Begin Healing Society's Wounds

Begin Healing Society's Wounds
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 1, 2016

Executive Summary: Two ex-presidents who were elected following the implementation of direct elections, cling desperately to their former political influence. They continue to wage ideological war. By doing so, they make blue vs. green conflict on Taiwan ever more fierce. Lee Teng-hui relies on the TSU. Chen Shui-bian is worse. His historical legacy is corruption. He entered prison in handcuffs, and became a blot on Taiwan's democracy. Ma Ying-jeou will of course not become another Chen Shui-bian. But he should also avoid becoming another Lee Teng-hui.

Full Text Below:

Public calls for a meeting between the “two Yings”, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen, has finally led to a meeting between the two at the Taipei Guest House. President Ma Ying-jeou, Chairman of the Kuomintang, and President elect Tsai Ing-wen, Chairman of the DPP, formally met. The two exchanged views on foreign affairs, education, energy policy, pensions, and other transition-related issues. This was only the second time the two met since the 2010 debate over ECFA. The ruling and opposition party leaders had a frank exchange of views. Nothing untoward happened. No conspiracy theories were floated afterwards. This was rare on the Taiwan political scene – unseen for decades.

The  two parties differed over minor details, such as whether the talks ought to be open or closed. The two parties sporadically touched upon matters of profundity. Overall, the atmosphere was amiable. It set an example for a society rife with violence and regret, and left the door open for blue green reconciliation. For this, the two deserve praise. The door has been left open. That said, the blue and green camps, as well as Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen, still have much to do.

Do we have regrets? The two sides of the Strait have been separated for six decades. We have gone from open military clashes, to isolation and stalemate. Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping overcame historical animosities in Singapore, with a smile and a handshake. Ma Ying-jeou has been in office for eight years. Why has it been so difficult for the “Two Yings” to sit down and talk? Ma Ying-jeou is only one month away from leaving office. Was it really necessary to delay until now? Blue and green are ironically farther apart than Taiwan and the Mainland. How can we not feel regret? Couldn't the two Yings not have met sooner, without so many preconditions? Couldn't matters of state have been discussed in a calm and rational manner? Wouldn't Taiwan be in a very different place today? Scorched earth democratic civil war has torn Taiwan apart. Wouldn't we have been spared at least some of the pain it caused? 

The meeting between the two Yings was so difficult to arrange because partisan interests invariably trump national interests. We urge future presidents-elect and outgoing presidents learn a lesson from this. Change your attitudes, forsake opposition, and put Taiwan's interests first. For the sake of Taiwan, support each other, help each other. Help each other instead of fighting each other. Heed the voice of reason. Transform society by transcending hostility toward those who hold different views.

Tsai Ing-wen should treat Ma Ying-jeou as a political asset and not as a campaign opponent, especially on cross-Strait issues and pension reform. This is especially true for the former. Deep distrust between the red and green camps will be the greatest danger during a Tsai Ing-wen regime. Ma Ying-jeou vigorously promoted cross-Strait peace. He established trust and understanding between his administration and the Mainland. He can be the lubricant between the red and green camps. He has valuable experience many future presidents could learn from. Ma Ying-jeou will no longer be running for office. He is no longer Tsai Ing-wen's rival. The t wo are no longer locked in a zero sum game. Tsai Ing-wen should find it in herself to adopt a win-win attitude, and cooperate with Ma Ying-jeou for the sake of Taiwan.

Tsai Ing-wen rejected Ma Ying-jeou's previous invitations. After she takes office, Tsai Ing-wen may wish to make Ma Ying-jeou her personal consultant. When she encounters major difficulties, especially with cross-Strait relations, she could consult with Ma Ying-jeou on how to stabilize the cross-Strait situation. On pension reform, Ma Ying-jeou could use his influence. He could help the Tsai government balance different interests in society. Ma Ying-jeou is an outgoing President. He will no longer be involved in election matters. He should break free of political shackles, whether blue, green or red. He is no longer hostage to ideological or political interests. He can rise above them. He can demonstrate his loyalty to the ROC, by promoting cross-Strait security and peace. Is Ma Ying-jeou high-minded enough? If he is, then ex-President Ma could play an even more important role than President Ma.

Two ex-presidents who were elected following the implementation of direct elections, cling desperately to their former political influence. They continue to wage ideological war. By doing so, they make blue vs. green conflict on Taiwan ever more fierce. Lee Teng-hui relies on the TSU. Chen Shui-bian is worse. His historical legacy is corruption. He entered prison in handcuffs, and became a blot on Taiwan's democracy. Ma Ying-jeou will of course not become another Chen Shui-bian. But he should also avoid becoming another Lee Teng-hui. He should become politically detached. He should care only about the ROC's interests. The nation's future must be his sole concern. He must remind himself to be an ex-president of the Republic of China, not an ex-president who belonged to the KMT. He must allow himself to be remembered as the legendary Ma Ying-jeou.

The murder of the little girl known as “Little Light Bulb”, has traumatized society. The tragedy has provoked intense public controversy. But the Little Light Bulb's mother has suppressed her grief and reminded everyone to remember the importance of love. We hope the meeting between the two Yings and the urging of Little Light Bulb's mother, can change peoples' attitudes and heal society's wounds.

撫平社會對立情緒的起點

2016年04月01日 中國時報

眾聲齊催的雙英會終於如期在台北賓館舉行，國民黨馬英九總統和即將接任總統的民進黨主席蔡英文正式會面，雙方就外交、教育、能源、年金等多項交接議題交換意見，這也是兩人繼2010年雙英ECFA大辯論後第二次見面對話。朝野政黨兩位領袖坦率交流意見，會中沒有出現意外場景，會後亦無陰謀論傳出，倒是台灣政黨政治數十年來所僅見。

會談整個過程，除一開始曾為形式上應公開或閉門有一些小歧異、談話過程中偶有小言語機鋒外，整體來說相當友善，為充斥暴戾之氣的社會留下了正面示範，也為藍綠和解開啟了一道門隙。就此而言，應該給兩人掌聲。但這道門隙要成為開敞的迎客之門，藍與綠，蔡英文與馬英九，還有許多要做的事。

若要論遺憾，兩岸隔閡對抗一甲子，從兵凶戰危到孤立對抗，馬英九與習近平已能跨越阻礙與歷史仇恨在新加坡相逢一笑，握手一會。馬英九執政8年，雙英要好好坐下來談話，竟然如此艱難，要到馬英九卸任前一個多月才能一見，藍與綠的距離竟大過兩岸的距離，實在讓人感慨。雙英若能早一點不預設議題、不預設形式、不預設條件，如此這般理性平和會商國事，台灣今天會不會有不一樣的局面？我們相信，台灣至少會少受一些民主內戰的焦土之苦、撕裂之傷吧！

雙英會如此千難萬難，就是把政黨利益放在國家利益之上造成的結果。我們要給雙英的第一個建議是，未來的總統與卸任總統應能記取教訓、改變心態、放下對立，事事以台灣利益為先，為台灣相互扶持，成為彼此的助力，而非互相消耗的阻力。風行草偃之效，必能改變社會不同意見與立場間的對抗仇恨情緒。

在蔡英文這一面，要把馬英九當成「治國的資產」，而不是「選舉的敵人」，尤其在兩岸與年金改革議題上。特別是前者，由於綠紅互不信任，將成為蔡英文治理國家最大的隱患，就這一點，任內大力推動兩岸和平，已與大陸建立互信基礎與默契的馬英九，應該可以成為綠紅潤滑劑，他的經驗也應該有許多是未來總統可以參酌或借鑑之處。馬英九不會再參選，也不再是蔡英文的「對手」，兩人不再有「立場的零和衝突」，蔡英文應以治國的高度找出兩人雙贏、台灣大贏的合作交集。

過去的蔡英文多次拒絕馬英九的會面邀約，未來上任後，蔡英文不妨把馬英九定位為「私人資政」，讓馬英九成為個人諮商對象，遇到重大困難，特別是兩岸關係上的困難，可以徵詢馬英九的意見，共同找出穩定兩岸局勢的方法。在年金改革議題上，馬英九同樣可以運用影響力幫助蔡英文政府，找出不同族群間的利益平衡點。在馬英九這一面，卸任總統後即不再有選舉議題的糾纏，更應在政治上擺脫束縛，不再被藍綠紅意識型態或政治利益綁架，展現新高度向台灣示忠誠、為兩岸保和平。如果馬英九有此心胸見識，說不定卸任後的馬總統，會比在任的馬總統，在歷史上扮演更關鍵的角色。

實施公民直選後的兩位卸任總統，李登輝挾台聯自重，戀棧政治影響力，繼續在意識型態上呼風喚雨，讓台灣藍綠對抗更激烈；陳水扁更不必論，貪汙已成其歷史定位，鋃鐺入獄成為台灣民主政治的汙點。馬英九當不至於成為後者，卻要避免變成前者。他應在政治上力求超脫，真正以台灣利益、國家禍福為唯一掛念，要期勉自己當「中華民國」的卸任總統，而不是「國民黨」的卸任總統，建立讓人懷念的馬英九傳奇。

內湖命案女童小燈泡的離世，已成為社會的重大創傷，再度引發不同意見間的對抗仇視，小燈泡的媽媽卻強忍悲痛，一句一句呼喚要找回台灣對愛的重視。我們希望雙英會和小燈泡媽媽的呼喚，能成為扭轉對抗思維、撫平對立情緒的起點。

Tsai Ing-wen is too Rash, Fails to Understand Beijing

Tsai Ing-wen is too Rash, and Fails to Understand Beijing
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 31, 2016

Executive Summary: The DPP regime is about to assume power. Whether one wants people like this dealing with Beijing, they are the ones whom Beijing will be dealing with. Several recent developments are worrying. Is the DPP treating cross-Strait issues too lightly? Does it not understand the Mainland? Do key leaders and members of the new regime's brain trust not understand Beijing? Are they misjudging the situation, making erroneous decisions that would make the Mainland put the squeeze on Taiwan, and increase the risk of conflict?

Full Text Below:

The DPP regime is about to assume power. Whether one wants people like this dealing with Beijing, they are the ones whom Beijing will be dealing with.

Several recent developments are worrying. Is the DPP treating cross-Strait issues too lightly? Does it not understand the Mainland? Do key leaders and members of the new regime's brain trust not understand Beijing? Are they misjudging the situation, making erroneous decisions that would make the Mainland put the squeeze on Taiwan, and increase the risk of conflict?

In political, diplomatic, and commercial negotiations, success does not accrue to those with brand recognition. It accrues to those able to analyze the larger picture and read their opponent's hand. To prevail during negotiations, one must first analyze the two sides' actual positions to see what chips they hold. Only then can one develop the best policy.

The new government has yet to assume power, but messages have already been sent back and forth between it and Beijing regarding the 1992 Consensus. By May 20, we will know who came out ahead during first round negotiations. The two sides may remain stalled. Washington may continue to act as middleman. But substantive negotiations are already under way. Therefore the DPP must first understand the cross-Strait situation as it stands, as well as Beijing's position. Only then can it avoid making blunders and missing opportunities. Only then can it avoid the impression it is setting traps for Beijing, or engaged in gamesmanship.

When Mainland Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the CSIS in Washington, he spoke of “constitutionalism”. The DPP reacted swiftly, saying that Tsai Ing-wen should "continue to resolve disputes and conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with the current ROC constitutional framework”.  This would seize the initiative, prevent Beijing from reneging on its position, and enable the DPP to observe Beijing's reaction to "two sides, two constitutions".

Alas, the DPP was too rash. It read too much into Wang Yi's reference to “constitutionalism”. It assumed that Tsai Ing-wen's handling of the 1992 Consensus had already passed muster, and that Beijing was backing down. The DPP's misunderstanding makes resolving the dispute even more difficult, and amounts to a missed opportunity.

When the Mainland and Gambia established diplomatic relations, the DPP may have attempted to console the public. When Panama invited both Tsai Ing-wen and Mainland President Xi Jinping to attend the completion ceremony for the canal widening, DPP officials actually envisioned a "Cai Xi meeting" in Panama.

Such foolish inferences make one fear for Tsai Ing-wen's administrative team. Do they have the slightest understanding of “Sinology” or the fundamentals of international power politics?

When Taiwan authorities seek meetings between leaders from the two sides in international venues, Beijing considers that a violation of the "Two Sides, One China" principle. Even meetings between leaders from the two sides at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APEC) pose difficulties. Xi Jinping cannot possibly meet with Tsai Ing-wen in Panama, especially since the Mainland currently lacks diplomatic relations with Panama. Xi Jinping's presence would be interpreted as Beijng's acceptance of "two Chinas". That is clearly impossible.

Therefore when the DPP misuses its media channels to tout a "Panama Tsai Xi meeting", Beijing may conclude that the new government is attempting to set a trap, with the intention of promoting “two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The two sides already lack a basis for trust. Bridge building will become even harder. This is a trap the DPP has laid for itself.

Panama invited leaders from both sides to attend the canal widening completion ceremony. But that could be a warning for our side. Were it not for President Ma Ying-jeou's diplomatic truce, Panama would probably already enjoy diplomatic relations with the Mainland. Over the past seven years, Taiwan's allies in Latin America have supported Taiwan's bid for membership in the United Nations. Only Panama and the Dominican Republic have not. Actually, the fact that Panama invited Xi Jinping to attend, implies that our relationship with Panama is not terribly secure. The DPP should devote more attention to firming up our diplomatic relations, rather than engaging in wishful thinking, and imagining an impossible "Tsai Xi meeting".

According to news reports, Tsai Ing-wen has met privately with Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng. She has urged him not to resign his position as KMT legislator at large, and agree to be named chairman of the SEF. Soon to be Premier Lin Chuan offered no comment. Tsai Ing-wen issued no denial. Therefore there may be some truth to it. If so, Tsai Ing-wen has clearly misjudged both the cross-Strait situation and Beijing's attitude. Wang Jin-pyng and former President Lee are very close. Wang privately inquired about visiting Beijing several times during his tenure in the Legislative Yuan, but was rebuffed every time. This reveals Beijing's attitude toward Wang. If Tsai in fact wants Wang Jin-pyng as her SEF chairman, observers will interpret it as an attempt to lure away the KMT “nativist” faction and to perpetuate Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan independence path. Either way, such a move is hostile to Beijing, and at such a stage, the DPP should not be making any such moves.

As part of one's negotiation strategy, one can of course deliberately raise the stakes, issue tough demands, or even advance absurd proposals, in order to undermine other peoples' expectations. But one must first realize who actually  holds the most chips. One must never forget that the outcome will ultimately be determined during the final showdown by real strength. The DPP must realize that cross-Strait talks began when the January 16 election ended. Every action by the new government, even accidentally or inadvertently, may be interpreted by the other side as a negotiating tactic.

Therefore before May 20, any senior official in the new government charged with cross-Strait matters must realize that negotiations are already in progress. They must be vigilant. They must avoid reckless speech. They must not misjudge the situation. They must not misinterpret Beijing's position, provoking an unnecessary showdown or collision between the two sides.

蔡英文既不瞭解北京 又太輕率

2016年03月31日 中國時報

民進黨政府即將上台，未來不論要以何種面貌與北京交往，終需自己面對交手的結果。

近來若干情勢發展，卻讓人擔憂，民進黨是否對兩岸問題太過輕率，或是太不瞭解大陸，造成領導核心、重要幕僚與智囊集體誤判客觀的形勢和北京當局的立場，因而做出錯誤的決策，導致大陸縮緊對台政策彈性空間，兩岸風險升高。

不論是政治、外交或商業談判，成功並不屬於擁有好牌的人，而屬於能夠分析通盤局勢、了解對手如何出牌者。想在談判中獲勝，必須先實際地分析雙方的立場和籌碼，才能擬定對自己最有利的策略。

事實上，新政府還沒上台，就已經和北京對如何化解「九二共識」進行一連串隔空談判，而且在520時第一階段的談判就會進行得失清算。就算目前雙方仍舊停留在透過華府協調和隔空對話，但實際的談判已經在進行；因此，民進黨首先必須認清當前的兩岸情勢和北京的立場，才不會在談判過程中，犯下錯失先機、自限陷阱和不當博弈的閃失。

當大陸外長王毅在華府智庫CSIS提出「憲法說」時，民進黨本可立即接下，蔡英文若能提出「執政後將繼續依據現行中華民國憲政體制處理彼此爭議並推動兩岸關係」來回應，不但能搶得先機，拉住北京不讓立場退後；還可以繼續試探對手對「兩岸兩憲」的態度。

可惜民進黨的回應太過輕率且過度解讀，把王毅的「憲法說」當成蔡英文處理「九二共識」過關的依據，造成北京立場退縮，讓化解彼此爭議變得更加困難，也錯失了先機。

再如大陸和甘比亞建交，民進黨或許出於安撫國人，當巴拿馬同時邀請蔡英文與中國國家主席習近平出席運河拓寬竣工典禮時，黨內竟然有人認為有可能在巴拿馬實現「蔡習會」。

這樣錯誤的推論，實在令人不得不擔憂蔡英文未來的執政團隊中，對於「中國學」和當前國際情勢的基本火候。

因為北京當局迄今依舊認為台灣方面鼓吹兩岸領導人在國際場合會晤，是違反「兩岸一中」原則，如果兩岸領導人連在亞太經濟合作會議（APEC）領導人會晤都有困難的情況下，習近平斷不可能在巴拿馬和蔡英文會晤，何況中巴目前沒有外交，習近平如果出席，國際將解讀為中國在外交上已經接受「兩個中國」，這基本上是不可能出現的情況。

因而，當民進黨過度透過媒體著墨「巴拿馬蔡習會」，反而造成北京判斷是新政府故意設下陷阱，有意搞雙重承認或「兩個中國」、「一中一台」，這會讓已經欠缺互信基礎的雙方，未來搭橋會更加困難，這是民進黨自己給自己設下的陷阱。

進一步說，巴拿馬同時邀請兩岸領導人出席運河拓寬竣工典禮，反而可能是對我方外交的示警。因為如果不是兩岸之間因為馬英九總統的兩岸外交休兵政策，巴拿馬很可能已經和中國大陸建交；即便如此，過去7年中，台灣在拉丁美洲的友邦中，巴拿馬和多明尼加從來沒有連署支持台灣加入聯合國。巴拿馬邀習近平出席，反過來說就是我們和巴國的邦誼並非很穩固；民進黨應該花更多的心思去推演如何鞏固邦交，而不是一廂情願的費力想像不可能實現的「蔡習會」。

媒體報導蔡英文私下與前立法院長王金平接觸，擬敦請辭去國民黨不分區立委，改任海基會董事長。對這項傳聞，準閣揆林全說無法評論，蔡英文也沒有否認，想來有幾分可能。但此事若為真，明顯又是蔡英文誤判兩岸形勢和北京態度。王金平和李前總統關係極深，他在立法院長任內幾度私下探詢訪問北京都無法成行，顯示北京對王的態度。蔡英文如果真的找王金平出任海基會董事長，外界將解讀是挖國民黨本土派出走，是延續李登輝路線。不論哪一項，都是對北京釋放不友善的訊號，現階段，民進黨最不該下這一著棋。

談判策略中，固然可以故意拉高籌碼、提出強硬的要求或荒謬的提議，破壞對方預期；但前提是了解雙方籌碼的實際分比，絕不能忘記實力才是最後攤牌的勝負依據。民進黨必須清楚認知，兩岸談判自116選舉結束就已經展開，新政府每一個動作，就算是意外、無心，也可能被對岸解讀為是一種談判策略或姿態。

因而新政府在520前，高層任何牽涉到兩岸議題或人事的安排，都要有「談判中」的戒慎警覺，不能輕率操弄言論、不能錯估形勢、不能錯誤解讀北京立場，導致兩岸不必要的攤牌、對撞。

DPP Will Set Electricity Rates and Work Hours Upon Assuming Power

DPP Will Set Electricity Rates and Work Hours Upon Assuming Power
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 30, 2016

Executive Summary: The government handover is at hand. The DPP is about to cut electricity rates and eliminate national holidays. This makes the situation particularly interesting. When the DPP was out of power, it could preach loudly from atop a high horse. Now that it is in power, it must balance goals and means, ideals and reality. The DPP is about to ascend the throne. It should put away its empty opposition era boasts. Electricity rates and labor issues provide two touchstones.

Full Text Below:

Key Tsai Ing-wen policy aide Chang Ching-sen recently launched an attack on the Ministry of Economic Affairs, demanding that it suspend electricity rate cuts. But even DPP legislators do not support Chang's demand. They intend to rate electricity rates on schedule. Also, the Ministry of Labor is cutting mandated working hours, and simultaneously cutting seven national holidays. Labor groups have launched protests. Therefore the Legislative Yuan does not intend to investigate, and has temporarily put the proposal on hold. These two controversial proposals were hastily withdrawn. Perhaps just as well. Tsai Ing-wen can deal with them after May 20.

"Wait for the Democratic Progressive Party to deal with them after it takes over" is not necessarily a joke. For starters, it is consistent with political responsibility. The DPP must state its policy, and bear all responsibility for them. Next, this will prevent them from advocating two sets of standards. When the DPP is out of power, it trumpets one set of standards. But if the DPP does an about face after it is in power, it will have a lot of explaining to do to voters.

Chang Ching-sen demanded that the Ministry of Economic Affairs suspend electricity rate cuts. Party insiders and outsiders alike hold differing opinions on this. That of course does not mean Chang's proposal has nothing to recommend it. In fact, Taipower's financial status and rate structures are distorted. Allocating billions to solve long-term problems, or improve air quality with new energy sources, may be more desirable than a rate cut. The problem is that given Chang Ching-sen's status, the manner and timing of his proposal was inappropriate.

Consider his status. The old and new governments are in transition. Every current official has his counterpart in the new regime. Chang Ching-sen considers himself Tsai Ing-wen's chief policy official, possibly even her new premier. He visited current Minister of Economic Affairs Teng Chen-chung to discuss the matter on his own. Internally he may have committed a faux pas. Externally, he may have violated the current minister's authority. Consider his manner. The rate cut is based on Legislative Yuan resolutions and rate formulas. Chang Ching-sen did not even bother to study the matter with the party caucus. He attempted to show off by riding off on his own. Instead he merely revealed his ignorance about how the system works.

Consider his timing. The Taiwan Power Company announced the April rate cut some time ago. The public welcomed the move. Chang Ching-sen objected to the rate cut only a few days before it was scheduled to go into effect. He gave neither the ruling and opposition parties, nor the public any time to react. He launched a crude sneak attack. Consider the inappropriateness of Chang's move. The DPP has repeatedly condemned Taipower for inept management. The DPP disregards countless losses suffered by the company. Instead it calculates electricity rates according to an overly simple formula and is demanding lower rates. Now Chang Ching-sen is openly demanding that rate cuts be suspended. The DPP now appears as if it is repeatedly flip-flopping. Chang Ching-sen's call to delay rate cuts is not altruistic. Tsai Ing-wen promised "no rate hikes for a decade". Chang is trying to make it easier for her to fulfill her promise. But he is ignoring the feelings of the people and government decision-making due process.

Currently, rates are reviewed every six months. Once the DPP comes to power, if it wants higher prices to compel public energy conservation, it can reevaluate rates in October. By then, Tsai Ing-wen's new energy policy may be incorporated into the rate formula, as part of broader planning considerations. Of course, Chang must remember to consult DPP legislators, and be prepared to sell his proposals to the public.

Labor fought for national holidays. Now the ball is back the DPP's court. Eliminating seven national holidays is mainly an accommodation. Labor wanted “two days off every week” changed to “40 hours a week”. In fact, the same issue arose 16 years ago, when the DPP came to power for the first time. It raised a hue and cry and got “two days off every week”. Now the problem has returned. To obtain two days off every week on behalf of labor, the KMT must eliminate national holidays. Will the DPP offer a clever solution?

Take a close and impartial look at the recent DPP draft of the "National Holiday and Holiday Implementation Regulations". Eliminate the days that the Ministry of Labor would "commemorate but not take off", including Teacher's Day, Taiwan Retrocession Day, and Chiang Kai-shek's Birthday, seven altogether. The two parties appear to have reached an understanding. Moreover, Tsai Ing-wen once blurted out, "There are too many holidays!” She frequently met with industry in an effort to revitalize the economy. If she is bent on economic revitalization, how can she shower benefits on labor by giving them seven days off? Labor's attitude is also worth noting. Suppose the KMT had eliminated seven holidays, wouldn't that be characterized as “exploitation”? But now that the DPP is doing it, will labor resist it to the bitter end?

The government handover is at hand. The DPP is about to cut electricity rates and eliminate national holidays. This makes the situation particularly interesting. When the DPP was out of power, it could preach loudly from atop a high horse. Now that it is in power, it must balance goals and means, ideals and reality. The DPP is about to ascend the throne. It should put away its empty opposition era boasts. Electricity rates and labor issues provide two touchstones.

聯合／電價和工時，民進黨執政後自己調

2016-03-30 01:36 聯合報 聯合報社論

 

蔡英文重要政策幕僚張景森最近發難要求經濟部緩降電價，但此議連民進黨立委都不支持，降價決定如期實施。與此同時，勞動部調降法定工時案同時刪除七天國定假日，因勞團發動抗爭，立法院不予備查而暫擱。這兩項爭議，與其倉促拉扯，不如等蔡英文五二○上任後自己面對處理。

「等民進黨執政後自己處理」，並不是一句風涼話。一則，這樣更符合「責任政治」的精神，自己要的政策自己說清楚，後果自己負；二則，也可以避免兩套標準，民進黨在野時談的是一套標準，執政後若要改變方向，必須自己向選民說清楚。

張景森要求經濟部暫緩調降電價，雖遭黨內外異口同聲反對，並不表示他的想法絕不可取。事實上，以台電財務狀況和電價結構之扭曲，這數百億元若用來解決長期性的問題，乃至保留作為改善空汙或發展新能源之用，都會比降價花掉更具綜合實效。問題是，張景森的提法，從角色、時機和正當性各方面看，都顯不恰當。

就角色論，新舊政府正處於「交接」狀態，雙方互有對口人員，而張景森自恃「蔡英文政策辦公室執行長」和可能的「新閣員」身分，逕自找現任經濟部長鄧振中商談此事，對內有僭越之嫌，對外則侵犯現任部長職權。何況，電價調降是根據立院決議和電價公式而來，張景森並未和黨團研商此事即逕自行動，顯示他有個人英雄式作風，卻缺乏體制觀念。

就時機而言，台電宣布四月一日調降電價已一段時日，民眾對此大表歡迎；而張景森卻在降價實施前數日提出異議，完全未留給朝野討論及社會反應的空間，這是對民意的突襲，委實過嫌粗暴。就正當性而言，民進黨屢屢痛責台電經營不力，且不顧台電虧損累累而僅依簡單的發電成本算式要求降價；如今張景森卻公開力阻電價下調，造成民進黨立場反覆的印象。再者，張景森提出緩降的大道理其實也不無私心，主要是蔡英文承諾過「十年內電價不大漲」，他意在為她爭取實踐承諾的空間，卻忽略民眾感受和政府決策的正當程序。

目前，電價固定每半年檢討一次，民進黨執政後，若覺得應以高電價督促民眾節能，可以在十月重新思考調漲。屆時，不妨將蔡英文的新能源政策精神灌注到公式中，作更宏觀的規畫調整。當然，也別忘了先徵詢民進黨立委意見，並作好說服民眾的準備。

至於勞工所爭的國定假日要如何定奪，現在球也又回到了民進黨手裡。國定假日減少七天，主要是伴隨勞動時數由「雙周八十四小時」減為「每周四十小時」，所做的同步調整。相同的議題，其實在十六年前民進黨首次執政時即有過一番叫價，才得到「雙周八十四小時」的變形工時；如今問題捲土重來，為使勞工皆得以週休二日，國民黨必須刪減國定假日，民進黨會不會有高明的解決辦法？

事實上，細觀民進黨最近所提的《紀念日與節日實施條例》草案，不偏不倚，也悉數刪除了勞動部認定「只紀念不放假」的教師節、光復節、蔣公誕辰等七個國定假日，彷彿雙方已有默契。再說，蔡英文曾脫口說出「勞工假太多」，她又頻頻拜會工商企業，顯露旺盛的拚經濟企圖。如果一心拚經濟，又要大手筆多給勞工七天假，她有可能達成目標嗎？此外，勞團的態度也值得觀察，如果國民黨刪七天國定假日就是剝削，那麼換成民進黨做，是不是會抗拒到底呢？

正當新舊政府交接，電價下降和節日削減的爭議在此時爆發，格外值得玩味。在野者可以大唱理想主義的高調，執政者則必須講求目標與手段的平衡、理想與現實的折衝。民進黨即將登上執政的寶座，它也要收拾自己在野時誇下的海口，電價和工時議題可謂提供了兩塊試金石。

Joint / electricity and hours after the DPP own tune
2016-03-30 01:36 Joint United Daily News newspaper on

Tsai important policy aide Zhang Jingsen recently launched an attack requires the Department of Economic slow down the price, but even this agenda DPP legislators do not support, decided to proceed with the implementation of the price. Meanwhile, cut the statutory working hours Lao Dongbu text deletes seven days a national holiday, because labor groups launched protests, not the Legislative Yuan for reference and is dormant. These two disputes, rather than hastily pulled, as Tsai Ing-wen Wu Er ○ Once appointed they face treatment.

"After the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and other deal with their own", not a sarcastic. One, which is more in line with "political responsibility" in the spirit, they have to make it clear that the policy of their own, the consequences of their negative; two, two sets of standards can be avoided, when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party is talking about a set of criteria, after the ruling to change direction, must make it clear to the voters themselves.

Zhangjing Sen requested the Ministry of Economy to suspend tariff cut, although the party was unanimous opposition outside, does not mean that his ideas not desirable. In fact, in a twisted Taipower financial status and tariff structures, which billions of dollars if used to solve long-term problems, as well as to retain or improve air pollution with the development of new energy, the price will be more than spend more comprehensive results. The problem is that Zhang Jingsen formulation, from the role, the timing and legitimacy of each side, all was not appropriate.

On the roles of old and new government is in "transition" status, both sides have counterparts, while Zhang Jingsen count, "Tsai Ing-wen policy office executive" and possible "new cabinet members' identity, went to find the current economy minister Teng Chen-chung in to discuss the matter, internally there are suspected transgression, violation of the current minister of foreign powers. Moreover, the price cut is based on the resolutions of the Legislative Yuan and price formulas come Zhangjing Sen did not matter and that is to study and caucus went actions show that he had a personal hero style, but the lack of institutional concepts.

On occasion, the Taiwan Power Company has announced the April price cut for some time, the people of this large table welcome; and Zhang Jingsen have raised objections to the implementation of the price in a few days before, did not fully discuss the ruling and opposition parties and social reaction space is left, this is a public opinion raid, really had too rough. On legitimacy, the DPP has repeatedly lambasted poor run Taipower and Taipower despite countless losses and only the cost of electricity by a simple formula demand for lower prices; Zhang Jingsen now openly bid to block tariff cut, resulting in the DPP's position repeated impression. Moreover, Zhang Jingsen proposed Descent truths in fact, not altruistic, mainly Tsai promised "no price rose within a decade," he intended for her commitment to fight for space practice, while ignoring the feelings of the people and government decision-making due process.

Currently, the price is fixed every six months to review, after the DPP came to power, if that should be a high price to urge the public saving, can rethink hike in October. By then, it might be a new energy policy Tsai spirit poured into the equation, as broader planning adjustments. Of course, do not forget to consult the views of DPP legislators, and make preparations to convince people.

As the labor dispute to decide how national holiday, and now the ball back to the hands of the DPP. Reduce national holiday, seven days a major number of working hours is accompanied by the "Fortnight eighty-four hours" Save as "forty hours a week," doing synchronization adjustment. The same issue, in fact, six years ago for the first time the ruling Democratic Progressive Party that is been some outcry, before they get deformed hours' Fortnight eighty-four hours "; the question now making a comeback, for the labor day weekend to all KMT must deletion of a national holiday, the DPP will have a clever solution?

In fact, micro DPP recently proposed draft "Day and Festival implementing regulations", impartiality, and remove all the Lao Dongbu finds "not only to commemorate the holiday" Teacher's Day, Independence Day, Chiang Kai-shek's Birthday, etc. seven national holiday, as if the two sides have been understanding. Moreover, Tsai Ing-wen had blurted out "false labor too much," she was frequently called on businesses, revealing strong economic revitalization attempts. If bent on economic revitalization, but also more generous to labor seven days off, she might reach a goal? In addition, the attitude of the labor group is also worth observing that if the KMT deleted seven days national holiday is exploitation, then replaced by the DPP to do, is not it will resist in the end it?

Just old government handover, the price decline and festivals cut controversy at this time the outbreak, particularly worth pondering. Opposition can sing idealism of high-profile, rulers must balance the emphasis on goals and means, the ideal and the reality of dispute. DPP about to board the throne of the ruling, it should clean up their own opposition to boast when under the sea, electricity and labor issues can be said to provide two touchstone.

How to Avoid a Head-On Collision between the CCP and the DPP

How to Avoid a Head-On Collision between the CCP and the DPP
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 29, 2016

Executive Summary: The Mainland clearly intends to adhere to its basic position that "both sides are part of one China". But conditions inside and outside the DPP, as well as partisan conflict on Taiwan, will probably make it impossible for Tsai Ing-wen to meet Mainland expectations in her inaugural speech. Does that mean the CCP and DPP will therefore collide head on like two freight trains? Does that mean all that we can do is stand by and wring our hands?

Full Text Below:

The Mainland clearly intends to adhere to its basic position that "both sides are part of one China". But conditions inside and outside the DPP, as well as partisan conflict on Taiwan, will probably make it impossible for Tsai Ing-wen to meet Mainland expectations in her inaugural speech. Does that mean the CCP and DPP will therefore collide head on like two freight trains? Does that mean all that we can do is stand by and wring our hands?

To explore this question objectively, we must seek agreement between the CCP and DPP.  We must understand the evolution of the Mainland's Taiwan policy. The Mainland's Taiwan policy is not a monolith. It has undergone repeated modifications, primarily in two phases. The first phase began with Mao Zedong's "liberate Taiwan", and ended with Deng Xiaoping's "peaceful reunification, one country two systems". During this first phase, the two sides had no official contacts and the private sector had only low level contacts. During the Hu Jintao era, the Mainland proposed "cross-Strait peaceful development" leading ultimately to peaceful reunification. The Mainland expressed goodwill towards Taiwan, expanded mutually beneficial cooperation in a variety of areas, initiating a new, second phase in Taiwan policy.

In 2005, following the Lien Hu summit, cross-Strait peaceful development began in earnest. Later, when Ma Ying-jeou assumed office, cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation increased by leaps and bounds. Cultural, scientific, and technological exchanges increased. The two sides signed 27 agreements. The private sector established links and a variety of convenience enhancing measures. Cross-Strait exchanges were now in full swing.

Cross-Strait peaceful development was the Mainland's first Taiwan policy to receive widespread acceptance. It played a huge role in the normalization of cross-Strait relations. But the ultimate goal remained peaceful reunification. This made it highly controversial on Taiwan. The Mainland hopes to sign a peace agreement formally ending hostilities. It seeks a clear definition of cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait interaction, one that will resolve the chief problem of national identity. The Ma government once considered this as a major plank in its election platform. But unequal benefits from cross-Strait interaction led to widespread social discontent. Anti-Mainland sentiment spread. The DPP successfully stigmatized any cross-Strait peace agreement as a “surrender agreement”. Internal acceptance on Taiwan plummeted. During the KMT party chairmanship election, Hung Shiu-chu raised the issues once again, only to encounter a severe backlash from fellow party members.

Voters once supported a cross-Strait peace agreement. But now many harbor doubts. Part of this is the result of long term stigmatization by the opposition DPP. But to many on Taiwan, peace has become the norm. Few appreciate it because they have forgotten how difficult peace was to come by. Tense confrontations in the Taiwan Strait no longer offer them reminders. When the new government comes to power, cross-Strait relations are likely to revert to unpredictability. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to respond to the 1992 Consensus. Nor has she responded to the Mainland's one China principle. This is clearly undermining the political basis for cross-Strait exchanges.

The Mainland has repeatedly emphasized that changes in Taiwan's internal political situation will not change the Mainland's Taiwan policy. Tsai Ing-wen has pledged not to provoke the Mainland. But the experience of the Chen Shui-bian era offers us a reminder. When the two sides cannot communicate through official channels, mutual suspicions may generate sparks resulting in a conflagration. If Taiwan's internal politics change, the government might repeat the mistakes of the Chen era. It might be tempted to use cross-Strait disputes to distract from discontent with the ruling party. Cross-Strait relations would assuredly be unable to withstand such pressures.

Such an outcome must be prevented. The rule of law may be able to consolidate the fruits of cross-Strait relations, by providing cross-Strait interaction with a legal framework. At the very least, it could become part of the DPP party platform. This would help prevent setbacks in cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait relations could fall prey to a new Cold Peace. The possibility makes the institutionalization of cross-Strait relations even more urgent. A cross-Strait declaration of intent would undoubtedly help prevent an escalation of cross-Strait tensions.

During the Chen era, cross-Strait tensions escalated to the point where the US suggested an interim agreement. It hoped the two sides would sign an agreement freezing the cross-Strait status quo for 20 to 30 years. This would enable the two sides to establish a mutually agreeable form of interaction, gain experience, increase mutual trust, and ultimately resolve cross-strait relations for the next generation. When the Ma administration came to office, cross-Strait relations progressed rapidly. The need for an agreement to avoid tensions became less urgent. Now this need has reappeared. The ruling and opposition parties must give the matter their full attention.

When Tsai Ing-wen visited Washington, she proposed a definition of the "status quo". The US approved. Back on Taiwan, she accepted the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus, and past cross-Strait agreements. Ma Ying-jeou said that the 27 agreements signed with the Mainland over the past eight years essentially constitute a peace agreement. He considers seeking substantive agreement better than demanding a formal peace agreement.

Can the DPP All Peoples Conference issue a political commitment to the public on Taiwan, to the Mainland authorities, and to the international community? If it can, it would help consolidate cross-Strait political relations.

The DPP will hold an All Peoples Conference. It should issue a resolution defining the "status quo". It should promise to negotiate the Mainland and sign an "agreement to normalize cross-Strait relations", thereby contributing to normalized exchanges between the CCP and DPP.

如何避免民共火車對撞？

2016年03月29日 中國時報

大陸展現堅持「兩岸同屬一中」的基本立場，但衡諸民進黨內外情勢與台灣政黨對峙現實，可能很難期待蔡英文的就職演說，能做出讓大陸可以接受的論述，那麼，民共的火車真的即將對撞嗎？我們只能心急如焚袖手旁觀嗎？

要客觀探究這個問題，勉力找出民共之間可能的共識，應先理解大陸對台政策的沿革與理路。大陸對台政策並非鐵板一塊，曾經數次調整，大致分成兩個階段。第一階段從毛澤東時代的「解放台灣」開始，到鄧小平時代的「和平統一、一國兩制」，這個階段兩岸官方互不往來，民間低度往來。胡錦濤時代提出「兩岸和平發展階段論」，宣示大陸在實現和平統一的終極結果之前，將致力向台灣釋放善意，與台灣各領域展開互利合作，對台政策進入新階段。

2005年連胡會後，兩岸和平發展進入實質操作階段，馬英九執政後兩岸經貿合作日趨緊密，文化、科技等諸領域的合作也更加頻繁，並簽署了27項協議，兩岸民間往來也開放三通和種種便捷化措施，讓兩岸進入大交流大發展時期。

兩岸和平發展政策是大陸對台政策第一次得到台灣社會廣泛接受，對兩岸關係正常發展進程發揮了巨大的促進作用。但其終極目標仍然是和平統一，這在台灣社會內部卻仍然具高度爭議性。大陸希望在這一階段能夠簽署和平協議，結束兩岸敵對狀態，明確兩岸關係定位，解決兩岸互動的主體身分問題，馬政府也曾將此作為主要政見爭取選民支持。但隨著兩岸互動過程中的分配不均問題引爆社會不滿，反中情緒開始瀰漫，「兩岸和平協議」也被民進黨汙名化為投降協議，台灣社會內部接受度大大降低，洪秀柱在國民黨主席選舉時提出相關議題，也受到黨員反彈壓力。

過去選民曾經支持簽署兩岸和平協議，現在卻普遍抱持疑慮，固然與反對黨的長期汙名化有關，但不能否認，在台灣人認知裡，「和平」已成為正常狀態，不再有得來不易的珍惜之心，也不再對台海緊張對峙有警覺之意。隨著新政府上台，兩岸關係很可能再度進入禍福難料時期，蔡英文遲遲未就九二共識表態，也沒有回應大陸有關一中原則的喊話，顯然將侵蝕兩岸活動的既有政治基礎。

雖然大陸兩次三番強調不論台灣內部政局如何變動，大陸對台的基本方針不會改變，蔡英文承諾對大陸絕不挑釁，但陳水扁時代的種種情境提醒了我們，當兩岸官方不能有效溝通，兩岸產生相互疑慮之心，星星之火也會引發大火。但我們更擔心，隨著台灣內部政局的變動，政府仍然有可能重蹈扁政府覆轍，以兩岸紛爭分散台灣內部對執政黨的壓力，這無疑是兩岸關係不能承受之重。

為了避免上述情況的發生，以法治化的形式鞏固兩岸關係既有發展成果，並將兩岸互動模式和原則以法律形式固定下來，或至少在民進黨內成為政綱的一部分，將有助於避免兩岸關係逆轉。在兩岸關係可能進入冷和的背景下，兩岸關係制度化的需求就更為急迫，兩岸之間簽署更具原則性和宣示性的政治協議，無疑有助於避免兩岸關係重新走入緊張對立的階段。

美國在扁政府兩岸關係緊張對立時代曾提出「中程協議」議題，希望兩岸簽署一個在20年到30年的時間內凍結兩岸現狀，建立雙方可接受的互動模式，以積累經驗並增加互信，最終幫助兩岸關係在下一代得到解決。後來馬政府上台，兩岸關係長足進步，使得簽署協議避免緊張的需要變得不那麼迫切。現在這種需求再度顯現，值得朝野各黨重視。

蔡英文在華府提出了「現狀」的定義，獲得美國認同，在國內又承諾願接受九二共識的歷史事實及過去兩岸談判的互動成果與協議。馬英九曾強調，過去8年與大陸簽署的27項協議也算廣義的和平協議，換句話說，與其拘泥於文字意義上的和平協議，不如在過去協議的基礎上尋求實質的共識。

在此思路下，如果民進黨能以全代會決議文方式，使之成為對台灣社會及大陸與國際社會的政治承諾，兩岸政治關係的基礎或許就可以建築得更深厚紮實。

民進黨即將舉行全代會，如果能夠以決議文的方式表述民進黨的「現狀」定義，並承諾願以開放的立場與大陸進行簽署「兩岸關係正常化協議」協商，或有助於跨越民共正常交往的最後一哩路。

Rise and Fall of the Boao Forum: Xi Jinping's Two Turns of Phrase

Rise and Fall of the Boao Forum: Xi Jinping's Two Turns of Phrase
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 26, 2016

Executive Summary: Boao is no longer a remote fishing village. Over the past decade, the Mainland has become a colossus.  If Tsai Ing-wen is willing to affirm the 1992 Consensus, Beijing will naturally be pleased. But even if she chooses to side with the US and Japan, and to incite cross-Strait enmity, that is already something the Mainland expects and is ready for.

Full Text Below:

Vincent Siew has returned to the lonely Boao Forum. In 2008, as vice president, he attended on behalf of President Ma Ying-jeou. He and Hu Jintao restarted cross-Strait negotiations, which had been severed for over a decade. He made possible the spectacle of the two sides reconnecting after a half century. Today however, this glorious image appears to have faded into memory.

The Boao Forum has become a microcosm of tumultuous cross-Strait relations. Boao was once a mere fishing village on Hainan Island. While blue vs. green battles raged back on Taiwan, a lonely Vincent Siew attended the forum, virtually unnoticed. Ma Ying-jeou later chose him as running mate. Upon winning the election, Boao suddenly became the bright pearl of Hainan Island. Economic and trade officials from all over, as well as the newly elected Vice-President of the Republic of China and the President of the People's Republic of China, spoke freely here. The two sides of the Strait turned a page in history here.

But looking back at Boao and cross-Strait relations, that image scene has become blurred, and now looks bleak. Two years ago, at this very moment, students occupied the Legislative Yuan and smeared this historic occasion as “a betrayal of Taiwan”. Vincent Siew traveled there alone this year. He met with Li Keqiang. But the meeting was strictly pro forma. Siew and Hu held an extraordinary summit. But Tsai Ing-wen has no interest in making it shine any brighter.

History has reversed its verdict, from night to day. This cannot be blamed solely only the youths who occupied the Legislative Yuan two years ago. It must also be blamed on years of DPP Taiwan independence indoctrination. Is Tsai serious about "maintaining the cross-Strait status quo"? After all, the status quo was the handiwork of Ma Ying-jeou. If she is, then how can the DPP repudiate this eight year achievement, and parade Ma Ying-jeou through the streets as if he were a traitor to the nation?

These contradictions show that under Tsai Ing-wen, cross-Strait relations will be dangerously unpredictable. After all, how can Beijing possibly believe that Tsai Ing-wen, author of the two-states theory, will actually concede that “the two sides are part of one China"? How can Beijing possibly believe that Tsai Ing-wen, who pronounced the Republic of China DOA, will do her best to “abide by the ROC constitutional framework"?

Vincent Siew met with Hu Jintao in Boao, mainly because Ma Ying-jeou had long recognized the 1992 Consensus. Vincent Siew was therefore permitted to attend. When Hu Jintao spoke on the Beijing-Washington Hotline, he expressed the desire to resume cross-Strait negotiations. Clearly, cross-Strait exchanges depend on more than mere political declarations. They require a clear record of words and deeds by persons or political parties. Tsai Ing-wen's political masterpiece is the two-states theory. How can she possibly expect Beijing to believe any of her current political rhetoric?

Xi Jinping expects Tsai Ing-wen to affirm that the "two sides are both part of one China" in her inaugural address. Tsai Ing-wen finds it difficult even to utter the term “1992 Consensus”. Xi probably assumes she will find it impossible to utter the words “both are part of one China”. Richard Bush, who shuttles between the Taipei and Beijing, does not think Beijing is seeking common ground with Tsai Ing-wen. Thefore Beijing is not pinning its hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. Instead it is relying on its own political and economic might, rather than Tsai Ing-wen's political rhetoric.

When the People's Daily reported on the 1992 Consensus, it used the terms "historical fact", and "core meaning". These two terms remain the political guideline for cross-Strait interaction. But Tsai Ing-wen cannot possibly respond to them. This makes Xi Jinping's two turns of phrase all the more intriguing. His first turn of phrase was, "shared cross-Strait destiny". His second was, "In order to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, the Mainland must first develop and progress".

The Taiwan Affairs Office recently posted a Xinhua News Agency analysis of Xi Jinping's remarks on its home page. It made the article the lead. The article focused on the meaning of Xi's two phrases. Consider the first phrase. During two party sessions this year, Xi Jinping spoke of "increasing cross-Strait economic and social integration and development", and "narrowing the emotional distance between compatriots, and enhancing awareness of a shared destiny". This probably means that the CCP has no intention of severing cross-Strait economic links in order to punish the public on Taiwan.

But even more noteworthy is how the article picked up on last year's phrase, "In order to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, the Mainland must first develop and progress", and made it the topic of two party sessions. This was no accident. It suggests that the CCP still subscribes to materialism, and believes that the future of the two sides will be determined by material forces on the Mainland.

Boao is no longer a remote fishing village. Over the past decade, the Mainland has become a colossus.  If Tsai Ing-wen is willing to affirm the 1992 Consensus, Beijing will naturally be pleased. But even if she chooses to side with the US and Japan, and to incite cross-Strait enmity, that is already something the Mainland expects and is ready for.

從博鰲盛衰看習近平新兩句話

2016-03-26 聯合報

蕭萬長又回到了寂寞的博鰲論壇。二○○八年，他以副總統當選人身分，銜準總統馬英九之命，跟胡錦濤拍板重啟已中斷十年的兩岸協商，開闢了兩岸分隔半世紀後僅有的盛景。而如今，這個歷史鏡頭彷彿成了羞赧的記號，它所創造的繁華景象也彷彿不久之後即將消失。

博鰲在偶然間成了兩岸關係榮枯的縮影。早年博鰲只是海南一座小小漁村，在台灣沉酣於藍綠惡鬥的年頭，蕭萬長獨自一人寂寞地參與這個論壇，幾乎無人聞問。在馬英九力邀他搭檔並一舉勝選後，博鰲突然成了耀眼的南島明珠，在各國經貿人士的見證下，熱騰騰剛當選的中華民國準副總統，與人民共和國的國家主席在這裡暢敘歡言，兩岸的新歷史列車也從這裡轟隆啟動。

然而，此刻再從博鰲回看兩岸，卻已成模糊蕭瑟之景致。兩年前的此刻，學生占據國會議場，將歷史賜予的機遇一竿子皆打成賣台行徑。今年蕭萬長踽踽獨行，雖然仍與李克強一晤，也只能行禮如儀。蕭胡會所締造的兩岸另類峰會，蔡英文毫無興趣將它燒成一口更加紅火的灶。

這樣天壤之判的反轉，其實不能只怪兩年前那群盤踞國會的年輕人，而在於民進黨經年催化出來的台獨教條。如果蔡英文真認為馬英九所創造的「兩岸現狀」就是她想要維持的現狀，那麼，民進黨何以這八年卻全力詆毀，將馬英九的成績形容成必須遊街示眾的賣國罪行？

從其中矛盾，正可以看到未來蔡英文執政下的兩岸，將是險峻危顫、禍福難測。因為，北京豈能想像，一個執筆兩國論的蔡英文竟可能直呼兩岸「同屬一中」？又豈能信服，一個曾稱中華民國已然流亡的蔡英文，真會戮力遵行中華民國的「憲政體制」？

蕭萬長當年在博鰲會見胡錦濤，主要肇因於馬英九對「九二共識」的長期認同，因此蕭萬長獲派出席後，胡錦濤即在中美熱線裡主動表露重啟兩岸協商的願望。可見，兩岸的往來基礎絕非僅繫於一句政治表白，而是在一個人或一個政黨長期各項言行的總和。蔡英文的政治傑作是其兩國論，那麼，如何奢望北京輕信她此刻的任何政治語言？

習近平將蔡英文就職演說的答題標準，拉高到「兩岸同屬一個中國」的核心意涵，或許早就料定蔡英文恐怕連「九二共識」的表面文章都難說出口，遑論「同屬一中」。這也是卜睿哲穿梭兩岸的重大發現：「與蔡英文求同存異似乎不是北京的目標。」據此，似可斷定，北京並不寄希望於蔡英文，它寧可倚恃自己的政經實力，而不是蔡英文的演說修辭。

亦即，人民日報所稱的九二共識「歷史事實」、「核心意涵」兩句話，固然仍是兩岸未來互動的政治準則，但蔡英文不能回應這兩句話恐已是確鑿的結論。那麼，習近平新的兩句話更加值得玩味：他的第一句話是「兩岸命運共同體」；第二句話則是「把握兩岸關係的未來走向，首先是大陸的發展進步」。

國台辦網站近日將一篇新華社解讀習近平談話的文章置於主頁頭標上，文章即重點琢磨了這兩句話。關於第一句話，習近平在今年兩會上表明，將「深化兩岸經濟社會融合發展」，以「拉近同胞心靈距離，增強對命運共同體的認知」。這或可解讀為，中共當不會任意斬斷兩岸經濟動脈，以懲罰台灣民眾。

但更值注意的是，這篇文章將去年這句「兩岸走向繫於大陸發展」之舊話特別撿拾起來，作為今年兩會談話的補綴，絕非偶然。這似乎意味信奉唯物主義的中共已意識到：兩岸最終決勝點，在於大陸的物質力量。

孜孜十餘年，博鰲已不再是個偏鄉漁村，而大陸也已長成魁梧的巨人。對北京而言，蔡英文願答覆九二共識，固然受到歡迎；就算她選擇附和美日、挑弄兩岸心結，恐怕也在意料之中，且已有了對案。

Transitional Justice? What about Optimer Pharmaceuticals and Taiwan Styrene?

Transitional Justice? What about Optimer Pharmaceuticals and Taiwan Styrene?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 25, 2016

Executive Summary: Transitional justice means that improper KMT party assets should be recovered. For that, this newspaper has long expressed support. But what the DPP offers is phony justice. It is demonizing opponents and purging them, merely to clear the way for its own political and financial interests. It is ignoring ongoing injustices. If it persists, transitional justice will become transitional injustice. Today, the DPP is willing to talk only about KMT party assets. It turns a blind eye to Optimer Pharmaceuticals and Taiwan Styrene. One can conclude only that “Justice may not be completely blind, it is at least half-blind”.

Full Text Below:

The DPP is holding high the banner of "transitional justice", demanding the recovery of Kuomintang party assets and settling old scores. But recent turmoil in the stock market is something the DPP must answer for. It should enable the public to consider a different aspect of transitional justice.

Turmoil first erupted when Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey gave Optimer Pharmaceuticals stock his glowing recommendation. But news soon emerged that his daughter Wong Yu-hsiu, owned a huge number of Optimer Pharmaceuticals shares. This was clearly a conflict of interest. Nor was that all. Tsai Ing-wen's brothers and sisters are among Optimer Pharmaceuticals' ten largest shareholders. Turmoil erupted a second time when a proxy fight broke out within the Taiwan Styrene Monomer Corporation. A company formerly owned by the KMT, was now the exclusive domain of green camp shareholders. Chen Shui-bian faction member Lin Wen-yuan was now fighting New Tide Faction elder Wu Nai-jen for board chairmanship. Each side recruited money men to help them do battle. Wu Nai-jen attempted to make his 30 year old daughter board chairman. He has already successfully deposed Lin Wen-yuan.

What do these two developments have to do with transitional justice? First of all, the DPP has long attributed Taiwan's problems to "historical injustices" perpetrated during early Kuomintang rule. There is a kernel of truth to this. But it also creates an illusion. It leaves the impression that the DPP is the embodiment of justice, utterly free of corruption. This impression is not just wrong. It is also dangerous. Secondly, some social injustices are rooted in history. But others are current. During the DPP's eight years in power, it accumulated enormous power and influence. This political power and financial influence has grown by leaps and bounds during Ma's eight years in office. The green camp has monopolized Taiwan Styrene. Optimer Pharmaceuticals executives and green camp politicians have been working hand in glove. This is what enabled Lin Chuan to receive a 20 million dollar annual salary from the private sector. Thirdly, the DPP pays lip service to "generational justice". It swears that it cares for the younger generation. But the Optimer Pharmaceuticals and Taiwan Styrene scandals reek of inherited power and wealth. So just how convincing are the DPP's shrill slogans?

Take the Optimer Pharmaceuticals scandal for example. Suppose Wong Chi-huey was not the president of Academia Sinica. Suppose he was an ordinary scientist, dedicated to his specialty. Then touting Optimer Pharmaceuticals shares would be a purely personal matter. In a normal society, scientists should be free to express their opinions, especially when they are addressing their specialties. But Wong Chi-huey touted Optimer Pharmaceuticals stock in his capacity as Academia Sinica president. What's worse, he claimed he owned no shares. But it turns out his shares were purchased in his daughter's name, and that he is the company's tenth largest shareholder. Wong Chi-huey touted Optimer Pharmaceuticals stock for his persona profit. Naturally he will be subject to criticism.

Other suspects include Tsai Ing-wen's brother Tsai Ying-yang, a major shareholder in Optimer Pharmaceuticals, and head of the Fu-tai Investment Co, as well as Ruentex Group CEO Yin Yan-liang. Entrepreneurs investing in promising biotechnology companies in the marketplace is perfectly normal. But Yin Yan-liang is also the person who bought Tsai Ying-wen's shares in Yu-chang. This July, Yin Yan-liang was a candidate for fellow of the Academia Sinica Engineering and Science Group. It makes one wonder. Was  Wong Chi-huey paying back Yin Yan-liang before leaving office? Is it really appropriate to reward business sector sugar daddies with academic titles?

Taiwan Styrene was a company owned and operated by the KMT. That it has fallen prey to green camp politicians and businessmen strikes one as particularly ironic. The Lin Wen-yuan faction and the Wu Nai-jen faction once dressed themselves up as reformers. Now they are the spitting image of crony capitalists, Masters of the Universe, fearless and insatiable. Even more interestingly, their manipulation of the stock market utterly "transcends blue and green".  For them, it's kill or be killed. Their sole concern is family or personal interests in the hundreds of millions. Table manners? What are they? Recently New Tide Faction member Hung Chi-chang was purged, on grounds that he was "too close to Su Chi". Hung Chi-chang was decapitated, merely because he was concerned about cross-Strait relations. Wu Nai-jen amassed an illicit fortune in the stock market, yet is given a free pass. What values does the New Tide Faction still hold, if any?

Transitional justice means that improper KMT party assets should be recovered. For that, this newspaper has long expressed support. But what the DPP offers is phony justice. It is demonizing opponents and purging them, merely to clear the way for its own political and financial interests. It is ignoring ongoing injustices. If it persists, transitional justice will become transitional injustice. Today, the DPP is willing to talk only about KMT party assets. It turns a blind eye to Optimer Pharmaceuticals and Taiwan Styrene. One can conclude only that “Justice may not be completely blind, it is at least half-blind”.

轉型正義看不見浩鼎與台苯案？

2016-03-25聯合報

正當民進黨高舉「轉型正義」大旗追討國民黨黨產，並清算各項歷史舊帳之際，最近發生在股市的兩起風波，恐怕是他們必須正視的事，同時也恰可讓社會大眾思考轉型正義的不同觀照面。

第一起風波，是中研院長翁啟惠稍早為浩鼎炒股大力背書，近日卻爆出其女翁郁琇持有大量浩鼎股票，顯示他恐未遵守「利益迴避」原則；此外，蔡英文之兄姊亦為浩鼎前十大股東。第二起風波，是台苯經營權之爭，原屬國民黨黨營事業的台苯如今淪為綠營人士的禁臠，扁系人馬林文淵和新系大老吳乃仁為爭董座相持不下，各援引市場實力派助陣決戰；其中，吳乃仁企圖將卅幾歲的女兒推上董事長寶座，並已成功拉下林文淵。

為什麼說這兩件事與轉型正義有關？第一，民進黨長期將台灣各種問題歸咎於國民黨早年的「歷史不正義」，這容或有局部道理，卻也造成一個錯覺，彷彿民進黨就是正義的化身，沒有貪腐的問題。這樣的印象不僅是錯誤的，也是危險的。第二，社會的不正義有些是歷史因素，有些卻是現在進行式。民進黨執政八年期間，其實也累聚了可觀的政商人脈及權勢能量，在馬政府的八年依然源源不斷；台苯為綠營所壟斷，浩鼎的政商人脈，林全在民間企業年領兩千萬薪資，皆是因此之故。第三，民進黨將「世代正義」掛在嘴上，口口聲聲要照顧年輕世代；但反觀浩鼎及和台苯的運作，卻充滿「權力世襲」及「財富世襲」的氣味。在這種情況下，民進黨高喊正義有什麼說服力？

在浩鼎風波中，如果翁啟惠不是中研院長，而只是一介潛心鑽研的科學家，他要如何為浩鼎新藥辯護，其實是他個人的事。一個正常的社會，應能接納科學家直抒見解，何況這項技術確具關鍵性。問題在，翁啟惠不僅以其中研院長身分為浩鼎背書，更嚴重的是，他聲稱自己未持有任何浩鼎股票，卻被發現其實是以女兒名義持股，而且持股量高居第十大股東。如此一來，翁啟惠為浩鼎護航，就涉及了自身的龐大利益，當然引人非議。

除了翁啟惠，同時受到外界質疑的是，浩鼎的大股東名單中，還有蔡英文之兄蔡瀛陽主導的富鈦投資及潤泰集團總裁尹衍樑。企業家投資前景看好的生技公司，其實是市場正常現象；但尹衍樑除了是當年買下蔡英文宇昌股票的接手人，今年七月中研院院士選舉名單，尹衍樑竟也列名「工程科學組」院士候選人。這難免令人質疑，翁啟惠趕在卸任前回報尹衍樑。將院士的學術名器，用來酬謝企業家金主，真的合適嗎？

至於台苯，國民黨黨營事業變成綠營政商人士的俎上肉，更顯得格外諷刺。無論是扁系的林文淵或新系的吳乃仁，一朝脫下改革戰袍，馬上就地變成了呼風喚雨的資本家，且生冷不忌，胃口奇佳。更值得注意的是，他們和股市的作手合縱連橫，完全「超越藍綠」；而雙方殺來殺去，所爭的全是數以億計的家族或個人利益，到了不顧吃相的地步。日前新潮流將洪奇昌除名，理由是他「和蘇起走得太近」。試想，洪奇昌因關注兩岸關係卻遭開鍘，吳乃仁在股市聚斂家族利益反而相安無事；一殺一縱之間，新系的價值觀到底顯現了什麼內涵？

從「轉型正義」的觀點，國民黨的不當黨產應該追討；這點，本報已多次表示支持。但我們要提醒的是：民進黨抱持的如果是一種狹隘甚至虛偽的正義觀，一味妖魔化對手，利用清算鬥爭的手法來攢積自己的政治利益，卻不將目光投注到當下社會現行的不公不義，不反省民進黨人士在台灣社會的鑽營苟且；那麼，轉型正義只會被扭曲成「轉型不正義」。就像今天，奢談黨產卻看不到台苯和浩鼎的不公不義，那只能說是半盲的轉型正義。

Both Sides Must Demonstrate Greater Goodwill

Both Sides Must Demonstrate Greater Goodwill
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2016

Executive Summary: During an interview with this newspaper, Tsai Ing-wen addressed the Mainland, saying she hoped it would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. She said the two sides should increase mutual trust by a show of goodwill, before May 20. Tsai appears to realize the importance of mutual trust and goodwill in cross-Strait relations. The Ma government maintained successful cross-Strait relations for eight years by recognizing the 1992 Consensus and avoiding provocative behavior. By understanding the requirements for cross-Strait cooperation, the Ma government and the Mainland gradually increased mutual understanding and trust. This enabled exchanges to be held on higher and higher levels, and eventually made the successful Ma Xi summit possible.

Full Text Below:

During an interview with this newspaper, Tsai Ing-wen addressed the Mainland, saying she hoped it would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. She said the two sides should increase mutual trust by a show of goodwill, before May 20. Tsai appears to realize the importance of mutual trust and goodwill in cross-Strait relations. The Ma government maintained successful cross-Strait relations for eight years by recognizing the 1992 Consensus and avoiding provocative behavior. By understanding the requirements for cross-Strait cooperation, the Ma government and the Mainland gradually increased mutual understanding and trust. This enabled exchanges to be held on higher and higher levels, and eventually made the successful Ma Xi summit possible.

But goodwill is more than mere lip service. The Ma government's experience should serve as a lesson for Tsai Ing-wen. If she genuinely wishes to make a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland, she must focus on the Mainland's core concern – the 1992 Consensus. The Ma government's clear recognition of the 1992 Consensus was precisely the right response to the Mainland's policy expectations. The full implementation of direct links, of a diplomatic truce, of Mainland tourism and Mainland exchange student programs, were all gestures of goodwill based on these expectations. The Mainland reciprocated, offering generous concessions to Taiwan. It relaxed restrictions on Taiwan's participation in international organizations and the signing of free trade agreements with other countries. The Mainland refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with many of Taiwan's diplomatic allies out of consideration for the Ma government. Can Tsai Ing-wen's new government achieve the same level of cross-Strait relations as the Ma government? That is highly doubtful. The reason is a lack of mutual trust, especially since Tsai Ing-wen obstinately refuses to issue a clear statement addressing the Mainland's chief concern.

Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland have been gradually narrowing the gap between them. The Mainland issued strong statements, both before and after the election. But during two party sessions this year, Mainland leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed the party's intention to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. This would not change in response to internal political changes on Taiwan. Not only that, he pledged to increase cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation in a number of areas, in order to increase cross-Strait economic and social integration, to ensure the welfare of compatriots, to bring them closer, and to increase their sense of shared destiny. Despite radical rhetoric emerging from among the public, Mainland officials have yet to criticize the new government. Instead, they have merely expressed hopes. Resumption of diplomatic relations between the Mainland and Gambia is widely viewed as mild pressure on Tsai Ing-wen. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stated that the Mainland's policy of peaceful cross-Strait relations remains unchanged. The Mainland apparently hopes the event will not be blown out of proportion, and undermine overall cross-Strait relations. Also, the Mainland military has refrained from commenting on the cross-Strait situation. The Mainland clearly has no intention of getting tough with Taiwan. These moves are Mainland expressions of goodwill toward the new government. Their intent is to ensure friendly cross-Strait interactions. Tsai Ing-wen has called on the Mainland to demonstrate goodwill. She needs to appreciate these expressions of goodwill from the Mainland, and reciprocate with enthusiasm.

Tsai Ing-wen has responded positively to the core concerns of the Mainland on two occasions. While visiting the US, she pledged to promote peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations under the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework. She pledged to build on the foundation of 20 years of negotiations and interactions. Upon winning the election, Tsai said she understands and respects the fact that in 1992, ARATS and the SEF held talks, during which the two sides sought common ground. This brought her a step closer to the Mainland's insistence on the 1992 Consensus. That said, Tsai Ing-wen and the Mainland remain far apart. The Mainland is not merely talking about acknowledging the fact of the 1992 Consensus, but of accepting its core meaning.

Nor is that all. Tsai Ing-wen has underscored the importance of public opinion on Taiwan. Perhaps in her mind, the election results amount to a vote of no confidence in the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. Perhaps they represent an attitude of defiance toward the Mainland. Tsai may think public opinion on Taiwan can serve as a shield against the Mainland.  She may think she can use this to force the Mainland to accept her position. But she has clearly underestimated the Mainland's iron will. She has misjudged public opinion on Taiwan as well. The public on Taiwan may may object to certain aspects of cross-Strait exchanges. But that does not mean it wants the new government to set cross-Strait relations back to what they once were. For most people, continued normal cross-Strait relations remain indispensable.

Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen must re-examine her hostility toward the Mainland. She must avoid strategic miscalculations. She must think hard about what the public on Taiwan can accept. The Mainland must understand cross-Strait policy rhetoric. Only then can it demonstrate genuine goodwill. We naturally understand Tsai Ing-wen's resistance to the 1992 Consensus. We realize Tsai Ing-wen must cope with pressure from both inside and outside the party.  Publicly accepting the One China Principle does indeed present practical difficulties. Tsai may wish to start from the periphery, and show her eagerness to address the Mainland's concerns.

She could, for example, call for a freeze on the expression of Taiwan independence political attitudes in the forthcoming party congress. She could call for a resolution in the legislature, promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations under the existing Republic of China constitutional framework. She could call for a new government policy path, based on the rule of law. She could regulate the behavior of party legislators. She could call on them to reduce rhetorical attacks on the Mainland, or even rethink their Chinese identity. These would demonstrate goodwill toward the Mainland. If Tsai can do these, we believe the Mainland would respond in kind. 

兩岸都需要釋放更多善意

2016年03月23日 中國時報

蔡英文接受本報專訪時向大陸喊話，希望對岸釋放更多善意，並表示520之前兩岸應該透過互釋善意來累積信賴。看得出來，蔡英文意識到善意和互信在兩岸交流進程中的重要性，馬政府8年之所以能在兩岸關係上取得巨大成就，除了承認九二共識這一基本前提外，也是因為在與大陸互動過程中做到了不挑釁、重合作的行為要求，在不斷的兩岸互動過程中，馬政府與大陸方面不斷累積互信和默契，這才有了後續交流層級的不斷提升，直至馬習會的成功舉行。

但善意絕不是嘴上說說那麼簡單，馬政府的經驗提醒蔡英文，要對大陸釋放善意，就應關注大陸的核心關切，馬政府堅持九二共識恰恰是對大陸對台政策底線的積極回應。而全面開放三通、外交休兵、開放陸客陸生等政策，則是在此基礎上的進一步善意舉動。對此大陸也投桃報李，不僅積極對台讓利，而且放鬆對台灣參與國際組織以及與別國簽訂自貿協定的限制，面對台灣許多邦交國的建交要求，大陸也都考量與馬政府的友善關係而婉拒。展望未來，蔡英文的新政府能否達到馬政府時期的兩岸關係高度，恐怕要打上問號，其原因正在於雙方互信不足，而蔡英文也遲未就大陸的核心關切表達明確接受的訊息。

當然蔡英文與大陸彼此間的立場落差已逐步縮小，雖然選前、選後大陸對台系統多有強硬言論，但在今年兩會上，大陸領導人習近平還是宣示將繼續推動兩岸關係和平發展，不會因台灣內部政局變化而改變。不僅如此，他進一步提出持續推進兩岸各領域交流合作，深化兩岸經濟社會融合發展，增進同胞親情福祉，拉近同胞心靈距離，增強對命運共同體的認知。拋開民間的許多激進論述來看，大陸官方對新政府始終未展示批評態度，而是更多的表達期許。陸甘復交事件雖然被普遍視為對蔡英文的輕度施壓，但大陸外交部和國台辦也都在第一時間表態推動兩岸關係和平發展的方針不變，顯然是希望這一事件不要被擴大解讀，避免影響兩岸關係的大局。另外，大陸軍方一直都未對兩岸局勢發表意見，顯示大陸官方並不會以強硬手段對台施壓。大陸的這些動作其實都在對新政府釋放善意，為未來兩岸的互動營造友善氛圍。要求大陸釋放善意的蔡英文，應對大陸這些善意舉動有更明確的感知，並給予積極回應。

蔡英文針對大陸的核心關切主要在兩個場合做了正面表態，先前在美國她明確表示將在中華民國現行憲政體制下，在20多年來協商與交流互動所累積的成果基礎上，依循普遍民意，持續推動兩岸關係的和平穩

定發展。勝選之後蔡英文進一步表示，她理解和尊重1992年兩岸兩會會談的歷史事實以及雙方求同存異的共同認知，這等於進一步趨近大陸對九二共識的原則堅持。但是，蔡英文的這一系列趨近動作畢竟跟大陸的要求還有一段距離，大陸的態度是，不能只承認九二共識的歷史事實，更應接受其核心意涵。

不僅如此，蔡英文著重強調台灣民意的重要性，或許在她看來，今年的大選結果表達了對馬政府兩岸政策的不信任，也表達了對大陸的抗拒態度，因此台灣民意可以成為她拒不接受大陸要求的擋箭牌，可以以此來迫使大陸接受她的主張。但這顯然低估了大陸對一中原則的堅定意志，也錯估了台灣的民意態度。台灣民眾對兩岸交流的現狀有不滿意見的表達，並不等於希望兩岸關係因為新政府的上台出現倒退，對大多數人來說，延續兩岸關係的正常發展趨勢仍是當前非常重要的課題。

因此，蔡英文必須重新審視自己對大陸的消極態度，避免戰略誤判，積極思考台灣內部民意可以接受，而大陸也能理解與認可的兩岸政策論述，如此才是對大陸真正釋放善意。當然，我們也理解蔡英文對「九二共識」的抗拒態度，也清楚地表白蔡英文所要面對的黨內、黨外壓力，公開接受一中原則也確有現實困難，那蔡英文不妨先從周邊做起，向大陸釋放解決問題的積極態度。

譬如，可以在即將舉行的黨代會上推動新決議文的通過，表達凍獨的政治態度。或在立法院推動通過主決議文，宣示在中華民國現行憲政體制下推動兩岸關係和平發展，從法治角度確立未來新政府的施政方向。除此之外，如能規範黨籍立委的行為，減少對大陸的攻擊言論，甚至重新思考情感上的中國人認同，這些都可向大陸展現善意，如果蔡英文能做到，相信大陸將回以善意。

Beware Critical Loss of Economic and Diplomatic Links

Beware Critical Loss of Economic and Diplomatic Links
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 23, 2016

Executive Summary: We would like to remind Tsai that the international political climate is changing. Will the DPP's cross-Strait strategy remain mired in thinking from 20 years ago, inadequate for today's situation? If Tsai wants to avoid the simultaneous loss of economic and diplomatic links, she must handle cross-Strait relations with care.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen still refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. As a result, cross-Strait relations have undergone subtle changes. Despite the unwritten diplomatic truce, the Mainland announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Gambia. The Taiwan Affairs Office cited "technical problems" as the reason it missed a hotline call from the Mainland Affairs Council. A few days earlier, ARATS chief Chen Deming played unprecedented hardball, saying the Mainland was “through talking about the MTA". Since 2008, political and economic links have been established with great difficulty. Now that Tsai Ing-wen is about to assume power, are these links about to be broken?

These broken links include economic links, and diplomatic links. In 2004, the Mainland became Taiwan's second largest trading partner, for the fourth year running. Taiwan's economic growth momentum was Mainland-based. On a foundation of  mutual trust, Taiwan sought to join regional economic organizations, to sign free trade agreements, and to take advantage of international markets to undergo industrial upgrading. Taiwan's economic development plan was to proceed from cross-Strait economic links, to free trade agreements, to industrial upgrading. Take diplomatic links for example. The two sides would establish a negotiating framework based on mutual trust. A diplomatic truce would enable the two sides to cease competing with each other. This would enable Taiwan to participate in international organizations and enjoy increased international breathing room. Taiwan's three links diplomacy would be: cross-Strait negotiations, leading to increased diplomatic space, leading to international participation.

In short, both economic links and diplomatic links depend upon cross-Strait relations. They are a vital part of the ROC's economy, trade, and diplomacy. Changes in cross-Strait relations affect our foreign relations. It affects the survival of Taiwan's industry, and Taiwan's economic growth. We cannot look at cross-Strait relations solely from an ideological perspective, while ignoring its importance to Taiwan's economic survival and diplomatic relations.

DPP economic, trade, and diplomatic strategy has long clung to two delusions. Delusion One is thinking that Taiwan's economy can bypass the Mainland, and rely entirely upon international and domestic demand. Hence the DPP "New Southern Strategy" to eliminate dependence on the Mainland market. But the Mainland is ASEAN's largest trading partner.  The China - ASEAN Free Trade Area has already been formed. ASEAN has close diplomatic relations with the Mainland. If cross-Strait relations have not been properly handled, any "New Southern Strategy" will run up against fear and resistance from ASEAN countries. Conversely, if Taiwan maintains stable cross-Strait economic relations, it can integrate itself into the regional economy, and through emerging market development support the upgrading of its domestic industries. This is the smart way to maintain Taiwan's economic development.

The second delusion is that Taiwan's relations with foreign nations can bypass the Mainland, and rely solely on support from the US and Japan. This is why the DPP emphasizes linking with the US and Japan to counter the Mainland. But in recent years, the rise of the Mainland has affected many international issues. The US and Japan need the Mainland to help solve the North Korean nuclear issue, and the Middle East refugee issue. This is why the United States and Japan may confront the Mainland in the South China Sea, but stop short of making a complete break. If the DPP is smart, it will use stable cross-Strait relations to give itself leverage on regional issues, in order to maximize Taiwan's interests. In other words, stable cross-Strait relations can increase Taiwan's international profile, provide it with opportunities for international participation. Such a strategy would be wiser by far.

A few days ago Tsai Ing-wen attended Taiwan's Clinical Medicine Academic Conference. She suddenly became “Dr. Tsai” and took Taiwan's economic pulse. She said that according to Traditional Chinese Medicine theory, Taiwan's political and economic systems are seriously out of balance, and require thorough readjustment. They require the development of key industries, allowing Taiwan's industrial chain to begin moving again. But how can cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's economic growth each go their own way? If one neglects cross-Strait relations, how can Taiwan's economic and diplomatic links remain in operation?

Tsai Ing-wen now enjoys “total government”. Now is the time for her to transcend blue vs. green political divisions. Now is the ideal time for her to lead Taiwan's economic breakthrough and seek new opportunities. But the opportunity is fleeting. She must strike while the iron is hot. Otherwise the ruling and opposition parties will resume their partisan bickering. Lack of agreement between the two parties over cross-Strait relations would result in stalemate. By then, any talk of a bright future by Tsai Ing-wen would find no traction.

We would like to remind Tsai that the international political climate is changing. Will the DPP's cross-Strait strategy remain mired in thinking from 20 years ago, inadequate for today's situation? If Tsai wants to avoid the simultaneous loss of economic and diplomatic links, she must handle cross-Strait relations with care.

小心台灣的「雙斷鏈」危機

2016-03-23 聯合報

在蔡英文遲不承認「九二共識」的情況下，近期兩岸關係出現了微妙的變化。中國大陸不顧與我「外交休兵」的默契，宣布與甘比亞建交；國台辦也以「技術」問題，「漏接」來自陸委會的熱線電話。稍早數日，海協會長陳德銘逕自稱貨貿協議已經「談完」，亦是一記硬球。兩岸自二○○八年以來好不容易建立的政治、經濟的協商互信基礎，在蔡英文上台前夕，是否可能相繼「斷鏈」？

所謂「斷鏈」，包含「經濟鏈」與「外交鏈」兩個概念。中國大陸在二○○四年成為台灣最大的貿易夥伴後，台灣經濟成長動力幾以大陸為依託，在兩岸互信的基礎下尋求加入區域經濟組織，並與它國簽署自由貿易協定，藉由國際市場的開拓來進行產業升級。「兩岸經濟—ＦＴＡ—產業升級」可謂台灣「經濟鏈」的三環節。在「外交鏈」方面，兩岸則在一定的互信基礎下建立制度性協商，經由「外交休兵」的共識停止邦交競逐，台灣藉此參與國際組織並拓展國際空間。「兩岸協商—外交空間—國際參與」便是台灣外交鏈的三環節。

簡言之，無論在經濟鏈或外交鏈，兩岸關係都是台灣經貿和外交的重要環節。一旦兩岸關係生變，不僅影響我國對外關係，也勢必影響台灣產業的生存發展，進而衝擊經濟成長。也因此，看待兩岸關係，不能僅從意識形態出發，而忽略它對台灣經濟和對外關係的重要性。

長期以來，民進黨的經貿、外交戰略存在兩種迷思。其一，認為台灣的經濟可以跳過大陸，僅靠國際或內需；就此，民進黨提出「新南向政策」，要擺脫對大陸市場的依賴。然而，中國不但是東協最大的貿易國，中國—東協自由貿易區早已成形；在東協與中國大陸緊密的外交關係下，如果不能處理好兩岸關係，「新南向政策」在東協國家也恐將橫生阻力。換個角度看，台灣若能藉由穩定的兩岸經濟關係，找到融入區域經濟的契機，並透過新興市場的開拓來支撐國內的產業升級，這才是維繫台灣經濟發展鏈的明智之舉。

第二個迷思是，認為台灣的對外關係可以繞過中國大陸，只需仰賴美日的支持；也因此，民進黨更強調聯美日來抗衡中國。然而，近年中國的崛起，在許多國際問題上，美日都需要假手北京的協助解決，如北韓核問題及中東難民問題，這也是美日兩國與大陸在南海問題上始終「鬥而不破」的主因。民進黨如果聰明的話，應藉由穩定的兩岸關係在區域問題上借力使力，才能為台灣爭取最大的利益。換言之，透過穩定的兩岸關係來擴大台灣的國際能見度，讓台灣找到國際參與的契機，才是更高明的戰略。

蔡英文日前參加台灣中醫藥臨床學術大會時，曾化身「蔡醫師」為台灣經濟把脈。她根據中醫強調整體均衡的理論，認為台灣政治、經濟正處於嚴重失衡的狀態，需要好好的調理；而透過重點產業的發展，可以讓台灣的產業鏈重新動起來。但是，經濟與兩岸關係猶如台灣的任督二脈，一旦要去除兩岸關係這個因素不顧，如何能讓台灣的經濟鏈和外交鏈順利運作？

蔡英文取得完全執政的優勢，這是她引領政治跳脫藍綠對立的最佳時刻，也是她帶領台灣經濟突破轉型成長遲滯的大好機會。問題是，機會稍縱即逝，如果不能好好把握，一旦朝野再度陷入惡鬥的循環，一旦兩岸關係又因民共兩黨缺乏共識而演成僵局；屆時，蔡英文要談什麼美好願景或共創未來，恐怕都將無從著力。

我們要提醒蔡英文：當國際形勢和氛圍已發生物換星移的變化，民進黨的兩岸戰略如果仍停留在廿年前的思維，勢必不足以應付今天的局面。尤其，若不想面對台灣經濟鏈和外交鏈的「雙斷鏈」危機，務必慎重處理兩岸關係。

"Natural Independence” vs. “Inevitable Reunification”

"Natural Independence” vs. “Inevitable Reunification” 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 22, 2016

Executive Summary: National identity is clearly not "natural". Rather it is an artificial construct resulting from political and social forces. Natural independence vs. inevitable reunification is a paradox. Cross-Strait relations may look bad on occasion. But impressions of the CCP are improving. This shows that national identity is a dynamic process. It is only two months until Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural address. We hope the green camp and the Mainland will not remain hostages to the past. They must change with the times. They must narrow the gap between imaginary cross-Strait relations and actual cross-Strait relations. Only then can cross-Strait peace be maintained.

Full Text Below:

For the past 20 years, reunification vs. independence storm clouds have darkened the skies above Taiwan. They have influenced peoples' sense of national identity, changed the balance of power, and provoked conflict between Taiwan, the Mainland, and foreign nations. The issue is too important to ignore. Over the years, academic and the media have periodically conducted polls to understand the problem. Their findings seem plausible, and many people are convinced they are true.

But different institutions have different agendas. Different poll designs and different polling methods lead to different results. This is why the outcome of so many polls contradict each other.

For example, according to a poll released on March 14, the number of people who consider themselves "Taiwanese" has climbed a new high over the past 20 years, from 44% to 73%. The number of people who consider themselves “Chinese”, on the other hand, has reached new lows. Another related poll, the Taiwan index poll published on the same day, asked “Are both sides of the Strait part of one China?”. If the one China referred to was the "People's Republic of China", 81.6% said no. If the one China referred to was the "Republic of China", 60% still said no. The younger the person polled, the more likely they would find the proposition, “Both sides of the Strait are part of one China” unacceptable. But the Taiwan index poll also asked people about their attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party. As many as 13.7% had a favorable opinion of the CCP, nearly the same percentage as the KMT. Interestingly enough, even though cross-Strait relations have become more strained, more people have a favorable opinion of the CCP than ever. Another figure emerged from an Academia Sinica survey conducted last year. When asked to make a “subjective choice” between reunification and independence, 46.6% chose independence. But when asked for an "objective prediction" of the future, 49.7% believed the two sides would be reunified under the PRC.

These complex, even contradictory poll numbers reflect a number of phenomena. First. Twenty years of political indoctrination has convinced 70% of the public that “Taiwanese" and "Chinese" are "foreign to each other". Second. Those who do not consider “both sides of the Strait part of one China", also oppose reunification. Here, the gap between blue and green is not great. Third. Roughly 60% want to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. But the KMT's status quo is "no reunification and no independence". The DPP's status quo however, is "Taiwan or the ROC is already independent".

If these three observations are correct, a question arises. National identity has undergone a huge change in 20 years. The blue and green camps have a very different perceptions of what constitutes the status quo, and what the name of the nation ought to be. Clearly all such perceptions are constructs. Clearly there is no such thing as "natural independence". There is no "natural independence", just as there is no "natural reunification". All national identities are constructs, created by systems of political indoctrination and media bias. Whether the two sides eventually separate or reunify, depends entirely on the two sides' education, willpower, and strength.

Academia Sinica poll numbers show that nearly half the population wants independence. But nearly half of the population expects Taiwan to eventually be reunified by the Mainland. This is worth noting. It means that the educational system has indoctrinated
half the population with Taiwan independence. But half the population believes nevertheless that Taiwan's determination to seek independence, is no match for the Mainland's determination to reunify China. They have concluded therefore, that in the end, Taiwan is destined to be reunified.

The DPP revels in "natural independence". Yet half of the population expects "inevitable reunification".  This cognitive dissonance derives from the gap between an imaginary cross-Strait relationship, and the actual cross-Strait relationship. On the one hand, there has been no threat of war for some time. But de-Sinicization political indoctrination has accustomed people to thinking of Mainlanders as “The Other”, rather than as “Family Members”. Their imaginary cross-Strait relationship is considered Politically Correct. The Ma government was in office for eight years. National identity was viewed as "one China, different interpretations". Unfortunately over-emphasis was given to “different interpretations”, which stressed that the two sides were different, and that relations were between “us” and “them”. Only Beijing argued that "boths sides are part of one China", and strengthened cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges based on objective strategic considerations. Beijing exercised restraint and implemented a diplomatic truce. Beijing allowed people to think that “different interpretations” would provide the two sides with a stable cross-Strait framework. Now however, poll data from the Ma government's eight years in office, show that differences in national identity have increased rapidly. This was the result of “different interpretations”.

On the other hand, half the people understand that the actual cross-Strait relationship will not dance to the tune of the green camp's imaginary cross-Strait relationship. Expectations, after all, are merely expectations. The Kuomintang and the DPP, which does not accept the 1992 Consensus, each have their own approach. But both are merely avoiding the problem.

Evaluations of the Chinese Communist Party remain low, but are improving. This is a noteworthy phenomenon. But evaluations of the CCP and support for reunification are different matters. The two may bear a relationship with each other. But positive evaluations of the CCP are not the chief variable. One may be friendly towards another party. But that does not mean one wishes to unite with them. Good feelings toward the Mainland will however increase cross-Strait harmony. The Mainland should consider this a positive indicator of public sentiment.

National identity is clearly not "natural". Rather it is an artificial construct resulting from political and social forces. Natural independence vs. inevitable reunification is a paradox. Cross-Strait relations may look bad on occasion. But impressions of the CCP are improving. This shows that national identity is a dynamic process. It is only two months until Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural address. We hope the green camp and the Mainland will not remain hostages to the past. They must change with the times. They must narrow the gap between imaginary cross-Strait relations and actual cross-Strait relations. Only then can cross-Strait peace be maintained.

「天然獨」與「必然統」的對沖

2016年03月22日 中國時報

20多年來，統獨霧靄一直或隱或顯、或濃或淡籠罩台灣天空，影響民眾國族認同並引導各項議題的發展，甚至改變了權力板塊，帶來台灣和大陸及世界關係的衝擊。這個問題太重要，學術與新聞機構多年來持續進行有關的民調，試圖理解這朦朧不去的霧靄。調查結果看似有理，許多人也深信不疑。

但如果把不同機構基於不同訴求，採取不同問卷設計與調查方法的結果整體解讀，卻可發現諸多矛盾現象。

譬如3月14日發布的一項民調，民眾自認「台灣人」的比率由20年前的4成4大幅成長為7成3，創下新高；覺得自己是中國人的比率則創新低。另一個相關民調，台灣指標民調同日公布，對於「兩岸同屬一中」認知，如果指的是「中華人民共和國」，有81.6%不能接受，如果指的是「中華民國」，也仍有高達60%不能接受，越年輕者對於「兩岸同屬一中」越不能接受。但台灣指標民調還做了台灣人對共產黨「好感度」調查，正向占13.7%，已接近國民黨，有趣的是，兩岸關係雖轉趨緊張，對共產黨的好感度卻比前一次提高。另外一個數字是去年中研院社會所的一項調查，對統獨的「主觀選擇」有46.6%選擇獨立，但對未來的「客觀預測」卻有49.7%認為會「被統一」。

這些錯綜複雜，甚至相互矛盾的民調數字反映出幾個現象。第一、經歷20多年的政治操作，已有7成左右的人視「台灣人」與「中國人」為「異己關係」。第二、不認同「兩岸同屬一中」者，或可解讀為不贊成兩岸應統一者，藍綠的差距並不大。第三、約有6成希望維持兩岸現狀，但國民黨認為「現狀」就是「不統不獨」，民進黨則認為「台灣／中華民國已經獨立」才是現狀。

如果這3個觀察是正確的，我們就可以問，既然「國族認同」在20多年間可以發生如此巨大的變化，藍綠對於「現狀」、「國家名稱內涵」可以有如此不同的認知，顯然所有的認同都是建構出來的，沒有所謂的「天然獨」。沒有所謂的「天然獨」，也就不會有「天然統」，所有的國族認同其實都是透過政治教育與媒體態度建構而成，兩岸最後是獨或統，取決於雙方的認同教育、意志力與實力。

那麼，中研院民調出現的數字：近半數民眾主觀上希望獨立，但是也有近半數預測最後的結果將是台灣被大陸統一，就非常值得注意，這表示有半數接受了「獨」的認同教育，但是也有約半數民眾認為，台灣追求「獨」的力量及意志不足以抵擋大陸「統」的決心，最後「必然被統」。

民進黨認為有「天然獨」，但是也有約半數民眾認為「必然統」。這個矛盾的認知是來自於台灣民眾在面對「想像的兩岸」與「真實的兩岸」時的誤差。一方面，兩岸長期處於沒有戰爭威脅的狀態，又受到「去中國化」的操作，民眾已經習慣於把大陸視為「他者」，而非「一家親」。他們用自己的想像去看兩岸關係，並認為這才是「政治正確」。馬政府執政8年期間，在「國族認同」方面，以「一中各表」為論述基礎，但強調的是「各表」，即視兩岸為「各是各」的「異己關係」。而僅主張「兩岸同屬一中」的北京，在基於加強兩岸經貿交流為更重要戰略目標的考量下，自制地在外交上進行休兵，讓民眾認為「各表」是可以讓兩岸關係穩定的有效論述。從民調的階段性數據可以看出，馬政府執政8年期間，兩岸在「國族認同」上的分歧快速加大，正是民眾自認為兩岸關係可以長期「各表」的展現。

但另一方面，約半數民眾也了解，「事實的兩岸」不會隨著「想像的兩岸」跳探戈。期望終歸期望，「各表」的國民黨與「不接受九二共識」的民進黨現有的做法，都只是在逃避問題。

至於對於共產黨的好感雖仍在低檔但已有提升，更是一個值得關注的現象。不過對共產黨的友善與否，與是否支持統一仍是兩個不同面向的指標，它們之間或許是有關的依變數，但「好感」不會是關鍵的主變數。例如，我們可以對一個國家友善或不友善，但不表示我們就會同意與對方統一或衝突，不過，對大陸「好感」將有助於增加兩岸「和合」的機會。對大陸而言，這應該是值得重視的民意訊號。

國族認同顯然並非「天然」，而是政治力與社會力建構出來的。「天然獨」與「必然統」矛盾現象可以並存，兩岸關係看壞之際，對中共的好感度反而提高，顯示認同問題的流動現象。距離蔡英文520就職演說僅剩下兩個月時間，希望泛綠及大陸都不要被過去經驗綁架，應該調整現在的思維及作法，讓「想像的兩岸」與「事實的兩岸」差距縮小，讓兩岸和平發展關係繼續下去。