The Constitution is the Constitution: A Spade is a Spade

The Constitution is the Constitution: A Spade is a Spade
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 30, 2012

Summary: The Wu/Hu Summit reached an important agreement. The two sides agreed that their "existing constitutions" stipulate that both are part of One China. This was the two leaders' greatest achievement. Unfortunately the two leaders also referred to their constitutions as "existing provisions." But everyone knows they were referring to the two sides' "existing constitutions." This is a major blind spot in a major breakthrough. The two sides must "ascend to the next level in order to see farther." The key is the wisdom and courage to call a spade a spade, and to call the constitution the constitution.

Full Text below:

The Wu/Hu Summit reached an important agreement. The two sides agreed that their "existing constitutions" stipulate that both are part of One China. This was the two leaders' greatest achievement. Unfortunately the two leaders also referred to their constitutions as "existing provisions." This constitutes a massive blind spot.

The two sides have been dealing with each other for some time now. They have gone from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-repudiation." They are now just short of "mutual recognition." Westerners speak of "calling a spade a spade." The Chinese speak of "calling things by their proper name." Do we wish to open a channel for cross-Strait relations? Then we must level with ourselves. We must refer to a constitution as a constitution.

One. The public on Taiwan, and especially the DPP, must acknowledge that Taiwan independence is impossible. Taipei's strategic posture towards the Mainland must change. It must change from "oppose [Mainland] China, demand Taiwan independence," to "accept [Mainland] China, demand democracy." Taiwan cannot wish away One China or Chinese reunification. Instead, it must use democracy to define the nature of One China and to modulate the pace of reunification. Twenty-three million people living on Taiwan must reaffirm the Republic of China, as it carries on its semantic tug of war with the People's Republic of China. We must uphold the Constitution of the Republic of China. We must view it as our most valuable asset in our ongoing struggle. We must not divide the Republic of China as it confronts a centralized People's Republic of China.

Unless Mainland China vanishes from the face of the earth, Taiwan independence is impossible. To take a leaf from Tsai Ing-wen, the shrewdest strategy for the Republic of China is to uphold One China, Different Interpretations. This strategy most cloesly approximates the strategy adopted by our opponents. The public on Taiwan cannot make Mainland China vanish. But a democratic Republic of China can change Mainland China for the better. History has presented Taiwan with an arduous but grand mission, one that it cannot shirk. The Republic of China is divided as a result of Taiwan independence. We must reunite. Taiwan must conductd a democratic dialogue with 1.3 billion compatriots across the Strait. We must seize the initiative. We must assert our right to speak.

Two. Beijing must accept certain realities. Cross-Strait relations may evolve in any number of ways. They include "peaceful development," a "One China in progress," a "One China in development," a politically integrated confederation, or "reunification." But one of them can ignore or invalidate the Republic of China. Beijing must admit that One China is not the same as the forceful eradication of the Republic of China. The two are not the same, and must not be conflated. Reunification is not the same as the forceful eradication of the Republic of China. The two are not the same, and must not be conflated. After all, we are not talking about coerced reunification.

Consider "One China in development." Recognizing the Republic of China does not violate the One China Principle. Recognizing the Republic of China does not preclude reunification. Beijing is unwilling to countenance Taiwan independence and the founding of a "Nation of Taiwan." But this hardly necessitates destroying the Republic of China. On the contrary, preserving the Republic of China is the same as precluding Taiwan independence.

As this newspaper's editorials have suggested, the two sides should write into law the special political relationship between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. This formulation paraphrases Hu Jintao's words. The two sides should sign a Cross-Strait Trust Agreement. They should cease communicating through middlemen. They should refer to the constitution as the constitution. They should enter a new stage of mutual recognition. Beijing must recognize the Republic of China, in this form or that. The public on Taiwan can then reach a firmer consensus on the One China Constitution, Taiwan independence will no longer have a leg to stand on. The two sides can then adopt a "One China in progress" stance. This can lead to a "One China in development." Beijing can hardly ask the Republic of China to reaffirm its One China Constitution, then ask it to repudiate the Republic of China. That would hardly be "calling things by their proper name."

Three. The two sides must consider a "Third Concept of China." The current cross-Strait arrangement is One China, Different Intepretations, and "seeking common ground while shelving differences." It is an ingenious formulation. But it has reached a bottleneck. One China, Different Intepretations and "seeking common ground while shelving differences" reflects a "You are you, and I am me" attitude. The People's Republic of China does not recognize the Republic of China. It refuses to refer to President Ma by his title. The Republic of China does not recognize the People's Republic of China. It refuses to refer to President Hu by his title. This is not merely self-deception. It is worse. It amounts to "Two Chinas." We need a "Third Concept of China" than the sum of its parts. We need a more transcendent concept of China that will link the two sides. Only that will be a genuine One China. That of course, is the "roof theory." Otherwise the public on Taiwan will take "One China" to mean the People's Republic of China. It will not perceive the Republic of China as part of "One China." That is why the public on Taiwan has become increasingly alienated from the notion that "Taiwanese are Chinese." That is why the public on Taiwan has a diminishing sense of Chinese consciousness.

CCP leaders since Deng Xiaoping often repeat, "You will not annex me. I will not annex you." This is absolutely correct. But the language should be reworded to "The People's Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. The Republic of China will not annex the People's Republic of China." Since we have "One China in progress," we need a "Third Concept of China." We need a transcendent China based on the roof theory, in both our imagination and in law, Only then can the two sides cease perceiving each other as "foreign nations." Only then can we look forward to a brighter future.

Four. We need an interim solution. Consider the "One China in development" concept. One China is evolving organically from one stage to another. The current "One China in progress" concept must be rooted in a "separately administered but undivided Third Concept of China." It must be written into law. Therefore we need a peace agreement or Cross-Strait Trust Agreement. An interim solution must be found. This will enable the Republic of China's One China Constitution and the People's Republic of China's One China Framework to find common ground. This will eliminate fears of Taiwan independence. This will moderate pressure for premature reunification. This will enable the two sides to approach the One China issue with a more rational attitude and clearer goals. This is what this newspaper refers to as "process orienation."

Over four short years, the Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao administrations have successfully walked a pragmatic path toward "peaceful development."  Their hard-won achievements merit the highest praise. Cross-strait interactions must preclude "you annexing me, me annexing you." Cross-Strait interactions must set an example for mankind.

The Wu/Hu Summit referred to the two sides' "existing provisions." But everyone knows they were referring to the two sides' "existing constitutions." This is a major blind spot in a major breakthrough. The two sides must "ascend to the next level in order to see farther." The key is the wisdom and courage to call a spade a spade, and to call the constitution the constitution.

把黑桃叫做黑桃 把憲法叫做憲法
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.03.30

吳胡會以「雙方現行憲法」來支撐「一個中國」，這是最大的成就；但二人卻又稱憲法為「雙方現行規定」，則是巨大的盲點。

兩岸關係走到今天，其實已從「互不承認」走到了「互不否認」，九仞一簣是在「相互承認」；也就是西諺所說：「把黑桃叫做黑桃。」中國人則說：「名正言順。」欲打通兩岸關係的任督二脈，關鍵即在還元歸真「把憲法叫做憲法」。

一、台灣方面必須認清，台獨已絕無可能，民進黨尤須有此認知。台灣對大陸的戰略原則，必須從「反對中國，我要台獨」，轉至「不反對中國，我要民主」；台灣不可能使「一個中國」或「統一」這些課題消滅，必須努力施展的是對「中國」的內容及「統一」的進度之民主制約力量。兩千三百萬人應當回到中華民國的基本立場，在與中華人民共和國的拔河角力中，以中華民國憲法為進退攻守的最高準據；不能以分裂的中華民國，去面對實施集中制的中華人民共和國。

事實上，除非使「中國」從地球上消失，台獨建國絕無可能實現；倘借用蔡英文的說法，中華民國持守「一中各表」的原則，正是最最「貼近你的對手」的明智戰略。台灣不可能使「中國」消滅，但應有透過中華民國的民主優勢使「中國」改變的決志；這是歷史給台灣的艱苦又光榮的使命，在現實上台灣亦捨此別無出路。中華民國因台獨而分裂，只要團結起來，台灣透過與對岸十三億人及全世界的民主對話，必可取得較具主動、自主與優勢的話語權。

二、北京必須認清，無論兩岸關係未來如何演進，或是「和平發展」，或是「現在進行式的一個中國」，或是「一個中國的發展論」，或是進行高度政治整合（如邦聯），抑或是「統一」，皆不能跳過、略過或否定「中華民國」這個平台。北京應知：「一個中國」與「強制消滅中華民國」並非同一概念，二者之間不能畫上等號；且「統一」亦與「強制消滅中華民國」並非同一概念，二者之間也不能畫上等號（除非「霸統一」）。

從「一個中國的發展論」之原理而論，承認中華民國，並不違反「一中原則」；而接受了中華民國，也並非就不能談「統一」。北京的核心關注在不願見台獨建國，但這與「消滅中華民國」不是同一個題目；正好相反，維持中華民國，卻與排除台獨是同一課題。

因此，如本系列社論所建議，兩岸應當建構一個「中華民國與中華人民共和國在特殊情況下的法制化政治關係」（修飾胡錦濤語），以簽定ＣＢＦＡ（兩岸信任架構協議）之類文件的方式，脫掉白手套，「把憲法叫做憲法」，進入「相互承認」的新階段；只要北京透過某種形式承認了中華民國，台灣內部「一中憲法」的共識必可更趨一致並強固，台獨自更無立足空間，兩岸即可走上「現在進行式的一個中國」，通往「一個中國的發展論」。否則，又要中華民國堅持「一中憲法」，卻又否定中華民國，如何「名正言順」？

三、兩岸之間須有一個「第三概念中國」的想像。兩岸現行的架構是「一中各表／求同存異」，這是極為巧慧的發明，但漸也瀕近瓶頸。因為，「一中各表／求同存異」，基本上是「爾為爾，我為我」的態度；中華人民共和國不承認中華民國（不稱馬總統），所以中華民國也不承認中華人民共和國（不稱胡主席）。這不僅是自欺欺人，其實更是「兩個中國」；必須要有一個高於並大於二者的「第三概念」或「上位概念」的「中國」作為二者的連結，這才是「一個中國」，亦即屋頂理論。否則，每稱「一個中國」，在台灣人的思緒中必是指「中華人民共和國」，而無由產生「中華民國是一部分的中國」，「台灣人是中國人」的意識；則中國議題在台灣之所以愈趨異化甚至惡化，實亦情理之必然。

倘若自鄧小平以來中共領導階層常說的「不是你吃掉我，不是我吃掉你」，確為真實可信，則此語應是指「不是中華人民共和國吃掉中華民國，也不是中華民國吃掉中華人民共和國」。倘係如此，在「現在進行式的一個中國」的進程中，自應有一「第三概念」、「上位概念」或「屋頂理論」的更高更大之「中國」，存在於想像或法制之中，始有可能使兩岸互視為「非外國之國家」。進此一步，海闊天空。

四、必須有一「中程方案」。若以「一個中國的發展論」而言，「一個中國」是從一個階段演化、進化、發展、成長至另一個階段的有機過程。此一「現在進行式的一個中國」，必須以「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念的中國」為運作準據，並應當取得法制化的架構。因此，「和平協議」或「兩岸信任架構協議／ＣＢＦＡ」之類的「中程方案」仍為必要的建構，可使中華民國的「一中憲法」與中華人民共和國的「一中框架」在此尋得交集，一以免除「台獨」的疑忌，一以減輕「統一」的緊迫感，俾使「一個中國」的課題，能夠較有餘裕地「經由合理的過程，通向改善之目的」，此即本報社論所說的「過程論」。

馬英九與胡錦濤兩個政府，能在短短四年之中，將兩岸帶上如此務實的「和平發展」之路，這是難能可貴的優異表現。兩岸的互動，絕不可是「你吃掉我，我吃掉你」；因為，兩岸的互動，應以「為人類歷史創造文明典範」為目標。

吳胡會雖稱「雙方現行規定」，但盡人皆知所指為「雙方現行憲法」，這是重大突破中存有的巨大盲點；兩岸值此「欲窮千里目／更上一層樓」之際，關鍵的作為應是：智慧而勇敢地，把黑桃叫做黑桃，把憲法叫做憲法！