Three Points in Time: Changes in Beijing's Policy Toward Taipei

Three Points in Time: Changes in Beijing's Policy Toward Taipei
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 17, 2012

Summary: DPP leader Frank Hsieh visited the Chinese mainland as Chairman of the Taiwan Restoration Foundation. He met with important figures responsible for Taiwan policy, including Wang Yi, Chen Yunlin, and Dai Bingguo. This broke new ground for public meetings between Beijing officialdom and DPP leaders. Have the DPP and CCP begun initiated a new mode of interaction? Will it affect the three way dynamics between the KMT, DPP, and CCP? Will it impact Taiwan policy following the 18th National Congress?

Full Text below:

Beijing has celebrated its long October 1st National Day holiday and is counting down to its 18th National Congress. For the CCP, this is an important moment. DPP leader Frank Hsieh visited the Chinese mainland as Chairman of the Taiwan Restoration Foundation. He met with important figures responsible for Taiwan policy, including Wang Yi, Chen Yunlin, and Dai Bingguo. This broke new ground for public meetings between Beijing officialdom and DPP leaders. Have the DPP and CCP begun initiated a new mode of interaction? Will it affect the three way dynamics between the KMT, DPP, and CCP? Will it impact Taiwan policy following the 18th National Congress? Everyone is asking these questions.

This is a critical moment for the Mainland authorities. They allowed Frank Hsieh to attend the International Bartenders Association as a private citizen. That has a number of implications for its Taiwan policy.

One. It shows how confident the Mainland authorities are about their Taiwan policy. Beijing officials responsible for Taiwan policy know that a vast chasm separates the DPP and CCP on matters of politics and sovereignty. The long National Day holiday and upcoming 18th National Congress make this a politically sensitive moment. Nevertheless they allowed a DPP leader to visit. They gave him the red carpet treatment. They extended him every courtesy. This shows that the two parties have an understanding. Beijing is using the occasion to underscore its growing confidence in its Taiwan policy. It does not think the visit will result in nasty surprises that someone will have to answer for.

Two. This shows the Mainland authorities' resolve regarding its Taiwan policy. Beijing insists that cross-Strait party to party exchanges must be predicated upon the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Hsieh entered through Xiamen. He was greeted at the airport, whisked off to Beijing, where he met with officials responsible for Taiwan policy. During his visit Beijing treated him like a government official and not like a private citizen. They never mentioned either party's offiical titles. They never mentioned that he might meet with Jia Qinglin, a Standing Member of the Political Bureau.

Beijing has taken a firm stand on inter-party interaction. But it also knows it must offer hope to the public on Taiwan. It knows it cannot avoid the 40% of voters who support the DPP. It knows the ruling party on Taiwan could change. Four years ago, the "Hu Six Points" noted that "Those who once advocated, enaged in, and followed Taiwan independence, are welcome to return to the fold, move in the right direction, and promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations." Contrast this with the first three generations of CCP leaders. During Hu Jintao's term of office the two sides established direct cross-Strait links. They established a dialogue between the KMT and CCP. Now interaction between the CCP and Green camp politicians has begun. This can only be characterized as a milestone.

Three. This underscores the Mainland authorities' flexibility regarding Taiwan policy. The DPP and CCP share no common ground on the one China principle. Beijing considers Frank Hsieh's "two constitutions, different interpretations" unacceptable. But it is willing to set aside Point Four of the Hu Six Points. It is attempting to divide the Green camp by courting "progressive elements." It has long been impatient with the KMT's hesitancy on cross-Strait political issues. It used Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland. It gave him VIP treatment. It used the occasion to underscore increasing flexibility in its Taiwan policy. Consider Beijing's Taiwan policy. What Beijing objects to most vehemently is the DPP's repeated attempts to promote de-Sinicization, cultural Taiwan independence, and de jure Taiwan independence. Frank Hsieh's first stop was Fujian, where he paid his respects to his forebears. He revealed how he felt. He stressed that "[The two sides] cannot merely seek common ground while shelving differences. They must address and transcend their differences. This will require patience and mutual trust." Hsieh even advocated "two constitutions, different interpretations." To some extent he echoed Jia Qinglin's "The two sides are honoring existing provisions." This being the case, the two sides may have established some degree of trust and understanding.

Frank Hsieh met with Wang Yi, Chen Yunlin, and Dai Bingguo. What they talked about is not that important. After all, this was not a formal talk. This was not a party-to-party dialogue. Outside observers focused on how the DPP and CCP related to each other. Will this continue? Will this develop into something more? Will it affect the three way dynamic between the KMT, DPP, and CCP? These are all worthwhile questions.

Fourth and finally, the Chinese Communist Party is about to convene its 18th National Congress. What will its policy toward Taiwan be? Everyone on Taiwan should be concerned. First of all, the 18th Party Congress Political Report represents the Party's direction and principles. Thousands of words will be devoted to Taiwan policy. Will the 1992 consensus appear in this year's government work report and political report? Secondly, two sessions will be held in the spring of next year. The CCP's highest Taiwan policy body is the Central Government's Taiwan Affairs Leadership Group. The group leader is Xi Jinping. He is both deputy chief and a group member. These and other Taiwan policy positions are currently being determined. When they are, Beijing's policy toward Taiwan will become clear. Thirdly, Xi Jinping will soon assume power. On the one hand, he will follow Hu Jintao's established practices and guidelines. On the other hand, he must change with the times and find his own style of decision making. Xi Jinping will soon assume power. He will review the results of current Taiwan policy. The results of the 2016 general election will be an important criterion in his decision. In 2017 the CCP will convene its 19th National Congress. What will the outcome of the 2016 general election on Taiwan be? Regardless of what it is, the CCP will want to ensure cross-Strait peace. This will naturally become the top priority for new and old Taiwan policy makers alike. Beijing gave Frank Hsieh the red carpet treatment during his visit to the Chinese mainland. The CPP 18th National Congress will focus on the above as it determines the Mainland's policy toward Taiwan.

三個時間點 觀察大陸對台政策變化
    2012-10-17
    中國時報

　北京在十一國慶長假與中共「十八大」召開進入倒數計時的重要時刻，讓民進黨重量級政治人物謝長廷以「台灣維新基金會」董事長的名義登陸，並安排與王毅、陳雲林、戴秉國等涉台重要人物見面，這不僅創下北京高層公開與民進黨重量級人士會面的先例，民共的互動交流是否藉此開啟新模式，以及，國、民、共三方互動，乃至十八大後中共對台政策的可能作為等，在在都引發各界的高度關注。

　在這關鍵性的敏感時刻，北京讓謝長廷以參加國際調酒協會的個人身分登陸，凸顯其現階段在對台政策上具有下列的意涵：

　首先是展現了對台工作高度的自信。北京涉台系統明知民、共兩黨的政治與主權主張存有高度歧見，卻敢在國慶長假與十八大即將召開的政治敏感時刻，邀請民進黨籍重量級人士到訪，並拉高層級、給予公開禮遇與接待，顯示雙方已具有若干程度的互諒；此外，北京也藉此凸顯對台政策上的日益自信，不太擔心行程中有意外變數發生，以致有人必須為此負責。

　其次是體現對台工作立場原則的堅定性。對於兩岸黨對黨的交流與對話，北京堅持以「九二共識」與「反對台獨」為前提。因此謝從廈門入境、接機到北京與涉台領導人見面，所有在大陸的行程，北京都是以政府官方名義接待謝的個人參訪，絕不提及雙方黨的頭銜，更遑論可能會見政治局常委賈慶林。

　但雖然北京對於黨際互動交流的立場堅定，卻也深知要貫徹「寄希望於台灣人民」，就不可能不與擁有四成以上選票的民進黨打交道，更何況未來台灣也有政黨輪替的可能。事實上，早在四年前提出的「胡六點」中的第四點就強調，「對於那些曾經主張過、從事過、追隨過台獨的人，也歡迎他們回到推動兩岸關係和平發展的正確方向上來」。是以，相較於前三代領導人，胡錦濤任內不僅實現了兩岸的直接三通，開啟了國共黨對黨的對話，如今也開啟了與泛綠政治人物的互動，這不能不說是一個歷史性的里程碑。

　再則是凸顯對台工作策略的靈活性。雖然民共對於一中原則尚無交集，謝長廷的「憲法各表」也非北京所能接受。但無論就胡六點的第四點主張，抑或區隔泛綠陣營以爭取所謂的「進步力量」，乃至於對國民黨長期以來對於兩岸政治議題裹足不前的不耐，藉由謝長廷的登陸並給予高規格禮遇與接待，更凸顯北京對台政策的日趨靈活彈性。就北京對台政策認知而言，其對於民進黨最為不滿的乃在於其認為民進黨一再實行「去中國化」，藉由「文化台獨」走向「法理台獨」。當謝長廷首站到福建尋根祭祖時，自然流露情感，強調兩岸「不能只是求同存異，應面對、處理及超越差異，並有耐心和互信」；乃至謝主張的「憲法各表」與賈慶林的「兩岸從各自現行規定出發」，都有若干共通之處。如此，雙方也算是有了初步的互信與互諒。

　因而，謝長廷見王毅、陳雲林與戴秉國時談什麼倒不是關鍵，畢竟這不是正式會談也非黨對黨的對話。外界關注的是此次所開啟的民、共交流另類新模式，往後何以為繼、發展？其對日後國、民、共三方的互動又有何影響等。俱為值得持續觀察的議題。

　最後，面對中共「十八大」召開與對台政策，台灣各界應該高度關注：第一，「十八大」代表黨的路線方針的〈政治報告〉中，占有千字篇幅的對台政策主要內容為何（如九二共識是否繼今年見諸於政府工作報告後也列入政治報告中）？第二，明年春天兩會召開，中共對台最高決策機構─中央對台工作領導小組（組長習近平與副組長暨小組成員）等涉台人事的布局底定，政策也將日趨明朗。第三，習近平主政後，一方面秉持「胡規習隨」的政策方針，另一方面也必須與時俱進並體現個人決策風格。我們認為，在習近平主政後初步對台政策的成果驗收，將以二○一六年台灣的大選結果作為重要判準，因為二○一七年中共即將召開「十九大」。但不論二○一六年台灣大選選舉的結果如何，確保台海的和平發展格局尚不致生變，這也自然成為北京新、舊領導人推動對台政策的重中之重。觀諸北京此次接待謝長廷登陸行的態度與十八大後的對台政策，仍將在貫徹與落實北京的此一重點工作。