The Easy and the Difficult in Cross-Strait Relations

The Easy and the Difficult in Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 26, 2013

Summary: The DPP is attempting to go from "refusing to recognize the 1992 consensus" to "determining how to deal with the 1992 consensus." Beijing meanwhile, has concluded that the 1992 consensus fails to provide a sufficiently secure political link between the two sides. Therefore it has begun promoting the "one China framework." 

Full text below:

The DPP is attempting to go from "refusing to recognize the 1992 consensus" to "determining how to deal with the 1992 consensus." Beijing meanwhile, has concluded that the 1992 consensus fails to provide a sufficiently secure political link between the two sides. Therefore it has begun promoting the "one China framework." 

During the June Wu Xi meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung reiterated his support for the 1992 consensus. But Xi Jinping has not mentioned the 1992 consensus since. Instead, he has emphasized the "one China framework." What sort of political message is he sending? That has yet to be determined.

Last November the CCP 18th Party Congress incorporated the 1992 consensus into ts Political Report. But this move was followed by a search for one China political links and talk of "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and making reasonable arrangements." This is part of Beijing's quest for more secure political links. Apparently Beijing feels the political links provided by the 1992 consensus are inadequate. It wants to replace the 1992 consensus with the "one China framework."

In late June, Renmin University Professor Huang Jiashu told Frank Hsieh that "Beijing has never recognized one China, different interpretations." But this is incorrect. On March 26, 2008, George W. Bush and Hu Jintao spoke on the Beijing-Washington hotline. Hu said "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. This means that both parties recognize that there is only one China, but agreed to define it differently, based on their own interpretations." Hu's statement was "one China, different interpretations." It was a key pillar for five straight years of cross-strait peaceful development. Beijing may wish to reconsider the pros and cons of the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpetations. But it cannot take back what it said, or renege on its promises.

Recent cross-strait peaceful development is undoubtedly based on the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Yet Beijing is now refusing to recognize "one China, different interpretations." It is stressing instead the 1992 consensus and the one-China principle. Beijing feels that "one China, different interpretations" fails to provide sufficiently robust political links between the two sides. Therefore it has floated the "one China framework."

In fact "one China, different interpretations" does provides political links. Since the 2012 Wu Hu meeting, authorities on both sides have agreed to use "each of the two parties' existing laws, regulations, and institutions" as the basis for cross-Strait exchanges. This means they consider the two sides' constitutions to be political links. During the Wu Xi meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung cited this as the basis for the "one China framework," The Constitution of the Republic of China is a "one China Constitution," with "one country, two regions." Therefore if Beijing publicly overthrows "one China, different interpretations," it is actually undermining support for the "one China framework."

The problem is that "One China, different interpretations" still implies "You are you. I am me." The "different interpretations" portion is a reality. But the two sides lack any consensus on "one China." Beijing may wish to use the "one China framework" as a replacement or supplement for the 1992 consensus. But the result would still be a "one China framework, different interpretations." It would not result in a more secure political connection.

Cross-strait relations are currently in shallow waters. Therefore "one China, different interpretations" may be sufficent. But if one wishes to enter deeper waters, an agreement must be reached on the meaning of "one China," above and beyond "one China, different interpretations." Only then can one establish more secure political connections. Deeper waters means we must cope with the following realities. . First, the nation has yet to be reunified. Secondly, its circumstances are special. Thirdly, the two sides of the Strait seek political relations. . Fourthly, the two sides of the Strait seek reasonable arrangements. In short, the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China should explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and make reasonable arrangements. 

Beijing is switching from the "one China principle" to the "one China framework." But Beijing has not always been clear about what it means by the "one China principle" or the "one China framework." In fact, what Beijing means is that "One China is the People's Republic of China." Beijing thinks that the "One China framework means abolishing the Republic of China. Everything would then be included within the framework of the People's Republic of China. " But Beijing cannot say this. It dares not say this. Because it cannot achieve it. Even if it could, attempting to do so could lead to catastrophe, both for China and the world.

Therefore if one wishes to enter deeper waters, one must establish a one China framework, for circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. This does not negate any longing for reunification. But one must establish a political connection that enables the PRC and the ROC to enter deeper waters.

What's the difference between deeper and shallower waters? A old poem says "Deep waters are difficult to cross, shallow waters are easy." Those crossing shallow waters need only roll up their trouser legs. Those crossing deeper waters have no choice but to dive in and get completely wet. Whether the water is deep or shallow, one must be prepared to respond as the situation requires.

Deeper waters involve two contrary factors. First, one can easily drown in deeper waters. Deeper waters are high-risk areas. If both sides drown in deeper waters, the result would be a major disaster for Chinese history and even human civilization. Secondly, deeper waters provide greater buoyancy. As long as one's intentions are true, there is no reason for the Republic of China and People's Republic of China not to make the attempt. The mainland would win. Taiwan would win. China as a whole would win. Global civilization would win.

The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is shallow water. All one has to do is roll up one's pants legs. Today however, if one wishes to enter deeper waters, one should consider this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." One will have to dive in and get wet. One must take advantage of the buoyancy provided by the deeper waters. That way one will not drown.

The big roof concept of China states that under the big roof of China, the Taiwan Region is democratic China while the Mainland Region is socialist China. Both regions are part of China. Both belong under a big roof concept of China. In other words, "The two sides' sovereignty include each other. Together they form one China."

This is the "one China framework." Deeper waters are difficult to cross. Shallow waters are easy. Why not let the two sides give serious consideration to the "big roof concept of China?" Why not enter the deeper waters together?

深則厲，淺則揭：兩岸關係的深水區思維
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.26 03:42 am

正當民進黨欲從「否認九二共識」翻越到「如何處理九二共識」之時，北京卻似乎感到「九二共識」缺乏強固的「連結點」，而開始倡議「一中框架」。

六月的吳習會中，吳伯雄重申「九二共識」，卻未聞習近平再提「九二共識」，而僅強調「一中框架」。這是一個怎樣的政治訊息，尚待發展與解讀。

去年十一月，中共十八大將「九二共識」載入政治報告，但接著就開始強調要尋找並建立「一個中國」的「連結點」：並謂要「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，這也是一種「連結論」。此處顯示：北京覺得「九二共識」的「連結」不夠穩固，因而思以「一中框架」取代。

六月下旬，中國人民大學教授黃嘉樹對謝長廷說，「北京從來沒有承認『一中各表』」。此說或有謬誤。二○○八年三月二十六日，胡錦濤在布胡熱線說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方皆承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」胡錦濤此語即是「一中各表」，亦是五年來兩岸「和平發展」的主要支柱。如今，北京可以斟酌「九二共識／一中各表」的得失，卻不宜出爾反爾，自食諾言。

兩岸近年來的「和平發展」，無疑是建立在「九二共識／一中各表」之上；但北京卻諱言「一中各表」，而強調「九二共識／一個中國原則」。這是因為北京認為「一中各表」缺乏穩固的「連結點」，於是又有「一中框架」的提法。

其實，「一中各表」亦有「連結點」。自二○一二年三月吳胡會後，兩岸當局一致以「雙方各自現行的法律、規定與體制」為兩岸關係的基準，這即是認為可用雙方的憲法為「連結點」（吳伯雄在吳習會以此為「一中架構」的基準，因為中華民國憲法為「一國兩區」的「一中憲法」）。因而，北京若公然推翻「一中各表」，「一中架構」即失依託。

問題在於：「一中各表」仍是「爾為爾，我為我」，「各表」是現實，但何謂「一中」，卻無共識。如今，即使北京欲以「一中框架」取代或補充「九二共識」，但仍然是「一中框架／各自表述」，並未出現一個較現狀為佳的「連結點」。

目前在「淺水區」的兩岸關係，或許「一中各表」即可維持。但如果要進入「深水區」，就須在「一中各表」之上，建立對「一個中國」的共同定義，始有可能出現較佳的「連結點」。所謂深水區，就是必須：一、對國家尚未統一的，二、特殊情況下的，三、兩岸政治關係，四、作出合情合理的安排。也就是必須對「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」尚未統一、特殊情況下的政治關係（連結點），作出合情合理的安排。

北京從「一中原則」換到「一中框架」，但始終未說清楚何謂「一中原則」與「一中框架」。其實，北京的心中想的是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，「一中框架就是消滅中華民國，一切納入中華人民共和國的框架」。但北京畢竟不能也不敢如此說，因為這是做不到的事，若勉強做到，即不無可能釀成世界文明及中國歷史的浩劫。

因而，深水區的主軸工程，即在建立「尚未統一」狀態下的「一中框架」；這並未否定「統一」的懸想，卻必須建立一個「連結點」，使中華人民共和國與中華民國一同渡過「深水區」。

「深水區」與「淺水區」有何不同？詩云：「深則厲，淺則揭。」（揭，音氣）意指：欲渡淺水者，撩起衣襬即可；但涉深水者，即只能穿著衣裳下水渡河。此謂：「深厲淺揭，隨時為義。」

「深水區」有兩種矛盾的能量。一、深水極易溺水，是災禍的高風險區；兩岸若在此區溺水，即可能造成人類文明與中國歷史的大悲劇。二、然而，深水區亦有較大的浮力，只要心術正大，未始不能找到一個共渡共濟中華人民共和國與中華民國的「大陸贏／台灣贏／中國贏／世界文明也贏」的四贏水道。

「九二共識／一中各表」是撩起衣襬渡淺水；如今倘若要進入深水，則應當思考以本報倡議的「大屋頂中國架構」來和衣渡河，如此始能善用深水的足夠浮力，而不致溺水。

大屋頂中國：在大屋頂中國下／中華民國是民主中國／中華人民共和國是社會主義中國／二者皆是一部分的中國／同屬「一個（大屋頂）中國」／亦即「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。

這就是「一中框架」，就是「一中架構」。深則厲，淺則揭，何不認真思考讓兩岸在「一個大屋頂中國框架」下共渡深水區。