Can Tsai Ying-wen Control the DPP's Factions?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2016
Executive Summary: Political arm-twising requires both power distribution and power sharing. For example, the "Policy Coordination Committee” meetings convened by the president include such dubious participants asChen Chu and Chiu Yi-jen. She was merely using factional rivalry to consolidate her political power. Unfortunately when Tsai's popularity declines, she will find it harder to control factions using her prestige. She will be forced to meet factional demands by resorting to ever more power distribtion and power sharing. By that time, will Tsai Ing-wen still be in control of the government, or will she have become a mere figurehead? Will she be forced to appoint someone she does not want as premier?
Full Text Below:
The chairmanship of China Steel, which has remained vacant for four months, will finally be filled from within the company by former General Manager Weng Chao-tung. Meanwhile, former chairman Sung Chi-yu has retired. Jostling among DPP factions has made the appointment of a successor impossible. Ministry of Economic Affairs Deputy Chief Shen Jung-chin is filling in on a temporary basis. This has set a new and rare precedent. These personnel appointments have remained unfilled for such a long time because the Tsai government and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu have both dug in their heels.
According to reports, The Tsai government's preferred candidate was former China Steel chairman Chiang Yao-chung. Chen Chu's perferred candidate was former board member Lin Wen-yuan. Lin is less cooperative. His personal manners are controversial. He even intervened in a rights dispute over Taiwan Benzene, a one time party owned enterprise belonging to the KMT. Therefore the Tsai government is reluctant to accept him as a candidate. But fearful of angering Chen Ju, Tsai hesitated to come right out and appoint Chiang Yao-chung. Eventually the Tsai government was forced to appoint Chiang Yao-chung to the Taiwan High Speed Rail System, and compromise on the China Steel appointment by appointing Weng Chao-tung. Weng tung is nominally a compromise candidate, but was in fact vetted by Chen Chu.
China Petroleum chairman Chen Chin-teh is also a beloved Chen Chu lieutenant, and former deputy mayor of Kaohsiung. The central government takes into consideration the feelings of local government heads regarding local state-owned enterprises. This is understandable, and conducive to good relations. But appointments to state owned enterprises are the purview of the central government. Local government heads normally do have veto power over central government appointments. Chen Chu was an elder of the New Tide Faction, and current head of the Chen Chu Faction. Such an arrangement makes it even more difficult to escape the shadow of factional struggle.
DPP factions have long enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the DPP. The DPP has repeatedly proclaimed the "dissolution of factions". But intraparty factions have repeatedly reconstituted themselves or cross-bred in response to political necessity. They never really disappeared. This is evidenced by the fact that SEF Chairman Hung Chi-chang was expelled from the New Tide Faction this March.
DPP factions differ from the Kuomintang's "bottom up" local factions. DPP factions are the result of a combination of party member ideology and shared history. After long evolution, many factions have become personal connections. As a result, many factions are named after persons. For example, Chen Chu and William Lai both emerged from the New Tide Faction. But years of cultivating their own power bases has enabled them to head their own factions. Others, such as Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, and Yu Hsi-kun, each have their eponymous factions. During his presidency, Chen Shui-bian had his Mainstream Alliance faction. Today there is even a "One Nation on Each Side Faction".
These factions however, are largely distinct from traditional DPP factions. The sole exception to this rule is President Tsai. She does not belong to any traditional faction, but has gradually become a party leader in her own right. Tsai Ing-wen has long been an outsider, beginning when the DPP was out of power, and ending when it assumed power for the first time. Tsai Ing-wen rose to power with considerable help from the New Tide Faction. Only after Tsai Ying-wen was elected president, did the so-called Ying Faction formally take shape.
The Ying Faction is the result of a combination of special interests and political styles. It lacks deep roots. It lacks revolutionary fervor and ideological commitment. It lacks close ties to regional power brokers. It lacks personal connections. As a result, the Tsai government requires “factional symbiosis" to survive. Factional symbiosis rests on three pillars. The first is camaraderie among a leader and his followers, rooted in shared party history and revolutionary sentiments. The second is quid pro quo power exchanges. The third is the leader's prestige. Tsai Ing-wen lacks the first. She must rely solely on power and prestige. For example, during the battle over leadership of the legislature, Tsai Ying-wen vigorously backed Su Chia-chuan, one of her own, as premier, who partnered with the New Tide Faction's Tsai Chi-chang. This was a perfect example of her dependence upon power and prestige.
The problem is, no matter how many positions of power one has to allocate, it is hard to meet the demands of so many factions. More positions unequally distributed could even provoke a greater backlash. As a result, the Tsai government has been forced to create new positions. These include previously rumored level three central government agency heads, nominations by blue camp legislators, and the relaxation of qualifications for diplomats. They even include level two political appointees to deputy chief, and deputy chiefs of level three agencies.
Political arm-twising requires both power distribution and power sharing. For example, the "Policy Coordination Committee” meetings convened by the president include such dubious participants asChen Chu and Chiu Yi-jen. She was merely using factional rivalry to consolidate her political power. Unfortunately when Tsai's popularity declines, she will find it harder to control factions using her prestige. She will be forced to meet factional demands by resorting to ever more power distribtion and power sharing. By that time, will Tsai Ing-wen still be in control of the government, or will she have become a mere figurehead? Will she be forced to appoint someone she does not want as premier?
蔡英文駕馭得了民進黨派系嗎？
2016-10-30 聯合報
懸缺四個月的中鋼董事長，終於確定由原總經理翁朝棟內升。在此期間，前董事長宋志育退休，接任人選卻因民進黨派系競相推薦人選爭取無法擺平，而由經濟部政務次長沈榮津暫代，創下罕見紀錄。此一人事之所以久懸，與蔡政府和高雄市長陳菊各有堅持有關。
據報導，蔡政府屬意的人選，是曾任中鋼董事長的江耀宗；而陳菊想要的人選，則是另一名與其配合度較佳、亦曾任中鋼董座的林文淵。由於林文淵個人作風爭議甚大，甚至介入前國民黨黨營事業台苯的經營權之爭，蔡政府因此遲遲不願埋單；但為免觸怒陳菊，也不敢直接任命江耀宗接任。最後，蔡政府只好改派江耀宗接任高鐵，中鋼則由雙方妥協的人選翁朝棟出任。雖曰「妥協」，但翁朝棟仍是經「陳菊認可」而出線。
除了中鋼人事，中油董事長陳金德也是陳菊愛將，曾任高雄市副市長。為求「敦親睦鄰」，政府對於在地國營事業的人事要尊重地方首長意見，本無可厚非；然而，原本屬於中央的國營事業人事權，竟要地方首長點頭才能敲定，實非尋常。陳菊是民進黨「新潮流」的元老，更是當今「菊系」龍頭，此一安排，就更難脫派系角力的影子。
民進黨的派系，與民進黨的發展一直是一種「共生」關係。儘管民進黨幾度宣布「解散派系」，事實上，黨內派系因為政治形勢而迭有重組或換血，卻從來不曾真正消失。這點，從今年三月前海基會董事長洪奇昌遭到新潮流系「除名」，即可見一斑。
民進黨內的派系，和國民黨「由下而上」的地方派系本質不同，是成員基於理念或歷史背景的結合；經過多年演變，如今不少派系則變成是「人脈」的繁衍與分殖，因此才有眾多依姓氏命名的派系。例如，陳菊和賴清德都出身新潮流系，卻因多年經營的政治實力，擁有各自的派系；其餘如謝長廷的「謝系」、蘇貞昌的「蘇系」、游錫堃的「游系」，陳水扁擔任總統時有「主流聯盟」，現在則有「一邊一國連線」。
但萬變不離其宗，這些派系多半仍與民進黨的傳統派系相承。唯一的例外，是蔡總統在黨內逐漸定於一尊，但蔡英文並不屬於任何傳統派系。畢竟，在民進黨從在野到第一次執政的過程，蔡英文始終是一個「局外人」。蔡英文在取得政權的過程中，得力於新系的助力甚多；一直到蔡英文當選總統，所謂「英系」才正式以組織化的型態出線。
所謂的英系，其實是基於利益與風格向實力靠攏的結合，缺乏革命感情與意識形態的根深底蘊，也缺乏地緣或人脈的緊密關係；也因此，蔡政府注定只能「與派系共生」。「派系共生」原仰賴三大支柱：一，是領導者與黨內的淵源及革命情感，二是權位的交換，三是領導人的威望。蔡英文缺了其一，只能靠權位和威望來羈縻。例如在國會龍頭之爭，蔡英文強推自己屬意的蘇嘉全為院長，搭配新系的蔡其昌，就是結合威望與權位的範例。
問題是，可以分配的位子再多，也難讓眾多派系人馬完全饜足。甚至可以說，位子越多，因為分配不均而引發的反彈還可能更大。為此，蔡政府只好拚命製造「新位子」，除了先前傳出的中央三級機關首長、監委提名和外交官資格放寬，連二級政務次長、三級機關副首長也欲染指。
政治上的攏絡手段，除了權位分配，還有權力分享。例如，總統召集的「執政決策協調會議」，納入非名正言順的陳菊和邱義仁，就是在借重派系力量來鞏固政權。問題是，當蔡英文聲望不斷下跌，她勢必更難用威望來駕馭派系，而必須用更多的權位或權力分享來滿足派系的要求。屆時，蔡英文是否仍能充分掌握國政，或者她將變成名義上的共主，或者她將被迫任命自己不想要的閣揆？
Monday, October 31, 2016
Thursday, October 27, 2016
Closer to China, Farther from America: The Philippines' Diplomatic Tango
Closer to China, Farther from America:
The Philippines' Diplomatic Tango
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 22, 2016
Executive Summary: Diplomacy is like the tango. It involves steps to the rear and steps to the front. One must go with the flow. Duterte's diplomatic tango has enabled the Philippines to free itself from the clutches of nationalism and US influence. It has successfully positioned itself between two major powers, the United States and China. It has achieved the greatest possible gains in the Philippines' national interest. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy remains mired in controversy over the 1992 Consensus. Its only answer has been to cling to the United States and Japan, while trumpeting a flashy but hollow New Southern Strategy, merely to defy the Mainland. Contrast Duterte's pragmatic and balanced policy, with the folly of Tsai Ing-wen's rigid and obtuse policy, which has led to a deadlock in the Taiwan Strait.
Full Text Below:
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte arrived in Mainland China in a far-reaching move to become “closer with China, and farther from America”. This was Duterte's first state visit after taking office. His first stop was Mainland China, clearly revealing his priorities. Five months ago, China and the Philippines were mired in the South China Sea arbitration case. Upon taking office, Duterte immediately changed the tone of the relationship, showing us how swiftly the Philippines could change its diplomatic stance.
Ice three feet thick is never the result of an overnight freeze. The Philippines has wanted to free itself from the clutches of the United States for some time. In the past however, it was trapped in America's strategic net, and unable to break free. When Duterte came to power, under the banner of populist reform, he saw the benefits that an economically rising Mainland China could bring to his nation. Naturally he was moved.
Duterte's visit is generally seen as the Philippines desire to distance itself from the United States and move closer to Mainland China. But at a deeper level, it is merely the result of the Philippines' quest for diplomatic independence.
In 1946, the Philippines gained its independence from the United States. Nevertheless the spectre of US influence hung over the Philippines. They Americans may have left, but they kept a large number of military bases. They continued using the Philippines as a forward outpost in the US-Soviet Cold War. The United States also cultivated a large number of pro-US politicians in the Philippines, who controlled Philippine politics. Most of the families were educated in the United States, and made the Philippines the ideal mouthpiece for the United States in Asia.
Upon first achieving independence, Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base became the chief source of economic and foreign exchange earnings for the Philippines. But over-reliance on US military consumption made the Philippines miss the East Asian economic express train during the 1980s. As a result, it remains backwards even today. With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the strategic value of the Philippines plummeted, and the US military withdrew, causing the nation's economy to collapse. Filipinos remember this clearly.
Five years ago, then President Aquino III attempted to shift attention away from domestic economic troubles. He attempted to catch the United States' “Pivot to Asia” express train. On the one hand, he incited nationalist fervor. On the other hand he sought United States backing on the front lines. He appealed the South China Sea case in the International Court of Arbitration. He worked hand in glove with the Japan military. He clashed with China on Huangyan Island. These moves brought Sino-Philippine relations to new lows.
The Philippine's may have won the South China Sea arbitration case. But its economy remained mired in recession. By contrast, other Southeast Asian nations have taken advantage of Mainland Chinese capital to carry out various infrastructure projects. The Philippines meanwhile, lost out on the Chinese economic dividend. This was when Duterte, a man who lacked nepotistic US backing, came to power. Duterte was determined to change the Philippines' lop-sided policy toward the United States, and adopt a more balanced foreign policy, one that would enable the Philippines to benefit from China's economic dividend, even as it remained under the US military umbrella.
Duterte may be an enfant terrible, but he is also a pragmatic politician. He knows the realities of geopolitics. He knows that the Philippines must make friends with its neighbor China. He knows the Philippines must not expect too much from America, situated as it is on the opposite shore of the Pacific Ocean. He understands American political realities. He knows the Philippines has only two warplanes. It cannot possibly wage war against China, which has 3000 warplanes. He is also a believer in capitalism. He knows that only the Chinese people will help the Philippines develop its economy. The Philippines was abandoned by the Americans in the past. This remains etched deeply in Filipinos' memories.
Duterte's visit to Mainland China, is akin to an ocean liner changing directions. In fact, relations between Mainland China and the Philippines have yet to take shape. Duterte's independent foreign policy remains under the influence of two factors, one domestic and one foreign. The first factor is political pressure from the United States. The US may not be happy with Duterte's pro-China policy, but it is pre-occupied with the presidential election and has no time to deal with him. Once the new government has been decided next year, the US may increase pressure on the Philippines, especially if Clinton, who preaches a "repivot to Asia" takes office.
The second factor is a nationalist backlash from inside the Philippines. Duterte's power is based on regional support from a majority of the public. He is relying on the popularity of his war on drugs and war on corruption, to silence the pro-American political dynasties that despise him. If his popular support collapses, a nationalist backlash will swiftly emerge.
Diplomacy is like the tango. It involves steps to the rear and steps to the front. One must go with the flow. Duterte's diplomatic tango has enabled the Philippines to free itself from the clutches of nationalism and US influence. It has successfully positioned itself between two major powers, the United States and China. It has achieved the greatest possible gains in the Philippines' national interest. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy remains mired in controversy over the 1992 Consensus. Its only answer has been to cling to the United States and Japan, while trumpeting a flashy but hollow New Southern Strategy, merely to defy the Mainland. Contrast Duterte's pragmatic and balanced policy, with the folly of Tsai Ing-wen's rigid and obtuse policy, which has led to a deadlock in the Taiwan Strait.
親中遠美：菲律賓的外交探戈
2016-10-22 聯合報
菲律賓總統杜特蒂到中國大陸訪問，進行其「親中遠美」政策。這是杜特蒂上台後首次出訪，第一站即選擇中國大陸，可見其目標甚明。五個月前，中菲兩國才在為南海仲裁案鬧到不可開交，杜特蒂上來後立刻換臉，讓我們見識到菲律賓外交板塊轉移之迅速。
冰凍三尺，非一日之寒。菲律賓想要「脫美」已久矣，只是過去長期被美式戰略的網絡所綁架，苦於無法掙脫。杜特蒂上台後，打著民粹和改革的大旗，看準經濟崛起的中國大陸可能為該國帶來的利益，自然有了轉向的動力。
杜特蒂此行，一般認為，這是菲國想要遠離美國、倒向中國的前奏。但說得更深刻些，這其實是菲律賓追求「獨立外交」的實現。
一九四六年，菲律賓脫離美國獨立後，美國影響力仍如鬼魅般地徘徊在菲律賓上空。美國人雖然離開，卻保留大量軍事基地，繼續把菲律賓當成美蘇冷戰的一個前沿。同時，美國也在菲國培養大量親美政客，掌控菲律賓政治的地方世族大多擁有留美背景，這使得菲律賓成為美國在亞洲的最佳代言人。
獨立之初，龐大的蘇比克灣及克拉克空軍基地，成為菲國主要的經濟和外匯收入來源；但過度仰賴美軍消費養分的結果，則讓該國錯過八○年代東亞經濟高度成長的列車，落後依舊。及至一九九○年冷戰結束之後，菲律賓的戰略價值一落千丈，美軍無情地撤離，這也讓該國經濟頓時陷入困境。對此，菲律賓人記憶猶新。
五年前，前總統艾奎諾三世為了轉移國內經濟蕭條的焦點，再次搭上美國重返亞洲的列車。他一方面鼓動國內的民族主義熱情，一方面在美國的撐腰下再度走上前線，不但向國際法院提出南海仲裁案，也和日本進行軍事合作，更與中國在黃岩島兵戎相見。這些舉措，讓中菲關係陷入空前的低潮。
菲律賓雖在南海仲裁案勝訴，其國內經濟卻陷入泥沼。反觀東南亞各國，卻搭上「一帶一路」的順風車，利用中國資金進行各項基礎建設，而菲律賓則失去中國的經濟紅利。此時，沒有美國裙帶瓜葛的杜特蒂上台，便想要改變過去菲國對美一面倒的政策，改採平衡的外交政策，讓菲律賓能夠享受中國大陸的經濟紅利，同時也能在美國軍事保護傘下得到安全。
杜特蒂雖然草莽，卻也是務實的政治家。他洞悉地緣政治，知道菲律賓要與近鄰中國交友，而無法奢望遠在太平洋彼岸的美國；他了解國際政治的現實，知道菲律賓只有兩架戰機，沒有本錢和三千架戰機的中國開戰；他也是資本主義信徒，知道只有中國人會幫助菲律賓發展經濟。過去，菲律賓被美國人拋棄的經驗，太刻骨銘心了。
杜特蒂這次訪中，只能說是大船轉向，中菲關係其實還未定錨。原因是，其自主外交政策，仍受兩項國內外因素影響。其一，是美國的政治壓力。美國雖不滿杜特蒂的親中政策，但由於美國正忙於總統大選，無暇他顧；俟明年新政府底定，特別是若鼓吹「重返亞洲」的希拉蕊．柯林頓上台，便可能擴大對菲律賓施壓。
其二，是菲律賓國內民族主義者的反撲。杜特蒂的執政基礎，主要靠地方廣大人民的支持，他現在挾著掃毒肅貪的高人氣，讓親美的政治世家敢怒不敢言。一旦他民意下滑，民族主義的反撲力量勢將迅速湧現。
外交就像跳探戈，舞步有進有退，要順勢而為。杜特蒂所譜的外交探戈，讓菲律賓擺脫民族主義窠臼及美國勢力的掌控，成功地周旋在美、中兩大之間，為菲國爭取最大的國家利益。反觀，蔡英文政府的兩岸政策，卻還困限在九二共識的泥沼，只能一面倒向美日，並以華而不實的新南向政策來對抗中國。兩相對照，杜特蒂的務實、平衡政策，即凸顯出蔡政府在兩岸僵局中的僵化和不智。
The Philippines' Diplomatic Tango
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 22, 2016
Executive Summary: Diplomacy is like the tango. It involves steps to the rear and steps to the front. One must go with the flow. Duterte's diplomatic tango has enabled the Philippines to free itself from the clutches of nationalism and US influence. It has successfully positioned itself between two major powers, the United States and China. It has achieved the greatest possible gains in the Philippines' national interest. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy remains mired in controversy over the 1992 Consensus. Its only answer has been to cling to the United States and Japan, while trumpeting a flashy but hollow New Southern Strategy, merely to defy the Mainland. Contrast Duterte's pragmatic and balanced policy, with the folly of Tsai Ing-wen's rigid and obtuse policy, which has led to a deadlock in the Taiwan Strait.
Full Text Below:
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte arrived in Mainland China in a far-reaching move to become “closer with China, and farther from America”. This was Duterte's first state visit after taking office. His first stop was Mainland China, clearly revealing his priorities. Five months ago, China and the Philippines were mired in the South China Sea arbitration case. Upon taking office, Duterte immediately changed the tone of the relationship, showing us how swiftly the Philippines could change its diplomatic stance.
Ice three feet thick is never the result of an overnight freeze. The Philippines has wanted to free itself from the clutches of the United States for some time. In the past however, it was trapped in America's strategic net, and unable to break free. When Duterte came to power, under the banner of populist reform, he saw the benefits that an economically rising Mainland China could bring to his nation. Naturally he was moved.
Duterte's visit is generally seen as the Philippines desire to distance itself from the United States and move closer to Mainland China. But at a deeper level, it is merely the result of the Philippines' quest for diplomatic independence.
In 1946, the Philippines gained its independence from the United States. Nevertheless the spectre of US influence hung over the Philippines. They Americans may have left, but they kept a large number of military bases. They continued using the Philippines as a forward outpost in the US-Soviet Cold War. The United States also cultivated a large number of pro-US politicians in the Philippines, who controlled Philippine politics. Most of the families were educated in the United States, and made the Philippines the ideal mouthpiece for the United States in Asia.
Upon first achieving independence, Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base became the chief source of economic and foreign exchange earnings for the Philippines. But over-reliance on US military consumption made the Philippines miss the East Asian economic express train during the 1980s. As a result, it remains backwards even today. With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the strategic value of the Philippines plummeted, and the US military withdrew, causing the nation's economy to collapse. Filipinos remember this clearly.
Five years ago, then President Aquino III attempted to shift attention away from domestic economic troubles. He attempted to catch the United States' “Pivot to Asia” express train. On the one hand, he incited nationalist fervor. On the other hand he sought United States backing on the front lines. He appealed the South China Sea case in the International Court of Arbitration. He worked hand in glove with the Japan military. He clashed with China on Huangyan Island. These moves brought Sino-Philippine relations to new lows.
The Philippine's may have won the South China Sea arbitration case. But its economy remained mired in recession. By contrast, other Southeast Asian nations have taken advantage of Mainland Chinese capital to carry out various infrastructure projects. The Philippines meanwhile, lost out on the Chinese economic dividend. This was when Duterte, a man who lacked nepotistic US backing, came to power. Duterte was determined to change the Philippines' lop-sided policy toward the United States, and adopt a more balanced foreign policy, one that would enable the Philippines to benefit from China's economic dividend, even as it remained under the US military umbrella.
Duterte may be an enfant terrible, but he is also a pragmatic politician. He knows the realities of geopolitics. He knows that the Philippines must make friends with its neighbor China. He knows the Philippines must not expect too much from America, situated as it is on the opposite shore of the Pacific Ocean. He understands American political realities. He knows the Philippines has only two warplanes. It cannot possibly wage war against China, which has 3000 warplanes. He is also a believer in capitalism. He knows that only the Chinese people will help the Philippines develop its economy. The Philippines was abandoned by the Americans in the past. This remains etched deeply in Filipinos' memories.
Duterte's visit to Mainland China, is akin to an ocean liner changing directions. In fact, relations between Mainland China and the Philippines have yet to take shape. Duterte's independent foreign policy remains under the influence of two factors, one domestic and one foreign. The first factor is political pressure from the United States. The US may not be happy with Duterte's pro-China policy, but it is pre-occupied with the presidential election and has no time to deal with him. Once the new government has been decided next year, the US may increase pressure on the Philippines, especially if Clinton, who preaches a "repivot to Asia" takes office.
The second factor is a nationalist backlash from inside the Philippines. Duterte's power is based on regional support from a majority of the public. He is relying on the popularity of his war on drugs and war on corruption, to silence the pro-American political dynasties that despise him. If his popular support collapses, a nationalist backlash will swiftly emerge.
Diplomacy is like the tango. It involves steps to the rear and steps to the front. One must go with the flow. Duterte's diplomatic tango has enabled the Philippines to free itself from the clutches of nationalism and US influence. It has successfully positioned itself between two major powers, the United States and China. It has achieved the greatest possible gains in the Philippines' national interest. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy remains mired in controversy over the 1992 Consensus. Its only answer has been to cling to the United States and Japan, while trumpeting a flashy but hollow New Southern Strategy, merely to defy the Mainland. Contrast Duterte's pragmatic and balanced policy, with the folly of Tsai Ing-wen's rigid and obtuse policy, which has led to a deadlock in the Taiwan Strait.
親中遠美：菲律賓的外交探戈
2016-10-22 聯合報
菲律賓總統杜特蒂到中國大陸訪問，進行其「親中遠美」政策。這是杜特蒂上台後首次出訪，第一站即選擇中國大陸，可見其目標甚明。五個月前，中菲兩國才在為南海仲裁案鬧到不可開交，杜特蒂上來後立刻換臉，讓我們見識到菲律賓外交板塊轉移之迅速。
冰凍三尺，非一日之寒。菲律賓想要「脫美」已久矣，只是過去長期被美式戰略的網絡所綁架，苦於無法掙脫。杜特蒂上台後，打著民粹和改革的大旗，看準經濟崛起的中國大陸可能為該國帶來的利益，自然有了轉向的動力。
杜特蒂此行，一般認為，這是菲國想要遠離美國、倒向中國的前奏。但說得更深刻些，這其實是菲律賓追求「獨立外交」的實現。
一九四六年，菲律賓脫離美國獨立後，美國影響力仍如鬼魅般地徘徊在菲律賓上空。美國人雖然離開，卻保留大量軍事基地，繼續把菲律賓當成美蘇冷戰的一個前沿。同時，美國也在菲國培養大量親美政客，掌控菲律賓政治的地方世族大多擁有留美背景，這使得菲律賓成為美國在亞洲的最佳代言人。
獨立之初，龐大的蘇比克灣及克拉克空軍基地，成為菲國主要的經濟和外匯收入來源；但過度仰賴美軍消費養分的結果，則讓該國錯過八○年代東亞經濟高度成長的列車，落後依舊。及至一九九○年冷戰結束之後，菲律賓的戰略價值一落千丈，美軍無情地撤離，這也讓該國經濟頓時陷入困境。對此，菲律賓人記憶猶新。
五年前，前總統艾奎諾三世為了轉移國內經濟蕭條的焦點，再次搭上美國重返亞洲的列車。他一方面鼓動國內的民族主義熱情，一方面在美國的撐腰下再度走上前線，不但向國際法院提出南海仲裁案，也和日本進行軍事合作，更與中國在黃岩島兵戎相見。這些舉措，讓中菲關係陷入空前的低潮。
菲律賓雖在南海仲裁案勝訴，其國內經濟卻陷入泥沼。反觀東南亞各國，卻搭上「一帶一路」的順風車，利用中國資金進行各項基礎建設，而菲律賓則失去中國的經濟紅利。此時，沒有美國裙帶瓜葛的杜特蒂上台，便想要改變過去菲國對美一面倒的政策，改採平衡的外交政策，讓菲律賓能夠享受中國大陸的經濟紅利，同時也能在美國軍事保護傘下得到安全。
杜特蒂雖然草莽，卻也是務實的政治家。他洞悉地緣政治，知道菲律賓要與近鄰中國交友，而無法奢望遠在太平洋彼岸的美國；他了解國際政治的現實，知道菲律賓只有兩架戰機，沒有本錢和三千架戰機的中國開戰；他也是資本主義信徒，知道只有中國人會幫助菲律賓發展經濟。過去，菲律賓被美國人拋棄的經驗，太刻骨銘心了。
杜特蒂這次訪中，只能說是大船轉向，中菲關係其實還未定錨。原因是，其自主外交政策，仍受兩項國內外因素影響。其一，是美國的政治壓力。美國雖不滿杜特蒂的親中政策，但由於美國正忙於總統大選，無暇他顧；俟明年新政府底定，特別是若鼓吹「重返亞洲」的希拉蕊．柯林頓上台，便可能擴大對菲律賓施壓。
其二，是菲律賓國內民族主義者的反撲。杜特蒂的執政基礎，主要靠地方廣大人民的支持，他現在挾著掃毒肅貪的高人氣，讓親美的政治世家敢怒不敢言。一旦他民意下滑，民族主義的反撲力量勢將迅速湧現。
外交就像跳探戈，舞步有進有退，要順勢而為。杜特蒂所譜的外交探戈，讓菲律賓擺脫民族主義窠臼及美國勢力的掌控，成功地周旋在美、中兩大之間，為菲國爭取最大的國家利益。反觀，蔡英文政府的兩岸政策，卻還困限在九二共識的泥沼，只能一面倒向美日，並以華而不實的新南向政策來對抗中國。兩相對照，杜特蒂的務實、平衡政策，即凸顯出蔡政府在兩岸僵局中的僵化和不智。
Wednesday, October 26, 2016
Stop Supreme Court Justices From Advancing De Jure Taiwan Independence
Stop Supreme Court Justices From Advancing De Jure Taiwan Independence
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27, 2016
Executive Summary: What is done is done. Tsai Ing-wen has nominated pro-Taiwan independence oriented justices. The Legislative Yuan has approved them. They are about to take office. But judicial independence under our constitutional framework means that the justices are not under the President's control. A fuse has been buried, and may be lit any time. We must now see whether the justices themselves believe in constitutionalism.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen's nominees for chief justice, deputy chief justice, and other justices of the Supreme Court have been approved by the Legislative Yuan. For Tsai Ying-wen, approval of her Supreme Court nominees was easy. But the real difficulties lie ahead. These difficulties are not merely Tsai Ying-wen's difficulties. They are difficulties for the Republic of China, and for cross-Strait peace.
The first difficulty will be the justices' swearing-in. They must "Swear to be honest, to abide by the laws and regulations of the nation, to serve the nation, avoid waste, avoid abuse of personnel, and avoid corruption and bribery. If I violate my oath, I am willing to accept the harshest possible punishment”. According to the Oath Ordinance, this is the oath the justices must swear upon taking office.
To "abide by the laws and regulations of the nation” refers of course to the Constitution of the Republic of China. According to the preamble of the Constitution, the justices must serve "the Republic of China founded by Sun Yat-sen”. That refers to the Republic of China founded in 1911 following the revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. Its flag is the “blue sky, white sun, red earth” flag, per Article 6 of the Constitution. Its historical territory is defined by Article 4 of the Constitution. It is important to note that the oath is not merely a matter of conscience, but of the law. Under the law, an oath is not merely a pro forma ritual. According to Section 8 of the Oaths Ordinance, if one refuses to take the oath, one may not take office. According to Article 9, "Anyone who takes the oath only to violate it, shall be punished in accordance with the law."
Will Hsu Chung-li, Hsu Chi-hsiung, Huang Chao-yuan and other justices swear to abide by Sun Yat-sen's Constitution? Will they swear to serve the Republic of China? Or will they merely pay lip service to serve the nation, while secretly clinging to such notions as "special state-to-state relations", "not a normal nation" and "domestic consumption and nostalgia"?
The new justices who are sworn in may say one thing while thinking another. But even if they get away with this, they face an even tougher hurdle -- fears that the new justices will use constitutional interpretations to smuggle their personal Taiwan independence thinking into the Republic of China's constitutional framework. If the new justices abuse their power in this manner, three betrayals and one disaster will follow.
The first betrayal, needless to say, would be the betrayal of the Republic of China and its Constitution. The second betrayal, would be the betrayal of President Tsai Ying-wen, who nominated them. They would change the status quo that Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly pledged to maintain. The third betrayal would be exceeding the justices' authority, as noted in Interpretation No. 499. In 1999, the National Assembly voted to continue lining their own members' pockets. People demanded a constitutional interpretation. The justices' Interpretation No. 499 ruled that the National Assembly's amendment was unconstitutional. It said, "The fundamental value and purpose of the Constitution is the establishment of a basis for order. If amendment provisions change this, then the Constitutional has efffectively been destroyed, and the amendment provisions have lost any claim to legitimacy".
The Supreme Court justices' Interpretation No. 499 established limits to constitutional amendments. Even constitutional amendments have limits, never mind constitutional interpretations. What is the fundamental value and purpose of the Constitution?
Interpretation No. 499 refers to the “principle of a democratic republic", "the principle of national sovereignty", "the protection of people's rights" and "the principle of the separation of powers and checks and balances". Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of China refers to "historical territory", history, statehood, nation-building and sovereignty. These are even more fundamental in character.
The only way to overthrow the Constitution, is to author an entirely new constitution. Such are the limits of constitutional amendments. On this point, those in the know are concerned. They would remind Taiwan independence oriented justices. Do not abuse the process of constitutional interpretation. Do not use it to violate the Constitution. Do not use it to make substantive changes to the Republic of China's constitutional history and founding spirit, in order to covertly author a new constitution.
If the new justices are bent on extremism, they will bring about a catastrophe that crosses the line in the sand over to de jure independence. The CCP leadership must then bow to nationalist sentiment on the Mainland. This means disaster for Taiwan, disaster for both sides of the Strait, and disaster for the Chinese nation.
Faced with public doubts, the justices must be prudent during their swearing-in. They must publicly declare that they will never to use the constitutional interpretation process to smuggle their personal Taiwan independence ideology into the Republic of China constitutional framework, in order to implement de jure Taiwan independence. Also, when interpreting the Constitution, the justices must exercise restraint on major political issues that bear on the territory of the Republic of China, as per Constitutional Interpretation No. 328. They must have the restraint and wisdom not to abuse their judicial authority to interpret the Constitution.
What is done is done. Tsai Ing-wen has nominated pro-Taiwan independence oriented justices. The Legislative Yuan has approved them. They are about to take office. But judicial independence under our constitutional framework means that the justices are not under the President's control. A fuse has been buried, and may be lit any time. We must now see whether the justices themselves believe in constitutionalism.
拆除大法官推進法理台獨引信
2016/10/27 中國時報
蔡英文提名的司法院正副院長及大法官人選，全數獲得立法院同意過關。這一關對蔡英文、對獲得同意的大法官來說，都是輕易的一關。但真正的難關橫梗在前，不只是蔡英文的難關，更是中華民國的難關、兩岸和平的難關。
第一個將登場的「難關」，是大法官的「宣誓」兩難。「余誓以至誠，恪遵國家法令，盡忠職守，報效國家，不妄費公帑，不濫用人員，不營私舞弊，不受授賄賂。如違誓言，願受最嚴厲之處罰，謹誓。」依《宣誓條例》規定，這是大法官就職時必須宣讀的誓詞。
所謂「恪遵國家法令」，首遵的當然是《中華民國憲法》，大法官要報效的「國家」，依《中華民國憲法》前言「依據孫中山先生創立中華民國之遺教」，當然指的是1911年由國父孫中山先生領導革命所創建的中華民國，國旗為青天白日滿地紅（憲法第6條），有其從歷史傳承的固有疆域（憲法第4條）。要知道，宣誓不僅是「違不違背良心」的問題，在法律上，宣誓不是形式上的過場，依《宣誓條例》第8條，不依本宣誓條例規定宣誓者，均視同未就職。依第九條：「宣誓人如違背誓言，應依法從重處罰。」
面對宣誓這一關，許宗力、許志雄、黃昭元等大法官，要不要宣誓恪守這個依孫中山遺教創立的憲法？要不要宣誓報效「中華民國」？還是口裡誓遵憲法、誓報效國家，心裡取巧想的是「特殊國與國關係」、「不是正常國家」、「內部講講滿足鄉愁」？
即便新任大法官可以用「說一套、想一套」矇過宣誓這一關，但接下來是更嚴峻的關卡，也就是外界所擔心的，新任大法官會不會將個人的獨派思想與理念，透過釋憲，偷渡進中華民國的憲政體制？倘若新任大法官偏執而為，將帶來3個背叛、1個災難。
第1個背叛，無庸多言，就是背叛了《中華民國憲法》、背叛了中華民國。第2個背叛，背叛了提名他們的蔡英文總統，因為他們變更了蔡英文不斷宣示要維持的「現狀」。第3個背叛是踰越大法官的職務界限，這一點可以從釋字第499號加以闡明，1999年爆發國民大會代表延任自肥案，經申請釋憲，大法官會議達成釋字第499號解釋，認定國民大會代表的修憲違憲，解釋文中明言：「憲法中具有本質之重要性而為規範秩序存立之基礎者，如聽任修改條文予以變更，則憲法整體規範秩序將形同破毀，該修改之條文即失其應有之正當性。」
大法官釋字第499號解釋，就此確立了修憲的界限。如果修憲是有界限的，遑論釋憲。何謂「憲法中具有本質之重要性」，除了釋字第499號所例舉的「民主共和國原則」、「國民主權原則」、「保障人民權利」、「有關權力分立與制衡之原則」外，《中華民國憲法》前言所陳的憲法緣起、第4條的「固有疆域」等涉及中華民國歷史、國體、立國精神以及主權範圍者，更是「本質中的本質」。
要推翻變更，只有「制憲」一途，這些是修憲的界限，更是釋憲的界限。這一點，識者再三擔憂與提醒，呼籲獨派傾向的大法官，莫濫用釋憲，逾越憲法，實質地變更中華民國的立憲歷史與立國精神，遂成變更國體的「實質制憲」。
新任大法官若執意偏執而為，將帶來的一個災難，就是跨越「法理台獨」紅線的災難，將讓中共領導陷入民族主義的民粹情緒壓力下，等於拆掉中共不犯台的台階，這將是台灣的災難、兩岸的災難與中華民族的災難。
對於社會的疑慮，大法官除了在就職時應敬謹慎重宣誓，也要對外公開宣示，絕不把個人的獨派思維，透過釋憲灌進中華民國的憲政體制，以法理台獨質變中華民國。此外，大法官在釋憲時，當記得釋字第328號在對於中華民國領土此一「重大政治問題」上所表現的自我節制。要有「不應由行使司法權之釋憲機關予以解釋」的克己智慧。
生米煮成熟飯，蔡英文已經提名了獨派色彩的大法官，並通過了立法院同意權投票，即將就職。不過在我國司法獨立憲政機制下，大法官並不受總統的節制，已經埋下的災難引信是否會被點燃，就要看大法官們自己是否信仰憲政主義了。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27, 2016
Executive Summary: What is done is done. Tsai Ing-wen has nominated pro-Taiwan independence oriented justices. The Legislative Yuan has approved them. They are about to take office. But judicial independence under our constitutional framework means that the justices are not under the President's control. A fuse has been buried, and may be lit any time. We must now see whether the justices themselves believe in constitutionalism.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen's nominees for chief justice, deputy chief justice, and other justices of the Supreme Court have been approved by the Legislative Yuan. For Tsai Ying-wen, approval of her Supreme Court nominees was easy. But the real difficulties lie ahead. These difficulties are not merely Tsai Ying-wen's difficulties. They are difficulties for the Republic of China, and for cross-Strait peace.
The first difficulty will be the justices' swearing-in. They must "Swear to be honest, to abide by the laws and regulations of the nation, to serve the nation, avoid waste, avoid abuse of personnel, and avoid corruption and bribery. If I violate my oath, I am willing to accept the harshest possible punishment”. According to the Oath Ordinance, this is the oath the justices must swear upon taking office.
To "abide by the laws and regulations of the nation” refers of course to the Constitution of the Republic of China. According to the preamble of the Constitution, the justices must serve "the Republic of China founded by Sun Yat-sen”. That refers to the Republic of China founded in 1911 following the revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. Its flag is the “blue sky, white sun, red earth” flag, per Article 6 of the Constitution. Its historical territory is defined by Article 4 of the Constitution. It is important to note that the oath is not merely a matter of conscience, but of the law. Under the law, an oath is not merely a pro forma ritual. According to Section 8 of the Oaths Ordinance, if one refuses to take the oath, one may not take office. According to Article 9, "Anyone who takes the oath only to violate it, shall be punished in accordance with the law."
Will Hsu Chung-li, Hsu Chi-hsiung, Huang Chao-yuan and other justices swear to abide by Sun Yat-sen's Constitution? Will they swear to serve the Republic of China? Or will they merely pay lip service to serve the nation, while secretly clinging to such notions as "special state-to-state relations", "not a normal nation" and "domestic consumption and nostalgia"?
The new justices who are sworn in may say one thing while thinking another. But even if they get away with this, they face an even tougher hurdle -- fears that the new justices will use constitutional interpretations to smuggle their personal Taiwan independence thinking into the Republic of China's constitutional framework. If the new justices abuse their power in this manner, three betrayals and one disaster will follow.
The first betrayal, needless to say, would be the betrayal of the Republic of China and its Constitution. The second betrayal, would be the betrayal of President Tsai Ying-wen, who nominated them. They would change the status quo that Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly pledged to maintain. The third betrayal would be exceeding the justices' authority, as noted in Interpretation No. 499. In 1999, the National Assembly voted to continue lining their own members' pockets. People demanded a constitutional interpretation. The justices' Interpretation No. 499 ruled that the National Assembly's amendment was unconstitutional. It said, "The fundamental value and purpose of the Constitution is the establishment of a basis for order. If amendment provisions change this, then the Constitutional has efffectively been destroyed, and the amendment provisions have lost any claim to legitimacy".
The Supreme Court justices' Interpretation No. 499 established limits to constitutional amendments. Even constitutional amendments have limits, never mind constitutional interpretations. What is the fundamental value and purpose of the Constitution?
Interpretation No. 499 refers to the “principle of a democratic republic", "the principle of national sovereignty", "the protection of people's rights" and "the principle of the separation of powers and checks and balances". Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of China refers to "historical territory", history, statehood, nation-building and sovereignty. These are even more fundamental in character.
The only way to overthrow the Constitution, is to author an entirely new constitution. Such are the limits of constitutional amendments. On this point, those in the know are concerned. They would remind Taiwan independence oriented justices. Do not abuse the process of constitutional interpretation. Do not use it to violate the Constitution. Do not use it to make substantive changes to the Republic of China's constitutional history and founding spirit, in order to covertly author a new constitution.
If the new justices are bent on extremism, they will bring about a catastrophe that crosses the line in the sand over to de jure independence. The CCP leadership must then bow to nationalist sentiment on the Mainland. This means disaster for Taiwan, disaster for both sides of the Strait, and disaster for the Chinese nation.
Faced with public doubts, the justices must be prudent during their swearing-in. They must publicly declare that they will never to use the constitutional interpretation process to smuggle their personal Taiwan independence ideology into the Republic of China constitutional framework, in order to implement de jure Taiwan independence. Also, when interpreting the Constitution, the justices must exercise restraint on major political issues that bear on the territory of the Republic of China, as per Constitutional Interpretation No. 328. They must have the restraint and wisdom not to abuse their judicial authority to interpret the Constitution.
What is done is done. Tsai Ing-wen has nominated pro-Taiwan independence oriented justices. The Legislative Yuan has approved them. They are about to take office. But judicial independence under our constitutional framework means that the justices are not under the President's control. A fuse has been buried, and may be lit any time. We must now see whether the justices themselves believe in constitutionalism.
拆除大法官推進法理台獨引信
2016/10/27 中國時報
蔡英文提名的司法院正副院長及大法官人選，全數獲得立法院同意過關。這一關對蔡英文、對獲得同意的大法官來說，都是輕易的一關。但真正的難關橫梗在前，不只是蔡英文的難關，更是中華民國的難關、兩岸和平的難關。
第一個將登場的「難關」，是大法官的「宣誓」兩難。「余誓以至誠，恪遵國家法令，盡忠職守，報效國家，不妄費公帑，不濫用人員，不營私舞弊，不受授賄賂。如違誓言，願受最嚴厲之處罰，謹誓。」依《宣誓條例》規定，這是大法官就職時必須宣讀的誓詞。
所謂「恪遵國家法令」，首遵的當然是《中華民國憲法》，大法官要報效的「國家」，依《中華民國憲法》前言「依據孫中山先生創立中華民國之遺教」，當然指的是1911年由國父孫中山先生領導革命所創建的中華民國，國旗為青天白日滿地紅（憲法第6條），有其從歷史傳承的固有疆域（憲法第4條）。要知道，宣誓不僅是「違不違背良心」的問題，在法律上，宣誓不是形式上的過場，依《宣誓條例》第8條，不依本宣誓條例規定宣誓者，均視同未就職。依第九條：「宣誓人如違背誓言，應依法從重處罰。」
面對宣誓這一關，許宗力、許志雄、黃昭元等大法官，要不要宣誓恪守這個依孫中山遺教創立的憲法？要不要宣誓報效「中華民國」？還是口裡誓遵憲法、誓報效國家，心裡取巧想的是「特殊國與國關係」、「不是正常國家」、「內部講講滿足鄉愁」？
即便新任大法官可以用「說一套、想一套」矇過宣誓這一關，但接下來是更嚴峻的關卡，也就是外界所擔心的，新任大法官會不會將個人的獨派思想與理念，透過釋憲，偷渡進中華民國的憲政體制？倘若新任大法官偏執而為，將帶來3個背叛、1個災難。
第1個背叛，無庸多言，就是背叛了《中華民國憲法》、背叛了中華民國。第2個背叛，背叛了提名他們的蔡英文總統，因為他們變更了蔡英文不斷宣示要維持的「現狀」。第3個背叛是踰越大法官的職務界限，這一點可以從釋字第499號加以闡明，1999年爆發國民大會代表延任自肥案，經申請釋憲，大法官會議達成釋字第499號解釋，認定國民大會代表的修憲違憲，解釋文中明言：「憲法中具有本質之重要性而為規範秩序存立之基礎者，如聽任修改條文予以變更，則憲法整體規範秩序將形同破毀，該修改之條文即失其應有之正當性。」
大法官釋字第499號解釋，就此確立了修憲的界限。如果修憲是有界限的，遑論釋憲。何謂「憲法中具有本質之重要性」，除了釋字第499號所例舉的「民主共和國原則」、「國民主權原則」、「保障人民權利」、「有關權力分立與制衡之原則」外，《中華民國憲法》前言所陳的憲法緣起、第4條的「固有疆域」等涉及中華民國歷史、國體、立國精神以及主權範圍者，更是「本質中的本質」。
要推翻變更，只有「制憲」一途，這些是修憲的界限，更是釋憲的界限。這一點，識者再三擔憂與提醒，呼籲獨派傾向的大法官，莫濫用釋憲，逾越憲法，實質地變更中華民國的立憲歷史與立國精神，遂成變更國體的「實質制憲」。
新任大法官若執意偏執而為，將帶來的一個災難，就是跨越「法理台獨」紅線的災難，將讓中共領導陷入民族主義的民粹情緒壓力下，等於拆掉中共不犯台的台階，這將是台灣的災難、兩岸的災難與中華民族的災難。
對於社會的疑慮，大法官除了在就職時應敬謹慎重宣誓，也要對外公開宣示，絕不把個人的獨派思維，透過釋憲灌進中華民國的憲政體制，以法理台獨質變中華民國。此外，大法官在釋憲時，當記得釋字第328號在對於中華民國領土此一「重大政治問題」上所表現的自我節制。要有「不應由行使司法權之釋憲機關予以解釋」的克己智慧。
生米煮成熟飯，蔡英文已經提名了獨派色彩的大法官，並通過了立法院同意權投票，即將就職。不過在我國司法獨立憲政機制下，大法官並不受總統的節制，已經埋下的災難引信是否會被點燃，就要看大法官們自己是否信仰憲政主義了。
Tuesday, October 25, 2016
Hsu Chung-li's Constitutional Interpretation: An Unacceptable “Gesture of Goodwill”
Hsu Chung-li's Constitutional Interpretation:
An Unacceptable “Gesture of Goodwill”
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 25, 2016
Executive Summary: In her National Day address, President Tsai called on the Beijing authorities to face the fact that the ROC exists. But perhaps President Tsai should first ask her nominees for Supreme Court justices to face the fact that the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China exist. Someone who does not recognize the Constitution, is obviously unqualified to interpret the Constitution. Actually, this goes beyond that. This raises the question of where the justices intend to take the Republic of China as a nation.
Full Text Below:
In her National Day address, President Tsai called on the Beijing authorities to face the fact that the ROC exists. But perhaps President Tsai should first ask her nominees for Supreme Court justices to face the fact that the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China exist. Someone who does not recognize the Constitution, is obviously unqualified to interpret the Constitution. Actually, this goes beyond that. This raises the question of where the justices intend to take the Republic of China as a nation.
The justices of the Supreme Court issued their first Constitutional Interpretation on January 6, 1978. On October 21 of this year, they issued their seven hundred and fortieth Constitutional Interpretation. Over the past 60 years, the justices have issued numerous Constitutional Interpretations pertaining to the nation's political status and to cross-Strait relations.
During the early years, some interpretations resolved problems with a Constitution authored on the Mainland, that applied to China as a whole, by adopting it to Taiwan. They limited the application of the Constitution of the Republic of China to the Taiwan Region, and gave it a reasonable legal foundation. For example, some constitutional interpretations pertained to legislators and justices terms of office, to the number of representatives to the National People's Congress, to the terms of office for the first Central Government People's Representatives, and to the appointment of representatives and legislators. All were important measures that maintained the legal relationship between the Taiwan Region and Mainland Region of China, and provided a legal basis for the Republic of China as the government of the entire nation.
Constitutional amendments brought about constitutional changes. Pragmatic solutions to the problem of the two sides' political status were urgently required. Cross-Strait exchanges often led to conflicts over fundamental human rights and national security. But they also subjected more and more laws pertaining to cross-Strait relations to constitutional review. The justices clearly affirmed the "one country, two regions" clause in the amended Constitution. They acknowledged the distinction between sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the distinction between different jurisdictions. In other words, the Republic of China may have divided jurisdiction, but it has undivided sovereignty. On the matter of sovereignty, there is only one country. As for laws governing cross-Strait relations, past justices have given priority to fundamental human rights and freedoms.
Changes have taken place in Taiwan's political situation. The regional situation has evolved. Constitutional interpretations by Supreme Court justices have become an important pillar of national identity and cross-Strait relations. Constitutional interpretations rendered over time by past justices are the backbone of our constitutional framework. They are they key to Tsai's declaration that the two sides are committed to “maintaining the status quo". They are the true measure of Tsai Ing-wen's expressions of goodwill toward to the Mainland.
Tsai's nominees for Supreme Court justices however, have left people aghast. Hsu Chung-li for example, claims that cross-Strait relations are "special state-to-state relations", and that Republic of China sovereignty does not include territory occupied by the People's Republic of China. Hsu Chi-hsiung called the Constitution of the Republic of China “rotten”, and characterized the name “Republic of China” as a "national title abandoned by China". Huang Chao-yuan claimed that "The title of Republic of China is merely for domestic consumption, to satisfy nostalgic longings". Every one of these nominees has ridiculed and repudiated the Constitution of the Republic of China. So what are they? Are they defenders of the Constitution, or terrorists out to destroy the Constitution?
Individual justices may not be able to change long standing constitutional interpretations. But when the make up of the Supreme Court undergoes sudden change, a constitutional crisis is entirely conceivable. The Justice Yuan consists of 15 justices. A constitutional interpretation requires a two-thirds quorum. Two-thirds of the justices, i.e., ten of them must be present and seven must vote for passage. Given the seven current nominees' party affiliations, future interpretations of the Constitution will obviously tilt in one directions. By 2019, four more justices will retire. Tsai Ing-wen will nominate their replacements. In particular, when Hsu Chung-li established a new and negative "re-appointment" precedent. Huang Chao-shun made no secret of his willingness to be nominated as President of the Justice Yuan. He painted a picture of future justices resorting to political influence in order to remain in office.
Hsu Chung-li claims his "two-states theory" interpretation is "quite friendly" to the Mainland. But "friendliness" of this sort is intolerable to the other side. Chen Shui-bian attempted to author a new constitution but failed. Can his goal be realized through constitutional interpretations? The Constitution and the Regulations Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area are Tsai Ing-wen's basis for cross-Strait relations. Suppose Hsu Chung-li leads, and Hsu Chi-hsiung, Huang Chao-yuan and others follow? How will the justices interpret the Constitution, the law, and executive orders? Just how “friendly” will their constitutional interpretations of the two sides' political status be? How will they fulfill Tsai Ying-wen's pledge to demonstrate “goodwill” towards the Mainland? People are right to be worried.
許宗力釋憲，兩岸關係難以承受的「善意」
2016-10-25 聯合報
蔡總統在國慶演說呼籲北京當局正視中華民國存在的事實，然而，蔡總統其實應先要求她提名的大法官，正視中華民國以及中華民國憲法存在的事實。這不僅在應然面上根本涉及「不認同憲法的人，如何負責釋憲？」的問題，更在實然面引人產生「大法官可能把中華民國帶向何方？」的疑惑。
從民國三十八年一月六日的大法官釋字第一號，到今年十月廿一日的釋字第七四○號，六十幾年來，大法官們已經陸續依據憲法作成許多主旨涉及國家定位與兩岸關係的解釋。
早期一些大法官解釋，解決了這部在大陸制定、適用於整個中國的憲法繼續在台灣適用的問題；通過限縮憲法適用範圍，為中華民國憲政體制在台灣的實踐提供合理的解釋和合法化的基礎。例如，涉及立委與監委任期、國大代表總額計算標準、第一屆中央民代任期，以及國大代表與立委延任等問題的一些釋憲案，都在確保「值國家發生重大變故」的憲政體制維繫與運作，同時保持著台灣與中國大陸之間的法理聯繫，為中華民國的法統與政府的全國代表性提供正當性基礎。
隨著修憲而來的憲政變遷，讓務實解決兩岸定位問題日益迫切。兩岸交流衍生的問題，往往涉及人民基本權利與國家安全的衝突，也讓越來越多兩岸關係的法律規範必須接受合憲性的審查。大法官的解釋明確站在憲法增修條文「一國兩區」的立場，承認主權與治權的落差，區分治權之所及與所不及。換言之，在國家定位上，中華民國治權分裂；但就主權而言，只有一個國家。至於兩岸關係的法律規範，過去的大法官也堅持人民基本權利和自由保障優先的原則。
事實上，隨著台灣政治的變遷與區域情勢的演變，大法官對於憲法的解釋，已成為國家定位與兩岸關係發展的重要支柱。過去的大法官在不同時代作成的憲法解釋，不僅是構成我國憲政體制的支柱，也是蔡英文宣稱將致力維持的兩岸「現狀」的重要組成，更是蔡英文向中國大陸方面表達「最大善意」的憑藉。
但令人錯愕的是，蔡英文提名的大法官中，許宗力主張兩岸是「特殊國與國關係」，且中華民國主權並不包含中華人民共和國；許志雄鄙斥「中華民國憲法爛」，而中華民國則是「中國廢棄的國號」；黃昭元更說「中華民國只是內部講講，用以滿足鄉愁」，在在皆是對中華民國憲法的譏誚與否定。他們到底是要做憲法守護者，還是對憲法的恐攻者？
個別大法官未必能改變憲法解釋長期累積、充實的內涵，但當大法官會議結構及生態發生驟變，既有憲政內涵的崩解，並非不可想像。司法院包含正副院長共十五位大法官，釋憲應有三分之二大法官出席，出席者三分之二同意，也就是十位出席、七位同意才能通過。以這次七位大法官被提名人的政黨色彩分布，未來釋憲恐將大大傾斜。到二○一九年，另有四位大法官任期屆滿，蔡英文得以再提名後，更將徹底改造大法官會議生態。尤其，許宗力創下「再任」之惡例，黃昭元也毫不掩飾任滿後再被提名為司法院長的意願，繪出一幅未來大法官為留「後路」向政治權力靠攏的想像。
許宗力自認其「兩國論」的詮釋，對大陸是「相當友善的」；但這樣的「友善」，對岸恐難消受。陳水扁制憲失敗而無法達成的目標，是否可能通過釋憲來完成？尤其，憲法和兩岸人民關係條例是蔡英文處理兩岸關係的依據，而未來在許宗力主導、許志雄與黃昭元等人側翼助攻下，大法官會議在釋憲或統一解釋法律及命令時，對於兩岸關係定位的詮釋將表達怎樣的「友善」態度，又將如何充實蔡英文對中國大陸的「善意」內涵？思之，恐令人油然不安。
An Unacceptable “Gesture of Goodwill”
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 25, 2016
Executive Summary: In her National Day address, President Tsai called on the Beijing authorities to face the fact that the ROC exists. But perhaps President Tsai should first ask her nominees for Supreme Court justices to face the fact that the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China exist. Someone who does not recognize the Constitution, is obviously unqualified to interpret the Constitution. Actually, this goes beyond that. This raises the question of where the justices intend to take the Republic of China as a nation.
Full Text Below:
In her National Day address, President Tsai called on the Beijing authorities to face the fact that the ROC exists. But perhaps President Tsai should first ask her nominees for Supreme Court justices to face the fact that the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China exist. Someone who does not recognize the Constitution, is obviously unqualified to interpret the Constitution. Actually, this goes beyond that. This raises the question of where the justices intend to take the Republic of China as a nation.
The justices of the Supreme Court issued their first Constitutional Interpretation on January 6, 1978. On October 21 of this year, they issued their seven hundred and fortieth Constitutional Interpretation. Over the past 60 years, the justices have issued numerous Constitutional Interpretations pertaining to the nation's political status and to cross-Strait relations.
During the early years, some interpretations resolved problems with a Constitution authored on the Mainland, that applied to China as a whole, by adopting it to Taiwan. They limited the application of the Constitution of the Republic of China to the Taiwan Region, and gave it a reasonable legal foundation. For example, some constitutional interpretations pertained to legislators and justices terms of office, to the number of representatives to the National People's Congress, to the terms of office for the first Central Government People's Representatives, and to the appointment of representatives and legislators. All were important measures that maintained the legal relationship between the Taiwan Region and Mainland Region of China, and provided a legal basis for the Republic of China as the government of the entire nation.
Constitutional amendments brought about constitutional changes. Pragmatic solutions to the problem of the two sides' political status were urgently required. Cross-Strait exchanges often led to conflicts over fundamental human rights and national security. But they also subjected more and more laws pertaining to cross-Strait relations to constitutional review. The justices clearly affirmed the "one country, two regions" clause in the amended Constitution. They acknowledged the distinction between sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the distinction between different jurisdictions. In other words, the Republic of China may have divided jurisdiction, but it has undivided sovereignty. On the matter of sovereignty, there is only one country. As for laws governing cross-Strait relations, past justices have given priority to fundamental human rights and freedoms.
Changes have taken place in Taiwan's political situation. The regional situation has evolved. Constitutional interpretations by Supreme Court justices have become an important pillar of national identity and cross-Strait relations. Constitutional interpretations rendered over time by past justices are the backbone of our constitutional framework. They are they key to Tsai's declaration that the two sides are committed to “maintaining the status quo". They are the true measure of Tsai Ing-wen's expressions of goodwill toward to the Mainland.
Tsai's nominees for Supreme Court justices however, have left people aghast. Hsu Chung-li for example, claims that cross-Strait relations are "special state-to-state relations", and that Republic of China sovereignty does not include territory occupied by the People's Republic of China. Hsu Chi-hsiung called the Constitution of the Republic of China “rotten”, and characterized the name “Republic of China” as a "national title abandoned by China". Huang Chao-yuan claimed that "The title of Republic of China is merely for domestic consumption, to satisfy nostalgic longings". Every one of these nominees has ridiculed and repudiated the Constitution of the Republic of China. So what are they? Are they defenders of the Constitution, or terrorists out to destroy the Constitution?
Individual justices may not be able to change long standing constitutional interpretations. But when the make up of the Supreme Court undergoes sudden change, a constitutional crisis is entirely conceivable. The Justice Yuan consists of 15 justices. A constitutional interpretation requires a two-thirds quorum. Two-thirds of the justices, i.e., ten of them must be present and seven must vote for passage. Given the seven current nominees' party affiliations, future interpretations of the Constitution will obviously tilt in one directions. By 2019, four more justices will retire. Tsai Ing-wen will nominate their replacements. In particular, when Hsu Chung-li established a new and negative "re-appointment" precedent. Huang Chao-shun made no secret of his willingness to be nominated as President of the Justice Yuan. He painted a picture of future justices resorting to political influence in order to remain in office.
Hsu Chung-li claims his "two-states theory" interpretation is "quite friendly" to the Mainland. But "friendliness" of this sort is intolerable to the other side. Chen Shui-bian attempted to author a new constitution but failed. Can his goal be realized through constitutional interpretations? The Constitution and the Regulations Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area are Tsai Ing-wen's basis for cross-Strait relations. Suppose Hsu Chung-li leads, and Hsu Chi-hsiung, Huang Chao-yuan and others follow? How will the justices interpret the Constitution, the law, and executive orders? Just how “friendly” will their constitutional interpretations of the two sides' political status be? How will they fulfill Tsai Ying-wen's pledge to demonstrate “goodwill” towards the Mainland? People are right to be worried.
許宗力釋憲，兩岸關係難以承受的「善意」
2016-10-25 聯合報
蔡總統在國慶演說呼籲北京當局正視中華民國存在的事實，然而，蔡總統其實應先要求她提名的大法官，正視中華民國以及中華民國憲法存在的事實。這不僅在應然面上根本涉及「不認同憲法的人，如何負責釋憲？」的問題，更在實然面引人產生「大法官可能把中華民國帶向何方？」的疑惑。
從民國三十八年一月六日的大法官釋字第一號，到今年十月廿一日的釋字第七四○號，六十幾年來，大法官們已經陸續依據憲法作成許多主旨涉及國家定位與兩岸關係的解釋。
早期一些大法官解釋，解決了這部在大陸制定、適用於整個中國的憲法繼續在台灣適用的問題；通過限縮憲法適用範圍，為中華民國憲政體制在台灣的實踐提供合理的解釋和合法化的基礎。例如，涉及立委與監委任期、國大代表總額計算標準、第一屆中央民代任期，以及國大代表與立委延任等問題的一些釋憲案，都在確保「值國家發生重大變故」的憲政體制維繫與運作，同時保持著台灣與中國大陸之間的法理聯繫，為中華民國的法統與政府的全國代表性提供正當性基礎。
隨著修憲而來的憲政變遷，讓務實解決兩岸定位問題日益迫切。兩岸交流衍生的問題，往往涉及人民基本權利與國家安全的衝突，也讓越來越多兩岸關係的法律規範必須接受合憲性的審查。大法官的解釋明確站在憲法增修條文「一國兩區」的立場，承認主權與治權的落差，區分治權之所及與所不及。換言之，在國家定位上，中華民國治權分裂；但就主權而言，只有一個國家。至於兩岸關係的法律規範，過去的大法官也堅持人民基本權利和自由保障優先的原則。
事實上，隨著台灣政治的變遷與區域情勢的演變，大法官對於憲法的解釋，已成為國家定位與兩岸關係發展的重要支柱。過去的大法官在不同時代作成的憲法解釋，不僅是構成我國憲政體制的支柱，也是蔡英文宣稱將致力維持的兩岸「現狀」的重要組成，更是蔡英文向中國大陸方面表達「最大善意」的憑藉。
但令人錯愕的是，蔡英文提名的大法官中，許宗力主張兩岸是「特殊國與國關係」，且中華民國主權並不包含中華人民共和國；許志雄鄙斥「中華民國憲法爛」，而中華民國則是「中國廢棄的國號」；黃昭元更說「中華民國只是內部講講，用以滿足鄉愁」，在在皆是對中華民國憲法的譏誚與否定。他們到底是要做憲法守護者，還是對憲法的恐攻者？
個別大法官未必能改變憲法解釋長期累積、充實的內涵，但當大法官會議結構及生態發生驟變，既有憲政內涵的崩解，並非不可想像。司法院包含正副院長共十五位大法官，釋憲應有三分之二大法官出席，出席者三分之二同意，也就是十位出席、七位同意才能通過。以這次七位大法官被提名人的政黨色彩分布，未來釋憲恐將大大傾斜。到二○一九年，另有四位大法官任期屆滿，蔡英文得以再提名後，更將徹底改造大法官會議生態。尤其，許宗力創下「再任」之惡例，黃昭元也毫不掩飾任滿後再被提名為司法院長的意願，繪出一幅未來大法官為留「後路」向政治權力靠攏的想像。
許宗力自認其「兩國論」的詮釋，對大陸是「相當友善的」；但這樣的「友善」，對岸恐難消受。陳水扁制憲失敗而無法達成的目標，是否可能通過釋憲來完成？尤其，憲法和兩岸人民關係條例是蔡英文處理兩岸關係的依據，而未來在許宗力主導、許志雄與黃昭元等人側翼助攻下，大法官會議在釋憲或統一解釋法律及命令時，對於兩岸關係定位的詮釋將表達怎樣的「友善」態度，又將如何充實蔡英文對中國大陸的「善意」內涵？思之，恐令人油然不安。
Sunday, October 23, 2016
Why the US Poured Cold Water on Autonomous National Defense
Why the US Poured Cold Water on Autonomous National Defense
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2016
Executive Summary: In recent years, the PRC has rapidly increased its military might. The strategic balance has become increasingly unfavorable for Taipei. Therefore, Tsai government cries for an autonomous national defense may receive considerable public support. But the government must learn its lessons. It must ensure balance as it procures arms and builds up the defense industry. It must prevent businessmen and politicians from engaging in war profiteering. If mercurial public sentiment enables the looting of the nation's coffers, those responsible will not escape punishment.
Full Text Below:
Since the new government assumed power, calls for “autonomous national defense” industries have rung out. Tsai Ing-wen visited relevant the industries. She emphasized the development of northern, central, and southern Taiwan information, aerospace, shipbuilding industries, as well as the domestic manufacture of submarines and advanced trainer aircraft. But during a recent US Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, Washington poured cold water on the prospect of autonomous national defense. Pentagon senior adviser David Helvey openly questioned domestic Taiwan submarine and trainer aircraft manufacturing. David An, a former State Department official and researcher at the Global Taiwan Institute, a pro-green Washington think tank, warned that for Taiwan, domestically manufactured submarines are an unrealistic proposition.
Over 30 years ago, the United States severed diplomatic relations and ended arms sales to the ROC. President Chiang Ching-kuo called for the domestic manufacture of second-generation military hardware. During Hau Pei-tsun's eight years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the government spent heavily on R&D for jet fighters, warships, tanks, missiles, and other weapons. By the 1999s, military strength had increased dramatically. But since then, the government has been slow to update equipment. Warships, jet fighters, and other weapons have all been outsourced.
The “no expense spared” approach adopted back then no longer sustainable. The main reason is that while we may seek autonomy, we lack sustainable industrial management. We may be bent on replacing old weapons, but cannot sustain the manufacture of of new weapons. Following the Tiananmen Incident, the United States, France, and other nations relaxed restrictions on the sale of arms to Taiwan, including militarily advanced F-16s, Mirage 2000s, and other fighters. But this unexpectedly undermined production of the Indigenous Defense Fighter. Worse still, the purchase of new equipment, all at one time, placed an enormous strain on the budget. It also posed the problem of simultaneous replacement of aging equipment.
When considering defense industry autonomy, one point must be made clear. Autonomous national defense is not synonymous with having a domestic defense industry. So-called autonomy in domestic arms manufacturing is a matter of degree. On the weapons market, “100% domestic content” is almost non-existent. Even US weapons accessories are not necessarily locally made. In other words, it is meaningless to regard "autonomy" as some sort of Holy Grail. What is important is obtaining the most urgently needed weapons and equipment for national defense. One must also consider whether investments in certain weapons and equipment can promote national industrial development.
Consider the two major would be “autonomous” items. The United States has not produced diesel-powered submarines for years. It has no inventory available for purchase. European countries fear pressure from Beijing. They are even less likely to sell arms to Taiwan. Under the circumstances, our military has no choice but to take the Dutch Sternon Class hull, and outfit it with US weapons systems. Even assuming such a “domestically manufactured” submarine works, it will be a poor value. But submarines can be replaced by other weapons systems. One may have to bite the bullet. But what else can one do?
Consider advanced trainer aircraft. It is possible to purchase products containing top-secret technology. Therefore one must consider cost. One must consider the issue of industrial production. One of the most obvious problems is the economies of scale. Domestically manufactured jet fighters and other advanced weapons, are subject to export controls. Domestic demand is limited. Low production volumes combined with high research and development costs, mean prices will remain high. Therefore, one must carefully consider whether R&D for only 66 new aircraft is worth the outlay.
Also, modern weapons cost more and more. Service lives are longer and longer. Fighters and warships are frequently used for over 30 years. Spare parts must remain available for the life of the product. But the fewer units produced, the more parts are likely to be out of stock, and the more a product is likely to be orphaned in the middle of its service life, seriously impacting combat efficiency and operational safety.
To industrialize national defense, one must reject the shibboleth of autonomy. One must integrate oneself fully into the global industrial chain. One must achieve sufficient economic scale to ensure a sustainable arms industry. Only a sustainable industry can advance upstream, and step by step increase its international presence. Only a small number of absolutely essential items should be “cost is no object” and require "storming the hills" regardless of cost.
In recent years, the PRC has rapidly increased its military might. The strategic balance has become increasingly unfavorable for Taipei. Therefore, Tsai government cries for an autonomous national defense may receive considerable public support. But the government must learn its lessons. It must ensure balance as it procures arms and builds up the defense industry. It must prevent businessmen and politicians from engaging in war profiteering. If mercurial public sentiment enables the looting of the nation's coffers, those responsible will not escape punishment.
美國何以潑我「自主國防」冷水
2016-10-23 聯合報
新政府上台後，「自主國防產業」的口號震天；蔡英文並走訪相關廠商，強調要在北中南基地發展資訊、航太、造船產業，要自製潛艦及高級教練機。但美方最近卻在美台國防工業會議對這股「自主國防熱」大潑冷水，五角大廈資深顧問海大衛（David Helvey），公開質疑自製潛艦與教練機政策；華府親綠智庫「全球台灣研究所」研究員，國務院出身的安大維（David An）最近也警告，「完全自製潛艦」對台灣是不切實際的誘惑。
早在卅多年前美國與我斷交並限縮軍售時，蔣經國總統就裁示自製二代兵力。在參謀總長郝柏村八年任內，政府砸下重金研發戰機、軍艦、戰車、飛彈等武器，到九○年代逐一開花結果，使國軍實力大幅提升。但自此之後，裝備更新卻呈現遲緩趨勢，主力戰艦、戰機等兵器又落到必須外購的境地。
當年不惜砸巨資的成就，如今難以為繼，主因是主事者雖有自立自強的雄心，卻缺乏產業永續經營的觀念：一心想著汰換舊武器，卻未考慮新裝備入列後生產線如何維持。中共六四事件後，美法等國大幅放寬對台軍售限制，國軍獲得先進的F-16、幻象兩千等戰機；不料，卻也使得經國號產量慘遭腰斬。更糟的是，所有新裝備同時換裝，不僅造成使用單位壓力大增，也面臨未來同時屆齡汰換的難題。
倡議自主國防產業，必須先釐清：「自主國防」與「國防產業」之間並非等號關係。所謂「自主」，其實只是自製程度之別，武器市場幾乎不存在「純國產」；即使是美國，武器裝備的零附件也未必皆為本土製造。亦即，把「自主」當成神主牌，其實毫無意義。重要的是如何獲得最迫切需要的武器裝備，以滿足國防的需求。同時仔細盤算，為獲得某些武器裝備所付出的投資，是否有帶動本國產業發展的作用。
檢視目前國軍兩大「自主」計畫：在潛艦方面，美國已多年不生產柴電動力潛艦，根本沒有現貨可賣；歐洲各國忌憚北京壓力，更不可能軍售台灣。面對此情況，國軍以現役荷蘭劍龍級船體設計，搭配美國的戰系、兵器等「內裝」，堪稱是無奈的選擇。可以斷言，即使國造潛艦成功，「性價比」也必偏低。但潛艦的戰略價值非其他武器所能取代，即使咬牙吞血，也只能勉力一拚。
至於高級教練機，並非無法購得的絕密技術產品，就不該「何必曰利」，而須先從產業角度出發。其中最需注意的，就是規模經濟問題：國人自製戰機等先進武器，受限外交情勢難以外銷，本身需求數目有限，以低產量負擔研發開銷，成本必定居高不下。因此，為了區區六十六架的需求量，去研發一架新機，是否合算，便必須仔細斟酌。
另一方面，現代武器愈來愈貴，役期愈來愈長，戰機艦艇動輒使用廿、卅年以上，所使用的各種零附件也必須在壽期內都保證無缺。如果產量愈少，零件愈可能斷貨，就愈容易在服役中期後，淪為後勤不繼的「孤兒機」，嚴重影響戰力與操作安全性。
要落實國防工業「產業化」，必須捨棄「全自製」的誘惑，而要盡最大可能融入全球產業鏈，才能夠建立足夠的經濟規模，並替業者找出可行的獲利模式。只有確認能永續經營，業者才可能力爭上游，按部就班提升其國際合作的參與度。只有在少數絕對必要的項目上，才須忘記經濟面的優先考量，應不計成本地「強攻山頭」。
近年中共軍力突飛猛進，戰略天平日益對我不利。也因此，蔡政府喊出自主國防，可以獲得相當程度的輿論支持。但當局仍務須記取教訓，在獲得新武器與建立國防產業間，須找到適切的平衡點，更不可容許商人或政客趁機「發國難財」。若以一時民氣為障眼，趁機攫取國防資源，造成國家得不償失，將罪無可逭。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2016
Executive Summary: In recent years, the PRC has rapidly increased its military might. The strategic balance has become increasingly unfavorable for Taipei. Therefore, Tsai government cries for an autonomous national defense may receive considerable public support. But the government must learn its lessons. It must ensure balance as it procures arms and builds up the defense industry. It must prevent businessmen and politicians from engaging in war profiteering. If mercurial public sentiment enables the looting of the nation's coffers, those responsible will not escape punishment.
Full Text Below:
Since the new government assumed power, calls for “autonomous national defense” industries have rung out. Tsai Ing-wen visited relevant the industries. She emphasized the development of northern, central, and southern Taiwan information, aerospace, shipbuilding industries, as well as the domestic manufacture of submarines and advanced trainer aircraft. But during a recent US Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, Washington poured cold water on the prospect of autonomous national defense. Pentagon senior adviser David Helvey openly questioned domestic Taiwan submarine and trainer aircraft manufacturing. David An, a former State Department official and researcher at the Global Taiwan Institute, a pro-green Washington think tank, warned that for Taiwan, domestically manufactured submarines are an unrealistic proposition.
Over 30 years ago, the United States severed diplomatic relations and ended arms sales to the ROC. President Chiang Ching-kuo called for the domestic manufacture of second-generation military hardware. During Hau Pei-tsun's eight years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the government spent heavily on R&D for jet fighters, warships, tanks, missiles, and other weapons. By the 1999s, military strength had increased dramatically. But since then, the government has been slow to update equipment. Warships, jet fighters, and other weapons have all been outsourced.
The “no expense spared” approach adopted back then no longer sustainable. The main reason is that while we may seek autonomy, we lack sustainable industrial management. We may be bent on replacing old weapons, but cannot sustain the manufacture of of new weapons. Following the Tiananmen Incident, the United States, France, and other nations relaxed restrictions on the sale of arms to Taiwan, including militarily advanced F-16s, Mirage 2000s, and other fighters. But this unexpectedly undermined production of the Indigenous Defense Fighter. Worse still, the purchase of new equipment, all at one time, placed an enormous strain on the budget. It also posed the problem of simultaneous replacement of aging equipment.
When considering defense industry autonomy, one point must be made clear. Autonomous national defense is not synonymous with having a domestic defense industry. So-called autonomy in domestic arms manufacturing is a matter of degree. On the weapons market, “100% domestic content” is almost non-existent. Even US weapons accessories are not necessarily locally made. In other words, it is meaningless to regard "autonomy" as some sort of Holy Grail. What is important is obtaining the most urgently needed weapons and equipment for national defense. One must also consider whether investments in certain weapons and equipment can promote national industrial development.
Consider the two major would be “autonomous” items. The United States has not produced diesel-powered submarines for years. It has no inventory available for purchase. European countries fear pressure from Beijing. They are even less likely to sell arms to Taiwan. Under the circumstances, our military has no choice but to take the Dutch Sternon Class hull, and outfit it with US weapons systems. Even assuming such a “domestically manufactured” submarine works, it will be a poor value. But submarines can be replaced by other weapons systems. One may have to bite the bullet. But what else can one do?
Consider advanced trainer aircraft. It is possible to purchase products containing top-secret technology. Therefore one must consider cost. One must consider the issue of industrial production. One of the most obvious problems is the economies of scale. Domestically manufactured jet fighters and other advanced weapons, are subject to export controls. Domestic demand is limited. Low production volumes combined with high research and development costs, mean prices will remain high. Therefore, one must carefully consider whether R&D for only 66 new aircraft is worth the outlay.
Also, modern weapons cost more and more. Service lives are longer and longer. Fighters and warships are frequently used for over 30 years. Spare parts must remain available for the life of the product. But the fewer units produced, the more parts are likely to be out of stock, and the more a product is likely to be orphaned in the middle of its service life, seriously impacting combat efficiency and operational safety.
To industrialize national defense, one must reject the shibboleth of autonomy. One must integrate oneself fully into the global industrial chain. One must achieve sufficient economic scale to ensure a sustainable arms industry. Only a sustainable industry can advance upstream, and step by step increase its international presence. Only a small number of absolutely essential items should be “cost is no object” and require "storming the hills" regardless of cost.
In recent years, the PRC has rapidly increased its military might. The strategic balance has become increasingly unfavorable for Taipei. Therefore, Tsai government cries for an autonomous national defense may receive considerable public support. But the government must learn its lessons. It must ensure balance as it procures arms and builds up the defense industry. It must prevent businessmen and politicians from engaging in war profiteering. If mercurial public sentiment enables the looting of the nation's coffers, those responsible will not escape punishment.
美國何以潑我「自主國防」冷水
2016-10-23 聯合報
新政府上台後，「自主國防產業」的口號震天；蔡英文並走訪相關廠商，強調要在北中南基地發展資訊、航太、造船產業，要自製潛艦及高級教練機。但美方最近卻在美台國防工業會議對這股「自主國防熱」大潑冷水，五角大廈資深顧問海大衛（David Helvey），公開質疑自製潛艦與教練機政策；華府親綠智庫「全球台灣研究所」研究員，國務院出身的安大維（David An）最近也警告，「完全自製潛艦」對台灣是不切實際的誘惑。
早在卅多年前美國與我斷交並限縮軍售時，蔣經國總統就裁示自製二代兵力。在參謀總長郝柏村八年任內，政府砸下重金研發戰機、軍艦、戰車、飛彈等武器，到九○年代逐一開花結果，使國軍實力大幅提升。但自此之後，裝備更新卻呈現遲緩趨勢，主力戰艦、戰機等兵器又落到必須外購的境地。
當年不惜砸巨資的成就，如今難以為繼，主因是主事者雖有自立自強的雄心，卻缺乏產業永續經營的觀念：一心想著汰換舊武器，卻未考慮新裝備入列後生產線如何維持。中共六四事件後，美法等國大幅放寬對台軍售限制，國軍獲得先進的F-16、幻象兩千等戰機；不料，卻也使得經國號產量慘遭腰斬。更糟的是，所有新裝備同時換裝，不僅造成使用單位壓力大增，也面臨未來同時屆齡汰換的難題。
倡議自主國防產業，必須先釐清：「自主國防」與「國防產業」之間並非等號關係。所謂「自主」，其實只是自製程度之別，武器市場幾乎不存在「純國產」；即使是美國，武器裝備的零附件也未必皆為本土製造。亦即，把「自主」當成神主牌，其實毫無意義。重要的是如何獲得最迫切需要的武器裝備，以滿足國防的需求。同時仔細盤算，為獲得某些武器裝備所付出的投資，是否有帶動本國產業發展的作用。
檢視目前國軍兩大「自主」計畫：在潛艦方面，美國已多年不生產柴電動力潛艦，根本沒有現貨可賣；歐洲各國忌憚北京壓力，更不可能軍售台灣。面對此情況，國軍以現役荷蘭劍龍級船體設計，搭配美國的戰系、兵器等「內裝」，堪稱是無奈的選擇。可以斷言，即使國造潛艦成功，「性價比」也必偏低。但潛艦的戰略價值非其他武器所能取代，即使咬牙吞血，也只能勉力一拚。
至於高級教練機，並非無法購得的絕密技術產品，就不該「何必曰利」，而須先從產業角度出發。其中最需注意的，就是規模經濟問題：國人自製戰機等先進武器，受限外交情勢難以外銷，本身需求數目有限，以低產量負擔研發開銷，成本必定居高不下。因此，為了區區六十六架的需求量，去研發一架新機，是否合算，便必須仔細斟酌。
另一方面，現代武器愈來愈貴，役期愈來愈長，戰機艦艇動輒使用廿、卅年以上，所使用的各種零附件也必須在壽期內都保證無缺。如果產量愈少，零件愈可能斷貨，就愈容易在服役中期後，淪為後勤不繼的「孤兒機」，嚴重影響戰力與操作安全性。
要落實國防工業「產業化」，必須捨棄「全自製」的誘惑，而要盡最大可能融入全球產業鏈，才能夠建立足夠的經濟規模，並替業者找出可行的獲利模式。只有確認能永續經營，業者才可能力爭上游，按部就班提升其國際合作的參與度。只有在少數絕對必要的項目上，才須忘記經濟面的優先考量，應不計成本地「強攻山頭」。
近年中共軍力突飛猛進，戰略天平日益對我不利。也因此，蔡政府喊出自主國防，可以獲得相當程度的輿論支持。但當局仍務須記取教訓，在獲得新武器與建立國防產業間，須找到適切的平衡點，更不可容許商人或政客趁機「發國難財」。若以一時民氣為障眼，趁機攫取國防資源，造成國家得不償失，將罪無可逭。
Thursday, October 20, 2016
Is Someone Who Refuses to Recognize the Constitution Qualified to Interpret the Constitution?
Is Someone Who Refuses to Recognize the Constitution Qualified to Interpret the Constitution?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2016
Executive Summary: The Legislative Yuan has recently been reviewing nominees for chief justices of the Supreme Court. During questioning, two striking phenomena have appeared. First, some nominees have raised questions about abolishing the death penalty or gay marriage. These are sensitive issues that depart from current social norms. Secondly, some nominees have not been shy about their views on national identity, and their hostility toward the existing constitution and political framework.
Full Text Below:
The Legislative Yuan has recently been reviewing nominees for chief justices of the Supreme Court. During questioning, two striking phenomena have appeared. First, some nominees have raised questions about abolishing the death penalty or gay marriage. These are sensitive issues that depart from current social norms. Secondly, some nominees have not been shy about their views on national identity, and their hostility toward the existing constitution and political framework.
Of the two, the latter is far more worrisome than the former. Many members of the public cannot accept the abolition of the death penalty or the legalization same-sex marriage. But education, social movements, even legislation, could lead to gradual change. Many nominees personally favor the abolition of the death penalty. This does not necessarily reflect the imminent abolition of the death penalty by the Conference of Justices. After all, the Conference of Justices involves prolonged debates, and not a summary judgment.
What is truly questionable are the nominees who refuse to recognize the existing constitutional framework. How can they be considered qualified to interpret the Constitution? The main duty of a chief justice is to interpret the Constitution, or offer a unified interpretation of conflicting laws, procedures, and orders. If a chief justice is in fundamental disagreement with the design and spirit of the Constitution, or worse, regards the Constitution with contempt, how can he or she be considered qualified to interpret the Constitution?
Consider recent reviews. Hsu Chung-li, a justice and chief justice nominee, shared his view on cross-Strait relations. He believes, now as in the past, that relations between Taiwan and the Mainland are akin to relations between East and West Germany, that they are "special state-to-state relations". He believes that the sovereign territory of the Republic of China does not include territory controlled by the People's Republic of China. This view is the "two-states theory". It contradicts the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of China. It even contradicts President Tsai's position as expressed in her inaugural address. The MAC was quick to dismiss it. This added to the controversy over Hsu Chung-li's nomination to justice and chief justice.
Among the nominees for chief justice, the most difficult to accept is that of Hsu Chi-hsiung. During his review, Hsu said, "People cannot violate their consciences". He said “The Three People's Principles is problematic". He even said that Taiwan is not a normal nation, that the Republic of China is a "discarded" nation, and that Taiwan needs a new constitution, as soon as possible. When referring to "historic territory" as stipulated in the Constitution, he was even more contemptuous, and wondered whether it referred to territory fought over during the "Yellow Emperor's war with Chi You". Nominee Huang Chao-yuan, not to be outdone, said the name “Republic of China” was “mere nostalgia", and that he already had his fill of singing the national anthem.
As legal scholars, these people are free to hold whatever political views they wish. But will these candidates for chief justice be interpreting a constitution for which they have nothing but disdain? How can they possibly be considered qualified to do so? How can they do anything, other than add to the nation's troubles and fragmentation?
The parable of “The Father and Son Riding a Donkey” warns against the folly of trying to please everyone. Tsai Ing-wen appears to have forgotten this lesson. She has lost control of the nomination process for justices and chief justices. President Tsai's initital nominees for chief justice and deputy chief justice were Hsieh Wen-ting and Lin Ching-fang. They were not outstanding, but they were at least qualified. Green camp elements however, were unhappy, and forced the two candidates to withdraw. Tsai Ing-wen then nominated Hsu Chung-li, who may have violated the constitution, as president of the Judicial Yuan. In fact, Hsu Chung-li himself admitted that during the first wave of nominations, he was supposed to be vice president of of the Judicial Yuan under Hsieh Wen-ting. But because a second term was unconstitutional, Hsieh was forced to withdraw. During the second wave of nominations, Hsu Chung-li was nominated president of the Judicial Yuan. The government again argued on behalf of a second term. It assumed that the issue of constitutionality could be interpreted however it wished. These nominations, rammed through by force,
have led to the absurdity of “violators of the constitution interpreting the constitution”.
We do not understand why President Tsai was willing to risk nominating judges who are obviously ineligible. Was it merely impetuousness and imprudence? Was it merely to pander to the green camp? Was it a deliberate attempt to showcase her own political ideals? Whatever the case may be, most nominees hailed from the Ministry of Justice and certain law firms. They represent inbreeding within the legal community, even political factionalism. In the event these people, good and bad alike, pass muster, the Constitution will fall into their hands. What will it look like after it is butchered? One cannot help but worry.
A good judge can endow the Constitution with broader and more profound significance. But a biased judge will be seen as a tool by which President Tsai carries out "judicial Taiwan independence."
不認同憲法的人，如何負責釋憲？
2016-10-21 聯合報
立法院最近正就大法官提名人進行資格審查，在詢答過程中，出現了兩種引人注意的現象：其一，有些被提名人就敏感的社會議題如廢死或同性婚姻提出了高於社會現狀的寬容見解；其二是，有些被提名人毫不避諱大談自己的國家認同，對現行憲法內容或體制表示不以為然，甚至覺得難以苟同。
這兩種現象，後者遠比前者更值得憂慮。以目前的社會民意，許多民眾對於廢死或同性婚姻的合法化雖仍不能接受；但是，透過教育、社運乃至立法、釋憲的思辨過程，不無逐漸改變的可能。多位被提名人傾向支持「廢死」，是其個人態度之表達，未必代表大法官會議很快就會作成廢死之解釋；畢竟，大法官會議的討論仍必須經一番唇槍舌劍，不致率爾作出決定。
真正令人存疑的，則是那些顯不認同既有憲政體制的人，究竟有何資格擔當「解釋憲法」的工作？大法官的職責，主要就是在解釋憲法，或對發生衝突的法律、程序、命令等作出統一解釋。若有大法官基本上就對這部憲法缺乏認同，或對若干憲政設計或精神不以為然，甚至不掩其輕蔑；我們很難想像，這種人如何可能適當扮演解釋憲法的角色？
從近日的審查看，大法官暨司法院長提名人許宗力談到他對兩岸關係的看法，認為就像過去的東西德，是「特殊的國與國關係」，中華民國主權不包容中華人民共和國。此一看法，被認為是主張「兩國論」，除不符中華民國憲法精神，甚至違背蔡英文總統在就職演說中的立場，連陸委會都急忙撇清。此舉，使許宗力原本即備受爭議的司法院長提名，又更添一筆。
在所有大法官提名人中，最讓人難以接受的，是許志雄。他在詢答中一路語出驚人，諸如：被詢及願不願意唱國歌時，他稱「人不能違背良心」，他認為「三民主義有問題」。他甚至直言，台灣「不是正常國家」，「中華民國」是被中國「廢棄」的國號，台灣需要一部合時合用的新憲法。在談到憲法規定的「固有疆域」時，他更譏誚說，是指「黃帝大戰蚩尤」時的疆域嗎？黃昭元的表現絲毫不輸，他曾說中華民國稱號只是為了「滿足鄉愁」，並說他唱國歌的「配額」已經用完了。
作為法律學者，這些人持什麼政治理念，是他們的個人自由。但是，這樣的人若要扮演大法官來解釋他們所不屑的憲法，我們看不出他們可能稱職的理由，而且恐怕只會更增國政的紛擾和割裂。
蔡英文提名大法官及司法院長的過程變化再三，除露出「父子騎驢」式的心態，她的提名似乎也在爭議中逐漸失去沉穩與平衡。蔡總統首度提名的司法院正副院長人選謝文定、林錦芳，原非出色，但亦無不妥；卻因綠營人士不滿，而以跡近羞辱的方式迫使兩人退出提名。其後，蔡英文改提有違憲疑慮的許宗力為司法院長，事實上許宗力也自承，在首波提名中他原本要作為謝文定的「副院長」搭檔，卻因有「連任」的違憲之虞而放棄。但在第二波提名，許宗力反被提名為「司法院長」，府方更強以「再任」曲為辯解，以為合不合憲問題可全憑一己主觀認定。如此一來，這樣硬拗的提名，又更埋下「違憲者主導釋憲」的爭議火種。
我們不明白蔡總統為何甘冒大不韙提名那些顯不適任的大法官，這究竟只是行事急躁、粗疏所致，或者單純出於討好綠營，或是故意藉此凸顯自己的政治理念？無論如何，從這些提名人選多半出自司改會及特定律師事務所看，不僅被法界質疑為「近親繁殖」，甚至是特定政治派系人馬。萬一這些人不分良莠全數過關，未來國家憲法落在他們手裡，會被宰割變成什麼面貌，不能不令人擔心。
好的大法官，可以賦與憲法更博大、深邃的內涵；但偏執的大法官，則會被外界解讀為蔡總統遂行「司法台獨」的工具。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2016
Executive Summary: The Legislative Yuan has recently been reviewing nominees for chief justices of the Supreme Court. During questioning, two striking phenomena have appeared. First, some nominees have raised questions about abolishing the death penalty or gay marriage. These are sensitive issues that depart from current social norms. Secondly, some nominees have not been shy about their views on national identity, and their hostility toward the existing constitution and political framework.
Full Text Below:
The Legislative Yuan has recently been reviewing nominees for chief justices of the Supreme Court. During questioning, two striking phenomena have appeared. First, some nominees have raised questions about abolishing the death penalty or gay marriage. These are sensitive issues that depart from current social norms. Secondly, some nominees have not been shy about their views on national identity, and their hostility toward the existing constitution and political framework.
Of the two, the latter is far more worrisome than the former. Many members of the public cannot accept the abolition of the death penalty or the legalization same-sex marriage. But education, social movements, even legislation, could lead to gradual change. Many nominees personally favor the abolition of the death penalty. This does not necessarily reflect the imminent abolition of the death penalty by the Conference of Justices. After all, the Conference of Justices involves prolonged debates, and not a summary judgment.
What is truly questionable are the nominees who refuse to recognize the existing constitutional framework. How can they be considered qualified to interpret the Constitution? The main duty of a chief justice is to interpret the Constitution, or offer a unified interpretation of conflicting laws, procedures, and orders. If a chief justice is in fundamental disagreement with the design and spirit of the Constitution, or worse, regards the Constitution with contempt, how can he or she be considered qualified to interpret the Constitution?
Consider recent reviews. Hsu Chung-li, a justice and chief justice nominee, shared his view on cross-Strait relations. He believes, now as in the past, that relations between Taiwan and the Mainland are akin to relations between East and West Germany, that they are "special state-to-state relations". He believes that the sovereign territory of the Republic of China does not include territory controlled by the People's Republic of China. This view is the "two-states theory". It contradicts the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of China. It even contradicts President Tsai's position as expressed in her inaugural address. The MAC was quick to dismiss it. This added to the controversy over Hsu Chung-li's nomination to justice and chief justice.
Among the nominees for chief justice, the most difficult to accept is that of Hsu Chi-hsiung. During his review, Hsu said, "People cannot violate their consciences". He said “The Three People's Principles is problematic". He even said that Taiwan is not a normal nation, that the Republic of China is a "discarded" nation, and that Taiwan needs a new constitution, as soon as possible. When referring to "historic territory" as stipulated in the Constitution, he was even more contemptuous, and wondered whether it referred to territory fought over during the "Yellow Emperor's war with Chi You". Nominee Huang Chao-yuan, not to be outdone, said the name “Republic of China” was “mere nostalgia", and that he already had his fill of singing the national anthem.
As legal scholars, these people are free to hold whatever political views they wish. But will these candidates for chief justice be interpreting a constitution for which they have nothing but disdain? How can they possibly be considered qualified to do so? How can they do anything, other than add to the nation's troubles and fragmentation?
The parable of “The Father and Son Riding a Donkey” warns against the folly of trying to please everyone. Tsai Ing-wen appears to have forgotten this lesson. She has lost control of the nomination process for justices and chief justices. President Tsai's initital nominees for chief justice and deputy chief justice were Hsieh Wen-ting and Lin Ching-fang. They were not outstanding, but they were at least qualified. Green camp elements however, were unhappy, and forced the two candidates to withdraw. Tsai Ing-wen then nominated Hsu Chung-li, who may have violated the constitution, as president of the Judicial Yuan. In fact, Hsu Chung-li himself admitted that during the first wave of nominations, he was supposed to be vice president of of the Judicial Yuan under Hsieh Wen-ting. But because a second term was unconstitutional, Hsieh was forced to withdraw. During the second wave of nominations, Hsu Chung-li was nominated president of the Judicial Yuan. The government again argued on behalf of a second term. It assumed that the issue of constitutionality could be interpreted however it wished. These nominations, rammed through by force,
have led to the absurdity of “violators of the constitution interpreting the constitution”.
We do not understand why President Tsai was willing to risk nominating judges who are obviously ineligible. Was it merely impetuousness and imprudence? Was it merely to pander to the green camp? Was it a deliberate attempt to showcase her own political ideals? Whatever the case may be, most nominees hailed from the Ministry of Justice and certain law firms. They represent inbreeding within the legal community, even political factionalism. In the event these people, good and bad alike, pass muster, the Constitution will fall into their hands. What will it look like after it is butchered? One cannot help but worry.
A good judge can endow the Constitution with broader and more profound significance. But a biased judge will be seen as a tool by which President Tsai carries out "judicial Taiwan independence."
不認同憲法的人，如何負責釋憲？
2016-10-21 聯合報
立法院最近正就大法官提名人進行資格審查，在詢答過程中，出現了兩種引人注意的現象：其一，有些被提名人就敏感的社會議題如廢死或同性婚姻提出了高於社會現狀的寬容見解；其二是，有些被提名人毫不避諱大談自己的國家認同，對現行憲法內容或體制表示不以為然，甚至覺得難以苟同。
這兩種現象，後者遠比前者更值得憂慮。以目前的社會民意，許多民眾對於廢死或同性婚姻的合法化雖仍不能接受；但是，透過教育、社運乃至立法、釋憲的思辨過程，不無逐漸改變的可能。多位被提名人傾向支持「廢死」，是其個人態度之表達，未必代表大法官會議很快就會作成廢死之解釋；畢竟，大法官會議的討論仍必須經一番唇槍舌劍，不致率爾作出決定。
真正令人存疑的，則是那些顯不認同既有憲政體制的人，究竟有何資格擔當「解釋憲法」的工作？大法官的職責，主要就是在解釋憲法，或對發生衝突的法律、程序、命令等作出統一解釋。若有大法官基本上就對這部憲法缺乏認同，或對若干憲政設計或精神不以為然，甚至不掩其輕蔑；我們很難想像，這種人如何可能適當扮演解釋憲法的角色？
從近日的審查看，大法官暨司法院長提名人許宗力談到他對兩岸關係的看法，認為就像過去的東西德，是「特殊的國與國關係」，中華民國主權不包容中華人民共和國。此一看法，被認為是主張「兩國論」，除不符中華民國憲法精神，甚至違背蔡英文總統在就職演說中的立場，連陸委會都急忙撇清。此舉，使許宗力原本即備受爭議的司法院長提名，又更添一筆。
在所有大法官提名人中，最讓人難以接受的，是許志雄。他在詢答中一路語出驚人，諸如：被詢及願不願意唱國歌時，他稱「人不能違背良心」，他認為「三民主義有問題」。他甚至直言，台灣「不是正常國家」，「中華民國」是被中國「廢棄」的國號，台灣需要一部合時合用的新憲法。在談到憲法規定的「固有疆域」時，他更譏誚說，是指「黃帝大戰蚩尤」時的疆域嗎？黃昭元的表現絲毫不輸，他曾說中華民國稱號只是為了「滿足鄉愁」，並說他唱國歌的「配額」已經用完了。
作為法律學者，這些人持什麼政治理念，是他們的個人自由。但是，這樣的人若要扮演大法官來解釋他們所不屑的憲法，我們看不出他們可能稱職的理由，而且恐怕只會更增國政的紛擾和割裂。
蔡英文提名大法官及司法院長的過程變化再三，除露出「父子騎驢」式的心態，她的提名似乎也在爭議中逐漸失去沉穩與平衡。蔡總統首度提名的司法院正副院長人選謝文定、林錦芳，原非出色，但亦無不妥；卻因綠營人士不滿，而以跡近羞辱的方式迫使兩人退出提名。其後，蔡英文改提有違憲疑慮的許宗力為司法院長，事實上許宗力也自承，在首波提名中他原本要作為謝文定的「副院長」搭檔，卻因有「連任」的違憲之虞而放棄。但在第二波提名，許宗力反被提名為「司法院長」，府方更強以「再任」曲為辯解，以為合不合憲問題可全憑一己主觀認定。如此一來，這樣硬拗的提名，又更埋下「違憲者主導釋憲」的爭議火種。
我們不明白蔡總統為何甘冒大不韙提名那些顯不適任的大法官，這究竟只是行事急躁、粗疏所致，或者單純出於討好綠營，或是故意藉此凸顯自己的政治理念？無論如何，從這些提名人選多半出自司改會及特定律師事務所看，不僅被法界質疑為「近親繁殖」，甚至是特定政治派系人馬。萬一這些人不分良莠全數過關，未來國家憲法落在他們手裡，會被宰割變成什麼面貌，不能不令人擔心。
好的大法官，可以賦與憲法更博大、深邃的內涵；但偏執的大法官，則會被外界解讀為蔡總統遂行「司法台獨」的工具。
Wednesday, October 19, 2016
President Tsai Should Give Her Blessing to the Hung Xi Summit
President Tsai Should Give Her Blessing to the Hung Xi Summit
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2016
Executive Summary: The theme of the KMT CCP Forum has been changed. What was a trade and cultural forum, is now a peace forum. This proves that the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not changed. It still seeks to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. President Tsai said she hoped the Mainland would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. The Mainland has demonstrated goodwill toward Taiwan, through practical action. The Mainland has not endorsed the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Nevertheless it remains willing to carry on exchanges with Taiwan. It remains willing to ensure cross-Strait peace. By taking advantage of this opportunity, the KMT will make a contribution to cross-Strait peace. This merits President Tsai's careful consideration.
Full Text Below:
The Democratic Progressive Party now exercises total control over the Taiwan Region of China. Yet the Mainland has decided to keep communication channels between the KMT and the CCP open. Xi Jinping, one of the five most powerful figures in the world, will meet with the relatively powerless Kuomintang and its relatively powerless chairman, Hung Hsiu-chu. This may be a negative development for the DPP as a party, but a positive signal for the DPP government. The reason is simple. Official cross-Strait channels of communication have been severed. But private sector contacts are not following suit. Many problems remain and must be resolved. If the government cannot fulfill this role, the relative strength of the Mainland means that Taiwanese will be the ones to suffer. From another perspective, the KMT and CCP are helping the DPP government. President Tsai needs to understand this.
In 2005, the DPP vehemently opposed Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland. The following year, it opposed the KMT CCP Forum, and the Lien Hu Summit. History shows that when the DPP is in power, its attempts to block the opposition KMT were ineffectual. Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland was a success. He reached five points of agreement with the Mainland authorities. He established a new, peaceful relationship with the Mainland. Over the past decade, cross-Strait relations, economic and trade cooperation, and Taiwan's participation in international activities, have all improved as a result of the consultations held back then. Taiwan as a whole has benefited. The KMT may be in the opposition. But it remains in a position to improve cross-Strait relations and benefit Taiwan.
The DPP has habitually denounced the KMT for “pandering to China [sic] and selling out Taiwan”. It has opposed many KMT moves to the bitter end. The DPP is now the ruling party, yet it persists in disparaging the Hung Xi Summit. The summit may break the deadlock in cross-Strait relations and benefit Taiwan, but the DPP does not care. The DPP is no longer an opposition party. As the ruling party, it must view cross-Strait issues from the interests of people as a whole. It must view the role played by the KMT from a positive angle. Taiwan society is dogged by blue vs. green confrontation, particularly in such areas as national identity and Taiwan independence. Nevertheless both parties have a responsibility to the 23 million people on Taiwan, regardless of where their partisan loyalties may lie. They must fulfill their respective roles, for the benefit of Taiwan and for the sake of cross-Strait peace.
Most people on Taiwan still want to maintain the status quo. They do want to move too quickly toward reunification. Nor do they want to incite cross-Strait conflict over Taiwan independence. President Tsai has not make any provocations with her cross-Strait policy. But neither has she offered any way to break the cross-Strait deadlock. She is determined to resist Mainland pressure, to the bitter end. But she cannot change the cross-Strait power differential. Economics, trade, diplomacy, and other factors will further increase the pressure on Taiwan. The Tsai government will face even greater challenges. The struggle between the CCP and the DPP is an unequal one. The KMT can help provide balance. Through friendly interaction with the Mainland, it can reduce cross-Strait tensions. It can reduce social divisions on Taiwan that result from cross-Strait tensions. It can reduce Mainland pressure on Taiwan society, and enable Mainland policies to benefit Taiwan. For Taiwan, this equals KMT DPP cooperation. It enables the KMT to acquire more maneuvering room for the DPP.
President Tsai has set forth her Four Noes Principle. But it remains mired at the level of political proclamations. Mutual trust with the Mainland is non-existent. Communication channels have been cut. Therefore, the above-mentioned proclamations cannot be implemented. They cannot become part of cross-Strait interaction. Interaction between the KMT and the Mainland is now the most effective channel for cross-Strait communication. Can the DPP set aside partisan power struggles? Can it refrain from blocking KMT efforts on behalf of cross-Strait communications? If it can, Taiwan as a whole will have more bargaining chips when dealing with the Mainland, and the public on Taiwan will benefit more from improved cross-Strait relations.
If the KMT interaction with the Mainland can benefit Taiwan, if it can ensure cross-Strait peace, its interactions will become an example for the DPP to emulate. KMT interaction can alert the DPP to other options in cross-Strait relations, and dissuade it from continuing down a blind alley. The will of the people is as changeable as running water. President Tsai must appreciate the peoples' desire for peace. The KMT is working toward that end. Tsai must not undermine cross-Strait relations. The KMT is the opposition party. It is the minority party in the legislature. It cannot implement the results of negotiations with the Mainland as easily as it did in the past. That will require DPP government cooperation, and will reveal how the DPP government thinks. Can President Tsai put the well-being of the public on Taiwan first? If she can, she must support the KMT CCP Conference, enabling it to benefit the public on Taiwan.
The theme of the KMT CCP Forum has been changed. What was a trade and cultural forum, is now a peace forum. This proves that the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not changed. It still seeks to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. President Tsai said she hoped the Mainland would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. The Mainland has demonstrated goodwill toward Taiwan, through practical action. The Mainland has not endorsed the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Nevertheless it remains willing to carry on exchanges with Taiwan. It remains willing to ensure cross-Strait peace. By taking advantage of this opportunity, the KMT will make a contribution to cross-Strait peace. This merits President Tsai's careful consideration.
蔡總統應對洪習會樂觀其成
2016/10/20 中國時報
民進黨全面執政後，大陸仍然決定維繫國共溝通平台，全球最有權力人物排名前5名的習近平也將與弱勢國民黨的弱勢主席洪秀柱會談。對民進黨而言，可能是負面事件；對民進黨政府而言，卻可能是正面訊號。理由很淺顯，兩岸官方聯繫機制停擺，民間互動熱度卻不會隨之降低，從中衍生的諸多問題需要解決，政府若不能扮演好這個角色，以兩岸實力對比關係，吃虧的會是台灣與台灣人。換個角度看，這是國共在幫助民進黨政府，蔡總統應該正確認知。
民進黨2005年曾激烈反對連戰登陸，次年也反對國共論壇、反對連胡會談。歷史經驗顯示，民進黨當年大權在握，窮洪荒之力阻撓反對，並未達到任何效果，連戰還是成功登陸，並與大陸達成5項共同願景，從此確立兩岸關係和平發展的新局。兩岸關係10年來，舉凡經貿合作、國際空間的開拓等等，都建立在當時的協商成果之上，台灣從中受益。顯然，國民黨即便身處在野，仍然可以為台灣、為兩岸關係發展發揮正面作用。
長久以來，民進黨習慣於將國民黨斥為親中賣台，對國民黨的諸多作為，也都反對到底，即便已身處執政地位，看待洪習會仍充滿貶低之意，對洪習會可能為台灣利益創造的契機，對突破兩岸僵局可能發揮的作用卻視而未見。民進黨畢竟不同於過往的在野地位，既然已經成為執政黨，就應該從全民利益角度看待兩岸問題，更應該學會用正面的態度來審視國民黨從中扮演的角色。雖然台灣社會內部藍綠對立，特別是在國族認同和統獨立場上立場殊異，但兩黨都有責任維護台灣2300萬人民的最大利益，無論是國民黨還是民進黨都可在兩岸關係中扮演各自的角色，共同為台灣謀利益、為兩岸促和平。
具體而言，台灣社會的主流民意仍然是維持現狀，既不希望過度傾向統一，也不願意因為台獨招致兩岸衝突。蔡總統的兩岸政策基調雖是不挑釁，但也沒有提出更積極進取的主張來突破兩岸僵局，面對大陸的壓力雖然有決心力抗到底，卻不可能改變兩岸實力對比的差距，一旦大陸在經貿、外交等領域進一步加大壓力，蔡政府無疑將面臨更大考驗。在民共弱雞博弈過程中，國民黨可以從中扮演平衡的角色，透過與大陸的友善互動，一方面有助於緩和社會內部因兩岸緊張可能造成的對峙衝突，一方面也有助於化解大陸對台灣可能的壓力，使其對台政策重點多放在惠台之上。站在台灣的立場來看，這等於國民黨與民進黨的一種分進合擊，國民黨也可以為民進黨爭取迴旋空間。
現在蔡總統確立的新四不原則，還都停留在立場宣示層面，苦於與大陸沒有互信，聯繫溝通管道也都中斷，因而無法將上述宣示落實到兩岸互動的實務中，國民黨與大陸的互動也就成為現在兩岸關係中最有效的交流平台。若民進黨能夠拋開政黨鬥爭思維，在兩岸問題上至少不對國民黨橫加阻撓，那麼台灣作為一個整體，在面對大陸時，將有更大的談判籌碼，台灣人民也將從兩岸關係的進展中獲得更多好處。
國民黨若能通過與大陸的互動為台灣爭取更多利益，特別是為兩岸和平發展創造更廣闊的空間，也可以給民進黨帶來示範效果，使其意識到兩岸關係發展的多元選項，從而避免一意孤行。民意如流水，總是強調民意的蔡總統應該意識到台灣民眾渴望和平、不希望兩岸關係倒退的意願，國民黨正在為此努力。當然，國民黨現在畢竟是在野黨，在國會中亦處於少數，其與大陸協商的諸項成果若要落實，自然不像過去那樣方便，需要民進黨政府的配合。這將考驗民進黨政府的心胸，若蔡總統能以全台灣民眾的福祉為念，那就應該幫助國共會談獲得成果，為台灣民眾謀福利。
這次國共論壇的主題由過去的經貿文化變為和平發展，證明大陸對台政策基調並未改變，仍然是以推動兩岸和平發展為職志。蔡總統總說希望大陸多給一些善意，大陸此番也是以實際行動向台灣展示善意，即便民進黨政府的兩岸政策並未得到大陸的認可，但大陸仍有誠意和善意與台灣繼續開展交流，並共同維護和平發展的局面。藉此次洪習會的契機，國民黨也將為兩岸和平做出新的貢獻，這一層深意也值得蔡總統審慎思之。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2016
Executive Summary: The theme of the KMT CCP Forum has been changed. What was a trade and cultural forum, is now a peace forum. This proves that the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not changed. It still seeks to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. President Tsai said she hoped the Mainland would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. The Mainland has demonstrated goodwill toward Taiwan, through practical action. The Mainland has not endorsed the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Nevertheless it remains willing to carry on exchanges with Taiwan. It remains willing to ensure cross-Strait peace. By taking advantage of this opportunity, the KMT will make a contribution to cross-Strait peace. This merits President Tsai's careful consideration.
Full Text Below:
The Democratic Progressive Party now exercises total control over the Taiwan Region of China. Yet the Mainland has decided to keep communication channels between the KMT and the CCP open. Xi Jinping, one of the five most powerful figures in the world, will meet with the relatively powerless Kuomintang and its relatively powerless chairman, Hung Hsiu-chu. This may be a negative development for the DPP as a party, but a positive signal for the DPP government. The reason is simple. Official cross-Strait channels of communication have been severed. But private sector contacts are not following suit. Many problems remain and must be resolved. If the government cannot fulfill this role, the relative strength of the Mainland means that Taiwanese will be the ones to suffer. From another perspective, the KMT and CCP are helping the DPP government. President Tsai needs to understand this.
In 2005, the DPP vehemently opposed Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland. The following year, it opposed the KMT CCP Forum, and the Lien Hu Summit. History shows that when the DPP is in power, its attempts to block the opposition KMT were ineffectual. Lien Chan's visit to the Mainland was a success. He reached five points of agreement with the Mainland authorities. He established a new, peaceful relationship with the Mainland. Over the past decade, cross-Strait relations, economic and trade cooperation, and Taiwan's participation in international activities, have all improved as a result of the consultations held back then. Taiwan as a whole has benefited. The KMT may be in the opposition. But it remains in a position to improve cross-Strait relations and benefit Taiwan.
The DPP has habitually denounced the KMT for “pandering to China [sic] and selling out Taiwan”. It has opposed many KMT moves to the bitter end. The DPP is now the ruling party, yet it persists in disparaging the Hung Xi Summit. The summit may break the deadlock in cross-Strait relations and benefit Taiwan, but the DPP does not care. The DPP is no longer an opposition party. As the ruling party, it must view cross-Strait issues from the interests of people as a whole. It must view the role played by the KMT from a positive angle. Taiwan society is dogged by blue vs. green confrontation, particularly in such areas as national identity and Taiwan independence. Nevertheless both parties have a responsibility to the 23 million people on Taiwan, regardless of where their partisan loyalties may lie. They must fulfill their respective roles, for the benefit of Taiwan and for the sake of cross-Strait peace.
Most people on Taiwan still want to maintain the status quo. They do want to move too quickly toward reunification. Nor do they want to incite cross-Strait conflict over Taiwan independence. President Tsai has not make any provocations with her cross-Strait policy. But neither has she offered any way to break the cross-Strait deadlock. She is determined to resist Mainland pressure, to the bitter end. But she cannot change the cross-Strait power differential. Economics, trade, diplomacy, and other factors will further increase the pressure on Taiwan. The Tsai government will face even greater challenges. The struggle between the CCP and the DPP is an unequal one. The KMT can help provide balance. Through friendly interaction with the Mainland, it can reduce cross-Strait tensions. It can reduce social divisions on Taiwan that result from cross-Strait tensions. It can reduce Mainland pressure on Taiwan society, and enable Mainland policies to benefit Taiwan. For Taiwan, this equals KMT DPP cooperation. It enables the KMT to acquire more maneuvering room for the DPP.
President Tsai has set forth her Four Noes Principle. But it remains mired at the level of political proclamations. Mutual trust with the Mainland is non-existent. Communication channels have been cut. Therefore, the above-mentioned proclamations cannot be implemented. They cannot become part of cross-Strait interaction. Interaction between the KMT and the Mainland is now the most effective channel for cross-Strait communication. Can the DPP set aside partisan power struggles? Can it refrain from blocking KMT efforts on behalf of cross-Strait communications? If it can, Taiwan as a whole will have more bargaining chips when dealing with the Mainland, and the public on Taiwan will benefit more from improved cross-Strait relations.
If the KMT interaction with the Mainland can benefit Taiwan, if it can ensure cross-Strait peace, its interactions will become an example for the DPP to emulate. KMT interaction can alert the DPP to other options in cross-Strait relations, and dissuade it from continuing down a blind alley. The will of the people is as changeable as running water. President Tsai must appreciate the peoples' desire for peace. The KMT is working toward that end. Tsai must not undermine cross-Strait relations. The KMT is the opposition party. It is the minority party in the legislature. It cannot implement the results of negotiations with the Mainland as easily as it did in the past. That will require DPP government cooperation, and will reveal how the DPP government thinks. Can President Tsai put the well-being of the public on Taiwan first? If she can, she must support the KMT CCP Conference, enabling it to benefit the public on Taiwan.
The theme of the KMT CCP Forum has been changed. What was a trade and cultural forum, is now a peace forum. This proves that the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not changed. It still seeks to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. President Tsai said she hoped the Mainland would demonstrate greater goodwill toward Taiwan. The Mainland has demonstrated goodwill toward Taiwan, through practical action. The Mainland has not endorsed the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Nevertheless it remains willing to carry on exchanges with Taiwan. It remains willing to ensure cross-Strait peace. By taking advantage of this opportunity, the KMT will make a contribution to cross-Strait peace. This merits President Tsai's careful consideration.
蔡總統應對洪習會樂觀其成
2016/10/20 中國時報
民進黨全面執政後，大陸仍然決定維繫國共溝通平台，全球最有權力人物排名前5名的習近平也將與弱勢國民黨的弱勢主席洪秀柱會談。對民進黨而言，可能是負面事件；對民進黨政府而言，卻可能是正面訊號。理由很淺顯，兩岸官方聯繫機制停擺，民間互動熱度卻不會隨之降低，從中衍生的諸多問題需要解決，政府若不能扮演好這個角色，以兩岸實力對比關係，吃虧的會是台灣與台灣人。換個角度看，這是國共在幫助民進黨政府，蔡總統應該正確認知。
民進黨2005年曾激烈反對連戰登陸，次年也反對國共論壇、反對連胡會談。歷史經驗顯示，民進黨當年大權在握，窮洪荒之力阻撓反對，並未達到任何效果，連戰還是成功登陸，並與大陸達成5項共同願景，從此確立兩岸關係和平發展的新局。兩岸關係10年來，舉凡經貿合作、國際空間的開拓等等，都建立在當時的協商成果之上，台灣從中受益。顯然，國民黨即便身處在野，仍然可以為台灣、為兩岸關係發展發揮正面作用。
長久以來，民進黨習慣於將國民黨斥為親中賣台，對國民黨的諸多作為，也都反對到底，即便已身處執政地位，看待洪習會仍充滿貶低之意，對洪習會可能為台灣利益創造的契機，對突破兩岸僵局可能發揮的作用卻視而未見。民進黨畢竟不同於過往的在野地位，既然已經成為執政黨，就應該從全民利益角度看待兩岸問題，更應該學會用正面的態度來審視國民黨從中扮演的角色。雖然台灣社會內部藍綠對立，特別是在國族認同和統獨立場上立場殊異，但兩黨都有責任維護台灣2300萬人民的最大利益，無論是國民黨還是民進黨都可在兩岸關係中扮演各自的角色，共同為台灣謀利益、為兩岸促和平。
具體而言，台灣社會的主流民意仍然是維持現狀，既不希望過度傾向統一，也不願意因為台獨招致兩岸衝突。蔡總統的兩岸政策基調雖是不挑釁，但也沒有提出更積極進取的主張來突破兩岸僵局，面對大陸的壓力雖然有決心力抗到底，卻不可能改變兩岸實力對比的差距，一旦大陸在經貿、外交等領域進一步加大壓力，蔡政府無疑將面臨更大考驗。在民共弱雞博弈過程中，國民黨可以從中扮演平衡的角色，透過與大陸的友善互動，一方面有助於緩和社會內部因兩岸緊張可能造成的對峙衝突，一方面也有助於化解大陸對台灣可能的壓力，使其對台政策重點多放在惠台之上。站在台灣的立場來看，這等於國民黨與民進黨的一種分進合擊，國民黨也可以為民進黨爭取迴旋空間。
現在蔡總統確立的新四不原則，還都停留在立場宣示層面，苦於與大陸沒有互信，聯繫溝通管道也都中斷，因而無法將上述宣示落實到兩岸互動的實務中，國民黨與大陸的互動也就成為現在兩岸關係中最有效的交流平台。若民進黨能夠拋開政黨鬥爭思維，在兩岸問題上至少不對國民黨橫加阻撓，那麼台灣作為一個整體，在面對大陸時，將有更大的談判籌碼，台灣人民也將從兩岸關係的進展中獲得更多好處。
國民黨若能通過與大陸的互動為台灣爭取更多利益，特別是為兩岸和平發展創造更廣闊的空間，也可以給民進黨帶來示範效果，使其意識到兩岸關係發展的多元選項，從而避免一意孤行。民意如流水，總是強調民意的蔡總統應該意識到台灣民眾渴望和平、不希望兩岸關係倒退的意願，國民黨正在為此努力。當然，國民黨現在畢竟是在野黨，在國會中亦處於少數，其與大陸協商的諸項成果若要落實，自然不像過去那樣方便，需要民進黨政府的配合。這將考驗民進黨政府的心胸，若蔡總統能以全台灣民眾的福祉為念，那就應該幫助國共會談獲得成果，為台灣民眾謀福利。
這次國共論壇的主題由過去的經貿文化變為和平發展，證明大陸對台政策基調並未改變，仍然是以推動兩岸和平發展為職志。蔡總統總說希望大陸多給一些善意，大陸此番也是以實際行動向台灣展示善意，即便民進黨政府的兩岸政策並未得到大陸的認可，但大陸仍有誠意和善意與台灣繼續開展交流，並共同維護和平發展的局面。藉此次洪習會的契機，國民黨也將為兩岸和平做出新的貢獻，這一層深意也值得蔡總統審慎思之。
Tuesday, October 18, 2016
Hung Hsiu-chu Must Achieve Three Goals
Hung Hsiu-chu Must Achieve Three Goals
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2016
Executive Summary: Disputes over political path may provoke short term controversy. In the long run, the KMT must reflect on any biases in its political path. It must reflect upon course adjustments it must make to remain up to date and relevant. Disputes must not be the by product of personal animosities. They must not be the instruments of internecine struggle. Hung Hsiu-chu must have the courage to make a commitment on behalf of the KMT. She must obtain conditions beneficial to the KMT and Taiwan from Xi Jinping. Disputes over the KMT political path can be resolved. This is the challenge Hung faces. This is her chance to make history.
Full Text Below:
On November 2 and November 3, the KMT and CCP will hold a forum on cross-Strait peace and development in Beijing, and decide whether to convene a Hung Xi Summit. The DPP has yet to cast stones, but Hung's KMT comrades are already sharpening their axes. KMT legislators are complaining that Hung Hsiu-chu failed to inform the party beforehand. They are demanding that Hung Hsiu-chu coordinate with the party before her visit, and are voicing doubts about Hung's "one China, same interpretation" premise. They want Hung Hsiu-chu to inform Xi Jinping that the Kuomintang insists on the 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations.
Former Vice President Wu Dunyi visited the United States a few days ago and criticized Hung Hsiu-chu's "different from us" remark. The clash within the KMT over its political path is now out in the open. Disputes over political path within political parties are common, and not necessarily a bad thing. But the current dispute over political path has degenerated into a battle of wills, even a battle of personalities. The criticisms directed against the upcoming Hung Xi Summit are clearly without merit, either procedurally or substantively.
From a procedural perspective, the KMT legislative caucus complained that it was not informed about the Hung Xi Summit beforehand. Hung Hsiu-chu responded. She said, "Consider the Lien Hu Summit, the Ma Xi Summit, the Chu Xi Summit. When have KMT chairmen ever notified the KMT legislative caucus in advance? Many details are still being negotiated. Not every detail can be included in a report. Even announcements must be made by the two sides at the same time.” Her perfectly reasonable answer left critics speechless. After all, when critics fail to apply the same procedural standards to all, it is obvious their attack is personal in nature.
The KMT legislative caucus made the same mistaken when it demanded that Hung Hsiu-chu publicly reaffirm "one China, different interpretations" during the Hung Xi Summit. But with the sole exception of the Ma Xi Summit, past KMT CCP summits never included any such public affirmations. This demand was clearly unreasonable.
The KMT legislators' selective indignation arouses the suspicion that Hung Hsiu-chu was being personally attacked. Doubts about the party's political path may be real. But unfair targeting of Hung has turned the debate into a power struggle.
From a practical perspective, it is unwise for the KMT to make political hay out of the Hung Xi Summit. Instead, the KMT should ask itself, if the Hung Xi Summit fails to gel, the Tenth Annual KMT CCP Forum will be canceled. How will that be interpreted? Everyone will conclude that the KMT has been marginalized. They will conclude that even cross-Strait dialogue has come to an end, and that the Mainland authorities no longer have any desire to deal with the KMT. Will such an interpretation benefit the KMT? The interests of the KMT as a party and the interests of the Republic of China as a nation, demand the convening of the KMT CCP Forum and the Hung Xi Summit. That ought to be a consensus within the KMT.
Of even greater importance of course, are Taiwan's interests. Continuation of the KMT CCP Forum will stabilize cross-Strait relations, which are currently in jeopardy. The KMT CCP Forum will keep official cross-Strait political communication channels open. It will prevent misunderstandings that could lead to a shooting war. The KMT CCP Forum ensures that the KMT and CCP will remain committed to peace. Such a guarantee will help contain the DPP. It will prevent it from becoming too radical in its advocacy of Taiwan independence. It can prevent it from going too far, from crossing a line in the sand and endangering cross-Strait peace. This is the substantive merit of the KMT CCP Forum and the Hung Xi Summit.
That does not mean that the KMT or others cannot raise doubts about the Hung Xi Summit. But such doubts should be constructive. In fact, Hung Hsiu-chu's participation in a Hung Xi Summit could yield considerable benefits.
A change in ruling parties and cross-Strait relations has taken place. Hung Hsiu-chu must seek to achieve at least three goals:
First, she should reaffirm the path of cross-Strait peace. She should ensure that cross-Strait relations under DPP rule remain stable. She should declare that the KMT will actively ensure KMT CCP cooperation, and grant swing voters on Taiwan peace of mind.
Second, the KMT is no longer the ruling party. The DPP is likely to move toward Taiwan independence. Political dialogue will be extremely important. The KMT and the CCP must ensure mutual trust. They must enable the two sides to engage in peaceful political dialogue. They must begin with economics, trade, and culture, and end with politics. They must enable the opposition KMT to lead Taiwan's political development.
Thirdly, at the core of any political dialogue is Hung and Xi's affirmation. They must affirm that although two sides of the Strait are separately governed, they are not moving away from each other. The KMT must stress that although the two sides are divided, they are not on a separatist path. Hung Hsiu-chu must urge Xi Jinping to accept separate governance. That means the Mainland must accept the Republic of China's constitutional framework. Only then can the political relationship between the two sides be further clarified. Only then can the two sides move toward reunification.
Disputes over political path may provoke short term controversy. In the long run, the KMT must reflect on any biases in its political path. It must reflect upon course adjustments it must make to remain up to date and relevant. Disputes must not be the by product of personal animosities. They must not be the instruments of internecine struggle. Hung Hsiu-chu must have the courage to make a commitment on behalf of the KMT. She must obtain conditions beneficial to the KMT and Taiwan from Xi Jinping. Disputes over the KMT political path can be resolved. This is the challenge Hung faces. This is her chance to make history.
洪秀柱必須達成的三個目標
2016/10/19 中國時報
國共兩黨將於11月2日至3日在北京舉行兩岸和平發展論壇，並確定循例舉行「洪習會」，民進黨還未丟石頭，國民黨內已刀光劍影。國民黨立法院黨團埋怨洪習會沒有事前告知黨團，要求洪秀柱在出訪前先與黨團溝通，並表達對洪「一中同表」主張的疑慮，希望洪秀柱在洪習會中，大聲表達國民黨堅持九二共識、一中各表。
前副總統吳敦義日前訪美，就針對一中各表問題批評洪秀柱「跟我們不一樣」，國民黨內的路線之爭已經檯面化。基本上，政黨有路線之爭極為平常，也未必是壞事。然而，國民黨這一波的爭執，卻隱然從「路線之爭」變為「意氣之爭」，甚至變質為「人事鬥爭」。以這次對即將登場的「洪習會」所發出的批評質疑，就顯然失焦，不管在「程序面」或「實質面」，質疑方都顯得欠缺正當性。
從程序面言，國民黨立院黨團抱怨事前未被告知「洪習會」。洪秀柱說：「請問哪一次連胡會或者馬習會、朱習會，有事先跟黨團做報告嗎？很多細節問題兩方面在協調，不可能說每個細節都跟大家說明報告，甚至於連發布時間都是要雙方（國共）一起同時。」這一番在情在理的回答，讓質疑者啞然。因為當質疑者沒有以同樣的程序標準公平檢驗時，就會顯得是「針對個人」。
同樣的謬誤，亦發生在黨團要求洪秀柱在「洪習會」上大聲表達「一中各表」，然而之前的國共高層會面，除了馬習會時，馬英九在與習近平的閉門會中提及一中各表，其他包括歷次國共論壇在內的領導人會談，都沒有公開提及，這又是一種不公平。
程序上的針對性，難免讓人有「黨團舞『表』，志在『秀柱』」對人意氣的解讀。即便其中存有路線的疑慮，也因為這種不公平的針對性，變質為權力鬥爭。
從實質面而言，國民黨黨團挑「洪習會」作文章，並不明智。不妨反過來模擬一個情境，如果「洪習會」沒有成局，舉辦10年的國共論壇中斷了，外界會如何解讀這樣的訊息？各界只會認為，國民黨已經邊緣化到連兩岸的話語權都淪失，解讀為大陸當局已無意與國民黨打交道。這樣的解讀，對國民黨會是加分嗎？從國民黨的「一黨利益」、從中華民國的整體利益，國共論壇都必須延續、「洪習會」不能不辦，理應是國民黨的全黨共識。
更重要的是「台灣利益」，國共論壇的延續，對低迷不振、危機四伏的兩岸關係來說，尤有安定的功能。國共論壇不但可以讓兩岸保留政治對話的窗口，在官方溝通機制中斷的此時，可具有避免擦槍走火的保險功能，國共論壇也是國共二方堅持兩岸和平發展路線的一種形式保證，這樣的形式保證可以牽制民進黨，不要在台獨問題上太過激進、走得太遠而越過了紅線，造成兩岸和平立即性的危險。凡此，都是國共論壇與「洪習會」所具有的實質、積極的功能。
當然，這並不意謂，國民黨黨團或其他人士，不能提出其對「洪習會」的關心乃至於疑慮。但這樣的關心，仍宜立於「建設性基調」。而事實上，對於洪秀柱在「洪習會」中的角色，不是沒有可積極期待的空間。
在政黨輪替、兩岸處在變局的此刻，洪秀柱至少應該在「洪習會」上，達成3個目標：
第一，確認兩岸和平發展路線，讓兩岸關係在民進黨造成的變局中仍能走穩，宣示國共將積極合作，讓台灣中間選民心安。
第二，國民黨已不是執政黨，在民進黨可能往台獨方向前進的此時，政治對話就非常重要。國共應建立互信，讓雙方得以安心地大開大闔進入政治對話階段，從經貿、文化議題，跨入政治議題，讓在野的國民黨反而可以引領台灣政治發展。
第三，政治對話的核心是洪、習確認兩岸分治不分裂的關係。國民黨力主現在是分治，但不走分裂路線。洪秀柱也要積極爭取習近平接受分治的關係。分治，就是大陸要正視與接受中華民國的憲政體制。在分治關係下，兩岸的政治關係與政治安排才能進一步釐清。兩岸才有機會走向融一到統一的道路。
路線之爭可能帶來短期紛擾，長期來說，也是一面映照路線有無偏誤，是否該調整的鏡子，是讓政黨與時俱進、體質更強健的機制。前提是，不能出於個人意氣，也不應做為黨爭的工具。洪秀柱應有膽識對黨內承諾，向習近平爭取到對國民黨有利、對台灣有利的最佳條件，路線之爭必可化解。這是洪秀柱的挑戰，也是成就歷史地位的機會。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2016
Executive Summary: Disputes over political path may provoke short term controversy. In the long run, the KMT must reflect on any biases in its political path. It must reflect upon course adjustments it must make to remain up to date and relevant. Disputes must not be the by product of personal animosities. They must not be the instruments of internecine struggle. Hung Hsiu-chu must have the courage to make a commitment on behalf of the KMT. She must obtain conditions beneficial to the KMT and Taiwan from Xi Jinping. Disputes over the KMT political path can be resolved. This is the challenge Hung faces. This is her chance to make history.
Full Text Below:
On November 2 and November 3, the KMT and CCP will hold a forum on cross-Strait peace and development in Beijing, and decide whether to convene a Hung Xi Summit. The DPP has yet to cast stones, but Hung's KMT comrades are already sharpening their axes. KMT legislators are complaining that Hung Hsiu-chu failed to inform the party beforehand. They are demanding that Hung Hsiu-chu coordinate with the party before her visit, and are voicing doubts about Hung's "one China, same interpretation" premise. They want Hung Hsiu-chu to inform Xi Jinping that the Kuomintang insists on the 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations.
Former Vice President Wu Dunyi visited the United States a few days ago and criticized Hung Hsiu-chu's "different from us" remark. The clash within the KMT over its political path is now out in the open. Disputes over political path within political parties are common, and not necessarily a bad thing. But the current dispute over political path has degenerated into a battle of wills, even a battle of personalities. The criticisms directed against the upcoming Hung Xi Summit are clearly without merit, either procedurally or substantively.
From a procedural perspective, the KMT legislative caucus complained that it was not informed about the Hung Xi Summit beforehand. Hung Hsiu-chu responded. She said, "Consider the Lien Hu Summit, the Ma Xi Summit, the Chu Xi Summit. When have KMT chairmen ever notified the KMT legislative caucus in advance? Many details are still being negotiated. Not every detail can be included in a report. Even announcements must be made by the two sides at the same time.” Her perfectly reasonable answer left critics speechless. After all, when critics fail to apply the same procedural standards to all, it is obvious their attack is personal in nature.
The KMT legislative caucus made the same mistaken when it demanded that Hung Hsiu-chu publicly reaffirm "one China, different interpretations" during the Hung Xi Summit. But with the sole exception of the Ma Xi Summit, past KMT CCP summits never included any such public affirmations. This demand was clearly unreasonable.
The KMT legislators' selective indignation arouses the suspicion that Hung Hsiu-chu was being personally attacked. Doubts about the party's political path may be real. But unfair targeting of Hung has turned the debate into a power struggle.
From a practical perspective, it is unwise for the KMT to make political hay out of the Hung Xi Summit. Instead, the KMT should ask itself, if the Hung Xi Summit fails to gel, the Tenth Annual KMT CCP Forum will be canceled. How will that be interpreted? Everyone will conclude that the KMT has been marginalized. They will conclude that even cross-Strait dialogue has come to an end, and that the Mainland authorities no longer have any desire to deal with the KMT. Will such an interpretation benefit the KMT? The interests of the KMT as a party and the interests of the Republic of China as a nation, demand the convening of the KMT CCP Forum and the Hung Xi Summit. That ought to be a consensus within the KMT.
Of even greater importance of course, are Taiwan's interests. Continuation of the KMT CCP Forum will stabilize cross-Strait relations, which are currently in jeopardy. The KMT CCP Forum will keep official cross-Strait political communication channels open. It will prevent misunderstandings that could lead to a shooting war. The KMT CCP Forum ensures that the KMT and CCP will remain committed to peace. Such a guarantee will help contain the DPP. It will prevent it from becoming too radical in its advocacy of Taiwan independence. It can prevent it from going too far, from crossing a line in the sand and endangering cross-Strait peace. This is the substantive merit of the KMT CCP Forum and the Hung Xi Summit.
That does not mean that the KMT or others cannot raise doubts about the Hung Xi Summit. But such doubts should be constructive. In fact, Hung Hsiu-chu's participation in a Hung Xi Summit could yield considerable benefits.
A change in ruling parties and cross-Strait relations has taken place. Hung Hsiu-chu must seek to achieve at least three goals:
First, she should reaffirm the path of cross-Strait peace. She should ensure that cross-Strait relations under DPP rule remain stable. She should declare that the KMT will actively ensure KMT CCP cooperation, and grant swing voters on Taiwan peace of mind.
Second, the KMT is no longer the ruling party. The DPP is likely to move toward Taiwan independence. Political dialogue will be extremely important. The KMT and the CCP must ensure mutual trust. They must enable the two sides to engage in peaceful political dialogue. They must begin with economics, trade, and culture, and end with politics. They must enable the opposition KMT to lead Taiwan's political development.
Thirdly, at the core of any political dialogue is Hung and Xi's affirmation. They must affirm that although two sides of the Strait are separately governed, they are not moving away from each other. The KMT must stress that although the two sides are divided, they are not on a separatist path. Hung Hsiu-chu must urge Xi Jinping to accept separate governance. That means the Mainland must accept the Republic of China's constitutional framework. Only then can the political relationship between the two sides be further clarified. Only then can the two sides move toward reunification.
Disputes over political path may provoke short term controversy. In the long run, the KMT must reflect on any biases in its political path. It must reflect upon course adjustments it must make to remain up to date and relevant. Disputes must not be the by product of personal animosities. They must not be the instruments of internecine struggle. Hung Hsiu-chu must have the courage to make a commitment on behalf of the KMT. She must obtain conditions beneficial to the KMT and Taiwan from Xi Jinping. Disputes over the KMT political path can be resolved. This is the challenge Hung faces. This is her chance to make history.
洪秀柱必須達成的三個目標
2016/10/19 中國時報
國共兩黨將於11月2日至3日在北京舉行兩岸和平發展論壇，並確定循例舉行「洪習會」，民進黨還未丟石頭，國民黨內已刀光劍影。國民黨立法院黨團埋怨洪習會沒有事前告知黨團，要求洪秀柱在出訪前先與黨團溝通，並表達對洪「一中同表」主張的疑慮，希望洪秀柱在洪習會中，大聲表達國民黨堅持九二共識、一中各表。
前副總統吳敦義日前訪美，就針對一中各表問題批評洪秀柱「跟我們不一樣」，國民黨內的路線之爭已經檯面化。基本上，政黨有路線之爭極為平常，也未必是壞事。然而，國民黨這一波的爭執，卻隱然從「路線之爭」變為「意氣之爭」，甚至變質為「人事鬥爭」。以這次對即將登場的「洪習會」所發出的批評質疑，就顯然失焦，不管在「程序面」或「實質面」，質疑方都顯得欠缺正當性。
從程序面言，國民黨立院黨團抱怨事前未被告知「洪習會」。洪秀柱說：「請問哪一次連胡會或者馬習會、朱習會，有事先跟黨團做報告嗎？很多細節問題兩方面在協調，不可能說每個細節都跟大家說明報告，甚至於連發布時間都是要雙方（國共）一起同時。」這一番在情在理的回答，讓質疑者啞然。因為當質疑者沒有以同樣的程序標準公平檢驗時，就會顯得是「針對個人」。
同樣的謬誤，亦發生在黨團要求洪秀柱在「洪習會」上大聲表達「一中各表」，然而之前的國共高層會面，除了馬習會時，馬英九在與習近平的閉門會中提及一中各表，其他包括歷次國共論壇在內的領導人會談，都沒有公開提及，這又是一種不公平。
程序上的針對性，難免讓人有「黨團舞『表』，志在『秀柱』」對人意氣的解讀。即便其中存有路線的疑慮，也因為這種不公平的針對性，變質為權力鬥爭。
從實質面而言，國民黨黨團挑「洪習會」作文章，並不明智。不妨反過來模擬一個情境，如果「洪習會」沒有成局，舉辦10年的國共論壇中斷了，外界會如何解讀這樣的訊息？各界只會認為，國民黨已經邊緣化到連兩岸的話語權都淪失，解讀為大陸當局已無意與國民黨打交道。這樣的解讀，對國民黨會是加分嗎？從國民黨的「一黨利益」、從中華民國的整體利益，國共論壇都必須延續、「洪習會」不能不辦，理應是國民黨的全黨共識。
更重要的是「台灣利益」，國共論壇的延續，對低迷不振、危機四伏的兩岸關係來說，尤有安定的功能。國共論壇不但可以讓兩岸保留政治對話的窗口，在官方溝通機制中斷的此時，可具有避免擦槍走火的保險功能，國共論壇也是國共二方堅持兩岸和平發展路線的一種形式保證，這樣的形式保證可以牽制民進黨，不要在台獨問題上太過激進、走得太遠而越過了紅線，造成兩岸和平立即性的危險。凡此，都是國共論壇與「洪習會」所具有的實質、積極的功能。
當然，這並不意謂，國民黨黨團或其他人士，不能提出其對「洪習會」的關心乃至於疑慮。但這樣的關心，仍宜立於「建設性基調」。而事實上，對於洪秀柱在「洪習會」中的角色，不是沒有可積極期待的空間。
在政黨輪替、兩岸處在變局的此刻，洪秀柱至少應該在「洪習會」上，達成3個目標：
第一，確認兩岸和平發展路線，讓兩岸關係在民進黨造成的變局中仍能走穩，宣示國共將積極合作，讓台灣中間選民心安。
第二，國民黨已不是執政黨，在民進黨可能往台獨方向前進的此時，政治對話就非常重要。國共應建立互信，讓雙方得以安心地大開大闔進入政治對話階段，從經貿、文化議題，跨入政治議題，讓在野的國民黨反而可以引領台灣政治發展。
第三，政治對話的核心是洪、習確認兩岸分治不分裂的關係。國民黨力主現在是分治，但不走分裂路線。洪秀柱也要積極爭取習近平接受分治的關係。分治，就是大陸要正視與接受中華民國的憲政體制。在分治關係下，兩岸的政治關係與政治安排才能進一步釐清。兩岸才有機會走向融一到統一的道路。
路線之爭可能帶來短期紛擾，長期來說，也是一面映照路線有無偏誤，是否該調整的鏡子，是讓政黨與時俱進、體質更強健的機制。前提是，不能出於個人意氣，也不應做為黨爭的工具。洪秀柱應有膽識對黨內承諾，向習近平爭取到對國民黨有利、對台灣有利的最佳條件，路線之爭必可化解。這是洪秀柱的挑戰，也是成就歷史地位的機會。
Monday, October 17, 2016
Let the President be the President, and the Chairman be the Chairman
Let the President be the President, and the Chairman be the Chairman
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2016
Executive Summary: If Ms. Tsai clearly distinguishes between her roles as president and chairman, if she clearly separates her duties of president and chairman, if she adheres strictly to the law, cross-Strait official interaction is possible. President Tsai's priority must be to sort out the relationship between party and government. The government is the government. The party is the party. She must use both to achieve the best results. This is the art of politics. Can she succeed? That is up to her.
Full Text Below:
The Presidential Office “Policy Coordination Committee” will convene in the evening after work in order to avoid objections that it is unconstitutional. But we have to ask, if something is unconstitutional during working hours, does it suddenly become constitutional after working hours?
President Tsai and the Lin Chuan cabinet have been beset by internal and external problems since inauguration. The president's reforms have backfired and are now in limbo. The cabinet has lost control of command and communications. Local power brokers rule, doing as they wish. Public support for the two has plummeted. President Tsai wants a coordination mechanism for the Presidential Office, the Executive Yuan, the DPP, the DPP think tank, and for central and local governments. She hopes to integrate the party with the government, the executive with the legislative, even at the local level, in order to ensure smooth governance. Her swift action has raised concerns that the party is no longer distinct from the government, and that the president now wields unconstitutional authority. Even Hsu Chong-li, the president's own nominee for Judicial Yuan president, warned that the president's committee "warrants closer examination”, and pressured President Tsai to make changes.
Actually, for the President to convene such meetings is not without precedent. The Chen era nine-man group and the Ma era five-man group also provoked controversy. Clearly the seventh amendment to the Constitution has led to a clash between government operations and the constitutional framework. The president is directly elected by the people and must answer to them. He or she must assume responsibility for the conduct of government affairs. But the Constitution also stipulates that the premier is the chief executive. In theory, the president may not interfere in the administration of affairs other than diplomacy, defense, and cross-Strait relations. Confusion of authority and responsibility has forced the president to rely on personal influence to implement government policy.
The Policy Coordination Committee established by President Tsai is even more constitutionally questionable, due to its wider scope. President Tsai has included the premier, the chief convener of the ruling party, the secretary-general of the ruling party, the head of the DPP think tank, and even the ruling party county chiefs and city mayors on her committee. The president has in effect personally assumed control over the executive branch, the legislative branch, even party affairs and local affairs. This already undermines checks and balances between the executive and the legislature, and rides roughshod over local government autonomy.
Meeting after normal office hours does nothing to reduce constitutional controversy. The reason is simple. The problem lies in the constitutional status of the president and members of the committee. It has nothing to do with working hours. Every political office within the political system has its own unique status, requiring a particular pattern of political conduct. This is true for the president, for the premier, for the chief party convener, for county chiefs, for city mayors, and for think tank heads. How can constitutional checks and balances work if the president tells the premier and the Legislative Yuan which bills to pass? Is the Republic of China still a nation governed by a constitution, or not? No wonder Hsu Chong-li was taken aback.
However, a solution is available. The DPP is the ruling party. It controls over half the seats in the legislature. It controls over half the county and municipal governments. If it wishes to, a DPP coordination mechanism would enjoy far greater legitimacy. DPP legislators, DPP county chiefs, and DPP city mayors, are all members of the Democratic Progressive Party. Naturally they must obey DPP resolutions and participate in DPP policy coordination. The premier is appointed by the president. Even if the premier himself is not a DPP member, his participation in a DPP policy meeting is required. If President Tsai, in her capacity as DPP Chairman, held a similar Policy Coordination Committee meeting within the confines of the Democratic Progressive Party or the DPP think tank, she could avoid constitutional controversy. The DPP is a private sector entity. It wields no government authority. Its resolutions are neither law nor executive orders. Its activities can be regarded as mere coordination, and need not provoke constitutional concerns.
President Tsai must distinguish between her role as president and her role as party chairman. She must diligently distinguish party from government. She must prevent the party from prevailing over the government. In particular she must avoid the impression that the party is ruling the nation. The president is a public official, responsible to the constitution and the people as a whole. Her words and deeds must conform to the constitution and to the law. Policies promoted in her capacity as president must comply with the constitutional framework. As chairman of the DPP, she must be responsible for all DPP members. Their words and deeds must also comply with the Constitution. When conflicts between her two identities arise, Ms. Tsai must remind herself which is which. If she is president, she must consider the interests of the nation as a whole. She must not obey the party at the expense of the constitutional order. In her capacity as president, the nature of her relationship is that of “government vs. opposition party” and “Presidential Office vs. Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan” In her capacity as party chairman, the nature of her relationship is that of “ruling party vs. opposition party”. The former relationship is one of listening and respect. The latter relationship is one of partisan rivalry.
As for cross-Strait relations, the separation of party and government also facilitates the resolution of impasses. President Tsai must abide by the Constitution and the law. Therefore she has repeatedly declared that cross-Strait relations must be handled in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. But the DPP adheres to its Taiwan Independence Party Platform and advocates Taiwan independence. Therefore the Mainland remains skeptical about the DPP government. This makes the restoration of cross-Strait official relations difficult.
If Ms. Tsai clearly distinguishes between her roles as president and chairman, if she clearly separates her duties of president and chairman, if she adheres strictly to the law, cross-Strait official interaction is possible. President Tsai's priority must be to sort out the relationship between party and government. The government is the government. The party is the party. She must use both to achieve the best results.
This is the art of politics. Can she succeed? That is up to her.
讓總統的歸總統 主席的歸主席
2016/10/18 中國時報
總統府決定將「執政決策協調會議」改到晚間下班後舉行，希望藉此避免違憲疑慮。我們不禁要問，如果上班時違憲，下班後就不違憲了嗎？
蔡總統及林全內閣就任以來，內外問題叢生，總統各項改革不是反彈四起，就是動彈不得，內閣縱向指揮與橫向聯繫都螺絲掉滿地，地方諸侯坐大，各行其是，兩人民意支持度快速下墜。蔡總統決建立府、院、黨、智庫及中央地方協調機制，希望快速整合黨與政、行政與立法及地方意見，順暢推動政務。實施以來決策果斷迅速，卻遭到遭外界質疑，認為黨政不分、總統擴權，有違憲之虞。司法院院長被提名人許宗力在立法院應詢時也認為，總統召集這樣的會議「值得進一步考慮」，迫使蔡總統做出一些技術性調整。
其實總統召集類似會議並非沒有前例，扁時代的九人小組及馬政府時期的五人小組，同樣也都存在爭議。顯見憲法第七次增修條文已造成國政運作與憲政體制的扞格，總統經由全民直選，背負全民期待，必須為政務的有效推動負起責任，但憲法又規定行政院長才是最高行政首長，理論上總統不應干預除外交、國防和兩岸事務以外的政務。權責的錯位迫使總統必須依賴實質影響力干預行政工作。
即便如此，蔡總統成立的協調會議，由於參與人員更廣，逾越憲政分際的問題就更嚴重。蔡總統不僅納入行政院長和執政黨黨團總召、執政黨祕書長、智庫執行長，連執政直轄市長都成為與會成員，等於總統親自站上行政立法乃至黨務、地方事務的第一線，已悖離了行政立法的制衡法則，及地方自治的分權關係。
縱然改到下班後舉行，並不能因此降低違憲爭議，理由很簡單，違憲疑慮是因為總統與會議成員的憲法身分扞格而起，與是否上班身分無關。每一個政治職務在政治系統中，有不同的政治地位，每一政治地位都有一定的政治行為模式，總統如此，閣揆、黨團總召、院轄市長、智庫董事長亦然。試問，如果可以允許總統指揮閣揆與立法院黨團通過法案，憲法的制衡關係不是蕩然無存嗎？台灣還是憲政主義國家嗎？難怪許宗力對此亦不以為然。
不過，這也並非沒有解決辦法，民進黨是執政黨，國會議席過半，且在地方過半數的縣市執政，若要建構協調機制，民進黨的平台更具法理的正當性。無論立法委員還是綠營縣市首長，都是民進黨員，自然有服從民進黨決議和參與民進黨政策協調的義務。行政院長由總統任命，即便院長本人未必是民進黨員，但列席民進黨的政策會議也有其必要。蔡總統若能以蔡主席的身分，在民進黨內或者民進黨智庫召開類似協調會議，就完全能夠避免憲政爭議。更重要的是，民進黨屬於民間社團，沒有公權力，形成的決議不能直接成為法律和行政命令，只能視為協調機制而不會有超越憲法的嫌疑。
蔡總統所應為，是區分自己總統與黨主席的身分，做好黨政分立，避免在實踐中讓黨凌駕於政府，特別是要避免黨天下的嫌疑。總統屬於公職，要對憲法及全體人民負責，言行必須符合憲法和法律，以總統身分推動的政務，必須符合憲政體制。身為民進黨主席，則需向全體民進黨員負責，其言行也要受黨章的約束。當兩者身分發生衝突時，蔡女士應意識到自己當時是總統身分或主席身分。如果是總統身分，就必須以全民利益為考量，不能為了服從黨意而不惜違背憲政秩序。以總統身分，就是政府與反對黨的關係、總統與閣揆及立法院的關係；以黨主席身分，則變成了執政黨與在野黨的關係。前者首重傾聽與尊重，後者才是競爭關係。
至於兩岸關係，黨政分立也可以為僵局的解套創造空間。既然蔡總統要遵守憲法和法律，她也多次宣示要按照《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》來處理兩岸事務，其實這與馬政府的立場並無二致。不過，由於民進黨堅持《台獨黨綱》和台獨主張，大陸對民進黨政府的疑慮日深，兩岸官方難以恢復互動關係。
如果蔡女士分清楚自己的總統與主席身分，據此區隔總統與主席的職務行為，並堅持依法行政，兩岸官方互動的糾結並非沒有機會化解。蔡總統的當務之急就是理順黨政關係，政府歸政府，黨歸黨，善用各自不同的功能，以期達到最大的執政績效。
這是政治的藝術，能不能做好，考驗蔡總統的智慧。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2016
Executive Summary: If Ms. Tsai clearly distinguishes between her roles as president and chairman, if she clearly separates her duties of president and chairman, if she adheres strictly to the law, cross-Strait official interaction is possible. President Tsai's priority must be to sort out the relationship between party and government. The government is the government. The party is the party. She must use both to achieve the best results. This is the art of politics. Can she succeed? That is up to her.
Full Text Below:
The Presidential Office “Policy Coordination Committee” will convene in the evening after work in order to avoid objections that it is unconstitutional. But we have to ask, if something is unconstitutional during working hours, does it suddenly become constitutional after working hours?
President Tsai and the Lin Chuan cabinet have been beset by internal and external problems since inauguration. The president's reforms have backfired and are now in limbo. The cabinet has lost control of command and communications. Local power brokers rule, doing as they wish. Public support for the two has plummeted. President Tsai wants a coordination mechanism for the Presidential Office, the Executive Yuan, the DPP, the DPP think tank, and for central and local governments. She hopes to integrate the party with the government, the executive with the legislative, even at the local level, in order to ensure smooth governance. Her swift action has raised concerns that the party is no longer distinct from the government, and that the president now wields unconstitutional authority. Even Hsu Chong-li, the president's own nominee for Judicial Yuan president, warned that the president's committee "warrants closer examination”, and pressured President Tsai to make changes.
Actually, for the President to convene such meetings is not without precedent. The Chen era nine-man group and the Ma era five-man group also provoked controversy. Clearly the seventh amendment to the Constitution has led to a clash between government operations and the constitutional framework. The president is directly elected by the people and must answer to them. He or she must assume responsibility for the conduct of government affairs. But the Constitution also stipulates that the premier is the chief executive. In theory, the president may not interfere in the administration of affairs other than diplomacy, defense, and cross-Strait relations. Confusion of authority and responsibility has forced the president to rely on personal influence to implement government policy.
The Policy Coordination Committee established by President Tsai is even more constitutionally questionable, due to its wider scope. President Tsai has included the premier, the chief convener of the ruling party, the secretary-general of the ruling party, the head of the DPP think tank, and even the ruling party county chiefs and city mayors on her committee. The president has in effect personally assumed control over the executive branch, the legislative branch, even party affairs and local affairs. This already undermines checks and balances between the executive and the legislature, and rides roughshod over local government autonomy.
Meeting after normal office hours does nothing to reduce constitutional controversy. The reason is simple. The problem lies in the constitutional status of the president and members of the committee. It has nothing to do with working hours. Every political office within the political system has its own unique status, requiring a particular pattern of political conduct. This is true for the president, for the premier, for the chief party convener, for county chiefs, for city mayors, and for think tank heads. How can constitutional checks and balances work if the president tells the premier and the Legislative Yuan which bills to pass? Is the Republic of China still a nation governed by a constitution, or not? No wonder Hsu Chong-li was taken aback.
However, a solution is available. The DPP is the ruling party. It controls over half the seats in the legislature. It controls over half the county and municipal governments. If it wishes to, a DPP coordination mechanism would enjoy far greater legitimacy. DPP legislators, DPP county chiefs, and DPP city mayors, are all members of the Democratic Progressive Party. Naturally they must obey DPP resolutions and participate in DPP policy coordination. The premier is appointed by the president. Even if the premier himself is not a DPP member, his participation in a DPP policy meeting is required. If President Tsai, in her capacity as DPP Chairman, held a similar Policy Coordination Committee meeting within the confines of the Democratic Progressive Party or the DPP think tank, she could avoid constitutional controversy. The DPP is a private sector entity. It wields no government authority. Its resolutions are neither law nor executive orders. Its activities can be regarded as mere coordination, and need not provoke constitutional concerns.
President Tsai must distinguish between her role as president and her role as party chairman. She must diligently distinguish party from government. She must prevent the party from prevailing over the government. In particular she must avoid the impression that the party is ruling the nation. The president is a public official, responsible to the constitution and the people as a whole. Her words and deeds must conform to the constitution and to the law. Policies promoted in her capacity as president must comply with the constitutional framework. As chairman of the DPP, she must be responsible for all DPP members. Their words and deeds must also comply with the Constitution. When conflicts between her two identities arise, Ms. Tsai must remind herself which is which. If she is president, she must consider the interests of the nation as a whole. She must not obey the party at the expense of the constitutional order. In her capacity as president, the nature of her relationship is that of “government vs. opposition party” and “Presidential Office vs. Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan” In her capacity as party chairman, the nature of her relationship is that of “ruling party vs. opposition party”. The former relationship is one of listening and respect. The latter relationship is one of partisan rivalry.
As for cross-Strait relations, the separation of party and government also facilitates the resolution of impasses. President Tsai must abide by the Constitution and the law. Therefore she has repeatedly declared that cross-Strait relations must be handled in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. But the DPP adheres to its Taiwan Independence Party Platform and advocates Taiwan independence. Therefore the Mainland remains skeptical about the DPP government. This makes the restoration of cross-Strait official relations difficult.
If Ms. Tsai clearly distinguishes between her roles as president and chairman, if she clearly separates her duties of president and chairman, if she adheres strictly to the law, cross-Strait official interaction is possible. President Tsai's priority must be to sort out the relationship between party and government. The government is the government. The party is the party. She must use both to achieve the best results.
This is the art of politics. Can she succeed? That is up to her.
讓總統的歸總統 主席的歸主席
2016/10/18 中國時報
總統府決定將「執政決策協調會議」改到晚間下班後舉行，希望藉此避免違憲疑慮。我們不禁要問，如果上班時違憲，下班後就不違憲了嗎？
蔡總統及林全內閣就任以來，內外問題叢生，總統各項改革不是反彈四起，就是動彈不得，內閣縱向指揮與橫向聯繫都螺絲掉滿地，地方諸侯坐大，各行其是，兩人民意支持度快速下墜。蔡總統決建立府、院、黨、智庫及中央地方協調機制，希望快速整合黨與政、行政與立法及地方意見，順暢推動政務。實施以來決策果斷迅速，卻遭到遭外界質疑，認為黨政不分、總統擴權，有違憲之虞。司法院院長被提名人許宗力在立法院應詢時也認為，總統召集這樣的會議「值得進一步考慮」，迫使蔡總統做出一些技術性調整。
其實總統召集類似會議並非沒有前例，扁時代的九人小組及馬政府時期的五人小組，同樣也都存在爭議。顯見憲法第七次增修條文已造成國政運作與憲政體制的扞格，總統經由全民直選，背負全民期待，必須為政務的有效推動負起責任，但憲法又規定行政院長才是最高行政首長，理論上總統不應干預除外交、國防和兩岸事務以外的政務。權責的錯位迫使總統必須依賴實質影響力干預行政工作。
即便如此，蔡總統成立的協調會議，由於參與人員更廣，逾越憲政分際的問題就更嚴重。蔡總統不僅納入行政院長和執政黨黨團總召、執政黨祕書長、智庫執行長，連執政直轄市長都成為與會成員，等於總統親自站上行政立法乃至黨務、地方事務的第一線，已悖離了行政立法的制衡法則，及地方自治的分權關係。
縱然改到下班後舉行，並不能因此降低違憲爭議，理由很簡單，違憲疑慮是因為總統與會議成員的憲法身分扞格而起，與是否上班身分無關。每一個政治職務在政治系統中，有不同的政治地位，每一政治地位都有一定的政治行為模式，總統如此，閣揆、黨團總召、院轄市長、智庫董事長亦然。試問，如果可以允許總統指揮閣揆與立法院黨團通過法案，憲法的制衡關係不是蕩然無存嗎？台灣還是憲政主義國家嗎？難怪許宗力對此亦不以為然。
不過，這也並非沒有解決辦法，民進黨是執政黨，國會議席過半，且在地方過半數的縣市執政，若要建構協調機制，民進黨的平台更具法理的正當性。無論立法委員還是綠營縣市首長，都是民進黨員，自然有服從民進黨決議和參與民進黨政策協調的義務。行政院長由總統任命，即便院長本人未必是民進黨員，但列席民進黨的政策會議也有其必要。蔡總統若能以蔡主席的身分，在民進黨內或者民進黨智庫召開類似協調會議，就完全能夠避免憲政爭議。更重要的是，民進黨屬於民間社團，沒有公權力，形成的決議不能直接成為法律和行政命令，只能視為協調機制而不會有超越憲法的嫌疑。
蔡總統所應為，是區分自己總統與黨主席的身分，做好黨政分立，避免在實踐中讓黨凌駕於政府，特別是要避免黨天下的嫌疑。總統屬於公職，要對憲法及全體人民負責，言行必須符合憲法和法律，以總統身分推動的政務，必須符合憲政體制。身為民進黨主席，則需向全體民進黨員負責，其言行也要受黨章的約束。當兩者身分發生衝突時，蔡女士應意識到自己當時是總統身分或主席身分。如果是總統身分，就必須以全民利益為考量，不能為了服從黨意而不惜違背憲政秩序。以總統身分，就是政府與反對黨的關係、總統與閣揆及立法院的關係；以黨主席身分，則變成了執政黨與在野黨的關係。前者首重傾聽與尊重，後者才是競爭關係。
至於兩岸關係，黨政分立也可以為僵局的解套創造空間。既然蔡總統要遵守憲法和法律，她也多次宣示要按照《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》來處理兩岸事務，其實這與馬政府的立場並無二致。不過，由於民進黨堅持《台獨黨綱》和台獨主張，大陸對民進黨政府的疑慮日深，兩岸官方難以恢復互動關係。
如果蔡女士分清楚自己的總統與主席身分，據此區隔總統與主席的職務行為，並堅持依法行政，兩岸官方互動的糾結並非沒有機會化解。蔡總統的當務之急就是理順黨政關係，政府歸政府，黨歸黨，善用各自不同的功能，以期達到最大的執政績效。
這是政治的藝術，能不能做好，考驗蔡總統的智慧。
Sunday, October 16, 2016
Taiwan Independence: An Internal Problem Requiring an Internal Solution
Taiwan Independence: An Internal Problem Requiring an Internal Solution
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 17, 2016
Executive Summary: The Tsai government must come to the realization that internally directed Taiwan independence requires an internally directed solution. Without such an understanding, the contradiction between "We will not yield under pressure", and "We will not return to the old path of confrontation", will continue to undermine the credibility of her administration. Taiwan independence forces will run rampant. Centrist voters will be disillusioned. Problems will be harder to solve
Full Text Below:
Is Taiwan independence a problem that can be resolved by means of international and cross-Strait politics? If not, then it must be resolved by means of internal politics within Taiwan. The Tsai government must not divide Taiwan internally, while denying it solution externally. Internal problems require internal solutions.
Taiwan independence was once regarded as an external problem. It was seen as a breakthrough that could solve the nation's external problems. The belief was that severing Taiwan's connection to the Mainland would enable it to become a new and independent nation on the international scene.
But the cross-Strait and international situation has changed. Taiwan independence is clearly impossible. It is no longer an external problem. It has become an internal problem. In other words, Taiwan independence has become a purely internal political controversy inside Taiwan. It has even been reduced to the level of an internal struggle within the green camp, one concerning the green camp's political path and who will hold power. Taiwan independence is a unsolved problem, because internal struggles within the green camp have remained unsolved.
Editorials published by this newspaper have said that “externally directed Taiwan independence”, or "Taiwan independence directed against forces outside of Taiwan”, has waned, while “internally directed Taiwan independence", or “Taiwan independence that tears Taiwan apart from within”, persists. These are the two forms that Taiwan independence takes.
In her National Day address, President Tsai said, "We will not return to the old path of confrontation." This is consistent with Su Tseng-chang's declaration that, "We will not return to the old ways of Taiwan independence." President Tsai also pledged to conduct cross-Strait relations “in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Regulations Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area”. These remarks show that President Tsai realizes externally directed Taiwan independence has lost its appeal.
On the other hand, President Tsai failed to mention the 1992 Consensus, and instead stressed that, "We will not yield under pressure." This was intended to mollify Taiwan independence forces. It shows that internally directed Taiwan independence continues to hold the Tsai government hostage.
The Tsai government's current dilemma reveals that externally directed Taiwan independence has subsided, but internally directed Taiwan independence persists. Therefore, if the Tsai government cannot promote externally directed Taiwan independence, it must defang internally directed Taiwan independence.
The Tsai government is clearly being held hostage by the Taiwan independence camp. Taiwan independence forces, both abroad and within Taiwan, have shrunk dramatically. Nevertheless they continue to exert a major impact on Taiwan's politics. Therefore, if the Tsai government wants to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence, it must find a new base of support. It must liberate itself from Taiwan independence captivity. It must appeal to pale green voters, pale blue voters, and swing voters. It must change its base of support, enabling it to change its cross-Strait policy and rhetoric.
During President Tsai's inaugural address and National Day address, what Tsai actually said was the following: In fact I have accepted everything that [Beijing wants]. I will not renege on my commitments. I will not retract my goodwill gestures. I will not return to the old ways of confrontation. But because I remain fettered by Taiwan independence forces, I will not change my mind, and I cannot utter the words "1992 Consensus". Beijing's view is this: Since you have accepted all of our demands, and since you have no intention of reneging on your promises, of retracting your goodwill gestures, or returning to the old ways of confrontation, why do you refuse to utter the words "1992 Consensus"? Beijing knows that Tsai's refusal to utter these two words show that she has yet to liberate herself from Taiwan independence captivity. They know that if she is willing to utter the words "1992 Consensus", then she is willing to fight.
Anyone can see that President Tsai's statement, "We will not yield under pressure", flatly contradicts her other statement, "We will not return to the old path of confrontation". Since President Tsai has vowed not to return to the old path of confrontation, what reason does she have for not accepting the 1992 Consensus and peaceful cross-Strait relations? When President Tsai vows that she "will not yield under pressure", it is a sure sign that feels obligated to “confront” the 1992 Consensus. The Tsai government knows that externally directed Taiwan independence is no longer feasible. But she remains fettered by internally directed Taiwan independence. Beijing understands this. Therefore, Beijing considers Tsai's willingness or unwillingness to utter the words "1992 Consensus" an indicator of whether she remains a captive of Taiwan independence forces.
President Tsai's inaugural address and National Day address show that externally directed Taiwan independence has retreated, but internally directed Taiwan independence persists. Therefore the Tsai government cannot count on help from the outside world. Its only solution is to change its base of support. Only then can it break free of interference from Taiwan independence forces.
The Tsai government must come to the realization that internally directed Taiwan independence requires an internally directed solution. Without such an understanding, the contradiction between "We will not yield under pressure", and "We will not return to the old path of confrontation", will continue to undermine the credibility of her administration. Taiwan independence forces will run rampant. Centrist voters will be disillusioned. Problems will be harder to solve
台獨：內向事件 內部解決
2016-10-17 聯合報
台獨的方案，若不能向國際及兩岸取得發展，即必須設法在台灣內部政治中加以化解。蔡政府不可使台獨成為「對外沒有出路／對內只有撕裂」的自我戕害之路。內向事件，必須內部解決。
台獨曾被認為是一個「外向事件」，亦即被視為是一個突破及解決國家外在困境的方案。具體而言，即切斷與中國的連結，使台灣在國際上成為新而獨立的國家。
但是，隨著兩岸格局及國際情勢的推移變化，台獨顯然已是無可能實現之事，其「外向性」也就急劇消減，反過來則愈來愈變成只是一個「內向事件」。亦即，台獨其實已然成為純粹台灣內部的政治爭議，甚至成為只是綠營內部路線及權力鬥爭的外溢題材而已。台獨之所以無解，只因綠營內部的鬥爭無解。
本報社論曾說，「外擊型的台獨」（即攻擊台灣外在敵對勢力的台獨）已經式微，「內殺型的台獨」（即撕裂台灣內部政治的台獨）仍然存在。這即是指出了台獨的外向性及內向性。
蔡總統在國慶演說中說「不會走回對抗的老路」，此語與蘇貞昌曾說的「不會走回台獨的老路」應有交集；蔡總統並重申，「依據中華民國憲法、兩岸人民關係條例，處理兩岸事務」。這些說法，皆可印證蔡總統也知：外向性外擊型的台獨已然消退。
與此對照，蔡總統在演說中仍未提「九二共識」四字，並說「我們不會在壓力下屈服」，這則是要向獨派交代，也顯示了內向性內殺型的台獨仍然綑綁了蔡政府。
蔡政府今日的矛盾，其實只是反映了「外向性外擊型台獨」已然消退，及「內向性內殺型台獨」依然存在的悖論。因而，蔡政府若不能發展外擊型的台獨，即必須化解內殺型的台獨。
蔡政府顯然已被獨派所挾持，這股內向性內殺型的台獨勢力，無論在國際上及台灣內部皆趨向萎縮，如今卻對台灣政局產生了巨幅超越比例的嚴重影響。因此，蔡政府若想處理台獨問題，即必須設法換置改組其社會支持的結構。亦即，必須設法從獨派的挾持中脫困，積極地柔化淺綠、爭取淺藍、擁抱廣大的中間選民，使其社會支持結構得以換置改組，並在此基礎上重新整理其兩岸論述及政策。
蔡總統就職演說及國慶談話的兩岸論述語意是：我其實什麼都接受了，我不會改變承諾，不會改變善意，我也不會走回對抗的老路；只是，我因獨派的羈絆而不能說出「九二共識」那四個字。北京的語境則是：妳既然認為什麼都可以接受，有承諾，有善意，不走回對抗的老路，則為什麼不能說出「九二共識」這四個字？北京知道，蔡不說這四個字，正顯示她未跳脫獨派的挾持。如此，是否說出九二共識四字，就成了是否「對抗」的指標。
任何人皆可看出，蔡總統所說「我們不會在壓力下屈服」與「不會走回對抗的老路」這兩句話的矛盾。蔡總統既說「不會走回對抗的老路」，則有何理由不接受「和平發展」的九二共識？而她所謂的「不會在壓力下屈服」，正是表明了她在獨派挾持下不得不「對抗」「九二共識」四字的困境。蔡政府這種自知外擊型台獨已無可能，卻又被內殺型台獨綑綁的困境，自然看在北京的眼中；所以北京也就將「說不說九二共識」視為蔡英文能不能擺脫獨派挾持的指標，因而更不肯放過這四個字。
蔡總統的就職演說及國慶談話，皆顯示外擊型的台獨已然消退，而內殺型的台獨依然存在。因此，處理台獨問題既不可能寄望於對外發展，唯一的解決路徑就是要換置改造蔡政府的社會支持結構，掙脫獨派挾持。
蔡政府若沒有這種「內向事件／內部解決」的認知，倘放任現今這種「不屈服／不對抗」的矛盾情勢繼續惡化下去，將使獨派更加張揚，中間選民更加失望，整個局面就更難收拾了。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 17, 2016
Executive Summary: The Tsai government must come to the realization that internally directed Taiwan independence requires an internally directed solution. Without such an understanding, the contradiction between "We will not yield under pressure", and "We will not return to the old path of confrontation", will continue to undermine the credibility of her administration. Taiwan independence forces will run rampant. Centrist voters will be disillusioned. Problems will be harder to solve
Full Text Below:
Is Taiwan independence a problem that can be resolved by means of international and cross-Strait politics? If not, then it must be resolved by means of internal politics within Taiwan. The Tsai government must not divide Taiwan internally, while denying it solution externally. Internal problems require internal solutions.
Taiwan independence was once regarded as an external problem. It was seen as a breakthrough that could solve the nation's external problems. The belief was that severing Taiwan's connection to the Mainland would enable it to become a new and independent nation on the international scene.
But the cross-Strait and international situation has changed. Taiwan independence is clearly impossible. It is no longer an external problem. It has become an internal problem. In other words, Taiwan independence has become a purely internal political controversy inside Taiwan. It has even been reduced to the level of an internal struggle within the green camp, one concerning the green camp's political path and who will hold power. Taiwan independence is a unsolved problem, because internal struggles within the green camp have remained unsolved.
Editorials published by this newspaper have said that “externally directed Taiwan independence”, or "Taiwan independence directed against forces outside of Taiwan”, has waned, while “internally directed Taiwan independence", or “Taiwan independence that tears Taiwan apart from within”, persists. These are the two forms that Taiwan independence takes.
In her National Day address, President Tsai said, "We will not return to the old path of confrontation." This is consistent with Su Tseng-chang's declaration that, "We will not return to the old ways of Taiwan independence." President Tsai also pledged to conduct cross-Strait relations “in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Regulations Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area”. These remarks show that President Tsai realizes externally directed Taiwan independence has lost its appeal.
On the other hand, President Tsai failed to mention the 1992 Consensus, and instead stressed that, "We will not yield under pressure." This was intended to mollify Taiwan independence forces. It shows that internally directed Taiwan independence continues to hold the Tsai government hostage.
The Tsai government's current dilemma reveals that externally directed Taiwan independence has subsided, but internally directed Taiwan independence persists. Therefore, if the Tsai government cannot promote externally directed Taiwan independence, it must defang internally directed Taiwan independence.
The Tsai government is clearly being held hostage by the Taiwan independence camp. Taiwan independence forces, both abroad and within Taiwan, have shrunk dramatically. Nevertheless they continue to exert a major impact on Taiwan's politics. Therefore, if the Tsai government wants to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence, it must find a new base of support. It must liberate itself from Taiwan independence captivity. It must appeal to pale green voters, pale blue voters, and swing voters. It must change its base of support, enabling it to change its cross-Strait policy and rhetoric.
During President Tsai's inaugural address and National Day address, what Tsai actually said was the following: In fact I have accepted everything that [Beijing wants]. I will not renege on my commitments. I will not retract my goodwill gestures. I will not return to the old ways of confrontation. But because I remain fettered by Taiwan independence forces, I will not change my mind, and I cannot utter the words "1992 Consensus". Beijing's view is this: Since you have accepted all of our demands, and since you have no intention of reneging on your promises, of retracting your goodwill gestures, or returning to the old ways of confrontation, why do you refuse to utter the words "1992 Consensus"? Beijing knows that Tsai's refusal to utter these two words show that she has yet to liberate herself from Taiwan independence captivity. They know that if she is willing to utter the words "1992 Consensus", then she is willing to fight.
Anyone can see that President Tsai's statement, "We will not yield under pressure", flatly contradicts her other statement, "We will not return to the old path of confrontation". Since President Tsai has vowed not to return to the old path of confrontation, what reason does she have for not accepting the 1992 Consensus and peaceful cross-Strait relations? When President Tsai vows that she "will not yield under pressure", it is a sure sign that feels obligated to “confront” the 1992 Consensus. The Tsai government knows that externally directed Taiwan independence is no longer feasible. But she remains fettered by internally directed Taiwan independence. Beijing understands this. Therefore, Beijing considers Tsai's willingness or unwillingness to utter the words "1992 Consensus" an indicator of whether she remains a captive of Taiwan independence forces.
President Tsai's inaugural address and National Day address show that externally directed Taiwan independence has retreated, but internally directed Taiwan independence persists. Therefore the Tsai government cannot count on help from the outside world. Its only solution is to change its base of support. Only then can it break free of interference from Taiwan independence forces.
The Tsai government must come to the realization that internally directed Taiwan independence requires an internally directed solution. Without such an understanding, the contradiction between "We will not yield under pressure", and "We will not return to the old path of confrontation", will continue to undermine the credibility of her administration. Taiwan independence forces will run rampant. Centrist voters will be disillusioned. Problems will be harder to solve
台獨：內向事件 內部解決
2016-10-17 聯合報
台獨的方案，若不能向國際及兩岸取得發展，即必須設法在台灣內部政治中加以化解。蔡政府不可使台獨成為「對外沒有出路／對內只有撕裂」的自我戕害之路。內向事件，必須內部解決。
台獨曾被認為是一個「外向事件」，亦即被視為是一個突破及解決國家外在困境的方案。具體而言，即切斷與中國的連結，使台灣在國際上成為新而獨立的國家。
但是，隨著兩岸格局及國際情勢的推移變化，台獨顯然已是無可能實現之事，其「外向性」也就急劇消減，反過來則愈來愈變成只是一個「內向事件」。亦即，台獨其實已然成為純粹台灣內部的政治爭議，甚至成為只是綠營內部路線及權力鬥爭的外溢題材而已。台獨之所以無解，只因綠營內部的鬥爭無解。
本報社論曾說，「外擊型的台獨」（即攻擊台灣外在敵對勢力的台獨）已經式微，「內殺型的台獨」（即撕裂台灣內部政治的台獨）仍然存在。這即是指出了台獨的外向性及內向性。
蔡總統在國慶演說中說「不會走回對抗的老路」，此語與蘇貞昌曾說的「不會走回台獨的老路」應有交集；蔡總統並重申，「依據中華民國憲法、兩岸人民關係條例，處理兩岸事務」。這些說法，皆可印證蔡總統也知：外向性外擊型的台獨已然消退。
與此對照，蔡總統在演說中仍未提「九二共識」四字，並說「我們不會在壓力下屈服」，這則是要向獨派交代，也顯示了內向性內殺型的台獨仍然綑綁了蔡政府。
蔡政府今日的矛盾，其實只是反映了「外向性外擊型台獨」已然消退，及「內向性內殺型台獨」依然存在的悖論。因而，蔡政府若不能發展外擊型的台獨，即必須化解內殺型的台獨。
蔡政府顯然已被獨派所挾持，這股內向性內殺型的台獨勢力，無論在國際上及台灣內部皆趨向萎縮，如今卻對台灣政局產生了巨幅超越比例的嚴重影響。因此，蔡政府若想處理台獨問題，即必須設法換置改組其社會支持的結構。亦即，必須設法從獨派的挾持中脫困，積極地柔化淺綠、爭取淺藍、擁抱廣大的中間選民，使其社會支持結構得以換置改組，並在此基礎上重新整理其兩岸論述及政策。
蔡總統就職演說及國慶談話的兩岸論述語意是：我其實什麼都接受了，我不會改變承諾，不會改變善意，我也不會走回對抗的老路；只是，我因獨派的羈絆而不能說出「九二共識」那四個字。北京的語境則是：妳既然認為什麼都可以接受，有承諾，有善意，不走回對抗的老路，則為什麼不能說出「九二共識」這四個字？北京知道，蔡不說這四個字，正顯示她未跳脫獨派的挾持。如此，是否說出九二共識四字，就成了是否「對抗」的指標。
任何人皆可看出，蔡總統所說「我們不會在壓力下屈服」與「不會走回對抗的老路」這兩句話的矛盾。蔡總統既說「不會走回對抗的老路」，則有何理由不接受「和平發展」的九二共識？而她所謂的「不會在壓力下屈服」，正是表明了她在獨派挾持下不得不「對抗」「九二共識」四字的困境。蔡政府這種自知外擊型台獨已無可能，卻又被內殺型台獨綑綁的困境，自然看在北京的眼中；所以北京也就將「說不說九二共識」視為蔡英文能不能擺脫獨派挾持的指標，因而更不肯放過這四個字。
蔡總統的就職演說及國慶談話，皆顯示外擊型的台獨已然消退，而內殺型的台獨依然存在。因此，處理台獨問題既不可能寄望於對外發展，唯一的解決路徑就是要換置改造蔡政府的社會支持結構，掙脫獨派挾持。
蔡政府若沒有這種「內向事件／內部解決」的認知，倘放任現今這種「不屈服／不對抗」的矛盾情勢繼續惡化下去，將使獨派更加張揚，中間選民更加失望，整個局面就更難收拾了。
Thursday, October 13, 2016
James Huang Incident Reveals the Shallowness of Taiwan's Populism
James Huang Incident Reveals the Shallowness of Taiwan's Populism
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2016
Executive Summary: The appointments of Chiang Chun-nan and James Huang as ROC Representative to Singapore were stillborn. The Tsai government's ill-fated "New Southern Strategy" reveals the shallowness of Taiwanese populist politics, as well as the unprofessional nature of its diplomacy. They simply do not pass muster. The Tsai government's diplomatic incompetence has been fully revealed.
Full Text Below:
The appointments of Chiang Chun-nan and James Huang as ROC Representative to Singapore were stillborn. The Tsai government's ill-fated "New Southern Strategy" reveals the shallowness of Taiwanese populist politics, as well as the unprofessional nature of its diplomacy. They simply do not pass muster. The Tsai government's diplomatic incompetence has been fully revealed.
The Singaporean government refused to accept James Huang as ROC Representative to Singapore for three reasons. First, the Tsai government failed to consult Singapore's prime minister before Tsai government officials leaked the news of James Huang's appointment. Second, when James Huang's appointment made the news, DPP and Tsai government officials openly boasted that Singapore would become a "command post" to promote the “New Southern Strategy”. The Tsai government has not denied this. Treating a nation with which one has diplomatic relations as a strategic base is a diplomatic no-no. Singapore was naturally incensed. Third, in 2008 James Huang was dismissed for his involvement in the Papua New Guinea bribery scandal. Wu Sicai, one of the brokers in the scandal was a Singaporean national, and opened a joint account in Singapore with another broker, Jin Jijiu. The ROC filed suit in Singapore to recover the funds. James Huang's checkbook diplomacy is well known in Singapore, and does him no credit.
As the above analysis shows, James Huang's rejection as ROC Representative to Singapore is a major diplomatic setback for the Tsai government. This defeat appears unrelated to pressure from Beijing. Instead it reflects our own failure to comply with diplomatic professionalism and custom, and our own failure to respect Singapore's circumstances. Taiwan's self-indulgent populism is solely for domestic political consumption. When aired in public, this dirty laundry eventually proves to be an embarrassment.
James Huang's rejection has nothing to do with pressure from Beijing. Clashes have arisen between the Mainland and Singapore recently as a result of the South China Sea dispute. In the international arena, Singapore has long played a role as middleman and non-aligned nation. But on the South China Sea issue, Singapore's concern for regional strategic balance has led Beijing to conclude that Singapore has cozied up to the US and distanced itself from China. During the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in late September, Singapore proposed that the results of the South China Sea “arbitration” be included in the minutes of the General Assembly. The proposal was rejected. But the hawkish Mainland Global Daily blasted Singapore for the move. Beijing's Ambassador to Singapore Luo Jialiang minced no words. The Mainland and Singapore found themselves at odds with each other. Therefore they could not have joined hands to oppose James Huang's appointment. On the contrary, the decision was made by the Singaporean government on the basis of its own national interests.
James Huang was once Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chiang Chun-nan was merely a National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General. Strictly speaking, Huang is far more qualified. The government of Singapore accepted Chiang Chun-nan, yet rejected James Huang. That is indeed interesting. Leave aside personal qualifications for the moment. What angered Singapore was our government's rude, arrogant diplomatic response. This provoked it to say no. Naturally this includes forbidding Taiwan to use Singapore as a base of operations for its New Southern Strategy, thereby creating chaos among the ASEAN nations.
Similar problems arose during the Ma era. Shi Ya-ping repeatedly crossed Singapore's diplomatic line in the sand, upsetting relations between the two nations. He flew the national flag above the embassy on National Day. He sang the national anthem. He met with opposition parties. He even met with members of the Chinese Communist Party without Singapore's knowledge. His actions violated Singapore's political taboos. He was even reprimanded by Singapore's deputy foreign minister. Eventually the chill forced Shi's recall from Singapore. The Shi Ya-ping and James Huang incidents had something in common. Both men were the president's trusted advisors. But both their actions were too heavy handed for the host nation to tolerate.
On Taiwan, populist politics has degenerated to the point where nothing is taboo. Anything can be rationalized under the banner of "Love for Taiwan". The sole exception is diplomacy, where the superficial nature of Taiwan's populist politics is revealed for all the world to see. Shi Ya-ping raised the national flag and sang the national anthem without prior approval from the Singaporean government. James Huang treated Singapore as a command post for the Tsai government's New Southern Strategy. From a populist point of view, why not? The problem is, that when we talk about the New Southern Strategy, and about "standing tall and marching forth", can we really afford to ignore international norms or the norms of our hosts?
James Huang was appointed to Singapore in his capacity as director of the Office for New Southern Strategy. This in itself revealed the narrowness and bankruptcy of Tsai government thinking. Huang is in no position to explain why Singapore rejected him. Can he calmly return to his job as director? Early last year, James Huang joined the DPP as director of its International Affairs Department. In fact, he was waiting for the DPP to become the ruling party before taking to the diplomatic battlefield, as a "Level 12 Presidential Office Secretary”.
Look around. Whom among Tsai Ing-wen's foreign policy advisers still has the courage to step forward?
黃志芳案暴露台式民粹政治的淺薄
2016-10-14 聯合報
從江春男到黃志芳，我駐新加坡代表接連難產，除隱示蔡政府「新南向」的前途多舛，也說明台式民粹政治的淺薄，通不過專業外交的檢驗。而蔡政府外交人才之捉襟見肘，至此也暴露無遺。
新加坡政府拒絕接受黃志芳為駐星代表，主因大約有三：第一，政府尚未徵詢星方意見，官員即逕自披露黃志芳將出使的消息，不符正常外交慣例，亦不尊重駐在國。第二，黃志芳使星消息傳出，黨政人士即渲染此布局是要以新加坡為推動南向的「指揮站」，府方亦未否認；這種將出使國當成戰略基地的作法，犯了外交大忌，新加坡當然反感。第三，黃志芳二○○八年因巴紐案去職，該案掮客之一吳思材持有新加坡國籍，並與另一掮客金紀玖在星國開設聯合帳戶，我國並在星國提出告訴追還款項。黃志芳進行金錢外交之事，因此在星國人盡皆知，並不光榮。
從以上分析看來，黃志芳使星遭拒，當然是蔡政府在外交上的一大挫敗。而這次的挫敗，基本上似無關乎中共的打壓，而是我國不遵守外交專業與慣例，又不尊重新加坡的立場所致。尤其，台灣內部自我耽溺式的民粹作風盛行，所有操作均只為國內政治消費之用，但放在國際場合，終將自取其辱。
之所以說黃志芳被拒無關中共打壓，主要是，中星之間最近才因南海問題連續發生爭執。在國際上，新加坡一向以「中間人」及「不結盟」的角色自許，但在南海議題上，卻因強調區域戰略平衡，被北京認為是「親美遠中」。在九月下旬的「不結盟運動首腦峰會」中，新加坡提議將南海仲裁結果寫入大會文件，卻未獲通過。其後，中共鷹派媒體《環球日報》為此大批新加坡，復引發星國駐北京大使羅家良強硬回應。也因此，以中星兩國的不睦氣氛，不可能聯手運作反對黃志芳，而是新加坡政府基於其自身國家利益所作的決定。
嚴格而論，以黃志芳曾任外交部長的資歷，比起江春男的國安會副祕書長資歷，顯有過之；新加坡政府稍早接受江春男，而今卻拒絕黃志芳，自耐人尋味。亦即，撇開個人條件不談，讓新加坡不滿的，應當是我政府在外交應對上的粗魯草率，一連串的荒腔走板演出，讓對方決以「否定」向台灣示警。其中，當然包括了：絕不容許台灣將新加坡當成新南向的指揮作戰基地，搞亂東協國家間的關係。
類似問題，在馬政府時代其實也曾經上演過。當時，駐星代表史亞平數度踩到新加坡的外交紅線，而引起兩國關係一度欠和，包括：國慶日在使館懸掛國旗並唱國歌、不當會見該國在野黨人士、乃至未知會星國逕自接觸中共人員等，皆觸犯星國政治禁忌，甚至遭到該國外交次長約見訓斥，最後因關係已僵，只能調離當地。史亞平和黃志芳事件的共同軌跡是，兩人都深受總統重用，但可能也因此操作上便顯得草率，踰越了駐在國可以忍受的尺寸。
在台灣，當政治已民粹到百無禁忌的地步，只要套上一句「愛台灣」的大紅花布，什麼事都可以正當化，在外交上卻淺薄畢露。史亞平未經協調地唱國歌掛國旗、愛見誰就見誰，黃志芳要把新加坡當成南向指揮站，從民粹的角度看，有何不可？問題是，當我們談的是「新南向」、「站起來、走出去」，台灣能絲毫不遵守國際禮儀或地主國的規範嗎？
黃志芳以「新南向辦公室主任」被總統指派出使新加坡，已暴露蔡政府用人的侷促與拮据；如今因不便明說的原因遭新加坡拒絕，他還能坦然回任南向總指揮的工作嗎？去年初黃志芳申請加入民進黨，出任「國際事務部」主任，其實就在等著執政後能披掛上外交戰場一搏；誰料，出師未捷，他已連栽兩個跟斗，而以「總統府十二等祕書」職作收。
放眼望去，蔡英文總統的外交策士群中，誰還有餘勇可賈？
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2016
Executive Summary: The appointments of Chiang Chun-nan and James Huang as ROC Representative to Singapore were stillborn. The Tsai government's ill-fated "New Southern Strategy" reveals the shallowness of Taiwanese populist politics, as well as the unprofessional nature of its diplomacy. They simply do not pass muster. The Tsai government's diplomatic incompetence has been fully revealed.
Full Text Below:
The appointments of Chiang Chun-nan and James Huang as ROC Representative to Singapore were stillborn. The Tsai government's ill-fated "New Southern Strategy" reveals the shallowness of Taiwanese populist politics, as well as the unprofessional nature of its diplomacy. They simply do not pass muster. The Tsai government's diplomatic incompetence has been fully revealed.
The Singaporean government refused to accept James Huang as ROC Representative to Singapore for three reasons. First, the Tsai government failed to consult Singapore's prime minister before Tsai government officials leaked the news of James Huang's appointment. Second, when James Huang's appointment made the news, DPP and Tsai government officials openly boasted that Singapore would become a "command post" to promote the “New Southern Strategy”. The Tsai government has not denied this. Treating a nation with which one has diplomatic relations as a strategic base is a diplomatic no-no. Singapore was naturally incensed. Third, in 2008 James Huang was dismissed for his involvement in the Papua New Guinea bribery scandal. Wu Sicai, one of the brokers in the scandal was a Singaporean national, and opened a joint account in Singapore with another broker, Jin Jijiu. The ROC filed suit in Singapore to recover the funds. James Huang's checkbook diplomacy is well known in Singapore, and does him no credit.
As the above analysis shows, James Huang's rejection as ROC Representative to Singapore is a major diplomatic setback for the Tsai government. This defeat appears unrelated to pressure from Beijing. Instead it reflects our own failure to comply with diplomatic professionalism and custom, and our own failure to respect Singapore's circumstances. Taiwan's self-indulgent populism is solely for domestic political consumption. When aired in public, this dirty laundry eventually proves to be an embarrassment.
James Huang's rejection has nothing to do with pressure from Beijing. Clashes have arisen between the Mainland and Singapore recently as a result of the South China Sea dispute. In the international arena, Singapore has long played a role as middleman and non-aligned nation. But on the South China Sea issue, Singapore's concern for regional strategic balance has led Beijing to conclude that Singapore has cozied up to the US and distanced itself from China. During the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in late September, Singapore proposed that the results of the South China Sea “arbitration” be included in the minutes of the General Assembly. The proposal was rejected. But the hawkish Mainland Global Daily blasted Singapore for the move. Beijing's Ambassador to Singapore Luo Jialiang minced no words. The Mainland and Singapore found themselves at odds with each other. Therefore they could not have joined hands to oppose James Huang's appointment. On the contrary, the decision was made by the Singaporean government on the basis of its own national interests.
James Huang was once Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chiang Chun-nan was merely a National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General. Strictly speaking, Huang is far more qualified. The government of Singapore accepted Chiang Chun-nan, yet rejected James Huang. That is indeed interesting. Leave aside personal qualifications for the moment. What angered Singapore was our government's rude, arrogant diplomatic response. This provoked it to say no. Naturally this includes forbidding Taiwan to use Singapore as a base of operations for its New Southern Strategy, thereby creating chaos among the ASEAN nations.
Similar problems arose during the Ma era. Shi Ya-ping repeatedly crossed Singapore's diplomatic line in the sand, upsetting relations between the two nations. He flew the national flag above the embassy on National Day. He sang the national anthem. He met with opposition parties. He even met with members of the Chinese Communist Party without Singapore's knowledge. His actions violated Singapore's political taboos. He was even reprimanded by Singapore's deputy foreign minister. Eventually the chill forced Shi's recall from Singapore. The Shi Ya-ping and James Huang incidents had something in common. Both men were the president's trusted advisors. But both their actions were too heavy handed for the host nation to tolerate.
On Taiwan, populist politics has degenerated to the point where nothing is taboo. Anything can be rationalized under the banner of "Love for Taiwan". The sole exception is diplomacy, where the superficial nature of Taiwan's populist politics is revealed for all the world to see. Shi Ya-ping raised the national flag and sang the national anthem without prior approval from the Singaporean government. James Huang treated Singapore as a command post for the Tsai government's New Southern Strategy. From a populist point of view, why not? The problem is, that when we talk about the New Southern Strategy, and about "standing tall and marching forth", can we really afford to ignore international norms or the norms of our hosts?
James Huang was appointed to Singapore in his capacity as director of the Office for New Southern Strategy. This in itself revealed the narrowness and bankruptcy of Tsai government thinking. Huang is in no position to explain why Singapore rejected him. Can he calmly return to his job as director? Early last year, James Huang joined the DPP as director of its International Affairs Department. In fact, he was waiting for the DPP to become the ruling party before taking to the diplomatic battlefield, as a "Level 12 Presidential Office Secretary”.
Look around. Whom among Tsai Ing-wen's foreign policy advisers still has the courage to step forward?
黃志芳案暴露台式民粹政治的淺薄
2016-10-14 聯合報
從江春男到黃志芳，我駐新加坡代表接連難產，除隱示蔡政府「新南向」的前途多舛，也說明台式民粹政治的淺薄，通不過專業外交的檢驗。而蔡政府外交人才之捉襟見肘，至此也暴露無遺。
新加坡政府拒絕接受黃志芳為駐星代表，主因大約有三：第一，政府尚未徵詢星方意見，官員即逕自披露黃志芳將出使的消息，不符正常外交慣例，亦不尊重駐在國。第二，黃志芳使星消息傳出，黨政人士即渲染此布局是要以新加坡為推動南向的「指揮站」，府方亦未否認；這種將出使國當成戰略基地的作法，犯了外交大忌，新加坡當然反感。第三，黃志芳二○○八年因巴紐案去職，該案掮客之一吳思材持有新加坡國籍，並與另一掮客金紀玖在星國開設聯合帳戶，我國並在星國提出告訴追還款項。黃志芳進行金錢外交之事，因此在星國人盡皆知，並不光榮。
從以上分析看來，黃志芳使星遭拒，當然是蔡政府在外交上的一大挫敗。而這次的挫敗，基本上似無關乎中共的打壓，而是我國不遵守外交專業與慣例，又不尊重新加坡的立場所致。尤其，台灣內部自我耽溺式的民粹作風盛行，所有操作均只為國內政治消費之用，但放在國際場合，終將自取其辱。
之所以說黃志芳被拒無關中共打壓，主要是，中星之間最近才因南海問題連續發生爭執。在國際上，新加坡一向以「中間人」及「不結盟」的角色自許，但在南海議題上，卻因強調區域戰略平衡，被北京認為是「親美遠中」。在九月下旬的「不結盟運動首腦峰會」中，新加坡提議將南海仲裁結果寫入大會文件，卻未獲通過。其後，中共鷹派媒體《環球日報》為此大批新加坡，復引發星國駐北京大使羅家良強硬回應。也因此，以中星兩國的不睦氣氛，不可能聯手運作反對黃志芳，而是新加坡政府基於其自身國家利益所作的決定。
嚴格而論，以黃志芳曾任外交部長的資歷，比起江春男的國安會副祕書長資歷，顯有過之；新加坡政府稍早接受江春男，而今卻拒絕黃志芳，自耐人尋味。亦即，撇開個人條件不談，讓新加坡不滿的，應當是我政府在外交應對上的粗魯草率，一連串的荒腔走板演出，讓對方決以「否定」向台灣示警。其中，當然包括了：絕不容許台灣將新加坡當成新南向的指揮作戰基地，搞亂東協國家間的關係。
類似問題，在馬政府時代其實也曾經上演過。當時，駐星代表史亞平數度踩到新加坡的外交紅線，而引起兩國關係一度欠和，包括：國慶日在使館懸掛國旗並唱國歌、不當會見該國在野黨人士、乃至未知會星國逕自接觸中共人員等，皆觸犯星國政治禁忌，甚至遭到該國外交次長約見訓斥，最後因關係已僵，只能調離當地。史亞平和黃志芳事件的共同軌跡是，兩人都深受總統重用，但可能也因此操作上便顯得草率，踰越了駐在國可以忍受的尺寸。
在台灣，當政治已民粹到百無禁忌的地步，只要套上一句「愛台灣」的大紅花布，什麼事都可以正當化，在外交上卻淺薄畢露。史亞平未經協調地唱國歌掛國旗、愛見誰就見誰，黃志芳要把新加坡當成南向指揮站，從民粹的角度看，有何不可？問題是，當我們談的是「新南向」、「站起來、走出去」，台灣能絲毫不遵守國際禮儀或地主國的規範嗎？
黃志芳以「新南向辦公室主任」被總統指派出使新加坡，已暴露蔡政府用人的侷促與拮据；如今因不便明說的原因遭新加坡拒絕，他還能坦然回任南向總指揮的工作嗎？去年初黃志芳申請加入民進黨，出任「國際事務部」主任，其實就在等著執政後能披掛上外交戰場一搏；誰料，出師未捷，他已連栽兩個跟斗，而以「總統府十二等祕書」職作收。
放眼望去，蔡英文總統的外交策士群中，誰還有餘勇可賈？
Wednesday, October 12, 2016
KMT-CCP Dialogue May Marginalize the DPP
KMT-CCP Dialogue May Marginalize the DPP
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 10, 2016
Executive Summary: The "Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum" and the "Hung Xi Summit" will focus on the substance of cross-Strait interaction. The results will be laid out for all to see. Does the green camp intend to do nothing except flap its gums, convene press conferences and hurl epithets, and insult summit participants, in order to win points with the Taiwan public? Does it have anything of value to contribute in terms of ideas and practices? If it does not, it will merely marginalize itself in future cross-Strait interactions.
Full Text Below:
The KMT-CCP Forum will convene in Beijing early next month. KMT Chairman Hung Hsiu-chu and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping will also take part in a “Hung-Xi Summit”. Following the change in ruling parties, the DPP government refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Cross-Strait relations officially ended. Amidst the uncertainty, the KMT and the CCP fell back on channels established in 2005 by former KMT Chairman Lien Chan and former CCP Chairman Hu Jintao. They established a regular platform for party-to-party communications. They preserved the KMT-CCP Forum and high-level two-party talks. Their decision has a whole range of implications for cross-Strait relations.
After the Kuomintang lost power completely, regular communication channels between the KMT and CCP remained intact. This fact has great significance for the KMT. Following the election earlier this year, the Mainland considered the possibility of working with the DPP. It is now certain however, that Beijing will not be looking to the DPP, but will continue cooperating with the KMT. As far as the DPP government is concerned, the Mainland may not have made a complete break with the DPP. But contacts and dialogue that have already been disrupted will not be resumed. Is Tsai Ing-wen government sincere about "maintaining the status quo"? If it is, it must present its position on cross-Strait relations and reach an agreement with the Mainland. This is extremely difficult for both the DPP and Tsai Ying-wen.
For Beijing, the cross-Strait achievements of the past eight years were based on the 1992 Consensus, something agreed to by both sides. On the basis of the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen expressed goodwill and sincerity in cross-Strait relations. But the real objectives of her government soon became clear. It was obvious the new government would never accept the 1992 Consensus. It would never clarify the nature of cross-Strait relations. Instead, it would cling to the US and distance itself from the Mainland. Its educational and cultural policies would stress on “de-Sinicization”. The status quo has already been changed. "Maintaining the status quo" is nothing more than a slogan. The Mainland has decided. The mutual trust that ensured peace in the Taiwan Strait since 2008 no longer exists.
As we have seen, over the past few months communications between the two cross-Strait entities have been interrupted. The number of Mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan has been halved. The number of Mainland students has been slashed. Taiwan has been shut out of the ICAO Conference. Cross-Strait communications and 5G cooperation meetings have changed. Will James Soong be permitted to attend the annual APEC conference? If he is, will he be permitted to interact with the Mainland? Beijing is making overtures to our diplomatic allies. Will they stay or leave? That remains to be seen. Even the "Republic of China" rhetoric trotted out by Tsai Ing-wen may be seen as a form of the "two states theory". If so, then mutual trust between the two sides has evaporated, and relations will revert to what they were during the Chen era. President Tsai's insistence that she is "not taking the old road" may not lead to zero sum game confrontation. But official and even quasi-official contacts remain frozen.
The promotion of the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum" shows that Beijing does not want cross-Strait interaction interrupted altogether. After all, cross-Strait political cooperation already enabled dialogue between Ma and Xi. Ending all interaction would be a pity. Maintaining a platform for KMT-CCP dialogue enables private sector cross-Strait contacts to remain warm. This is necessary. The KMT has become an opposition party. But as Taiwan's largest opposition force, it remains highly representative and influential. Hung Hsiu-chu and Xi Jinping will meet. In the short-term, this may not have much impact on cross-Strait relations. But it will encourage cohesion and unity. As long as KMT-CCP dialogue on peaceful relations between the two sides persists, the formalization of peaceful relations remains possible, and will win points for the KMT among the Taiwan public. After all, Taiwan's election system always offers the chance for a comeback the next time around.
The green camp will not be happy with this development. Its reaction will surprise no one. Belittlement, sarcasm, and McCarthyite political smears. The script will probably be little changed from eight years ago. Huang Kuo-chang of the New Power Party has lept forward and shouted, "The Kuomintang is colluding with the Communist Party to form a united front against Taiwan" and "The Kuomintang has learned nothing from its past failures". But these same accusations were leveled against the KMT eight years ago, during the Chen era. Today's attacks by the New Power Party pale next in comparison. Those attacks in 2008 failed to prevent a second change in ruling parties. Consider the matter quietly and calmly. Peaceful and stable exchanges between the two sides over the past eight years enabled direct flights, tourism, trade, cultural exchanges, participation in international activities, and even diplomacy. This was all made possible through step by step efforts. Now this may all come tumbling down. The ruling DPP likes to imagine that its New Southern Strategy will prop up the nation. Can it really? Do voters really not understand the consequences?
The "Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum" and the "Hung Xi Summit" will focus on the substance of cross-Strait interaction. The results will be laid out for all to see. Does the green camp intend to do nothing except flap its gums, convene press conferences and hurl epithets, and insult summit participants, in order to win points with the Taiwan public? Does it have anything of value to contribute in terms of ideas and practices? If it does not, it will merely marginalize itself in future cross-Strait interactions.
國共對話 民進黨小心被邊緣化
2016/10/13 中國時報
國共論壇確定將於下月初在北京登場，國民黨主席洪秀柱與中共總書記習近平將同時舉行「洪習會」。政黨輪替後，民進黨政府拒絕接受「九二共識」，兩岸官方溝通管道全然中斷，當此兩岸關係高度不確定的狀態下，國共兩黨決定依照連戰前主席與胡錦濤前總書記於2005年達成「建立黨對黨定期溝通平台」的共識，繼續維持國共論壇及兩黨高層會談機制不變。此一決定對兩岸關係未來走向，具有多重意義。
在國民黨徹底失去政權後，國共定期溝通機制仍得以維繫，對國民黨實具有重要意義。今年初大選結束後，大陸不是沒有評估與民進黨建立合作關係的可能性。現在可以確定，北京不再對民進黨政府抱期待，未來仍將以國民黨為交往合作對象。對民進黨政府而言，與大陸即便不致走向全面決裂，但已經中斷的接觸與對話是不會再恢復了，蔡英文政府如果真心希望「維持現狀」，就必須在兩岸關係定位上提出論述，並與大陸達成協議。客觀而言，無論對民進黨、對蔡英文，這條路都坎坷難行！
對北京而言，過去8年的兩岸榮景，是建立在雙方都認同的「九二共識」基礎上，初始小英在兩岸關係定位上曾經展現一定的善意與誠意，大陸一度報以希望。但隨著施政目標與規畫逐漸明朗，顯示新政府既不接受「九二共識」，又不對兩岸關係的性質說清楚，對外關係上卻明顯親美日、疏離大陸，教育與文化政策上堅持「去中國」。「現狀」既已改變，「維持現狀」就只是口號，大陸認定，兩岸自2008年經由和平發展所締造的互信，已不復存在！
我們看到，過去幾個月兩會函電中斷、陸客減半、陸生減少、ICAO大會缺席、兩岸通訊搭橋及5G合作會議生變，這些恐怕都只是熱身！接下來，宋楚瑜能否順利出席APEC年會，縱然參加，與大陸能否互動、對北京頻送秋波的邦交國是否守得住等，恐怕都會是考驗！甚至連小英所提出的「中華民國論述」，也可能被解讀成「兩國論」，這意味兩岸的「互信」已消失，兩岸將逆退回扁政府年代。蔡總統堅持「不走對抗老路」，或許不致走上零和對抗，但官方乃至準官方接觸是全面凍結了！
「兩岸和平發展論壇」的推動，意味北京不願見兩岸善意互動所累積的成果全面中斷，畢竟兩岸治權合作已進入「馬習會」雙方領導人對話階段，就此廢棄停頓，真的非常可惜。繼續維持國共對話平台，讓兩岸在民間層次接觸上維持最大熱度，還是有一定程度的需要。國民黨雖淪為在野黨，但作為台灣最大在野勢力，還是有其代表性與影響力。洪秀柱與習近平會對話，對兩岸關係的短期發展或許沒有太多實質作用，但還是有凝聚團結的功能與意義。只要國共對話在兩岸和平關係制度化、法制化上能有具體進展，讓民眾有感，對國民黨重新執政就會加分。畢竟以台灣的選民結構與選舉機制，下一回合的政黨輪替，機會一直都在！
綠營不會樂見這種情勢發展，其反應大概也不會讓人意外，輕則冷嘲熱諷之，重則抹紅羞辱之，主要劇本與8年前比較，大概也不會有太多新意！時代力量的黃國昌，已迫不及待跳出來，說什麼「國民黨跟共產黨在統戰上是聯手」、「國民黨沒從過去的失敗得到教訓」云云。但這些指控早在8年前扁政府執政的年代，早就全套操演過，那時綠營政客與名嘴的語言暴力，較之今天的時代力量甚至還更超過，但也沒能阻止2008年的二度政黨輪替。平心靜氣地說，也就是因為有了過去8年兩岸和平穩定的交流，才有後續直航、觀光、經貿、文化、國際參與，乃至活路外交的榮景，這個局面是許多人一步一腳印慢慢搭建出來的，如今這一切均將可能化為烏有，執政的民進黨卻只想靠新南向政策撐起一切，試問真能全面承接取代嗎？其後果選民不會察覺嗎？
可預見「兩岸和平發展論壇」與洪習會，將聚焦討論兩岸互動的實質議題，成果也會一一端上檯面。綠營上下如果還是只會出張嘴，用記者會開罵、羞辱出席會議代表，對爭取台灣民眾實質利益，卻全無想法與做法，那麼在未來兩岸互動上，也將逐步陷入邊緣化境地！
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 10, 2016
Executive Summary: The "Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum" and the "Hung Xi Summit" will focus on the substance of cross-Strait interaction. The results will be laid out for all to see. Does the green camp intend to do nothing except flap its gums, convene press conferences and hurl epithets, and insult summit participants, in order to win points with the Taiwan public? Does it have anything of value to contribute in terms of ideas and practices? If it does not, it will merely marginalize itself in future cross-Strait interactions.
Full Text Below:
The KMT-CCP Forum will convene in Beijing early next month. KMT Chairman Hung Hsiu-chu and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping will also take part in a “Hung-Xi Summit”. Following the change in ruling parties, the DPP government refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Cross-Strait relations officially ended. Amidst the uncertainty, the KMT and the CCP fell back on channels established in 2005 by former KMT Chairman Lien Chan and former CCP Chairman Hu Jintao. They established a regular platform for party-to-party communications. They preserved the KMT-CCP Forum and high-level two-party talks. Their decision has a whole range of implications for cross-Strait relations.
After the Kuomintang lost power completely, regular communication channels between the KMT and CCP remained intact. This fact has great significance for the KMT. Following the election earlier this year, the Mainland considered the possibility of working with the DPP. It is now certain however, that Beijing will not be looking to the DPP, but will continue cooperating with the KMT. As far as the DPP government is concerned, the Mainland may not have made a complete break with the DPP. But contacts and dialogue that have already been disrupted will not be resumed. Is Tsai Ing-wen government sincere about "maintaining the status quo"? If it is, it must present its position on cross-Strait relations and reach an agreement with the Mainland. This is extremely difficult for both the DPP and Tsai Ying-wen.
For Beijing, the cross-Strait achievements of the past eight years were based on the 1992 Consensus, something agreed to by both sides. On the basis of the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen expressed goodwill and sincerity in cross-Strait relations. But the real objectives of her government soon became clear. It was obvious the new government would never accept the 1992 Consensus. It would never clarify the nature of cross-Strait relations. Instead, it would cling to the US and distance itself from the Mainland. Its educational and cultural policies would stress on “de-Sinicization”. The status quo has already been changed. "Maintaining the status quo" is nothing more than a slogan. The Mainland has decided. The mutual trust that ensured peace in the Taiwan Strait since 2008 no longer exists.
As we have seen, over the past few months communications between the two cross-Strait entities have been interrupted. The number of Mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan has been halved. The number of Mainland students has been slashed. Taiwan has been shut out of the ICAO Conference. Cross-Strait communications and 5G cooperation meetings have changed. Will James Soong be permitted to attend the annual APEC conference? If he is, will he be permitted to interact with the Mainland? Beijing is making overtures to our diplomatic allies. Will they stay or leave? That remains to be seen. Even the "Republic of China" rhetoric trotted out by Tsai Ing-wen may be seen as a form of the "two states theory". If so, then mutual trust between the two sides has evaporated, and relations will revert to what they were during the Chen era. President Tsai's insistence that she is "not taking the old road" may not lead to zero sum game confrontation. But official and even quasi-official contacts remain frozen.
The promotion of the "Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum" shows that Beijing does not want cross-Strait interaction interrupted altogether. After all, cross-Strait political cooperation already enabled dialogue between Ma and Xi. Ending all interaction would be a pity. Maintaining a platform for KMT-CCP dialogue enables private sector cross-Strait contacts to remain warm. This is necessary. The KMT has become an opposition party. But as Taiwan's largest opposition force, it remains highly representative and influential. Hung Hsiu-chu and Xi Jinping will meet. In the short-term, this may not have much impact on cross-Strait relations. But it will encourage cohesion and unity. As long as KMT-CCP dialogue on peaceful relations between the two sides persists, the formalization of peaceful relations remains possible, and will win points for the KMT among the Taiwan public. After all, Taiwan's election system always offers the chance for a comeback the next time around.
The green camp will not be happy with this development. Its reaction will surprise no one. Belittlement, sarcasm, and McCarthyite political smears. The script will probably be little changed from eight years ago. Huang Kuo-chang of the New Power Party has lept forward and shouted, "The Kuomintang is colluding with the Communist Party to form a united front against Taiwan" and "The Kuomintang has learned nothing from its past failures". But these same accusations were leveled against the KMT eight years ago, during the Chen era. Today's attacks by the New Power Party pale next in comparison. Those attacks in 2008 failed to prevent a second change in ruling parties. Consider the matter quietly and calmly. Peaceful and stable exchanges between the two sides over the past eight years enabled direct flights, tourism, trade, cultural exchanges, participation in international activities, and even diplomacy. This was all made possible through step by step efforts. Now this may all come tumbling down. The ruling DPP likes to imagine that its New Southern Strategy will prop up the nation. Can it really? Do voters really not understand the consequences?
The "Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum" and the "Hung Xi Summit" will focus on the substance of cross-Strait interaction. The results will be laid out for all to see. Does the green camp intend to do nothing except flap its gums, convene press conferences and hurl epithets, and insult summit participants, in order to win points with the Taiwan public? Does it have anything of value to contribute in terms of ideas and practices? If it does not, it will merely marginalize itself in future cross-Strait interactions.
國共對話 民進黨小心被邊緣化
2016/10/13 中國時報
國共論壇確定將於下月初在北京登場，國民黨主席洪秀柱與中共總書記習近平將同時舉行「洪習會」。政黨輪替後，民進黨政府拒絕接受「九二共識」，兩岸官方溝通管道全然中斷，當此兩岸關係高度不確定的狀態下，國共兩黨決定依照連戰前主席與胡錦濤前總書記於2005年達成「建立黨對黨定期溝通平台」的共識，繼續維持國共論壇及兩黨高層會談機制不變。此一決定對兩岸關係未來走向，具有多重意義。
在國民黨徹底失去政權後，國共定期溝通機制仍得以維繫，對國民黨實具有重要意義。今年初大選結束後，大陸不是沒有評估與民進黨建立合作關係的可能性。現在可以確定，北京不再對民進黨政府抱期待，未來仍將以國民黨為交往合作對象。對民進黨政府而言，與大陸即便不致走向全面決裂，但已經中斷的接觸與對話是不會再恢復了，蔡英文政府如果真心希望「維持現狀」，就必須在兩岸關係定位上提出論述，並與大陸達成協議。客觀而言，無論對民進黨、對蔡英文，這條路都坎坷難行！
對北京而言，過去8年的兩岸榮景，是建立在雙方都認同的「九二共識」基礎上，初始小英在兩岸關係定位上曾經展現一定的善意與誠意，大陸一度報以希望。但隨著施政目標與規畫逐漸明朗，顯示新政府既不接受「九二共識」，又不對兩岸關係的性質說清楚，對外關係上卻明顯親美日、疏離大陸，教育與文化政策上堅持「去中國」。「現狀」既已改變，「維持現狀」就只是口號，大陸認定，兩岸自2008年經由和平發展所締造的互信，已不復存在！
我們看到，過去幾個月兩會函電中斷、陸客減半、陸生減少、ICAO大會缺席、兩岸通訊搭橋及5G合作會議生變，這些恐怕都只是熱身！接下來，宋楚瑜能否順利出席APEC年會，縱然參加，與大陸能否互動、對北京頻送秋波的邦交國是否守得住等，恐怕都會是考驗！甚至連小英所提出的「中華民國論述」，也可能被解讀成「兩國論」，這意味兩岸的「互信」已消失，兩岸將逆退回扁政府年代。蔡總統堅持「不走對抗老路」，或許不致走上零和對抗，但官方乃至準官方接觸是全面凍結了！
「兩岸和平發展論壇」的推動，意味北京不願見兩岸善意互動所累積的成果全面中斷，畢竟兩岸治權合作已進入「馬習會」雙方領導人對話階段，就此廢棄停頓，真的非常可惜。繼續維持國共對話平台，讓兩岸在民間層次接觸上維持最大熱度，還是有一定程度的需要。國民黨雖淪為在野黨，但作為台灣最大在野勢力，還是有其代表性與影響力。洪秀柱與習近平會對話，對兩岸關係的短期發展或許沒有太多實質作用，但還是有凝聚團結的功能與意義。只要國共對話在兩岸和平關係制度化、法制化上能有具體進展，讓民眾有感，對國民黨重新執政就會加分。畢竟以台灣的選民結構與選舉機制，下一回合的政黨輪替，機會一直都在！
綠營不會樂見這種情勢發展，其反應大概也不會讓人意外，輕則冷嘲熱諷之，重則抹紅羞辱之，主要劇本與8年前比較，大概也不會有太多新意！時代力量的黃國昌，已迫不及待跳出來，說什麼「國民黨跟共產黨在統戰上是聯手」、「國民黨沒從過去的失敗得到教訓」云云。但這些指控早在8年前扁政府執政的年代，早就全套操演過，那時綠營政客與名嘴的語言暴力，較之今天的時代力量甚至還更超過，但也沒能阻止2008年的二度政黨輪替。平心靜氣地說，也就是因為有了過去8年兩岸和平穩定的交流，才有後續直航、觀光、經貿、文化、國際參與，乃至活路外交的榮景，這個局面是許多人一步一腳印慢慢搭建出來的，如今這一切均將可能化為烏有，執政的民進黨卻只想靠新南向政策撐起一切，試問真能全面承接取代嗎？其後果選民不會察覺嗎？
可預見「兩岸和平發展論壇」與洪習會，將聚焦討論兩岸互動的實質議題，成果也會一一端上檯面。綠營上下如果還是只會出張嘴，用記者會開罵、羞辱出席會議代表，對爭取台灣民眾實質利益，卻全無想法與做法，那麼在未來兩岸互動上，也將逐步陷入邊緣化境地！
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