From Mutual Non-Repudiation to Mutual Recognition

From Mutual Non-Repudiation to Mutual Recognition
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 24, 2012

Summary: Making the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China part of the same realm poses enormous difficulties, both legal and logical. But bilateral efforts and achievements in recent years prove that political ideals and political will trump legality and logic. The two sides have already recognized each others' "existing provisions." What is that, if not the recognition of "one China?" What is that, if not the recognition of each others' constitutions?

Full Text below:

The recent Wu/Hu Summit made major breakthroughs. But huge blind spots remain.

First, consider the breakthroughs. According to the Xinhua News Agency, Hu Jintao said, "Beijing and Taipei have reaffirmed that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. This is consistent with the two sides' existing provisions. It is something both sides consider doable." Wu Poh-hsiung said, "According to the two sides' existing systems and relevant provisions, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that both are part of one China."

As everyone knows, the "existing provisions" and "relevant provisions" that Wu and Hu referred to are the two sides' constitutions. Aside from their constitutions, they have no "existing provisions" or "relevant provisions" that support a declaration at this level. Hu Jintao expressed this view in 2005. He said, "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. This fact has never changed... This is clear from Taiwan's existing provisions and documents." Hu Jintao was of course referring to the Constitution of the Republic of China. During the recent Wu/Hu Summit, the two leaders concurrently underscored "the two sides' existing provisions." They underscored the constitution aspect and highlighted this logic.

Nevertheless the two sides have a blind spot. They are clearly referring to "existing constitutions." But they demote "existing constitutions" to the level of "existing provisions." They obviously know that cross-Strait relations must be predicated upon the two sides' constitutions. But they refuse to recognize each others' constitutions. They persist in demoting each others' existing constitutions to the level of "existing provisions." This is the most serious blind spot in cross-Strait relations.

The "One China" principle essentially states that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. This framework has two implications. One. China is a concept that transcends both the Mainland and Taiwan. Two. The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China. Therefore the Mainland is not subordinate to Taiwan, and Taiwan is not subordinate to the Mainland. The Mainland and Taiwan are merely geographical terms. Therefore any policy measures must be consistent with the two sides' "existing provisions." By implication, "There is only one China in the world. The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are both part of that one China." This is what UDN News editorials refer to as the "Newest Three Principles."

"Taiwan" and "the Mainland" are geographical terms. They have no legal force behind them. The names "Republic of China" and "People's Republic of China" are often demoted to "Taiwan" and "the Mainland." By the same token, "existing constitutions" are often demoted to "existing provisions."

The two sides' current policy is "non-recognition of each others' sovereignty, non-repudiation of each others' jurisdiction." This is President Ma's mantra. The Mainland also adheres to this position. Therefore, the government of the Republic of China refuses to recognize the People's Republic of China and its Constitution. The government of the Peoples Republic of China does not recognize the Republic of China and its Constitution. That is why both sides insist that "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China," instead of "The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are both part of one China." But as mentioned before, one fact is obvious to everyone. Both sides agree that their existing constitutions support the "One China" principle.

Today's "one China" is no longer rooted in the "Old Three Principles." Nor is it rooted in the assertion that "Taiwan is part of China." Today's One China Principle has evolved. It now proclaims that "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China." Another, third concept of China has also emerged. It proclaims that "I will not annex you. You will not annex me." Under that One China, the People's Republic of China will not annex the Republic of China. Nor will the Republic of China annex the People's Republic of China. This being the case, why do the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China still refuse to recognize each other?

The status quo is one in which "Neither side recognizes each others' sovereignty. But neither sides repudiates each others' jurisdiction." But this is self-deception. Without sovereignty, how can one assert jurisdiction? Without jurisdiction, how can one assert sovereignty? How can the two sides implement three links? How can they implement ECFA? This is not a problem of logic. Politics has transcended logic.

Suppose the two sides accept the One China Principle? Then the status quo, in which "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China" actually means that "The Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China are both part of one China." This One China is a "transcendent concept," or "third concept." It is part of a "big roof theory." It represents the evolution of "mutual non-recognition" into "mutual non-repudiation," and eventually into "mutual recognition." Only then can the two sides establish a "We will not annex you. You will not annex us" understanding of One China.

Of course, making the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China part of the same realm poses enormous difficulties, both legal and logical. But bilateral efforts and achievements in recent years prove that political ideals and political will trump legality and logic. The two sides have already recognized each others' "existing provisions." What is that, if not the recognition of "one China?" What is that, if not the recognition of each others' constitutions?

兩岸新試探：從互不否認到相互承認
【聯合報╱社論】 2012.03.24

這次的吳胡會，有重大突破，但也仍然存在著向來皆有的一個大盲點。

先談突破。新華社報導，胡錦濤說：「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的。」同時報導，吳伯雄說：「根據雙方現行體制和相關規定，兩岸都堅持一個中國。」

眾所皆知，吳胡二人所稱之「現行規定」，即是各自的憲法。除了憲法，沒有任何「相關規定」可有效支撐此一層次的宣示。胡錦濤在二○○五年曾表達過此一觀點，當時的用語是：「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變……，也見之於台灣現有的規定和文件。」當然，胡錦濤當年所指，無非亦是中華民國憲法。而此次吳胡會，二人更同時引據「雙方現行規定」，觸及憲法層次，使得此一論點尤其凸顯。

盲點則是，明明是指「雙方現行憲法」，卻矮化成「雙方現行規定」。一方面明知必須憑藉「雙方憲法」為兩岸的主要支撐，另一方面卻又不能相互承認其為「憲法」，以至於矮稱之為「現行規定」，正是兩岸一向以來的盲點所在。

「一個中國」的原則，其基本論述是：大陸和台灣同屬一個中國。此一架構的引申意義是：一、中國是一高於亦大於大陸及台灣的概念；二、大陸與台灣同屬一個中國，因此不能說，大陸屬於台灣，或台灣屬於大陸。而且，大陸與台灣畢竟只是地理名詞；因此，若落實至政治現實及「雙方現行規定」，其必然引申出來的定義應當是：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國皆是一部分的中國。」（此為本報社論所稱的「新新三句」）。

「台灣」與「大陸」是地理名詞，不能有法律行為能力；如此，何以諱言「中華民國／中華人民共和國」，而矮稱為「台灣／大陸」？正如將「雙方現行憲法」矮稱為「雙方現行規定」？

兩岸雙方現今所採政策皆是「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」。這雖是馬總統的箴言，其實大陸方面亦持此立場。所以，中華民國政府不承認中華人民共和國及其憲法；中華人民共和國政府亦不承認中華民國及其憲法。因此才會說，「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」，而不說「中華民國與中華人民共和國同屬一個中國」；然而，如前所述，有目共睹的事實卻是，雙方卻又明知是以雙方各自的現行憲法來支撐「一個中國」的概念。

現今所稱的「一個中國」，已非「老三句」時代的定義；也就是不再只說「台灣是中國的一部分」，而是已演化、進化至「大陸與台灣同屬於」另一個「第三概念」的「中國」；亦即演化、進化至「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」的思維，那也就是「不是中華人民共和國吃掉中華民國，也不是中華民國吃掉中華人民共和國」。如此，為什麼「中華人民共和國」與「中華民國」仍互不承認？

「主權互不承認，治權互不否認」是兩岸的現在情境，卻是自欺欺人的行為。沒有主權，哪來的治權？若否認主權，豈可不否認其治權？然而，如果否認治權，兩岸如何能有三通？如何能有ＥＣＦＡ？由此可見，這不是一個邏輯的問題，政治有超越邏輯的力量。

如前所述，如果兩岸皆接受「一個中國」的概念，則「大陸與台灣同屬一個中國」的現況，實際上應是「中華民國與中華人民共和國同屬一個中國」。這個「一個中國」，是一個高於大於二者的「上位概念」或「第三概念」，亦即屋頂理論；亦唯有二者之間逐漸從「互不承認」演化、進化至「互不否認」，再演化、進化至「相互承認」，始有可能建構一個「不是你吃掉我，也不是我吃掉你」的「一個中國」。

當然，要想像一個「中華民國與中華人民共和國同是一部分的中國」的境界，在法理及邏輯上皆有極大的困難；但是，近年來兩岸的努力及成果皆已證實，政治的理想與決志，比法理及邏輯更有力。如今既已相互承認了「雙方現行規定」，這難道不是已經承認了「一個中國」是一個攸關兩岸雙方憲法層次的議題？