Mainland China's Rise: Government and Opposition Require Strategic Overview

Mainland China's Rise:
Government and Opposition Require Strategic Overview
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2012

Summary: Governing a large country is like cooking a small fish.  It requires both close attention and strategic vision. Taiwan has already wasted too much time. Vicious infighting persists between the ruling and opposition parties. Shouldn't we think long and hard about what we are doing?

Full Text below:

Frank Hsieh will end his "trail blazing journey" and return to Taiwan today. Will his visit encourage the DPP to adopt a more broad-minded cross-Strait policy? That remains to be seen. But cross-Strait relations definitely offer new opportunities for interaction.

The Mainland is about to convene its 18th Party Congress. It is counting down to its generational transfer of power. The era of fifth-generation leader Xi Jinping is now dawning. Xi Jinping is the first Mainland leader born after the founding of the PRC government. He is inheriting a political authority increasingly alienated from those whom it governs. Society is fractured. The people's misery index is high. But the Mainland is also an emerging power with strength and resources beyond the reach of past leaders. When Hu Jintao took over as General Secretary during the 16th National Congress, the Mainland's economic output was less than one-third of Japan's, with its medium sized economy. It was a high risk regime undergoing its first peaceful transfer of power. The 18th Party Congress is coming up. The international media is wondering whether China will replace the United States as the world's largest economy.

Xi Jinping commands vast political and economic resources. He will adopt a more proactive policy, predicated upon "Sovereignty and power is ours, control of the economy and trade can be shared." The Mainland has made massive and rapid investments. It now boasts considerable basic infrastructure. The "ten two five" plan will use social welfare to alleviate social anxiety.

A new strategic scenario is emerging. Yet leaders on Taiwan continue to dwell on near term issues. Does Xi Jinping understand Taiwan? Is he friendly toward Taiwan? What are the differences between "two sides, one country" and " two sides, one China?" Are ECFA follow-up negotiations proceeding smoothly? How many Mainland tourists will be allowed free and independent travel? The rise of Mainland China has brought about a new international political and economic order. In particular it has impacted the East Asian regional order. Leaders on Taiwan clearly lack the necessary macro level perspective.

Mainland China is on the rise. Since the mid 90s leaders on Taiwan have begun exhibiting negative reactions. They have had difficulty adapting. Their strategic plans have been upset. The government has gradually lost the ability to formulate strategy and engage in original thinking. It has long bee either passive or reactive. It has failed to actively engage in long-term planning. It has failed to anticipate. Its strategic responses in cross-Strait relations have become increasingly chaotic and confused. They have ranged from former President Lee Teng-hui's "Exodus: Flight from Egypt," to former President Chen Shui-bian's "new nation and new constitution." President Ma made cross-Strait strategy congruent with international strategy. Over the past four years, cross-Strait relations have benefitted from the resulting synergy. But what does the future hold? What are our strategic goals? What are the Mainland's long range prospects? How should Taiwan respond? These are issues of strategic importance. Leaders on Taiwan still lack an overall plan. They have not researched these issues. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy has provided a legal foundation for close exchanges. But it nevertheless lacks a roadmap for future development.

Structurally and functionally, the Mainland Affairs Council is not suited for the role of cross-Strait strategy formulation. It must rely on higher level national security entities. The problem is that Ma administration officials are wound too tight. They are too immersed in their daily affairs. Policy planning is limited to the next round of negotiations. One issue that often preoccupies them is how to respond to erroneous media reporting on cross-Strait symposia. Political appointees lack strategic vision.

Inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms are non-existent. They are a major cause of poor strategy. Electoral politics is rife with "love for Taiwan" demagoguery. Taiwan has gradually reverted to a view of history held before the central government retreated to Taiwan. President Ma has occasionally underscored the historic relationship with Mainland Chinese culture. But details have been lacking. He has proposed cultural exchanges with the Mainland, but lacks any strategy for doing so.

What was Taiwan's relation with Mainland Chinese culture prior to 1949? That question involves more than history or culture. It involves strategic issues of sovereignty. There is a disconnect between cultural strategy and cross-Strait economic and trade policy. This makes simple problems concerning national dignity extremely complicated. Take sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. Leaders on Taiwan ought to be able to cite powerful evidence drawn from our historical archives. Yet the Executive Yuan Secretary-General said that Diaoyutai was incorporated into Yilan County in 1971! A limited understanding of history has limited our understanding of our sovereignty. Leaders on Taiwan have forfeited their right to speak out on the history of the Republic of China prior to 1949. The Republic of China cannot limit its historical memory to events following the transfer of the national capital to Taipei. If it does, how can it distinguish its sovereignty from that of the Mainland regime's? What legal basis can we cite?

The Mainland is a rising power. Taiwan cannot remain passive and inattentive. Our sovereignty has been curtailed and our strategic thinking has been muddled. The main reason for this is the DPP's difficult transformation. This has bound Taiwan hand and foot. The DPP is a major party that has the opportunity to rule again. It has the opportunity occupy a position of power, to formulate policy, to cross the Strait to create economic opportunities, and to eliminate political risk. Is this not its duty? Cross-Strait relations are a Gordian Knot. In an increasingly globalized world, how can we develop a reasonable global strategy?

Governing a large country is like cooking a small fish.  It requires both close attention and strategic vision. Taiwan has already wasted too much time. Vicious infighting persists between the ruling and opposition parties. Shouldn't we think long and hard about what we are doing?

面對中國崛起 朝野宏觀戰略不能再失神
    2012-10-08
    中國時報

　謝長廷將於今日結束「開展之旅」返台，

此行究竟是否可以為民進黨的兩岸政策帶來更寬闊的格局，猶待持續觀察，但兩岸關係的確呈現出新的互動機遇。

　在宣布召開十八大後，中國大陸的世代權力移轉，已進入了倒數計時，第五代領導人習近平的時代，即將來臨。習近平是中國大陸第一位建政以後出生的領導人，他所承襲的政權，是ㄧ個被治者對統治階層逐漸疏離、人民的痛苦指數居高不下的斷裂社會，但也是一個實力與資源為任何過往的領導人所無法企及的新興強權。當胡錦濤於十六大接任總書記時，大陸只是一個經濟產值不及日本三分之一的中等經濟體，也是政權第一次和平而制度化轉移的高風險國家。但在十八大即將召開之際，國際媒體上出現的是中國何時取代美國、成為全球最大經濟體的報導。

　有龐大的政經資源作後盾，習近平對外，將採行更積極主動的「主權強勢在我，經貿主導分享」的政策。在投入大量資金以超趕的速度全力衝刺後，大陸的基礎建設算是已有相當規模，「十二五」規畫的重點，將是社福部門，以紓緩逐漸浮現的社會焦慮。

　值此歷史新局，台灣所關心的，卻仍然停留在即期性的問題，譬如習近平究竟是知台還是友台？「兩岸一國」與「兩岸一中」的差異何在？ＥＣＦＡ後續談判是否順利、陸客自由行多少人等。對於中國大陸崛起所帶來對國際政經秩序，尤其是東亞次區域秩序的聯帶效應，台灣的宏觀視野明顯不足。

　面對中國的崛起，台灣自九○年代中葉以還，開始出現適應不良症候，國家戰略的設計凌亂，政府逐漸喪失戰略構建的原創性，長期下來，政策已習以為常地傾向於被動反射，而非積極的長遠規畫、預做因應。以兩岸關係而言，從李前總統的「出埃及記」到陳前總統的新國家、新憲法，戰略目標的脫序變本加厲。馬總統把國際與兩岸的戰略接軌，四年多來兩岸關係也確實達到加乘的效果。但是，兩岸的前景何在？台灣的戰略目標為何？大陸中長程的發展情況為何？台灣如何應對？對這些戰略性問題，台灣依舊欠缺綱領性的指導，也缺乏研究。馬政府的兩岸政策，為綿密的交流提供了法制的基礎，缺的是前景發展的路徑圖。

　不論自結構或功能而言，陸委會都很難扮演兩岸大戰略制定者的角色，必須仰賴更高層級的國安單位。問題是，馬政府的官員們都過於上緊發條，過多的沉浸、銷耗在日常事務的處理上，政策的規畫，最多僅止於下一輪協商議題的配置，經常處理的，是兩岸是否召開學術研討會、要不要回應媒體的不實報導等瑣事，不見政務官應有的戰略高度。

　跨部會協調機制的空乏，毋寧是戰略貧乏的主因。在選舉政治和愛台灣的口水口號驅策下，台灣逐漸自遷台以前的史觀中退卻，馬總統雖然偶爾也會提出中華文化的歷史連結，但配套措施空泛，對大陸有文化交流而無文化戰略。

　台灣與一九四九年之前的中華文化的關係如何定位？這個問題涉及的，不是單純的歷史或文化的問題，而是牽涉主權的大戰略問題。文化戰略與以經貿為主的兩岸政策脫節的結果，使得許多與國家尊嚴有關的單純問題，反而變得礙手礙腳。例如，對於釣魚台主權的爭執，台灣本應從歷史檔案中拿出最有力的證據，但行政院祕書長出示的，卻是民國六十年核定釣島列嶼為宜蘭縣所屬的證明！歷史限縮的結果，是主權陣地的狹窄化，對民國三十八年以前的中華民國歷史，台灣已逐漸喪失發言權。假如中華民國只剩下遷台以後的經驗與記憶，主權如何與對岸區隔、我方法統又源出何處？

　面對大陸的強勢崛起，台灣不能繼續被動失神。主權限縮與戰略迷惘的主因，實源於民進黨的轉型困境，給台灣處處帶來的掣肘。作為一個有機會再度執政的大黨，負責政策設計的上位者，為台灣跨海開創機運、掃除風險，難道不是職責所在？兩岸關係癥結之不解，在一個全球化日深的環境裡，如何制定一個合理的全球戰略？

　治大國如烹小鮮，側重的，是大的戰略規畫。台灣已經蹉跎多時，朝野惡鬥之餘，豈能不三思乎？