President Ma's State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce

President Ma's State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2008

In mid-August President Ma Ying-jeou will visit Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. This will be his first trip outside the country after becoming president. During this trip he can realize his concept of a "diplomatic truce." The outcome will be an important indicator of his policy's success or failure.

The Ma administration's biggest difference with the Chen administration, is that the Ma administration is not irreconciliably hostile towards mainland China. Ma hopes to dissolve cross-Strait confrontation, promote cooperation, and increase Taiwan's room for development. On the diplomatic front, Ma has renounced his predecessor's "scorched earth diplomacy," which only wound up burning the ROC's fingers. Nor is Ma adopting his predecessor's "transit diplomacy," which abused the hospitality of our diplomatic allies. Ma's visits are no longer subterfuges. They are merely means of facilitating his transit through the United States. They are unlike Chen's visits, which squandered energy and resources merely to upgrade Chen's city of transit and duration of transit.

This change is correct. The Chen Shui-bian administration turned "transit diplomacy" from a positive into a negative. Besides allowing Chen to bask in glory, it had no real diplomatic function. Chen Shui-bian's plane was parked on the tarmac. By sheer coincidence, Air Force One, the U.S. President's plane, parked next to it. Chen chose to play up this triviality, as if it had some sort of special political significance. This sort of "transit diplomacy" has become a self-deceptive, nauseating farce. The result has been the breakdown of mutual trust and serious damage to Taipei-Washington relations. With each transit, Chen Shui-bian's treatment went from bad to worse. It went from being invited to baseball games and steak dinners, to being shunted off to Alaska to endure the cold arctic winds. Taipei-Washington relations are warming up again. It might be better not to put invest too much emotion into Ma's upcoming transit through the US. Allow it to be remain a plain and simple transit, and allow people to catch their breath.

A "diplomatic truce" is not fruit one can pick off a tree. The Ma administration must have no illusions about that.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou's basic direction is correct. His long struggle to maintain diplomatic relations in Latin America, has made him deeply aware that vicious cross-Strait diplomatic struggles have left both sides wounded. They have wasted resources. They make no sense. They have harmed our international image. He believes that whether we have 23 or 30 allies makes little difference. Quarrels in international organizations over nomenclature and protocol have paralyzed ROC diplomacy, and have been of little help to the people. These concepts, coming from a veteran diplomat, are more avant garde, innovative, and pragmatic than the public on Taiwan is accustomed to.

The problem is it takes two to Tango. A truce requires both sides to lay down their arms. In the cross-Strait diplomatic war, Taipei finds itself at a major disadvantage. Past investments of resources were intended to prevent the total loss of sovereignty and international living space. Our survival hung by a thread. We had no capital to squander, or latitude for mistakes.

In the absence of specific concessions by Beijing, it is too early for Taipei to declare a truce. Doing so may inflict serious harm upon ourselves. Even if Beijing were to fall asleep at the wheel and lose several allies, it wouldn't harm their international stature. Taipei, by contrast, is hanging on for dear life. If 23 allies are reduced to 13 allies, or 3 allies, this could delegitimize us as a regime. This has already become an international law issue. Beijing has power. Once we make concessions, they may counterattack. If the ROC pulls back its line of defense, regaining ground may be even more difficult.

Therefore, we hope that before any "diplomatic truce" is implemented, we focus on communication and persuasion, and not make costly unilateral concessions. After all, this is another way to safeguard our national sovereignty and survival. We must never confuse means with ends.

President Ma's trip is hardly a junket. First, he must consolidate Taiwan's diplomatic standing in Latin America. He must improve the ROC's image, which has been tainted by numerous bribery scandals. Since President Ma has an aptitude for foreign relations, he can be an effective PR man. He can win the support of Latin American allies. He can even win the support of local populations. Cross-Strait relations have been signifcantly improved. Beijing wants the Olympic Games to be a total success, and is worried about negative developments. This is an ideal opportunity for the ROC to strengthen its diplomatic hand.

President Ma must also improve communications with the United States. As a result of the new administration taking office, cross-Strait relations are no longer on red alert. But the closer Taipei and Beijing get. the bigger the problem for the United States. Washington is no longer as sure as it once was whether Taipei is on its side, or Beijing's side. President Ma has not made his position clear. So far the new administration's policy is giving people the impression that it is leaning all the way toward Beijing, without any reservations or safeguards.

But the United States is Taiwan's most important supporter, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Ever since reports of frozen arms sales, the United States has been waiting for the Ma administration to give the US an accounting. If he has a chance, during his transit through the United States, President Ma can do much in this respect. He can also help the public on Taiwan better understand. The President is someone who must take on major tasks. Instead of worrying about such details as saving money on charter flights, he should spend his energy thinking about the direction in which the nation must develop.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.29
從馬總統出訪談「外交休兵」的真義
中時社論

　馬英九總統將於八月中旬率團訪問巴拉圭和多明尼加，這是他就任總統後的首次出國，也是一次實踐「外交休兵」理念的出訪。後續發展結果如何，將具有重要的指標意義。

　馬政府和扁政府最大的不同，在於對中國不再採取全面敵對的態度，希望化解兩岸對立增進合作，進一步促成台灣更大的發展空間。在外交方面，揚棄到處放火最後把自己燒得焦頭爛額的「烽火外交」，也不再走喧賓奪主用過境待遇自吹自擂的「過境外交」老路，轉而將出訪單純化，過境美國時以便利、自然為主，不會像過去那樣用盡力氣耗費資源在禮遇、停留地點與天數、會晤層級上。

　這項改變是正確的，因為過去扁政府已經把「過境外交」的價值從正操作到負，最後除了自己往自己臉上貼金之外，在外交上已經沒有實質功能了。當扁搭乘的專機在停機坪上恰巧停在美國總統專機「空軍一號」的旁邊，都可以被渲染成別具政治意義，這種過境外交已經變成了自欺欺人的噁心鬧劇。尤其最後台美關係因互信破裂而嚴重毀損，陳水扁的過境待遇跟著每下愈況，從看棒球、吃牛排淪落到在阿拉斯加「閃」冬風，如今台美關係重起爐灶，元首過境這檔子事，不妨先卸下過多的政治負載，讓它回歸單純與理性，對大家都是一種喘息。

　然而，「外交休兵」並不是束手就擒，馬政府可千萬不要搞錯了。

　外交部長歐鴻鍊提出的理念基本方向是對的，他長年在拉美固守邦交，深感兩岸外交惡鬥讓雙方都受害，浪費資源又毫無意義，而且傷害國際形象。他認為，邦交國是廿三還是卅個，並沒有太多差別；在國際組織爭吵名稱與儀節，既癱瘓了台灣的外交，也無法替人民帶來幫助。這些觀念雖出自一位老外交官之口，和社會習慣的思路相比，卻是比較前進創新且務實的。

　問題在於一個巴掌拍不響，要休兵，得雙方都放下武器。在兩岸的外交戰中，台灣處於嚴重不利局勢，之前之所以投注大量資源心力，也是為了避免岌岌可危的主權地位與國際生存空間被完全吞噬掉。這是千鈞一髮的求生，沒有太多揮霍或犯錯的本錢。

　在沒有得到中共具體讓步之前，台灣太早即自行休兵，可能會對自己造成嚴重的傷害。因為中共外交對台部門即使睡個幾年覺，就算丟了幾個邦交國吧，也無損於其舉足輕重的國際地位；但台灣的外交版圖可是寸土寸金，每一寸都在咽喉上。廿三個邦交國如果掉到十三或三個，是否還能構成合法政權的定義，已經會成為國際法上需要爭辯的議題了。而且，中共以其實力，讓步之後很容易就能反攻，台灣的陣線如果後退了，要再搶回可就難上加難。

　因此，我們希望「外交休兵」在付諸實行前，要先把重點放在理念溝通與說服上，不能變成不划算的片面退讓。畢竟這是用另一種方式來維護國家主權與生存機會，手段與目的之間的從屬位階不能混淆。

　馬總統此行並不輕鬆，首先，他必須鞏固台灣在拉美的外交地盤，改善因多項獻金醜聞而被汙名化的台灣形象。馬總統個人既有涉外的能力，希望他能多多替台灣做有效的公關工作，爭取拉美友邦的民意支持，甚至去當地民間「long stay」搏感情也可以。現在兩岸關係大為改善，中共又力求奧運圓滿成功而投鼠忌器，正是台灣趁隙補強外交陣地的絕佳時機。

　馬總統另外一件要做的事，是加強與美國的溝通。兩岸關係固然因新政府上台而暫時解除警報，但台灣和中共愈走愈近，對美國來說，也是一個大問題。因為台灣現在到底屬於自己這一邊、還是中共那一邊，已經不如過去那麼有把握了。偏偏馬總統一直沒有提出個清楚的論述，新政府至今的施政也讓人覺得向中共一路倒，沒有自我校正或警惕的機制。

　但無論在軍事、經濟或國際空間上，美國都是台灣的最重要支持，從傳出凍結軍售之說以來，美國都在等待馬政府給個說法。如果有機會的話，這次過境美國時，馬總統倒是可以在這方面多多釋疑，順便也讓台灣民眾有更多了解。總統是要做大事的人，與其在搭包機省錢之類的小細節上斤斤計較，不如把心力花在經營國家發展的大方向。