Beijing/Tokyo Relations Strained: Taipei Could Serve as Intermediary

Beijing/Tokyo Relations Strained: Taipei Could Serve as Intermediary
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 19, 2012

Summary: The Diaoyutai Islands are outlying islands of Taiwan. Taipei could ask Beijing to respect Taipei's jurisdiction. Beijing is attempting to maintain sovereignty over the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. This could moderate its behavior. This could calm the current crisis. This could prevent the Diaoyutai Islands conflict from undermining the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Relations are strained on both Mainland China and Japan. Under the circumstances Taipei could play a valuable role as intermediary.

Full Text below:

The backlash from Japan's so-called "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands has far exceeded the expectations of the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet. Anti-Japanese sentiment on Mainland China is raging out of control. On 9/18, the anniversary of the September 18, 1931 Shengyang Incident, large scale demonstrations erupted in over 100 Mainland cities. A ceremony celebrating the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan was cancelled. Numerous private sector economic and tourism exchanges were also cancelled. Sino-Japanese relations were once again in a state of crisis. Tensions were even higher than in 2005, when the Koizumi cabinet was in office.

Both times the crisis in Sino-Japanese relations was the result of Japanese provocation. The last time was during Prime Minister Koizumi's term. He made annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. He stirred up the Chinese people's memories of anti-Japanese resistance. Japan's Fuso history textbooks were the catalyst. They ignited anti-Japanese protests on the Chinese mainland. Basically this sort of anti-Japanese sentiment is rooted in emotions. Once passions subside, people come back down to earth. They consider reality. They return to reason. Anti-Japanese sentiment cools. The situation does not spin out of control. By this is very different from the current anti-Japanese demonstrations on Mainland China. These were triggered by Japan's so-called "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands.

Japan has a "different understanding of history" than its neighbors China and Korea. This often undermines Japan's real world diplomatic interests. After Koizumi stepped down, the Japanese government attempted to improve Sino-Japanese relations. To stabilize bilateral relations, currently serving Prime Ministers would avoid visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. The result was that Japan, which suffered two recessions, sank deep roots in into the Mainland Chinese market. For the Japanese economy, which was experiencing deflation, this was an important shot in the arm.

As a result, for some time, Japanese officialdom deliberately exercised restraint regardubg its "understanding of history." It discouraged Japanese rightists from demagoguing the issue in history textbooks. But the two countries' maritime interests enabled right-wing politicians in Japan to provoke conflict between the two nations. The Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute became the catalyst by which Shintaro Ishihara would undermine Sino-Japanese relations. The hot topic between leaders of the two major parties was once economic growth. It is now national security. Ishiba Shigeru, Ishihara Akira, and other right wingers were able to set the election agenda. They gained an advantage in party leader elections. Meanwhile, in the upcoming House of Representatives elections became a means to incite antagonism toward Mainland China. It became a way to mask the Japanese government's ineptitude and the Japanese government's economic plight.

Governor Ishihara's so-called "purchase of the island" and Prime Minister Noda's "nationalization" are both examples of political sleight of hand. They are both ploys to distract from domestic policy failures by shifting attention to foreign policy conflicts. This changes Sino-Japanese relations from one rooted in subjective emotions, to one rooted in objective maritime interests. This makes the risk of an unintended conflict even greater than in 2005. . Japan probably made certain calculations. It probably calculated that on the eve of the 18th National Congress, the CCP would feel compelled to maintain political stability. It probably calculated that circumstances would be more favorable to Japan. It probably calculated that it would not trigger the tripwire in the Diaoyutai Islands. But the backlash genuinely took Japanese politicians by surprise.

Mainland China has risen. It has become increasingly active in the East Asian maritime region. It has become a thorn in the side of Japan, a self-proclaimed "maritime nation." In particular, cross-Strait relations have improved in recent years. Japan sees an increasing threat to its security on its southern flank. This underscores Sino-Japanese competition in the East Asian maritime region. The Diaoyutai Islands have a fatal attraction for both sides not limited to incalculable oil reserves. It also involves critical strategic values.

Since the Cold War, Japan has been accustomed to cross-Strait opposition. It has been advantageous to Japanese security interests. It has limited the practical importance of Taipei/Tokyo relations. Japanese politicians may hold high the banner of the "East Asian Community." But they have never departed from Fukuzawa's "We Must Possess Taiwan" realpolitik. They still see Taiwan as a means to maintain the security of the southwestern archipelago to the south of Japan's border. Anti-Japanese sentiment has reappeared throughout the Chinese Mainland. Japanese from all walks of life worry that Beijing may impose economic sanctions and jeopardize Japanese economic security. Japanese must rethink the impact of cross-Strait relations on Japan's foreign policy and national security. Japanese have traditionally assumed society on Taiwan is divided into simple blacks and whites, into  pro-Japan/anti Mainland China sentiments, or pro Mainland China/anti-Japan sentiments. Japan needs to incorporate improved cross-Strait relations into Sino-Japanese relations. Take the East China Sea issue. Butting heads with Beijing will not increase Japan's security. It will not benefit Japanese diplomacy. The victims will be the markets and investments of Japanese trading companies on the Chinese mainland. This is clearly a disadvantageous policy.

Take the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. Japan must realize that Taipei has negotiated temporary administrative measures for the waters between 25 and 27 degrees north latitude. These could become the ultimate solution to the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty issue. The Diaoyutai Islands are outlying islands of Taiwan. Taipei could ask Beijing to respect Taipei's jurisdiction. Beijing is attempting to maintain sovereignty over the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. This could moderate its behavior. This could calm the current crisis. This could prevent the Diaoyutai Islands conflict from undermining the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Relations are strained on both Mainland China and Japan. Under the circumstances Taipei could play a valuable role as intermediary.

中日關係緊繃 台灣的區域斡旋自有價值
    2012-09-19
    中國時報

　「國有化」釣魚台後的情勢似乎遠超過日本野田內閣的預估。中國大陸的「反日」運動如大火燎原，超過一百座城市在九一八紀念日當天，出現大規模的示威遊行，亦使原本預先登場的中、日建交四十周年慶祝活動紛紛喊卡，不少民間經濟、旅遊互動也叫停，中日關係再現危機，其程度更甚於二○○五年小泉內閣時中日關係的緊張。

　雖說，兩次中日關係的危局皆為日本主動挑釁，但前次乃小泉首相在其任內，個人每年參拜靖國神社，喚醒中國人「抗日」的歷史記憶，經日本「扶桑社歷史教科書」催化，激起中國大陸的反日運動。基本上，此種「反日」為情緒性的，激情過後，仍會回歸「現實」，且因「現實」的考量，而重返「理性」，讓反日降溫，不易造成情勢失控，因而中、日間的衝突，其本質上迥異於此次因「國有化」釣魚台所引發的中國大陸反日示威。

　誠然，「歷史認識問題」為日本與中、韓鄰國間關係的不確定因子，經常危及日本外交的現實利益。後小泉時代，日本為改善中日關係，歷任首相選擇迴避「靖國神社參拜」，企圖穩定雙邊關係，而其結果也的確讓二度經濟衰退的日本得以深耕中國大陸市場，對陷入通貨緊縮的日本經濟來說，有很重要的挹注效果。

　因此，一段時間以來，日本官方刻意在「歷史認識問題」上克制，不再令日本右派在歷史教科書中借題發揮；但兩國在海洋利益的競爭關係上，又提供了日本右翼政客另闢戰場的溫床，釣魚台主權爭端旋即被石原慎太郎操作為裂解中日關係的催化劑，亦使原本朝野兩大政黨黨魁之爭的最熱議題，由經濟議題讓路給安保議題，石破茂、石原伸晃等右派成功掌握選戰主軸，在黨魁選舉中取得優勢，同時，在即將到來的眾議院大選中，中國大陸勢將成為渠等群起攻之的對象，以掩飾日本朝野對當前日本經濟困局的束手無策。

　因此，不論石原知事的「購島」或野田首相的「國有化」，都是日本國內政治的圍魏救趙之策，但卻使得影響日中關係的因素從主觀的「情感性」歷史問題，轉化為現實性的「海洋利益」，因此，其中存在的不可測性與擦槍走火的風險自然也遠甚於○五年的局勢。日本或許是機關算盡，想藉中共十八大召開前夕、政治上需要維穩之際，圖謀將釣魚台現狀的「紅線」往對日本有利的方向挪移，但引發如此巨大的後坐力，實是日本政界所始料未及的。

　中國大陸崛起後，對東亞海域之經營轉趨積極，確實令自詡為「海洋國家」的日本感到芒刺在背。尤有進者，近年兩岸關係的改善更造成日本想像其南面安全環境已出現質變，如此更突出中、日兩國在東亞海域的競爭關係；其中，釣魚台對雙方的致命吸引力不再只是深不可測的石油蘊藏，而是攸關現實安保利益的戰略價值。

　冷戰以來，日本習慣於兩岸關係的對立，一方面從中獲取日本安保上的利益，另一方面，也由此局限了台日關係的現實意義。在日本政界高舉「東亞共同體」的自由主義大旗時，對台灣的認識竟仍不脫福澤諭吉之「台灣領有論」的現實主義思維，將台灣視為其維持西南群島安全的「國境之南」。其實，在中國大陸舉國再現「反日」浪潮，日本各界憂心中共再度祭出經濟制裁手段、危及日本經濟安全時，應重新思考兩岸關係對日本外交及安保的意義，揚棄傳統將台灣社會內部分為親日/反中或親中/反日二元對立的僵化認識。日本需要學習如何將兩岸關係的改善轉化成為其操作中日關係的槓桿，在東海問題上，與北京衝撞無助於加大日本的安全縱深，不會給日本外交帶來利益，老實講，直接受害者為日本商社在中國大陸的市場及投資，實為損人不利己之策。

　在釣魚台爭端中，日本應意識到與台灣先行在北緯二十五度至二十七度間海域，協商暫時性的管理措施，可作為最終解決釣魚台主權問題的過渡性安排，並透過兩岸關係，要求北京尊重台北對台灣屬島釣魚台列嶼的管轄權，以節制中共對釣魚台水域所採取的維權行為，始為平息當前危局，並有效避免釣魚台爭端今後成為中日關係深水炸彈的良方。關係緊繃的中日雙方應體會到，在這件事情上，台灣在區域斡旋上是有角色與價值的。