Diaoyutai: Taipei Must Choose Sides

Diaoyutai: Taipei Must Choose Sides
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
November 29, 2013

Summary: The "East China Sea Peace Initiative" is currently Taipei's best option. But it is not its only option. The purpose of the East China Sea Peace Initiative was to address the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute. It does not address the complex East China Sea dispute. The East China Sea Peace Initiative names three parties, Beijing, Tokyo, and Taipei. It does not include Seoul. It does not include Taipei-Washington relations or cross-Strait relations. Today, changing circumstances necessitate a change in Taipei's strategy.

Full text below:

Beijing's Ministry of Defense announced an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. The zone includes Diaoyutai Island waters claimed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Taipei. It also includes islands claimed by both China and Korea, which China refers to as the Su Yan Islets. As expected, the announcement provoked strong protests from neighboring governments. Taipei now faces a more complex international situation.

Washington recently sent two unarmed B-52 bombers to overfly the Diaoyutai Islands. Korean P-3C anti-submarine aircraft also entered the airspace over outlying islands, without advanced notice. These were deliberate challenges to Beijing's declared Air Defense Identification Zone. Japan has announced that it will further expand the range of its Air Defense Identification Zone to the Xiao Li Yuan Archipelago in response. At the same time, Mainland China's aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, passed through the Taiwan Strait yesterday on its way to the South China Sea. These developments have expanded the East Asian crisis, from a territorial dispute between Taipei, Tokyo, and Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands, to a four way dispute between Tokyo, Washington, Seoul, and Beijing.

Each of the parties wants to declare sovereignty. Xi Jinping also wants to consolidate his power and proclaim the "Renaissance of a Great Nation." The United States wants to promote its "Asian Rebalancing" strategy. Changes in these two situations have affected the direction of three policies. They will profoundly affect the future of cross-Strait relations, as well as the direction of Washington-Taipei relations and Taipei-Tokyo relations.

Consider the changing situation. First of all, the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute has expanded. It has become an East China Sea regional security issue. From Washington's perspective, the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute is an issue between China and Japan, But East China Sea and South China Sea security issues involve Washington's core interests and its "Return to Asia" strategy. Beijing unilaterally announced its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. It requires other countries' civil and military aircraft passing through the East China Sea to inform them. The Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute has escalated. It is now an East China Sea sovereignty dispute. The Sino-Japanese conflict has raised tensions between neighboring countries in the East China Sea. This provides Washington with a perfect excuse to intervene.

Secondly, the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute has intensified Sino-US regional confrontation. Last April the Diaoyutai Islands territorial dispute erupted. Washington was merely a spectator. Its position was that Beijing and Tokyo should resolve their differences through political dialogue. But it also wanted a strong Japan to counter Mainland China's rise. The U.S. had no desire to shred the post-war Japanese "peace constitution." It had no desire to change the balance of power in East Asia. But after Beijing announced its Air Defense Identification Zone, Washington rushed to send two bombers into the area to test Beijing's resolve. Washington officially declared that it was no longer a "bystander," but a participant.

Consider the new policy direction. First, Mainland China's "peaceful rise" has taken a new turn. Since 2000, "peaceful rise" and "good-neighbor diplomacy" have been the two pillars of Beijing's foreign policy. The CCP Third Plenary Session consolidated Xi Jinping's power. Mainland China's Ministry of Defense announced its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. This was a new twist in Mainland China's diplomacy. This was a new starting point for Xi Jinping's dream of becoming a great nation. Mainland China's foreign policy is increasingly assertive. It also include cross-Strait relations. This year Xi Jinping stressed that the cross-Strait issue "cannot be handed down from one generation to the next." As we can see, Taipei will face increasing pressure during political negotiations with Beijing.

Next, consider the direction the Washington-Tokyo axis is taking. Mainland China's Ministry of Defense announced its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. It intends to turn the East China Sea into a "Chinese lake." It intends to breakthrough the Western Pacific first island chain. Washington is sure to increase military cooperation with its Asian allies. Together they hope to contain Mainland China's military power. Washington has officially intervened in the Diaoyutai Islands dispute. It is strengthening the Washington-Tokyo axis. This means the new Washington Beijing big power relationship has gradually been internalized and eroded. Taipei now faces increasing pressure to choose sides between Beijing and the Washington-Tokyo axis.

Finally, consider the change in Japan's defense policy. Beijing announced its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone without advance notice. The Japanese government voiced strong objections. It ordered Japanese airlines not to submit flight plans to Beijing. The day before, Japan's parliament established a "National Security Council" and a "National Security Bureau." It will amend Japan's National Defense Program Outline by the end of this year. This will strengthen its military deployment in Yunaguo Island and Shitan Island waters. In the future, Its military activities in waters surrounding Taiwan will increase.

Events are swirling around Taiwan. Taipei cannot pretend everything is fine. In particular, the parties involved, Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington, have close ties to Taipei. A weaker Taipei finds itself caught between three stronger powers. It must be extraordinarily cautious. Taiwan must not do what DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang demanded. It must not join hands with Washington and Tokyo and demand that Beijing take back its Air Defense Identification Zone. But it must be prepared for different eventualities.

The "East China Sea Peace Initiative" is currently Taipei's best option. But it is not its only option. The purpose of the East China Sea Peace Initiative was to address the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute. It does not address the complex East China Sea dispute. The East China Sea Peace Initiative names three parties, Beijing, Tokyo, and Taipei. It does not include Seoul. It does not include Taipei-Washington relations or cross-Strait relations. Today, changing circumstances necessitate a change in Taipei's strategy.

周邊有事，台灣將面臨選邊的壓力
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.11.29 03:05 am

一如預期，中國大陸國防部公布東海防空識別區後，因其範圍不僅涵括日中台爭議的釣魚台海域，也劃入了中韓爭議的離於島（中方稱為蘇岩礁），此舉引起周邊國家強烈的抗議，台灣也面臨了更複雜的國際形勢。

美國日前派遣兩架無武器的B52轟炸機飛越釣魚台上空，韓國P3C反潛機也無預警進入離於島海域，藉此反對中共對防空識別區的宣示；日本則宣布將進一步擴大防空識別區範圍至小笠原群島，以為對抗。與此同時，中國大陸的航母遼寧號也於昨日通過台灣海峽，前往南海海域。這些發展，頓使東亞安全情勢從「台日中釣魚台領土爭議」擴大為「日美韓中四國角力」。

除了當事各國之間有意圖的主權宣示與行動，若加入習近平上台後鞏固權力所宣示的「大國復興」的因素，以及美國推動「亞洲再平衡」戰略的用心，我們可以看到兩項情勢的變動如同齒輪軸般地牽動三個政策的轉向，也將深刻牽動往後兩岸關係、美台關係及台日關係的走向。

先談情勢的變動。首先，是釣魚台主權爭議擴大為東海區域安全問題。從美國的觀點來看，釣魚台主權爭議是中日兩國的問題，但東海及南海的海域安全問題卻事涉美國重返亞洲戰略的核心利益。中共這次片面公布東海防空識別區，使得各國通過東海海域的民用及軍用航空器都必須向其通報，將原本的釣島主權問題升高為東海海域爭議，也將原先的中日衝突擴大為東海周邊國家的緊張關係，這正好讓美國找到介入的理由。

其次，是中日領土爭議提升為中美區域對抗。去年四月釣魚台領土爭議爆發以來，美國一直扮演著旁觀者的角色，它的立場是希望透過政治對話來解決中日的歧見，同時期待一個強大的日本來抗衡中國的崛起。但是，美國其實並不希望日本突破戰後「和平憲法」的框架來改變東亞的權力平衡。然而，在中共公布防空識別區後，美國卻搶先派遣兩架轟炸機進入該海域來試探及反制中國，這不啻正式宣告美國從「旁觀者」變成利害當事國。

再觀察政策的轉向。首先，是中國大陸「和平崛起」路線的轉向。兩千年後，「和平崛起」及「睦鄰外交」一直是中共外交政策的兩項基軸，而中共選擇在三中全會習近平權力穩固之後，由國防部發布東海防空識別區，可視為中國大陸外交新路線的新試點，也是習近平追求大國夢的新起點。接下來，中國大陸的對外政策將越來越強勢，這必然也包含兩岸關係在內。這從今年以來習近平強調兩岸問題「不能一代一代傳下去」，可以看出，今後台灣面對來自對岸要求政治談判的壓力將會越來越大。

其次，是美日同盟關係的轉向。中共國防部這次公布東海防空識別區，可視為其意圖將東海「內海化」及突破西太平洋第一島鏈的首部曲；美國今後必定會強化與亞洲軍事盟國的合作，共同圍堵中國的軍事擴張。美國正式介入釣魚台問題，以及美日同盟關係的再強化，表示美中新型大國關係已經逐步內化、弱化，今後，台灣面臨在中國大陸／美日同盟之間的選邊壓力，將會越來越大。

最後，是日本防衛政策的轉向。面對中共無預警地公布東海防空識別區，日本政府一方面表達強烈抗議，並要求日本國籍航空不能向中國大陸提交飛航計畫書；另一方面，日本參院前天也通過設立「國家安全會議」以及「國家安全保障局」，並將在今年底修改日本防衛大綱，進一步強化在與那國島及石垣島等離島海域的軍事部署。今後，在台灣周邊海域的軍事活動，將會越來越頻繁。

由此可見，周邊有事，台灣不可能沒事，尤其利害當事國都是與台灣關係密切的中美日等大國，在「三大之間難為小」的情況下，台灣的因應更要顯得格外謹慎。台灣並不需要如同民進黨主席蘇貞昌所說的，以聯合美日要求中國大陸撤回防空識別區來選邊站，卻不能沒有十八套劇本的因應準備。

「東海和平倡議」雖是台灣當前的最佳選擇，卻不是唯一的選擇。因為，東海和平倡議的前提是處理釣魚台主權爭議，而不是面對複雜的東海問題。東海和平倡議的三組雙邊是界定在中日台三國，而並不包括美韓，更不涉及台美關係及兩岸關係；如今面對情勢的轉變，台灣的國家戰略恐亦必須隨之調整因應。