The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: Daily Life, the Economy, and National Security

The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant:
Daily Life, the Economy, and National Security
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2013

Summary: Taiwan's political and economic situation is special. Would a "nuclear-free homeland" neglect some concerns for others? That is debatable. But as matters stand, there is no longer any room for debate. If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, that is one thing. Otherwise, should we not weigh the immediate abolition of nuclear power against the gradual abolition of nuclear power?

Full text below:

Building a "Number Five Nuclear Power Plant" on Taiwan will be impossible. Controversy is currently raging over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). Many people mistrust nuclear power per se, not just the 4NPP. If these people mistrusted only the 4NPP, rather than nuclear power per se, then in theory one could halt construction on 4NPP but still build a 5NPP. But as matters stand, a "nuclear-free homeland" has become established policy. Therefore whether construction on the 4NPP is halted or continued, there will be no "5NPP."

As a result, the referendum on whether to halt or continue construction on the 4NPP has become, in effect, a referendum on the immediate abolition of nuclear power vs. the gradual abolition of nuclear power. It has become a referendum on how to use the 4NPP as the first step towards a "nuclear-free homeland." As we have reiterated, if experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, then a referendum is superfluous and need not be held. But if experts certify that the 4NPP is safe, the commissioning of the 4NPP will merely be the first step in the "gradual abolition of nuclear power" or the "immediate abolition of nuclear power." Either way, the public on Taiwan will have taken the first step toward the abolition of nuclear power. Either way, there will be no "5NPP."

The "immediate abolition of nuclear power" and the "gradual abolition of nuclear power" differ in their procedure. If the 4NPP is commissioned, then the 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP can be decommissioned gradually. The 4NPP will act as a buffer in the gradual abolition of nuclear power generation. It will enable the power generation transition to proceed relatively smoothly. If however the 4NPP is immediately killed, and the 1NPP decommissioned in 2018, then the public on Taiwan will experience a more severe energy shortage.

Energy transformation is extremely difficult. It is a major political and economic undertaking. Consider only the hardware transformation. The construction of new, non-nuclear power plants, such as wind and solar, would take at least a decade, even assuming no procedural obstacles. Forget the widespread construction of small power plants, wind turbines, or solar panels. The time consumed due to public resistance will be inestimable. What about waiting until bioenergy or "new energy" becomes a viable form of "alternative energy?" That is like waiting for Lady Luck to smile upon us. That is hardly something one can take for granted. Even if everything imaginable is done, the energy transformation process will take at least two decades. We have not even mentioned other costs. Consider the aforementioned new power plants. Public resistance will exact a high price. Carbon emissions will increase. Electricity prices will rise. Corporations will be forced to restructure in response to environmental and economic costs. Therefore whether the energy transformation process is gradual or rapid will affect the social cost. The termination or continuation of the 4NPP has become a choice between the immediate abolition of nuclear power and the gradual abolition of nuclear power.

Energy transformation involves three levels. 1. Daily Life 2. The Economy 3. National Security

1. Daily Life. This is the most superficial level. If the energy transformation process is too abrupt, energy shortages and the rising cost of electricity will impact the daily life of the individual. If energy transformation affected only this level, it would be bad enough. We could use a little less air conditioning and pay a little more on our electricity bills. If the impact was confined to our daily lives, if Taiwan became a larger version of Palau, then why not?

Two. The Economy. Irene Chen will not mind paying more for her electricity bills. But the impact on small factories and snack bars will be very different. Last year the electricity rate hike was essentially a test run. Now the impact has expanded from daily life to the economy. It will impact all industries. We can of course trumpet industrial transformation. We can oppose energy consuming industries. But merely wishing does not make it so. Moreover, we face an immediate need. We must break through the barriers of TPP or RCEP within a few years. Energy insecurity and rising electricity prices could affect the competitiveness of our economy and liberalization process. The consequences must be addressed.

Three. National Security. If energy insecurity impacts the economy, it will also impact national security. For example, if Taiwan's economic status is weakened as a result of the energy transformation process, it will inevitably become more dependent upon favors from the Mainland. It will naturally increase the risk in cross-Strait relations. Such national security concerns cannot be ignored.

Taiwan is not Palau. Palau has no cross-Strait relations. Some on Taiwan may yearn to return to the same natural lifestyle as Palau. But Taiwan's economic development cannot be turned back. Taiwan's survival depends on it. Taiwan must be competitive enough to withstand the magnetic attraction of the Mainland. National security is the third level of the energy transition problem.

In today's populist atmosphere, anyone making the above arguments will be accused of being alarmist. That is not surprising. The leaders of the various political parties know the truth. But they use the 4NPP issue as a political tool to divide the public. We predict that if the DPP is able to halt construction on the 4NPP, and wins the 2016 presidential election, its first major energy policy will be to "postpone the decommissioning of the 1NPP." That will prove that its current anti-nuke rhetoric is a sham. Yet the DPP categorically refuses to adopt a gradual abolition of nuclear energy policy in the event experts certify that the 4NPP is safe.

The DPP has done two things that are fatal to Taiwan. The first is to advocate Taiwan independence. The other is to interrupt construction on the 4NPP during the Chen administration. Now, whether the 4NPP can be certified as safe or not, the DPP is obdurately opposed to its construction. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. But even if the 4NPP is certified as safe, it has been ruined by the DPP. In this sense, the DPP has indeed done everything it can.

Energy policy and energy transformation are major issues affecting a nation's survival. As we have reiterated the United States experienced the Three Mile Island incident. Russia experienced the Chernobyl disaster. Japan experience the Fukushima disaster. Yet they remain nuclear energy nations. This shows that a nuclear free homeland is not something one can have merely because one wants it. Which of these three has political and economic conditions inferior to Taiwan's? Never mind that the United States and Russia are major producers of energy.

Taiwan's political and economic situation is special. Would a "nuclear-free homeland" neglect some concerns for others? That is debatable. But as matters stand, there is no longer any room for debate. If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, that is one thing. Otherwise, should we not weigh the immediate abolition of nuclear power against the gradual abolition of nuclear power?

生活、經濟、國安：核四問題的三個層次
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.02 03:21 am

台灣不可能再建「核五」。因為，倘若現在爭議的只是不能信任核四，而不是對整個核電的否定，則在理論上，即使停建核四，仍可另建足堪信任的「核五」；但是，現在的情勢，卻是「非核家園」已成既定政策，因此，核四無論停或續，皆已不會再有「核五」。

所以，核四停續公投就成了「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」的策略抉擇問題，也就是要公投決定如何用「核四」邁出「非核家園」的第一步。

我們屢申，倘若核四在專業體檢後不能確認其安全，即失去公投的基礎，也就不必舉行公投。但若核四的專業安全獲得確認，國人所迎對的即是贊成核四上路以「漸進廢核」，或反對核四上路以「立即廢核」的策略抉擇。畢竟，不論核四上路或不上路，台灣就此已邁出非核廢核的第一步，無論如何皆不會再有「核五」

所謂「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」，其差異是對「能源轉型」程序的不同抉擇。核四若能運轉，再一步一步使核一二三除役，那麼核四就能在廢核過程中發生交疊、緩衝及漸進的作用，即可使能源轉型的過渡程序走得比較平緩；但若核四立即退場，再加上二○一八年核一除役，台灣在能源的過渡程序上即會承負較大的壓力。

能源轉型是一個極端困難且牽涉廣大的政經工程。僅以硬體轉型言，如新建「非核」電廠、設置風力、太陽能機組，即使在一切手續皆全無阻障下，至少也須有十年以上的時間（何況，若要廣建小型發電廠、風力機組或太陽能板，其社會抗拒所消耗的時間及最終能否建得成皆難估計）；至於若要等到生質能源等「新能源」能夠成為可用的「替代能源」，則尚須等待文明的幸運之神到來，不能視為當然。以上這些，即使一切想像得到的都能做得到，此一能源轉型過程也至少要有二十年上下的過渡程序；且尚未計入其代價，包括例如前述新建電廠等的社會抗爭代價，以及包括排碳增加、電費上漲、企業轉型等生態及經濟上的代價。所以，能源轉型過渡程序的平緩或急遽，對社會形成的負荷自有差異；也因此，核四的停續遂成為「立即廢核」及「漸進廢核」的抉擇問題。

進一步言，能源轉型更牽涉到三個層次的問題：一、生活方式；二、經濟形態；三、國安架構。

一、生活方式：這是最淺的一個層次。如果能源轉型的過程太激進，形成缺電或電費上漲，皆將影響個人的生活形態。然而，如果能源轉型的影響只及於此一層次，那也就罷了；少吹些冷氣，多繳點電費，只是生活層次受到影響，則將台灣想像成大一號的帛琉島又何妨？

二、經濟形態：陳藹玲不會在乎多繳些電費，但對小工廠及小吃店的影響就不一樣，其實去年電費上漲已經「演習」過了。此時，影響層面就從生活方式推進到了經濟形態，且是將擴展至一切的產業。當然，我們可以倡議產業轉型，反對「耗能產業」；但這也不是想得到就做得到的。何況，台灣眼前面對的是必須在幾年內闖過ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ的關卡，倘因電力不穩定及電價上漲影響了開放後的經濟競爭力，其後果仍應正視。

三、國安架構：如果衝擊到經濟形態，自然也一定會影響到國安層次；譬如說，台灣的經濟狀態若因能源轉型失利而受創，難免就會更增加對大陸「讓利」的依賴，自亦更難避免兩岸關係的風險，這類顧慮皆是不可忽略的國安思維。

畢竟，台灣不是帛琉，因為帛琉沒有「兩岸關係」。台灣或許有人嚮往像帛琉那種回歸自然的生活方式，但台灣發展至今日，在經濟形態上已回不去了，而且台灣的生存更須建立在能夠開放競爭又足以抵擋中國大陸磁吸作用的國安架構之上。這即是能源轉型問題的三個層次。

以上論點，在今日民粹氛圍中，若被指為危言聳聽，亦不足為怪。問題在於，各政黨的領導人物皆不可能不知道這個道理，卻只是將核四議題當作撕裂社會的政治工具。即以民進黨言，核四若停建，我們可以預言，倘該黨當選二○一六年的總統，第一個重大的能源政策，必將是「核一延役」，屆時即可證明今天的一切皆是騙局；但民進黨今日卻絲毫不容「核四若在專業上確認安全，應採漸進廢核政策」的空間。

民進黨作了兩件會讓台灣致命的事：一是主張台獨，另一是扁政府把核四工序中斷毀壞，現在又不論核四安不安全都反核四。如今，台獨已無可能；但即使核四證實安全也會被民進黨毀了，這個，民進黨已有可能做到。

能源政策及能源轉型皆是攸關國家命脈的無比大事。我們曾論，即使如美國（三哩島）、俄羅斯（車諾比）、日本（福島）這樣的「核災大國」，如今仍維持核電政策，足徵這絕非一個想得到就做得到的事。這三國的政經條件難道不如台灣？更何況美俄還是能源生產大國。

因此，以台灣的特殊政經處境言，「非核家園」是否會顧此失彼，其實仍有議論空間，但是如今皆已無討論的餘地；然而，除非核四的專業安全未獲確認，否則，難道我們不能仔細想想究竟應「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」？