DPP Cross-Strait Policy Must Overcome Two Hurdles

DPP Cross-Strait Policy Must Overcome Two Hurdles
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2012

Summary: Su Tseng-chang said "People may differ about the national flag at home, but in the international arena, the flag represents Taiwan. We must defend the ROC national flag." This was a surprising and risible comment. What it really meant was that even though the DPP advocates Taiwan independence and refuses to fly the ROC national flag at home, the Ma administration is nevertheless obligated to wave the ROC national flag in Beijing's face.

Full Text below:

The DPP's attempt to transform its cross-Strait policy has clearly run aground.

First of all, it has named its restored cross-Strait institution the "China Affairs Department" instead of the "Cross-Strait Affairs Department." A "Cross-Strait Affairs Department" implies "one China, different interpretations." A "China Affairs Department" implies "one country on each side." The hand of Taiwan independence is clearly visible. Furthermore, it is redundant. It overlaps the "China Affairs Committee" custom tailored for Chairman Frank Hsieh. Dissent within the party has forced Frank Hsieh to adopt a "neither opposing nor demanding" stance on the new "China Affairs Department."

Su Tseng-chang's strategic understanding and tactical skills were apparently unable to ensure transformation. Take Su Tseng-chang's response to the removal of the ROC national flag on Regent Street, London. He was transparently insincere. Su Tseng-chang has clearly returned to the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." He is clearly saying that according to the current constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the Republic of China, and uses the ROC national flag. This is "amputated history." Su Tseng-chang utterly fails to address the DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Platform," the DPP's calls for the "Rectification of Names," and the DPP's still alive and kicking "one country on each side" rhetoric. If Su Tseng-chang was really that broken up about the ROC national flag being taken down on Regent Street, why did he not vow that he would obtain this flag and make it the centerpiece of DPP political rallies? If this is what Su Tseng-chang's cross-Strait rhetoric boils down to, isn't it just a wee bit superficial? Isn't it just a wee bit deceitful?

The KMT is in trouble. The DPP may be able to win back the presidency in 2016. It may be able to return to power. But first DPP cross-Strait policy must be successfully transformed. In 2016, the DPP will encounter two hurdles. Hurdle One would be that voters on Taiwan will refuse to vote for the DPP because they don't think the DPP can win. If the DPP does win, it will encounter Hurdle Two. The ruling DPP will be held hostage by Beijing. For Taiwan, this would be a catastrophe. Judging by Su Tseng-chang's cross-Strait transformation so far, even if he helps the DPP over the Hurdle One, the DPP will not be able to negotiate Hurdle Two.

The DPP can no longer play "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" type "backdoor listing" word games. It can no longer pass off "Taiwan" as the Republic of China. It can no longer pass off the Constitution of the Republic of China as "Taiwan's Constitution," It can no longer pass off the Republic of China national flag as "Taiwan's flag." Cross-Strait coopetition is now deep rooted. Does the DPP actually imagine it can continue to skate by on such glib sophistries? 

One can be certain that Beijing's bottom line in 2016 will remain "opposition to Taiwan independence" and "adherence to the 1992 consensus." This is not something the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" can resist. The DPP must offer a response before the election. In the event it wins, it must offer a response after the election. If it responds before the election, the DPP will at least have exercised some initiative. In the event it wins but responds only after the election, the result will be political and economic catastrophe.

Blue vs. Green politics on Taiwan has led to political instability. As a result, Beijing is taking a harder line. To "opposing Taiwan independence and upholding the 1992 consensus," it has added "consolidating the one China framework." It has begun criticizing the Ma administration's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy. This reflects Beijing's concern about political instability on Taiwan. It also reflects Beijing's reservations about attacking the Ma administration. Its words are heavy with subtext. It is giving the DPP advance warning. It is saying that if the DPP returns to power, the political and economic pressure Beijing applies to the DPP administration will far exceed the pressure applied to the Ma administration. When the time comes, the DPP will be able to adopt Chen Shui-bian's suicidal Taiwan independence policy. Just the opposite,it will be hostage to Beijing. It will be compelled to knuckle under. Therefore the DPP must seize the initiative and transform itself before the election. This is a far wiser strategy than waiting passively and knuckling under to pressure after the election. This is Su Tseng-chang's responsibility as party chairman. Does Su Tseng-chang understand the strategic picture well enough to pull it off?

The DPP's transformation has run aground. It has struck a reef, the struggle between Su and Tsai for the presidency in 2016. This has dealt Taiwan independence elements a stronger hand. Any transformation will be hobbled by these Taiwan independence elements. Under the circumstances, Frank Hsieh's sudden prominence could take a surprising turn. Frank Hsieh is the only DPP leader still promoting the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. Su and Tsai may reach a tacit understanding. They may exploit Frank Hsieh's self-sacrifice to facilitate the party's transformation. Su and Tsai may not be able to reach an understanding. They may not wish to offend Taiwan independence elements as they jockey for position. Frank Hsieh may be rendered impotent. The DPP may revert to the backdoor listing of its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It may continue to engage in self-deception.

Su Tseng-chang said "People may differ about the national flag at home, but in the international arena, the flag represents Taiwan. We must defend the ROC national flag." This was a surprising and risible comment. What it really meant was that even though the DPP advocates Taiwan independence and refuses to fly the ROC national flag at home, the Ma administration is nevertheless obligated to wave the ROC national flag in Beijing's face.

What it really means is that the DPP must be allowed to promote Taiwan independence. But defending the Republic of China is Ma Ying-jeou's responsibility. As chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, isn't Su Tseng-chang ashamed about indulging in such superficial and deceitful sophistry?

民進黨兩岸政策轉型工程的兩大關口
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.04

原本甚囂塵上的民進黨兩岸政策轉型工程，顯然已告擱淺。

首先，恢復的機構，仍名為「中國事務部」，卻不是「兩岸事務部」；而「兩岸事務部」意味「一中各表」，「中國事務部」則意味「一邊一國」，可見獨派的掣肘。再者，原本疊床架屋、為謝長廷量身裁製的「中國事務委員會」主任委員一職，由於「黨內意見很多」，謝長廷的態度已由當仁不讓，轉為「不排斥，也不強求」。

最值得注意的是，蘇貞昌在思維的高度與操作的手法上，似乎皆不具帶領轉型的能力。從蘇貞昌對此次倫敦攝政街撤旗事件的回應，可以看出他的膚淺與不真誠。蘇貞昌又回到了一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》，謂台灣依現行憲法稱為中華民國，就是用這一面國旗；這卻是將歷史掐頭去尾的手法，蘇貞昌完全未交代民進黨此前的《台獨黨綱》，及此後的「正名制憲」，與現在仍然活蹦亂跳的「一邊一國」；何況，蘇貞昌既如此心痛在攝政街被撤去的那一幅國旗，為何不承諾將這面國旗插回民進黨的群眾集會中？倘若這就是蘇貞昌的兩岸論述水準，豈非太膚淺？又豈非太不真誠？

由於國民黨的形勢式微，出現了民進黨可能在二○一六贏回大選、重返執政的可能性。但是，倘若民進黨在兩岸政策上不能轉型成功，則在二○一六年，必將遭遇兩大關口；不是在第一關被台灣選民所拒以致不能勝選，就是倘若勝選，亦將在第二關被北京挾持而釀成台灣的浩劫。若以蘇貞昌如今在兩岸轉型工程上的表現，他即使帶領民進黨過了第一關，也絕無可能過得了第二關。

民進黨不能再玩《台灣前途決議文》那種「借殼上市」的把戲；把「台灣」說成「中華民國」，把「中華民國憲法」說成「台灣的憲法」，把「中華民國國旗」說成「台灣的國旗」。兩岸競合關係的重重關口，盤根錯節，豈能以如此移花接木的淺薄手法就想僥倖過關？

可以預言，北京在二○一六年的政策底線，仍將是「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」二大元素，這絕非《台灣前途決議文》所能抵擋的題目。民進黨若不在選前回答這個題目，必將在若勝選後被迫回答；倘在選前回應，則民進黨尚不致全然淪於被動，但若至勝選執政才被北京逼迫回應，則必將釀成台灣政經的巨災浩劫。

由於台灣藍綠政局出現不穩，如今北京的底線已然更見限縮；由「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」，又加上了「鞏固一中框架」，並開始對馬政府的「不統／不獨／不武」展開批判，這反映了北京對台灣政局不穩的憂慮。這一方面是北京在攻擊馬政府的保守，另一方面更是「項莊舞劍，意在沛公」，不啻也是預先為民進黨點眼藥。民進黨若執政，在北京的政經壓力下，其抗壓能力可以斷言絕對不如現在的馬政府；屆時，民進黨勢必不能、不敢再採行陳水扁式的台獨自殺政策，反而必將被北京所挾持並對北京屈服。所以，民進黨若在大選前主動轉型，自遠較若勝選後的被動屈服為得計；這正是蘇貞昌作為黨主席的責任，但蘇貞昌有這樣的思維高度與操作能力嗎？

民進黨轉型的擱淺，主因之一是撞上了「蘇蔡二○一六」的礁岩。蘇蔡相爭，使獨派籌碼的分量上升，因此轉型受到獨派的掣肘。在這樣的情勢下，謝長廷的角色由奇峰突起轉至可能驚鴻一瞥，就尤令人玩味。其實，如今謝長廷已成了整個民進黨想要在兩岸政策大轉型的唯一槓桿，蘇蔡若有默契，即可能藉謝長廷的「自我犧牲」來帶動轉型；倘若蘇蔡不能一致，而皆不想在相互「卡位」中開罪獨派，則非但謝長廷無用武之地，民進黨也只能回到借殼上市的《台灣前途決議文》，繼續玩弄自欺欺人的把戲。

蘇貞昌說：「雖然國旗在國內仍有不同看法，但在國際上，國旗代表台灣，當然要維護國旗的權益。」這真是一段令人驚詫不置的荒謬言論，其意是指，即使民進黨主張台獨，在國內也不掛青天白日滿地紅國旗，但馬政府仍有責任在北京的面前展開國旗。

民進黨可以搞台獨，但捍衛中華民國是馬英九的責任。作為民進黨主席，說出如此膚淺與不真誠的言語，蘇貞昌，你不覺得難為情嗎？