Remember What the Election is About

Remember What the Election is About
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2007

Ruling and opposition party presidential candidates have each put forth proposals to revive the economy. Unfortunately their proposals have been drowned out by political controversies provoked by their fellow party members. Frank Hsieh is concerned about oil prices. He hopes those in power will "feel your pain." He hopes to promote his "Economy of Affluence" program. But not only did the Executive Yuan ignore his suggestion, the DPP and the Chen regime both invested all their energy in the Plebiscite to Join the UN Torch Relay. Ma Ying-jeou has been addressing economic issues since the beginning of his campaign. The economy is the theme of his election campaign. But who knew that suddenly an internal document would emerge from nowhere, deleting the 1992 Consensus and provoking bitter infighting, leaving Ma Ying-jeou once again outside the loop on party affairs, and his election campaign in total disarray.

The Green camp's strong arm tactics in promoting the Join the UN Torch Relay have drowned out the "Economy of Affluence" campaign. Perhaps they decided the issue of the economy would not necessarily be advantageous to the DPP. The ruling regime faces the problem of rising consumer prices, which it is at a loss do anything about. It has only served to underscore the reality of an "Economy of Destitution." The controversy over the 1992 Consensus is a farce. It is much ado about nothing. In the process the focus has been lost. The biggest victim is not necesarily Ma Ying-jeou, but the 1992 Consensus itself. Deleting the 1992 Consensus from specific documents and recognizing the 1992 Consensus are entirely different matters. If Ma Ying-jeou were to spublicly declare that he did not recognize the 1992 Consensus, and was amending the party constitution or its political platform, that would be a serious matter. But Ma Ying-jeou has never made such a declaration. Would a political leader in the midst of promoting his "Plebiscite to Rejoin the UN" campaign have the gall to overthrow the 1992 Consensus? The 1992 Consensus affirms that each side verbally declared that it recognized One China. Isn't the "One China" that the Taiwan side refers to the "Republic of China?"

The 1992 Consensus was one of the most important cross Straits breakthroughs following the Koo Wang talks. Before his death, Koo Chen-fu confirmed the existence of the 1992 Consensus. Washington has also indicated that the 1992 Consensus exists. The existence of the 1992 Consensus has nothing to do with whether it has or has not been deleted from a political document.

This is similar to the Democratic Progressive Party's "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution," which continues to exist even though it has been set aside and is no longer discussed. The DPP will suddenly play up its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." After a while it may play up its "Resolution for a Normal Nation." It is unlikely anyone will characterize such moves as "phasing out demands for independence." Besides, no matter how one revises one's language, in the end they are just words, These word games are pretexts for intraparty power struggles. They are of little help to the Democratic Progressive Party's Join the UN campaign or goal of founding a Nation of Taiwan. What difference was there between Yu Hsi-kuen's "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and A Bian's "Resolution for a Normal Nation?" Now that the word games are over, the resolutions just sit there. Who pays them any mind?

The 1992 Consensus was merely an oral agreement, a tacit understanding between the two sides that did not need to be stated too clearly. This tacit understanding was decided by cross Straits dynamics. When cross Straits relations are good, the 1992 Consensus takes effect. When cross Straits relations are strained, either side may consider it non-binding. The Democratic Progressive Party has been in power for more than seven years. During this time it has openly repudiated the 1992 Consensus. When Su Chi was Mainland Affairs Commissioner he advocated "One China, Separate Interpretations." Beijing was willing to accept only the "One China" part of the formula. It was reluctant to accept the "Separate Interpretations" part. Once the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, it overturned the 1992 Consensus in toto. Only then did Beijing return to the 1992 Consensus. This tangled political web is not something that can be resolved with a few political slogans.

The past several years have shown that 1992 Consensus has never resided in any particular document, but in cross-Straits interactions and mutual recognition. If cross-Straits opposition has esclated, mentioning the 1992 Consensus in political documents is useless. If both sides of the Straits wish to improve relations with each other, it may not be necessary to stress the 1992 Consensus. Discussing the 1992 Consensus without the historical context of the Koo-Wang talks, or rational cross-Straits dialogue, is pointless. To worry about whether an irrelevant political document contains the 1992 Consensus is to blow matters out of proportion. It trivializes the 1992 Consensus.

This is a difficult test for both Ma Ying-jeou and Frank Hsieh. Jockeying for short-term political advantage is easy. Simply fan populist passions. Addressing economic issues, by contrast, requires professionalism and rational policies. One's proposals may not receive media applause. Political proposals are easy. Simply scream one's head off. Economic proposals are difficult. One must listen to the people. Will Hsieh and Ma be able to stand their ground? The current controversy may become a landmark for future historians, and an indicator of fitness for national leadership.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.11.05
別讓已定調的選戰主軸再度失焦
中時社論

　挺令人遺憾的是，朝野政黨的總統候選人最近都在訴求民生議題的同時，被黨內同志所掀起的政治議題所掩蓋。謝長廷關注油價問題，期待主事者能「視民如傷」，藉以突出其「幸福經濟」的訴求，結果行政部門不僅未理會他的建議，整個黨政部門更是把全部精力都放在「入聯公投」的聖火接力上；同樣的馬英九競選起跑後一路主打民生議題，整個選戰主軸也大致確定，怎麼都沒想到會跑出個內部文件刪除九二共識的爭議，讓馬英九再度陷入黨內外撻伐的處境，讓原已定調的選戰步伐完全被打亂。

　綠營強行將入聯聖火的動員壓過「幸福經濟」訴求，或許是判斷打這個議題並不一定討好，畢竟面對眼前的物價上漲問題，行政部門根本束手無策，談多了反而突出了「不幸福經濟」的現實。倒是「九二共識」的爭議問題，從事件初始紛擾到現在，很像是一場無事生非的鬧劇，整個爭議過程一路失焦，受到傷害最大的，倒不一定是馬英九的選情，而是「九二共識」的本身。

　其實，在特定文件刪除九二共識的文字，跟在立場上承不承認有九二共識根本是兩回事。如果馬英九公開聲稱不承認有九二共識，並領銜在黨內推動黨綱或政綱的修改，那當然很嚴重。問題是馬英九從來沒做出過這種立場表述與動作。更何況一個正在推動「公投返聯」動員的政治領袖，怎麼會干冒大不諱去推翻「九二共識」呢？九二共識中所謂「口頭上各自表述一中」，在台灣這邊所指的不就是中華民國嗎？

　要知道，「九二共識」是當年兩岸在辜汪會談後所達成的重要突破之一，辜振甫先生生前曾明白表示過有「九二共識」的存在，美國方面也曾指出有「九二共識」這回事，它在客觀上存不存在，與它在那篇政治文件中刪或不刪除其實一點關係都沒有。

　這正好像民進黨把「台獨黨綱」明白擱置予以存而不論，一會兒推出個「台灣前途決議文」，一會兒又弄個「正常國家決議文」，這些動作大概不會有人說是在「去獨化」吧！更何況，文字修辭再怎麼斟酌考量，它終究也只不過是文字，除了黨內派系領袖拿這種文字遊戲借題發揮搞鬥爭外，對民進黨的入聯動員甚至建國大業，實質助益相當有限。否則講白一點，先前游錫？所主導的「正常國家決議文」，與後來扁版的「正常國家決議文」，差別難道是比誰的文字「比較正常」？現在文字遊戲玩完了，還不就是晾在那裡，有誰會去認真理會呢？

　「九二共識」在當年既只是一項口頭約定，它就是兩岸間所達成的一種不必太明說的默契，這種默契可說完全取決於兩岸的動態情勢，兩岸情勢好的時候，九二共識自然有其發揮空間，兩岸關係大壞的時候，任何一方都可以片面不認帳，民進黨執政的過去七年多，不就硬生生的推翻了九二共識？記得當年陸委會主委蘇起剛提出這種說法時，北京方面最初也只肯強調「一中」，不想理會「各表」，後來民進黨執政了，乾脆把整個「九二共識」都踢翻了，北京才又開始重拾「九二共識」的說法，這種複雜的政治糾葛，不是幾句政治口號就能夠理清楚的。

　過去幾年的經驗已充分證明，「九二共識」從不是活在那一份特定的文件裡，而是活在兩岸對彼此定位與互動的認知上，兩岸對立一旦升高，就算把「九二共識」放進所有政治文件中也沒用；兩岸若有意改善彼此關係，是不是非要強調「九二共識」也有討論的空間。今天談「九二共識」，如果不放在當年辜汪會談的歷史脈絡上，不放在兩岸理性對話的現實上，卻為一篇無關緊要的政治文件有無刪掉九二共識的文字一路無限上綱，那其實是在糟蹋九二共識！

　不論是對馬英九或是對謝長廷，這都是一場艱困的魔考。要訴諸短線的政治議題，不僅廉價輕鬆，又可煽動民粹熱情，相對的訴求務實的民生議題，不僅需要專業的理解，還需要提出理性的對策，更何況相關主張也不一定會得到媒體的青睞。要訴求政治議題只需要情緒與叫囂，訴求民生議題卻需要冷靜與傾聽。謝馬兩人守不守得住自己的選戰主軸，或許也是未來觀察其能否擔任國家領導人的參考指標之一。