Taiwan Independence Dream Has Evaporated: DPP Should Boldly Champion One China

Taiwan Independence Dream Has Evaporated:
DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2013

Summary: What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"

Full Text below:

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is convening its nine session "Huashan Conference." The theme of the first session is "Taiwan's China [sic] Policy: Core Values and Vision." The theme of the second session is "How to Deal with the 1992 Consensus."

It is not hard to imagine the form these two themes originally took. The first was probably, "Taiwan independence vs. one China, different interpretations: Which has a larger market?" The second was probably, "Should cross-Strait interaction be based on the 1992 consensus, or a constitutional consensus?" The original and final forms expose the issues at the core of DPP's cross-Strait policy. Clearly the DPP is still casting about for an alternative to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. This is abundantly clear from the DPP's response to the "one China framework" proposed during the Wu Xi Meeting

The KMT initially championed "one China, different interpretations." Wu Poh-hsiung's new formulation, at least as far as the KMT is concerned, replaces it with "one China framework, different interpretations." Both inside and outside the Wu Xi Meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung argued that the "one China framework" is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. What he said was 100% correct.

In response to the "one China framework," Su Tseng-chang insisted that Taiwan is not part of China. The DPP is absolutely unwilling to be locked into the "one China" framework. It equates "one China" with the "Peoples Republic of China." It opposes "a constitutionally-defined one China." Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said, "One country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." But oddly enough, he also said the Republic of China "should relinquish its fictitious claim to represent all of China and all its territory." Frank Hsieh's logic is flawed. After all, if "one country, two regions" is constitutional, then isn't it unconstitutional to "relinquish its claim to represent all of China and all its territory?"

Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was the most bizzare of all. She said the Ma administration's advocacy of the "one China framework" is the same as accepting the "one China principle." By the same token, she said, recognizing the 1992 consensus is the same as accepting the "one China principle," without the qualifier "different interpretations." She even said. "What exactly is there left of the Republic of China? Is it still is a sovereign and independent country?" As everyone knows, opposition to the 1992 consensus is Tsai Ing-wen's calling card. Yet now she would have people believe she is coming to the rescue of the 1992 consensus. She even said "Without one China, different interpretations, what exactly is there left of the Republic of China?"

Su Tseng-chang said, "Do not turn around and promote Taiwan independence." But Su, Hsieh, and Tsai all share a common problem. Their references to the one China framework, to the Republic of China, and the Republic of China Constitution, are incomplete. They are all piecemeal constructs. Su Tseng-chang openly asserted that "One China means the People's Republic of China." This, she said, is opposed to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said "one country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." Yet he also advocated relinquishing claims of sovereignty over the Mainland Region of China. This mires him in a contradiction. Tsai Ing-wen argues that the 1992 consensus must include "one China, different interpretations." But when has she ever officially accepted the 1992 consensus?

The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations can be equated with either one China, different interpretations, or the one China framework, different interpretations. Either manner of expression is rooted in the ROC Constitution. Either is consistent with the ROC's basic survival strategy. The DPP has responded in various ways to the one China framework. But the only correct way is the one Hsu Hsing-liang advocates, "a bold affirmation of one China." Hsu believes that Taiwan must find its footing inside the one China framework. It must not deny or avoid the one China framework.

Su, Tsai, and Hsieh's rhetoric expose the contradictions, the defects, and the dilemmas inherent in the DPP's cross-Strait policy proposals. These contradictions, defects, and dilemmas, all share the same root. They all attempt to use the Republic of China to engage in "backdoor listing," even as they repudiate the one China Constitution. Alas, the reality is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party still denies that "the ROC Constitution is a one China constitution," then why not simply "turn around and promote Taiwan independence?" Conversely, if the DPP accepts the Constitution of the Republic of China, then how can it oppose the one China framework?

When confronting the future of cross-Strait relations, the DPP has only one option. That option is to cease playing around with any form of backdoor listing, and reaffirm the ROC's one China Constitution, in toto. That option is to use the one China framework to fight the PRC over the right to define itself as "China." That option is to attempt to spin the meaning of the one China framework. Perhaps this is what Hsu Hsing-liang meant by the "bold advocacy of one China."

Tsai Ing-wen has blasted the Ma government for not having the courage to openly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state." She also argued that the 1992 consensus must include one China, different interpretations. We have no idea whether Tsai Ing-wen was drunk or sober when she issued these pronouncements. But we are pleased to see Tsai Ing-wen, who once alleged that the "The Republic of China is a foreign regime," loudly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country!"

Assuming the news reports were accurate, the first and second sessions of the DPP's Huashan Conference have indeed yielded answers to two questions. Question One. What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? The answer is, Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. Question Two. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The answer is, the DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"

台獨幻滅　民進黨應當大膽一中
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.20 04:15 am

民進黨「華山會議」將間續舉行九場。第一場的主題是「台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景」，第二場的主題是「如何處理九二共識」。

在擬想階段，這兩個題目的原型是：「第一場／台灣獨立和一中各表，誰有市場？」，及「第二場／兩岸互動依據應為九二共識或憲法共識？」。從原型與定稿的對照可知，民進黨兩岸政策的核心議題，似仍在尋找「九二共識／一中各表」的「替代物」。這從民進黨內對「吳習會」所提「一中架構」的回應，亦可概見。

國民黨原持「一個中國／各自表述」的主張；吳伯雄此次的新提法，就國民黨而言，只是換成「一中架構／各自表述」。吳伯雄在吳習會中及會外皆稱，「一中架構」是根據中華民國憲法，此說無誤。

對於「一中架構」的回應，蘇貞昌說：台灣不是「中國」的一部分，民進黨絕不願被鎖在「一個中國」的框架中；這是將「一個中國」指為「中華人民共和國」，並反對「憲法一中」。倡議「憲法各表」的謝長廷則說，「一國兩區，難謂違憲」；但他卻也主張「（中華民國）要放棄虛構的代表中國及領土」。謝長廷的理論缺口在於：如果「一國兩區」是合憲的，則「放棄代表中國及領土」是否違憲？

蔡英文的主張最奇妙。她說，馬政府主張「一中架構」，等於接受「一中原則」，也等於承認「九二共識」就只是「一中原則」，而沒有了「各自表述」。她進而質疑：「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？還算是主權獨立的國家嗎？」然而，眾所皆知，反對「九二共識」是蔡英文的政治旗幟，但如今她的口氣卻像是在搶救「九二共識」似的，甚至稱：「如果沒有一中各表，中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？」

蘇貞昌說：「不要回過頭去搞台獨。」但是，蘇謝蔡三人共同的問題，卻在於對「一中架構」及「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」的論述皆不完整，都是七折八扣。蘇貞昌直指「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這就是反對「九二共識／一中各表」；謝長廷主張「憲法各表」，而稱「一國兩區，難謂違憲」，卻又倡議放棄對「大陸地區」的主權主張，遂陷於自相矛盾；蔡英文則主張「九二共識」應當含有「一中各表」，但她迄今卻未曾正式表示過接受「九二共識」。

其實，「九二共識／一中各表」，不論是「一個中國／各自表述」或「一中架構／各自表述」，皆是本於中華民國憲法的應然表述方式，也是中華民國的基本生存戰略。因此，在民進黨對「一中架構」的各種回應中，唯一正確的思維應是許信良所主張的「大膽一中」，認為台灣必須在「一中架構」中尋找立足點，而不是否定或逃避「一中架構」。

從蘇蔡謝的論述可以看出，民進黨的兩岸議題走到今日，充分暴露其矛盾錯亂的窘境。而這種矛盾錯亂的窘境，皆是出自同一根源，那就是：又想利用「中華民國」借殼上市，卻又欲否定「一中憲法」。現在擺明的情勢是：民進黨倘若反對「中華民國憲法為一中憲法」，何不乾脆「回過頭去搞台獨」？反之，民進黨如果接受「中華民國憲法」，又豈能反對「一中架構」？

面對兩岸未來情勢，民進黨其實只有一種選擇。那就是：不再玩弄任何形式的「借殼上市」，完完整整地回到中華民國的「一中憲法」下，根據「一中架構」，與中華人民共和國爭取「中國」的定義權，並努力節制「一中架構」的內涵與發展。這或許就是許信良所說的「大膽一中」。

蔡英文猛批馬政府不敢公開表態說「中華民國是主權獨立的國家」，更指「九二共識」不能沒有「一中各表」。我們不知這是糊塗的蔡英文或清醒的蔡英文，但十分欣慰見到曾說「中華民國是外來政府」的蔡英文高呼：「中華民國是主權獨立的國家！」

倘係如此，第一場及第二場華山會議其實已有解答。一、台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景是什麼？答案是：基於中華民國憲法的民主自由價值與願景，即是台灣的核心價值與願景。二、如何處理九二共識？答案是：堅持「一中各表」或「大屋頂中國」，否則，即如蔡英文所說「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼」？