merely a "national embarrassment," it made us an "international joke." Numerous Mainland tourists were among the casualties. Taiwan's image as a destination for international tourism has suffered considerable damage.

Yesterday the Hualien County Council's regular session was changed to a special inquiry into the Suhua Highway Improvement Project. Council Members blasted the central government for long neglecting the fundamental rights of Hualien citizens. County Speaker Yang Wen-chi said that if construction on the Suhua Highway Improvement Project did not begin immediately, the county council would adjourn and stage a long term protest.

The Suhua Highway landslide caused a significant number of casualties. EPA Chief Chen Shi-hong pointed out that "out of on humanitarian concerns, the EPA would expedite its administrative procedures." He said that such an unfortunate incident must not be allowed to recur. He said that following "sufficient discussion and respect for professionalism," the EIA for the Suhua Highway Improvement Project would be completed as soon as possible. Chen Shi-hong also believes that even before preliminary assessment, the developer had already reached an understanding with environmental groups and local citizens. As a result, the preliminary assessment encountered little controversy. It appears it will be passed as soon as possible.

Environmental groups have been under considerable pressure. Anything they say at this moment, is unlikely to be well received. They insist that the EPA can expedite its assessment process, but must not rubber stamp the project and rush it through. In their view, the purpose of an EIA is to help everyone solve problems. For example, if the geological conditions along the route are not suitable for construction, then any potential hazards must be addressed. The Suhua Highway Improvement Project is feasible. But we must proceed with extreme caution.

First, we should point out that calls from folks on the eastern seabord for a "safe way home" must be viewed from the perspective of social justice, rather than economic development. The question concerning the Suhua Highway Improvement Project is not "whether the highway should be improved," but "how the highway should be improved." Past discusssions of the Suhua Highway Improvement Project were about balancing "economic development" and "environmental sustainability." Today however, it is all about "social justice." The Suhua Highway Improvement Project must be implemented as soon as possible, It will improve traffic safety and disaster relief capabilities along the Suhua Highway. During the planning and construction process, we must of course do everything in our power to minimize the environmental impact.

If we wish to discuss the Suhua Highway Improvement Project, we must go back and discuss the Suhua Highway Project. Past controversies over the Suhua Highway did not concern the northern section, where the current disaster occurred. They concerned the southern section, the section south of Chung-teh. The northern section was prone to disaster. A consensus had already been reached. That section had to be rebuilt as soon as possible. According to Highway Administration statistics, between '94 and '98, the Suhua Highway was impassable in both directions for as many as 224 days. The annual average was 45 days. Whether residents could connect with the outside world depended on Mother Nature's whims.

When the DPP was in power, the Suhua Highway EIA authorized construction toward the northern section, but reserved judgment on the southern section. But following the second change in ruling parties, the DPP decided to leave this political hot potato to the incoming Ma administration. The Ma administration followed up by announcing the construction of the Suhua Highway Improvement Project.

According to Directorate General of Highway plans, the Suhua Highway Improvement Project would cost 46.5 billion NTD. The Suhua Highway collapsed in three places. Eroded and endangered coastal stretches are being improved. Seven long and short tunnels will be constructed along the 77 km section between Suao and Chung-teh, improving safety. Two single opening two lane tunnels will be constructed between Suao and Tungao, one of the stretches most seriously affected by landslides. The stretch between Tungao and Nanao will follow its original route. The Suhua Highway Improvement Project will be only 60.4 km long. But it will save about 45 minutes of driving. The Suhua Highway Improvement Project has affected the environmental impact assessment statement issued on October 8 of this year. Planning and design are proceding simultaneously. We only hope that by the time the EIA has been completed, bidding can begin immediately.

But no matter how one looks at it, the Suhua Highway Improvement Project has not solved all the problems. The current landslide took a toll in human lives. But it had little to do with the expedited environmental assessment of the Suhua Highway Improvement Project. The government must not focus on the new road while neglecting the old road. Even if we construct new roads, we will continue to use the old road. Even if the Suhua Highway Improvement Project tunnels are completed, the old road may still experience landslides. Similar incidents may still happen. We must look at them from a scientific and engineering point of view. We must establish early warning systems. We must prevent falling rocks from causing injuries to people and vehicles.

In the face of climate change, extreme weather conditions have become the norm. In the face of unpredictable weather, we must build better early warning systems. We must also review the effectiveness of Taiwan's disaster prevention measures.

興建蘇花改必須謹慎行事
2010-10-27 中國時報

蘇花公路發生歷來最嚴重的崩塌事故,數百人車受困,至今仍有廿五人下落不明。一場颱風豪雨重創蘇花公路,也重創民眾對花東旅遊的交通安全信心,地方要求蘇花改盡速動工的呼聲再起。

花蓮縣長傅?萁日昨撂下重話,要求中央馬上建蘇花改,否則不惜繞遠路帶領民眾北上抗議。傅?萁強調,「興建蘇花改不是經濟問題,而是人道問題」,中央不要再找藉口搪塞;蘇花公路崩山不只是「國恥」,已是「國際笑話」;這麼多陸客的傷亡,對於台灣整體國際觀光形象都有相當大的傷害。

花蓮縣議會定期大會日昨變更總質詢議程,針對蘇花公路改善工程案,議員砲火猛烈,痛批中央長期漠視花蓮人基本生存權,議長楊文值揚言,蘇花改不立刻動工的話,議會無限期休會抗爭。

面對蘇花公路坍方落石,造成重大死傷意外,環保署長沈世宏也指出,「基於人道關懷,環保署將加速行政程序」,不能讓類似不幸的事再度發生;蘇花改的環評案將在「充分討論、尊重專業」前提下,盡早完成環評。沈世宏也認為,早在初審前,開發單位就與環保團體及當地民眾妥善溝通,因此初審時沒有太大爭議。目前看來應該很大機會盡速順利通過。

環保團體則坦承,壓力相當大,此時好像說什麼都不太對,但仍堅持環署可加速審查,但不可草率地通過。他們認為,環評目的是幫大家解決問題,例如沿線地質環境適否適合開發道路;若確定開發,那些潛在災害必須解決等,蘇花改不是不能做,但要非常謹慎。

首先我們要指出,回應東部鄉親一條「安全回家的路」訴求,已必須從社會公義的觀點,而不是經濟發展觀點,蘇花公路改善工程不是「應不應該改善」的問題,而是「如何改善」的技術問題。過去談蘇花公路改善,是「經濟發展」對「環境永續」如何平衡的問題,現在則是「社會公義」問題。蘇花公路改善計畫必須儘速興建,提高蘇花公路行車安全性和抗災能力,而在規畫和施工過程,當然也要全力保護減少對生態和環境的衝擊。

談起蘇花公路改善工程,就不得不回頭談蘇花高。過去蘇花高爭議最嚴重的並不是目前發生災難的北段(即蘇花公路這一段),而是在南段(崇德以南路段)。北段容易產生災難,大家都有儘早興建的共識,因為,公路總局統計,九十四年至九十八年,蘇花公路雙向阻斷天數高達二二四天,平均每年有四十五天不通,對外聯絡長年都要看老天爺臉色。

在民進黨主政的時代,蘇花高環評本來就朝北段工程允許施作,但南段工程則保留的思維。但後來二次政黨論替,民進黨政府就把蘇花高環評爭議燙手山芋留給馬政府,馬政府也隨後宣布興建蘇花改。

根據公路總局的規畫,蘇花改總經費為四百六十五億元,針對現有蘇花公路三處易坍方、消蝕及瀕臨海岸的路線進行改善。從蘇澳到崇德七十七公里的路段將以七座長短隧道提高安全性,其中這次坍塌最嚴重的蘇澳到東澳段改闢兩座單孔雙車道短隧道,東澳到南澳維持原線。蘇花改僅六十點四公里,約節省四十五分鐘車程。蘇花改環境影響說明書於今年十月八日進入環評程序,規畫設計同步進行中,希望能在年底通過環評後,隨即招標。

不過話又說回來,興建蘇花改並無法完全解決問題。此次發生土石崩落的人命關天的事情與快速通過蘇花改環評案之間的關連性並不大,政府不能只顧及新計畫,而忽略了舊道路。因為即使興建新的道路,舊的道路仍會繼續使用,即使蘇花改的隧道完工,舊道路不見得就不會發生坍方,類似事情還是可能發生,必須從科學及工程的角度上,設立預警系統,避免落石所造成的人車傷亡。

面對氣候變遷,極端氣候恐成常態,面對難以捉摸的天氣,除應建置較周延的預警系統,也應重新檢討台灣耐災能力,這也是我們另一個要面對的課題。

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Tokyo Film Festival Confrontation:
Opening Fire is Easy, Making Peace is Hard
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 26, 2010

A minor incident can sometimes lead to a major disaster. One individual's rash conduct can sometimes lead to a policy impasse. Against enormous odds, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have finally managed to moderate cross-Strait hostility, and promote reconciliation and cooperation. Who knew the Tokyo Film Festival would become the occasion for a confrontation over name change, and undermine the improved political atmosphere? This shows us just how difficult the road to reconciliation is, and how fragile the fruits of reconciliation are. If Beijing is sincere about improving cross-Strait relations, it must demonstrate its sincerity by taking concrete action.

The Tokyo Film Festival incident was apparently the handiwork of Mainland delegation leader Jiang Ping as an individual. The Tokyo Film Festival is a non-governmental activity. Movie industry exchanges have nothing to do with politics. In the past, Taipei has always used the name "Taiwan" when participating in the Tokyo Film Festival. This usage never elicited any controversy. This time however, Jiang Ping suddenly demanded that the Taipei delegation's name be changed to "China, Taiwan," or "Chinese Taipei," in accordance with Olympic Committee rules. Frank Chen, leader of the Taipei delegation, flatly refused. To everyone's surprise, Jiang Ping began shouting and pointing at him in the crowded lobby of a five-star hotel. He even threatened him, saying "Do you still want to sell your films to [Mainland] China?" His rude speech and behavior disgusted not just the public on Taiwan, but the entire world.

Frank Chen was baffled. The two sides had just signed ECFA. Exchanges had become more and more frequent. What prompted the Mainland delegate to behave that way? The two sides have expended immense time and energy, and overcome countless obstacles, creating an environment conducive to reconciliation. They are now awaiting the opportunity to follow-up and actively promote cooperation. But suddenly, this atmosphere has been spoiled by a single individual, posturing as a hero. Jiang Ping's imperious manner and crude language were broadcast on television for all to see. Against all odds, by means of a "diplomatic truce," the two sides reached a reconciliation longed for by the international community. Suddenly that reconciliation has been shattered, casting doubt on the Mainland's sincerity. This situation is hardly what the Beijing authorities want to see.

Specifically, the dispute over names prevented Taiwan stars such as Vivian Hsu, Ethan Juan, and Chang Chun-ning from appearing on the green carpet. Vivian Hsu was reduced to tears. The treatment these stars were subjected to will have an impact, particularly on younger generation people on Taiwan. Young people seldom care when government officials engage in one-upsmanship across the Strait. But when their idols are bullied, young people may lash back at Mainland China.

The two sides have been in conflict for such a long time. Everyone looks to the fading away of historical grievances. That would allow the younger generation to inhabit a peaceful and friendly environment, to understand each other, and to develop feelings for each other. Now however, a single act of self-righteous behavior has sown seeds of enmity in the hearts of countless young people. It has canceled out the goodwill cultivated over many years by others. The cost is inestimable, both in intellectual perception and in hurt feelings. For cross-Strait relations, this was absolutely unnecessary. It was a lose/lose proposition.

From Jiang Ping's perspective, he may feel justified. He may even believe he did nothing wrong. The expression, "There is only one China in the world. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China." is the most politically correct mantra one can recite anywhere on the Mainland. Even now, no government agency has dared to say Jiang did anything wrong. This clearly underscores the gap in Beijing's Taiwan policy. This gap is a problem the Mainland must confront and deal with.

Those who understand Mainland politics know that Beijing's basic policy toward Taipei has not changed that much. It is merely Beijing's tactics and methods that have changed. For example, Beijing no longer attempts to lure away our diplomatic allies. It allows Taipei to enjoy observer status in the WHO. It does not object to Taipei signing free trade agreements with other governments. But at the moment these practices are applied differently within and without, and also differently between different agencies. Taipei-related agencies are more flexible. . Their attitude is relatively friendly. Other agencies still adhere to their previous rigid stance.

There are two aspects to the problem. First, complex and delicate cross-strait issues. A single word can often convey very different meanings and attitudes. Taipei-related agencies have a better understanding of the nuances. They know how to speak in language Taipei understands. But other departments may not understand these niceties. Naturally they fall back on long held dogma.

This, in turn, involves a second gap. Many leaders in Beijing have expressed goodwill towards Taipei. They have made substantial adjustments in their strategy towards Taipei. But just what changes in policy do these adjustments imply? Decision makers at the central government level have yet to communicate these changes to their subordinates. Furthermore, information is controlled on the Mainland. Even though its Taipei strategy has changed, it will not be the focus of news reports. The result will be that other agencies have no understanding of these changes. Nor does the rest of Mainland society.

This gap will make the public on Taiwan wonder whether Beijing's goodwill is genuine or false. Taipei-related departments are friendly toward Taipei. But the rest of the Beijing government has yet to be updated on its policy toward Taipei. The failure of Beijing leaders to deal with this gap implies that the policy has not really changed.

The development of cross-Strait relations should be considered from the perspective of the public. What kind of future is beneficial or detrimental to the public on both sides, as well as mankind? What kind of responsibilities do those in power bear? These issues all deserve careful consideration.

東京影展「暴衝」 交火容易和解難

2010-10-26 中國時報

一個小意外,有時會造成大災難;一個人的「暴衝」,有時可以讓政策撞牆。兩岸好不容易緩和敵對態勢,推動和解合作,卻因為東京影展爆發改名之爭,而讓氣氛大受影響。這說明和解之路多麼困難,和解成果又多麼脆弱。北京如果對推動兩岸友好關係有誠意,就必須展現出更具體的行動。

這次的東京影展事件,看來是大陸代表團團長江平個人的「暴衝」所致。東京影展是個民間活動,電影交流也無關政治,台灣過去參加東京影展,也向來用台灣名義,沒發生過什麼爭議。這次江平卻突然要求台灣代表團的名稱改為「中國台灣」,或比照奧會模式改為「中華台北」。台灣代表團團長陳志寬堅決拒絕,江平竟在五星級飯店人來人往的大廳裡,指著陳志寬叫罵,還威脅說「你們的電影不想賣到中國了嗎?」這種粗魯蠻橫的言行,不要說台灣民眾看了反感,更是貽笑國際。

就像陳志寬質疑的,兩岸剛簽完ECFA,交流越來越頻繁,中國代表團為什麼還要這樣?的確,兩岸花了許多心力時間,克服了不少障礙,才經營出一個有利於和解交流的環境,正待後續積極推動各項合作時,氣氛卻一下子就被一個自己搞暴衝當英雄的人搞砸了。江平跋扈的嘴臉、粗暴的言語,全都透過電視傳達出來,讓之前兩岸透過「外交休兵」政策好不容易達成的國際社會和解態勢,瞬間跌碎在地,也讓台灣民眾對大陸的誠意重新打上問號,這種狀況,豈是北京當局所樂見的?

尤其值得重視的是,因為名稱之爭,台灣明星如徐若瑄、阮經天、張鈞甯等,最後都不能走星光大道的綠地毯,徐若瑄甚至失望落淚。這些明星所受到的打壓,對台灣的年輕世代尤其會產生影響。兩岸政治人物高來高去的交鋒,年輕人通常懶得搭理,但受崇拜的偶像被欺負,年輕人可是會對中國強烈反彈的。

兩岸的結打了這麼久,大家寄望歷史恩怨能隨著歲月淡去,讓年輕世代有一個和平友好的環境,去理解彼此、建立感情,結果一個人自以為是的暴衝行為,在無數年輕人心中種下了惡感,抵消掉之前澆灌耕耘的善意。其代價,難以估計,既傷觀感又傷感情。對兩岸關係來說,這是完全沒必要、也沒有價值的耗損。

站在江平的立場,可能至今還振振有詞,完全不認為自己哪裡做錯了。而「世界上只有一個中國,台灣是中國不可分割的一部分」,在中國不管走到哪裡都是最政治正確的真理。即使到了現在,大陸也沒有哪個單位敢說他有什麼地方做得不對,這就清楚凸顯出了北京對台政策的落差,而這個落差,是中國必須正視並處理的問題。

了解大陸政情的人都知道,北京對台的基本政策並沒有太大改變,但是策略和做法上有所調整,例如不搶邦交國、容許台灣以觀察員身分出席世衛組織大會、不反對台灣與他國簽署自貿協定等。不過目前這些做法不只內外有別,各部門之間也有不同。涉台機構、對台灣說話時,用語比較彈性、態度比較和善,其他機構卻仍然依循一貫的強硬僵化立場。

問題有兩個層面,一是兩岸問題複雜微妙,一字之差,意涵與姿態都可以有相當不同。涉台部門比較理解其中的拿捏技巧,懂得使用台灣比較聽得入耳的言詞,但其他部門不太懂其中三昧,當然會照搬長年教條來表態。

這又牽涉到第二個落差了。北京領導人雖然多次對台灣做出善意的表達,對台策略做了相當調整,但這些做法上的調整,究竟在政策上意味著什麼變化,中央決策高層顯然並沒有全面的傳達出去。加上大陸資訊封閉,即使對台策略有調整,也不會成為報導重點,以致於其他部門毫無掌握,整個中國社會也欠缺理解。

這種落差會讓台灣民眾質疑,中國的善意究竟是真是假。如果比較友善的臉孔只有涉台部門在面對台灣時才戴上,而整個中國對政策的理解與執行都沒有得到訊息更新,北京領導當局放任這個落差存在而不去處理,恐怕意味著政策並沒有真正的改變。

兩岸關係的發展,要回歸到從人的角度去思考。什麼樣的未來是對兩岸乃至人類社會有益,什麼又是不利,而擁有執政權的人又肩負什麼責任,值得慎重思考。

Monday, October 25, 2010

Conditions and Timing for a Ma/Hu Summit

Conditions and Timing for a Ma/Hu Summit
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 25, 2010

Do we want a "Ma/Hu Summit?" If so, when would it be held? Consider last weekend's controversy over the Tokyo Film Festival, and the answers to these questions should be clear.

In response to talk of a Ma/Hu Summit, President Ma said, "If we fail to do our homework, it would be better not to have a summit at all." Premier Wu Den-yih said, "The conditions have not been met, and the timing is not right." Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said, "Let nature take its course. When the time is ripe, things will happen of their own accord."

In our opinion the real obstacle to a Ma/Hu Summit is the inability of the two sides to define their political status in a pragmatic and equitable manner. In other words, in what capacity should Ma and Hu, or any other future cross-Strait heads of state meet? Surely they cannot meet as "Mr. Ma" and "Mr. Hu." Nor can they meet in their capacity as "KMT Chairman" and "Communist Party General Secretary." Lien Chan and Wu Po-hsiung have already done that. The expressions, "the leader of Taiwan" and "the leader of the Mainland" were coined by the Mainland media. They are not titles specified in the Constitution of the ROC and the Constitution of the PRC. Therefore, as long as we cannot refer to things by their proper names, we will inevitably find it difficult to get things done.

A Ma/Hu Summit is difficult not merely because Ma and Hu have been unable to reach an agreement regarding their political status as individuals. It is difficult due to other issues related to political identity, including "Taiwan vs. the Mainland," or "the Republic of China vs. the Peoples Republic of China." The Tokyo International Film Festival issue is the Ma/Hu Summit issue. When Chen Yunlin met Ma Ying-jeou, he could only address Ma as "you." If Ma and Hu meet under the same circumstances, why bother? How could they meet in the first place? How the two sides address each other may appear to be a superficial matter. In fact it encapsulates one of the most fundamental problems in cross-Strait relations. It is not merely a matter of nomenclature, but a matter of substance.

If cross-Strait relations are to reach new heights, the two heads of state must meet. People are well aware that significant progress has been made in cross-Strait relations, for example, with ECFA. But the Big Picture remains deadlocked over the issue of political identity, with no way out. A solution will require policy goals and conscious planning. One cannot simply "Let nature take its course" in the hope that "When the time is ripe, things will happen of their own accord." Even the Tokyo Film Festival ended in deadlock. One can only imagine what might happen with a Ma/Hu Summit.

We need "liberation of thinking" and "policy innovation." For example, Beijing says the cross-Strait status quo is the legacy of civil war. It has used this as a basis for the "One China Principle." It agrees that the civil war led to "divided rule within the same nation." In this case, perhaps we can use the "legacy of civil war" premise to establish a political framework for cross-Strait relations. It is difficult to imagine the President of the Republic of China meeting with the President of the Peoples Republic of China as "Taiwan's leader." Unless this obstacle can be overcome, it really would be better not to meet at all.

In the event a Ma/Hu Summit is held, Ma Ying-jeou says he has no problem addressing Hu Jintao as "Chairman Hu." The question is whether Hu Jintao would have a problem addressing Ma Ying-jeou as "President Ma." A deeper problem is whether the two sides can find a way to adhere to the "One China Principle" even as Ma and Hu address each other as "Chairman Hu" and "President Ma." This is why we have repeatedly called for the two sides to seek a solution through an "in progress form of One China." Such thinking is hardly unreasonable. After all, East and West Germany, South and North Vietnam in the past, and South and North Korea in the present, never referred to each other as "German Berlin," i.e., "Chinese Taipei." They referred to each other as "President Kim" rather than "the leader of Taiwan." Yet they were able to adhere to a One Germany, One Vietnam, or One Korea principle. Why shouldn't the two sides of the Taiwan Strait be able to do the same?

The Hu/Wen regime is already preparing for the transfer of power. The transfer of power includes two important items. First, political reforms. Second, cross-Strait issues. First, allow us to address the former. In terms of reform and liberalization, Hu and Wen's achievements have been brillant. Add to them the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai World Expo, and Hu and Wen's historical legacy is assured. But on the eve of the handover, Wen Jiabao seems unwilling to remain silent. He has loudly called for "political reform." Apparently Hu and Wen are deeply aware of the risks that loom, and are concerned about their successors. That is why they have spoken so bluntly. They are paving the way for future generations of political reformers. After all, these things are better broached by Hu and Wen, rather than left for future generations. In fact, Hu and Wen could do the same with cross-Strait policy.

Hu and Wen's policy of "peaceful development" coincides with the rare opportunity presented by Ma Ying-jeou's election as president in 2008. This has made cross-Strait relations the best they have been in 60 years. This can be considered an achievement of the Hu/Wen regime. However no significant progress has been made in establishing an "in progress form of One China" or defining the two sides' political status. Hu and Wen are about to consolidate their historical legacy. If at this moment they could make a major breakthrough regarding the status of the Republic of China, they would clear the way for cross-Strait relations in a hundred different ways. That would be the finest legacy they could leave their successors.

If that is possible, then the preconditions for a Ma/Hu Summit will have been met.

馬胡會的因緣與時機
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.25

要不要「馬胡會」?什麼時候「馬胡會」?但看上周末東京影展的爭議,即知癥結何在。

回應「馬胡會」的議論,馬總統說:「如果沒有把這些工作做好……相見不如不見。」閣揆吳敦義說:「因緣未到,時機不宜。」北京國台辦主任王毅則說:「順其自然,水到渠成。」

我們認為,阻擋「馬胡會」的真正障礙,仍在兩岸未能建立一個務實而對等的「身分架構」;也就是說,馬胡二人(或未來任何兩岸元首),該以什麼身分見面?總不能以「馬先生」及「胡先生」的身分見面吧?也不宜用「國民黨主席」及「中共總書記」的身分見面,因為連戰及吳伯雄皆已做到;至於若用「台灣領導人」及「大陸領導人」的身分見面,那是大陸媒體使用的名詞,但不是中華民國憲法及中華人民共和國憲法上規定的職銜,所以也是名不正,言不順,因而恐怕見不成。

「馬胡會」所反映的兩岸「身分架構」的障礙,不止涉及了馬胡二人的身分對等問題,其實也是反映了「台灣/大陸」或「中華民國/中華人民共和國」之間的身分對等問題。「東京影展」的問題,就是「馬胡會」的問題。試想,倘若馬胡相會,卻如陳雲林見馬英九,居然詞窮以「您」相稱;則何必會面?又豈能會面?雙方的身分稱謂,看似是最表層的問題,卻是一個總結兩岸關係總體架構最深層的問題。也就是說,這其實不只是一個名目上的問題,而是一個牽涉實質的問題。

如果兩岸關係要更上層樓,一定要經歷雙方元首會面的歷程;然而,眾所皆知的是,兩岸關係在下位領域已經大有進展(如ECFA),但大局大勢卻卡在上位的「身分架構」仍然覓無出路。這方面倘不在政策上加以有目標、有意識地規劃引導,似無可能只靠「順其自然,水到渠成」,就能期待出現「因緣已成,時宜已至」的機遇。連東京影展都鬧僵,遑論馬胡會?

也就是說,在這方面須有「思想解放」及「政策創新」。比如說,北京既以兩岸現狀為內戰的遺留,並以此作為「一個中國原則」的解釋基準,則即應接受內戰所形成的「分治而不分裂」的現今情勢,如此或許即能以「內戰遺留」的理論,建立兩岸對等的「身分架構」。我們不易想像,「台灣的領導人」有可能以「中華民國總統」以外的身分與「中華人民共和國主席」會面。這個結若不打開,那就真是「相見不如不見」。

如果「馬胡會」,馬英九稱胡錦濤為「胡主席」的問題不大,問題是在胡錦濤是否稱馬英九為「馬總統」。深一層的問題在於:雙方能否找出一個方法,在馬胡以「主席/總統」互稱時,仍然可以固守「一個中國原則」。這也是我們一再呼籲,應當在「現在進行式的一個中國」找出路的原因。這樣的思考,其實一點也不突兀;因為,過去東西德、南北越及現在的南北韓,皆未曾稱對方是「德意志柏林」(中華台北?),而是稱對方「金大中總統」(台灣領導人?),但亦能維持「一個德國/一個越南/一個韓國」的原則,為何兩岸就不可?

胡溫體制已經進入準備交班的階段,最重要的交接項目有二:一、政治體制改革;二、兩岸問題。先言前者,就改革開放言,胡溫的成就可謂是相當輝煌的,加上京奧及上海世博兩場世紀盛會,皆為胡溫的歷史地位加分;但是,在交接前夕,溫家寶似乎不想持盈保泰,而強烈鼓吹「政治體制改革」,此應視為胡溫深知操危慮患,為後繼者憂,所以想說幾句重話,為後人的政治改革預作鋪墊。畢竟由胡溫先說,好過留給後人說。其實,在兩岸政策上,胡溫亦可作同樣思考。

胡溫的「和平發展」政策,準確呼應千載難逢的「零八機遇」(馬英九當選總統),使兩岸關係臻至六十年來的最佳境界,這可謂是胡溫體制的成績。但是,在如何營造「現在進行式的一個中國」,及發展兩岸對等「身分架構」上,仍無重大進展。其實,在胡溫準備向歷史交卷之際,若能對「中華民國的定位問題」作出重大突破,將可促成兩岸關係一脈通百脈通,這也是贈予後繼者的最佳禮物。

倘能如此,馬胡會的因緣就到了。

Friday, October 22, 2010

Help SMEs Develop Within the Mainland Domestic Market

Help SMEs Develop Within the Mainland Domestic Market
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 22, 2010

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress has passed a "ten two five plan." The plan will attempt to rapidly change the direction of the Mainland Chinese economy over the next five years. It will increase domestic demand and improve people's lives, and enable the domestic consumer market to become the strategic focus of economic development. Private consumption is expected to reach 36% of total GDP, a significant increase from its current low level. For thousands of SMEs on Taiwan, this Mainland market is an earnest invitation to a golden opportunity that must not be passed up.

The signing of the cross-Strait economic cooperation agreement (ECFA) was the opening shot. The Mainland has over 200 products ready to enter the Taiwan market, tariff free. Taiwan meanwhile, has over 500 products that will enjoy zero tariff or low tariff treatment, beginning next year. These can make a major push into a vast market of 1.3 billion consumers. Most of these products are manufactured by SMEs. How will small and medium enterprises from Taiwan fare amidst the influx of goods from the Mainland? This question has many people worried. Conversely, many more daring and promising Taiwan enterprises, face an inconceivably vast Mainland market. How can they achieve a stable footing, make the most of their competitive advantages, and expand their businesses? This is a rare opportunity one could never have hoped for.

A shining opportunity has suddenly appeared. Taiwan has over a million SMEs. But how many are ready to take advantage of this generous invitation? Regrettably, very few. For small and medium enterprises, the risks have always been high. Over the past several decades, regardless of whether those in power were Blue or Green, large enterprises and high-tech industries have always received preferential treatment. Traditional and small and medium enterprises have received only neglect. They were forced to sink or swim. For small and medium enterprises, life is short. They rarely last more than ten years. Those that master their market niches, that are able to survive, stick largely to their niche markets, maintaining the status quo. Apart from OEM enterprises and suppliers of essential raw materials, they rarely have the courage to overstep their bounds. As a result, they allow others to seize the value-added market, while they maintain their closed and conservative business model. Even professionals in the information, design, and marketing industries, seldom have the courage to make any further moves.

These small and medium enterprises have enormous potential. Their untapped value is amazing. Once the doors to the Mainland are thrown open, they will be looking at a vast market. Even if tempted, they will be afraid to act rashly. Conquering new territories and achieving bold victories is not their forte. Even if they had the courage to take bold steps, the odds would still be stacked against them. But once the Mainland market has been thrown open, wealthy and powerful Mainland tycoons will sift through these SMEs. They will pick out the uncut diamonds. They will separate the wheat from the chaff. These SMEs will become part of a highly profitable Mainland market. Taiwan will be left with the dregs. These SMEs will be like brides who have been married off, totally unable to resist.

Yesterday President Ma attended the "Global Chinese Business Summit." He spoke enthusiastically of the post-ECFA era. He said companies on Taiwan should seize this low-tariff, no-tariff opportunity to enter the Mainland market, They should take advantage of domestic demand to build their own brands. They should break free of the the low margin OEM business model. This is fully consistent with our own reasoning. President Ma however, is urging them to jump directly from their OEM business model to building their own brands. Apparently he is unaware of the dangers, difficulties, and frustrations that confront conservative Taiwan enterprises, which consequently may miss this golden opportunity.

The Mainland market has magnanimously rolled out the red carpet for Taiwan products of superior quality. Taiwan's design skill and marketing talent have already reached maturity. But if no one has the determination to cut and polish the many hundreds of thousands of diamonds in the rough, bridging the Taiwan Strait will be difficult, and all their efforts will be in vain.

Twenty-five years ago, export industries began relocating. Taiwan's industrial chain was severed. Businesses with competitive advantages, such as upstream and midstream raw materials exporters, relocated. Downstream branded products suitable for an international market were missing. This was our fatal mistake going up against South Korea. We failed to fill in this gap as soon as possible. Just how many brands on Taiwan can be developed? Two remedies are available. One is to offer guidance to upstream and midstream industries, fully integrating their existing design and marketing talent, energetically developing high-quality downstream industries. The second is to take advantage of rising labor costs on the Mainland, and the relocation of large numbers of downstream industries. Provide an environment, carefully select industries with the most potential, invite them to Taiwan to merge with upstream and midstream industries, thereby creating an unbroken industrial chain.

President Ma sees the opportunity for SMEs. The Ma administration should swiftly make the necessary preparations, and implement its plans as soon as possible.

協助中小企業開發大陸內需市場

【聯合報╱社論】 2010.10.22 0



中共十七屆五中全會通過的「十二五」計畫的建議,確立中國大陸未來五年將致力加快轉變經濟發展方向,堅持擴大內需、改善人民生活,這將使內需消費市場成為經濟發展的戰略重點;民間消費可望自目前佔GDP 36%的偏低水準大幅上升,這對於萬千面對大陸市場躍躍欲試的台灣中小企業而言,如同鄭重發出的邀請,不能錯過此一大好機會。

兩岸經濟合作協議(ECFA)的簽署,開了第一槍。對岸將有二百多項產品排闥直入,免稅攻掠台灣市場;相對地,台灣更有五百多項產品從明年開始享受減免關稅的待遇,可以大舉進軍十三億人構成的廣闊天地。這些相對開放的產品大多出自中小企業。我們的中小企業要如何在大陸貨品入侵的開放市場中掙扎求存,這是許多人憂心忡忡的挑戰;反過來說,更多身手矯健、潛力雄厚的台灣企業,面對大得難以想像的大陸市場,又如何站穩腳步、發揮優勢,大事擴展,眼下更是可遇不可求的難得契機。

然而,當如此耀眼的機會忽然臨頭,在台灣一百餘萬中小企業裡,有多少已經準備好迎接慷慨的邀請?我們不能不憾然指出,恐怕微乎其微。中小企業的經營,原本就艱險重重;而數十年來,主政者不論藍綠,概皆偏好大企業與高科技產業,而忽視傳統型的中小企業,任令其自生自滅。因而中小企業壽命甚短,能持續十餘年即屬難能可貴;而幸得掌握市場利基、屹立不搖者,多半堅守其利基市場,以不變應萬變,除了為人代工、供應基本原材料之外,不敢輕易越雷池一步;因而附加價值多為他人奪佔,經營模式封閉而保守,甚至已發展成熟的資訊、設計、行銷等專業,也不敢嘗試再作進取。

這類的中小企業,潛力十足,未開發的價值驚人,然一旦大陸市場大開,他們遙望廣闊的對岸市場,即使心動,也不敢輕舉妄動;且因如何攻城掠地,取勝致果,亦全非其所長,即使大膽邁出一步,恐怕也是凶多吉少。但在市場大開之後,這一大群中小企業,在對岸財大氣粗的金主眼中,有如未琢璞玉,必將挑精揀肥,挾往彼岸大發利市,使台灣只能抱殘守缺,為人作嫁,完全喪失抗衡力量。

馬總統日前出席「全球華人企業高峰論壇」時,意氣風發地倡言,後ECFA時代,台灣企業應把握低關稅或免關稅進入大陸市場的良機,藉廣大內需開創自有品牌,突破賺取代工微利的窘境。我們深然是言,這與以上的推理完全吻合;只是馬總統跳躍性地自代工微利直取自創品牌,卻似不識其中的艱難險阻以及台灣企業困頓與保守的實情,因而可能坐失這個天賜良機。

的確,大陸市場為台灣的優質產品鋪出坦蕩的道路;台灣的設計功力與行銷人才,已臻成熟圓融的境地;但若無人用心將數以十萬計的眾多璞玉砥礪雕琢,台灣海峽的鴻溝難以跨越,這一切仍屬枉然。

再者,自從二十五年前出現加工出口業外移潮,台灣的產業鍊即橫遭斬斷,徒有優異的中、上游原材料大量出口為人作嫁,卻欠缺可供發展品牌的下游產品揚名國際市場;這是我們與南韓對壘時最大的致命要害。不儘速彌補此一缺口,究竟台灣有多少品牌可以發展?彌補之道有二,其一是全力輔導中上游產業整合既有設計、行銷人才,努力開發優質下游產業;其二是乘對岸工資高漲,大批下游業者蜂擁外移之際,提供適當環境,精選可造之材,迎來台灣與中上游結合,打造完整的產業鍊。

馬總統看到了中小企業的機會,馬政府要趕緊完成相關的工作,早日促其實現。

Thursday, October 21, 2010

Mainland China's Paradox: The More Developed the Economy, the More Serious the Political Crisis

Mainland China's Paradox: The More Developed the Economy, the More Serious the Political Crisis
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2010

Executive Summary: The Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress has adjourned. No major political reform programs emerged. The quest for stability remains the ultimate concern of the Chinese Communist Party. This does not mean that demands for political reform can be postponed, or that the people's voices can be ignored. Observers believe Beijing is merely shelving them, with the intention of dealing with them later. They do not believe Beijing is an ostrich burying its head in the sand. They do not believe Beijing will allow the situation to deteriorate. Recently rumors have emerged that President Hu Jintao intends to promote a "socialist two-party system." If true, Beijing has already broken out of its mental box. The rumor may be true, or it may be false. Either way, Mainland China's political reform has reached a watershed. The Hu-Wen regime knows only too well that "defying the will of the people is ultimately a dead end."

Full Text below:

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress has adjourned. No major political reform programs emerged. The quest for stability remains the ultimate concern of the Chinese Communist Party. This does not mean that demands for political reform can be postponed, or that the people's voices can be ignored. Observers believe Beijing is merely shelving them, with the intention of dealing with them later. They do not believe Beijing is an ostrich burying its head in the sand. They do not believe Beijing will allow the situation to deteriorate.

One reason for their belief is Wen Jiabao, who recently said, "Defying the will of the people is ultimately a dead end." The words "dead end" reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is fully aware of the problem. On the other hand, during an interview with a Western reporter, Wen mentioned death in another context. He said, "come rain or come shine, we will not give up until we are dead." This underscores the difficulty of political reform.

These invocations of the word "dead" or "death," offer an overview of political reform on the mainland. On the one hand, Beijing is aware that if it fails to undertake reform, it will eventually reach a dead end. On the other hand, Beijing is aware of the difficulty of reform, and how slim the chances for successful reform are. But political reform is no less urgent merely because real world difficulties abound. Especially when the key reason for the Chinese Communist Party's difficulties is its own procrastination.

Political reform is urgent. Consider an historical precedent. As Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his "Message to Compatriots in the Soviet Union," "When I became head of state (in 1985) the nation was clearly in a state of crisis. The reasons were obvious. Society, shackled by a bureaucratic command system, was close to suffocation. Society was forced to serve ideology. Society was forced to bear the burden of the arms race, and was already exhausted. Partial reform measures had failed. We could no longer live like this. We had to fundamentally change everything." Isn't Gorbachev's tone similar to that of Wen Jiabao?

Conditions in the Soviet Union just before its implosion cannot be compared to conditions on the Mainland today. But the core issue remains the same. The nation is under the control of a single party dictatorship which dominates society and monopolizes its resources. Mainland China's political system has undergone three decades of "reform and liberalization." The CCP is now caught in a cycle from which it cannot escape. The more it implements "reform and liberalization," the more corruption spreads, and the greater the public's perceived sense of deprivation. As a result, reform becomes ever more threatening and ever more difficult. As a result, even though the CCP is aware of the need for reform, partial reform efforts invariably end in failure. Intellectuals such as Liu Xiaobo say "we can not go on like this." Wen Jiabao of course understands that "without guarantees of political reform, the results of economic reform may be lost."

Reform and liberalization means forsaking class struggle and moving toward "economic development as the central value." It makes no difference whether the society is referred to as socialist or capitalist. What matters is liberating the productivity of the people and society. But one-party dictatorship has concentrated the wealth produced in the hands of those in power -- central and local level government officials. Government officials and business interests have monopolized most of the benefits. Economic growth fattens the pocketbooks of the rich and the powerful. Many party officials live lives of unbridled decadence. Compare this to the past. Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward and class struggle impoverished the nation, to the point where everyone was utterly destitute. Indignation and discontent were widespread. But if one compares yesterday's universal suffering, with today's unequal suffering. Inequality may grate on people's emotions even more than suffering. As a result, the greater the economic development, the greater the social unrest.

The Fifth Plenary Session is aware of the problem of inequality. Discussions of the "ten two five plan" have therefore concentrated on narrowing the income gap, the urban vs. rural gap, the east vs. west gap, and the rich vs. poor gap. The Fifth Plenary Session touts "inclusive growth." It understands that "unless one divides the pie evenly, it will be impossible to bake a bigger pie." The problem is not merely inequality. Inequality is merely a material issue. The problem involves two issues. One is corruption. The CCP has already experienced a serious loss of public trust. The moral foundation of its rule is built on quicksand. The other is dictatorship. The CCP remains a one-party dictatorship. This democratic dictatorship is guilty of uncontrolled corruption. It exploits the public. It deprives them of their rights. The public is unable to seek redress. Therefore on the surface, Mainland China's economy appears increasingly prosperous. But a closer look reveals that the greater the economic development, the more severe the political and social crises. Hence, Wen Jiabao's references to death.

Recently rumors have emerged that President Hu Jintao intends to promote a "socialist two-party system." If true, Beijing has already broken out of its mental box. The rumor may be true, or it may be false. Either way, Mainland China's political reform has reached a watershed. The Hu-Wen regime knows only too well that "defying the will of the people is ultimately a dead end."

中國弔詭:經濟愈發展 政治危機愈嚴重
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.21 01:33 am

中共的十七大五中全會閉幕了,未見任何具有力度的政治改革方案,求穩仍是中國共產黨的終極關切。但這並不意味政治改革的需求可以被拖滯,人民的呼聲可以被漠視;有些觀察者相信,北京只是暫時擱著、容後徐圖,而不是鴕鳥鑽沙,聽任情勢繼續惡化。

相信的理由之一來自於溫家寶,溫家寶才說過,「違背人民的意志,最終只會是死路一條」,「死路」兩字刻劃出了中共對於這個問題的認識非常清醒,然而,他接受西方媒體專訪時所說的另一個「死」字:「風雨無阻,至死方休」,卻也點出了政改的艱險與困難。

兩個「死」字畫出了大陸政改的輪廓,在此端已認知到再不改則死路一條,另一邊卻又感到現實中改革希望的困頓與渺茫。然而,政改的迫切性不能因為現實上的困難,特別是這個困難的核心源自於中共本身,就一再滯後。

政改的迫切性不妨藉蘇聯瓦解時蘇聯總統戈巴契夫的「告蘇聯同胞書」得到某種歷史的參照,戈巴契夫說:「我當上國家元首時(一九八五年)就已經很清楚:國家情況不妙。」「原因已清晰可見,社會在官僚指令體制的束縛之下近於窒息,它注定為意識形態服務,注定背負軍備競賽的重擔,已經筋疲力盡。」「所有的局部改革都以失敗告終……,不能再這樣生活下去了,應從根本上改變一切。」昔戈巴契夫的口氣是否與今溫家寶的口氣有幾分神似?

蘇聯解體前的情況,與當今大陸不能相提並論,但核心問題並無二致,亦即:國家由單一政黨專政掌控,支配社會中的全部或絕大多數資源。這種政治體制放在已走了三十年「改革開放」路子的中國,已然形成了一個難以自拔的迴圈,即愈「改革開放」反倒愈加腐敗,社會的相對剝奪感亦愈增,因而也就愈不敢改革且愈難改革;於是,中共雖認知到必須改革,但一切局部的改革,仍然「以失敗告終」,讓像劉曉波這樣的知識份子感到「不能再這樣下去了」,當然也讓溫家寶體察到「沒有政治體制改革的保障,經濟體制改革的成果就要得而復失」。

「改革開放」就是放棄「以階級鬥爭為綱」,走向「以經濟建設為中心」,不管姓社姓資,由此釋放了人民與社會的生產力;但一黨專政的體制卻導致生產的利益由掌有權力的中央到地方基層官員,以及與官員結合的特權企業攫奪大半,經濟增長大多數進了權貴集團的荷包裡,許多黨官的生活已至驕奢淫佚的地步。往前頭對照,毛澤東縱使搞鬥爭與大躍進弄得全國「一窮二白」,固亦天怒人怨,但那個年頭「患寡」,如今卻是「患不均」,「不均」的矛盾恐遠甚於「寡」。於是,經濟愈發展,社會愈不安定。

五中全會意識到「不均」之弊,於是在討論審議的「十二五規畫」裡,集中力氣於縮小收入差距、城鄉差距、東西差距與貧富差距,標舉「包容性增長」,理解到「不把蛋糕切好,就做不大蛋糕」;但問題並非只是「不均」,「不均」仍在唯物的層次上討論問題,問題還有兩層:一層是,由於腐化,中共在統治的精神面貌上已嚴重地失去人民對它的信任與信仰,統治的道德基礎已如建立在流沙之上。另一層是,繼續保持本質為一黨專政的人民民主專政,就是繼續讓腐敗不受監督,並繼續讓人民處於被宰割的處境上,其權利永恆地被剝削,且無平反與伸冤的地方。因而,從表面上看,中國是經濟愈加發展;但往內裡看,卻是經濟愈加發展,政治危機及社會危機愈加嚴重。此即前述兩個「死」字的源起。

最近,有一匿名信傳聞胡錦濤有意推動「社會主義兩黨制」,此說若真,則北京似已跳出思維窠臼;但不論真假,中國大陸的政治改革已到了歷史的渡口,胡溫體制應知:「違背人民意志,最終只會是死路一條。」

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Democracy and Foreign Relations will Test the Next Generation of Mainland Leaders

Democracy and Foreign Relations will Test the Next Generation of Mainland Leaders
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2010

On the 19th of this month, during the Fifth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping was elected Vice President of the Central Military Commission. This move confirmed his status as one of the next generation leaders of the CCP. Less than two weeks apart, both North Korea and Mainland China held elections, confirming successors for Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Neither government has an arrangement western governments would term democratic. But Mainland China has created its own unique system of elections. North Korea on the other hand, is entirely subject to the rule of men.

In North Korea, Kim Jong Eun, who is not even 30, has been made Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. His sole qualification is that he is the grandson of Kim Il Sung, and the son of Kim Jong Il. Xi Jinping meanwhile, was not made a fifth-generation successor solely because his father Xi Zhongxun was a Communist Party elder. He is a seasoned veteran who has held both party and government positions. He is currently the leader most able to ensure a consensus within the Chinese Communist Party.

More importantly, the system of succession on Mainland China is predictable in nature. For example, the 70 year age limit for membership of the Politburo Standing Committee has become an iron law. The same is true of the system of succession. When Xi Jinping was made Vice President during the 17th Party Congress, everyone expected him to gradually assume control over both the party and the government. Now that he has been made Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he is following in the footsteps of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Because the system is predictable, the political situation should remain stable. This differs from North Korea. Kim Jong Eun may be the designated successor. But no one can predict when Kim Jong Il will die, and what sort of chaos might ensue. Mainland China has freed itself from such a chaotic fate. It may lack democratic institutions. But it has this political model unique to Mainland China.

Xi Jinping has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. We cannot ignore another question. Hu Jintao is still Chairman of the Central Military Commission. How long will he retain that position? Will he resign during the 18th Party Congress? Speculation is rife. But most likely he will remain Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

We are only two years away from the 8th Party Congress. Xi Jinping will then assume the role of General Secretary and State President. That much is known. But with only two years of experience in the Central Military Commission, the Vice Chairman will need to "be helped onto his horse, and accompanied part of the way." In the past Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin retained their positions as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. They continued to influence the Central Military Commission. Hu Jintao is not "retiring completely." There is a precedent for this as well.

Nevertheless, after the 18th Party Congress, fifth generation leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will be the successors. They will take over the reigns of government from fourth generation leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. They will face new challenges. Some of these challenges will be domestic, some foreign.

Committment to ongoing reform and liberalization is no longer in question. During the Hu and Wen era, a minority still had doubts. But today the entire party, the entire nation has reached a consensus. They disagree only about execution. Take the "ten two five plan" adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session. Some people still disagree about the future ratio of state-owned enterprises vs. private enterprises.

We must point out that the fifth generation leaders' real challenge comes from freedom and democracy. When Jiang Zemin passed the baton on to Hu Jintao, the only stipulation was "never reverse the verdict on the June 4 Tiananmen Incident." Now however, the situation is much more complicated. Liu Xiaopo has won the Nobel Peace Prize. That is merely one of many indicators. Others include grievances over the gap between rich and poor and uneven regional development. Wen Jiabao's repeated talks on democracy reflect differences in thinking within the party. Also, modern means of mobilization and communication could allow the situation to quickly spin out of control.

No consensus has been reached within the party regarding the development of democracy. The same is true of foreign policy, the currency war, territorial sovereignty, and maritime disputes. Mainland China wants a peaceful rise. But this is no easy task. In the face of so many international challenges directed at Mainland China, should it continue keeping a low profile, or should it stand up and speak out? Should it not be afraid of war, and engage in tit for tat with the world's great powers? The fourth generation leaders did not need to make such decisions. But the fifth generation leaders will not be able to avoid confronting these challenges.

Regarding cross-Strait relations, some are pinning their hopes on Xi Jinping. Xi worked for many years in Fujian. He has many Taiwanese friends. He has feelings for Taiwan. Therefore his Taiwan policy may involve new thinking.

Naturally we hope the new generation of Mainland Chinese leaders will have a good understanding of Taiwan. We hope they will have a first-hand grasp of the situation. But Mainland China's institutionalized system of succession means the institutionalization of decision-making. Major decisions will be made collectively. Taiwan policy will be no exception.

Past CCP leaders had absolute authority. "One word from Mao Zedong was the same as ten thousand." But with successive generations, the authority of individual leaders has diminished. Cross-Strait policy makers on Taiwan have focused their attention on Xi Jinping's personal character and leadership style. Instead, they should attempt to understand the background of the fifth generation leaders as a whole.

In particular, they must not overlook the role President Hu Jintao will play after stepping down. During Hu's final days in power, he will want to leave a legacy. That will be a driving force in cross-Strait relations.

民主、外交 考驗中共下一代接班人
2010-10-20
中國時報

中共十七屆五中全會十九日增補習近平為中央軍事委員會副主席,確認了他作為下一代中共權力核心領導人;相隔不到兩周,北韓與中國分別選出中央軍委會副主席,確定了接班人,雖然兩個國家的安排,不是西方所熟知的民主選舉,但是中國已經形成了自己獨特的制度,反觀北韓還是人治。

在北韓,不到三十歲的金正恩能夠擔任軍委會副主席,唯一的資格,就是因為他是金日成的孫子、金正日的兒子。但是習近平之所以成為第五代接班人,不僅僅是因為他的父親習仲勛是中共元老,更重要的是他歷經過黨、政要職,是考驗過的人選,也是此刻最能凝聚中國共產黨統治共識的領導人。

更重要的是,中國的這套接班制度是有可預期性的,就像政治局常委限齡七十歲,已經成了鐵律,接班也有類似的原則,從習近平在十七大擔任國家副主席之後,大家就期待他會逐步接掌黨權與政權,現在出任軍委會副主席,也是仿效過去江澤民與胡錦濤逐步接班的先例。

我們認為,就是因為制度有可預期性,政局得以穩定;不像北韓,即使安排了金正恩接班,沒有人能夠預測金正日一旦過世,北韓會出現怎樣的亂局。而中國卻已經擺脫了這樣的混亂宿命,雖然這未必是民主體制,卻是中國特有的政治模式。

然而在習近平出任中央軍委會副主席的同時,我們不能忽略另一面:胡錦濤仍然擔任軍委會主席;究竟他會當多久?是否會在十八大時也一併辭去?目前各方揣測很多,但以留任軍委主席的可能性最大。

由於距離十八大僅有兩年時間,習近平屆時接下總書記與國家主席的頭銜,當是確定。但是軍委副主席的歷練僅兩年,還需要「扶上馬、送一程」;過去鄧小平、江澤民都曾經留任軍委主席,也都曾以軍委主席的身分繼續發揮影響力;胡錦濤不「裸退」,是有前例可援的。

但無論如何,十八大之後,習近平與李克強等第五代,將成為接班人。他們接過了胡錦濤與溫家寶等第四代交予的權力,同時也將面臨新的挑戰。這些挑戰有些來是內部,有些來自外部。

持續堅定的改革開放,已經不成問題。在胡溫的時代,還有少數人質疑;現在全黨、全國上下都有共識。唯一差別僅在執行方式,譬如五中全會所通過的《十二五規畫》,就還有人爭論未來國營與民營企業孰輕孰重等。

但是我們必須指出,第五代領導人的內部真正挑戰,卻來自對自由與民主的要求。在江澤民交棒給胡錦濤時,僅要求對六四「永不翻案」,但現在情況複雜的太多。劉曉波獲得諾貝爾和平獎,僅僅是表徵之一;社會對貧富差距的怨氣,發展所造成的地區不均衡,溫家寶的幾次關於民主講話,反映了黨內有不同思考;再加上,動員與傳播工具的多元與現代化,都更讓情況可能快速失控。

黨內除了對民主發展,未建立共識,對於外交政策,也步調不一。從貨幣戰爭,到領土領海主權爭議,中國要和平崛起,並不是件容易的事;面臨這麼多的衝著中國來的國際挑戰,是繼續韜光養晦,不強出頭?還是不畏戰、不懼戰,與世界強權針鋒相對?第四代領導人不須作決定,但第五代領導人卻無可迴避這個挑戰。

對於兩岸關係來說,有人寄希望於習近平,認為他曾經在福建工作多年,認識許多台灣朋友,對台灣是有感情的,因此對台政策會有新的思路。

我們當然期望,新一代中國領導人對台灣問題有善意的了解、有第一手的掌握。但是中國制度化的接班,意味著決策體制的制度化,主要決策會出自政治局集體的決定,對台政策自不例外。

過去的中共領導人有絕高的權威,毛澤東「說一句、頂萬句」,但是隨著領導人世代交替,個人權威色彩也逐漸褪去。台灣的兩岸決策人士,與其專注在習近平的個人特質與領導風格,不如從整體第五代出身背景來了解。

尤其不能忽略胡錦濤在卸下國家主席後,所扮演的角色;胡在最後當政時間,希望能夠留下歷史遺產,將會是推動兩岸關係的重要動力。

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Just What Are James Soong's Intentions?

Just What Are James Soong's Intentions?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 19, 2010

James Soong has thrown his support behind Yang Chiu-hsing. He is attempting to persuade voters to "dump Huang to save Yang." He either wants to split the Blue Camp, or to ensure that Yang is elected.

But given the bigger picture, such tactics may not guarantee Yang Chiu-hsing's victory. The move has already led to a complete break between Ma and Soong, and may ensure that Chen Chu is elected.

The reasons are simple. James Soong's move will leave the KMT with even less room to maneuver. Now all the KMT can do, is limit the damage James Soong has inflicted upon the Blue Camp. Soong has clearly made his play. His is attempting to "dump Huang to save Yang" in Kaohsiuing. He has blasted Hau Lung-ping for "failure to make Taipei look like a national capital." Soong has already precipitated a complete schism. This forces the KMT to back Huang Chao-shun in Kaohsiung to the bitter end. The KMT now has no choice but to prevent the "James Soong factor" from spreading to Taipei and Xinbei City. If the situation persists, if both Huang and Yang remain in the race to the very end, if both manage to retain over 10% of their diehard supporters, then Huang Chao-hsun stands no chance of getting elected. James Soong's attempt to ensure that Yang gets elected will fail. Therefore James Soong's move is really intended to split the Blue Camp. His attempt to get Yang elected is merely a pretext

The real problem is that Blue Camp voters no longer have the same opinion of James Soong they once did. Any attempt to promote a "dump/save effect" in Kaohsiung hinges on Pan Blue voters' desire to bring down Chen Chu. But this collective desire rests on the premise of "Blue Camp solidarity." James Soong's attempt to exploit this "dump/save effect" involves flagrant attempts to discredit Ma and Hao. These may be unacceptable to most Blue Camp voters. Therefore Soong's attempt to play the "dump/save card" may on the one hand incite "defeat Chen Chu above all else" sentiment among Blue Camp voters. They may intensify support for Yang Chiu-hsing. They may on the other hand may provoke intense Blue Camp voter anger against James Soong, and persuade them to support Huang to the bitter end. Another possibility is that such offensive tactics may alienate them so badly they boycott the election altogether. These are all reasons why Soong's attempt to persuade voters to "dump Huang to save Yang" may not succeed.

With this "shot in the arm," Yang Chiu-hsing may have overplayed his hand. He has forced the KMT's hand. Now there is no turning back. The KMT must now fight him to the end. Yang's move will inevitably provoke a backlash. It will inevitably incite Blue Camp anger against a common enemy. Also, the Chen Chu camp, seeing Soong and Yang come together, is bound to point to this move and attempt to dissuade Green Camp voters from dumping Chen Chu to save Yang. This will reduce Yang's final vote count. Therefore, once the dust settles, Yang Chiu-hsing may find that his piece of the pie has actually shrunk. The Blue Camp initially had a chance to play the "dump/save card" in the Greater Kaohsiung election. But James Soong's move has mired the Blue Camp in a deadlock.

This is not the first time James Soong has sprung such a surprise. His February 24, 2005 "Bian/Soong meeting" was a classic case. The purpose of the "Bian/Soong meeting" was to "dump the KMT to save the PFP." Soong's methods have not changed. First, he wanted to split the Blue Camp. Secondly, he wanted the People First Party and Chen Shui-bian to agree to "DPP/PFP co-rule." Eventually the "Bian/Soong meeting" led to James Soong's downfall. Why? Because voters disapproved of James Soong's attempt to "sell out the Blue Camp for selfish gain." Even People First Party legislators were troubled. James Soong overestimated his personal charm. In the end, he was forced to withdraw in disgrace.

James Soong's image is not what it used to be. It is no longer what it was years ago. Therefore persuading voters to "dump Huang to save Yang" will be correspondingly difficult. When Soong lashed out, he immediately impacted the larger political picture. Even Hau Lung-bin was dragged in. Soong's public pronouncements will inevitably become increasingly intemperate. This of course will affect the feelings of Blue Camp voters. Some may agree with Soong. But others may become even more contemptuous of him. In short, for Blue Camp voters, this is highly emotional matter. The impact of Soong's move is not limited to "dump Huang to save Yang" in Kaohsiung. It is bound to impact every one of the five cities elections. It is bound to impact the Ma administration's 2012 re-election bid.

In the twenty years since martial law was lifted, the most prominent feature of politics on Taiwan has been "trickery above all." As a result, political moves are never rooted in moral principles, but in political calculation. Lee Teng-hui was once "a party chairman and a half." He was full chairman of the KMT, plus a half chairman of the DPP. In the end however, this was also the cause of Lee's downfall. The aforementioned "Bian/Soong meeting" was classic Machiavelli. In the end however, Soong ended up with nothing. Politicians overestimate their own charm. They underestimate the people's intelligence. They come to believe they can perform miracles, that they can control the political weather in a god-like manner. In fact, voters will not necessarily permit themselves to be manipulated. Twenty years of experience since the lifting of martial law has confirmed that those who live by trickery, will die by trickery.

Yang Chiu-hsing recruited James Soong. Has this made it easier for him to play the "dump/save card?" Or more difficult? James Soong has backed Yang Chiu-hsing. Has this destroyed the Blue Camp, or has it destroyed his own image and credibility? Has he helped out Yang Chiu-hsing, or hindered him? The answer will soon become apparent.

宋楚瑜又想幹什麼?
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.19

宋楚瑜挺楊秋興,是要催動「棄黃保楊」的效應。亦即:一要撕裂藍營,二要拱楊當選。

然而,就大局大勢看來,此種操作卻未必能使楊秋興當選。也就是說,此舉已使馬宋自此徹底決裂,卻可能更加鞏固了陳菊必定當選的情勢。

道理很簡單,宋楚瑜來這麼一手,使國民黨更無轉圜空間;如今國民黨能做的,只有回過頭來設法使宋楚瑜撕裂藍營的傷害減低。因為,宋顯然已經豁了出去,他不僅在高雄操作「棄黃保楊」,且先一手砲轟郝龍斌「沒有首都格局」,已是全面決裂的態勢;這使得國民黨在大高雄只有力挺黃昭順寧為玉碎地選到底,並力拒「宋楚瑜因素」感染到北二都,別無選擇。這個情勢發展下去,只要黃楊二人都選到底,並只要各自保有十%的鐵票,則黃昭順固然恐怕當選無望,宋楚瑜要「保」楊上壘的意圖亦將落空。因而,宋的舉動,大概撕裂藍營是真,也許保楊當選是幻。

問題的關鍵在藍營選民對宋楚瑜人格形象的評價已今非昔比。大高雄若要操作棄保,其槓桿是在藍營選民希望扳倒陳菊;但這樣的群眾心理,仍是建立在「藍營整合」的想像之上。然而,如今由宋楚瑜出面操作棄保,卻是批馬斥郝以血淋淋的撕裂為手段,這恐未必是多數藍營選民所能接受。所以,宋的棄保操作,一方面可能煽動「倒菊為上」的藍營選民倒向楊秋興,另一方面卻也可能激發藍營選民升高對宋楚瑜的反感而致敵愾同仇挺黃到底,或因厭惡權謀、失望疏離而乾脆不投票。這些因素皆是宋楚瑜操作「棄黃保楊」未必會得逞的原因。

楊秋興的這一劑強心針似乎打得猛過了頭,他逼使國民黨沒有回頭路,只有死戰到底,且必回過頭來運用宋的倒戈來激發藍營同仇敵愾;何況,菊營見宋楊合流,則必將藉此削弱綠營選民挺楊棄菊的動機,壓低楊的得票。如此一來,待情勢沉澱後,楊秋興可能發現餅反而變小了。其實,藍營在大高雄原本不無操作棄保的空間,如今因宋楚瑜出面反而陷入僵局。

這不是宋楚瑜第一次有驚人之舉,二○○五年二月二十四日的「扁宋會」即是經典之作。若此次宋操作的是「棄黃保楊」,則「扁宋會」操作的即是「棄國民黨/保親民黨」,手法如出一轍:一要撕裂藍營,二要保親民黨取得與陳水扁「民親共治」的地位。後來,「扁宋會」搞得宋楚瑜身敗名裂的原因正是:非但藍營選民不贊同宋楚瑜「賣藍求榮」的操作,且親民黨立委也難苟同;宋楚瑜高估了他的形象魅力,終以灰頭土臉收場。

現在的宋楚瑜,其形象魅力大幅折損,更已不復當年,因而「棄黃保楊」的難度亦相對攀高。就宋的手法言,他一出手就將打擊面推擴到全局全面,連郝龍斌也要拖進來,且宋必將愈來愈口不擇言;這當然對藍營選民的心理平衡會有影響,有人可能呼應宋楚瑜,但也有人可能更鄙棄宋楚瑜。總之,對藍營選民而言,這是一個親痛仇快之局;因為,宋的操作,其效應不僅在高雄一隅的「棄黃保楊」,且勢將衝擊整個五都選情,亦是直指整個馬政府二○一二的政權保衛戰而來。

解嚴二十幾年來,台灣政治最凸出的特質就是「權謀掛帥」。因而,政治上的縱橫捭闔,亦非根據義理,而往往淪於權謀。李登輝曾是「一又二分之一個黨主席」(國民黨加半個民進黨),但最後李登輝的覆敗亦植根於此。前述「扁宋會」亦是權謀經典之作,結果也是竹籃打水一場空。政治人物高估了自己的魅力,低估了民眾的理智,以為真有「翻手為雲覆手雨」之類的政治奇蹟;其實,選民未必接受翻雲覆雨的操作,解嚴二十幾年來的經歷已經證實,成於權謀者終亦敗於權謀。

楊秋興找來宋楚瑜,究竟是寬鬆了棄保的形勢?或反而緊縮了棄保的空間?宋楚瑜挺楊秋興,究竟是在撕裂藍營或在撕裂自己的人格形象?究竟是幫了楊秋興或是幫了倒忙?一切均待且戰且看了。

Monday, October 18, 2010

The Nobel Prize and Economic Policy

The Nobel Prize and Economic Policy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2010

The winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics have been announced. The 1.5 million USD prize will be divided equally among three candidates: Peter Diamond. Dale Mortensen, and Christopher Pissarides. But the prize money is a minor matter. The reputations of these Nobel laureates will be enhanced dramatically. That is a far greater reward. The Swedish Central Bank established the Noble Prize in Economics in 1968. Since then, controversy has raged over whether the awards criteria and even the science of economics are objective.

One best-selling author became famous when he warned of the financial tsunami in advance. The day before the award was announced, he filed a claim against the Swedish Central Bank. Nobel Prizes were awarded to scholars who invented a portfolio risk model. Their portfolio risk model received the blessing of the Nobel Prize Committee, and encouraged bankers to take their theory seriously. The result was a serious blow to the global economy. Investors suffered heavy losses, and taxpayers were compelled to bail investors out with their hard-earned money.

Worse still, after this prize-winning portfolio risk model failed, more heavyweight Nobel Laureates in Economics warned that the world would be plunged into a terrifying Great Depression. Their columns led to the collapse of public confidence in the world's governments, and the paralysis of the global economy. They worsened the financial tsunami by pouring gasoline on the fire.

Two years have passed since the 2008 financial tsunami. The economies of the United States, Europe, Japan and other countries have yet to fully recover. Constant fear of a second recession remains. Are economists attempting to stem the tide, or make larger waves? Actually, they are doing both. Another accomplice looks on, far from the crime scene. The Great Depression led to the development of Keynesian theory in the 70s. Keynesianism has been repudiated by three decades of experience. But when the global economy became paralyzed, governments the world over rallied behind the US and collectively adopted Keynesian deficit spending policies. They did everything possible to borrow, spend, and build. Mainland China was the most extravagant. In a single breath, it invested four trillion RMB in new highway construction, high-speed railway construction, and housing construction. The result was no improvement to the economies of many countries. Meanwhile, because the proportion of government debt was too high, they turned to tax increases and budget cuts, in accordance with Keynesian policies of austerity. Such on again, off again policies, operating in fits and starts, battered their economies. Government debt was so heavy, their political stability was at risk.

Not only that, economic experts painted such a terrifying picture of the financial tsunami, Keynesian deficit spending policies were taken to an extreme. Monetarists -- long time rivals of the Keynsians -- offered their own policies. They lowered interest rates to zero or historic lows. They resorted to loose money policies to save the market. This policy was tantamount to printing paper money, and pumped unlimited quanties of paper money into the market place. Industries supposedly helped by real investments remained in the doldrums. Instead, hot money scattered, creating trouble everywhere. Financial bubbles burst in every country.

These mutally contradictory policies were ineffective, even counterproductive. The Nobel Prize in Economics has been awarded for 32 years. The United States has a virtual monopoly on them. These leading economists have touted, advocated, and promoted failed policies. This proves one thing: The science of economics remains frozen at a primitive stage of development. Theories abound, but none of them has stood the test of reality. Contrast this with the Nobel Prize in Physics or Chemistry, first awarded in 1901. There is no comparision.

The biggest difficulty with economics, is that it studies the behavior of mortal human beings. To compare them to atoms, molecules, gravity, and other non-human entities, is to artificially impose a mechanistic model from physics, in order to give the study of economics a "scientific" veneer. In reality, doing so turns one's back on the unique nature of human behavior. Ironically, doing so moves economics further and further away from genuine science. Therefore the more economics resorts to models, abstractions, and quantification, the less its conclusions conform to reality, and the less useful they are to us in the real world.

The three new laureates' greatest contribution is their realization that the market does not conform to the world of economic theory. In the world of economic theory, information is complete and readily available to both buyers and sellers. In the world of economic theory, unemployment and lack of work never coexist. Diamond's 's search markets theory first discovered that consumers and job seekers must bear expensive search costs, before they can obtain satisfactory results. If we were to ask the man in the street, he would give us the same answer. Is it really necessary to construct an elaborate mathematical model?

The world will arrive at its own evaluation of economic theories, based on how well they fare during financial crises. Nobel laureates' halos may be tarnished, but this should not be considered a bad thing, After all, when 10 different economists offer 11 different opinions, it is dangerous to put too much stock in any one of them.

從諾貝爾獎談經濟政策
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.18

諾貝爾經濟學獎得主揭曉,由戴門、莫忝生及皮薩里德斯三人平分一五○萬美元獎金;不過獎金事小,得獎者因諾貝爾的桂冠而身價大漲,更是難得的榮耀。然而,從一九六八年起由瑞典中央銀行設立諾貝爾經濟學獎以來,這個獎有否客觀標準,及經濟學有否客觀標準,皆仍是見仁見智的爭議。

就在揭曉的前夕,一位因在金融海嘯前事先提出警告而聲名大噪的暢銷書作家公然表示,要向瑞典中央銀行索賠,因為諾貝爾獎曾授予幾位發明投資組合風險模型的財金學者;由於諾貝爾獎的加持,使其理論大受重視,風險模型受到銀行家的高度依重,結果卻導致全球經濟重創,投資者蒙受嚴重損失,納稅者也要拿出血汗錢來紓困。

尤有甚者,在這個獲獎的風險模型失誤後,又有更重量級的諾貝爾經濟學獎得主厲聲恫嚇,恐嚇全球各國將陷入百年來最可怕的經濟大蕭條之中,透過其風行全球的專欄擊潰各國政府與人民的信心,導致世界經濟應聲癱瘓,為金融海嘯火上加油,雪上加霜。

事實上,從二○○八年金融海嘯爆發,至今已歷兩年,包括美、歐、日等國的經濟元氣未復,時刻擔心二次衰退;在這個階段,經濟學家究竟是力挽狂瀾,還是推波助瀾,實在是功過兼之。還有一個不在現場的幫兇,那就是七十年前為對治前一次經濟大恐慌而發展出來的凱因斯學說。儘管三十年來這一套理論早已被抨擊得體無完膚,但全球經濟全面癱瘓,各國政府在美國登高一呼之下,群起採取凱因斯學派的赤字支出政策,竭盡所能地舉債投入公共支出與建設,尤以中國大陸手筆最大,一口氣投下四兆人民幣大事興築高速公路、高速鐵路、住宅建築。結果許多國家景氣非但未見起色,卻因為政府負債比重過高,又反過來採取增稅、削減預算的凱因斯學派緊縮政策,如此忽正忽反,忽冷忽熱,經濟飽受摧殘,政府沉重的債務則令國家的穩定出現風險。

不僅如此,由於金融海嘯被經濟學者渲染得太過可怖,因而在凱因斯赤字支出政策用到極致的同時,一向與此派學者為死對頭的貨幣學派的政策也全面出爐,將利率壓低到零或歷史新低,並同時使出等同印鈔救市的量化「寬鬆政策」,無限量向市場撒鈔票。結果真正有助於實業發展的投資仍陷低迷,卻搞得熱錢橫流、四處為患,各國均深為泡沫所苦。

這些行之無效反有後患的種種相互矛盾的政策,在諾貝爾經濟學獎問世三十二年後,出現在幾乎囊括全部經濟學獎得主的美國,又由頂尖的經濟學家鼓吹、宣揚、推動,這證明了一件事情:經濟學仍停留在十分粗糙而幼稚的階段,雖有一家之言,卻難有顛撲不破之論,與一九○一年開始頒發諾貝爾獎的物理學、化學等實不可同日而語。

經濟學最大的困難,在於所研究的是芸芸眾生千奇百怪的行為,卻強要借用分析原子、分子、引力等非人對象、極其機械化的物理學分析工具,勉強撐出一個「科學」的面貌,實際上已與人的行為特性背道而馳,愈走愈遠。因而經濟學愈是模型化、抽象化、數理化,所獲得的結論即可能愈無補於實事。

即以此次三位新科得主而言,他們最大的貢獻,就是發現現實的市場並不像經濟理論中的世界,資訊完整而充分,不論買方還是賣方,都唾手可得,因而失業與缺工絕不可能同時存在。其實,戴門首創的搜尋理論即首先發現,不論消費者還是求職者,都要付出最昂貴的搜尋成本,才有可能得到比較滿意的結果。我們試以此詢問路旁的黃口孺子,同樣的答案脫口即出,何需精細複雜的數理模型努力推敲?

經濟學的威力及價值,經過此次金融海嘯的考驗,世人必將重新評價。或許以後諾貝爾獎得主的光環會大為減色,但這應不是壞事,畢竟當十個經濟學家就有十一個不同意見時,賦予其中任何一個意見太高的價值,恐怕都有極高的風險。

Friday, October 15, 2010

They Emerged from Purgatory, But Did We Learn Anything?

They Emerged from Purgatory, But Did We Learn Anything?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 15, 2010

Executive Summary: Rescue operations for the San Jose gold and copper mine in Chile ended yesterday. Thirty-three miners, trapped more than 600 meters underground, were successfully brought to the surface. Looking back at Taiwan, how many of our politicians have this foreman's courage in the face of crisis? When a crisis confronts us, can we work together to survive the difficulties, instead of complaining? When someone needs assistance, do we go all out, acting with precision, doing our utmost? Or do we merely make a token effort, then give up? This group of miners laughed in the face of adversity. Besides admiring them, will we learn from them as well?


Full Text below:

For the first time, human beings were drilling to the center of the earth, not to extract minerals, but to rescue their trapped fellows. For the first time, a developing nation successfully carried out a difficult rescue mission with military precision, and the world looked on with admiration. For the first time, a tragic mine disaster had a happy ending, and redeemed the humanity of people the world over.

Rescue operations for the San Jose gold and copper mine in Chile ended yesterday. Thirty-three miners, trapped more than 600 meters underground, were successfully brought to the surface. Furthermore, they were in better physical condition than anyone expected. Rescuers initially estimated that the rescue would take 120 days, and that the trapped miners could not be extracted before Christmas. But technical and material support from various quarters enabled them to accomplish their "Mission Impossible" in 70 days, with virtually no complications to speak of.

This was the longest rescue operation in history. For the rescuers above ground, it was a difficult project. For the miners trapped underground, the physical and mental challenges were daunting. The amazing thing is that the rescuers above ground did everything right. They never missed a step. The miners trapped underground gave each other encouragement. No one fell apart. The rescue operation is being touted as the greatest rescue in modern history. The rescuers above ground and the miners trapped underground encouraged each other, cooperated with each other. They never lost faith. This enabled the trapped miners to emerge from purgatory and rejoin the living.

This incident forced us to re-examine the "time" vs. "cost" myth. Disaster relief efforts on Taiwan used to be conducted in accordance with an iron law known as the "Golden 72 Hours." The assumption was that once this time frame had been exceeded, the chances the victims were still alive were slim, and rescue efforts would be abandoned. This time however, the miners were found alive by rescuers 70 days after the mine collapsed. The provision of the emergency refuge zone played a role. It had only enough air and water for two days. But rescue workers remained tireless, and continued their search. After seven failed exploratory shafts, they finally located the survivors. Their efforts bore witness to boundless human will and endurance.

The rescue operation required continuous excavation at extremely deep levels. Not only were the risks high, the cost was even higher. The rescue operation cost nearly 600 million NTD. The cost of rescuing each miner was nearly 20 million NTD. The rescue operation had a price. But human life is priceless. People clearly knew that over 30 people were trapped below. No matter how financially strapped the government might be, it had to do its utmost to rescue them. How can one put a price tag on a successful rescue?

The Chilean government's rescue operation was remarkable. Its rescue plan was methodical. It proceeded above ground and below, simultaneously. In the event one rescue plan failed, it simultaneously prepared an alternate plan. For example, rescuers simultaneously drilled two rescue shafts. In the event one of the two shafts missed, they would immediately begin drilling a third, at another location. This substantially increased the cost of the rescue operation. But it was the best way to ensure that the miners would be rescued.

Chile's mines have a poor reputation. Their safety has been questionable. But this time the Chilean Government's rescue effort resulted in success. It looked after the trapped miners, providing them with sustenance. The military cooperated by providing the Phoenix rescue capsule. The government invited experts from the United States to assist, The disaster had a happy ending. It not only united the hearts of the Chilean people, it won the applause of the world.

Most moving of all, was the comportment of the 33 miners. Trapped in a virtual purgatory, subject to physical and mental suffering, facing an unknown fate, they refused to despair. They cheered each other on. Within their dark, narrow space, they maintained discipline and order. They exercised, making their waists smaller, ensuring that they would fit into the rescue capsule. They yielded to one another. Each volunteered to be the last rescued. By mutual agreement, they agreed to write a book about their experience, and to share any royalties.

How can anyone not respect the miners? Yesterday, 54 year old Luis Ursua was the last man to be rescued. This mining foreman may look like just another elderly man. But he is a genuine hero. When the mine collapsed, he led everyone to the refuge zone. He strictly rationed both water and food, ensuring that two days of rations lasted 17 days, and keep them alive until rescuers could reach them. He divided 30 square meters of tunnel into a work area, rest area, and sanitary area. He assigned people to shifts. He simulated day and night by turning the lights on and off, making sure that everyone knew what time it was above. This foreman comported himself with greater calm and wisdom than most generals. That was why 33 miners could stare into the face of death and not panic.

Looking back at Taiwan, how many of our politicians have this foreman's courage in the face of crisis? When a crisis confronts us, can we work together to survive the difficulties, instead of complaining? When someone needs assistance, do we go all out, acting with precision, doing our utmost? Or do we merely make a token effort, then give up? This group of miners laughed in the face of adversity. Besides admiring them, will we learn from them as well?

他們走出煉獄,我們學到什麼?
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.10.15

第一次,人類鑽向地心的深井不是為了掏礦,而是為了把困在那裡的人營救出來;第一次,一個開發中國家把高難度的救援過程操練得如此完美,讓舉世刮目相看;第一次,一次悲慘的礦坑大災變卻以動人的大喜劇收場,讓全球共沐從災難到救贖的人性恩典。

智利聖荷西金銅礦場的救援行動昨天落幕,卅三名受困六百多公尺深地底的礦工全部順利脫困;而且,他們的健康狀況顯得比外界預期為佳。最初預估要花費一百廿天,遲至耶誕節才可能將他們救出;但靠著各界的技術及物資支援,最後僅花了七十天即成功達陣。完成此一不可能的任務,絲毫沒有儌倖可言。

這項史上最漫長的救援行動,對地面營救者而言,是艱鉅的工程;對地下受困者而言,則是身心的嚴酷挑戰。難得的是,地面上的人步步為營,沒有失手;而地下的人相互鼓勵,沒有人崩潰。這次行動被稱為近代史上最偉大的救援,原因就是地上與地下的彼此呼應、打氣、配合,在絕不放棄的信念下,使所有受困者得以走出煉獄,重返人間。

此一事件,教我們如何重新審視救災的「時間」及「成本」迷思。過去台灣的災難救援工作,存在著「黃金72小時」的鐵律;認為過此時限,受難者生還機會渺茫即告放棄。這次,礦工們是在礦坑崩塌17天後,才被搜救者發現都還活著。坑道避難所的設計發揮了作用,那裡的空氣和飲水雖僅足兩天之用,搜救人員卻仍持續不懈地搜尋,探鑽通風井歷經七次失敗,終於探測生還者的蹤跡。人的意志和耐力不可限量,由此可見。

再看,整個救援行動因為要不斷深度掘挖,不僅危險度極高,經費更是驚人。高達六億多元新台幣的救援花費,平均起來,花在每個礦工身上的費用高達兩千萬元。但是,救援有價,人命卻是無價的;明知有卅多人身陷於此,政府再怎麼拮据也要用盡方法把人救出來。救援成功的甜美果實,豈能以金錢計?

在救援過程中,智利政府的表現可圈可點。它提出的營救方案,步驟分明,地上、地下兩路並進;同時,為了防止救援失敗,還提出備用計畫同步進行。例如,鑽挖救生坑的行動,採取A、B兩路同時進行;A計畫挫敗後,又立即啟動C計畫,在另翼開挖。如此,雖大幅增加營救成本,卻是保證礦工得到最佳救援機會的不二法門。

智利的礦場一向聲名不佳、安全堪虞,但智利政府透過這次救援行動,包括對受困礦工的飲食及身心健康維護,包括軍方配合打造了「鳳凰號」救生艙,乃至邀來美國探鑽專家的協助,使得一場救援行動完美落幕。一場災難以喜劇收場,不僅凝聚了智利人民的心,也贏得了世界的掌聲。

最令人動容的,還是33名受困礦工的表現。他們困處煉獄般的礦坑,在身心煎熬中面對不可知的命運,卻沒有被絕望或焦慮擊倒。他們互相打氣,在狹窄而黑暗的空間中建立共處秩序;他們鍛鍊身體,使腰圍變小,以便使自己裝進狹小的救生艙;他們彼此推讓,希望自己排在最後出坑;相互約定,這段地底的日子要共同寫成書,集體分享版稅。

真的,誰能小看礦工?54歲的領班鄂蘇亞昨天最後一個被營救出來,這位長得像隔壁歐吉桑的領班,卻是真正的英雄。礦坑坍塌時,他指引大家疏散逃生;在逃生區,他嚴格管制水和食物,讓大夥靠著兩天的口糧撐了17天,撐到救兵發現他們。他把不到30平方米的坑道,分為工作區、休息區和衛生區,指派大家輪流工作休息;利用燈光的開閉模擬日夜,教大家知道地面的時日。一個領班,表現得比一位將軍還要鎮定與睿智;所以33名礦工能一條心,面對死亡威脅,毫不慌亂。

回頭想想,在台灣,我們的政壇有多少人臨危時能有這位工頭的膽識?當我們遭遇危難,能否齊心協力共度難關,而不怨天尤人?當有人需要救援,我們能否義無反顧、精準擘劃、全力以赴,而不只是略盡心意即止?看這群礦工談笑走過煉獄,我們除了感佩,會不會有些自嘆弗如?

Thursday, October 14, 2010

Where Are Taiwan's "18 Responses" to the Global Currency War?

Where Are Taiwan's "18 Responses" to the Global Currency War?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2010

For the past two weeks, the most striking aspect of international financial markets has been the struggle between two superpowers, the Chinese Mainland and the US, over the upward revaluation of the renminbi. Emerging markets have joined hands opposing an upward revaluation of the RMB. The current situation is more complex than in the past. The USD, the RMB, the JY, and various emerging market currencies have intersected. The major powers have mutual interests, both positive and negative.

Following the 2008 financial tsunami, the advanced economies of Europe and North America fell into sharp recession. Beijing injected four trillion RMB into its economy to increase domestic demand. It hoped to gradually convert its single-engine economy, driven by exports, into a twin-engine economy, driven by both exports and domestic demand. Because of this, many countries hope Mainland China will be the force behind a global economic turnaround. Washington and Beijing joined hands to fight the financial tsunami. Their relationship has become extremely close. Hence the expression, "G2." The US Currency Report has not listed Beijing as a "currency manipulator state."

This year however, the US has frequently touched sensitive nerves during its Western Pacific military exercises. The US economy has shown no improvement. Unemployment remains close to 10 percent. The US government is under tremendous pressure. At this point, claiming that the yuan has been deliberately undervalued and is "taking away American jobs," is an easy way to find a scapegoat. The value of the RMB rose dramatically after being floated, establishing new highs. Nevertheless the US government demands that the RMB be revalued upward even further. The Chinese Mainland, out of national pride or economic realism, balks at revaluing the RMB as much as the US demands. In fact the tug of war over the revaluation of the RMB is not purely a monetary and economic issue. It is part of a "total war" between two major powers.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Yen has been subjected to a huge upward revaluation, The exchange rate is approaching 80 JY to the USD. Japanese companies must bear the brunt of this revaluation. This has forced the Japanese government to intervene with an injection of several trillion yen into its economy. But the Japanese government's unilateral intervention will not necessarily inspire other major industrial nations to ride to the rescue. Other countries are happy to see the JY appreciate. As a result, the effectiveness of the Japanese government's intervention may be limited. The appreciation of the JY has two causes. The underlying cause is spread trading funds covering the JY following the financial tsunami. The proximate cause is the Mainland Chinese government, which has been buying vast quantities of Japanese government bonds. The two Asian powers are arguing over whether Mainland China is deliberately attempting to force an upward revaluation of the JY.

Following the financial tsunami, emerging market countries must confront the world's central banks. First they injected trillions of dollars to the market. Then they implemented a near-zero interest rate policy. They made unlimited funds available with a "quantitative easing" policy, flooding the market knee deep in capital. High interest funds looked to emerging markets, which were the first to recover in the wake of the financial tsunami. Several trillions of dollars in hot money from all over the world poured into these emerging markets. Naturally these national currencies appreciated. But these countries had just climbed out of a recession. Domestic demand was insufficient. They needed to strengthen their exports. They were afraid currency appreciation would impact their export competitiveness. Needless to say, they all did their best to stop any upward revaluation.

As a result, the Brazilian Finance Minister publicly spoke of the race to devalue among nations, Japan 's forceful intervention in the exchange rate, the Central Bank on Taiwan pegging its exchange rates to those of its main competitor Korea, strongly defending the 31 NT per USD level. The interest some emerging market countries showed in the so-called "hot money tax" was a product of this situation. The International Monetary Fund has issued repeated warnings. It is concerned that if governments use monetary policy as a weapon to solve domestic economic problems, they could seriously jeopardize any global economic recovery.

The US wants to compel an upward revaluation of the RMB. The situation is similar to the 1985 Plaza Accord, which attempted to compel an upward revaluation of the JY. The United States was suffering from a weak domestic economy. Japan was enjoying a huge trade surplus with the United States. The United States, along with other major industrial countries, intervened. Japan played along. Today's situation differs. The Chinese Mainland does not need to play along with the United States the way Japan did. The Chinese Mainland has links with all major industrial nations, who may not be able to reach a consensus. Therefore the situation is more complex and unpredictable than in the past.

The most important point for future reference, is of course, the exchange rate report published by the United States. Will it accuse Mainland China of being a currency manipulator? Will it impose punitive tariffs on exports from Mainland China? If it comes to this, then a global trade war could erupt. All manner of protectionist policies and puniitve measures against competitor nations may be imposed. The pace of global economic recovery will inevitably be reversed. History has taught us a series of painful lessons. Unless all nations lose their senses, the probability of this happening is low. But a tug of war and shocks to the system during the consultation process are inevitable. The Republic of China government may not have much leverage in this rivalry among international powers. But it must protect itself. It must maximize the good, and minimize the bad. The government must have "18 Responses," not just the one in which the Central Bank defends to the death the 31 NT per USD exchange rate.

全球貨幣戰爭 台灣的「18套劇本」在哪?
2010-10-14
中國時報

近兩周來,國際金融市場上,最引人矚目的事件,莫過於以中、美兩大強權角力的人民幣逼升為主軸,新興市場聯手抗升的貨幣戰爭。相較過去,這次的情勢更複雜,美元、人民幣、日圓,及其它新興市場國家貨幣彼此交錯,強權國家之間的利害也互有正向或負向關聯。

二○○八年金融海嘯後,歐美先進經濟體大幅下滑,大陸祭出四兆人民幣的擴大內需方案,期望把原來帶動經濟的出口單引擎,逐步轉為出口與內需並重的雙引擎,並因而成為海嘯中,許多國家寄望能帶動全球經濟脫困的力量。當時,中、美兩國攜手力抗海嘯,關係如膠似漆,因而有「G2」之稱。美國的匯率報告,也因而並未把大陸列為「匯率操縱國家」。

不過,今年以來,美國頻頻在西太平洋的軍事演習,觸動雙方敏感的神經。美國內部經濟無起色,失業率仍接近十%,讓美國政府承受莫大壓力。此時,以人民幣蓄意低估,「搶走美國人的就業機會」,就成為最廉價的代罪羔羊了。縱然人民幣在加大浮動區間之後,價位頻創新高,但美國政府壓迫人民幣升值的力道仍不斷加強。而大陸方面,不論就其「民族自尊」,或是其經濟承受能力,都不可能如美國所願的讓人民幣大幅升值。人民幣升值的角力,實際上已不是單純的貨幣與經濟問題了,而是兩大強權「總體戰」的一環了。

而同時,日圓也在近日因升值過鉅,逼近八十日圓兌一美元這個日本企業承受底限,因而迫使日本政府投入數兆日圓干預;但日本政府獨力干預,未能得到其它主要工業國奧援,其它國家倒是樂於看到日圓升值,因而使其干預難有成效。日圓的升值,遠因是海嘯之後的套利交易資金回補日圓,近因則是大陸政府開始大筆的吃進日本國債。兩個亞洲強權間,又為了中方是否蓄意逼迫日圓升值而你來我往、爭論一番。

至於新興市場國家面對者,則是海嘯後的全球各國央行,先是挹注數兆美元資金到市場,接著實施接近零利率的低利政策,及資金無限寬鬆的「量化寬鬆」,讓資金泛濫淹腳目。這些逐高利而居的資金,就看上海嘯後率先復甦反彈的新興市場,全球數兆美元熱錢分頭湧入這些新興市場,各國貨幣當然要升值。但各國才由谷底走回,內需支撐力不足,都需要加強出口這個引擎,深怕貨幣升值影響出口競爭力,當然是竭盡其能的阻止升值。

因此,我們看到巴西財長公開講出各國競貶、日本大力干預匯率、台灣央行緊盯主要競爭國韓國的匯率,力守卅一元關卡,部份新興市場國家有意開徵所謂的「熱錢稅」,都是這個情勢下的產物。國際貨幣基金為此再三發出警語,憂心各國政府競相以貨幣做為政策武器,以解決本國的國內經濟問題,將重傷全球經濟復甦。

美國要逼升人民幣,其情勢與一九八五年廣場協定後逼迫日圓升值雷同,同樣是美國受困於國內經濟疲弱,而日本則對美國享有龐大的貿易順差。但當時是美國與其它主要工業國聯手干預,日本也買美國的帳。今日的情況則是大陸不必如日本般對美國言聽計從,主要工業大國中,在大陸的合縱連橫下,也未能達成聯手行動。因而局勢較過去又更複雜難測。

未來最重要的觀察點,當然是美國即將公布的匯率報告中,是否把大陸列為匯率操縱國,並進而對大陸出口品祭出懲罰性關稅。如果走到這步,全球的貿易大戰將因而點燃,各種貿易保護政策、對競爭國的懲罰性措施都將紛紛出籠,全球經濟復甦腳步必然因而反轉。鑑於過去歷史慘痛的教訓,除非各國都失去理性,否則走到這步的機率應低。不過,雙方角力、協商過程中的震盪難免。台灣在此國際強權較勁過程中,或許沒有太多著力處,但如何自保、趨吉避凶,政府有關單位是該有個「十八套劇本」,而不是只有讓央行隻手死撐卅一元關卡這麼一招。

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

How Dare Tsai Ing-wen Attend the National Day Ceremony?

How Dare Tsai Ing-wen Attend the National Day Ceremony?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 13, 2010

Will Tsai Ing-wen attend the National Day ceremony or won't she? This is basically a non-issue. During Democratic Progressive Party protest marches, flags and banners are so numerous they block out the sun. But one will never see a single Republic of China flag. The party's fundamental nature has not changed. The five cities elections are looming. How dare Tsai Ing-wen attend the National Day ceremony?

This is one of the fundamental paradoxes on Taiwan. A "revolutionary political party" has an unspoken goal -- to overthrow the Republic of China. Yet it runs for Republic of China political offices in the guise of a "democratic political party." On the one hand, at election time, it assures moderate voters that it is a "democratic political party." On the other hand, it assures Taiwan independence supporters that it is a "revolutionary political party." On the one hand, upon taking office, it declares "five noes." On the other hand, it promotes the "rectification of names," the "authoring of a new constitution," a "referendum to enter the UN," and "one nation on each side.“ Over the past eight years, when President Chen Shui-bian presided over the New Year's Day flag-raising ceremony, the DPP parade formation would be filled with "Nation of Taiwan" flags and banners, fluttering in the breeze, blotting out the sun.

The DPP's two-faced nature has reached extremes. Its supporters apparently believe their two-faced nature is a "necessary evil," essential for the growth of Taiwan independence, which cannot survive without it. Perhaps in the beginning the DPP concluded that in order to ensure the survival of Taiwan independence, it had no choice but to adopt this two-faced behavior. But it now engages in this two-faced behavior to exploit Taiwan independence. In other words, it originally engaged in political manipulation to promote Taiwan independence. Now however, it engages in political manipulation to exploit Taiwan independence. This practice has transformed the DPP's two-faced behavior into "ersatz democracy/ersatz Taiwan independence." It can no longer extricate itself, and is dragging its supporters into this moral quagmire.

In order to advocate Taiwan independence, the DPP must express "total opposition." It must incite hatred. It must tear society apart. It must express opposition merely for the sake of expressing opposition. The DPP's unspoken goal is to overthrow the Republic of China. For this it has a tacit understanding with its supporters. How can it possibly accept any of the ROC government's key policies? ECFA is clear example. ECFA is part of the Republic of China path. It is fundamentally opposed to the "Nation of Taiwan" path. If the DPP sides with the Republic of China, how can it possibly oppose ECFA? Conversely, if it champions Taiwan independence, how can it not oppose ECFA?

In almost any political controversy, the DPP criticizes the "Republic of China" from a "Nation of Taiwan" perspective. For example, when typhoons caused flooding in Kaohsiung, DPP officials said the disaster was caused by "too many Mainlanders." For example, during the H1N1 influenza outbreak, DPP officials said "This was the Ma administration's first anniversary gift to Taiwan." The DPP has cultivated in the minds of its supporters the belief that "Taiwan independence is more exalted morally than the Republic of China." It has even cultivated in the minds of its supporters the belief that "Taiwan independence is more exalted morally than any value one can imagine." For Taiwan independence, "repudiating the Republic of China" and "hating the Republic of China" is the highest morality. Therefore for the sake of Taiwan independence, one is morally justified in opposing democracy, the rule of law, even morality itself.

Given this understanding, it is obvious why the DPP felt the courts had no right to judge Chen Shui-bian's corruption. After all, for the DPP, Taiwan independence trumps the rule of law. That is why Chen Shui-bian's 3/19 shooting hoax, Frank Hsieh's doctored audio tapes, and Chen Chu's "gotcha" press conference, were all considered morally justifiable. After all, for the DPP, Taiwan independence trumps democracy. Repeated distortions of the water spinach issue slandered the entire Flora Expo. This was another spectacular victory for the DPP. After all, for the DPP, Taiwan independence is the highest morality, and trumps even morality itself. For the sake of Taiwan independence, any immoral or unscrupulous conduct is considered acceptable.

This is the unspoken goal shared by the DPP and its supporters. On the one hand, the DPP uses this understanding to brazenly engage in all sorts of trickery. It incites hatred, destroys democracy, undermines the rule of law, and ignores moral standards. Nevertheless it still receives over 40% of the vote. On the other hand, it is also the reason the DPP can never transform itself from a "Taiwan Independence Party" into the "Republic of China's loyal opposition." In recent years, the world, the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan have changed. The moral status of Taiwan independence, its legitimacy and its feasibility, have been increasingly eroded. The DPP and its supporters, with their two-faced advocacy of "ersatz democracy/ersatz Taiwan independence," have destroyed the Republic of China. But they have also hollowed out and falsified the "Nation of Taiwan."

Tsai Ing-wen has already embarked on the same path as all other DPP leaders. She will share the same fate. On the one hand, the DPP wants to seize political power within the Republic of China under the guise of a "democratic political party." On the other hand, the DPP wants to deceive Taiwan independence supporters under the guise of a "revolutionary political party." Tsai Ing-wen cannot attend the ROC National Day ceremony. All she can do is hold high the "Nation of Taiwan" banner as she marches in lockstep formation. All she can do is perpetuate the DPP's two-faced game of self-deception.

蔡英文怎麼敢出席國慶典禮
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.10.13

蔡英文會不會出席國慶典禮,這根本是個假議題。民進黨迄今仍是在大遊行時旌旗蔽日、卻見不到一面國旗的政黨,如果該黨的「本性」不變,況且又五都選舉在即,蔡英文豈會又豈敢出席國慶典禮?

這是台灣政治的根本僵局。一個以顛覆中華民國為潛台詞的「革命政黨」,卻以「民主政黨」的形式進入政治運作。在選舉時,一方面要使中間選民認為,它是「民主政黨」;另一方面,又要台獨支持者相信它是「革命政黨」。在執政後,一方面要宣示「四不一沒有」;另一方面又要操弄「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」、「一邊一國」。過去八年,當陳水扁總統在元旦升旗典禮率官民向國旗行禮的年代裡,民進黨的遊行隊伍中一律插滿「台灣國」的旗幟,迎風獵獵,遮天蔽日。

民進黨已將這樣的「兩面性」操作得爐火純青,其支持者也似乎相信,這種「兩面性」是台獨生存發展的「必要之惡」,非此不能存活。開始時,或許覺得,為了台獨的存活,不能不操作這種兩面性;但是,到了如今,卻是為了操作這種兩面性,而玩弄台獨。也就是說:原來是為台獨而操弄權謀;如今卻是為了操弄權謀而玩弄台獨。這種操作手法,已使民進黨的「兩面性」成為「假民主/假台獨」,非但自己難以自拔,也使其支持者陷入道德困境。

因為主張台獨,所以要「完全反對」,要煽動仇恨,要撕裂社會;因此,民進黨就必須為反對而反對。以推翻中華民國為潛台詞(與其支持者之間的默契)的民進黨,豈能承認或接受中華民國政府的任何重大政策?ECFA即是顯例:因為,ECFA本是中華民國路線與台灣國路線的根本分歧;民進黨倘站在中華民國的立場上設身處地,豈會反對ECFA?反過來說,主張台獨者又豈能不反對ECFA?

民進黨幾乎在任何政治爭議上,皆是以「台灣國」的心態來批判「中華民國」。例如,高雄颱風淹大水,民進黨有人說,禍因是「外省人來得太多了」;再如H1N1流感爆發,民進黨有人說:「這是給馬政府就職周年的禮物。」民進黨用台獨在其支持者間非但製造了一種「台獨比中華民國具道德性」的幻覺,也使其支持者認為「台獨的道德階位高於其他任何的道德標準」,因為「否定中華民國及仇恨中華民國」就是台獨的最高道德。所以,為了台獨,甚至以反民主、反法治與反道德為道德。

有此理解,即知為何民進黨會認為:陳水扁的貪腐是法院所不能評價的(反法治);且陳水扁藉三一九槍擊案、謝長廷因假錄音帶、陳菊以「抓到了」記者會操弄選舉,皆為理所當然(反民主);而用幾株扭曲的空心菜汙名化整個花博,更是精彩絕倫的權謀勝利(反道德)。這一切,皆因以台獨為最高道德,為了台獨,一切不道德的不擇手段,皆是最高道德。

這正是民進黨與其支持者之間的潛台詞。一方面,民進黨利用此種默契,肆無忌憚地玩弄權謀,煽動仇恨,摧毀民主、法治與道德的標準,而仍能贏得至少超過四成的社會支持;但另一方面,民進黨也因而不可能由「台獨黨」轉型為「中華民國的忠誠反對黨」。於此同時,由於近年來全世界、兩岸及台灣內部情勢的巨變,台獨的道德性、正當性及可行性,皆已日趨淪喪流失;民進黨與其支持者遂相互在「假民主/假台獨」的兩面性中,毀了中華民國,但也空洞化、虛假化了台灣國。

蔡英文已走上此前所有民進黨領袖的同一宿命。一方面,想用「民主政黨」的面貌爭奪中華民國的政權;另一方面,又要用「革命政黨」的憧憬來哄騙台獨支持者。蔡英文當然不會出席中華民國國慶,她只能回到高擎台灣國旌旗的遊行隊伍中,繼續操作這自欺欺人的「兩面性」。