The War between Hsieh and Chen

The War between Hsieh and Chen
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 31, 2007

Frank Hsieh has returned from his visit to the US. According to his public statements he is waging a "Two Stage Struggle" with Chen Shui-bian, with March of next year as the line of demarcation between the two stages.

According to Frank Hsieh: First, any fallout from the "Join the UN Plebsicite" is Chen Shui-bian's responsibility, because "diplomatic policy is the president's prerogative." Second, he hopes the US will distinguish between him and Chen Shui-bian, and that US opposition to Chen will not cost him the election. Third, the purpose of the "Join the UN Plebsicite" is not to join the UN. Its only purpose is to stir up popular discontent. It is merely an election ploy. Fourth, the Democratic Progressive Party is currently under Chen Shui-bian's control, he cannot prevent the "Join the UN Plebsicite" from being held, otherwise the DPP might be split. Fifth, all these concerns will evaporate after he is elected in March next year. Chen Shui-bian will no longer be able to direct the course of events. The political deck will be reshuffled. As Hsieh put it: "All this nonsense will end in March of next year."

This is Frank Hsieh's "Two Stage Struggle Thesis." It defies normal political logic. Normal political logic declares: A presidential candidate during election season promotes his own political platform full force. His political party supports him whole heartedly. But it is not always possible to fulfill one's promises after one is elected. Frank Hsieh's political campaign is the antithesis of this. During election season he cannot freely promote his own political platform and his own vision for the future. If he does, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP will publicly contradict him, bringing him to his knees. Frank Hsieh's attitude is: "Let Chen Shui-bian make trouble up to March next year. After March next year, I will be in charge." During election season, Chen Shui-bian will command the spotlight. After the election, it will be Frank Hsieh's turn on stage. This is not conventional political logic. Still less is it normal political logic.

Hsieh's "Two Stage Struggle Thesis" says that during election season Frank Hsieh must patiently endure Chen's oppression. He cannot promote his own ideas or assert his own will. If he is elected however, he will boldly enter the arena, defeat Chen Shui-bian, and not allow Chen Shui-bian to continue controlling the post-March political scene. In effect, during the election there will be a covert Hsieh vs. Chen struggle. Following the election, there will be an overt Hsieh vs. Chen struggle. As we can see, the Hsieh vs. Chen struggle has already dominated and distorted the presidential election.

Unfortunately this "Two Stage Struggle" cannot possibly play itself out according to Frank Hsieh's convenient little script. If Hsieh follows Chen's lead, and resorts to such political gimmicks as a "Plebiscite on Taiwan's Future" or a "Join the UN Plebiscite" to win the election, or if Frank Hsieh wins the election due to Chen Shui-bian's endorsement, how will Frank Hsieh jettison Chen Shui-bian after March? Conversely, if Chen Shui-bian overplays his hand pushing a Taiwan independence agenda, and undermines Frank Hsieh's election prospects, will Hsieh really have the courage to break with Chen Shui-bian during the election in order to shield himself from the political fallout?

Besides, what we are witnessing is not merely a Two Stage Struggle between Hsieh and Chen. The DPP is currently under the control of the radical Yu Hsi-kuen. Deep Green party insiders also favor Chen Shui-bian. Therefore this struggle is actually a "Two Stage Struggle" between Frank Hsieh and Deep Green party insiders who support the ruling Chen regime. Deep Green ruling Chen regime supporters will not let off Frank Hsieh off the hook on election day. Even assuming they help him win the presidency, does that mean they are going to give Frank Hsieh carte blanche? Can Frank Hsieh shrug them off? Isn't Frank Hsieh's convenient little script, in which he "first holds back, then charges forward, first feigns weakness, then asserts strength, first defers, then dominates" nothing more than self deception?

The DPP has used its political infighting skills to seize the initiative in the upcoming presidential election. The Hsieh vs. Chen struggle is more vicious than the average person can imagine. Hsieh wants to defend the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," to declare his opposition to a "Taiwan independence Plebiscite," to declare his opposition to the Taiwan independence movement, to declare his opposition to any future "Declaration of Taiwan independence," as expressed in his "Hsieh's Three Noes." Chen Shui-bian has lashed back, saying "Taiwan's future and cross straits relations must be decided by means of a plebiscite." Yu Hsi-kuen has been even more blunt, and advocated a "Taiwan Independence Plebiscite." Frank Hsieh responded by saying that "There is no need for a Taiwan independence plebiscite, only for a unification plebiscite." If this kind of confrontation were merely a game of "good cop, bad cop," that would be one thing. If on the other hand, this is the main theme of the Democratic Progressive Party's Two Stage Pre Election/Post Election Power Struggle, then it is actually a fight to the bitter end. Frank Hsieh may have some room for bobbing and weaving during the election, but if Chen Shui-bian and Yu Hsi-kuen are the ones credited with getting him elected, the national nightmare will not end in March next year, it will just be beginning.

Frank Hsieh has divided this struggle into "two stages." He hopes the US government and middle of the road voters will sympathize with the fact that he cannot call the shots during election season, and will pin their hopes on him calling the shots after seizing power. That is why Frank Hsieh assured the US: "Let Chen Shui-bian make trouble up to March of next year. After March of next year, I will be in charge." But even an idiot is not going to buy this rosy scenario. How is the US going to buy it? How are a majority of voters? How is Chen Shui-bian?

March is Frank Hsieh's line in the sand, not the DPP's, and not Chen Shui-bian's.

三月界線：長扁之間的「兩階段鬥爭」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.31 03:45 am

謝長廷訪美歸來。總結其相關言論，不啻公開指出：他與陳水扁之間正在進行一場「兩階段鬥爭」，以明年三月為界線。

謝長廷的說法是這樣的：一、「入聯公投」的帳應算在陳水扁頭上，因為「外交權是總統權」；二、希望美國能將我與陳水扁區隔，勿因美國反扁而使我落選；三、入聯公投並非追求實際成效，只是為了煽動民氣，亦即只是選舉操作而已；四、民進黨現在是在陳水扁的操控之下，我不能阻止入聯公投，否則民進黨會分裂；五、但是，這一切紛擾，待明年三月我當選後，陳水扁將失去主導權，即可全盤改觀，「一切只鬧到明年三月為止」。

這就是謝長廷的「兩階段鬥爭論」，完全違反了一般正常的政治邏輯。正常的邏輯是：總統候選人在選季全力宣揚自己的政治路線與願景，所屬政黨亦全力配合支持其論述，唯有時未必在當選後能做得到；但是，謝長廷如今卻是反向操作，在選季不能自由闡發其路線與願景，陳水扁及民進黨且公開與他牴觸，迫使謝長廷不啻在告饒：「就讓他陳水扁鬧到明年三月為止吧，三月過後就看我謝長廷的了。」選季中一切看陳水扁演出，若當選才看謝長廷表演。這不是一般的政治邏輯，更不是正常的政治邏輯。

「兩階段鬥爭論」指出：在選季，謝長廷必須以隱忍面對長扁鬥爭，不能伸張自己的理念與意志；若當選後，謝長廷則將改以強勢面對鬥爭，必能鬥倒陳水扁，不容陳水扁繼續操控「三月以後的情勢」。亦即，選舉時有選舉時的長扁鬥爭，選後又有選後的長扁鬥爭；眼下所見，長扁內鬥儼然已凌駕並扭曲了總統大選。

然而，這場「兩階段鬥爭」絕無可能按謝長廷一廂情願的劇本演出。假如，選舉時謝聽扁的，且以「公投入聯」及「台灣前途公投」等麻辣議題炒熱選情，並因此當選；則謝長廷在陳水扁抬轎當選後，豈有可能命陳水扁「只可鬧到三月為止」？反過來說，倘若陳水扁以傾獨路線操控大選過了頭，致重傷了謝長廷的選情，謝又如何可能不自衛求生，而與陳在選季即告翻臉？

何況，眼前所見尚絕不僅是「長扁之間」的「兩階段鬥爭」而已；因為，民進黨此時掌控在激進的游錫?之手，而黨內深綠亦傾向陳水扁，則這場鬥爭其實是「謝長廷VS.黨內深綠挺扁當權派」的「兩階段鬥爭」。深綠挺扁當權派，在選舉時尚不肯放過謝長廷；則若把謝拱上了總統寶座，他們就會放過謝長廷嗎？或謝長廷就能甩掉他們嗎？這樣看來，謝長廷「先退後進、先弱後強、先賓後主」的「兩階段鬥爭論」，難道不是「自欺欺人」？

民進黨的內鬥襲奪並佔用了總統大選為戰場，扁謝鬥爭的慘烈超過一般人的想像。謝欲退守《台灣前途決議文》，宣示「反對台獨公投、反對台獨運動、反對宣布台獨」的「謝三不」；陳水扁竟立即回嗆「台灣前途及兩岸關係應由公投決定」，游錫?更直接主張「統獨公投」，而謝長廷又回稱「不必台獨公投，只有統一公投」。這類一來一回的唇槍舌劍，倘若只是分扮黑白臉也就罷了；否則即是民進黨內「由大選鬥到選後」的鬥爭主軸，在形式上分成「兩階段」，在實質上卻是一路鬥到底。對謝長廷而言，在選舉時或許尚有閃躲騰挪的空間，但若他一旦由陳水扁、游錫?等人主導輔選而當選，謝長廷及整個國家的噩夢就絕不會「到明年三月為止」，而是正要從明年三月才剛剛開始。

謝長廷將這場鬥爭分成「兩階段」，藉此希望美國及中間選民能同情他在第一階段選季的隱忍及身不由己，並對他在選後的第二階段即可奪回主導權寄予希望。因而，謝長廷對美國說：就讓陳水扁鬧到三月為止吧，三月我當選後就能將他制伏了！但是，白癡恐亦不會相信這種說法，美國會相信嗎？多數選民會相信嗎？陳水扁會相信嗎？

三月，是謝長廷畫的界線，不是民進黨畫的，更不是陳水扁畫的。

Frank Hsieh's Concept of Nationhood

Frank Hsieh's Concept of Nationhood
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 30, 2007

While visiting the US, Frank Hsieh talked about the nation's plight. He said the public should have a sense of national consciousness and national identity. They must not refuse to acknowledge that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation".

His comments touched a sore spot in Taiwan's political discourse. The real problem is that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) remains fixated on the premise that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation," and refuses to publicly acknowledge, in accordance with the constitution, that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."

If the assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation," refers to a non-existent and fictitious "Republic of Taiwan," how can they expect people to identify with it? If on the other hand, the assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation," refers to the Republic of China, why not simply and honestly state that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation?"

The Taiwan independence movement's concept of nationhood has undergone two transformations. One. The Taiwan independence movement originally referred to the Republic of China as an "illegitimate political authority," demanded its overthrow, and demanded the establishment of a separate and independent Republic of Taiwan. Two. Ever since the DPP announced its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," the DPP has asserted that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation, its current name is the Republic of China." Eventually the Taiwan independence movement's concept of nationhood will probably have to undergo a third transformation: "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation, and amounts to the realization of Taiwan independence." These three transformations are not based on any individual's whims, but reflect acquiescence to irresistible forces.

Today's Taiwan independence rhetoric remains stuck in the second stage: "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation, its current name is the Republic of China." This sort of political rhetoric has the power to persuade some swing voters. But it has no legal standing whatsoever, because in the world we live in there is no "Taiwan Constitution" or "Republic of Taiwan Constitution." Therefore "Taiwan" has never been the name of a nation with any constitutional foundation. The assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" is meaningless. Actually, it's worse than meaningless, as it can easily degenerate into self-deception. In the nomenclature of the Taiwan independence movement, "Taiwan" refers to a "Nation of Taiwan," as in "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." In fact, this assertion is nothing more than an obstinate refusal to acknowledge that the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation. Current assertions that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" are constructed upon the Republic of China's constitutional law foundation. If the Taiwan independence movement repudiates the Republic of China, then the assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" immediately loses its legal foundation.

On the one hand, the Taiwan independence movement spares no effort undermining the legitimacy of the Republic of China. It yearns to "rectify names," to "author a new constitution," and to abolish the Republic of China. On the other hand, the Taiwan independence movement's allegation that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" has no basis in fact. Not only is there no nation named the "Republic of Taiwan," there is no "Constitution of Republic of Taiwan." That of course is precisely why the Taiwan independence movement demands the so-called "rectification of names," and the "authoring of a new constitution." As a result, when the Taiwan independence movement bandies about its concept of nationhood, Taiwan independence fundamentalists deny that they are Republic of China citizens. They refuse to consider anyone who identifies with the Republic of China as "Taiwanese." The Taiwan independence movement's concept of "nationhood" contradicts itself both externally and internally, both in name and in fact. Basically it fails the test of nationhood altogether.

On the one hand, the Taiwan independence movement's concept of nationhood struggles to undermine the Republic of China. On the other hand, it creates a fictitious "Republic of Taiwan." On the one hand it denies the reality of a Republic of China. On the other hand it fabricates a non-existent "Republic of Taiwan" Fantasyland. The Democratic Progressive Party needs to realize that its current concept of nationhood has created a Gordian Knot for itself. It will remain incapable of establishing a "Republic of Taiwan" because fundamentally speaking, it is nothing more than self-deception. The most they can do is undermine the Republic of China.

Frank Hsieh said that "Taiwan has already held presidential elections. Of course it is independent." This is political sophistry, not constitutional law. In the real world we live in no nation named "Taiwan" ever elected a "President of Taiwan." Only a nation named the Republic of China, founded upon the Republic of China Constitution, has ever elected presidents of the Republic of China. If Frank Hsieh is elected, he will be a president of the Republic of China, not a president of "Taiwan." Therefore what Frank Hsieh ought to say, loudly and with pride, is that the "Republic of China has already held presidential elections, therefore the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."

Taiwan independence rhetoric must acknowledge that the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation. Otherwise the disingenuous assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" will have even less basis in fact. From a Taiwan independence standpoint, Taiwan independence advocates are revolutionaries who wish to overthrow the Republic of China. But from the Republic of China's standpoint, Taiwan independence advocates are traitors to the Republic of China, who are betraying their nation. Do not mock the Republic of China. Do not engage in self-deception in order to "rectify names," to "author a new constitution," or undermine the Republic of China. Only by reaffirming the nationhood of the Republic of China, by reaffirming one's national identity as a Republic of China citizen, can one avoid tearing the Republic of China apart and unite the Republic of China against foreign influences.

Do not use a fictitious "Nation of Taiwan" to repudiate a real life Republic of China. Do not use party labels to create divisions between an alleged "native political regime" and an alleged "alien political regime." Do not divide people into enemy camps consisting of "Taiwanese" on the one side, and "non-Taiwanese" on the other. This is what Frank Hsieh as a presidential candidate must do to strengthen the concept of nationhood and national identity. Since Frank Hsieh is about to run for Republic of China president, how can he refuse to acknowledge that the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation?

與謝長廷談國家觀念
社論
【2007-07-28/聯合報/A2版/焦點】

謝長廷在美國談到國家處境；他認為國人應有國家觀念與國家認同，不要不承認「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」。

這段話觸及了台灣政局的痛處，但問題的癥結卻正是在民進黨的國家觀念始終停留在「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」的階段，未能遵照憲法公開認同「中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家」。

台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，倘是指子虛烏有的「台灣共和國」，如何教國人皆認同？台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，倘是指「中華民國」，則何不乾脆直說「中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家」？

台獨運動的「國家觀念」，歷經了兩個階段的遞嬗轉型。一、台獨早先指中華民國為非法政權，必欲推翻之，另建台灣共和國；二、至民進黨發表《台灣前途決議文》，則稱「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國」。未來台獨論述的「國家觀念」恐須再經第三階段轉型，成為：「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家，這即是台灣獨立的實現。」這三階段的轉型，不隨個人意志為轉移，而是一必趨必至的遞嬗過程。

現今的台獨論述，仍停留在第二階段，亦即：「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國。」這樣的論述，作為政治語言，確實較具騰挪游移的空間，但這種說法畢竟不具法律意義；因為，世界上並無一部「台灣憲法」或「台灣共和國憲法」，因此「台灣」從來不是具有憲法意義的國號，則自稱「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」，其實沒有憲政意義，反而極易淪為一種「自欺欺人」的政治操作。在台獨詞彙中，「台灣」就是指「台灣國」；稱「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」，其實是在諱言「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」。但是，如今稱「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」，卻是建立在「中華民國」的架構之上；倘若台獨否定了「中華民國」，「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的論述，亦立即失去憑藉。

一方面，台獨不遺餘力地否定「中華民國」的合法正當性，而欲以正名制憲等手段去終結中華民國；但是，另一方面，所謂「台灣是一主權獨立國家」的台獨論述又根本沒有憑據，既無「台灣共和國之國號」、又無「台灣共和國之憲法」（當然，這正是台獨主張正名制憲的理由）。於是，在台獨操作的「國家觀念」中，台獨基本教義派否認自己是「中華民國國民」，且又否認其他認同中華民國者為「台灣人」；這樣的「國家觀念」，表裡衝突，名實撕裂，也就根本不成其為「國家」了。

台獨的國家觀念，一方面摧毀「中華民國」的正當性，另一方面虛構「台灣共和國」的正當性；一方面否定「中華民國」的現實，另一方面偽造「台灣共和國」的幻境。民進黨應知：當前「國家觀念」的癥結，不在未能建立「台灣共和國」（因為那根本是「自欺欺人」），而在你們要毀滅中華民國。

謝長廷說：「台灣已經選舉總統了，當然已經獨立。」這仍是政治語言，而非憲法語言。因為，世界上並無一個稱為「台灣」的國家曾選舉過「台灣總統」；只有一個名為「中華民國」的國家、依「中華民國憲法」，選舉產生「中華民國總統」。謝長廷如果當選，他也是中華民國的總統，而不是台灣（國）的總統。那麼，照謝長廷的話說：「中華民國已經選舉總統，即應大聲說出中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家。」

台獨論述必須承認「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」，否則連「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」亦無所寄託。從台獨本位來看，台獨是主張推翻中華民國的革命者；但是從中華民國本位來看，台獨卻是背叛中華民國的竊國賊。勿再對中華民國冷嘲熱諷，亦勿再以「自欺欺人」的正名制憲欲置中華民國於死地；唯有建立這樣的「國家觀念」與「國家認同」，台灣才不會撕裂，也才能凝聚一致對外的力量。

不要用虛構的「台灣國」來否定實存的「中華民國」，也不要將政黨標籤化成「本土政權」或「外來（國）政權」，更不要將國人分成「台灣人」與「非台灣人」兩種仇敵；這是謝長廷以總統候選人對強化國家觀念與國家認同可為之努力，既然謝長廷都要選中華民國總統了，難道還能諱言中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家？

Chen Shui-bian's Taiwan Independence Makeup

Chen Shui-bian's Taiwan Independence Makeup
The "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite"
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 26, 2007

Frank Hsieh says that the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" campaign has already been launched. "Now even President Chen cannot call a halt to the process."

Frank Hsieh's comments in the US about the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" were akin to microsurgery. They were intended to draw a bright line between himself and Chen Shui-bian. Although Frank Hsieh signed the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite," his key phrase was "Diplomatic policy is President Chen Shui-bian's prerogative." What he was actually saying was that the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" was Chen Shui-bian's pet project.

Frank Hsieh said that "Now even President Chen cannot call a halt to the process." In fact, the law states that "only the president can call a halt to the process." Is it really the case that Chen Shui-bian cannot call a halt to the process? After all, the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is still in the second phase of its signature drive. As long as Chen Shui-bian moderates the signature drive, he can cite the high-minded justification that "The public values Taiwan US relations, understands the need to maintain cross straits peace and ensure domestic tranquility," then allow the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" drive to throttle down and make a soft landing.

In fact, Chen Shui-bian's tone has already softened. He recently said "I have not ruled out the possibility of combining the presidential election with the plebiscite." The implication being he hadn't ruled out the possibility of not combining the presidential election with the plebiscite, either. This was not his original, dogmatic posture. Since this is the case, then a face saving measure during the second phase signature drive would be a smart move on the part of the Democratic Progressive Party.

Now let's look at how Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh, and the Democratic Progressive Party determined the pros and cons of carrying the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" petition drive all the way to the bitter end. First, Chen Shui-bian's formal application to "Join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has already been rejected out of hand by United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and returned unread. On the one hand, since Chen Shui-bian has already made the decision to submit the application on his own, without public authorization, why bother with a pro forma "first board the train, then buy the ticket" plebiscite? On the other hand, since the application has already been rejected, what's the point of holding a plebiscite at all?

Second, the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is merely a masochistic "butting your head against the wall diplomacy" electioneering gimmick intended to win sympathy votes. Therefore the DPP needs to determine just how beneficial it will be to its election prospects. As of today, the election is still seven months away, and it has unexpectedly hit a wall. Frank Hsieh "was surprised" at how firmly the US opposed the plebiscite. The European Union, Japan, Russia, and other major nations all declined to support the plebiscite. The manner in which the United Nations rejected the application came close to a slap in the face. Will hitting a wall this early in the game induce voters to cast sympathy votes for the DPP seven months from now? Or will it merely inspire contempt for the DPP's incompetence? This is something that the DPP must carefully determine. Recent polls indicate that 27.8 % of the public thinks Ma Ying-jeou has a better chance of getting Taiwan into the UN than Frank Hsieh. Only 18.9 % think Frank Hsieh has a better chance of getting Taiwan into the UN than Ma Ying-jeou. Obviously the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is a phony issue, just like the question, "Do you want to win first prize in the lottery?" It is not necessarily advantageous to the DPP's electioneering efforts.

Third, the issue most worth paying attention to is whether Frank Hsieh should draw a line between himself and Chen Shui-bian. Frank Hsieh's main theme during his talks in the US were about severing ties with Chen Shui-bian. He said "The Five Noes are missing at least one No." What he meant was that "Four Noes" remain in effect. He also said that, "Taiwan is already independent, therefore it has no need for a Taiwan independence plebiscite, has no need for an independence movement, and has no need to declare independence." He drew a line between himself and Chen Shui-bian's "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue." Frank Hsieh cannot publicly commit to the "Five Noes," but he was indicating to the US that he would make such a pledge if elected. He also said that he cannot withdraw the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" petition, but he indicated that if elected, the plebiscite would no longer be an issue after March next year. These declarations suggest that Chen Shui-bian is holding Frank Hsieh hostage. The "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" and the "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue" bombshells are Chen Shui-bian's pet projects, not Frank Hsieh's. Why exactly is Chen Shui-bian holding Frank Hsieh hostage? How can Frank Hsieh campaign under such circumstances? If Frank Hsieh cannot get the Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence monkeys off his back, what guarantee do voters have that after he is elected he won't remain a hostage of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence hardliners?

Fourth, lastly, we must carry out a realistic cost/benefit analysis. According to insider information, US reaction to the "Join the UN in the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" was extremely negative. This was apparent from Frank Hsieh's hesitant manner while discussing the issue. The US feels that the "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is a "Plebiscite intended to change the Status Quo," and has already caused Taipei/Washington relations to degenerate to their lowest level in seven years. Japan, Russia, the European Union, other major nations, and the Secretary General of the United Nations have all expressed their opposition. For the Republic of China government, this is not merely an isolated defeat. It is a defeat that has further consolidated an international consensus in favor of a "One China" as defined by the CCP, rather than as defined by the KMT and by the 1992 Consensus. It is not a temporary setback. It is a setback that has cast a long shadow over Taipei/Washington relations and undermined trust between the DPP and the US government. Chen Shui-bian is recklessly "burning down the house in order to keep warm." Can the DPP tolerate this behavior? Can the people?

The "Join the UN under the name of Taiwan Plebiscite" and the "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue" initiatives are not helpful to Frank Hsieh's election prospects. Nor are they helpful to the DPP's rational interests. All they do is apply a heavy and politically costly layer of make-up over the face of a corrupt Chen Shui-bian, transforming him into a "Champion of Taiwan independence." Must Frank Hsieh pick up the tab for Chen Shui-bian? Must the DPP pick up the tab for Chen Shui-bian? But above all, must the people pick up the tab for Chen Shui-bian?

陳水扁的台獨胭脂：公投入聯，如何下車？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.26 03:32 am

謝長廷說，「入聯公投」已經發動：「現在即使陳總統來談，也無法說停就停！」

看謝長廷在美國關於入聯公投的談話，他儼然正以「奈米手術」與陳水扁切割。謝長廷雖表示也連署了入聯公投，但他最關鍵的一句話卻是「外交權是陳水扁總統的權力」，其實就是直指「入聯公投」全是陳水扁一個人的花樣。

謝長廷說「陳總統也無法說停就停」，實則是說「只有陳總統能夠叫停」。何況，陳水扁真的不能叫停嗎？畢竟入聯公投案仍在進行第二階段連署，只要陳水扁節制連署，即可標舉「民眾珍惜台美關係、顧全兩岸和平、維護國內和諧」的堂皇理由，讓入聯公投案不了了之軟著陸。

其實，陳水扁的口氣已見軟化。他居然說：「不排除總統大選併入聯公投。」言下之意即是，亦「不排除」不併；儼然已不是原先那種斬釘截鐵非併不可的姿態。倘係如此，在第二階段連署下車，或不失為民進黨的明智之舉。

現在，就要看陳水扁、謝長廷及民進黨如何評估公投入聯是否進行到底的利弊得失：一、陳水扁正式發出的「以台灣名義加入聯合國」申請案已告失敗，遭聯合國秘書長潘基文直接退件。一方面，陳水扁既已擅作主張逕自送案，又何必舉行「先上車，後補票」的公投？另一方面，案子既遭退件，公投有何意義？

二、其實，「入聯公投案」根本只是又一次「撞牆外交」的選舉操作，因此至少須評估對民進黨的選情是否有利。然而，如今在距大選還有漫漫七個月的今日，竟然已經「撞牆」，美國反對之堅決令謝長廷「驚訝」，歐盟及日俄等國際主流國家無一支持，聯合國也以跡近羞辱的手段退件；則這種過早出現的「撞牆」現象，在未來七個月會使選民滋生對民進黨的同情，或反而產生對民進黨的嫌惡，民進黨當局恐須審慎評估。最近民調居然出現認為馬英九（二十七‧八％）比謝長廷（十八‧九％）更有利台灣進入聯合國的答案，可見「公投入聯」猶如「你是否希望中樂透頭獎」的假議題，未必有利民進黨的選舉操作。

三、最值得關注的是謝長廷與陳水扁應否作出區隔的問題。謝長廷在美談話的主軸就是要與陳水扁切割，他說「四不一沒有，至少已少了『一沒有』」，意指「四不」仍然有效。他又說：「台灣已經獨立，不必（獨立）公投，不必獨立運動，不必宣布獨立。」已與陳水扁的「四要一沒有」切割。謝長廷不能公開承諾「四不一沒有」，但他向美方暗示，他當選後即可承諾；他又說不能撤回公投入聯案，但他向美方表示，只要他當選，這個議題（公投入聯）即可「到明年三月為止」，不再作祟。這些表述，其實皆顯示謝長廷受到陳水扁的挾持，「公投入聯」及「四要一沒有」均是陳水扁的花樣，而非謝長廷的主張。那麼，陳水扁憑什麼挾持謝長廷？這叫謝長廷如何競選？謝長廷若在選舉時不能甩掉陳水扁及台獨，又何以保證他在選後不受陳水扁及台獨的挾持？

四、最後，更須評估實際上所付的代價。據幕後消息，美國對公投入聯合國的反對態度極為強烈，這從謝長廷吞吞吐吐的談話已可感知。美國認為，入聯公投就是「要改變現狀的公投」，已使台美關係降至「七年以來最惡劣、最艱困的時刻」；且自日、俄、歐盟至聯合國主事者皆對此案持反對立場。何況，對台灣而言，這也不只是個案的失敗，而是反而使得「一個中國」的國際主流政策架構更形鞏固堅實；亦不僅是一時的失敗，而將使得台美關係及「民進黨／美國政府」的信任留下長期陰影。陳水扁這種燒房子取暖的愚妄行徑，民進黨豈能姑息？國人又焉可縱容？

「公投入聯」及「四要一沒有」，不符謝長廷的選舉利益，亦不符民進黨的理性利益；這只是「貪腐的陳水扁」化粧成「台獨的陳水扁」的昂價政治胭脂。謝長廷要為陳水扁埋單嗎？民進黨要為陳水扁埋單嗎？國人要為陳水扁埋單嗎？

Is Chen Shui-bian celebrating the National Day of an "Alien Regime?"

Is Chen Shui-bian celebrating the National Day of an "Alien Regime?"
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 25, 2007


Double Ten Troop Review: the Real Thing, during the Two Chiangs Era

Comment: The following United Daily News editorial is unquestionably the best I've had the honor of translating since I created Dateline Taipei. Better even than the recent July 11 editorial on Ma Ying-jeou. Working on it was a joy. Many recent Pan Blue op ed pieces show signs of having caved in to Pan Green "ben tu" nativist Political Correctness. Not this piece. This piece represents True Blue adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Is Chen Shui-bian celebrating the National Day of an "Alien Regime?"
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 25, 2007

The question is not whether the upcoming Republic of China National Day celebration is a "troop review" or a so-called "national defense performance." The question is why Chen Shui-bian, who has spared no effort to do away with the Republic of China, insists on spending vast sums of public money celebrating the National Day of the Republic of China, when the ruling DPP insists on labeling the Republic of China as an "alien regime?"

Chen Shui-bian is an advocate of Taiwan independence. His political banner is "Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue." He wants Taiwan independence, he wants the so-called "rectification of names," he wants the "authoring of a new constitution," he wants to establish a "Republic of Taiwan," and he wants to eliminate the Republic of China. Why does such an fanatical advocate of Taiwan independence such as Chen Shui-bian want to celebrate the National Day of the Republic of China in such an extravagant manner?

The question is not whether the upcoming Republic of China National Day celebration is a "troop review" or a "national defense performance." The question is whether a president of the Republic of China has the right to promote Taiwan independence.

The Double Ten Festival commemorates the 1911 Revolution. The 1911 Revolution established the Republic of China (Chen Shui-bian's "Four Imperatives" demand the repudiation of the Republic of China). The Republic of China's Founding Father was Sun Yat-Sen (high school textbooks will soon be subjected to historical revisionism and repudiate this fact). The Republic of China recovered Taiwan from its Japanese colonial occupiers (yet Chen Shui-bian refers to the Republic of China as an "alien regime"). The recovery of Taiwan made possible the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (otherwise Chen Shui-bian, as a member of a Category Three Impoverished Household would long ago have become a member of the "Five Red Categories" under Chinese Communist Party rule), The establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) made possible the election of Chen Shui-bian and his current advocacy of Taiwan independence, his Orwellian "rectification of names" campaign, his demands for the "authoring of a new constitution," his "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue" (without the Republic of China, Taiwan would be under People's Republic of China rule. Taiwan independence would have the same status as Tibetan independence. There would be no Republic of China president from Taiwan and no possibility of promoting Taiwan independence). There would be no Chen Shui-bian to advocate Taiwan independence, or the "rectification of names," or the "authoring of a new constitution." There would be no extravaganza commemorating the National Day of this alleged "alien regime" known as the Republic of China. This paradox is a microcosmic version of the grand paradox at the heart of politics on Taiwan. This fraud is a microcosmic version of the massive fraud at the heart of politics on Taiwan.

This fraud is full of contradictions. For example, the ruling DPP government is financially underwritten by the Republic of China, yet it demands Taiwan independence and the death of the Republic of China. The Taiwan independence movement demands the death of the Republic of China, yet Taiwan independence can survive only under the protective wing of the Republic of China. Chen Shui-bian refers to the Republic of China as an "alien regime," as "invaders belonging to an alien race," as "colonizers belonging to an alien race," yet he enjoys the rights and privileges of the highest-ranking official of the Republic of China government, and abets his family's abuse of Republic of China presidential power and influence to embezzle hard-earned dollars belonging to Republic of China taxpayers. Chen Shui-bian advocates Taiwan independence, the "rectification of names," the "authoring of a new constitution," his "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue," and the death of the Republic of China. Yet he uses his legal status as "President of the Republic of China" to preside over ceremonies commemorating the founding of the Republic of China, in front of the Republic of China Presidential Palace. Is this not a grotesque paradox? Is this not an outrageous fraud?

During last year's National Day celebration, Red Shirt Army protestors heckled Chen Shui-bian during his address, primarily because given his malfeasance and misgovernance, they felt he had long ago forfeited his status as "President of the Republic of China." Chen Shui-bian's apoplectic response was "Since everyone has so many objections, next year there won't be a National Day ceremony!" Realizing his legitimacy had been openly challenged, Chen threw a temper tantrum and threatened to cancel next year's festivities. But even as his words rang in our ears, Chen Shui-bian reneged on his threat. Not only will he enthusiastically celebrate the National Day of the Republic of China, an alleged "alien regime," he will gild the lily by holding a "national defense performance." But what pray tell does "national defense" mean on today's Taiwan? Is "national defense" the defense of a nation known as the Republic of China, a alleged "alien regime?" Or is it for the defense of a would be "Republic of Taiwan," a "Nation consisting of Saliva," that exists only in the corner of Chen Shui-bian's mouth?

Chen Shui-bian, in the final days before he must leave office, wants to misappropriate the National Day of the Republic of China, to mobilize the Republic of China's armed forces, to squander the Republic of China's public funds, to trumpet "his accomplishments as president" and underline "his status as commander in chief." On the National Day podium, he will abuse his status as "President of the Republic of China" to demand Taiwan independence, the "rectification of names," the "authoring of a new constitution" and the imposition of his "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue." His goal will be the annihilation of the Republic of China. How long can Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party get away with this grotesque paradox, this outrageous fraud? How long will the people tolerate to this grotesque paradox, this outrageous fraud?

The Taiwan independence movement uses the Republic of China as a shell, under whose protection it promotes Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence in turn, destroys the Republic of China shell. Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party have nothing in their hearts but Taiwan independence and the overthrow of the Republic of China. On the Republic of China's National Day, they will go through the motions of celebrating the founding of the Republic of China, an alleged "alien regime." What manner of "National Day" celebration will this be, other than a charade in which citizens of the Republic of China are compelled to celebrate Chen Shui-bian's political fraud?

This year's National Day "national defense performance" will be nothing more than a smoke screen. The real drama will be enacted behind the scenes. It will be a "Taiwan independence Double Ten" ceremony celebrating Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party's Magic Trick of the Century.

陳水扁慶祝「外來政權」國慶？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.25 03:23 am

爭點不只在「閱兵」或「國防表演」，而是以陳水扁如此「去中華民國化」不遺餘力者，為何要耗費大筆公帑來慶祝「外來政權中華民國」的國慶？

陳水扁是台獨分子，「四要一沒有」是他的政治旗幟。要台獨，要正名，要新憲；也就是要另建台灣共和國，不要中華民國。如此偏執的台獨分子陳水扁，何以要如此奢華鋪張地慶祝中華民國國慶？

所以，問題的爭點不只在「閱兵」或「國防表演」，這是一個「台獨分子總統」與「中華民國」是否相配相容的問題。

雙 十節是紀念辛亥革命。有辛亥革命始有中華民國（但陳水扁以「四要」否定中華民國），有中華民國始有國父孫中山（但中學教材已打算否定此事），有中華民國始 有台灣光復（但陳水扁指其為「外來政權」），有台灣光復今日始有民進黨（否則陳水扁以三級貧戶早已是「紅五類」），有民進黨始有陳水扁在今日主張台獨正名 制憲的「四要一沒有」（若是沒有中華民國，台灣在中華人民共和國治下，台獨可能如藏獨，絕無今日連總統亦可倡言台獨之光景）。然而，何以主張為台獨正名制 憲的陳水扁，又欲以「盛大嘉年華」來熱烈慶祝「外來政權」中華民國的開國革命國慶日？這個矛盾，正是台灣整個政治大矛盾的縮影；這個騙局，也正是台灣整個 政治大騙局的縮影。

此一騙局充滿矛盾。例如，民進黨政府受中華民國的供養，卻主張欲置中華民國於死地的台獨；又如，台獨欲置中華民國於死 地，其實台獨自身卻是在中華民國的政治羽翼下始能存活；又如，陳水扁指中華民國為外來政權，為異族侵略者，為異族殖民者，自己卻享受中華民國的俸祿和權 柄，還縱容家族利用總統權勢在中華民國的體制內貪汙；再如，陳水扁主張台獨正名制憲的「四要一沒有」，欲置中華民國於死地，卻以「中華民國總統」的身分， 在中華民國總統府前主持中華民國開國革命紀念日。這是不是矛盾？這是不是騙局？

去年國慶，紅衫軍鬧場，主因即在有不少國人根本否認失政敗 德的陳水扁仍具「中華民國總統」的「合法正當性」；而去年陳水扁氣急敗壞地稱：「如果大家這麼有意見，明年就不再舉辦國慶。」一方面顯是感知自己的「合法 正當性」已受質疑，另一方面則亦在以否定「國慶」來威脅國人。但是，言猶在耳，陳水扁卻已變卦，不但要熱烈慶祝中華民國這個「外來政權」的開國革命紀念 日，而且還要舉行「國防表演」。問題是：台灣今日國防的意義已不知何指，是為了「外來政權」中華民國而國防嗎？或是為了只是存在於陳水扁等人嘴角的「口水 國家」台灣共和國而國防？

陳水扁在他卸任最後時日，仍欲假借慶祝中華民國國慶的名義，動員中華民國的三軍，揮霍中華民國的公帑，來彰顯其 作為「總統」及「三軍統帥」的威儀；但在「國慶」的典禮台下，他卻利用「中華民國總統」的地位，去推動他台獨正名制憲的「四要一沒有」，以消滅中華民國為 目的。陳水扁及民進黨能將這個大矛盾的大騙局支撐到幾時？國人又能對這個大矛盾的大騙局容忍到幾時？

借中華民國的殼玩台獨，又用台獨來摧毀中華民國的殼。眼看著心存台獨建國革命的陳水扁及民進黨，熱烈慶祝「外來政權」中華民國的辛亥開國革命紀念日；這豈是慶祝「國慶」，簡直是逼國人慶祝陳水扁政治大騙局的演出！

今年國慶，「國防表演」只是煙幕，真正的好戲其實是在陳水扁及民進黨「台獨慶雙十」的「政治騙術表演」！

Financial Oversight becomes Financial Plunder

Financial Oversight becomes Financial Plunder
The Man behind the Curtain and the Scarecrow
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 19, 2007


Financial Supervisory Commissioners

The Rebar Asia Pacific Group is currently tens of bilions of dollars in debt. A judge has discovered that the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has been covering up the Rebar Asia Pacific Group's illegal loans. Officials were derelict in their duty. They abused state power to ingratiate themselves with company officials, covering up for them, helping them out of their jam.

Question and answer sessions between judges and company officials over the past two days have revealed just how hollow the nation's financial oversight mechanisms are. Not only were FSC officials arrogant, passing the buck whenever they could, they were completely unwilling to engage in self-introspection. Taipei District Court Judge Tseng Cheng-lung characterized the manner in which the FSC dealt with the Great Chinese Bills Finance Corporation's illegal loans as: catching a thief but letting him go, allowing him to keep half the loot and pay back the rest on the installment plan. No wonder District Court Presiding Judge Lee Ying-hao reprimanded FSC officials, saying that "You have totally undermined public trust in the government!"

The judges were hardly alone. The public knew exactly how they felt. The difference between the FSC and the other machinery of the central government, is that financial oversight is its central responsibility, its basic duty, Its goal is to nip corruption in the bud, in order to maintain the nation's financial stability. As matters stand, it has abandoned its oversight responsibility and disregarded laws and regulations in order to assist business cronies evade the law. Are officials nothing more than scarecrows wielding state power? Wang You-theng emptied out Rebar Asia Pacific Group's coffers. The FSC inititially tried to cover up the scandal. To quote District Court Presiding Judge Lee Ying-hao: "Do we really need officials like this?"

Such officials can be described as scarecrows, because they neglect their duties by shelving their authority instead of exercising it. One moment Bank Bureau Assistant Commissioner Lin Tung-liang says "We cannot concern ourselves only with the law, and not concern ourselves wtih business management." The next moment he says "We have no authority to investigate shell companies." The moment after that he says "Our manpower was inadequate." What we would like to know is, what exactly does he think his responsibilities ought to be?

FSC Vice Chairperson Susan Chang said, "if only we had known sooner" that the Rebar Asia Pacific Group had problems, we would have aggressively prosecuted the case. Her response merely revealed her buck-passing mentality. The public has never expected officials to be prophets. They merely expect officials to administer in accordance with the law. The FSC can't even manage to "paint by the numbers." Yet it wants to talk about "looking after the nation's businesses" and "stabilizing the nation's finances?" We really can't think of any reason why the government should pay these Financial Supervisory Commission officials their inflated salaries.

Whether the reason is plain and simple incompetence, or criminal complicity, the emergence of one FSC scandal after another shows that the nation's highest financial supervisory body is completely ineffective and has lost all credibility. Lest we forget, among the many "independent" agencies established during the Chen regime's term of office, the FSC is the one most closely controlled by the ruling DPP regime, the one that has shouldered the most vital responsibilities, and the one responsible for the most outrageous scandals. In three short years, its committee chairman, vice-committee chairman, bureau chief, and numerous committee members have all been thrown in prison. Rather than argue that its director is a "bad judge of character," it would be more accurate to say that from the day of its inception, this agency was deprived of its independent status due to political considerations, resulting in the loss of its financial oversight function.

The current Great Chinese Bills Finance Corp case involves illegal loans as long as seven or eight years, repeatedly exposed by lower echelon whistle-blowers. The FSC repeatedly bent the rules. Officials testified in court, acknowledging that they received "instructions from the Executive Yuan." Some indicated that they were ordered to comply with President Chen's requests to relieve the effects of the financial crunch. Obviously, the FSC abetted Great Chinese Bills Finance Corp. wrongdoing. On the one hand the president issued his imperial decree. On the other hand, high level senior officials issued detailed instructions. Judges have uncovered a row of scarecrows. But if they can't uncover the "Man behind the Curtain," then aren't they wasting their time?

If we want to discuss the erosion of public trust in government over the past several years, FSC collusion and abuse of power is merely the tip of the iceberg. It is merely an isolated example of an across the board loss of government effectiveness. The Chen regime cares only whether its personnel are friends and relations, not whether they are professional and capable. It has destroyed the civil service system's neutrality and stability. It has destroyed its automatic checks and balances. In the past, financial oversight authority and responsibility were divided among the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and a number of other agencies, each of which checked and balanced the other. The concentration of authority in the FSC has paradoxically allowed financial irregularities to sprout like mushrooms. The main reason of course is that given such concentration of authority, the "Man behind the Curtain" need only issue a single command to implement his goal.

One after another, Kong Jaw-sheng, Lin Chung-cheng, and Lee Chin-cheng were indicted. These politically connected nouveau riches were corrupted by power. But Susan Chang, Gary Tseng and other experienced, long time civil servants have also found themselves knee deep in corruption. Obviously Green Dynasty political toxins have spread to the very heart of the administration.

State power has been transformed into political tool. An independent agency entrusted with financial oversight has degenerated into a criminal gang dedicated to financial plunder. Who bears greater responsibility? The "Man behind the Curtain" or the "Scarecrow?"

藏鏡人和稻草人：金融監理變成金融盜匪
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.19 03:31 am

力霸集團捅出虧空數百億的大窟窿，法官發現金檢機構長年縱容力霸關係企業違法放貸，官員不僅怠忽職守，更拿公權力大作人情，包庇放水，幫業者解套。

這兩天法官與官員在法庭上的問答，讓人見識了國家金融監理機制的形同虛設。金管會官員不僅態度傲慢，處處推託，更對自己的顢頇一無反省。法官曾正龍形容金管會處理力華票券違貸，就像抓到小偷不辦，還和盜賊私了，准許贓款減半、分期償還。也難怪法官李英豪當庭痛斥：「公權力都被你們玩完了！」

法官們的沈痛，國人亦皆感同身受。金管會不同於一般行政機構，金融監理是它最核心、也是最基本的任務，目的在防微杜漸，維護國家金融秩序的安定。但現在，它不僅拋棄監理職責，更無視法令規章，一再對違法業者私下放水，官員難道只是手握公權力的「稻草人」？王又曾掏空力霸，原來金管會還居間扮演了包庇窩藏的角色，讓人痛心疾首。套用李英豪的話：「要這些公務員幹嘛？」

稱這些官員是看守公權力的「稻草人」，是因他們怠忽職守，將公權力束諸高閣。銀行局副局長林棟樑忽而聲稱「不能只管法令，不管企業經營」，忽而表示「無權查虛設公司」，忽而改口「人力不足」；說東說西，請問：他眼裡還有什麼自己應負的責任？

副主委張秀蓮則說，如果「早知道」力霸會出事，早就強行處理了；這更反映出強詞奪理的推諉心態。國家從未要求官員作預言家，只要求官員「依法行政」。金管會連「照步數來」這麼基本的行政邏輯都不能遵循，卻奢言要「照顧企業」、「穩定金融」，真不知國家何以要付薪水給這些金管官員？

是單純的無能也好，或涉及犯罪情節也罷，金管會層出不窮的弊案，都說明這個國家最高金檢機構已徹底失能，也完全失去了公信。別忘了，在扁政府任內新成立的獨立機構中，金管會是執政當局隻手牢牢掌控的單位，肩負最重要的任務，卻也爆發了最多端的弊情；僅僅三年，主委、副主委、局長、委員一干人皆深陷牢獄之災。與其說是主政者識人不明，不如說這個機構一開始就因政治動機被剝奪了獨立性格，終至喪失了金融監理的本能。

看這次的力華票券案，涉及違法貸放長達七、八年，屢遭基層查獲，金檢當局卻不斷給予通融。官員在庭上作證，承認受到「行政院指示」，亦有人指稱是配合陳總統要求消除金融緊縮情況的指示行事。可見，金管會對力華放水，一方面有總統諭令當尚方寶劍，另一方面還有具體的高層長官下達指令。現在，法官查到一排稻草人，若不揪出幕後藏鏡人，豈不白忙一場？

的確，要論國家公權力近幾年的消損，金管會的放水、濫權恐怕只是冰山一角；這從整體行政治理的失能，即可見一斑。扁政府用人但視親疏、不重專業，不僅摧毀了文官體系的中立及穩定性，更使得行政機構的自動勾稽和制衡作用消失。過去金融監理權責分散在央行及財政部等不同部會手中，彼此尚能層層節制；但事權集中至金管會後反而紕漏百出，主要原因，不就是政治藏鏡人只要一個口令就能輕易貫徹其目的嗎？

值得警惕的是，先前龔照勝、林忠正、李進誠等人涉案，尚可稱是「政治新貴」因暴得權力而墮落；但今天張秀蓮、曾國烈等久經文官歷練的官員也泥足深陷，可見綠朝帶進的政治汙染已滲透到了行政體系的心臟地帶。

公權力變成唯政治是從的工具，金融監理機構當然要淪為金融盜匪的共犯。藏鏡人和稻草人，誰能說誰的責任少一點？

Every "Taiwanese" has the right to be "Taiwanese"

Every "Taiwanese" has the right to be "Taiwanese"
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 18, 2007

Frank Hsieh says he advocates reconciliation and coexistence. As a result, people have certain expectations about him. They hope he will respect the right of every Taiwanese to be Taiwanese.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) says that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country, its current name is the Republic of China." According to the DPP's own definition, anyone who is a Republic of China citizen is "Taiwanese." According to the Republic of China Constitution meanwhile, everyone who is Taiwanese, i.e., a Chinese citizen living in the Province of Taiwan, is also a Republic of China citizen.

Frank Hsieh and Ma Ying-jeou both have Republic of China ID cards. If Frank Hsieh is Taiwanese, then so is Ma Ying-jeou. The DPP and the Kuomintang (KMT) are both legally registered Republic of China political parties. If the DPP is a "native political party" then the KMT is not a "foreign political party." By the same token, those who support Frank Hsieh and the DPP are Republic of China citizens, and Taiwanese. Those who support Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT are also Republic of China citizens, and also "Taiwanese."

The criminal code states that any attempt to revoke a person's Republic of China citizenship, i.e., deprive him of the right to be "Taiwanese," must be done according to due process, within a court of law. Frank Hsieh may not rule that anyone is not Taiwanese. Ma Ying-jeou may not rule that anyone is not a Republic of China citizen. Only on such a foundation, can we talk about democratic politics, the rule of law, and party politics. After all, we are supposed to be implementing constitutional republicanism, multiparty democracy, and free and fair elections. We are not supposed to be reenacting the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. No one should be able to characterize others as members of the "five blacklisted categories" or as "counter-revolutionaries." Partisan competition under constitutional republicanism should not emulate political struggles in Nazi Germany. No one should be able to characterize themselves as "Taiwan's Aryans" and others as "Taiwan's Jews."

In fact, numerous experts have warned that Taiwan's democracy and partisan politics have displayed Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Nazi characteristics. Frank Hsieh ought to be aware of this danger, since he opposed a "civil war over democracy" and advocated "reconciliation and coexistence." The fundamental distinction between democratic elections and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution or political struggles in Nazi Germany, is that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution denied other people's equal rights as citizens, and Nazism went even further by denying other people's equal rights as human beings. Look at someone the wrong way on today's Taiwan and he can dismiss you as "Not Taiwanese," denounce you as a "Chinese pig," and even deny you the status of a human being. Compete against him for political office and he can denounce you as the representative of an "alien political authority." Point to his unwillingness to abide by the constitution, and he will blame the same constitution he amended as "defective." Point to his incompetence at governing the nation, and he will blame the Republic of China and demand the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan. Point to how he has torn Taiwan to pieces, and he will say that "Taiwan is not a normal country."

Allegations such as these have no constitutional or legal basis. They have not been subjected to due process in a court of law. Chen Shui-bian need only say "Four Imperatives and One Non-issue," and the Republic of China becomes something to be exterminated as soon as possible. Yu Hsi-kuen need only say "Shih Ming-teh is a Chinese Communist Party fellow traveller," and Shih Ming-teh has lost his right to be Taiwanese. Frank Hsieh need only say that "Ma Ying-jeou represents an alien political authority," and Ma Ying-jeou and all his supporters have become "Non-Taiwanese." According to such standards, Chiang Ching-kuo, Sun Yun-suan, Li Kuo-ting are all Chinese Communist Party fellow travelers, all "traitors to Taiwan."

The distinctions made today between so-called "Taiwanese" and "Non-Taiwanese" are not racial differences or differences based on blood relations. They are political labels. What the DPP's political labels peddle is this: Support Taiwan independence, and you are Taiwanese. Oppose Taiwan independence, and you are not Taiwanese. Support the DPP, and you are Taiwanese. Oppose the DPP, and you are not Taiwanese. Support the corrupt Chen Shui-bian, and you are Taiwanese. Oppose him, and you are not Taiwanese. Support Frank Hsieh for president, and you are Taiwanese. Support Ma Ying-jeou, and you are not Taiwanese, you are a Chinese Communist Party fellow traveler, a "traitor to Taiwan."

This kind of demagoguery will transform any so-called "civil war over democracy" into a "conflict between enemy nations." To invoke Frank Hsieh's own language, not only is Taiwan's way is not the way of the Bodhisattva, Taiwan has become a Roman Coliseum. Taiwan has been divided into two nations, one a so-called "native political authority" and the other a so-called "alien political authority." Taiwan has become the "lowest rung of hell," without any concept of what it means to be a citizen. Republic of China citizens do not approve of a Republic of Taiwan. Republic of Taiwan citizens want to overthrow the Republic of China. As a result, all Taiwanese have lost their rights as citizens. This kind of demagoguery is not merely dividing the country. It is emptying the term "citizenship," of any and all meaning. Twenty-three million people have become lost souls without a national identity, hating each other, killing each other. Is this the road to heaven, or is this the road to hell?

The upcoming election is supposed to be competition between political parties, carried out within the political framework of a constitutional republic. It is not supposed to be a reenactment of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Nor is is supposed to be a reenactment of the political struggles within Nazi Germany. Everyone is a citizen of the Republic of China. Everyone, according to the DPP's own disingenuous definition of the Republic of China, is "Taiwanese." Everyone is equal. No one may deprive anyone else of the right to be "Taiwanese." No one may deprive anyone else of the right to be a citizen of the Republic of China.

Frank Hsieh has said that he advocates reconciliation and coexistence. Twenty-three million "Taiwanese" expect him to practice what he preaches, to respect the right of every "Taiwanese" to be "Taiwanese."

和解共生：每個台灣人皆有作台灣人的權利！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.18 04:12 am

謝長廷主張和解共生。因此國人可以對他有一最起碼的期待，希望他能尊重每一個台灣人都有作為台灣人的權利。

民進黨說：台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國。即使依此定義，則所有中華民國國民皆是台灣人，所有台灣人亦是中華民國國民。

謝 長廷與馬英九所持同是中華民國國民身分證，若謝長廷是台灣人，馬英九當然也是。民進黨與中國國民黨皆註冊為中華民國的政黨，若民進黨是「本土政黨」，國民 黨亦不是「外來政黨」。同理，支持謝長廷與支持民進黨者是中華民國國民，是台灣人；則支持馬英九與支持國民黨者亦是中華民國國民，是台灣人。

罪 刑法定，若要褫奪任何人作為中華民國國民的資格，或剝奪其作為台灣人的權利，即必須根據明文的法律，經由法院的判決始可。謝長廷不可逕自宣判任何人不是台 灣人，馬英九亦不可逕自宣判任何人不是中華民國國民。唯有在此一起碼的基礎上，始能談民主政治、法治政治，與政黨政治。畢竟，我們現在進行的是在民主憲政 下政黨競爭的平等選舉，而不是文化大革命，因此沒有人可以被打成黑五類或反革命分子；民主憲政下的政黨競爭也不是納粹運動，因此沒有人可以自封為「台灣的 亞利安人」，亦沒有人可以被打成「台灣的猶太人」。

其實，近年有極多的專家學者警告指出，台灣的民主憲政與政黨政治，已有文革化及納粹運 動化的傾向。謝長廷對此頗有警覺，因此他反對「民主內戰」，主張和解共生。民主選舉與文革及納粹運動的根本不同之處，即在文革否定了他人作為「國民」的平 等權利，納粹運動則甚至否定他人作為「人」的權利。現在的問題是，台灣的政治危機已近乎此：看不順眼就說你不是台灣人，甚至稱你「中國豬」而否定你是 「人」；與你競選就指你是「外來政權」；不肯行憲守憲就說自己修的憲法是烏魯木齊；無能治理國家就否定中華民國而揚言另建台灣共和國；自己把台灣撕扯得四 分五裂然後就說台灣不是一個正常的國家。

以上這些「宣判」，皆沒有憲法或法律的根據，亦未經法院依正當程序作出判決。只消陳水扁說「四要 一沒有」，「中華民國」就成了必欲滅之而後快；只消游錫?說施明德是中共同路人，施明德就失去了作為台灣人的權利；如今又聞謝長廷指馬英九為「外來政 權」，馬英九及其支持者亦皆成了「非台灣人」。若依這個標準，蔣經國、孫運璿、李國鼎等亦皆是中共同路人，也都是賣台集團。

因為，如今所 謂「台灣人／非台灣人」的區別標準，根本不在種族與血緣的差異，而完全是一種政治標籤。民進黨批發的政治標籤無非：支持台獨，就是台灣人；不支持台獨，就 不是台灣人。支持民進黨，就是台灣人；不支持就不是。支持貪腐的陳水扁，就是台灣人；不支持就不是。支持謝長廷選總統，就是台灣人；支持馬英九就不是台灣 人，就是中共同路人，就是賣台集團。

這樣的政治操作，將使「民主內戰」變質為「敵國交戰」。若用謝長廷的語言來說，台灣非但不是菩薩道， 簡直已成修羅場。台灣不僅已被分裂成兩個國家「本土政權／外來政權」，甚至台灣亦將惡質化為沒有「國民」的阿鼻地獄；中華民國國民不認同台灣共和國，台灣 共和國國民欲推翻中華民國，於是所有的台灣人皆失去了作為「國民」的身分與權利。這樣的政治操作，不僅是在分裂國家，更簡直欲使「國民」的身分與內涵徹底 空洞化與虛無化。二千三百萬人如同喪失國家認同及國民內涵的冤魂，相互仇恨，相互殘殺。試問：這究竟是天堂菩薩道，或其實是地獄修羅場？

這次選舉是在民主憲政下進行的政黨競爭，不是文革，也不是納粹運動；每一個人都是平等的中華民國國民，每一個人都是平等的台灣人，任何人皆不可剝奪任何人作為中華民國國民與作為台灣人的權利。

謝長廷主張和解共生，理應期待他為二千三百萬台灣人作出實踐其理念的正確示範：尊重每一個台灣人作台灣人的權利！

Judgment Day for Financial Officials

Judgment Day for Financial Officials
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 17, 2007

During the past two months, Taiwan's stock market has gone crazy. From 8066 points on May 4, it rocketed to 9471 points on July 13. Trading volume increased from 113.9 billion dollars to 239.6 billion dollars. Normally speaking, the stock market is a window on the economy. Stock market trading volume and indices reflect economic fundamentals. What is unsettling about this latest round of stock market movements, is that no changes in the economic fundamentals can be detected behind these momentous changes. No dramatic changes in domestic consumer investment, in imports and exports, in cross Straits trade, in free trade area negotiations, or international market competitiveness. Most analysts believe that the stock market's current rise has to do with aggressive intervention by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Whether such aggressive interventions will yield long term results, remains to be seen.

Financial and economic analysts look at the current round of government interventions in two different ways. The first is the Central Bank's dual rate policy: Control of exchange rates and interest rates and strict controls over overseas funds, effectively imprison capital within the island. Under today's Divided China, the Taiwan region is an island economy, highly dependent upon imports and exports. The price of trade goods have always reflected fluctuations in international pricing. When domestic capital is abundant, the price of trade goods tends not to rise because it is linked to international pricing. Capital naturally flows to regional, non-trade oriented investments such as stocks and real estate, resulting in a simultaneous rise in stock prices and real estate prices. The current rise in stock prices and real estate prices is essentially a reenactment of the 1986 to 1987 bull market drama, but with a different cast of characters. As analysts have pointed out, those entering the stock market this go around and making a profit are mostly corporations subject to the Central Bank's rate policies, not individual investors late to the game. If due to poor fundamentals the bottom falls out of the market, the impact on individual investors will be serious. Caveat Emptor!

The Central Bank's dual rate policy has incurred a great deal of outside criticism. But it is after all, only a tactical, short term measure. The Central Bank can raise interest rates or exchange rates at will. It enjoys considerable latitude in this, and side effects are limited. By contrast, many of the Executive Yuan's "entitlement of the week" vote-buying schemes involve tax cuts and land planning. Any excesses will probably have irreversible and catastrophic consequences. Caution is advised.

Take tax cuts over the past two months for example. First, the Executive Yuan demanded an increase in the Land Value Incremental Tax for personal residences to 10%, and a change in requirements from "once in a lifetime" to "one residence in a lifetime." The Ministry of Finance dared not dissent, and timidly agreed. Next, the Executive Yuan approved its Foreign Workers Levy. This, along with its decree that expenses incurred by workers' spouses while returning to their native villages were tax exempt, constituted yet another bizarre and irrational tax cut measure. After which, the Executive Yuan approved a five year tax exemption for the logistics industry, on the basis that it was an emerging industry of strategic importance, resulting in billions of dollars of loss in tax revenues. The Executive Yuan's policies regarding high value tracts of land in Taipei and Kaohsiung were reactive, hasty, and ill-considered. These tracts were nominally under the supervision of the Bureau of State-Owned Property of the Ministry of Finance. In fact, the bureau colluded with the Executive Yuan to bestow political patronage.

As we can see, the government's monetary policies and fiscal policies are short term stimulus measures. Undue political influence on short term economic trends forced the US government to respond to demands for central bank and monetary policy autonomy. The public regards even such short term economic measures unacceptable. How can it accept the subordination of long term economic development, tax policy, and agricultural policy to whatever regime happens to be in power? Take rural development for example. Every plot of farm land developed is one more plot of farm land gone forever, never to be restored to its original condition. Shouldn't such matters be subjected to meticulous debate before reaching hasty verdicts? Take the use of tax incentives to encourage speculation on rural land for example. What kind of half-baked financial policy is that? Take the logistics industry's five year tax exemption for example. How does this industry merit listing as an "emerging industry" deserving of tax exempt status by the Ministry of Finance? Don't such matters need to be debated with outside parties? If the Ministry of Finance is going to agree to any and all demands for tax cuts, what do we need a Minister of Finance for?

The DPP buys votes by means of pork barrel patronage. We have learned to accept it. But when it provides political patronage by means of short term tax cuts, using the pretext of systemic reform, that we can never accept. Do the Ministry of Finance and the Economic Development Advisory Conference have no opinion about such matters? Under pressure from tax cuts in other areas, Taiwan's business taxes have always been difficult to collect, and established a new low in 2002. Total revenues were only 150 billion. Combined efforts by the public and former Ministry of Finance officials eventually increased revenue to nearly 330 billion by the end of 2005. We must remind Minister of Finance Ho Chih-chin that our actions are being recorded. By this time next year, everyone on Taiwan will be able to see the amount of business taxes and individual income taxes collected in 2007. Whether inheritance taxes are reduced, whether procedures for investigating tax evasion are changed, whether ministry level officials have relinquished their nationality to evade taxes, are all trivial matters. The future prestige of the Minister of Finance will depend solely on whether he can protect the nation's assets and manage the nation's finances. Nothing else.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.07.17
財經官員終究要面對歷史評價
中時社論

最近兩個多月，台灣的股票市場發瘋一樣狂漲，由五月四日的八千零六十六點，暴漲到七月十三日的九千四百七十一點，成交量也由每日一千一百三十九億上升到二千三百九十六億，堪稱驚人。照理說，股市是經濟的櫥窗，股市的交易狀況與指數，都應反應經濟基本面的情形。但是令人不安的是，這一波股市飆漲，背後似乎找不到什麼經濟基本面的大變動；無論是國內消費投資、國外進出口、兩岸經貿、自由貿易區談判、國際市場競爭環境，都沒有什麼劇烈的改變。一般分析師認為，這一波股市上漲，大多與台灣政府的「作多」政策有關。這樣的作多政策究竟有什麼長期後果，值得我們關注與討論。

許多財經媒體分析，這一回合的政府作多，可以分為兩個方面來看。其一是中央銀行的雙率政策：透過匯率與利率的雙重管制，並對海外基金嚴加看管，等於是把資金「鎖」在台灣島內。台灣是一海島經濟，進出口一向暢旺，貿易商品的價格也一向隨國際價格波動。當國內資金充裕時，貿易商品的價格因與國際接軌而不易上漲，於是資金自然流向如股票與房地產等地區性非貿易財，造成股價與房地產價格的雙重上漲。就本質而言，此次股價房地產雙漲，與一九八六至八七年股價狂飆有異曲同工之處，唯一的不同是主角換人。分析師指出，此次進場股市獲利者多是受央行雙率政策鎖住資金的法人，而後來追進市場的則為散戶。萬一將來股市因基本面支撐無力而回檔，其對散戶的衝擊當然也較大，股市散戶不可不慎。

中央銀行的雙率政策雖然招致外界頗多批評，但畢竟只是戰術面的短暫作為；央行要升利息、要調匯率，都是彈指之事，調整空間大，也不會留下太多後遺症。相對而言，行政院最近推出的一周一利多政策，其中不少都牽涉到租稅減免與國土規畫，一但濫行放寬，將來都是覆水難收，可以說是後患無窮，不可不慎。

以最近兩個多月以來的減稅案為例。首先，是行政院要求土增稅自用住宅優惠稅率為一○％，由一生一次改為一生一屋，財政部完全不敢表示意見，僅唯諾接受。接著，行政院又通過外籍員工租稅優惠，加上員工配偶返鄉支出不列入薪資所得，又是一項莫名其妙、不合租稅學理的減稅措施。然後，行政院又同意將物流業五年免稅列為新興重要策略性產業，造成數十億營所稅稅收的損失。在減稅之外，則是北高等地數筆精華土地的釋出政策，雖然業務由財政部國有財產局主管，但是卻完全來不及做主動、縝密的規畫，卻配合行政院利多釋放的演出。

如前所述，不論是政府的貨幣政策、支出政策，都是刺激景氣的短期性戰術操作。美國政府早年以因為此類短期戰術操作過多，以政治力影響經濟的過度波動，乃有央行獨立、貨幣政策獨立的呼籲。連輿論都對此類短期經濟戰術操作期期以為不可，那麼關係著長遠經濟發展的租稅政策與土地政策，又怎麼可以隨著政治氣氛而隨意讓步呢？以農村改建為例；農地每建設一塊就少一塊，可見未來均難以回復原狀，這種事能夠不經縝密討論就倉卒定案嗎？以租稅為手段鼓勵農村炒地皮，這是哪一種碗糕的財政管理？再以物流業五年免稅為例，它究竟「新興」在什麼地方，值得財政部將之列為免稅對象？這些事難道不需要與外界討論？如果什麼樣的減稅財政部都能答應，那麼還要財政部長幹什麼？

民進黨以「政策」做選舉利多，我們不滿意，也只能勉強接受；但若要以制度改革或租稅減免來創造短期的利多，我們就難以茍同，而財政部與經建會更是不能沒有意見。在各種租稅減免的壓力下，台灣的營所稅始終難以課徵，在二○○二年達最低，決算僅一千五百億。在全民支持、輿論壓力與歷任財政部同仁的共同努力下，營所稅在二○○五年終於達到近三千三百億。我們要提醒何志欽部長，凡走過必留下痕跡，明年此刻，全台灣人民都會看到二 ○○七年營所稅與綜所稅的決算金額。遺產稅減不減、逃稅稽查公式改不改、部長有沒有放棄外國籍，都只是雞毛蒜皮的小事；財政部長的未來聲望，就只看他在任內能不能顧好國家財產與國家財政，如此而已！

Civil War, or International Conflict?

Civil War, or International Conflict?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 12, 2007

Frank Hsieh said that a "civil war over democracy" is currently raging on Taiwan. But if we examine Frank Hsieh's battle plan, we see that when he uses the expression "civil war over democracy" he really means "conflict between nations."

Frank Hsieh, who once advocated "reconciliation and coexistence" has apparently changed his mind. Who knew that the first word to pop out of his mouth would be "alien regime?" The DPP has demonstrated that it is neither democratic nor progressive, so how can any war it wages be a "civil war over democracy?" If the DPP wants to be perceived as genuinely democratic and progressive, the least it can do is refer to the political opposition as "the loyal opposition." It may have political differences with the political opposition, but it should not think of it as the enemy. When the DPP refers to the opposition party as an "alien regime," it is saying that the opposition party originates in a "foreign nation," an "enemy nation." Hsieh's "civil war over democracy" is clearly an attempt to cast the election as a war of "Taiwanese" national defense against an enemy nation, "China."

To refer to Ma Ying-jeou as the representative of an "alien regime," is to disenfranchise approximately half of the voters on Taiwan, those who support Ma Ying-jeou. It is to negate his credentials as a loyal citizen of the Republic of China. It is to cast Ma Ying-jeou as an "enemy of the people." Ma Ying-jeou is a citizen of the Republic of China. He has sworn his allegiance to the government of the Republic of China in Taipei. But as long as Frank Hsieh says "You represent an alien regime, you are not Taiwanese, you are an enemy of the Taiwanese people," then Ma Ying-jeou is disqualified from being "Taiwanese" and from swearing allegiance to the Republic of China government in Taipei. Who is Frank Hsieh that he can sit in god-like judgment over the court of public opinion on Taiwan?

In fact, for Frank Hsieh to cast doubt on Ma Ying-jeou's loyalty by referring to him as the representative of an "alien regime" is chock full of irony. Frank Hsieh and the Democratic Progressive Party advocate "eventual Taiwan independence." From either a constitutional or realpolitik perspective, both the "Republic of Taiwan" and the "People's Republic of China" are enemies of the Republic of China. So why must anyone who champions the Republic of China be maligned as someone who "doesn't love Taiwan," while anyone who champions a "Republic of Taiwan" is lauded as someone who "loves Taiwan?" In fact, "loving Taiwan" is the the largest common denominator for everyone living on Taiwan. "Loving Taiwan independence" on the other hand, is merely the whim of a minority of DPP members and Frank Hsieh. Disagreement with Taiwan independence hardly equals "not loving Taiwan." Therefore, if one wishes to define this election as a war between the Republic of China and a would-be "Republic of Taiwan," then naturally it amounts to a "conflict between nations" and not a "civil war for democracy." But isn't this the DPP's tired old rhetoric? Isn't this Frank Hsieh's entire battle plan?

If Frank Hsieh wants to escalate the presidential election to this level, the result will be a showdown between an alleged "alien regime" and a corrupt pro Taiwan independence political authority. Frank Hsieh apparently wants to totally repudiate Ma Ying-jeou's right to be a presidential candidate, on the grounds that Ma Ying-jeou is "not Taiwanese, does not love Taiwan, and is betraying Taiwan." Will this argument really persuade Republic of China voters on Taiwan to support the pro Taiwan independence DPP? Should Republic of China voters on Taiwan support a thoroughly corrupt DPP?

During last Monday's debate between Frank Hsieh and Ma Ying-jeou, Frank Hsieh's strategy was "back to the past." Therefore he attacked an alleged "alien regime." Ma Ying-jeou's strategy was "back to the present." Therefore he argued that "a corrupt regime has no legitimacy." Frank Hsieh used selective footage of Taiwan's history to create an ersatz "History of the 228 Incident." He harped on how many people the KMT killed. Compensation paid to the heirs of 800 dead and missing reveal the true number of victims. He glossed over the fact that had the KMT not defended Taiwan against the CCP, several generations would have been engulfed by a Red Tide. He glossed over the fact that under the CCP's "one child per couple" policy there would not be 23 million "Taiwanese" alive today. He glossed over the fact that there would be no DPP on Taiwan today, and that Frank Hsieh would not have had the opportunity to publish his "alien regime theory." By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's "back to the present" thesis that day was quietly understated. Ma asked whether a "nativist political authority" must be a corrupt authority such as the DPP, whether it must engage in self-deception and deception of others, and whether it must cast half of the people on Taiwan as "non-Taiwanese" agents of an "alien regime?" He asked whether casting half of the people on Taiwan as "non-Taiwanese" would provide a corrupt DPP with legitimacy, or enable the DPP to realize its dream of a "Republic of Taiwan." As soon as Ma and Hsieh clash, a showdown will begin between an alleged "alien regime" and a corrupt Taiwan independence political authority.

Frank Hsieh says he advocates "reconciliation and coexistence." He says that if he is elected, he will display "tolerance" toward Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT, and that they will defend Taiwan together. Is this his idea of "reconciliation?" Is this his idea of "coexistence?" To cast one's opponent as "non-Taiwanese" during the election, but promise to display "tolerance" toward him, providing one succeeds in thrashing him at the polls, is not only absurd, it is contemptible.

Frank Hsieh must not casually initiate a war against an alleged "alien regime." If he does, he will be escalating a "civil war over democracy" to the level of a "conflict between nations." After all, approximately half the people on Taiwan are supporters of Ma Ying-jeou. Frank Hsieh refuses to acknowledge that Ma Ying-jeou is Taiwanese. He refuses to acknowledge that approximately half the people on Taiwan are "Taiwanese," i.e., a citizen of the Republic of China living in the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China. Therefore when Frank Hsieh portrays Ma Ying-jeou as an "enemy of the Taiwanese people," he has simultaneously turned himself into an "enemy of the Taiwanese people."

Reconciliation and coexistence means that every citizen of the Republic of China must be allowed to enjoy all the rights and privileges of a citizen of the Republic of China, including voting and running for office.

是「民主內戰」，還是「敵國交戰」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.12 04:10 am

謝長廷說，台灣正在進行一場「民主內戰」。然而，檢視謝長廷漸次攤開的選戰全圖，這豈是「民主內戰」，根本就是一場「敵國交戰」。

原以為主張「和解共生」的謝長廷別有新意，豈料一開口又是「外來政權」。既不民主，也不進步。若謂是「民主內戰」，至少應當相互承認對方是「忠誠的反對黨」；即使政見歧異，畢竟不能相互以「敵國」視之。然而，指對方為「外來政權」，就是說對方是「外國」，是「敵國」；這豈是「民主內戰」，根本就是要將大選打成一場「敵國交戰」。

指馬英九是「外來政權」，就是根本否定受到約半數國人支持的馬英九有作為台灣人的資格，亦是根本否定他有效忠台灣的資格，不啻即是指馬英九為台灣公敵；縱使馬英九自我認同為台灣人，且真正效忠台灣，但只要謝長廷說，你是「外來政權」，你不是「台灣人」，你是「台灣公敵」，馬英九就沒有資格作台灣人，就沒有資格效忠台灣。謝長廷是何許人也，他難道是坐在台灣政治法庭中的上帝？

謝長廷以「外來政權」質疑馬英九的政治忠貞，其實充滿弔詭。謝長廷與民進黨是主張「終極台獨」的，就憲政現實而論，「台灣共和國」和「中華人民共和國」，都是「中華民國」的「敵國」；則為何主張「中華民國」者不是愛台灣，而只有主張「台灣共和國」者才是愛台灣？其實，愛台灣是台灣人的最大公約數，主張台獨則是民進黨及謝長廷等一部分人的見解。不同意台獨，不等於不愛台灣！因而，倘若將這場選戰定位為「中華民國」與「台灣共和國」之間的戰爭，自然是一場「敵國交戰」，而非「民主內戰」。這難道不是民進黨過去一貫的選戰伎倆？又難道不正是謝長廷此次的選戰全圖？

謝長廷若將選戰提升到此一高度，恐將演成「外來政權」與「貪腐台獨政權」之間的戰爭。謝長廷似乎想從根本處即完全否定馬英九的參選資格（因為馬英九不是台灣人，不愛台灣，背叛台灣）；但是，難道如此就能誘騙台灣人去支持主張台獨的民進黨嗎？或難道如此台灣人就應支持貪腐無狀至如此地步的民進黨嗎？

看謝長廷與馬英九周一的辯論，謝長廷的戰略是「回到從前」，所以猛攻「外來政權」；馬英九的戰略則是「回歸現在」，所以他說「貪腐政府沒有正當性」。謝長廷將一部台灣史剪接成一部「泛二二八史」；例如，他又提國民黨殺了多少人（二二八死亡失蹤受補償者八百餘人），卻不說若不是國民黨「反共保台」，台灣幾代數千萬人口早已陷於中共的紅潮赤焰之中（因一胎化，台灣今日不會有二千三百萬人），台灣亦不會有民進黨，而謝長廷今日也絕無發表「外來政權論」的機會。另一方面，馬英九當日「回歸現在」的措辭比較含蓄，但是，所謂「本土政權」就應當是民進黨這種貪腐無狀的政權嗎？所謂「本土政權」，就應當是民進黨這種操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙局，並暴虐地將約半數「台灣人」打成「非台灣人」的政權嗎？把約一半「台灣人」打成「非台灣人」就能使民進黨的貪腐正當化嗎？將約一半的「台灣人」打成支持「外來政權」的「非台灣人」，就能實現台灣共和國嗎？馬謝交鋒，一場「貪腐台獨政權」與「外來政權」的大戰就此登場。

謝長廷主張和解共生。他說，只要他選贏了，他就會「包容」馬英九及國民黨，一起來保衛台灣。這算什麼「和解」？這又算什麼「共生」？這種在選舉時將他人打成「非台灣人」，選贏才「包容」他人為「台灣人」的惡念，非但荒謬，亦復卑鄙。

謝長廷勿再輕易挑起「外來政權」的戰火。這是將「民主內戰」，升高至「敵國交戰」。畢竟馬英九亦有約半數國人的支持者，謝長廷不承認馬英九為台灣人，即是不承認約半數國人是台灣人。如此，當謝長廷欲將馬英九塑造成「台灣公敵」的同時，謝長廷自己亦儼然已成「台灣公敵」。

和解共生：每一個台灣人都有作台灣人的權利！

Chen is cutting Throats, Ma is plugging Holes

Chen is cutting Throats, Ma is plugging Holes
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 11, 2007

Comment: What can I say? The following United Daily News editorial is a breath of fresh air. It is flat out the best editorial I have read since the debut of Dateline Taipei. It truly nails Ma Ying-jeou's strategic myopia. If Ma Ying-jeou is too obstinate to heed repeated warnings from Deep Blue supporters and from the Pan Blue media, he will lose in 2008. His loss is one thing. A loss for Pan Blue political power on the island is another thing altogether.

Chen is cutting Throats, Ma is plugging Holes
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 11, 2007

Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou have adopted two very different election strategies. Chen Shui-bian is using Taiwan independence to consolidate his core constituency, while he manipulates real estate and stock prices and offers "entitlement of the week" bribes to swing voters. Ma Ying-jeou is attempting to win over swing voters by demonstrating "reverence for Lee Teng-hiu" and by jumping on the "join the UN under the name of Taiwan" bandwagon, even though these gambits cost him the support of his core constituency. The candidates' contrasting strategies can be divided into two parts.

First, the core constituency: Both Blue and Green camps have core constituencies. Relying exclusively upon one's core constituency will not guarantee election victory. But a candidate's core constituency is the engine, the driving force behind his election campaign. A political leader must maintain its fighting spirit and enthusiasm. Only then can his campaign gather momentum and win broader support. As things stand, the morale of the Green camp's core constituency is unquestionably higher, while the morale of the Blue camp's core constituency is relatively depressed.

Second, swing voters: Chen Shui-bian has been busy manipulating real estate and stock prices, and buying votes through political patronage, creating a bubble economy in which the economic fundamentals have not improved, but in which media-generated excitement may influence voter behavior. Therefore when Chen Shui-bian attempts to win over swing voters, he need not to stress ideology, he need only present the illusion of prosperity. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou may hope to pick up a handful of undecided votes by showcasing his "reverence for Lee Teng-hiu" and by jumping on the "join the UN under the name of Taiwan" bandwagon, but he will still have to overcome Chen Shui-bian's "entitlement of the week" offensive.

Chen Shui-bian's election strategy, could be called "Taiwan Independence with a gilt edge." Measures such as "joining the UN under the name of Taiwan" provide the "Taiwan independence" main body. Presenting the illusion of prosperity and vote-buying by means of political patronage add a "gilt edge." Taiwan independence consolidates his core constituency. The gilt edge attracts swing voters. The intriguing aspect about Chen's strategy is that the Taiwan independence main body rallies the fundamentalist masses, allowing lower socio-economic level voters to feel as if their status has been elevated. These are the ones referred to in the aphorism, "Voting for A-Bian, even though their bellies are bian (flat)." Manipulating real estate and stock prices, and buying votes through political patronage, attracts better off swing voters. The net result is his Taiwan independence plank helps Pan Green fundamentalists overlook the fact that their bellies are flat from hunger. Whereas projecting the illusion of prosperity enables middle-class swing voters to ignore the issue of Taiwan independence. Kaohsiung doesn't have enough water, yet the DPP wants to build a steel mill. Kaohsiung's port facilities are steadily declining, yet the DPP wants to to build a pop music center. The ruling DPP regime has imposed a Closed Door Policy on the island, yet it wants to rename the Hua Guang District (Light of China District) the "Financial District." Obviously the gilt edge is vanishingly thin. By next year the copper base beneath the gold plating will begin to show. Nevertheless, this sort of "Taiwan independence with a gilt edge," will to catch the voters' eye and tug at the voters' heartstrings come election time.

Ma Ying-jeou by contrast, has no policy tools. All he can do is watch idly as Chen Shui-bian uses government resources to buy votes via political patronage. Ma Ying-jeou's only cards are his campaign platform and his individual style. Unfortunately Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform and individual style inspire now only apathy in marginal supporters, and alienation in core supporters.

Some people may dismiss the reaction of Deep Blue supporters to Ma Ying-jeou's handling of the "reverence for Lee Teng-hiu" issue and the "joining the UN under the name of Taiwan" issue as fundamentalist hysteria. The truth is Deep Blue supporters understand that issues such as "reverence for Lee Teng-hui" and "joining the UN under the name of Taiwan" require responses. But they consider joining the Pan Green parade, marching behind Pan Green banners, and shouting Pan Green slogans, ill-considered, to put it mildly. Most people have no preconceptions about the newly completed cable car ride at Maokong. But nobody can accept the fact that no one thought to install air conditioning. Ma's mishandling of the Red Shirt Army protests and the Organic Law for the Central Election Committee battle are further examples. It is not that such challenges from the Green camp should be ignored. It is that Ma's methods of handling such challenges cast doubt on his ideological bottom line. As a result, Ma Ying-jeou has created a political dilemma for himself, in which rescuing his perimeter means sacrificing his core. He may not have lost his core constituency's political support on election day. But the erosion of his core constituency's enthusiasm and fighting spirit is a fact obvious to all. As we have seen, a candidate's core constituency is the engine at the heart of his political campaign. If the engine loses power, then the campaign loses momentum and loses any chance of attracting broader support. Besides, uncommitted voters have already been "taken care of" by Chen Shui-bian's patronage schemes. As matters stand, Ma Ying-jeou is struggling to pump air into a leaky basketball, a thankless task. He must offer the electorate a principled and consistent political platform that reaffirms his core values and rehabilitates his personal image.

The legislative election is coming up in six months. The presidential election is coming up in eight months. Both elections will take place within the framework of a "Ma Ying-jeou vs. Chen Shui-bian" showdown. As we can see, one side has access to abundant public funds with which it can buy votes by means of political patronage. The other side, meanwhile, can only struggle vainly to pump air into a leaky basketball.

陳水扁的割喉戰與馬英九的補洞術
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.11 03:53 am

陳水扁和馬英九的選戰策略大相逕庭。陳水扁用台獨來鞏固核心群眾的熱情，再用炒樓炒股及「一周一利多」等手段來爭取周邊的游離選票；馬英九則是以「尊李」或「入聯」來爭取周邊的游離選票，卻在核心群眾之間逐漸喪失了熱情與動能。這可分兩部分來說：

一、核心群眾：藍綠皆有核心群眾，唯僅憑核心群眾，藍綠皆未必能贏。但是，核心群眾畢竟是選舉的引擎，領導人必須使其維持高昂的鬥志與充沛的熱情，才能在選舉中產生帶動的作用與輻射的效應。就現今情勢看，無疑是綠色核心群眾的熱情較高，藍色核心群眾相對消沉。

二、 周邊游離選票：陳水扁如今用盡炒股、炒樓、炒匯及政策賄選的手法，來吹脹經濟泡沫；使得台灣在「基本面」毫無改善的情況下，竟然只靠「消息面」就炒出一股 聲勢懾人的選舉行情。因而，陳水扁在爭取周邊游離票時，即不必強調意識形態，只須炒作蒸蒸騰騰的繁榮幻象即可。相對而言，馬英九若仍想在「尊李」、「入 聯」的泥淖中撿拾幾張游離票，只怕難敵陳水扁「一周一利多」的攻勢。

陳水扁的選戰策略，可以稱作「鑲著金邊的台獨」。「以台灣名義加入聯 合國」等是「台獨」，炒作繁榮幻象及政策賄選則是「金邊」。「台獨」可以鞏固核心群眾，「金邊」則用以吸引游離票。最奇妙處在於：台獨鑲金邊，「台獨」主 要是用來召喚基層民眾，使社經地位較低者自覺人格昇華，肚子扁扁也選阿扁；另者炒樓炒股的實利，則是用來吸引較具社經條件的游離票。亦即，把「台獨」送給 綠營基層民眾，使他們忘了肚子扁扁；把鈔票送給炒樓炒股的資產階級，使他們忘了台獨。何況，連水都沒有，卻要興建大鋼廠；高雄港每下愈況，卻欲在港區興建 流行音樂中心；實行鎖國政策，卻宣稱要將「華光社區」改建為「金融中心」。可見，這些「一周一利多」的「金邊」，只是淺淺的一層到了明年大選後就會露出銅 胎的「鍍金」而已，甚至只是一層金色的泡沫。但是，這種「鍍金的台獨」、「金色泡沫的台獨」，在選舉中仍是光燦奪目，動人心弦。

回頭看馬英九，由於他完全沒有政策工具，只好眼看著陳水扁動用政府資源去打製「金邊」；而馬英九唯一的競選憑藉，只剩下論述與風格的競賽而已。但就論述與風格而言，馬英九如今的情勢似乎是：周邊游離、核心鬆動。

例 如，有人認為，馬英九在「尊李」、「入聯」等議題上不合深藍的口味，因此使支持者失望；實情卻可能是，藍色支持者當然亦知「尊李」、「入聯」等議題必須回 應，卻認為「拿香隨拜」的手法太過拙劣；正如大多數人對架設貓空纜車沒有成見，但無人能想像貓空纜車竟然未考慮到空調設備。類此事例甚多，處理紅衫軍，及 處理中選會組織法皆是如此；不是不應處理，而是處理的手法及境界令人質疑。於是，馬英九就陷入一種「救周邊，失核心」的困境；也許他尚未失去核心群眾的支 持，但核心群眾的熱情與鬥志日趨銷蝕，卻是有目共睹的事實。如前所述，核心群眾是選舉引擎，引擎失能，就不易產生帶動的作用及輻射的效應。何況，在游離選 票地帶，又被陳水扁的「金色泡沫」所籠罩。馬英九目前彷彿是對著一個有破孔的籃球打氣，自是吃力不討好；他必須設法建構一套可以自給自足的核心論述及風格 形象。

六個月後的立委選舉及八個月後的總統大選，皆無法跳脫「馬英九VS.陳水扁」的架構。當下所見，一方是用豐沛公帑打造的「鑲金的台獨」所發動的割喉戰，另一方則正在對始終不能「自給自足」的破孔籃球施行補洞術！

Who can offer Hope for the Future

Who can offer Hope for the Future
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 9, 2007

Frank Hsieh's announcement of his running mate must await the result of opinion polls. But this is probably only a way to allow everyone to save face. Su Tseng-chang has officially announced that he will not accept the vice presidential slot. Barring the unexpected, the Democratic Progressive Party will be endorsing a Hsieh/Yeh ticket. In other words, the ruling and opposition party tickets for the 2008 presidential race are pretty much set. Preliminary opinion polls suggest that a large part of the public is adopting a wait and see attitude.

The choice of running mates has long been a problem. The key is whether the candidate can affect the outcome of the election. The choice of presidential and vice presidential candidates offers all sorts of promises. It can create political momentum that leads to certain victory. In 2000, the Chen/Lu ticket offered the promise of gender equality. In 2004, the Lien/Soong ticket offered the promise of Pan Blue solidarity. Looking forward to 2008, the Blue vs. Green struggle is a whole new ball game. Lee, Chen, Lien, and Soong have determined Taiwan's political situation for the past six or seven years. In 2008 the will no longer be able to do so. What promises do a Hsieh/Yeh ticket or a Ma/Siew ticket offer? That is the question.

The Ma/Siew ticket was formed first. This ticket has provoked debate over the adoption of "ben tu" nativism and a potential Deep Blue backlash. But expert observers perceive these as secondary issues, as efforts at preemption. Pandering to nativism and ethnic identity has never been the Blue camp's strong suit. The Blue camp is not about to linger on a battlefield that is the Green camp's natural stomping ground. The promise that the Ma/Siew ticket hopes to offer is "good governance." This ticket came as a surprise, not entirely because of Siew's ideological path and political stance. Ma and Siew have different provincial backgrounds, but they duplicate each other's strengths more than they complement them. Both are technocrats and political appointees. Siew briefly held the post of party official and lawmaker. But his image as a financial and economic expert overshadows all else. This may well be the image this ticket aims to achieve.

If we look only at election considerations, this ticket is unpromising. Neither Ma nor Siew are charismatic speakers. Neither has the ability to inspire crowds during political rallies. On the other hand, such bland personalities also make it difficult for the opposition to create polarization. The promise of a Ma/Siew ticket is the return of the KMT responsible for Taiwan's economic miracle during the 70s and 80s, rather than the KMT burdened by allegations about illicit party assets and black gold or internecine power struggles. The voters most susceptible to such appeals are of course, older voters.

In contrast to the Ma/Siew ticket, the promise of a Hsieh/Yeh ticket is completely different. Hsieh and Yeh share the same ideology. Disagreements are unlikely to arise between them as they carry the Green banner into battle. Their differing backgrounds, meanwhile, complement each other. They promise the same gender equality as the Chen/Lu ticket. They also promise Hoklo/Hakka ethnic harmony. These are two promises that Su Tseng-chang could not offer as a running mate. Most importantly, a Hsieh/Yeh ticket offers the promise of a DPP that everyone is familiar with, the one that rebelled against KMT authority during the 80s and 90s, the one that promised democracy and reform, the one that continually met with political persecution, instead of a DPP burdened by an embarrassing record of incompetence and that descended swiftly into corruption after assuming power. Hsieh and Yeh each administered the southern Taiwan city of Kaohsiung, one after the other, defending this essential base for the DPP. Frank Hsieh has maintained relations that are neither too friendly nor too hostile toward Chen Shui-bian. He chose to cooperate with Yeh Chu-lan. He removed Chen Shui-bian's finger from the scales of power. He effectively drew a line between himself and Chen. The same is true of the promise for the Ma/Siew ticket for older generation voters.

Now we can look back and see why neither Ma nor Hsieh were eager to pick the most obvious running mates. The reason is simple. A Ma/Wang ticket or a Hsieh/Su ticket may have been a dream team in the eyes of some supporters. But those four would have fought over the presidential slot. Whoever settled for the vice presidential slot would have felt that he had knuckled under. Such a shotgun wedding between factions rather than candidates would not engender harmony. It would provoke fighting over spoils and struggles over power. The result would not be "one plus one equals more than two.' It would be "one minus one equals zero." Teaming Vincent Siew with Ma Ying-jeou, or Yeh Chu-lan Yu with Frank Hsieh, on the other hand, would not yield such negative results.

The DPP vice presidential running mate controversy may continue for quite some time, but the final result is unlikely to be a surprise. The problem has dragged on too long. What truly matters is whether the final choice of running mate can offer real hope for the future.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.07.09
誰能締造有願景的未來最重要
中時社論

儘管謝長廷表態還要等民調出爐才決定副手人選，但這應只是讓各方都有台階下的動作，在蘇貞昌日前正式宣布退出副手角逐之後，如果不出其他意外，民進黨應該就是「謝葉配」了。換言之，二○○八朝野陣營的對戰組合可以說大致已底定了，從民調初步的反映即可看出目前有不少比例的民眾仍選擇觀望，對這個兩組對戰組合是可展開初步的觀察了。

對朝野陣營而言，副手問題之所以會困擾那麼許久，關鍵即在於人選誰屬確實能牽動選局，特別是正副人選所塑造出的想像空間，可以營造一定的勝選氣勢，例如二 ○○○年的陳呂配即成功塑造了兩性共治的想像空間，而二○○四的連宋配即是塑造了泛藍大團結的想像空間。前瞻二○○八，對藍綠陣營而言某種程度上都是暫時歸零的一年，主導台灣政局六、七年之久的李扁連宋四人，某種程度上都不能再左右選局，因而謝葉配與馬蕭配究竟能營造怎樣的想像空間？是個饒富趣味的課題。

先看較早成局的馬蕭配，儘管這組人選最近一直繞著什麼本土論述、深藍反彈等話題繞，但明眼人都看得出，這些動作最多只是補強，甚至是在打預防針。本土亦或認同議題本來就不是藍營的強項，他們也不可能真的滯留在這個綠營擅長的戰場上等著挨打。馬蕭配真正所想要塑造的想像空間，應該就是「治理能力」！這組配對會在第一時間讓人感到意外，並不全是蕭的路線與立場，而是馬蕭兩人除了族群背景外，彼此的重疊性其實遠大於互補性，特別是他們兩人都是技術官僚與行政首長出身，蕭雖短暫擔任過黨職與立委，但財經首長的形象卻蓋過其他，而這或許就是這個組合最想要達成的效果。

純就選戰的考量而言，這個組合可以讓人期待地方其實並不多，馬蕭兩人口才其實都不佳，也都不是在造勢台上善於煽起群眾熱情的人物，但這種特質也同樣很難讓對手煽起對立的情緒。換言之，馬蕭所可能喚起的想像空間，或許是在一九七○﹣八○年代締造過經濟奇蹟的國民黨，而不是這幾年被黨產、黑金、內鬥所纏身的國民黨。當然對這種召喚能產生感覺的選民，很大一部分還是比較老世代的選民。

相較於馬蕭配，謝葉配所能召喚起的想像空間則完全不同。謝葉兩人在路線上沒有分歧，代表正綠旗出征也不會有爭議，而他們在背景上也確實能夠達到互補的效果，包括能夠延續陳呂配的「兩性共治」理念，還加上了閩客合作的「族群共榮」訴求，這兩點或許都是蘇貞昌所不及的。當然最重要的是，謝葉配所召喚起的想像空間，還是那個大家所最熟悉的民進黨，那個在一九八○﹣九○年代反抗國民黨權威、有民主與改革的論述能力、卻又不斷橫遭打壓與磨難的民進黨，而不是在執政後陷入政績難堪、沉淪貪腐的民進黨。謝葉兩人先後經營南台灣的高雄市，為民進黨守住了這個最關鍵的基地，謝長廷又一直與陳水揙維持著若即若離的關係，他選擇與葉菊蘭組合，不僅破了陳水扁操縱平衡槓桿的棋局，也有效的與扁達成若干區隔。當然，與馬蕭配一樣，能夠燃起這種想像空間的，也還是比較老世代的選民吧！

當然，現在也可以重新回頭看看，為何馬謝兩人都不樂意他們早先最被矚目的組合。理由其實也不複雜，馬王配或者謝蘇配，或許在部分支持者眼中是勝選的夢幻組合，但問題是他們四人都是爭取「一哥」的人選，擔任副手可能都自認是「屈就」。這種心理動機將使得這種強行送做堆的組合，在「派系結盟」的意義上遠大於「人選搭配」，它所產生的化學變化很可能不會是肝膽相照，而是權力分贓甚至是權力衝突，屆時沒有產生一加一大於二的效果事小，若是產生相互抵消的效應可能更糟。而蕭萬長之於馬英九，或是葉菊蘭之於謝長廷，都是不可能產生這種疑慮的。

民進黨的副手爭議可能還會吵一陣子，但最後結論應不致再讓人意外，而這個問題也確實沒必要拖太久。畢竟接下來怎麼讓已確定的人選搭配，創造出富前瞻性的想像空間，恐怕才該是重點。

High School Students and the Future of the Nation

High School Students and the Future of the Nation
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 5, 2007

Comment: The following editorial from the United Daily News is pretty damned feeble. Reading it you would hardly realize how strong the case it makes actually is. In short, less than inspiring, but at least it's not on the wrong side of the issue.

High School Students and the Future of the Nation
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 5, 2007

Republic of Taiwan/Republic of China/People's Republic of China

The latest edition of the high school textbook "The Citizen and Society," includes additional material relating to practical politics. It also includes considerable commentary on cross-Straits issues. For example, the textbook directs high school students to discuss the so-called "three options for the nation's future": unification, Taiwan independence, and maintaining the status quo.

Such a curriculum is worth anticipating. After all, discussing these three options in the classroom, where it is easier to keep a cool head and engage in rational thought, should be easier than debating them during election season. But turning a political topic such as the "three options" into an educational topic will be no easy matter. The first problem is the "reunification/Taiwan independence/maintaining the status quo" formulation.

From a realpolitik perspective, the terms "reunification/Taiwan independence/maintaining the status quo" have never been properly defined. Because the definition of these three options remain unclear, controversies arising from them remain difficult to resolve. Before introducing such a political topic into the classroom, one must first define one's terms.

Taiwan independence is a term whose definition is extremely unclear. For example, the Democratic Progressive Party's Taiwan Independence Constitution calls for "the founding of a Republic of Taiwan." The Taiwan Independence Constitution requires the "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution." But the Democratic Progressive Party's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation, whose current name is the Republic of China." This is also considered a form of Taiwan independence, one that doesn't require the "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution." Furthermore, Taiwan independence rhetoric usually avoids taboo terms such as "Taiwan independence." Instead it resorts to code words such as the "primacy of Taiwan," "nativization," "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution," "deSinicization," "purging of Chiang Kai-shek influences," and the "normalization of Taiwan."

If one asks a high school student, "Do you support Taiwan independence?" what is one actually asking him? Is one asking him whether he advocates "the primacy of Taiwan?" Is one asking him whether he feels that "Taiwan is already independent, and its current name is the Republic of China?" Or is one asking him if he demands the "overthrow of the Republic of China and the founding of a Republic of Taiwan?" In short, unless "Taiwan independence" is accurately defined, how can it become an educational topic? How can "options for the nation's future" become an academic subject?

What does "reunification" mean? Even Frank Hsieh has advocated a "constitutionally defined One China," only to be pigeonholed as a "reunificationist." But if "reunification" means "advocating Taiwan's annexation by the People's Republic of China," then how many people on Taiwan hold this position? Does advocating cross-Straits exchange make one a "reunificationist?" Ten years ago, Taiwan businessmen on the mainland were denounced as "traitors to Taiwan." Today they have been rehabilitated, and are referred to as "Taiwan's economic advance guard." Obviously the label "reunificationist" has no fixed definition.

At its core, "maintaining the status quo" means to "maintain the Republic of China." But does that refer to the Republic of China as defined by the constitution? Or does it refer to the Republic of China in "One China, Two Interpretations?" Does it refer to the Democratic Progressive Party's definition of the Republic of China, in its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?" Everyone has his own view. No one is able to agree. Is the Republic of China an "alien regime?" Is the Republic of China merely a shell company for creeping independence? Until these terms have been defined, "maintaining the status quo" may also be hard to define.

High school textbooks will include "maintaining the status quo" as an option. This reflects reality, transcends the "reunification vs. independence dichotomy," and is worth affirming. Otherwise one will see only the "Republic of Taiwan" and the "People's Republic of China" as options for the nation's future, and no mention of the Republic of China.

If one wishes to teach the "three options for the nation's future" in the high school classroom, one should first attempt to define "reunification/Taiwan independence/maintaining the status quo." Students should be advised that this is a subject about which everyone has different views, and opinions are sharply divided. This is the best way to introduce such a curriculum to the students. If one can make students understand the distinction between populist demagoguery and scholarly debate, when students are confronted by such a curriculum, they will find it far easier to keep a cool head and engage in rational thought.

The "three options for the nation's future" should be more precisely defined, not merely in the high school classroom, but also in the real world. Some have suggested that "reunification vs. independence is a phony issue," that it is a remote topic that can only be settled decades from now. But if Taiwan independence advocates the overthrow of the Republic of China and the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan, then how much room is there to demagogue the issue of Taiwan independence? By the same token, if reunification is defined as advocating the annexation of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, then how many reunificationists are there on Taiwan?

Actually, if one wants high school textbooks to transcend the poorly defined options of "unification/independence/maintaining the status quo," one might as well rename these three "three options for the nation's future."

Taiwan's "three options for the nation's future" should not be the poorly defined choices "reunification/independence/maintaining the status quo." They should be: "annexation by the People's Republic of China/establishing a Republic of Taiwan/preserving the Republic of China"

Only when the issue is defined this way, will high school students and the public understand.

Original Chinese below:

如何與高中生談國家前途三選項？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.05 03:45 am

台灣共和國／中華民國／中華人民共和國

新版高中《公民與社會》課本，添增了許多探討現實政治議題的教材，對兩岸關係亦有大篇幅的論述。例如，課本引導高中學生討論所謂「國家前途三選項」：統一、台灣獨立，與維持現狀。

這樣的課程設計值得期待。畢竟，在課堂上討論「三個選項」，自比在選舉場域議論，較能維持理性的思維與平衡的情緒。然而，欲將「三個選項」這類的政治議題轉成教育題材，恐非易事。首先，課本勢須對「統一／台獨／維持現狀」作出定義，正是第一個難題。

在現實政治中，「統一／台獨／維持現狀」始終沒有精確的定義；且正因「三個選項」的定義不明，所以相關爭議亦難有定論。如今欲將此一政治議題搬進教室，首應解決者亦是定義的問題。

「台獨」正是定義最混淆不清的名詞。例如，民進黨台獨黨綱中所標舉的「建立台灣共和國」，自是「台獨」，因此必須「正名制憲」；但民進黨「台灣前途決議文」中所指「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國」，亦是「台獨」的表述方式，卻未必要「正名制憲」。何況，台獨論述通常亦諱用「台獨」一詞，而往往以「台灣主體性」、「本土化」、「正名制憲」、「去中國化」、「去蔣化」、「國家正常化」為變形及分身。

那麼，若要問高中生：「你是否支持台獨？」究竟是在問學生什麼呢？是在問他是否支持「台灣主體性」嗎？是在問他是否支持「台灣已經獨立，名字叫做中華民國」嗎？或者，是在問他是否支持「推翻中華民國，另建台灣共和國」？總之，「台獨」若無準確之定義，如何能成為教育上的概念，更如何能成為學術或知識上的「國家前途選項」？

再者，「統一」究何所指？連謝長廷亦主張「憲法一中」，被歸類為「統派」。但若「統一」是指「主張台灣應被中華人民共和國併吞」，則台灣究竟有幾人持此主張？再者，主張兩岸交流是否即為「統派」？例如，十年前「台商」被視作統派「台奸」，今日卻儼然已轉型成「台灣經濟尖兵」，可見「統派」的標籤其實亦無定義可言。

「維持現狀」的核心概念即是「維持中華民國」。但究竟是指「憲法一中」的「中華民國」，或是「一中各表」的「中華民國」，還是民進黨「台灣前途決議文」中的「中華民國」？各說各話，莫衷一是。再如，「中華民國」是「外來政權」？或「中華民國」可「借殼上市」？在這類議論未澄清以前，「維持現狀」亦難有「定義」。

不過，可附一筆的是，高中課本將「維持現狀」列為「選項」，切合實際，亦超越了「統獨二分法」，值得肯定。否則，在「國家前途選項」中，豈不是僅有「台灣共和國」與「中華人民共和國」，卻不見「中華民國」？

綜上所論，若要在高中課堂講授「國家前途三選項」，首應嘗試對「統一／台獨／維持現狀」作出定義。然而，在進入相關課程之初，倘能首先將迄今這種「言人人殊，眾說紛紜」的「無定義狀態」告知學生，也許反而是將學生帶入門的最佳啟迪方法。若能使學生理解這些名詞在「知識探討」與「民粹炒作」上的落差，學生在面對此類課程時，自然較易維持理性的思維與平衡的情緒。

「國家前途三選項」，非但在高中課堂上應探究其定義問題，在現實政治中尤應設法建立較準確的定義。近來出現「統獨是否皆為假議題」的議論，即是數十年來探討統獨定義後的進階思維。試問：「台獨」若回到核心赤裸的樣貌，主張「推翻中華民國，建立台灣共和國」，則「台獨」這個「選項」尚有多少炒作的空間？同樣的，倘若將「統一」定位在「主張台灣應被中華人民共和國併吞」，則台灣哪裡還有「統派」？

其實，高中課本若欲跳脫「統一／獨立／維持現狀」定義不明的蔽障，或許不妨乾脆從根本處重新為「國家前途三選項」命名：

台灣的「國家前途三選項」，其實不應是定義不明的「統一／獨立／維持現狀」，而應是：「被中華人民共和國併吞／另建台灣共和國／維持中華民國」！

如此，高中生看得懂，國人也看得懂！

Ma Ying-jeou's Deference toward Lee Teng-hui

Ma Ying-jeou's Deference toward Lee Teng-hui
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 4, 2007


Pan Green political cartoon: Ma Ying-jeou: "I am a New Taiwanese. I am taking President Lee Teng-hui's path of democratic reform."

Comment: The following China Times editorial is the worst I have read yet. That's saying a lot. Every point it makes is dead wrong.

By all means read it, but only as an example of what not to do. To arrive at the truth, return the inverted logic of this editorial to its normal, upright position.

In case you're wondering, this kind strategic surrender for tactical gain, is why the current crop of Pan Blue "leaders" are losing ground to the Pan Greens, despite a global strategic scenario squarely in the Pan Blue camp's favor.

In late 2004 and 2005, the Pan Blue camp experienced a "Reversal of Fortune," due in part to Lien Chan's farsighted "Journey of Peace" to Beijing.

Lien Chan's hard-won gains are now being frittered away by an irresolute and incompetent Ma Ying-jeou, who has been pandering to Pan Green "ben tu" nativism and Taiwan independence Political Correctness, lending them an undeserved air of legitimacy, and giving the DPP an unearned political boost.

Ma Ying-jeou's Deference toward Lee Teng-hui
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 4, 2007

If during the Lien Chan era, the Kuomintang (KMT) healed the divisions left by the departure of the New Party and James Soong, then during the current Ma Ying-jeou era, the KMT is making an effort to heal the divisions left by the departure of Lee Teng-hui. Lien Chan used the Lien/Soong ticket to emerge from Lee Teng-hui's shadow. Ma Ying-jeou is using continual "Deference to Lee" to break out of Lien Chan's framework. This is a process of healing divisions that highlights the bitter struggle of the KMT to redefine its limits during its years out of office.

The KMT as currently configured is a heterogeneous hodgepodge. This heterogeneity may be due to historical factors. It may have its origins in unique political arrangements, perhaps even in "an alliance of thieves." No matter what the reason might be, it has allowed one group of people within the KMT to defend the faith, while another group of people casts itself as a nativist faction. When Lee Teng-hui was in charge, this heterogeneity led to open conflict, and evolved into factional strife. It eventually led to the rapid departure of the New Party and James Soong, one after the other. It also led indirectly to the defeat of the Lien/Hsiao ticket in 2000 and to Lee Teng-hui's departure soon after. The KMT's heterogeneity has allowed it remain mired in ethnic group/factional/ideological confrontation and conflict. Any power struggles among high ranking party officials, are blown up by these contradictions and divisions. This has been the main theme of the KMT's internal struggles over the past decade.

Ma Ying-jeou is different from past KMT elites in that he has been attempting to transform the KMT's heterogeneity into an asset instead of a liability. The number of people within the KMT who can fufill this role are few and far between. At a time when the fires of factional strife rage within the KMT, Ma Ying-jeou has nearly always remained outside the circle of fire, unaffected. He has not sworn eternal hostility toward the other Princes and elites, especially those close to Lee Teng-hui. Compared to Lien/Soong, who were quick to differentiate themselves, he has been seeking mutual respect and dialog all the way. This may not lead to Lee Teng-hui publicly endorsing Ma Ying-jeou, but at least it may dilute the criticisms directed against him.

Is not difficult to see Ma Ying-jeou's strategy. His background and image allow him to totally ignore his Pan Blue constituency. He is clearly aware of his shortcomings. Therefore year after year he commemorates 228. He actively adopts nativist rhetoric. He revises the KMT party constitution to eliminate the reunification clause and to underscore "Taiwan." He chooses Vincent Siew as his running mate. On controversial topics he adopts an inclusivist position. And finally, he adopts a posture of "Deference towards Lee Teng-hui." How useful these concessions are remains to be seen. But at least many of the KMT's contradictions have already obtained relief. When even Ma Ying-jeou himself is cultivating a "nativist" image, then the Wang Jyn-ping camp's provincial origin or national identity rhetoric will lose its impact. Just as the Lien Chan camp will be unable to play on the issue of rank and seniority.

The year 2008 may offer an entirely new political scenario, or it may replicate 2004. If the 2004 election represented a Blue vs. Green scenario, then one of the litmus tests for 2008 will be who can succeed in transcending this basic pattern of opposition. who can seek understanding and dialogue with the opposite camp's voters. Consolidating one's core support is easy. But the price paid is high. The result is Blue vs. Green opposition. The result is there are no winners. If Frank Hsieh and Ma Ying-jeou replicate 2004, then what the future holds can already be seen.

In today's political atmosphere, if one wishes to transcend Blue vs. Green opposition, and attempt to seek reconciliation and dialogue, one needs greater courage. Such efforts may not lead to the development of a new political force, but they may diminish support for the two existing camps. Both Frank Hsieh and Ma Ying-jeou see this. Neither of them wants to replicate 2004. Both of them want reconciliation and dialogue. But both of them face constraints from within their own parties. Frank Hsieh has not yet recovered from his party primary birth pains. The Chen administration, the DPP legislative committee, and the DPP party hierarchy, each intend to be the one determining election strategy. When Hsieh can begin to wage his own campaign remains to be seen. Ma Ying-jeou's faces a backlash from Deep Blue forces. This backlash has already appeared. How powerful this backlash will be remains to be seen. What we can see is that between Hsieh and Ma, whoever is able to shrug off constraints from within his own party, will be the one who can transcend Blue vs. Green opposition in the future.

Original Chinese below:

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.07.04
從馬英九的「尊李」談起
中時社論

如 果說，連戰時代的國民黨重新彌合了當年新黨與宋楚瑜出走的裂痕，那麼如今馬英九時代的國民黨，則是在致力彌合當年李登輝出走的陣痛。弔詭的是，連戰可說是 藉著「連宋合」完全走出李登輝的陰影，而馬英九則是藉著持續的「尊李」，逐漸走出連戰所設定的框架，這個從裂分到彌合過程，生動刻畫了國民黨在野的這幾 年，尋求重新自我界定的苦澀與掙扎。

換個角度說吧，現行國民黨的組成本來就是個異質性很高的大雜燴。這種異質性格或許源於歷史因素，或許 源於特殊的政治安排，甚或源於利益分贓的結盟，不論基於什麼因素，它讓國民黨內永遠有一批人以維持正統為職志，也同樣有一批人自居為本土派。李登輝主政時 這種異質性格一度釀成公開的衝突，並演成流派對抗，終致造成新黨、宋楚瑜的陸續出走，也間接造成稍後連蕭配的敗選，最後連李登輝都選擇出走。也可以說，國 民黨的這種異質性格，讓它永遠陷於族群／流派／路線的矛盾與糾葛當中，而任何高層精英間的權力衝突，都可藉由這種矛盾的切割與分化加以擴大，而這也正是國 民黨過去十數年內部鬥爭的主調。

馬英九不同於過去國民黨精英的地方在於，他一直嘗試將國民黨的這種異質性格，轉化為整合的資產，而不是分 化的槓桿。耐人尋味的地方也在這裡，國民黨內部還能扮演這種角色的人，已經不多了！在國民黨派系傾軋最熾烈的年代中，馬英九幾乎都置身烽火圈外未受波及， 因而他與所有天王精英都沒有誓不兩立的恩怨，特別是他與李登輝的關係，相較於連宋的急於切割，他卻是一路尋求尊重與對話，這種操作或許並不能讓李登輝再站 出來公開挺馬英九，但至少可以化解李登輝屆時批他的力道。

從這裡也不難看出馬英九的戰略，他的出身與形象，讓他可以完全不必再去經營泛藍 這個版塊，他也非常清楚知道自己的不足，所以他年年參與紀念二二八、積極發展本土論述、修改黨章去統加註台灣、選擇蕭萬長擔任副手、在許多爭議性的議題上 採取更包容的立場，到最後更擺出「尊李」到底的立場，這一切的作為究竟能發揮出多少成效或許尚待評估，但至少國民黨既有的諸多矛盾與張力，已經獲得紓解。 換言之，當馬英九自己都在往本土派的形象經營，那麼過去王金平系統人馬所操作的省籍或認同議題將很難再發揮作用，同樣的連戰系統人馬也將漸漸無法再搬弄什 麼「輩分倫理」的話題了。

不諱言說，展望明年的二○○八，是可以有一番全新的競爭局面，但也可以整套複製二○○四的戲碼。假如二○○四年 大選所標誌的是藍綠基本盤的對決，那麼面對二○○八年大選的重大考驗之一，就是誰能成功的跨越這種基本盤對決的模式，向對方陣營的選民尋求理解與對話。要 知道，鞏固基本盤的操作最簡單，但所付出的代價也最直接，我們過去幾年在台灣所見證的經驗，就是藍綠基本盤對決的結果。而這個結果很清楚就是沒有誰會是贏 家。如果謝長廷與馬英九還想複製二○○四年的模式，那麼未來幾年會是什麼景況，現在就已經可以預見了。

在現時的政治氛圍下，若要選擇超越 基本盤，嘗試尋求和解與對話，反而需要更多的勇氣。畢竟這種努力不一定能開發出新的支持力量，卻很可能造成既有基本盤的流失，這一點相信不論謝長廷或是馬 英九都了然於胸。但看得出來他們兩人都不想再複製基本盤對立模式，也都想採取某種和解與對話的模式，但他們也都面臨黨內某種程度的牽制，謝長廷尚未完全從 初選的陣痛中走出來，府院黨也都擺出有意主導選戰走向的意圖，他何時能啟動完全屬於他自己的選戰還有待觀察。而馬英九的考驗則是面臨深藍力量的反彈，目前 這種反彈已經出現，能有多大力道也尚待觀察。但至少我們目前可以選擇的一種觀察角度是：謝馬兩人誰能有效擺脫黨內基本盤的牽制，誰也就能在未來超越基本盤 的對決模式。