Two Cannots and One Must Not

Two Cannots and One Must Not
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 20, 2013

Summary: Can the Lien-Xi Summit discuss and explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified? Can it make fair and reasonable arrangements? Hopefully the two sides will consult this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." This concept is fully consistent with the aforementioned four conditions: "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, political relations, fair and reasonable." It also falls entirely within the scope of one China.

Full Text below:

Today, just before Lien Chan and Xi Jinping met each other, let us consider what the future of cross-Strait relations might be.

As we see it, the two sides are constrained by "Two Cannots" and one "Must Not." The Taiwan side is constrained by Two Cannots. 1. Taiwan independence cannot succeed. Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore Taiwan independence is not an option. 2. The Republic of China cannot exercise authority over Mainland China. It cannot realistically assert that it is the sole authority over all China. If it attempts to do so, it could end up devoured by the People's Republic of China. The Mainland side is constrained by One Must Not. Even if it can to eliminate the Republic of China by force, consider the price it paid for the June 4 Tiananmen Square Incident. If Beijing actually eradicated the Republic of China by force, the political price would be inestimable.

Take the Two Cannots. The public on Taiwan and the Republic of China government must find a way to be part of one China. Take the One Must Not. Beijing must adopt peaceful means when dealing with the Republic of China. The main test for peace is democracy. In other words, Beijing must not use force to eliminate the Republic of China. It must adopt inclusive democratic means to deal with and coexist with the ROC.

The Two Cannots and the One Must Not are preconditions. That is why the Chinese Communist Party 18th Party Congress concluded that it must "evaluate the special circumstances under the two sides have yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements." In this, it demonstrated considerable vision. It must first make fair and reasonable arrangements in response to special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Otherwise how can it champion fair and reasonable reunification? How can it persude people to accept reunificaton?

Beijing advocates reunification. But it must not use force to eliminate the Republic of China. It must use democratic means to deal with special, yet to be reunified, cross-Strait circumstances. In other words, it must acknowledge the special circumstances under which the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China coexist, side by side. It must attempt to establish a framework for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. It must persuade people on Taiwan to agree that the Republic of China is part of China, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunifed. Otherwise how can Beijing persuade people on Taiwan to think of themselves as Chinese. How can they speak of reunification?

Conversely, many on Taiwan are terrified to discuss reunification. But the matter of reunification will not go away merely because they are afraid and avoid it. The public on Taiwan cannot wish away the matter of reunification. They must seek instead to manage and moderate the reunification process. They must not evade the issue of one China. They should seek a foothold for the Republic of China within the scope of one China. The public on Taiwan avoids discussion of cross-Strait political relations. But they would be better advised to actively set conditions for cross-Strait political relations. In other words, they should seek to establish fair and reasonable cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Such political relations would of course recognize the Republic of China. Otherwise, how could they be fair and reasonable?

Beijing has made cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified its official cross-Strait policy. It realizes that no resolution to cross-Strait relations is possible in the near term. It realizes that no resolution can be achieved by force or by political and economic coercion. Therefore the two sides must adopt a long-term perspective. They must acknowledge the reality of special circumstances, and seek to establish fair and reasonable political relations, as a framework for cross-Strait peace and stability in the interim. In other words, the focus of cross-Strait policy should shift from far off goal of reunification, to the long term process of reunification. .

Beijing opposes Taiwan independence under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. But it cannot deny the existence of the Republic of China. The Republic of China is not Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is China. It is also a republic. The Republic of China opposes forcible or undemocratic reunification. Therefore it must seek fair and reasonable cross-Strait political relations under special circumstance in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. It should seek to manage and moderate the reunification process. The ROC must seize the bully pulpit and set the agenda. It must establish fair and reasonable political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Otherwise that agenda will be set by someone else.

Can the Lien-Xi Summit discuss and explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified? Can it make fair and reasonable arrangements? Hopefully the two sides will consult this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." This concept is fully consistent with the aforementioned four conditions: "yet to be reunified, special circumstances, political relations, fair and reasonable." It also falls entirely within the scope of one China.

The big roof concept of China means that under a big roof China, the Republic of China is democratic China, while the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both belong to a big roof concept of China whose sovereignty is shared and unified.

兩個不可能與一個不可以
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.25 03:03 am

在今日連戰與習近平互會之前，雙方可將兩岸未來情勢作一想像。

我們認為，兩岸的未來，有兩個不可能，與一個不可以。對台灣言，有「兩個不可能」：一、台獨不可能，所以台獨已非選項；二、「一個中國是中華民國」亦不可能，若採此途，最後可能在困迫又不合理的情勢下被「一個中國是中華人民共和國」所吞滅。大陸則有「一個不可以」，即不可以用武力消滅中華民國；試想，一個六四天安門事件的帳就難以償付了，倘若北京真以武力將民主政體中華民國消滅，其政治債務更將永難清償。

在「兩個不可能」之下，台灣或中華民國必須在「一個中國」的範圍中找到立足點。另在「一個不可以」之下，北京唯有採取和平的方法面對中華民國，而和平的方法最主要的檢驗標準即是民主；也就是說，北京既不可用武力消滅中華民國，唯一的辦法就是必須以民主的方法來包容及對待中華民國。

在「兩個不可能與一個不可以」之下，中共十八大所楬櫫的「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，即顯得有其見地。因為，若不能先就「尚未統一的特殊情況，作出合情合理的安排」，如何會有「合情合理的統一」，又如何教人接受「統一」？

北京主張「統一」，但若不可能（不可以）用武力消滅中華民國，即必須用民主的方法來處理「尚未統一」的兩岸關係，也就是必須正視「中華民國與中華人民共和國」對等並立的「特殊情況」，以設法在此一架構上建立「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。畢竟，若不能在「尚未統一」的「特殊情況下」，使台灣人民先認同「中華民國是一部分的中國」，將如何使台灣人民自我認同為「中國人」，更如何奢言「統一」？

另一頭，台灣怕談「統一」，但「統一」的議題卻不會因畏懼或逃避而消失。台灣若不能塗銷「統一」議題，即應設法操持與節制統一議題；亦因此，非但不須逃避「一個中國」的題目，更應在「一個中國」的範圍內找到中華民國的立足點。同理，台灣與其避談「兩岸政治關係」，其實不如對「兩岸政治關係」提出條件與主張，也就是應當爭取在「尚未統一的特殊情況」中，建構「合情合理的兩岸政治關係」。而此一「政治關係」，當然應以涵容中華民國為要件，捨此豈有可能合情合理？

北京既將「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，作為一個正式的兩岸政策議題，即意味著已經認知到，兩岸的終局解決絕非短期可以獲致，更絕非憑藉武力或政經暴力所能獲致；因此，雙方皆應有從長計議的打算，在相互尊重「特殊情況」的共識下，建立一種「合情合理的政治關係」，以作為兩岸「尚未統一」和平穩定的互動平台。也就是說，兩岸應將政策焦點，由「統一」的久遠目標，轉移至「尚未統一」的長期過程。

在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，北京反台獨，但不能抹殺中華民國，因為中華民國不是台獨，而是「中華」及「民國」；相對而言，中華民國若反對武力統一或不民主的統一，就更應爭取「尚未統一特殊情況下的合情合理的兩岸政治關係」，用為操持及節制統一議題的憑藉。倘若中華民國不能在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，經由「合情合理的政治關係」取得話語權及節制權，則情勢即可能照著別人的劇本演出。

如果今日連習會論及「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，希望雙方皆能參考本報社論所提出的「大屋頂中國論」；因為，此論完全符合「尚未統一／特殊情況／政治關係／合情合理」四個條件，亦在「一個中國」的範圍之內。

大屋頂中國：在大屋頂中國下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，兩者皆是一部分的中國，同屬主權相互含蘊並共同合成的「一個（大屋頂）中國」。