Walking on Two Legs: Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait

Walking on Two Legs: Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait
by Ma Ying-jeou
translated by Bevin Chu
March 12, 2007

Comments: Apparently Ma Ying-jeou didn't get the memo.

So here it is:

The Cold War is over. Mainland China is no longer your enemy. The US government is no longer your friend.

Walking on Two Legs: Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait
by Ma Ying-jeou
translated by Bevin Chu
March 12, 2007

As many observers have pointed out, cross-Straits issues concern not only the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, but also the Asian-Pacific region and foreign policy, because it may be the only issue that could provoke war between the United States, the world's only remaining superpower, and Communist-ruled mainland China, which has the world's largest population. If war were to break out, not only would regional trade and development be brought to a halt, nations in the region might be forced to choose between supporting and resisting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), precipitating long-term structural changes in the strategic environment of the Asian-Pacific region.

At a deeper level, I would especially like to point out three major negative developments affecting the security of both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the past several years. First, the rapid and large-scale development of Communist Chinese military forces.

In November 2006, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, established at the request of the US Congress, made public its annual congressional report.

One of its main conclusions was "Many experts have already arrived at an important consensus, that between 2008 and 2015, if a conflict arises, or tension increases between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the US decides that it must assist Taiwan, the United States military will experience a Window of Vulnerability."

In other words, many of the CCP's Taiwan-oriented military modernization plans, including submarines, destroyers, cruise missiles, as well as high mobility ballistic missiles, new style Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaisance Systems (C4ISR), as well as attack plans, may all be deployed around 2008, or shortly thereafter.

Meanwhile, the measures that the United States military may use to hinder the Chinese Communists, including guided missile defense systems, nearshore military capabilities, as well as comprehensive antisubmarine warfare networks, may not have adequate strength until 2015.

This will seriously reduce the ability of American military forces to intimidate the CCP, and simultaneously increase the cost of US intervention. Secondly, since 2000, the ruling DPP has never attempted to establish any form of relations with the newly-awaken Dragon of the East. Even more disadvantageous is the fact that the DPP stops at nothing to provoke the CCP, and frequently manufactures tensions between the US and the CCP.

One week ago, President Chen made yet another shocking statement: "Taiwan must become independent! Taiwan demands a new constitution! Taiwan must carry out the Rectification of Names! Taiwan demands economic development!" Since 2002, as we can see, Chen Shui-bian has set off a series of bombshells: "one country on each side," "referendum," "authoring a new constitution," "the balance of terror," as well as "abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification," and "Four Yeses and One No."

Many analysts think the DPP has already begun pursuing "de jure Taiwan independence." Because of election considerations, such a development may determine Taiwan's political climate for the coming year. Whether this development leads to tensions between the two sides of the Strait is not something that concerns either Chen Shui-bian or the DPP in the slightest.

Thirdly, despite the hardline standoff between their governments, the public on both sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to establish close economic and cultural relations. This, in today's world, is a unique situation.

However the DPP government turns a blind eye to the economic and cultural needs of millions who travel, trade, invest, and receive educations on the mainland.

In other countries such activities are fundamental to market liberalization and globalization, but some DPP political figures actually denounce such activities as "selling out Taiwan."

Even sadder, when people from Taiwan struggle alone on the outside, all they hear is insults and criticisms about "selling out Taiwan." This has cut them to the quick and demeaned their feelings for Taiwan. Their alienation has in turn strengthened the DPP's contempt for both economic considerations and human feelings.

In addition, such a vicious cycle has created significant internal fissures within Taiwan's society. One positive development, amidst the above three major negative developments, is that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have experienced a rapid increase in economic and cultural exchanges over the past several years.

According to figures published by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), cross-Straits trade between 1987 and 2006 has already amounted to 562.4 billion US dollars. As for the proportion of cross-Straits trade, Taiwan comprises approximately 5% of the mainland's trade, while the mainland accounts for 20% of Taiwan's trade.

Over the past ten years, Taiwan has enjoyed a favorable 244 billion US dollar trade balance with the mainland. Taking only 2006 (up to November) as an example, cross-Straits trade volume exceeded 80 billon US dollars, including the export of 57 billion US dollars and the import of 23 billion US dollars. In other words, Taiwan enjoyed a favorable balance of 34 billion US dollars.

At the same time, Taiwan's total world trade surplus was only 18.3 billion US dollars. In other words, without the mainland market, Taiwan would already have had an unfavorable balance of trade. In terms of investments, according to Ministry of Economic Affairs figures, as of 2006 Taipei had already authorized 35,542 investments on the mainland totalling 54.9 billion US dollars.

Mainland China is currently Taiwan's largest investor, accounting for 67.35% of Taiwan's total outside investments. Beijing's official figures show that since 1991, Taiwan had at least 72,285 investments on the mainland, amounting to 100 billion US dollars. In 2006, Taiwan remitted to and collected from mainland China receipts totalling approximately 180 billion US dollars, nearly ten times the amount in 2002.

That is why I refer to this trend as a positive development, instead of what the DPP calls a "hollowing out of the economy," not merely because it is a contribution to Taiwan's economy, but because it is helpful to the stability of cross-Straits relations.

For example, Taiwan's investments and human resources on the mainland have undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the mainland's economic development.

Therefore CCP authorities, at either the central government or local level, all appreciate the role Taiwan's business people have made to mainland economic development, career opportunities, and the upgrading of technology.

Close exchanges across the Taiwan Strait also help each side to understand the other's anxieties, expectations, and constraints. As a result of direct contacts, Taiwan's elites and public can begin to appreciate mainland China's political system and ideological principles and constraints. At the same time, more and more mainland elites and members of the public can better understand Taiwan's system of democracy and its lively political environment.

The above, I believe, can be helpful to the long-term benefit of Taiwan as well as mainland China. In my opinion, mainland China is not exclusively a threat, it is also an opportunity. If, as many DPP public figures insist, we treat mainland China exclusively as a threat, then we will be misled and unable to discover the opportunities it has to offer.

Similarly, if we regard mainland China exclusively as an opportunity, that is also a mistake. The mainland is simultaneously a threat and an opportunity. This will be the case for a long time to come.

In order to resist the Chinese Communist threat, Taiwan should adopt a kind of "Two-handed Strategy." First, on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, or perhaps "One China, Two Interpretations," Taiwan should re-establish the dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party that was interrupted in 1999. By means of dialogue, both sides of the Taiwan Strait may be able, by direct contact, to negotiate a modus vivendi that allows Taiwan more space and the opportunity to participate in international activities.

Once both sides of the Taiwan Strait have established sufficient trust and good will, we may even be able to look forward to a negotiated peace agreement. Next, in order to resist Chinese Communist threats, the ROC must also maintain a solid national defense. But we do not agree with the DPP's view that Taiwan should develop an "offensive approach to national defense."

An offensive approach to national defense would not not be feasible unless Taiwan develops weapons of mass destruction (WMD), otherwise any other deterrent would have not real effect. The danger of an "offensive approach to national defense" is that it would undoubtedly invite international intervention, even a CCP "first strike." We believe that the ROC's national defense posture should be to arm ourselves only to the point where the CCP cannot be confident of a successful "first strike."

As long as the CCP cannot be confident that it can achieve such goal, its strategic calculations will remain difficult, and the temptation to launch a surprise attack will be diminished. In order to become "a nut too tough to bite," the ROC should carry out national defense reforms while simultaneously purchasing advanced weapons from overseas.

Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the mainland also allows us to adopt a "Two-handed Strategy." On the one hand, both sides should sit down and reach an agreement on direct flights. Not only would this immediately and significantly increase cross-Straits economic activity, it would also promote the first large-scale direct contacts in cross-Straits history. The impact on economic and cultural exchanges would be immeasurable.

The political impact would also be beneficial; we could simultaneously forsee a reduction in the danger of war.

But, direct links would not merely bring positive results for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. They would also help safeguard investments, promote joint crime-fighting, intellectual property rights protection, and other long-unresolved questions, long neglected by the DPP's "Three Noes" policy (no contacts, no negotiations, no compromises).

I agree whole-heartedly in the necessity of cross-Straits "conflict management." The key word being "management." Overseas visitors may not realize that the DPP government defines cross-Straits relations as a "reunification vs. independence issue."

I emphatically disagree with this definition. Because no matter whether one is pro-reunification or pro-independence, neither conforms to the current wishes of the majority of people on Taiwan. According to numerous surveys, even officially-sponsored surveys, the results show that many of those who "identify with Taiwan" do not support Taiwan independence.

But just as the proverb which says "God helps those who help themselves," I believe that the "Walking on Two Legs" policy and the "Two-handed Strategy" offer a good start for Taiwan. Only by blazing a new trail and setting a new precedent, can we establish cross-Straits peace and prosperity.

Original Chinese below:

兩條腿走路：
台海的衝突管理
馬英九
三月十二日

正如同許多觀察家所指出的，台海問題並不僅攸關兩岸，而且是亞太地區的外交政策問題。因為它可能是唯一會引發世界唯一超強的美國，與最多人口的中共兩國之間戰爭的重大議題。一旦戰爭爆發，區域的貿易與發展不但會中斷，也可能會迫使區域各國必須在支持與對抗中共之間做出選擇，因而造成亞太地區戰略環境與結構長久性的改變。

再深入一點來說，我要特別指出在過去幾年，影響到台海安全與兩岸關係的三大負面發展。首先，中共軍力的快速與大規模現代化發展

2006年11月，由美國國會所要求成立的「美中經濟安全檢討委員會」(US- China Economic and Security Review Commission)公布了對國會的年度報告。

其中一個主要結論就是，「許多專家業已形成了一項重要共識，那就是在2008到2015年之間，如果兩岸之間出現衝突或緊張情況，而美國決定要協援台灣的話，美軍將會出現一個「脆弱之窗」(Window of Vulnerability)。

也就是說，中共許多針對台灣的軍事現代化計劃，包括潛艦、驅逐艦、巡弋飛彈以及具高度機動性的彈道飛彈、新式指管通情電監偵(C4ISR)系統，以及攻擊計劃等等，都很有可能會在2008年左右，或在之後的一段短暫時間內完成部署。

然而，美軍可以用來阻絕中共這些攻勢的措施與作為，包括飛彈防禦系統、近岸打擊兵力以及具整合性的反潛戰網絡等，卻可能在2015年前仍無法發揮戰力。

這將會嚴重降低美國軍力用來嚇阻中共的效果，同時也會增加美國進行干涉的成本。」第二，自2000年之後，民進黨政府從未嘗試要對這覺醒的東方巨龍進行任何形式上的交往。更為不利的是，民進黨還無所不用其極地刺激中共，並且還常常造成美國與中共這兩個強權之間關係的緊張。

就在一個禮拜前，我們的陳總統又再一次地發表了震撼性的談話：「台灣要獨立！台灣要新憲！台灣要正名！台灣要經濟發展！」誠如各位所看到的，自2002年後，陳水扁已經施放了一連串的震撼彈。「一邊一國」、「公民投票」、「制定新憲」、「恐怖平衡」以及「廢除國統綱領」到現在的「四要一沒有」，

許多分析家認為現在民進黨已經開始追求「法理台獨」。由於選舉的需要，這樣的發展趨勢很可能會主導著台灣未來一年的政治議題。對於是否會造成兩岸之間的緊張局勢，陳水扁和民進黨並不在乎。

第三，在雙方政府的強硬對立之下，台海兩邊的民眾持續在經濟上與文化上建立起密切交流關係。這是今天世界上最為獨特的情況之一。

然而對於數以百萬計的民眾在大陸旅遊、貿易、投資、教育，以及其他許多在經濟與文化方面的需要，民進黨政府完全視若無睹。

在其他國家內，這些活動是最基本的市場自由化與全球化的交流與活動，但一些民進黨政治人物卻污名化為「賣台」。

更令人痛心地是，當台灣人民獨自在外奮鬥的時候，耳朵裡聽到的卻是像「賣台」這類的污辱與批評。這在實質上已傷害了他們對於台灣這塊土地的情感。他們的疏離感轉過來又強化民進黨對於經濟與人性上的追?求嗤之以鼻。

此外，這樣的惡性循環也造成了台灣社會內部的重大裂痕。一項正面發展所幸，除了以上三大負面發展之外，在過去幾年還有一項正面的發展趨勢出現，那就是兩岸在經濟與文化交流上的快速成長。

根據陸委會的資料顯示，從1987到 2006年，兩岸的貿易總額已經累計達到了5,624億美元。至於兩岸貿易的比例，台灣約佔了中共對外貿易總額的5％；中共則佔了台灣對外貿易總額的 20％。

在過去十年間，台灣對大陸總共享有2,440億美元的順差。只以2006年（到11月）為例，兩岸的貿易額超過了 800億美元，其中包括了出口的570億美元，以及進口的230億美元，也就是說，台灣享有順差340億美元。

然而，在同一時期，台灣的全球貿易順差卻只有183億美元。換言之，如果沒有大陸市場，台灣早已是一個入超國了。在投資方面，根據我國經濟部的資料，到2006年為止，台北已經批准了35,542件的對大陸投資案，總額達到了549億美元。

中國大陸目前是台灣最大的投資對象，去年佔了台灣對外投資總額的67.35％。北京的官方資料則顯示出，自1991年，台灣對大陸累積投資案已至少有72,285件，總額達到了 1,000億美元。在2006年，台灣對中國大陸匯出及匯入款總額約有1,800億美元，這幾乎是2002年數字的十倍。

我之所以會像這個趨勢稱為「正面」發展，而不是民進黨所聲稱的「經濟空洞化」，不僅僅是因為這對於台灣的經濟福祉有所貢獻，更是因為這個發展有助於兩岸關係的穩定。

舉例而言，台灣對中國大陸在投資與人力資源上的挹注，無疑地會對大陸的經濟發展形成重大貢獻。

所以中共當局不論是中央或地方政府對於台商在其經濟發展、人員就業、以及技術提升上的付出都能感然於心。

海峽兩岸間的密切交流也幫助了彼此理解到對方的憂慮、期待以及限制。藉由直接的連繫，台灣社會的菁英與民眾開始能體會到中國大陸的政治系統與意識形態中的原則與其侷限。與此同時，也有越來越多的大陸菁英與一般民眾能夠了解台灣的民主制度以及活潑不羈的政治活動。

以上種種，我相信都會有助於台灣以及中國大陸兩者的長遠利益。在我看來，中國大陸不但是個「威脅」，也是個「機會」。如果像許多民進黨人士所言，只把中國大陸當做是個「威脅」，那麼我們就會被誤導而無法發掘到它所提供的「機會」。

同樣地，如果只把中國大陸當成是一塊充滿「機會」的寶地也是錯誤的。大陸同時是「威脅」，也是「機會」，這在未來很長的一段時間都會是如此。

為了抵抗中共的威脅，台灣應該採取一種「兩手策略」。首先，台灣應該在「九二共識」，或是「一中各表」的基礎上，重新與中共展開自1999年即中斷至今的對話。藉由雙邊對話，
海峽兩邊可以在彼此直接交往的情況下，談判出所謂的「活路模式」(modus vivendi)，讓台灣有更多空間可以參與國際活動。

當台海雙方有足夠的信任與善意後，「和平協議」的談判亦可預見。其次，為了抵禦來自中共的威脅，台灣還必須要維持堅實的國防實力。不過，我們卻不同意民進黨所提，台灣應該發展「攻勢國防」的看法。

攻勢國防」之所以不可行，是因為除非台灣發展出大規模毀滅性武器，否則任何其他的嚇阻都沒有實效；「攻勢國防」之所以危險，是因為它必將引起國際干涉，甚至是中共的先發攻擊。我們認為，台灣的國防態勢應該是要武裝到中共沒有把握可以成功地發動「第一擊」。

只要中共沒有自信能達到這樣的目標，其戰略盤算就會變得複雜，同時奇襲攻台的誘因也會減少。為了成為一顆「咬不動的堅果」，台灣應該持續進行國防改革，同時繼續向國外採購先進武器。

要利用中國大陸的「機會」也可以採取「兩手策略」。一方面，雙方應該坐下來好好就直航達成協議。這不僅立即大幅促進海峽兩岸的經濟活動，也會實現兩岸歷史上第一次大規模的直接往來，這在經濟與文化交流上的影響將十分巨大。

在政治上的影響也會是利多；同時可以預見地，戰爭的危險將會顯著地減少。

不過，直航並非只能為雙方帶來正面結果。包括投資保障、共同打擊犯罪、智慧財產權的保護等等長久以來懸而未決的問題，一直被民進黨政府的「三不」政策（不接觸、不談判、不妥協）忽略。

我衷心地認同「衝突管理」在兩岸關係的必要性。這其中的關鍵字是「管理」。來自國外的貴客或許不特別知道，民進黨政府把兩岸關係定位為「統獨關係」。

但我非常不同意這個定位。因為不管是「統」或「獨」，都不符合目前台灣大多數人民的期望。根據許多調查資料，甚至是官方所主辦的調查都顯示，許多「台灣認同」的人並不支持「台獨政策」。

但正如一句諺語所說：「天助自助者。」我相信我所提到的「兩條腿走路」以及兩套「兩手策略」可以為台灣提供了一個好的開始，藉此發展出新的道路與典則，也才有可能建立出一個和平而繁榮的台海局勢。