Broad One China Framework: The Only Non-Two States Theory Framework

Broad One China Framework: The Only Non-Two States Theory Framework
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 30, 2014

Summary: On the morning of the 27th, Shih Ming-teh announced his "Broad One China Framework." The Broad One China Framework is a symbol of innovative thinking in cross-Strait relations. In recent years, cross-Strait policy has been torn between reality and theory. The result has been massive and rapid change.

Full Text below:

On the morning of the 27th, Shih Ming-teh announced his "Broad One China Framework." Meanwhile, the Republic of China's first flag carrier, the "Natchan Rera," the world's largest and fastest ferry boat, left Taipei harbor for Pingtan, flying the red, white and blue national flag. 

These two events are unrelated. But the Natchan Rera symbolizes the evolution on both sides of the Strait. The Broad One China Framework is a symbol of innovative thinking in cross-Strait relations. In recent years, cross-Strait policy has been torn between reality and theory. The result has been massive and rapid change.

The announcement of the Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues provoked cynicism among both pro-reunification and pro-independence forces. But mainstream elements within both the blue and green camps think this innovative framework was advanced in good faith. Their chief reservation was that Beijing might not agree to it. In other words, a positive response from Beijing is necessary before this framework can go forward.

Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Ma Xiaoguang responded. He said that although the two sides of the Strait have yet to be reunified, both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. The relationship between the two sides is not a state to state relationship. These facts have an unshakeable legal foundation. We hope that everyone on Taiwan is on board with the 1992 consensus, and opposed to Taiwan independence. We hope they will offer suggestions on how to maintain and promote cross-Strait relations.

Some say the State Council for Taiwan Affairs considers the Broad One China Framework beyond the pale, and has just repudiated it. But Ma Xiaoguang may have been reciting Beijing's pro forma response on cross-Strait policy. His response may not have been directed at the Broad One China Framework. When a reporter asked him whether the Broad One China Framework was consistent with the 1992 consensus and the One China Principle, Ma Xiaoguang did not reply.

The Five Principles are based on the primacy of the Republic of China. Therefore it is not an argument for Taiwan independence. Nothing suggests that the One China Principle cannot accommodate the Broad One China Framework. Therefore the Five Principles can be seen as an upgraded version of the 1992 consensus. Furthermore, it states that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. That means cross-Strait relations are not relations between foreign nations. That means the two sides of the Strait do no see each other as foreign nations. So why did Beijing react the way it did? Why was it afraid that the Five Principles might be another Two States Theory?

In fact, the three parties' current cross-Strait policies are already Two States Theories lacking in points of linkage. Under Beijing's One Country, Two Systems, the term "One Country" refers to the People's Republic of China. But the Republic of China is a reality. It exists. Beijing merely refuses to recognize it. This amounts to a Two States Theory. The Ma administration insists that "One China is the Republic of China." It champions "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force." This can be considered another kind of Two States Theory. The DPP advocates "one country on each side." This is an even more clear-cut expression of the Two States Theory. Cross-Strait relations under these Two States Theories leads to a dog eat dog end game. They are an expression of the law of the jungle, and constitute a disaster for human civilization. They add another tragedy to the Chinese nation.

The Five Principles advocate divided rule under the Broad One China Framework. Under the Broad One China Framework, both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China would be considered "incomplete international legal persons." This is how they are linked. The status quo is the Two States Theory. This status quo must be changed. The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China must be linked together and become part of China. They must become part of a Broad One China. In other words, the Broad One China Framework must not be viewed as a Two States Theory framework. It is the only framework that does not involve the law of the jungle, and require a dog eat dog outcome. 

The Broad One China Framework stands apart from One Country, Two Systems, from One China, Different Interpretations, and from One Country on Each Side. One Country, Two Systems clings to the Republic of China, even as it refuses to recognize the Republic of China. This will not result in identification with China or build trust in the Mainland. It will only sow suspicion and hatred. One China, Different Interpretations is merely a delaying tactic. The final outcome will be a boiled frog. One Country on Each Side does not work, Of this there is no longer any doubt. Therefore the Broad One China Framework is where the other three frameworks overlap. It can be implemented gradually, starting out with Divided Rule, and gradually assume the form of the Broad One China Framework. Issues of international space can be gradually worked out at the two sides' discretion. Shih Ming-teh said the Five Principles were a "package deal" or "full course meal." But each dish must still be served separately. Each dish is still "a la carte."

This is the first time the private sector has proposed a cross-Strait policy that transcends blue vs. green partisanship. Does the public on Taiwan want to escape blue, green, and red bound cross-Strait policy? If so, it should take a hard look at this proposal. Otherwise, all it can look forward to is a dog eat dog outcome. Beijing in particular should take a hard look at this proposal. After all, the Broad One China Framework is also a One China Framework. How can we continue to view divided rule government as warring governments? Must cross-Strait relations remain dog eat dog relations?

One China becomes a Broad One China. Warring governments become divided rule governments. The cries of apes from the shores echo endlessly. The sampan has already crossed ten thousand mountains.

大一中架構：唯一不是兩國論的架構
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.30 04:00 am

本月二十七日上午，施明德領銜發布「大一中架構」；與此同時，首艘中華民國的國籍輪「麗娜輪」，自台北港懸著青天白日滿地紅的國旗駛往平潭，這是今日世界上最大最快的渡輪。

這兩件事並無相關。但麗娜輪象徵兩岸現實的演化，「大一中架構」則象徵兩岸理念的創新。近年來的兩岸關係，正是在「現實與理念」的交互滾動中，呈現出大幅且快速的遞變。

「處理兩岸問題五原則」發布後，統派及獨派冷嘲熱諷；但藍營及綠營的主流意見大致認同這個創新架構是基於善意，其主要的保留意見皆在於認為「北京不會同意」。換言之，必須獲得北京的正面回應，這個架構始有進一步發展的條件。

國台辦發言人馬曉光對這個方案的評論是：海峽兩岸雖尚未統一，但大陸和台灣同屬一個中國，兩岸不是國與國的關係，這具有不可動搖的事實和法理基礎；希望台灣各界人士在符合「九二共識，反對台獨」之原則的基礎上，提出維護及推動兩岸關係的意見和建議。

有人說，這是國台辦認為「大一中架構」超出「紅線」，已予否定。但是，這也可能只是馬曉光就北京兩岸政策的平鋪直敘，尚未對「大一中架構」有針對性的定性。因為，有記者追著問他：「大一中架構」是否符合「九二共識」？是否符合「一中原則」？馬曉光均未答覆。

「五 原則」是以中華民國為本體，因此不是台獨論述，亦看不出「一中原則」有絕對不能容下「大一中架構」的理由，進而可視為「九二共識」的升級版。再者，兩岸 「不是國與國的關係」，應指兩岸「不是外國與外國的關係」，但未必是指兩岸不能成為「不互視為外國的關係」。然而，為何北京方面的反應，似乎透露出一種對 「兩國論」的疑慮？

其實，現行兩岸三黨的兩岸政策皆是沒有「連結點」的「兩國論」。北京的「一國兩制」，「一國」是指中華人民共和國；但 中華民國卻不是在事實「不存在」，只是在北京政治上「不承認」，這是「兩國論」。馬政府主張「一個中國是中華民國」，「不統／不獨／不武」，也可說是另一 形式的「兩國論」。民進黨主張「一邊一國」，更是旗幟鮮明的「兩國論」。兩岸關係在這些「兩國論」推進下，皆唯有以「你吃掉我，或我吃掉你」收場；那將為 人類文明再增一場弱肉強食的災難，將為中華民族又添一筆萁豆相煎的悲劇。

「五原則」主張：「在大一中架構下的分治政府」。在大一中架構 下，以「不完整國際法人」作為中華民國與中華人民共和國的「連結點」，以改變「兩國論」的現狀，使中華民國與中華人民共和國「連結」而皆成為一部分的中 國，亦即皆成為「大一中」的一部分。也就是說，「大一中架構」應被視為唯一不是兩國論的架構，也是唯一不是弱肉強食、萁豆相煎的架構，也是唯一不是你吃掉 我、我吃掉你的架構。

「大一中架構」，是在「一國兩制」、「一中各表」及「一邊一國」之外，另樹一幟。「一國兩制」若是欲以「既要中華民 國挺住／又不承認中華民國」的手法，把台灣一直「玩」下去，恐怕累積的不是認同與互信，反而是猜忌與仇恨。「一中各表」只是「拖」字訣，終究將步上冷水煮 青蛙的結局。「一邊一國」行不通，則已毋庸贅議。準此以論，「大一中架構」或可視為其他三者的最大交集，可先從「分治政府」的逐步實踐，推向「大一中架 構」的逐步形成，至於國際空間等議題則可置於循序漸進的考酌之中。施明德雖說，「這是套餐」，但還是要一道一道地上菜，每一道菜其實仍是有待個別處理的 「單點」。

這是台灣首次由民間提出跨藍綠、超藍綠的兩岸政策方案，台灣人民若欲在兩岸政策上跳脫藍綠紅三黨的捆綁，應以嚴正的心態來看待 這個方案，否則就必將面對「你吃掉我，我吃掉你」的結局。北京方面尤應以認真嚴肅的心態來看待此一呼籲，畢竟，「大一中架構」也是「一中架構」，更豈能硬 將「分治政府」視作「交戰政府」。否則，難道兩岸關係竟仍不免存在「誰強迫誰／誰吃掉誰」的問題？

一中變為大一中，交戰從此成分治；兩岸猿聲啼不住，輕舟已過萬重山。

Liberating One's Thinking: New Concept of Sovereignty and Civil War

Liberating One's Thinking: New Concept of Sovereignty and Civil War
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2014

Summary: Shih Ming-teh has announced his "Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues." Implementing these principles requires liberating one's thinking and becoming innovative in one's policies. The "Great One China, Two Governments Framework" must be based on a new view of sovereignty and civil war.

Full Text Below: 

Shih Ming-teh has announced his "Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues." Implementing these principles requires liberating one's thinking and becoming innovative in one's policies. The "Great One China, Two Governments Framework" must be based on a new view of sovereignty and civil war.

First consider the new view of sovereignty. The Great One China, Two Governments Framework is based on an innovative view of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty only appeared in the 16th century. Before that, there was no concept of sovereignty. In other words, sovereignty is a human artifice, not a natural phenomenon.

Since sovereignty is a human artifice, it can develop, change, and evolve. For example, the earliest view of sovereignty included the "divine right of kings" and "L'etat, c'est moi." Later, Rousseau and Locke developed the "social contract" theory of popular sovereignty. Later, the socialist revolution led to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Later the confederation was another manifestation of sovereignty. Now the European Union is a "28 + 1" concept. Twenty-eight Member States each have their own constitution. Above them all there is the EU constitution. This is the "28 + 1" concept. When the United Nations was founded, there were only 50 sovereign states. Today the UN has 194 Member States. History shows us that the concept of sovereignty is a human artifice that can develop, change, and evolve.

The third of the "Five Principles" clearly points out how "One China" cannot be narrowly viewed as a synonym for the "People's Republic of China." The Great One China, Two Governments Framework is an innovative view of sovereignty. It proclaims that under the Great One China, Two Governments Framework, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are both part of China, that they are two governments equal in status but divided in their rule.

Now consider a new view of civil war. The cross-Strait status quo is the legacy of the 1940s era civil war. But the civil war ended long ago. All that remains today is politicians who refuse to allow the people to let go of their civil war mindset. Obviously no civil war is being waged today. Politicians who perpetuate a civil war view of history have hijacked the people, kidnapped the people, manipulated the people, and made fools of the people. Last year, over 10 million tourists crossed the Straits. Mainland visitors filled their suitcases with "Huang Fei Hong" spicy peanuts and pineapple cakes. Over the past six years the two sides signed 21 agreements, explicitly affirming "peaceful development." Are we really still in the midst of a civil war? Or more to the point, do we really want a civil war? Do we really need to continue a civil war?

What is a civil war? It is a war between two governments. It is rifles and cannons and rivers of blood. We are no longer shooting and bleeding. The two sides of the Strait now use "peaceful development" to solve their problems. The "warring governments" have become divided rule governments.

In short, as the second of the "Five Principles" notes, the warring governments on the two sides of the Strait are now divided rule governments. One. This means that the cross-Strait status quo is a legacy of the civil war. The civil war created "warring governments." It also led to the establishment of "two governments." Two. But these two governments are not currently at war. They have become two governments that signed 21 agreements on equal but divided rule. Three. The two equal, divided rule governments are a fact. Therefore they must recognize each others jurisdiction. This leads naturally to the Great One China, Two Governments Framework, which deals with the "non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty" issue.

The Great One China, Two Governments Framework deals with the issue of sovereignty. It invokes a new concept of sovereignty to deal with the existence of two countries. Linkage points ensure that they do not view each other as foreign countries. Divided rule involves jurisdiction. It is a new concept that deals with the existence of the two governments. Primacy means the two governments are equal but rule separately.

The Great One China, Two Governments Framework means that the facts are real, the recognition is real, the feelings are real, the values are real, the belief is real, the system is gradually becoming real. Divided rule is used to promote the Great One China, Two Governments Framework. Conversely, the Great One China, Two Governments Frameworks stabilizes the reality of divided rule.

How will the Great One China, Two Governments Framework create linkage points between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China ? The fourth of the "Five Principles" deals with this. It proclaims that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are each "incomplete international legal persons." The linkage points mean that the "Five Principles" are not the same as the "Two States Theory." What of the so-called "incomplete international legal person?" Consider the EU as a confederation. The confederation model and the EU model have been rejected in the past. Therefore one may wish to avoid mentioning it, But rejecting the name is not the same as rejecting the concept. The Mainland recently proposed setting up "Committee for Peaceful Development" think tanks on both sides of the Strait to serve as linkage points. One need not explore confederations, either in name or in fact.

解放思想：新的主權觀與新的內戰觀
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.29 04:22 am

施明德領銜發布《處理兩岸問題五原則》，這個方案若要進入實踐，首要條件是「解放思想／創新政策」。「大一中兩府」必須建立在「新的主權觀」與「新的內戰觀」之上：

先論新的主權觀。大一中兩府建立在「主權創新」的觀念上，而主權是十六世紀才出現的概念，在這以前根本沒有主權這個概念。亦即，主權是一個「人造物」不是「自然物」。

由 於主權是「人造物」，所以它是會發展、會變動及可以再創新的。例如，最早的主權觀，包括君權神授、朕即國家等，後來盧梭、洛克等又發展出契約論的「主權在 民」概念，再後來社會主義革命又出現「無產階級專政」的主權觀。再如，邦聯制，也是主權的另一表現形式。至於現在的歐盟，則是「二十八加一」的觀念，二十 八個會員國各有一部憲法，在上面的歐盟又有一部憲法，這就是「二十八加一」。聯合國成立時，主權國家只有五十個，今天聯合國的會員國則是一百九十四個。這 些歷史在在都證明，主權概念是「人造物」，它是可以發展、改變、創新的。

《五原則》的第三點明白指出，「一個中國」不能被窄化成「中華人民共和國」的代名詞。「大一中架構」即是創新的「主權觀」，也就是主張：在大一中架構下，中華民國和中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，並有兩個對等的分治政府。

再 論新的內戰觀。兩岸現狀是上世紀四○年代的內戰所形成，但是「內戰」的實況早已停止，留下的只是政治人物不容許人民丟掉的「內戰思維」。在明明沒有「內 戰」的今天，若仍然主張「內戰史觀」，那就是挾持人民、綁架人民、挑撥人民，及愚弄人民。去年兩岸互訪超過千萬人次，行李中放滿那邊的「黃飛紅」麻辣花生 和這邊的鳳梨酥，且六年簽訂了二十一個協議，口口聲聲「和平發展」，請問：我們還有「內戰」嗎？或者，請問：我們還要「內戰」嗎？再請問：我們還要「繼 續」「內戰」嗎？

什麼叫做內戰？就是兩個交戰政府之間的戰爭，那是槍砲大作，血流成河；現在，不開槍了，不要流血了，兩岸要用「和平發展」的方法來解決共同的問題，事實上，「交戰政府」已經變成了兩岸對等的「分治政府」。

綜 上所論，《五原則》第二點指出，「兩岸『交戰政府』轉為『分治政府』」，堪謂甚具巧思。一、這是指兩岸現狀為內戰的遺留，因內戰而有「交戰政府」，因此亦 確立了「兩府」的事實。二、但是，這個「兩府」如今已非「交戰」政府，而已成為互簽二十一協定的「對等分治」的「兩府」。三、既有「對等分治」的「兩府」 事實，即必須「治權相互承認」，因此也就自然引發了須以「大一中架構」來處理「主權互不否認」的問題。

在這個思想體系中，「大一中架構」涉及主權，是要以新的主權觀來處理兩個國家的問題（連結點），使其成為「互不視為外國的國家」；「分治政府」涉及治權，則是要以新的內戰觀來處理兩個政府的問題（主體性），使其對等分治。

未來，「大一中兩府」的方案，應當循「事實的存在→認知的存在→情感的存在→價值的存在→信仰的存在→法律的存在→制度的存在」之步驟漸進，以底於成。亦即，以「分治政府」的實踐來帶動「大一中架構」的理念，並以「大一中架構」的理念來穩定「分治政府」的實踐。

至 於如何以「大一中架構」來建立中華民國與中華人民共和國的「連結點」？《五原則》第四點提出了「在中華民國與中華人民共和國之上共組一個『不完整的國際法 人』」的建議；既有「連結點」，即非「兩國論」。至於所謂「不完整的國際法人」，如邦聯或歐盟等均是；唯若認為邦聯或歐盟模式皆是曾被否定的名稱，而須避 忌，但名稱被否定並不等同於觀念也要被否定，大陸智囊最近提出兩岸共設「和平發展委員會」作為「連結點」，即不必探究其是否雖無邦聯之名而有邦聯之實。

Greater One China, Two Governments: Shih Ming-teh's Five Cross-Strait Principles

Greater One China, Two Governments: 
Shih Ming-teh's Five Cross-Strait Principles
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2014

Summary: Yesterday Shih Ming-teh announced his "Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues." Seven promoters of the Five Principles, blue and green camp alike, sat on the stage above. Dozens of guests, blue and green camp alike, sat among the audience below. This was the first time in history both blue and green parties have gathered under the same roof to participate in a privately sponsored cross-Strait policy conference.

Full Text Below: 

Yesterday Shih Ming-teh announced his "Five Principles for Dealing with Cross-Strait Issues." Seven promoters of the Five Principles, blue and green camp alike, sat on the stage above. Dozens of guests, blue and green camp alike, sat among the audience below. This was the first time in history both blue and green parties have gathered under the same roof to participate in a privately sponsored cross-Strait policy conference.

As we can see, the cross-Strait policies of the blue, green, and red parties have all arrived at bottlenecks. Beijing's "one country, two systems," the Ma administration's "one China, different interpretations," and the green camp's "one nation on each side" policies have all hit the wall. Why? Because politically and ideologically. all three have their hands tied, either by themselves, or by others. Solutions to cross-Strait problems remain forever mired in political calculations that reflect neither the spirit of civilization nor the interests of the public.

Shih MIng-teh said his move was an attempt to cut the Gordian Knot. His Five Principles have two distinct traits. One. They were a private sector initiative that transcended blue vs. green barriers. Two. They stood outside the blue, green, and red political parties. They proposed a new framework for cross-Strait policy, and Five Principles for dealing with cross-Strait issues.

From his "Five Principles" we can infer the following. Under the Greater One China Framework, the Republic of China is linked to the People's Republic of China. The two sides' warring governments are transformed into divided rule governments. This is referred to as Greater One China, Two Governments, or One China, Two Governments for short.

Cross-Strait relations include two basic elements. One. Linkage points. For example, the term "One China" addresses the matter of linkage points. Two. Primacy. The term "Primacy" addresses the fact that the two sides are separately ruled. Therefore any solution to cross-Strait relations must deal both with linkage points and primacy. Lean too far toward one side or the other, and one will lose the necessary balance.

Under One China Two Governments, the term "One China" addresses the linkage points, while the term "Two Governments" addresses primacy. Therefore the "One China, Two Governments Framework" has two implications.

One. The One China Framework becomes the Great One China Framework. The Great One China Framework does not shatter or repudiate the One China Framework. It extends and enlarges it. Under the One China Framework the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China do not recognize each other's sovereignty. This involves a mutual repudiation. But the Great One China Framework is a more inclusive framework, under which the Republic of China can coexists side by side with the People's Republic of China. The two sides do not repudiate each other's sovereignty. Instead they share sovereignty. Therefore the Great One China Framework is a framework that addresses both linkage points and primacy.

Two. The two warring governments are transformed into peaceful, separately ruled governments. The 1949 era warring governments are transformed into 21st century era separately ruled governments. The separately ruled governments have both linkage points and primacy.

The primacy of the Republic of China is honored within the Great One China Framework. The ROC and the Great One China Framework linkage points are preserved. Therefore under the Great One China Framework the primacy of the Republic of China and the linkage points are two sides of the same coin. This cross-Strait relation, which addresses both linkage points and primacy, may be referred to as the "new cross-Strait relationship."

To establish a new cross-Strait relationship, Taiwan must look beyond internal Blue vs. Green clashes over reunification or independence. The two sides of the Strait must look beyond civil war era conflict between the KMT and CCP. The two sides must transform the warring governments into divided rule governments. The One China Framework must be raised to the level of the Great One China Framework. Cross-Strait relations can no longer be a civil war in which there is only me and no you. The resolution of cross-Strait problems must lead to a more humane civilization. Internationally, we must not revert to the law of the jungle. Domestically, we must not add another tragedy to the history of the Chinese nation. The Great One China, Two Governments Framework ends mutual aggression. It champions a "You do not swallow me up. I do not swallow you up" relationship. This of course amounts to a new kind of cross-Strait relationship.

Actually, in recent years, divided rule under the Great One China, Two Governments Framework has been the reality. It reflects the blue, green, and red parties' area of greatest overlap. Beijing has the advantage. Therefore it is reluctant to acknowledge this. The Ma administration remains wary of Beijing and fearful of a Green Camp backlash. Therefore it is afraid to acknowledge this. The Green Camp clings to its On Nation on Each Side premise. Therefore it is unwilling to acknowledge this. Shih Ming-teh and others have proposed divided rule under a Great One China Framework. This is both innovative and realistic. It says what the blue, green, and red parties were reluctant to say, or afraid to say, or unwilling to say. Therefore the three parties should take maximum advantage of the opportunity to cut the Gordian Knot and create a new cross-Strait policy framework.

To this extent the new cross-Strait relationship, or the Great One China, Two Governments Framework, enables the blue, green, and red parties to save face and break through the impasse. It enables the blue, green and red camps to take the high road, and cross-Strait relations to make a soft landing.


大一中兩府：解讀施明德兩岸五原則
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.28 02:08 am

施明德昨日領銜發布《處理兩岸問題五原則》。會場中，台上是七名跨藍綠的發起人，台下坐著幾十位跨藍綠的賓客。這是台灣首次跨藍綠人士在同一屋簷下，見證一場由民間發起的兩岸政策發布會。

眾所共見，此時兩岸藍綠紅三個政黨的兩岸政策皆已出現瓶頸。北京的「一國兩制」，馬政府的「一中各表」，及綠營的「一邊一國」都發生撞牆現象；究其原委，是這三個政黨因政治現實或意識形態而自我捆綁或相互捆綁，使得兩岸的解決方案始終陷於政治權謀的糾纏之中，而不能反映文明的真諦與人民的利益。

施明德稱，他的這個舉動是「破題式的引領」，其特徵有二：一、民間發動，跨越藍綠、超越藍綠；二、在藍綠紅政黨之外，提出了一個兩岸政策的新架構：處理兩岸問題五原則。

若歸納及演繹其《五原則》，可以得到基本論述如下：在大一中架構下，中華民國與中華人民共和國建立連結；兩岸交戰政府轉為分治政府。這可稱為「大一中兩府」，亦可簡稱為「一中兩府」。

兩岸關係有兩個基本元素。一、連結點：例如，「一個中國」即是有關連結點的議題。二、主體性：即是關於兩岸分治現實的議題。兩岸關係的解決方案，必須處理「連結點」，也必須處理「主體性」。在二者間若倚重倚輕，即無可能成為平衡的方案。

大一中兩府，「大一中」是在處理「連結點」，「兩府」是要處理「主體性」。準此，關於「一中兩府」的基本論述，可作兩點闡發：

一、是將「一中架構」引申為「大一中架構」。「大一中架構」不是「一中架構」的斷裂或否定，而是「一中架構」的延續、引申及放大。在「一中架構」中，中華人民共和國與中華民國是「主權互不承認」的排他關係；但「大一中架構」是一個「上位概念」，在其下並立並存的中華民國與中華人民共和國不是「主權互不承認」，而可謂是「主權相互含蘊並共同合成」的關係。因此，「大一中架構」是一個連結點與主體性兼具的架構。

二、是將兩岸交戰政府轉為和平分治政府。亦即將一九四九年代發生內戰的兩個交戰政府，轉變為二十一世紀的兩個分治政府。「分治政府」亦是一個連結點與主體性兼具的架構。

中華民國的主體性在「大一中架構」中受到尊重，中華民國與「大一中架構」的連結點始能保全。因此，在「大一中架構」中，中華民國的主體性與連結點其實是一體兩面。這個兼具主體性與連結點的兩岸關係，也可稱作「新型兩岸關係」。

建構新型的兩岸關係，台灣內部必須在藍綠統獨的捆綁中求超越，兩岸之間也必須自國共內戰思維的糾纏中求昇華。將兩岸交戰政府轉為兩岸分治政府即是求超越，將「一中架構」引申為「大一中架構」即是求昇華。因為，今日兩岸關係早已不能再是有我無你的內戰格局，兩岸關係的解決更必須要能為人類文明創造典範。對外，不能在國際上再增一場弱肉強食的災難；對內，不能在中華民族又添一筆萁豆相煎的悲劇。「大一中兩府」不再是你我相噬相食，而為「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」的關係，這當然是在倡議一種「新型的兩岸關係」。

其實，近幾年來，「大一中架構下的兩岸分治政府」已是真實存在的事實，亦是藍綠紅三黨兩岸思維的最大交集地帶。但是，北京因自估占了優勢而「不肯說」，馬政府因顧慮北京猜忌及綠營反彈而「不敢說」，綠營則自縛在一邊一國而「不能說」。現在，施明德等人所提「大一中架構／分治政府」，既反映了現實，又創新了論述，其實不啻即是說出了藍綠紅三黨「不肯說」、「不敢說」或「不能說」的話，因而三方自應因勢利導、借力使力，朝往這個「破題式的引領」的方向，共同致力於建造一個兩岸政策新架構。

倘能如此，在新型的兩岸關係中，「大一中兩府」即是藍綠紅共同跳脫僵局的「下台階」，也是藍綠紅共同開創未來的「青雲路」，更是兩岸關係軟著陸的最佳平台。

The Final Mile on the Road to the Presidency

The Final Mile on the Road to the Presidency
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2014

Summary: The movie "KANO" includes a classic line. "Do not think about winning. Think about not losing." Tsai Ing-wen and other presidential hopefuls may wish to consider the relevance of this to the 2016 presidential race. Elections are of course important for political parties and politicians. But Taiwan's future is more important. "Do not think about winning the presidency. Think about not losing Taiwan." If politicians were to think this way, and showed voters on Taiwan they were in earnest, voters would sit up and take note

Full Text Below:

The results of the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship election are out. Not surprisingly, Tsai Ing-wen won. The election was a prelude to the 2016 presidential election. Over the coming two years can Tsai Ing-wen achieve what she failed to achieve during the 2012 presidential election? Can she complete the final mile to her destination? Tsai Ing-wen has taken over as party chairman. How much will change? We may wish to consider the following points.

First, can Tsai Ing-wen make the transition from cotton candy to ginseng fruit? In other words, from fluff to substance?

Politicians often suffer a peculiar fate. Over time, their greatest strengths become their geatest weaknesses, and the cause of their downfall.

When Tsai Ing-wen rose to prominence on the political stage, her image as an expert and scholar won plaudits. Tsai Ing-wen had a unique way of making her points. This enabled her to avoid political damage on key issues. She made skillful use of ambiguity, making it impossible for others to find anything to attack. As long as she avoided any major blunders, her continued popularity was assured.

As a result, Tsai Ing-wen's policy proposals were often like cotton candy. They had just a touch of sweetness. People assumed they had tasted something rich in flavor. But upon closer scrutiny they found that her arguments were often nothing more than hot air. They had no core, and lacked any constructive solutions to problems.

At first, her unique style was highly appealing. But as time went by, people felt starved and undernourished. That was why during the 2012 elections, critics described Tsai Ing-wen as "kong xin cai," aka "water spinach," a leafy green vegetable hollow at the center. This image significantly undermined Tsai's election prospects.

Nothing frightens politicians more than the prospect that their political tricks have become outdated. Will Tsai Ing-wen cling to her cotton candy strategy over the next two years? Will she remain ambiguous on important issues? Will she bob and weave to avoid political damage? If so, her "kong xin cai" reputation is likely to return. It is likely to become her Achilles heel and prevent her from completing the final mile.

Tsai Ing-wen is clearly aware of the problem. During the party chairmanship election she advocated "constitutional reform." She advocated lowering the threshold for public referenda and changing the election system. These two ideas provoked political backlash and some debate over their pros and cons. But leave aside the details for the moment. This time Tsai Ing-wen has advocated some relatively concrete policy proposals. Concrete policy proposals are the beginning of policy debate. If Tsai Ing-wen is willing to subject herself to public scrutiny, this will help ensure rational debate.

Does that mean that henceforth Tsai Ing-wen's policy proposals will all be substance instead of fluff? Ginseng fruit instead of cotton candy? Will she confront controversy head on? Or is party chair Tsai Ing-wen merely putting on a show? We will have to wait and see.

Second, can Tsai Ing-wen stop criticizing Ma Ying-jeou, and instead surpass Ma Ying-jeou?

We are not saying she must not criticize. We are merely saying she should not criticize merely to criticize, She can criticize Ma Ying-jeou, but her criticism should be fair. We are saying that she should attempt to surpass him. She should focus on what is beneficial to Taiwan, rather than stubbornly oppose everything. She should transcend politics by helping Ma Ying-jeou. If she did that she would do more than merely help Ma Ying-jeou. She would help Taiwan.

Consider the Sunflower Student Movement. The DPP launched a one-sided attack against the government. It ignored a fundamental problem. The Sunflower Student Movement's street violence harmed more than just the Ma administration. It paralyzed the Legislative Yuan, disrupted the Executive Yuan, and thumbed its nose at representative democracy. As the largest opposition party, the DPP must remember that it too is a link in the chain of representative democracy. One day the DPP could return to power. Today the DPP is applying a certain standard for the Sunflower Student Movement. When it encounters a similar situation in the future, its integrity will be put to the test. We have a simple question for the DPP. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, and 200 students occupy the Executive Yuan, will the DPP expel them?

Consider policy. Tsai Ing-wen has taken over as party chair. Major policy battles are raging in the legislature over the STA, the "Draft Law for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight" and Free Trade Zones. Does Tsai Ing-wen intend to deal with these as party factional disputes? Or as matters affecting Taiwan's larger interests? Will Tsai Ing-wen repeat the mistakes of the 2012 presidential election? Will she admit being mistaken about ECFA, and switch from vehement opposition to unconditional acceptance? That remains to be seen.

The movie "KANO" includes a classic line. "Do not think about winning. Think about not losing." Tsai Ing-wen and other presidential hopefuls may wish to consider the relevance of this to the 2016 presidential race. Elections are of course important for political parties and politicians. But Taiwan's future is more important.

"Do not think about winning the presidency. Think about not losing Taiwan." If politicians were to think this way, and showed voters on Taiwan they were in earnest, voters would sit up and take note.

社論－走總統大位最後一哩路
2014年05月27日 04:10

民進黨黨主席選舉結果出爐，不意外的，蔡英文勝出。這也掀開了2016總統大選的序幕，蔡英文能不能在接下來兩年走完她2012總統大選時未走完的最後一哩路呢？端看接任黨主席後的蔡英文，會給大家看到多少的改變？不妨從以下角度觀察。

首先，蔡英文能否從棉花糖變成人參果？

政治人物有時會遇到一種宿命，原來為自己大大加分的優點，經過一段時間後，就會變成致敗缺點。

蔡英文剛在政壇崛起時，專業學者的知性形象，為她加分不少。蔡英文特有的邏輯論述方式，總是讓她能在關鍵議題上閃過會讓她受傷的稜角，擅用曖昧模糊的話術，讓別人找不到打點，只要不犯錯，便能持盈保泰地累積自己的人氣。

也因此，蔡英文的主張，常常就像一團棉花糖，帶著一點甜味，讓人感覺好像有那麼一點好味道、有一點吸引力，但仔細研究，又會發現，她的論點常常柔柔軟軟的沒有內核，缺少解決問題的建設性。

剛開始，這樣的論述模式，頗為討喜，但時間一久，就會讓人覺得空洞貧乏。這也是為什麼在2012選舉時，外界會以「空心菜」形容蔡英文，這個形象，也確實對當時蔡英文的選情構成重大影響。

政治領袖最忌招數用老，蔡英文在接下兩年，若還採取棉花糖策略，對重要議題以曖昧話術閃避打點，那麼「空心菜」的形象很可能再度成為蔡英文的阿基里斯之踵，威脅她的最後一哩路。

顯然，蔡英文已注意到這個問題，當選黨主席就拋出「憲政改革」，提出了降低公投門檻與修改選制兩項訴求。這兩個主張，都有一定的政治後座力，在政策上的利弊參陳，但我們先不進入這兩項訴求細部的政策論辯，至少從策略上言，蔡英文這次拋出的議題相對具體，從公共討論的角度看，意見具體化，代表政策辯論的開始，也代表蔡英文願意接受檢驗，這有助於台灣形塑一個理性的公共討論氛圍。

這是否意謂著蔡英文以後在政治與政策訴求上，將從棉花糖改拋有實有肉的人參果，不迴避爭議，正面迎戰？還是，這不過是蔡英文甫就任黨主席，曇花一現的起手式？有待進一步觀察。

其次，蔡英文能否從批評馬英九，昇華成為超越馬英九？

這裡指的不要批評，是指不要為批評而批評，不是不可以批評馬英九，而是要公道的批評。而這裡指的超越，意思是在對台灣有利的事情上，不要死守反對黨立場，而要以一個政治家的高度，反過來助馬英九一臂之力，因為那不是幫馬英九，是幫台灣。

以太陽花學運期間為例，民進黨一面倒攻擊政府作為，沒有思考一個最根本的問題，太陽花衝撞的不只是馬英九政府，嚴格來說，太陽花癱瘓國會、衝進行政院，也挑戰了代議民主體制。身為最大在野黨的民進黨不要忘了，自己也是代議民主體制的一環。更別說，有朝一日，民進黨可能重返執政，今時今日民進黨對太陽花學運的態度，未來遇到類似的情境時，也會被拿出來做一致性的檢驗。一個簡單的問題：如果民進黨執政後發生兩百位學生攻占行政院，民進黨要不要驅離？

在政策面上，蔡英文接任黨主席，正值《兩岸服務貿易協議》、《兩岸協議監督條例草案》及《自由經濟示範區特別條例草案》等重大政策在立法院決戰，蔡英文是要以黨派對抗的角度來看這些政策，還是以台灣利益的角度來看這些政策？蔡英文會不會重蹈2012選總統時，在ECFA議題上從大力批判變成概括承受的覆轍？這也將成為觀察指標。

電影《KANO》裡的經典台詞：「不要想著贏，要想不能輸！」可以提供包括蔡英文在內等有志於2016總統大位的政治人物參考。選舉對政黨或政治人物當然重要，但台灣的前途與未來更重要。

「不要想著贏得總統，要想著不能輸掉台灣！」如果政治人物能做此想，以實際作為展現對台灣的真心，選民雪亮的眼睛也必會收在眼底。

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. Tsai Ing-wen and the Post-Student Movement DPP

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.
Tsai Ing-wen and the Post-Student Movement DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 26, 2014

Summary: The DPP has a fatal flaw. It knows how to attack and destroy, but it has no idea how to build. Tsai Ing-wen may be more sober than Su Tseng-chang. But she remains capricious, superficial, and lacking in seriousness. She has long sought office this way. She and the DPP must take a hard look at the problem. In the wake of the student movement, the DPP appears to have advanced, but has actually retreated. Worse, it has taken one step forward and two steps back. Tsai Ing-wen is using high minded rhetoric to lead the DPP. She is attempting to change Taiwan. To do so however, she may first need to change her own thinking.

Full Text Below:

Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh withdrew from the DPP chairmanship election. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen was elected party chairman by over 93% of the votes. This shows how invincible she is within the party. She has won the chairmanship and the right to lead the party. But does this mean Tsai Ing-wen will be able to complete the final mile in 2016? That remains as much in question as it did two years ago.

The question is twofold. One. The Sunflower Student Movement has changed the DPP's policy path. Its political foundations are actually undergoing retreat despite the outerward appearance of progress. Two. Tsai Ing-wen's own thinking appears hollow and wavering. It cannot withstand close scrutiny.

First consider the student movement. Tsai Ing-wen is undeniably the biggest beneficiary of the Sunflower Student Movement. The student movement dealt a serious blow to the image of the Ma administration. But it also put the screws to the DPP. Key elements within the student movement are close to the Tsai camp. They even forced Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh to withdraw from the three-way leadership race prematurely. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen became the voice of "generational change."

Now consider another perspective. Tsai Ing-wen has benefitted from the student movement. But the Democratic Progressive Party's image has been damaged, and its policy path undermined. In other words, Tsai may not be a beneficiary in the long term. First, the DPP has sought to reform its Mainland policy since last year. The student movement's anti-STA demands have created a serious setback, to the point where the DPP can no longer make corrections. This could be fatal. Second, a succession of social movements and student movements have left the DPP nearly impotent. It has been reduced to "me-tooing." DPP influence has been seriously weakened. Third, on the surface, the student movement and social movements appear to echo the DPP. They resemble a coordinated attack on the ruling KMT. But in fact, they divide public support for the DPP. The general public is dissatisfied with representative politics, with chaos in the streets, and withe chronic unrest. The DPP is taking much of the heat.

Tsai Ing-wen has inherited leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party from Su Tseng-chang. But she must also deal with these blows to the DPP's image. She must deal with conflicts over strategy, and reactionaries who would drag the party into the past. She must ensure that the DPP engages in rational political discourse. He must restore its strategic status as a political party. In particular, Tsai Ing-wen must use her authority as party chairman to win the presidency in 2016. Over the past two years she was able to use Su Tseng-chang as a shield. This enabled her to express different views and score numerous victories. Now that their positions are reversed, the situation is very different, and little room remains for evasion.

Over the past two years, Tsai Ing-wen has held no political office. Therefore she appears to be sitting and waiting with exceptional calm. Unlike her comrades,such as Su Tseng-chang, she has not been subject to criticism. Unlike Frank Hsieh, she has not had to wrack her brains seeking a political stage. She could laugh as Ma Ying-jeou became an arrow magnet. But look more closely. Has Tsai Ing-wen changed over the past two years? Is she better prepared to lead Taiwan? We see few if any such signs. This brings us to our second point. Tsai Ing-wen has apparently never shifted her political consciousness, from that of an opposition party leader, to that of a ruling party leader. This is perhaps the most serious obstacle she must overcome to complete the final mile, the same final mile she failed to complete during the previous election.

During the recent DPP party chairmanship debate, Kuo Tai-ling, a political nobody, repeatedly questioned Tsai Ing-wen, who repeatedly bobbed and weaved. She gave non-answers to real questions. She appeared calm, but her words contained no substance. Kuo Tai-ling repeated asked Tsai Ing-wen three questions. Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly flip-flopped and revealed her lack of consistency. When she was in office, she championed the completion of the NPP4. Now that she is out of office, she is demanding the abolition of nuclear power. She once unconditionally accepted ECFA. Now however she opposes the STA and MTA. She once demanded that President Ma refrain from simultanously serving as KMT party chairman. Now however, she is running for president in her capacity as party chairman. Every voter on Taiwan wants answers to these questions. But Tsai Ing-wen bobs and weaves, shines her questioners on, and never answers any of them.

One thing is particulary puzzling. Tsai Ing-wen proclaimed that the DPP must henceforth take the "path of the citizens." It must proceed from the "path of the masses" to the "path of parliament." It must establish think tanks as the framework by which the party can dialogue with civic groups. When street demonstrations were erupting everywhere, such rhetoric implied that protestors would be recruited into the party. But the party failed to provide the people any leadership. It merely hopped on the bandwagon and joined the parade. What is the raison d'etre for political parties? Besides, using the "path of the masses" to promote the "path of parliament" has never worked for the DPP ever. The Green Camp cannot improve its "path of parliament," yet it would flaunt its "path of the masses." Where is this about to take Taiwan's democracy?

The DPP has a fatal flaw. It knows how to attack and destroy, but it has no idea how to build. Tsai Ing-wen may be more sober than Su Tseng-chang. But she remains capricious, superficial, and lacking in seriousness. She has long sought office this way. She and the DPP must take a hard look at the problem. In the wake of the student movement, the DPP appears to have advanced, but has actually retreated. Worse, it has taken one step forward and two steps back. Tsai Ing-wen is using high minded rhetoric to lead the DPP. She is attempting to change Taiwan. To do so however, she may first need to change her own thinking.

進一退二：蔡英文與後學運的民進黨
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.26 03:09 am

在蘇貞昌與謝長廷棄選下，蔡英文昨天以超過九成三的高得票率當選黨主席，顯示她在黨內的人氣無人能敵。然而，奪得主席領導權，能否幫蔡英文走完二○一六的「最後一哩」，這個問號恐怕不比兩年前小。

其中關鍵有二：一是太陽花學運對民進黨路線的拉扯和衝擊，已造成政治基礎的「形進實退」；二則是蔡英文本身的執政思考一直顯得空泛和搖擺，經不起認真檢驗。

先談學運因素。無可否認，蔡英文是太陽花學運的最大受益者：學運不僅嚴重打擊馬政府形象，同時也高度擠壓了民進黨的反對角色；而學運核心分子與蔡英文陣營的緊密關係，甚至迫使蘇貞昌、謝長廷提前退出「三個太陽」的主席之爭，使蔡英文在「世代交替」的呼聲中理所當然地取得指揮棒。

但從另一方面看，蔡英文在學運的獲益，其實卻是以損傷民進黨的路線和形象作為代價；加總而言，對蔡英文長期未必有利。第一，學運的「反服貿」訴求，使得民進黨去年以來一直力求轉型與突破的中國政策發生嚴重倒退，甚至已退到難以轉圜的地步，這是一大致命傷。第二，在學運及其前後的幾波社運中，民進黨幾乎無力插足，甚至淪為插花的角色，這顯示民進黨影響力大為弱化。第三，表面上看，學運、社運似乎與民進黨互為呼應，對執政黨形成分進合擊之勢；實際上，卻瓜分了群眾對民進黨的支持。觀察一般民眾對代議政治的不滿，對街頭亂象頻仍的不安，民進黨恐怕要承受更多責難。

也因為如此，在蔡英文從蘇貞昌手中重新接下民進黨的領導權之後，她必須一一處理這些形象損傷、戰略矛盾、和路線倒退的問題，把民進黨的問政理性、話語權、和政黨戰略地位找回來。尤其，蔡英文是要利用主席的指揮權為自己奪下二○一六的總統大位，這和她過去兩年可以利用蘇貞昌為擋箭牌一邊發表不同看法、一邊等著收拾戰果，主客之間，形勢即大不相同，她沒有太多迴避的餘裕。

回顧過去兩年，蔡英文因沒有政治職務在身，而顯得好整以暇，格外從容。她既不像蘇貞昌那樣飽受同志批評，也不必像謝長廷那樣挖空心思尋找舞台，甚至對馬英九遭萬箭穿心可以談笑風生。然而，若進一步檢視蔡英文兩年前後的變化，要說她已就領導台灣的各方面能力準備得更臻周全，則似乎仍難找到可靠的跡象。這就是我們要談的第二點：蔡英文本身的從政準備，似乎仍無法從「反對意識」進展到「執政思考」；這點，恐怕仍是她要完成上屆大選沒走完的「最後一哩」最大的障礙。

民進黨日前舉辦的黨主席選舉辯論會中，在名不見經傳的唯一對手郭泰麟的追問下，蔡英文一再閃躲、實問虛答，貌似從容，卻未說出言之有物的話。郭泰麟的「三問」，問的正是蔡英文的立場反覆、缺乏一致性，包括：執政時主張續建核四、如今又倡廢核；曾宣示概括承受ＥＣＦＡ，現在又反服貿反貨貿；要求馬總統不兼黨主席，自己卻又以黨主席角逐公職。這些，其實也是每個台灣選民都想知道的事，但蔡英文左閃躲、右迴旋，草草應付，無一解答。

最令人不解的是，蔡英文宣稱民進黨未來要走「公民路線」，經「群眾路線」走向「議會路線」，並架構智庫作為黨和公民團體的對話平台。在街頭示威四起之際，這樣的說法固有招兵買馬「收編」街頭的意味；然而，政黨提不出自己引領政局的主張，卻去附街頭運動的驥尾，試問，政黨存在的意義何在？再說，用「群眾路線」來推進「議會路線」，是民進黨多年來證實走不通的路；綠營無法提升其議會路線品質，卻奢言要回頭從群眾路線出發，這將把台灣的民主帶向何方？

民進黨的致命傷，是善於攻擊、破壞，卻忘了如何建設。比起蘇貞昌，蔡英文或許更有冷靜的特質，但她善於應變、包裝，卻缺乏認真、一貫的執政處方，卻是她自己和民進黨必須誠實並懇切檢視的問題。後學運的民進黨其實是形進實退，甚至是「進一步、退兩步」；蔡英文在高談率領民進黨改變並改變台灣，恐怕得先從改變她自己的心態與思維入手。

Dangerous Minds: From Hate Fantasies to Antisocial Behavior

Dangerous Minds: From Hate Fantasies to Antisocial Behavior
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 23, 2014

Summary: The Sunflower Student Movement revealed the younger generation's political concerns and rebelliousness. Cheng Chieh's random killings revealed the younger generation's antisocial mentality, and their dangerous lack of conscience. These are two sides of the same coin. We cannot ignore either of them. Therefore we must reflect upon this incident. Insisting on increasing the number of transit police is probably not the solution. Instead, we must understand what lurks in the hearts of people such as Cheng Chieh. What kind of hate fantasies led him to cold-bloodedly murder innocent people? Where did his desire to be an antisocial killer come from?

Full Text Below:

The earliest reports said a knife-wielding drunk on the Taipei MRT was hacking away at people. But later everyone could see that the killer was a college student little different in general appearance from countless other young men. He was not drinking, nor had he lost his mind. He brandished a knife and stabbed people, killing four and wounding 24 others. The perpetrator was the first spree killer in the history of the Taipei MRT. The incident provoked gloom and anxiety.

Why was the killer mistakenly characterized as a drunk. Because it was easy to jump to that conclusion. Perhaps he came from a broken family. Perhaps he had been unemployed too long. Perhaps he experienced a sudden shock, then after getting drunk, lost control and committed these terrible atrocities. But 21 year old Cheng Chieh "always wanted to achieve something great." He originally intended to put his plan into action after graduating from college. But "As it happened, today there was no class." So he bought a knife, rode around on the MRT for a while, then attacked his fellow passengers on the longest stretch between MRT stations.

Had he been drunk, others would have noticed. Had he exhibited any mental disorders, others would have had advance warning. But Cheng Chieh's dangerous mind hid behind a calm exterior. His antisocial personality hid behind the mask of a college student. Upon graduating from high school, he wrote "I did not set fire to my house" in his yearbook. His comment was dismissed as mere youthful rebellion. On his college dormitory room door he wrote, "I will not accept treatment even if I am beaten to death." His roommates shared his morbid humor. They considered it fashionable. Within such a culture, hatred of the world feels like fantasy. Youth feel no guilt. Even if the government were to station police in every MRT station, could they really control such dangerous elements?

Cheng Chieh is reminiscent of Anders Breivik, who took over 70 lives in Norway. He is also reminiscent of the Tsnarnaev brothers, whose bombings during the Boston Marathon killed three and wounded nearly 200 others. They all had something in common. Their plans were drawn up and carried out by individuals, not organizations. They all chose to attack in a public place, without specific victims in mind. None of them had traumatic childhoods. All of them chose random killing as a way to uphold "justice." All of them considered their actions heroic.

Anders Breivik killed because he felt immigrants were inundating Europe. He opposed multiculturalism. The Tsarnaev brothers detonated bombs because they were unhappy with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, The wanted to exact revenge on behalf of Islam. What was Cheng Chieh's motive for cold-blooded murder? That remains a mystery. Was he really determined to "do something great?" Did video games take him to the dark side? Killing people with a knife and setting off bombs is different. In the former case, the victim's blood spatters everywhere, and his guts spill out on the ground. Killing people with a knife is doubly bloody, Cheng Chieh hacked away at over 20 passengers without letting up. His coldness and cruelty defied belief.

A key feature of the antisocial personality is a lack of remorse, a serious lack of conscience, an inability to feel guilty or upset. The day before yesterday police interrogated Cheng Chieh. He showed no remorse. Police reminded him of his parents and younger brother, but he remained unmoved. He exhibited these very psychological traits. So far no one has been able to determine why he did what he did. But yesterday, immediately following the incident, someone set up a "Cheng Chieh Fan Club" on FaceBook. They said they supported Cheng Chieh. They said they "worship him, love him, and are grateful he helped society take out the trash." Within hours, thousands of people had signed up. As we can see, certain corners of society and certain social networks contribute to this anti-social psychology, and constitute a catalyst for evil. Other voices on FaceBook are responding to the atrocities by demanding "capital punishment for Cheng Chieh," and screaming, "Cheng Chieh die!" These are equally dangerous and equally worrisome.

Cheng Chieh moved up his plan for random killings. Did this bear any relationship to the recent street protests? That is hard to say. But in April he boasted on FaceBook that he "would do something great." His comment included 21 examples of the word "hack," (as in "to hack with a knife"). This was precisely when protestors on Taiwan were opposing the STA, opposing the NPP4, and demanding an "appendectomy." Was the atmosphere of rebellion a factor? Even the police were helpless in the face of the crowds, Perhaps this touched a nerve in Cheng Chieh. In fact, some people around him noticed the signs. They informed the university administration.  Unfortunately the school counselor was unable to penetrate the darkness of his heart .

The Sunflower Student Movement revealed the younger generation's political concerns and rebelliousness. Cheng Chieh's random killings revealed the younger generation's antisocial mentality, and their dangerous lack of conscience. These are two sides of the same coin. We cannot ignore either of them. Therefore we must reflect upon this incident. Insisting on increasing the number of transit police is probably not the solution. Instead, we must understand what lurks in the hearts of people such as Cheng Chieh. What kind of hate fantasies led him to cold-bloodedly murder innocent people? Where did his desire to be an antisocial killer come from?

We salute the elderly white-haired gentleman who bravely subdued Cheng Chieh with his umbrella. When others were panic-stricken, he reached out his hand to uphold justice and defeat evil.

危險心靈：從仇恨幻想到反社會暴行
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.23 03:50 am

最初傳出的消息，是一名「醉漢」持刀在台北捷運上砍人；但隨後大家看到的凶手是一名外觀與一般年輕人無異的大學生，他既未飲酒，亦未喪失心神，卻連續揮刀砍殺造成四死廿四傷。這樣的犯案者，為捷運史上首宗隨機殺人事件勾勒出最幽暗的險惡與不安。

之所以會把凶手誤傳成「醉漢」，因為那是最容易想像的事：或許是家庭破碎，或者長期失業，又或臨時受到什麼刺激，然後在酒後失控作出可怕的暴行。然而，廿一歲的鄭捷卻只是「從小就想要做件大事」，本來打算大學畢業後再付諸行動，但「今天正好沒課」，他就買了刀子，試乘了一回，即挑選捷運站距最長的一段向同車旅客下手。

但如果是醉漢，外人很快就能辨識出來；如果是外顯的精神異常，旁人也比較容易提高警覺。然而，鄭捷的危險心靈包藏在他平靜的外表底下，他的反社會人格被大學生的身分掩蓋；他在高中畢業紀念冊上那句「我沒有放火燒我家」的留言，被當成青春叛逆的趣味；他大學宿舍門上「打死不治療」的橫批，是室友們共同分享的病態時髦。在這樣的文化下，像這樣心存仇世的幻想、卻又毫無罪惡感的年輕人，就算政府在每個捷運站都部署了警力重兵，又如何防制這類危險分子？

鄭捷的犯行，讓人聯想起挪威奪走七十多條命的殺人者布列維克，以及波士頓馬拉松爆炸案造成三死近兩百傷的查納耶夫兄弟。他們的共同點，都是個人（而非組織）策劃犯案，都選擇在公共場合向不特定對象下手，他們並不是個人在成長過程有過不幸遭遇，卻選擇隨機殺人的方式來宣示自己以為的「正義」或英雄行為。

挪威的布列維克行凶是為了反對歐洲外來移民太多，反對多元文化主義；查納耶夫兄弟引爆炸彈，則是不滿美國出兵阿富汗及伊拉克，要為伊斯蘭教報復。然而，鄭捷冷血殺人的原因至今仍是個謎，他難道真的就是立志要「做件大事」嗎？或者只是殺人格鬥電玩玩到走火入魔？再說，持刀殺人和引爆炸彈不同，前者需要近距離面對被害者血濺腸流的慘狀，那是加倍血腥的事，而鄭捷能連續刺殺廿多名乘客仍不手軟，其冷酷和殘暴真是教人難以想像。

反社會人格的一大特徵是「無罪惡感」，嚴重缺乏良心的譴責，也不會感到內疚或不安。警方前天偵訊鄭捷時，認為他毫無悔意；甚至在警方提醒他上有父母、下有弟弟時，他依然無動於衷，呈現的正是這樣的心理特質。目前，我們尚無法判斷他為何如此，但從昨天案發後臉書立即有人成立「鄭捷粉絲團」，宣稱要支持鄭捷，「崇拜他、敬愛他、感謝他清除社會汙染物」云云，且短短數小時便有上千人加入，可以看出社會上或社群網路的若干角落確實存在助長「反社會心理」的邪惡觸媒。這點，臉書上對鄭捷的暴行按讚和高呼「鄭捷處死刑」、「鄭捷去死」的兩種聲音，其危險本質同樣讓人擔憂。

鄭捷的隨機殺人計畫提前發動，和近來的街頭抗議有沒有關係，外界難以斷言。但四月間他在臉書上聲稱自己「會有一番大作為」，文中出現廿個「砍」字，正值台灣反服貿、反核四、割闌尾示威期間；當時那種沸沸揚揚「造反有理」的氣氛，乃至警察面對群眾束手無策的情景，也許不知如何刺激了鄭捷的神經，想要「做件大事」的念頭便油然而生。在他的周遭，其實也有人察覺情況不妙，因而通報了大學校方處理；遺憾的是，學校的諮詢終究無法深入他的黑暗之心。

如果說太陽花學運表現了年輕族群對政治的關注和世代叛逆，鄭捷的隨機殺人事件則暴露了年輕世代反社會、缺乏良知的危險心靈，這一體兩面的正反關係，我們不能忽視任何一面。也因此，反省此一事件，一味要求「增加捷運警力」恐怕不是正確的解方，而必須了解鄭捷的心裡究竟潛藏著什麼樣的仇恨幻想，導致他如此冷血地向身旁無辜市民下手，以及他一心想要扮演反社會角色的致命誘惑究竟從何而來。

我們也要向勇敢力擒鄭捷的白髮伯、雨傘哥致敬，在人們倉皇失措時，感謝你們伸出正義之手阻擋了邪惡。

Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait Policy: Blue, Green, and Red Must Reach an Accord

Ma Ying-jeou's Cross-Strait Policy: Blue, Green, and Red Must Reach an Accord
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2014

Summary: Ma Ying-jeou 's cross-Strait policy has been in effect for six years. But it is self-limiting. Beijing is concerned that it is bound to the Green Camp, and has little room for development. What we need is a solution that meets the needs of all three camps, blue, green, and red. What we need is a solution that involves the greatest overlap between all three camps, blue, green, and red. The blue, green, and red camps must reach a tripartite accord. The government must apply the finishing touches to Ma's cross-Strait policy. Otherwise it could all come to naught. Disaster hangs in the balance.

Full Text Below:

In 2008 President Ma Ying-jeou began his first term. At the time the hot political and economic topic was cross-Strait relations. Today, only two years remain in President Ma's second and last term. Today the hot political and economic topic is globalization.

Globalization means that Taiwan cannot avoid cross-Strait exchanges. But it also means Taiwan has an opportunity to use globalization to control cross-Strait relations. Over the past six years, the Ma administration's strategy has been to use ECFA to normalize cross-Strait and international relations, then use the TPP and RCEP to help Taiwan globalize. This "cross-Straits first, globalization next" strategy is essentially correct. It has been strongly affirmed by the U.S. and the international community. It is favorable to the balance of power in the world. It will benefit both sides of the Strait, and both the blue and green camps on Taiwan. Ma must firm up his "cross-Straits first, globalization second" framework while he is still in office. If he can do this, even if another change in ruling parties takes place in 2016, the shocks and injuries inflicted upon cross-Strait relations and Taiwan internally will be limited.

But such a strategic plan depends on others. It has major limitations. Beijing still has reservations about "accepting the other side's jurisdiction." In early February Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun addressed each other by their official titles. But they made clear that this "cannot be applied to other agencies," even as the hoped for a Ma Xi meeting. The above constraints prevent any breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. Meanwhile, over the past two years, the DPP missed the opportunity to undergo reform. It was affected by the student movement, and reverted to advocating Taiwan independence. It is now obstinately standing in the way of the STA and free trade zones. As a result cross-Strait relations have taken a backward step.

Consider the role of the DPP. Hot war has already erupted in the 2016 political struggle. Opposition to Ma is conflated with opposition to Ma's policies. Take the 2013 presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen initially opposed ECFA. She denounced it as "pandering to [Mainland] China" and "selling out Taiwan." But later during the campaign, she opposed Ma but "unconditionally accepted ECFA." Clearly her opposition to Ma's policy was phony. Only her opposition to Ma was genuine. The DPP opposes Ma at every turn. It conflates opposition to Ma with opposition to Ma's policies. Because it opposes Ma, it opposes STA. Because it opposes Ma, it opposes free trade zones. The DPP knows that standing in the way of the "first cross-Straits, then globalization" path will bring Taiwan to ruin. Even if the DPP wins in 2016, it will Inevitably face catastrophe. The student movement could result in a Closed Door Policy, rooted in Taiwan independence and opposed to the STA and free trade zones. If so, Taiwan will run headlong into a brick wall. It will commit economic suicide. The DPP knows all this perfectly well. Will Ma Ying-jeou's "first cross-Straits, second globalization" strategy be given a chance to work? The DPP is unlikely to play a constructive role in this.

Consider Beijing's role. For Beijing, the student movement must have been a bolt out of the blue. Beijing never imagined that its thoughtful concessions would be perceived by people on Taiwan as "economic conspiracy." It assumed Taiwan independence sentiment would diminish as a result of generational factors. It never expected the Taiwan independence movement to pass the baton to a younger generation. As we can see, cross-Strait relations must give the public on Taiwan a sense of political equality, self-esteem, civic pride, and security. Otherwise economic and trade exchanges or concessions will only provoke political anxiety on Taiwan .

Wang and Zhang referring to each other by their official titles this February. As we can see, this reflected belated awareness. The Wang Zhang example remained inapplicable to other agencies. In effect, progress was aborted. Lung Ying-tai cannot visit the Mainland in her capacity as Minister. By extension, the Ma Xi meeting remains stalled by the same concerns. Why can't the two sides facilitate a Ma Xi meeting simply by referring to each other as "leader?" In one fell swoop cross-Strait relations would be elevated to a new level. 

The student movement told Beijing something. Under the one China framework, cross-Strait relations must provide the public on Taiwan with a sense of political equality, self-esteem, civic pride, and security. Otherwise persuading a majority of people on Taiwan to identify with Chinese as an ethnicity, China as a nation, and the Chinese as a people, will be impossible. Persuading them to proceed with political integration under the concept of China will be even more difficult. One might say that the greater the pressure to integrate, the greater the resistance. Therefore cross-Strait relations calls for a new framework based on the "big roof concept of China, with the two sides separately ruled." Beijing should take the lead.

Beijing remains mired in "peaceful reunification," and "one country, two systems." The Green Camp remains mired in "one country on each side." The Ma administration remains mired in "one China, different interpretations," and "No reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force." The blue, green, and red camps should jointly create a new framework. In this framework, reunification would include independence, and independence would include reunification. This would amount to a "big roof concept of China with the two sides separately ruled."

Ma Ying-jeou 's cross-Strait policy has been in effect for six years. But it is self-limiting. Beijing is concerned that it is bound to the Green Camp, and has little room for development. What we need is a solution that meets the needs of all three camps, blue, green, and red. What we need is a solution that involves the greatest overlap between all three camps, blue, green, and red. The blue, green, and red camps must reach a tripartite accord. The government must apply the finishing touches to Ma's cross-Strait policy. Otherwise it could all come to naught. Disaster hangs in the balance.
   
馬英九兩岸政策 有賴藍綠紅共同收尾
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.22 04:05 am

二○○八年馬英九總統首任伊始，當時台灣的政經主題是「兩岸關係」；如今，當馬總統任期僅餘兩年，台灣的政經主題卻已轉化為「全球化」。

全球化意味著台灣更無從迴避兩岸關係，但也意味著台灣有機會藉全球化來節制兩岸關係。回顧過去六年，馬政府的國家戰略規劃是：以ＥＣＦＡ來建構正常的兩岸關係及國際環境，再藉ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ帶台灣進入全球化。此一「經兩岸到全球」的戰略構思，大體來說是正確的，也獲致美國及國際社會的高度肯定；因其不僅對世界均勢有利，亦對兩岸有利，且對台灣藍綠雙方皆有利。因為，馬英九任內若能奠定好「經兩岸到全球」的架構，即使在二○一六出現政黨輪替，亦可減低對兩岸關係及台灣內部的衝擊與損傷。

但是，這套戰略規劃終非完全操之在己，以致仍有其重大侷限。一方面是北京對「治權互不否認」仍有遲疑，遲至今年二月始有「王郁琦、張志軍互稱官銜」，且明言「不能引用在其他機構」，又對「馬習會」多所瞻顧，凡此均使兩岸關係不能突破。另一方面是民進黨過去兩年錯失了轉型契機，竟被一場學運又帶回台獨的老路，目下正對「服貿協議」及「自由經濟示範區」強力杯葛，凡此亦使兩岸關係出現逆流。

先論民進黨的角色。由於台灣已進入二○一六的政權爭奪熱戰，遂使「反馬」與「反對馬英九的政策」糾纏不清。以二○一二年總統大選為例，蔡英文起初是「反對ＥＣＦＡ政策」，斥為「傾中賣台」；但到了大選後期，卻成了只是「反馬」，但「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」。可見，「反政策」是假，「反馬」是真。如今，民進黨逢馬必反又將「反馬」與「反政策」糾纏不清，因反馬而反服貿，因反馬而反自由經濟示範區；但民進黨不會不知，倘若因此將「經兩岸到全球」的路徑封阻，台灣恐就此走上絕路，則民進黨即使在二○一六年奪得了政權，難免面對一場大災難。何況，由於這場學運，不論反服貿或反示範區均以台獨鎖國為替代方案，那即不啻是要台灣推車撞壁，自尋死路，民進黨亦明知其理。因而，對於馬英九「經兩岸到全球」戰略部署的成敗得失，民進黨即使成事不足，亦不能扮演敗事有餘的角色。

再言北京的角色。這場學運，對北京應當也是青天霹靂。北京萬萬沒想到，有心「讓利」，卻被台灣民眾視為「經濟陰謀」；更沒想到，台獨因素非但未因世代轉移而消減，反而出現「台獨世代交替」。可見，兩岸關係若不能使台灣人在政治上獲得平等感、自尊心、光榮感及安全感，經貿的交流或施惠反而可能引發台灣人的政治恐懼。

由此可知，今年二月「王張互稱官銜」其實是遲來的覺悟，而謂王張之例不能引伸於其他機構，不啻猶執迷不悟，眼前即有龍應台不能以部長之名往訪大陸。推而廣之，「馬習會」的猶豫亦是困於同一心結，為何不能用「互稱領導人」來促成馬習會，一舉將兩岸關係推上一個新台階？

這場學運給北京的啟示是：兩岸關係在「一個中國」的架構下，若不能使台灣人民在政治上獲得平等感、自尊心、光榮感及安全感，即不可能使多數台灣人認同中華民族、中國，或中國人，更遑論在「中國」的概念下進行政治整合。甚且，整合的壓力愈大，反彈的力道也會愈大。因此，兩岸關係必須要有一個新架構，而這個架構的原理原則應建立於「在大屋頂中國下的兩岸分治政府」之上，且應由北京率先跨出一步。

現在，北京仍陷於「和平統一，一國兩制」的想像中，綠營則仍困於「一邊一國」的自我束縛中，馬政府也只能停留在「一中各表」、「不統，不獨，不武」的觀望狀態。其實，若欲讓藍綠紅三方面共同建立一個「統中有獨，獨中有統」新架構，那應就是「在大屋頂中國下的兩岸分治政府」。

馬英九的兩岸政策至今六年，既有其自我設限，再加上北京的顧慮多端與綠營的自我捆綁，以致開展不大。若欲有一符合藍綠紅三方共同利益、並包容藍綠紅三方理念最大交集的解方，當然有賴藍綠紅三方來共同收尾。而馬政府的兩岸政策倘不能妥適收尾，非但可能前功盡棄，且是後禍難料。

Our Shared Cross-Strait Destiny

Our Shared Cross-Strait Destiny
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2014

Summary: Taiwan can take advantage of the rise of Mainland China to further strengthen itself. But Chinese people on both sides of the Strait must stand together. We urge the government and the people of Taiwan to view the matter from a higher, more strategic level. We consider ourselves modern, civilized, rational Chinese. We have confidence in the soft power of Taiwan. Our attitude should be neither self-abnegating nor self-aggrandizing. Education and examinations can transform society, enlighten the public, and encourage identification with Chinese civilization. As proud Chinese people, both sides can participate in the process of modernization. This is the way to resolve cross-Strait issues.

Full Text Below:

The maritime clash between China and Vietnam has led to irrational protests by the Vietnamese people. Anti-Chinese activities have negatively impacted many Taiwan businesses. They have caused serious damage to property, and pose serious threats to personal security. The government has taken measures to safeguard the rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen. The media has predictably criticized the decisions of the government and the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mostly the media was being too perfectionistic. Vietnam's anti-Chinese behavior is outrageous. The two sides of the Strait have different regimes. But both belong to one China, They are both Chinese. This fundamental truth must not be muddied. This is the key to the problem. The strategic situation in East Asia is increasingly complex. Relations between Mainland China and other countries may be good and bad. Either way, Taiwan will find it hard to avoid the consequences.

A few simple facts can explain a seemingly complex matter. Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan have a dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. The Mainland has proposed that the two sides jointly safeguard sovereignty over the islands. President Ma however, has proposed an "East China Sea Peace Initiative," which refuses cooperation with the Chinese mainland. Japan is attempting to prevent cross-Strait cooperation. It hastily signed a fisheries agreements with us. With reference to the South China Sea disputes, Mainland China has proposed a "South China Sea Code of Conduct." The countries involved have agreed to it. But Taiwan has not been able to take part in any meetings. The United States is attempting to coerce us into taking back our declaration regarding the "nine segment line." It is attempting to undermine the legitimacy of Mainland claims. Taiwan and Vietnam could clash militarily over Taiping Island. In a worst case scenario, Support or even rescue by the Mainland may be needed. How would we deal with such a headache then?

On the 9th of this month, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Let the Republic of China become a Force for Cohesion." We appealed to the ruling and opposition parties and the nation to unite in the face of myriad challenges. Today we propose that Chinese people on both sides of the Strait join hands and acknowledge our common cross-Strait destiny. The first editorial addressed matters relating to systems and values. The second editorial addresses national sentiments and long-term cross-Strait relations. Our proposal is reasonable, necessary, and forward-looking. It also addresses matters of strategic vision and tactical methods. The two sides may wish to consider our proposal. What exactly should Mainland China and Taiwan do? Can the two sides work together and adopt the proper measures? Let this proposal come to fruition as soon as possible.

First, according to the constitution Ma Ying-jeou is president of the Republic of China. Therefore he should act in accordance with the constitution and promote national unity. The KMT's "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force" stance is merely a cheap and expedient means of maintaining the status quo. As Chen Chang-wen said, merely opposing Taiwan independence cannot inspire devotion. It cannot sustain public morale. President Ma says he considers Taiwan the heir to Chinese civilization. He considers the existence of the Republic of China an asset that can ensure China's prosperity and future. Therefore President Ma should restore the Guidelines for National Unification, and the National Unification Council. He should even reiterate his support for "Reunify China under the Three Peoples Principles." President Ma may even wish to follow the example of Chiang Ching-kuo, when Chiang declared that he was both Chinese and Taiwanese, or Taiwanese and Chinese. This would have an enlightening and reformative effect.

The public on Taiwan has undergone changes in its sense of national identity. This is only natural, given the passage of time. But politicians, especially Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian manipulated and artificially accelerated this alienation. Objectively speaking, Taiwan must learn to live in peace with the Mainland. The DPP must jettison its fear of Communism and Sinophobia. It must abandon its separatist ideas. It must learn to distinguish between a regime, a nation, and a people. Reunification need not be a problem. We merely need to stipulate the timing and conditions for reunification. Taiwan must insist on certain values. It must reject an unreasonable system. It cannot accept unreasonable conditions. What it must pursue is a win/win competition that leads to integration and reunification. We hope the DPP will recognize this. China is something that Chinese compatriots on both sides hold in common. The people of Taiwan have the right and responsibility to express their opinion about the future of China. The DPP must stop depriving future generations the opportunity to prosper on Mainland China.

Consider the matter from the perspective of Mainland China and the two sides. How specifically does one create a common destiny for both sides of the Strait? One can of course begin by reducing negative rhetoric. Make fewer negative statements. First put one's own house in order. Plan for the long term instead of seeking short term expediency. On issues of concern to people on both sides, make reasonable arrangements with concrete commitments. Continue promoting peaceful development and cross-Strait friendship.

The Mainland may wish to consider establishing cross-Strait economic zones and plans, explaining the substantive benefits of reunification. Various provinces could establish sister cities and sister counties relationships with various regions of Taiwan. They could promote cross-Strait cultural and educational agreements as soon as possible. This would increase identification with Chinese civilization and pride in Chinese identity among the public on Taiwan.

Taiwan can take advantage of the rise of Mainland China to further strengthen itself. But Chinese people on both sides of the Strait must stand together. We urge the government and the people of Taiwan to view the matter from a higher, more strategic level. We consider ourselves modern, civilized, rational Chinese. We have confidence in the soft power of Taiwan. Our attitude should be neither self-abnegating nor self-aggrandizing. Education and examinations can transform society, enlighten the public, and encourage identification with Chinese civilization. As proud Chinese people, both sides can participate in the process of modernization. This is the way to resolve cross-Strait issues.

中國時報社論--建構兩岸命運共同體的正確認知
http://www.cdnews.com.tw　2014-05-21 08:49:41
　中國時報21日社論--建構兩岸命運共同體的正確認知，全文如下：　

　 中越南海爭執引發越南民眾非理性抗議，排華活動波及眾多台商，造成嚴重的財產損失及人身安全威脅，政府已採取必要適切的措施以維護台商的權益，雖然媒體難 免對政府決策及外交部的作為多所抨擊，但多出於求全責備之心。此事的重點在於，面對越南蠻橫的反華行為，兩岸政權雖然不同，但同屬一中，都是華人的大是大 非卻不容混淆。東亞戰略格局日益複雜，中國大陸與相關國家關係的好與壞，台灣都將難以置身事外。

　幾個簡單的事實就可以說明事情的複雜程 度。中日台的釣魚台爭議，大陸主張兩岸共同維護主權，馬總統提出東海和平倡議，表明不與中國大陸合作，日本則企圖分裂兩岸合作的各種可能，迅速與我方簽署 漁業協定。對於南海紛爭，我國提出南海行為準則，各方雖然肯定，但我國又無法參與會議，而美方則試圖壓迫我方撤回九段線的立場，從而解構大陸主張的合法 性。假設未來台越雙方因為太平島發生軍事衝突，如果必須中共支援或在最壞的情況下出手相救，到時我方到底如何因應將是個頭痛的問題。

　本 報9日曾以〈讓中華民國成為凝聚的力量〉社論，呼籲朝野政黨及全國民眾團結起來，積極面對紛至沓來的各種挑戰；如今我們再以社論主張兩岸中國人攜手共行， 要從根本上建構兩岸命運共同體的認知。前者主要是處理制度與價值觀問題，後者則在處理民族感情及兩岸長遠關係問題。基於我們主張的合理性、必要性與前瞻 性，這裡面其實也就牽涉到戰略視野與戰術方法等問題，各方不妨思考，究竟中國大陸能夠做些什麼，台灣應該做些什麼，兩岸雙方是否又能共同合作，採取一些有 效的措施，讓這樣的主張能夠早日獲得實現。

　首先，既然馬英九是依《憲法》出任中華民國總統，他就應該依《憲法》行事，以追求國家統一為 職志，國民黨的不統、不獨、不武，維持現狀的作法只是便宜行事的權宜之計，就像陳長文先生所說，反對台獨不是一種信仰，不足以維繫民心與士氣，而且馬總統 既然堅信台灣是中華文明的傳承者，認為中華民國的存在與興隆昌盛是未來中國的資產，馬總統就應該恢復國統綱領及國統會，甚至重申以三民主義統一中國的立 場。馬總統其實也可以效法蔣經國先生當年所說，自己既是中國人也是台灣人，或至少自己是台灣人也是中國人，以生振聾發聵、移風易俗的作用。

雖說台灣民眾的自我認同發生變化，是時間發展下的自然趨勢，但政治人物，尤其是李扁二人的操弄更加速了異化發展；如今的客觀環境，台灣必須學習與大陸和平 相處，民進黨恐怕得先袪除恐共、反中情結，放棄分離主義主張，把政權和國家與民族區別對待。統一可以不是問題，但對統一的時機與條件則可有所堅持，台灣堅 持的是生活價值觀，反對的是不合理的體制，不接受的是不合理的條件，追求的是由競爭雙贏走向融合與統一。我們期望民進黨能夠認識到，中國是兩岸同胞共有的 中國，台灣人民也有權利和責任對中國的未來表示意見，民進黨切莫剝奪後代子孫到中國大陸發展的機會。

　再從中國大陸及兩岸的角度來看，要建構兩岸命運共同體的具體作法，當然是負面的話少說，負面的事少做，先把自己搞好，長期深耕不走短線；在對兩岸民眾極為關切的一些問題上，做出合情合理的具體安排與承諾，持續推動和平發展及兩岸一家親的友好政策。

　大陸甚至不妨考慮建立兩岸經濟示範區，規畫、說明統一的實質利益，著由不同的省分認領台灣的不同地區，建立具有實質意義的姊妹縣市關係，採取積極措施，盡早促成兩岸文化、教育協議的簽訂，增強台灣民眾對於中華文明的認同與身為中國人的自豪感。

　台灣可以利用中國大陸的崛起進一步壯大自己，但必須先站穩兩岸中國人的立場，我們要呼籲，台灣的政府與民眾要站在更高的戰略高度來看待問題，既 然我們自許為現代、文明、理性的中國人，對台灣的優勢和軟實力有信心，今天我們就該以不卑不亢的態度，透過教育、考試等社會化的過程來恢宏志氣，啟迪民 智，認同中華文明，自豪的以中國人的身分參與兩岸現代化的進程，才是解決兩岸問題之道。

Can Tsai Ing-wen Lead the Nation if She Will Not Say Where She Stands?

Can Tsai Ing-wen Lead the Nation if She Will Not Say Where She Stands?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2014

Summary: Taiwan society has moved on, to politicians who have the courage to say what they think. Old stereotypes and old thinking have been left behind. Candidates must offer new strategies and genuine substance.  They cannot avoid controversy. They cannot contradict themselves. They must declare what the problems are. They must be decisive in their actions. This is a new era. Taiwan society needs new political leaders. These political leaders cannot be afraid to champion their beliefs. They cannot be afraid to face those who oppose their beliefs. Only then can the people make their own choice about whom they want to represent them. Only then can they express fervent support for the candidate of their choice. Tsai Ing-wen has contemplated this problem for several years. But clearly she needs to contemplate it even more.

Full Text Below:

Earlier this year, Tsai Ing-wen went on FaceBook and promised to act responsibly. "In 2014, I will work with everyone during this critical year to help the DPP and the nation make the right choices." Her choice was to run for re-election as DPP chair. As she herself said, she wanted to reform the Democratic Progressive Party, to make sure that it was keeping pace with the times.

It was not that difficult for Tsai Ing-wen to make a personal decision. Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh had already withdrawn from the race. That "Xiaoying" would be leader of the DPP was a foregone conclusion. But the question is, can Tsai Ing-wen become Taiwan's leader as well? Can she become Taiwan's best choice as a leader over the coming years? That remains in serious doubt.

Tsai Ing-wen has been on the political stage and engaged in political activities for some time now. Her distinguishing trait has not been political courage or problem solving. It has not been a glowing record of accomplishments for the benefit of the common man, It has not been the resolute championing of any particular political path, on the way to any particular political goal. No. These are not Tsai Ing-wen's political trademark. Why? Because all of these require taking a stand. They require making choices between different ideas, different interests, and different groups, They require shining a light on one's political views and principles. They require championing a particular stance, which inevitably provokes a backlash from opponents of that particular stance. This is what Tsai Ing-wen habitually avoids.

As a result, Tsai In-wen's most distinctive trait has been her pretty catchphrases. She invariably uses the trendiest, most progressive, and most innocuous political rhetoric to package herself. But she never expresses an opinion on the all important key issues. She never explains her strategy. She never chooses sides. Politics is of course not black and white, not either-or. Often answers are found in the middle, midway between right and wrong. There is indeed is a gray area. There may be room for compromise and reconcilation. But this does not mean one can always avoid conflicts and sensitive issues. After all, one must first have a position, one must first have principles. Only then can one compromise and make concessions.

Tsai Ing-wen's New Year's Day FaceBook speech stated that "On certain issues, we must express the party's attitude and stance." It stated that "Politics is a kind of choice! It is a choice made in a rapidly changing external environment." Tsai Ing-wen has an image as someone who utters only empty rhetoric and pretty words. It would seem, to a greater or lesser degreee, that she wants to change that image. She is prepared to express her "attitude and stance." She is prepared to make choices on key issues. Unfortunately her performance at the DPP Chairmanship television debate showed that she has made no real change or progress. She remains vague and wavering. Any change was severely limited.

Tsai Ing-wen said Taiwan can no longer follow the economic growth strategy of the previous century. She said she and her campaign committee were "trying to find a new model." Their "guidepost would be innovation, entrepreneurship, and job creation. Economic development would be accompanied by the redistribution of wealth." Good. Given Taiwan's economic bottlenecks, not many people want to cling to the strageties of the previous century. Nobody opposes innovation, entrepreneurship, and job creation. Tsai's platitudes are irrelevant. The real question is whether she can offer a convincing solution. One key issue is taxation. What system of taxation does Tsai Ing-wen propose, in order to "redistribute the wealth?" How does she plan to use the tax system to encourage "innovation, entrepreneurship, and job creation?" So far, Tsai Ing-wen has not stated any positions or made any choices.

Tsai Ing-wen said we must maintain peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. She said cross-Strait exchanges should focus on "quality" instead of "quantity." She said we must return to democratization and transparency. Businesses and political parties must no longer hold monopolies. She said the cross-Strait economy was originally about individual commercial interests, but must instead be about larger national economic interests. Good. No one dares advocate cross-Strait exchanges that advance only the interests of monopolistic interests. No one thinks cross-Strait exchanges should be under the table deals. Tsai Ing-wen's catchphrases are all very pretty. But they cannot hide what actually matters in cross-Strait relations. For example, what kind of economic and trade agreements will result in "high quality" cross-Strait exchanges? For example, the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. It is unable to offer new ideas acceptable to both sides. Therefore how can the DPP "maintain peace and stability" in cross-Strait relations? 

Tsai Ing-wen has improved. She acknowledges that cross-Strait relations are important for "peace and stability." That is a step in the right direction. But she has not explained what cross-Strait policy agenda the DPP should set forward. She has not explained how the DPP will achieve "peace and stability," "democracy," "transparency," and "take into account the nation's larger economic interests?" Are we to understand that ECFA, the STA, and the GTA are really nothing more than "individual commercial interest-oriented?" Are we to understand that they harm "the nation's larger economic interests?" Shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen act responsibly and state her position more clearly?

Tsai Ing-wen is atypical for a Taiwanese politician. Her campaign committee has packaged her very cleverly. She utters pretty, progressive catchphrases. She markets herself by not adopting any clear policy positions. Her presentation is neutral, mild, with no sharp edges, and no clear policy positions. This enables her to cross the Blue/Green divide and seek over half the votes.

But she and her campaign committee have failed to realize something. Taiwan society has moved on, to politicians who have the courage to say what they think. Old stereotypes and old thinking have been left behind. Candidates must offer new strategies and genuine substance.  They cannot avoid controversy. They cannot contradict themselves. They must declare what the problems are. They must be decisive in their actions. This is a new era. Taiwan society needs new political leaders. These political leaders cannot be afraid to champion their beliefs. They cannot be afraid to face those who oppose their beliefs. Only then can the people make their own choice about whom they want to represent them. Only then can they express fervent support for the candidate of their choice. Tsai Ing-wen has contemplated this problem for several years. But clearly she needs to contemplate it even more.

社論－不表態的蔡英文 如何領導國家
2014年05月20日 04:10

今年年初，蔡英文在臉書上就表示要承擔責任，「2014年我會與大家一起努力，在這關鍵的一年幫民進黨，也幫這個國家做出正確的抉擇」。她的抉擇是再度出馬競選民進黨主席，就她本人的說法，是要推動民進黨的轉型，讓民進黨與時俱進。

蔡英文要做出個人的抉擇，還不算困難，從目前的局勢來看，在蘇貞昌、謝長廷退選之後，小英帶領民進黨，已毫無懸念，但是蔡英文能否成為台灣社會的抉擇，能成為帶領台灣未來幾年發展的最佳抉擇，則還非常需要謹慎的檢驗。

蔡英文真正走上檯面、從事政治活動以來，她個人最鮮明的特色，不是展現了什麼政治魄力，解決了重大政治難題，不是有什麼亮眼的執政成績，造福了廣大的黎民百姓，更不是堅定舉起某條政治路線的大旗，努力推進實現其政治主張。不是的，以上都不是蔡英文的政治品牌，因為要做到上述這些，都需要「表態」，需要在不同理念、不同利益、不同群體之間做出抉擇，也就是，因為要凸顯、展現個人的政治主張與方針，要成為某種立場的「正方」，因此，就必然會製造出「反方」。而這些，正是蔡英文所努力迴避的。

於是，蔡英文呈現在台灣政壇的最大特色，就是好說漂亮語彙，盡量用一切新潮的、進步的卻又「無害」的政治語言包裝自己，卻不對一切重要的、關鍵的課題表達自己的立場，說明自己的方略，也就是「拒絕選邊站」。政治，當然不是非黑即白的，不是非此即彼的，往往在是非黑白兩端的中間，確實有灰色的地帶，有可以調和妥協的空間。但是，這絕不代表可以永遠選擇迴避矛盾，迴避「敏感」問題，畢竟，總是要先有立場，先有原則，也才談得上妥協的底線、讓步的幅度。

本來，在蔡英文今年元旦的臉書發言中，她曾表明：「在某些議題上，我們必須展現黨的態度與立場」，她還強調「政治就是一種選擇！而且是一種在外在環境變動迅速的情況下所做的選擇」。看起來，蔡英文是多少想調整她光說空話、光說漂亮話的形象，準備展現「態度與立場」，準備在關鍵議題上做出「選擇」。可惜的是，從她在這次民進黨主席電視政見會上的表現來看，不是沒有調整，不是沒有進步，只是「模糊」、「游移」還是籠罩在她的政治形象之上，改變的幅度極為有限。

蔡英文說，台灣經濟成長策略不能再沿用上世紀的舊模式，她和團隊「試圖找出新模式」，「座標就是創新、創業及創造就業機會，經濟發展同時也達財富分配效果」。很好，面對台灣經濟瓶頸，沒有多少人想要守舊，更沒有人會反對創新、創業及創造就業，問題根本不在於口號與方向，而在於令人信服的作法。在這方面，一個關鍵的問題就是「稅制」，在達成「財富分配效果」上，蔡英文的稅制主張是什麼？又要如何運用稅制來鼓勵「創新、創業及創造就業機會」，我們至今看不到蔡英文的立場和選擇。

蔡英文說，兩岸關係要維持和平穩定，兩岸交往應從著重「量」變「優質」，並回歸民主化、透明化的常軌，不再被特定政商人士壟斷，兩岸經濟也要從以前個別商業利益導向整體國家經濟利益。很好，沒有誰敢公開主張讓特定集團壟斷兩岸交流利益，沒有人認為兩岸交往應該黑箱、獨斷，但是這些漂亮話，並無法掩蓋兩岸關係上的關鍵問題，比如，怎樣的經貿協定可以讓兩岸交流「優質化」，又比如，如果民進黨執政之後不承認「九二共識」，又提不出讓兩岸共同接受的新主張，兩岸關係又要如何「維持和平穩定」？

蔡英文是有在前進的，她認同兩岸關係的「和平穩定」很重要，這是正確的方向，但她欠缺的，是更清楚的說明，她心目中民進黨應該提出的整套兩岸政策綱領，這個綱領要如何同時做到「和平穩定」、「民主」、「透明」、「顧及整體國家經濟利益」？難道從ECFA到服貿、貨貿，真的就只是「個別商業利益導向」，真的就傷害了「整體國家經濟利益」嗎？蔡英文不應該負責任的說清楚嗎？

蔡英文這位台灣非典型的政治人物，在團隊的包裝下，選擇「說漂亮進步語言、迴避真實政策表態」的行銷手法，以為包裝成中性、溫和、不尖銳、不表態，就能夠跨越藍綠左右，攫取過半選票。

但她和團隊所不知道的是，台灣社會已經前進了，前進到需要政治人物勇於承擔，在突破舊窠臼、舊思維時候，要端出新方略、新牛肉，不迴避爭議，不繞過矛盾，直指要害，果斷解決，這是新時代台灣社會所要求於政治領袖的。政治領袖要不怕居於正方，不怕面對反方，人民才會做出自己的選擇，才會表達自己的熱切支持。「想想」了好幾年，蔡英文，還是應該好好想一想。

Abandon Hero Worship, Return to Candidate Character

Abandon Hero Worship, Return to Candidate Character
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2014

Summary: In the history of elections on Taiwan, elected superstars have almost invariably become tragic figures. Voters elected a self-styled Moses, a Don Quixote who tilted at windmills. Voters eleced a greedy "what's yours is mine" kleptocrat. Voters elected a "New Taiwan 1992 consensus president." Are voters more down to earth today? The old addage urges us to "Elect the wise and the able." Electing politicians who can actually govern in the year end seven in one local elections would be a good start.

Full Text Below: 

The year end election is rapidly approaching. Campaign activities have become more frequent and provocative. Political parties care only about winning. The nomination process is indifferent about whom is chosen. Old or young matter not. Candidates are often nominated purely because of who they are. Nomination rules are often ignored. The politician may be forced to to undergo an ordeal, or his nomination may be pro forma routine. He may assume that he will eventually emerge the victor and wield power. Therefore he may be willing to remain silent. This is why anything migh happen during the year end election, and why chaos could easily erupt.

Have politicians seriously pondered why they seek victory? Is their motive really only lust for power? Consider Taiwan's two most powerful and charismatic politicians. One is currently serving time in a Taichung prison hospital. He suffer from a wide range of physical and mental disorders. Rumor has it he suffers from incontinence, and must change his underwear 30 times a day. The other has a public approval rating of 9.2%, the lowest in history. His "New Taiwan 1992 consensus" is widely ridiculed. He cannot implement any of his policies, making any sort of political accomplishments difficult. These two former political superstars were products of the voters' imagination. Their plight could be described as tragic. But if so, how should we describe the plight of the public? For 16 years their wages have remained stagnant, The gap between rich and poor has widened. Aren't they considerably more deserving of our sympathy?

Consider the situation from a global perspective. Salaries have fallen. The wealth gap has widened. This is a universal problem. But Taiwan's economic fundamentals are strong. It should be doing better. The global economy is undergoing regionalization. Taiwan has no response. It has become increasingly marginalized. Future crises loom. This decline took place over the terms of three presidents. Their popularity and ability were irrelevant. Political parties and politicians seek victory at the polls. Instead, they should be considering what sort of vision they can offer Taiwan after their victories. They should be considering what can they do for the well-being of the people, and not merely for their own popularity.

Taiwan's year end elections will be the largest scale local elections ever held. Candidates include mayors and city councilmen for directly administered municipalities, county chiefs and county councilmen, township mayors and township representatives, seven local village chiefs, and other public officials. Voters will elect officials from six mayors of directly administered municipalities, 16 mayors and county chiefs, and 11,076 other public officials, in an election known as the "seven in one elections." The seven in one elections are basically local elections. The candidates' policy platforms need not include such issues as "national identity" and "Taiwan's primacy." The candidates need not engage in illusory "spittle wars," but should get back to matters of public welfare. They should remain realistic and pragmatic. Voters should pay attention to the candidate's character and behavior, and in particular to the candidates' personnel appointments. Voters on Taiwan have been through numerous elections, large and small. By now they ought to know better. They ought to realize that voting for a Messiah or a Superstar is unrealistic, regardless of whether the candidate will govern a nation, a city, or even a local body.

Nearly 20 years have passed since the 1996 presidential elections. We can go even further back, to 1946, when the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office held elections on behalf of the people of each township. This was followed by public elections for county senators. County senators were elected on Taiwan when the provincial authorities conducted the first ever post-war elections. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party participated in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections. As of today, they have done so for nearly 30 years.

But how well do politicians and voters understand the nature and value of the electoral system?

Voters need to understand that in a democratic political environment, the most important factor is how one votes. Alas, voters on Taiwan feel little responsibility about the manner in which they vote. Before the election, voters are passionate. They show tremendous interest in the race. When the election is over, they are eager to see who won. Some are happy. Others are sad. It is as if everything is over. This voter mentality leads politicians to make indiscriminate campaign promises before the election. Before the election they deceive voters by promising "All you can eat!" After the election, the voters are dismayed when they learn the reality: "You will be eaten by all!" They will bicker endlessly while violations of the law are rationalized away.

In fact, all of this could have been avoided before the election. But only if voters had a sense of responsibility and valued their votes. But only if Blue and Green camp voters refused to be manipulated by campaign tactics. But only if they calmly and carefully voted for candidates on the basis of competency, public service, and their contribution to national progress. There would be no need for one social movement after another, destroying the political framework and dividing the social fabric of the nation.

In the history of elections on Taiwan, elected superstars have almost invariably become tragic figures. Voters elected a self-styled Moses, a Don Quixote who tilted at windmills. Voters eleced a greedy "what's yours is mine" kleptocrat. Voters elected a "New Taiwan 1992 consensus president." Are voters more down to earth today? The old addage urges us to "Elect the wise and the able." Electing politicians who can actually govern in the year end seven in one local elections would be a good start.

社論－拋棄英雄崇拜 回歸候選人本質
2014年05月19日 04:10

年底選舉愈來愈近，政治活動漸趨頻繁且麻辣。政黨為求勝選，提名作業可謂葷素不忌、老少咸宜，甚至因人設事、打破既有規則也在所不惜。相關政治人物或是逆來順受、或是習以為常。也許他們心中存有一絲僥倖，認為自己終究會是最後取得勝利與權力的人，因此甘願無聲無息。這也使得年底的選舉平添不少變數與亂象的可能性。

然而，政治人物是否認真思考過：勝選的目的究竟為何，是為了權力嗎？台灣最有權力且最有魅力的兩位政治明星，如今一個在台中培德監獄病院服刑，罹患各種身心疾病，據傳尿失禁1天要換30件褲子；另一個，民調支持度創下9.2％史上最低紀錄，被人們訕笑「台灣新九二共識」，至今施政仍然寸步不行，難有作為。這兩位「前政壇人氣巨星」，是眾多選民一起創造出來的，若說他們的境遇悲慘，那麼，薪資停滯16年沒有成長、貧富差距日益擴大的台灣人民，豈不更該同情憂心嗎？

當然，放在全球架構下觀察，薪資倒退、貧富差距擴大，是世界共同的問題，但台灣經濟基礎雄厚，應該可以表現更好。在全球經濟區域化趨勢下，台灣由於因應無方，已日趨邊緣化，未來將危機重重。這段惡化過程跨越了3位總統的任期，「人氣」與「能力」無關。政黨與政治人物在謀畫如何「勝選」的同時，更應該思考：勝選之後能給台灣帶來什麼遠景、能為人民增添什麼福祉，而不是討好民眾累聚「人氣」。

今年年底的選舉是台灣有史以來規模最大的地方選舉，要選出直轄市長、直轄市議員、縣市長、縣市議員、鄉鎮市長、鄉鎮市民代表、村里長等7項地方公職人員，選民將要選出包括6個直轄市長、16個縣市長等11076名公職人員，簡稱「七合一」。但七合一選舉的性質乃是地方選舉，參選者所發表政見的理念和政策，實在不必拉高到「國家認同」或是「主體性之追求」的層次，做永無止境、虛無縹緲的口舌之爭，而應該回歸到與民眾生活息息相關、實事求是的實踐與操作層面；選民要重視的是候選人的品格與操守，尤其是必須多關注各候選人的「執政團隊」有些什麼樣參與者。經歷過去大大小小的多次選舉，應該已足夠讓台灣選民了解，無論是治理一個國家或是一個城市，乃至於管理地方層級的公共事務，選出人氣高的「救世主」、「超級巨星」，都是不切實際的。

從1996年台灣總統直選至今已近20年；甚至追溯到更早，1946年，台灣省行政長官公署即已舉行各鄉鎮市市民代表普選，之後當選的市民代表選出各縣縣參議員，而縣參議員則選出台灣參議員，可以說是戰後台灣史上首次進行的省民意機關選舉；而1986年組黨後的民進黨第一次參加立委與國代選舉，至今也將近30年了。

然而，這麼多年下來，政治人物和選民對選舉制度的本質和價值有多少認識呢？

選民必須了解，在民主政治環境裡，人民反制掌權者最重要的力量就是選票，然而台灣選民對選票的責任感卻很薄弱，選民對選前的激情、爭執興趣盎然，選完了看看誰贏，有的人開心、有的人難過，然後彷彿一切就結束了。選民這種心態，導致政治人物習慣選前亂開支票，擺出滿漢全席誆你說：「All you can eat！」選後選民才痛苦的發現原來其實是「All can eat you！」然後又吵又鬧，甚至不守法也振振有辭。

其實這一切都是可以在選前盡可能避免的。如果選民有足夠的理智與責任感，珍視手上這張選票，不被藍綠的選舉策略操弄，能夠平心靜氣、認真選出適任的人選，為民眾服務、讓國家進步，又何須事後一次又一次的進行社會運動，既破壞體制又撕裂社會情感呢。

在台灣選舉史上，我們選出的超級巨星，幾乎都成為悲劇英雄；選過以摩西自詡的唐吉訶德式夢幻人物、選過「你家就是我家」的貪婪者，也選出「台灣新九二共識總統」，如今我們是不是該腳踏實地些？從「選賢與能」這個老生常談的理念出發，選出真正能夠做好治理工作的政治人物─希望年底七合一地方選舉，會是好的開始。

Has Taiwan Learned Anything from the Crisis in Ukraine?

Has Taiwan Learned Anything from the Crisis in Ukraine?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 16, 2014

Summary: Although they are different in size, Taiwan and Ukraine have undergone similar experiences. Populist politics, national identity, social divisions, and power struggles have led to lost economic development. Confronted with the Ukraine crisis, we need to engage in self-examination. We need to think about how to forsake populist politics, how to establish a consensus on economic development, and how to revitalize the Republic of China politically, economically, and socially. We need to think about how to make it an attractive, dynamic, and constructive force for cross-Strait peaceful development. This will do more than benefit Taiwan. It will benefit our entire nation.

Full Text Below:

On the 11th of this month, two states in eastern Ukraine held referenda on independence. Polling stations were few. Donetsk City voters were forced to wait in long lines. The US and the EU denounced the referenda as illegal. ( AFP )

Two states in eastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Lugansk, held referenda on May 11. They decided whether to create a autonomous Donetsk/Luhansk People's Republic. or self-styled People's Republic of Donetsk. Election Commission officials said that 89.07% of the voters supported the establishment of autonomous state, while 10.19% were opposed. Luhansk Oblast separatist forces said 96% of the voters support autonomy.

The goals of the referenda were somewhat vague. What exactly constitutes "autonomy?" Is it a declaration of independence from Ukraine and the establishment of an independent nation? Is it a declaration of autonomy within Ukraine, moving Ukraine toward some sort of federalism? The separatist forces who organized the referendum failed to make any of this clear. On the 12th of this month, right on the heels of the referenda, pro-independence forces in two states in Houdon cited the results of these referenda and proclaimed their independence from Ukraine. They refused to participate in the Ukrainian presidential elections scheduled for May 25, and asked the Russian government to allow them to join the Russian Federation. Ukrainian independence has morphed into Russian reunification.

For many the referenda were farces. There was no voter registration, no verification of identities, no ballot security measures, no impartial, neutral vote counting system. There were not even enough votes for a quorum, Naturally Europe and the US refused to recognize the referenda. Even Russian authorities are maintaining a cautious attitude concerning the referenda and their outcomes

If Houdon's referendum was a farce, then isn't the entire Ukrainian crisis merely a larger-scale, more serious farce?

In 1991, Ukraine won independence from the Soviet Union. This was one of the results of the grand strategy of the United States and other Western countries to bring down the Soviet Union. Since then, the Western countries have fought to split Ukraine off from Russia and make it part of Europe. This fight has never ended. If anything, it has become more flagrant. In May 2004, the three Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other former communist countries joined the European Union. The borders of "Political Europe" now reached Ukraine. By the end of the year, the Orange Revolution had erupted in Ukraine. Western pressure, support, and subtle influence made Ukraine's orange revolution the most powerful of all the color revolution opposition groups. Its most significant impact on the world was the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovich, the pro-Russian Prime Minister of Ukraine.

But the orange revolution did not bring Ukraine hope. Inflation worsened and people's living standards fell. In 2010, Yanukovych was democratically elected President of Ukraine. After some waffling, Yanukovych terminated the long negotiated agreement with the EU. He canceled plans to join the EU free trade zone. He strengthened economic and trade relations with Russia. Yanukovych's actions triggered demonstrations by pro-EU forces. The so-called "revolution in Ukraine" eventually led to his downfall, and brought Ukraine even more turmoil and division.

It is fair to say that years of economic stagnation and poverty, coupled with corruption, tyranny, and oligarchic control, led to profound discontent with the Yanukovych regime. The movement initially focused on matters of the people's livelihood and democracy. Unfortunately Ukraine was in the grip of extreme right ultranationalists. These populists hated ethnic Russians and Russia.

Ukraine was once the richest republic in the Soviet Union. It was known as the Breadbasket of Europe. Among the Soviet republics, it had the highest proportion of engineers, the most technologically advanced manufacturing and engineering, and world-class welding technology. Its industrial and agricultural output accounted for one fifth of the Soviet Union's wealth. It was the base for the Soviet Union's military industry. Ukraine is located between the EU and Russia. Its geopolitical situation is complex and sensitive. All parties have intervened aggressively. Ukraine could have used this as leverage. With its unique combination of rich resources, of scientific, technical, and geopolitical advantages, it could have become self-reliant. Alas, these opportunies were repeatedly lost.

Today's Ukraine economy ranks at the bottom of the former Soviet states. After 20 years of independence, economic development has yet to be restored to the level it was in 1990. Real GDP in 2012 was 69.5% of what it was in 1990. Real GDP per capita was 81.1% of what it was in 1990. The nation is in chaos. People are suffering. Some scholars have identified the key. "Ukraine faces domestic problems. Twenty years of independence have not provided answers to problems such as economic development." Its ruling cliques however, have recast domestic issues as national identity issues. They want Russia to follow Europe. The result is that the nation has been divided and the people are suffering.

Houdon's future is in question. The major powers continue their struggle, fully exposing the hypocrisy of the West, Kosovo is permitted to hold a referendum. But Crimea and eastern Ukraine are not. In the past the major powers emphasized human rights over sovereignty. Now they insist the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine is indivisible. What constitutes true happiness and dignity for the Ukrainian people? The major powers have no answers and do not care.

Although they are different in size, Taiwan and Ukraine have undergone similar experiences. Populist politics, national identity, social divisions, and power struggles have led to lost economic development. Confronted with the Ukraine crisis, we need to engage in self-examination. We need to think about how to forsake populist politics, how to establish a consensus on economic development, and how to revitalize the Republic of China politically, economically, and socially. We need to think about how to make it an attractive, dynamic, and constructive force for cross-Strait peaceful development. This will do more than benefit Taiwan. It will benefit our entire nation.

社論－台灣從烏克蘭危機學到什麼
2014年05月16日 04:10 中國時報 編輯部

烏克蘭東部2州11日舉行「獨立公投」，由於投票所有限，頓涅茨克市選民大排長龍。美國和歐盟均稱本次公投違法。（法新社）
烏克蘭東部2州11日舉行「獨立公投」，由於投票所有限，頓涅茨克市選民大排長龍。美國和歐盟均稱本次公投違法。（法新社）

烏克蘭東部兩州頓涅茨克（Donetsk）與盧甘斯克（Luhansk）在5月11日舉行了「公民投票」，決定是否要建立「自治」的「頓涅茨克／盧甘斯克人民共和國」。自封的「頓涅茨克人民共和國（Donetsk People’s Republic）」選舉委員會官員表示，89.07%選票支持建立自治國家，10.19%反對。盧甘斯克州分離主義勢力則宣稱有96%選民支持「自治」。

這場「公民投票」的目標相當曖昧模糊。所謂的「自治」究竟是指什麼呢？是從烏克蘭「獨立建國」？是在烏克蘭內部「自治」，讓烏克蘭走向聯邦制？主辦公投的分離主義勢力並沒有能說清楚。緊接著「公民投票」，烏東兩州的「獨派」在12日援引公投結果，宣布從烏克蘭「獨立」，並拒絕參與烏克蘭預定5月25日舉行的總統選舉，進而要求俄羅斯政府同意它加入俄羅斯聯邦。烏克蘭「獨派」成了俄羅斯「統派」。

對許多人來說，這場公民投票只是場鬧劇。沒有選民登記，沒有嚴格的身分核對，沒有選票防偽措施，沒有公正中立的計票與監票體系，甚至沒有足夠的選票，歐美當然不承認這場公投的有效性，連俄羅斯當局都對公投及其結果抱持比較審慎的態度。

如果我們認定烏東的「公民投票」是場鬧劇，其實，整場烏克蘭危機，何嘗不是更大規模、更為嚴重的鬧劇？

1991年烏克蘭脫離蘇聯獨立，這是美國等西方國家瓦解蘇聯大戰略的結果之一，從此，西方國家爭取烏克蘭「脫俄入歐」的工程不但沒有停止反而更為公開。2004年5月，波羅地海三小國和波蘭、捷克、匈牙利等前共產國家加入歐盟，「政治歐洲」的邊界來到了烏克蘭周圍，同年底，烏克蘭就爆發了「橙色革命」。在西方國家的施壓、支援和「潛移默化」下，烏克蘭的「橙色革命」是當時「顏色革命」風潮中，反對派組織力量最強大、也對世界產生較大影響的一環，而「橙色革命」推翻的正是親俄的烏克蘭總理亞努科維奇。

然而，「橙色革命」上台的政權並未帶給烏克蘭希望，通貨膨脹高漲，人民生活水下降，2010年，亞努科維奇經民主選舉當選新一任烏克蘭總統。經過一番擺蕩，亞努科維奇中止簽署已談判多年的歐盟聯繫國協定，取消了加入歐盟自由貿易區計畫，轉向與俄羅斯強化經濟貿易關係。亞努科維奇的作法，引發親歐盟力量群起示威，所謂的「烏克蘭革命」，最終導致他的下台，更帶來烏克蘭的動盪甚至裂解。

持平說來，由於多年來的經濟停滯和貧困的蔓延，加上腐敗、專制，及寡頭勢力的操控，亞努科維奇政權確實民怨甚深，然而，原本改革運動應聚焦在民生和民主議題上，卻在烏克蘭極端民族主義和極右勢力的把持下，走向了狹隘的排俄（裔）和反俄仇俄民粹風潮。

烏克蘭本來是蘇聯最富裕的加盟共和國，素有「歐洲糧倉」美譽，在蘇聯各加盟共和國中，工程師比例最高、製造業和工程技術最發達，焊接工藝世界一流，其工農業總產值占蘇聯的五分之一，更是蘇聯軍事工業基地。烏克蘭處在歐俄之間，地緣政治關係確實複雜敏感，各方勢力積極介入，原本是烏克蘭可以善用的槓桿，只要巧妙結合富饒資源、科學技術和地緣特點，應有機會走上自主自強的道路，但是，機會卻一再的流失。

如今的烏克蘭，經濟在原蘇聯所有加盟國中墊底，獨立20年，經濟發展仍未恢復到1990年水準，2012年，實際GDP相當於1990年的69.5%，人均實際GDP相當於1990年的81.1%，國家混亂，人民痛苦日益加深。有學者直指要害：「烏克蘭面臨的是國內問題。獨立20多年，卻沒有找到國家發展目標和方式這些基本問題的答案」，但它的統治集團卻把國內問題轉換成國家認同問題：要跟著俄羅斯還是選擇歐洲，結果卻是國家裂解、人民困苦。

烏東前途未卜，列強繼續角力，西方的偽善完全暴露，科索沃可以公投，克里米亞和烏東不行，以往強調人權高於主權，現在說烏克蘭主權和領土完整不可分割，至於什麼才是烏克蘭人民真正的幸福與尊嚴，沒有答案，也沒有列強關心。

雖然面積大小不同，台灣和烏克蘭卻有類似的遭遇：民粹政治、國家認同撕裂、大國角力、發展目標失落。面對烏克蘭危機，我們要反觀自身，思考怎樣揚棄民粹政治，如何凝聚國家發展共識，如何讓中華民國在政治、經濟和社會、文化各方面煥發強大生命力，成為兩岸和平發展道路上，最有吸引力，最有活力，也最具建設性力量的磁極，這應該是最有利於台灣，也最有利於全中華民族。

Pay Raises rooted in Economic Fundamentals, not Populist Rhetoric

Pay Raises rooted in Economic Fundamentals, not Populist Rhetoric
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2014

Summary: The film "The American President" included some wonderful dialogue. At one point, the main character says that politicians usually do not solve problems. They merely provoke anxiety. Then they blame their opponents or some third party for that anxiety. The allegation that "Labour did not receive pay raises because capitalists pocketed all the profits" recalls a a line in the film. After politicians have provoked anxiety, capitalists may well leave. Will the Technology Development Program be distorted? Politicians will shirk responsible for the consequences. If Taiwan politicians and policy makers only wish to incite populist sentiment, do not be surprised if low-pay and low-growth on Taiwan persist.

Full Text Below:

Everyone is now concerned about low wages. Some companies have responded to the government's call to raise wages. This inspires optimism. But some radicals have blamed employers, saying that the long term failure to raise wages was the result of "bosses unwilling to share profits with employees." They even demanded that the law be amended to force companies to either raise wages or pay more taxes. Their alternative is to use the Technology Development Program (TDP) as the basis for wage raises. Their views simplistically reduce pay raises to bosses and employees fighting over who will receive the largest slice of the pie. They totally ignore international labor competition. Raising wages is essential. But too much populist rhetoric will do more harm than good.

Let us begin by calling a spade a spade. Let us first understand what the term "salary" means. In a free economy, salaries are determined by the labor market by labor supply and labor demand. Over the past ten years, Taiwan has experienced a low birth rate. There has been no significant increase in the labor supply. Much low-wage work is being performed by low wage foreign labor. As a result, wages have failed to rise. This is due to a lack of demand for specialized, skilled labor.

But why is labor demand by Taiwan manufacturers inadequate? In the final analysis, it has to do with the global competitiveness of Taiwan companies. Not every Taiwan company is as globally competitive as TSMC, MediaTek, Largan, or Giant. These companies have a strong demand for labor, in research, business, accounting, and production. Salaries for workers in these companies will surely increase. But suppose a company fails to innovate and its products lack distinction? Suppose that in a competitive global environment, the local labor force lacks distinction, and can easily be replaced by others? Salaries will decline due to international competition. They may even approach the levels in low-wage economies such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Chinese mainland.

The current salary freeze on Taiwan is the result of a long term lack of innovative industries with distinctive products. This has led to a reduced demand for their labor. In other words, most companies that lack distinctive products now face global and transnational labor competition. Salaries on Taiwan have not risen in 15 years. That has everyone worried. But we must understand that it was the result of the functioning of a market economy. Stubbornly blaming entrepreneurs or engaging in populist demagoguery will not help.

Basically globalization has created an external logic that countries must follow. For example, capitalists can set up factories around the world. They can outsource services. This external logic makes it difficult for domestic labor to make demands of capitalists. Governments the world over offer favorable conditions to capitalists to persuade them to set up factories. This external logic forces governments to lower taxes in order to keep them from leaving. In short, the external logic is too powerful and tends to override the internal logic in any given country.

If a populist political climate forces business owners to raise wages, what will the result be? Will domestic populist pressures reverse the consequences of inadequate innovation and International competitiveness? Unfortunately they will not. Under populist pressures, business owners may be able to tolerate a slight raise. But capitalists will never allow such domestic determinants to become the norm. The most important force for businesses is the profit motive. Forcing entrepreneurs to pay dividends and taxes means forcing them to pay 20 to 30 cents on every dollar earned. If governments force capitalists to pay too much in taxes, they will leave. So why wouldn't they leave if governments force them to give employees too large pay raises?

Globalization means that the entire world has become one vast market. The external logic of globalization means that market forces are ubiquitous. In other words, "The world is flat." The most important revelation about market forces, is that lone individuals or small countries cannot defy market forces. The best way tiny entities can cope is to go with the flow. We must go with the flow of market forces. We must adopt countermeasures when the time is right. In particular we create opportunities for innovation and upgrading.

The film "The American President" included some wonderful dialogue. At one point, the main character says that politicians usually do not solve problems. They merely provoke anxiety. Then they blame their opponents or some third party for that anxiety. The allegation that "Labour did not receive pay raises because capitalists pocketed all the profits" recalls a a line in the film. After politicians have provoked anxiety, capitalists may well leave. Will the Technology Development Program be distorted? Politicians will shirk responsible for the consequences. If Taiwan politicians and policy makers only wish to incite populist sentiment, do not be surprised if low-pay and low-growth on Taiwan persist.

為勞工加薪要看基本面，不能靠民粹
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.05.15 02:04 am

最近各界聚焦勞工薪資過低問題，也有若干企業主動響應政府加薪之號召，這是值得樂觀看待的發展。但與此同時，也傳出了一些激進的聲音，例如指責勞工長期未加薪是因為「老闆賺錢不想與員工分享」，乃至要求修法強制企業「不加薪就加稅」，或在「科專」計畫評比時把員工加薪列為參考。這些見解，把加薪簡化為老闆與員工「爭大餅」的鬥爭，完全忽略了國際間的勞工競爭問題。促成加薪誠然是必要的方向，但若過度流於「民粹」，則有害無益。

讓我們先正名，了解「薪資」是什麼。在一個自由經濟的社會，薪資一定是勞動市場上由「勞動供給」與「勞動需求」兩方面所共同決定的。過去十幾年，台灣由於少子化等因素，勞動供給沒有明顯增加，許多基層勞力工作則由工資低廉的外籍勞工取代；因此，勞工薪資未能成長，應該是肇因於比較專精的勞動力需求不足。

然而，為什麼台灣廠商的勞動需求會不足呢？追根究柢，當然與台灣企業的全球競爭力有關。如果台灣的企業，家家都像台積電、聯發科、大立光、捷安特那樣具有卓越的全球競爭力，則企業不論在研發、業務、財會、生產方面，都會有極大的勞動需求，這些企業的勞工薪資也一定會水漲船高。但是，如果企業的生產沒有創新、沒有特色，在全球競爭的環境下，其所聘用的是沒有特色、且很容易被他人取代的本土勞工，薪資就會因為國際競爭力低而壓低，甚至向工資低廉的國家（如越南、馬來西亞、中國大陸）看齊。

因此，台灣當前的薪資凍漲，可以說是多年來因為「有特色」的創新性產業比率太低，以致其勞工需求不足；換個說法，也可以說是大多數沒有特色企業面臨全球化跨國勞工競爭的結果。台灣人薪資十五年不漲，大家都很憂慮；但是我們必須要了解：那是市場經濟運作的結果，一味責怪企業家或是搞民粹手法，並沒有實質幫助。

基本上，全球化形塑了一套「外部邏輯」，逼著各國依循這個邏輯走。例如，資本家全球到處可以設工廠，可以外包勞務；這項外部邏輯，逼得國內勞工很難向資方爭權益。全球各國都希望用優惠條件爭取資本家來設廠，這個外部邏輯也逼得各國政府拚命降資本家的稅，以求留住他們。簡言之，外部邏輯太強了，往往會壓迫各國的內部邏輯。

如果國內的民粹氛圍硬逼著企業主加薪，結果將如何？我們內部的民粹壓力，能夠扭轉前述企業特色創新不足、國際競爭力不夠的外部事實嗎？恐怕不然。在民粹壓力下，企業主也許可以忍受小幅加薪，但資本家絕不可能讓這類「被內部邏輯逼得加薪」的事成為常態。企業運作背後最大的動力，絕對是業主「逐利」的欲望。逼著企業家分紅，和逼他們繳稅一樣，都是要他們「賺一百吐出二十、三十」。如果政府逼資本家繳稅他們會出走，那麼為什麼逼資本家給員工加薪他們就不會出走？

全球化，就是指全世界形成一個大市場。而所謂全球化的外部邏輯，就是指全世界無所不在的市場機能，亦即所謂「世界是平的」。市場運作最重要的啟示，就是微小個人或微小國家很難獨自抗拒市場。微小個體最佳的因應之道，就是要嘗試「隨順而轉」：我們一方面順著市場機能因應，另一方面也在因應之時安排種種轉變與對策，尤其要營造創新和升級的機遇。

電影「白宮夜未眠」中有句精彩對話，大意是說：政客通常不解決問題，只激起焦慮，然後，把焦慮的責任推給對手或第三者。「勞工沒加薪是因為資本家獨吞了利潤」這句話，與白宮夜未眠的台詞其實有些相似。政客激起焦慮之後，資本家是否出走、企業科專研發會不會受到扭曲，政客都不會對後果負責的。如果台灣政治人物與決策官員的思路就只是掀起民粹或迎合民粹，那麼台灣今天的低薪與低成長困境，也就不必感到意外。