To Win the Center, Pacify the Deep Greens

To Win the Center, Pacify the Deep Greens
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2007

While Ma Ying-jeou is aggressively courting "native" as well as "nativist" voters, Frank Hsieh is playing the "cross Straits" card. Many of the positions Hsieh has advocated over the past two or three years have disappeared from the Green camp's agenda. These include direct air links and opening the island to mainland capital. Frank Hsieh stressed that he wanted to "do everything in his power to seek dialogue and the negotiations, in order to promote peace in the Taiwan Straits." It is hard to imagine what would have happened if Hsieh had proposed such positions, which amount to heresy with today's Green camp, during the Democratic Progressive Party presidential primaries?

Frank Hsieh is obviously appealing to centrist voters. But many centrist voters probably want to ask Frank Hsieh a simple question: Your position makes sense. But have you explained it to Deep Green True Believers? Have you explained it to those voters who took to the streets demanding a "Plebiscite to Join the UN?" To those pro independence organizations who met Chairman Yu Hsi-kuen at the airport? To those pirate radio stations that denounced the "11 Brigands" and "Zhong Guo Qin?" Do they support direct flights? Do they welcome mainland capital?

Hsieh's problem isn't how to appeal to centrist voters. His problem is how to persuade Deep Green voters, how to obtain their understanding and endorsement. His problem is how to reconcile his cross Straits direct links proposals with Deep Green "nativist" doctrine. His problem is how to prove that his positions are not typical election promises to be forgotten overnight. Hsieh should realize that Ma Ying-jeou can deliver on this promise. But isn't it strange that over the past seven years, Chen Shui-bian couldn't?

Kuomintang spokesperson Su Chun-pin put his finger on the issue: "It is not possible for Frank Hsieh to be a more enthusiastic advocate of a 'new centrist path' today than Chen was seven years ago," What's more, Chen Shui-bian didn't promote his cross Straits policy only seven years ago, during his "new centrist path" phase. He promoted it several years in a row, during New Year's Day addresses, during Lunar New Year's Eve talks, during National Day addresses. But to what result? The closer Chen gets to stepping down, the more he has become a trouble-maker in the eyes of Washington and Beijing, someone who is promoting "unilateral changes to the status quo." This proves that Chen Shui-bian's campaign pledges were mere electioneering, to be forgotten as soon as he attained office. Therefore what reason do centrist voters have to believe that Frank Hsieh will do what A Bian didn't?

True, Frank Hsieh is not Chen Shui-bian. With his "One China Constitution," "reconciliation and coexistence," and "cross Straits direct links," Frank Hsieh has long maintained a safe distance between himself and Chen Shui-bian on cross Straits policy. His path differs in many respects with the orthodox Green path. That is why Frank Hsieh has more maneuvering room than the other Green Princes. The problem is Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the Green camp. He controls the power and influence of its many factions. Not one of them is able to make the slightest progress on cross Straits policy. They have even begun backpedaling. Frank Hsieh has yet to get his own house in order. How can he reconcile his cross Straits direct links proposals with those of Party Chairman Yu, nativist organizations, and pirate radio stations? With the "Plebiscite to Join the UN" President Chen has been advocating? With the aggressive promotion of "Resolution for a Normal Nation?" Many people harbor serious doubts. Hsieh had better convince them first.

To reconcile the differences between his proposals and current reality to the public at large is not going to be easy. Don't forget how Frank Hsieh practiced "reconciliation and coexistence" when he held the position of premier. Nobody doubted Frank Hsieh's sincerity. But Government Information Office Chief Yao Wen-chih single-handedly destroyed any possibility of "reconciliation and coexistence" betwen the government and the public. Yet Hsieh allowed Yao and the GIO to become the focus of Blue vs. Green conflict. Many legislators flying Hsieh's banner do not flinch from the coarsest possible language during factional infighting. It is hard to reconcile such behavior with "reconciliation and coexistence." Based on such experiences, not only must Frank Hsieh prove his sincerity vis a vis his cross Straits direct links proposal. He must also prove his sincerity vis a vis his desire to form a "coalition government" after the election. He can't just talk about it.

Frank Hsieh's situation today is completely different from Chen Shui-bian's situation yesterday, when Chen proposed his "new centrist path" Back then Chen Shui-bian did not have to deal with opposition from Green Princes within the party. Today Frank Hsieh must contend with reactions from the Yu Hsi-kuen faction, which is promoting its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." He also must contend with Chen Shui-bian's "Plebiscite to Join the UN" movement. He must smooth over the reaction from the Yu faction. Otherwise toward the end of September, a newly resigned Yu Hsi-kuen is not about to let matters rest. Hsieh must continue deferring to Chen Shui-bian, who is about to assume control of the party machine. A president who has monopolized the resources of both the party and the government, is also a president who has no desire to become a lame duck before it's time. When the time comes, and Chen Shui-bian insists on promoting his "Plebiscite to Join the UN" that will become Frank Hsieh's campaign theme. So the question is: Will Frank Hsieh, who advocates direct flights and the influx of mainland capital, have any room left to maneuver?

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.09.26
要爭取中間選民，先擺平深綠板塊吧！
中時社論

　 就在馬英九積極經營本土票源的同時，謝長廷也積極打出了他的「兩岸牌」，許多主張在最近兩、三年的綠營論述中已近乎絕跡，如開放直航、如開放陸資登台等， 謝長廷同時強調他要「盡最大努力尋求對話與談判，以便讓台海和平」。很難想像這種在當前綠營近乎「異端」的論述，如果選在民進黨總統黨內初選階段時提出， 會是個什麼光景？

　誰都看得出來，謝長廷此刻的出招，意在召喚中間選民。但多數中間選民或許也會向謝長廷回問一句很簡單的問題：你的主張 確有道理，但請問你與所有深綠支持者都溝通好了嗎？特別是，那些上街相挺「公投入聯」的選民，那些到機場迎接游主席的獨派團體，以及那些曾經用力聲討「十 一寇」、「中國琴」的地下電台等，他們今天都已經口徑一致的支持直航？歡迎陸資？

　所以問題的重點也出來了，謝長廷有關兩岸開放論述的著 力點，根本不是要怎麼去向中間選民「訴求」，而是要怎麼去向深綠選民「說服」，取得這些選民的諒解與認同，讓他的兩岸開放論述與深綠的本土論述可以整合， 如此才能證明他的所有這些主張，並不是曇花一現的選舉語言。要知道這一點馬英九是絕對做不到的。但同樣弔詭的是過去七年多，陳水扁也一樣沒做到，不是嗎？

　 國民黨發言人蘇俊賓的一句話點到了核心：「今天的謝長廷不會比七年前的陳水扁更主張中間路線」；更有甚者，陳水扁有關兩岸開放的論述，並不只在他七年前的 「新中間路線」中揭示過，更在數年中的元旦講話、除夕談話、國慶祝詞等多次重申過。結果呢？越是到任期屆滿前，陳水扁越是將自己變成為美、中眼中意圖「片 面改變現狀」的「麻煩製造者」，證明當年陳水扁的所有政見、承諾與保證，都是用過即丟的選舉語言。那麼有什麼理由要中間選民相信，當年阿扁說到沒做到的， 謝長廷就一定能說到做到！

　沒錯，謝長廷不是陳水扁，從「憲法一中」、「和解共生」到「兩岸開放」，謝長廷一路走來的政策路線，與陳水扁 一直維持著安全距離，與綠營的正統路線相較也多了些許異質性，這也是謝長廷相較於其他綠天王有更大彈性遊走空間的原因。問題是，以陳水扁昔日在綠營曾凌駕 一切派系權勢的影響力，都無法在兩岸政策開放上推進任何一步，甚至還走回頭路，謝長廷目前連內部整合都尚待努力，他要怎麼向各方證明：我的兩岸開放論述， 就是目前正在主導「公投入聯」的陳總統主張，也是力推「正常國家決議文」，即將卸任的游主席之主張，更是那些本土社團與地下電台的主張？如果這一部分還有 疑慮，那麼就請先說服他們吧！

　要化解這種主張與實踐之間的矛盾，並不是件容易的工作。還記得謝長廷在擔任閣揆期間，曾怎麼落實他的「和 解共生」主張？沒有人懷疑那時節謝長廷的誠意，但當時的內閣團隊中，僅一個新聞局長姚文智就幾乎摧毀了整個朝野「和解共生」氛圍，但謝卻聽任其成為藍綠衝 突的焦點。而掛著謝系招牌的多位立委，在發動黨派攻擊時所用政治語言之粗鄙、不留餘地，真的很難讓人與和解共生聯想在一起。從這個經驗被喚起，謝長廷不僅 對他的兩岸開放論述，甚至他表示在當選後要成立「聯合政府」的倡儀，都得要花更多的工夫證明，這一切並不只是說說而已。

　要知道，現時的 謝長廷，與當年倡議「新中間路線」的陳水扁相較，處境完全不同；當年陳水扁在黨內可沒有任何天王在前後掣肘，如今的謝長廷，要面對游系黨機器所推動的「正 常國家決議文」的反撲，又要應付陳水扁主導的「公投入聯」運動。他必須撫平游系的反彈，否則九月底後卸任的游錫？不會與他善罷干休；他必須持續尊重即將接 掌黨機器的陳水扁，一個即將黨政資源一把抓的總統，也是一個不想太早跛腳的總統。如果屆時陳水扁堅持推動「公投入聯」才該是謝長廷唯一的競選主軸，試問謝 長廷此刻所揭示的直航與開放陸資等主張，還有任何發揮的空間嗎？