The Plebiscite may not tie up the Election, but it will surely tie up Frank Hsieh

The Plebiscite may not tie up the Election, but it will surely tie up Frank Hsieh
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2008

Not surprisingly, despite all the controversy, the Central Election Commission (CEC) eventually package-dealed the "Join the UN" and "Rejoin the UN" plebiscites with the March 22 presidential election. This tells us that the results of the recent legislative elections did not change the DPP's agenda for the March presidential election. The package-dealing of the plebiscite is one of the most important factors in the presidential election. This may be the last time we ever see a combined plebiscite/election.

During previous consultations between ruling and opposition leaders, the Blue camp attempted to resolve the issue of the two referenda through the legislative process. But ultimately the Green Camp will find it impossible to abandon its "Join the UN" plebiscite. Chen Shui-bian went so far as to intentionally reveal that if the Blue camp took advantage of its new supermajority to eliminate the "Join the UN" and "Rejoin the UN" plebiscites, he might propose a defensive plebiscite instead. Even if the Blue camp legislative caucus responds to the proposed plebiscite, it will not willingly provide Chen Shui-bian with an opportunity to manipulate the issue before his term of office expires. This means everything is back where it started.

Because everything is back where it started, this makes the situation even more intriguing. For both the Blue and Green camps, the combined plebiscite and general election to be held this March has become a case of "riding the tiger." This is particularly true for the Green Camp, specifically for Frank Hsieh. The "Join the UN" plebiscite touches on the fundamental articles of faith for the Democratic Progressive Party. It also constitutes one of the key distinctions between the Pan Green camp and the Pan Blue camp. On this Hsieh has no room for evasion. But does he really want this to be the main theme of the presidential election? Hsieh has a predicament. If he pushes the "Join the UN" issue too hard, it will trigger an intense backlash from Washington and Beijing. Previous high-level US criticisms of the plebsicite were mainly directed at Chen Shui-bian. Hsieh is not going to be happy if future attacks are directed at him. Manipulation of the "Join the UN" plebiscite issue will increase cross-strait tensions. This would be self-defeating for cross-strait policy initiatives currently being promoted by the Hsieh/Su campaign.

Frank Hsieh may not be eager to state his second reason. Once the plebiscite issue becomes the main theme of the presidential election, Hsieh may be compelled to take the Chen Shui-bian path. He may even be compelled to allow Chen Shui-bian back into the campaign. He may find himself and Chen Shui-bian joined at the hip again. To Chen Shui-bian, the plebiscite issue is not about helping Frank Hsieh get elected. It is about leaving a legacy for himself within the Green Camp. This is the only issue that A Bian can manipulate before his term of office expires. To expect him not to use it is impossible. Neither Frank Hsieh nor the Blue camp want Chen Shui-bian to propose a defensive referendum. That would hand the initiative back to Chen Shui-bian. Not only would issues Hsieh is currently promoting be shoved aside, he would again end up as Chen's hostage. If the situation truly degenerates to that level, Hsieh may as well throw in the towel.

One issue the Green Camp needs to reflect upon is the outcome of the plebiscite. Suppose the result is as disastrous as the combined plebiscite and legislative elections? Suppose even the threshold isn't reached? How will it be interpreted? Based on the results of the legislative elections, even if the Blue camp fails to organize a boycott of the plebiscite, a significant proportion of Pan Blue voters will boycott the plebiscite on their own. Even assuming those who obtain plebiscite ballots exceed the 26% who did so during the legislative elections, the percentage is unlikely to reach the threshold. What will the Green Camp do in the face of such a setback? Will they do the same thing they did following their defeat in the legislative elections? Will they blame the plebiscite balloting system for unfairness?

To the Blue camp, the "Rejoin the UN" plebiscite was from beginning to end, a phony issue. The KMT promoted it in order to avoid being labeled as "anti-Taiwan." Events motivated the Blue camp to boycott all the plebiscites. Blue camp voters will resist manipulation by the plebiscite issue on their own accord. The Blue camp really has no need to dance to the Green camp's tune. Ma Ying-jeou will most likely downplay the plebiscite, hoping that it and related issues will marginalize themselves. After all, to the Blue camp, whether the "Rejoin the UN" plebisicite passes is a matter of indifference. With its numerical advantage in the new legislature, it can propose remedies any time it needs to.

Combining plebiscites with general elections has been Chen Shui-bian's main political strategy. He created the model. It is his only opportunity to intervene in the upcoming election. The plebiscite has been nothing more than an election tool. Its purpose has been to win general elections. The DPP has twice combined plebiscites with general elections. The cost has been a gradual debasement of the sanctity of plebiscites. In 2004 a plebiscite helped Chen "win" the presidential election. But at the same time, Chen lost his euphemistically named "Defensive Plebiscite," which was in fact a "Missile Purchase" plebiscite. In January of this year, the DPP lost the legislative elections. It also lost the "Recover the KMT's Party Assets" plebiscite. Will next month's "Join the UN" plebiscite really help Hsieh win the presidential election? Nobody knows. The answer to this question will test Frank Hsieh's political wisdom.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.02.05
公投不一定綁得了大選，但一定綁得住謝長廷
中時社論

　不出意外，儘管一度還曾有過爭議，中選會終究還是定案將入聯、返聯兩項公投與三月的總統大選同日舉辦，這意味先前立委選舉的結果，並未改寫三月選舉的任何議程，「公投綁大選」確定仍將是影響這次總統選舉的重要變數之一。而這或許也是我們所見證的最後一次「公投綁大選」了。

　先前朝野政黨領袖在協商時，藍營一度想透過新國會的提案來為兩項公投案解套，但綠營終究不可能會放棄「公投」，陳水扁甚至刻意釋出訊息，若是藍營占優勢的新國會企圖以立院提案取代入聯與返聯公投，則他不排除以這個決議文提出防禦性公投。有了這個變數，藍營就算要在立院針對入聯提案，也不會願意提供陳水扁在任滿前還有任何後續的操作空間，這也等於讓一切都回到了原點。

　正因為一切都回到原點，反而讓問題變得更耐人尋味。換言之，三月的這次「公投綁大選」，對藍綠陣營而言都形成某種「騎虎難下」之勢，對綠營尤其是如此。以謝長廷而言，「公投入聯」涉及民進黨本身的基本信仰，也是營造與藍營識別差異的重要關鍵，因而他不可能有任何迴避的空間，問題在於他還要不要將之納為這次總統大選的主軸？謝的困境在於：首先，如果強打公投入聯，勢必再度引發華府、北京的強烈反應。美國高層先前對入聯公投的批判主要都是衝著陳水扁，如果接下來矛頭開始轉向謝長廷，恐怕絕不是他所樂見的結果；同樣的操作入聯公投也一定會激化兩岸關係，這對目前謝所倡議的種種兩岸開放政策的措施，都形同是在自打嘴巴。

　謝長廷或許不願明說的第二個理由，就是一旦將「入聯公投」納為總統大選的主軸，無疑就是宣示將遵循扁的路線，甚至讓扁重回到競選的置高點，如此扁謝就會再度被掛在一起。對扁而言，操作「入聯公投」的重點早已不是能否幫助謝長廷當選，而是能否藉此最後機會確立他在綠營內部的歷史定位，這也是扁在任滿前唯一可以操作的議題，要他不作為，根本不可能。因而謝長廷可能與藍營一樣，都不樂見情勢走到讓扁操作防禦性公投的地步，那形同將發球權又送回到扁的手上，不僅謝此刻所操作的相關議題都會被擠壓，甚至他還會被扁帶著走，真要走到這步田地，謝也就不必選了。

　綠營需要思考的另一個議題是，如果入聯公投的最終結局，與綁立委的兩項公投一樣，連領投所需要的門檻都沒過，將會被怎樣的詮釋？而經歷過立委選舉的經驗後，藍營就算不再發動拒領公投票，一定比例的藍營選民也可能自發性的拒領，屆時就算領投公投票的比例較立委選舉的兩成六要高，還是非常有可能衝不過門檻，綠營面對此一挫折，難道還是要像立委敗選一樣，全歸咎於公投制度設計不公嗎？

　對藍營而言，從一開始「返聯公投」就是拿香跟拜的假議題，但為避免再被綠營扣上「反台灣」的帽子，依情勢研判，藍營這回應不致再強力操作「拒領公投」，除了藍營選民會自發性的抵制外，藍營實在也不需要滯留在這個戰場中，因而馬英九最可能的做法就是冷處理，讓相關議題自行邊緣化，畢竟對藍營而言，「返聯公投」過不過的問題不大，以其在新國會的席次優勢，隨時都可以提案來補救。

　無論如何，「公投綁大選」一直都是屬於陳水扁的主戰場，不僅是他創造了這個模式，也是他可以插手這次大選的唯一槓桿，而在這個戰場中，公投一直都只是工具，大選勝利才是目的。民進黨迄今已經操作過兩次的公投綁大選，代價是一步步在折損公投這個體制的神聖性。二○○四年是贏了總統選舉，卻輸掉了以「買飛彈」為名的防禦性公投，今年一月則是既輸了立委選舉，也輸掉了討黨產公投，下個月所舉行的入聯公投究竟能不能幫謝長廷贏得總統大選嗎？沒有人知道，畢竟如何解答這個問題，可真得要考驗謝長廷的政治智慧了。