Hsieh's Win was a Surprise, Chen's Loss was a Certainty

Hsieh's Win was a Surprise, Chen's Loss was a Certainty
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 07, 2007


Frank Hsieh wins Upset Victory over Su Tseng-chang

Hsieh's Win was a Surprise, Chen's Loss was a Certainty
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 07, 2007

Two major surprises. One, Frank Hsieh unexpectedly won a major victory, leading by nearly 16,000 votes. Two, Su Tseng-chang declared that he was forfeiting the party sponsored public opinion poll and withdrawing from the party primaries.

Prior to the election, even the Frank Hsieh camp estimated that Hsieh would lose by at least 15,000 votes. Instead, the result turned their universe upside down, and Frank Hsieh won by nearly 16,000 votes. Yesterday, halfway through the ballot counting, text messages from the Su Tseng-chang camp proclaimed that Su would seek to win the party sponsored public opinion poll, but shortly afterwards Su announced that he was withdrawing from the party primaries.

Frank Hsieh hopes to be the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate in 2008. Two upcoming developments are worth noting: One, on the eve of the election, Chen Shui-bian repudiated the suggestion that "the winner and runner-up should pair up." Su Tseng-chang also declared that he would not accept the vice-presidency. Now Su may have to resign his position as prime minister or else be forced out. Changes in this scenario will surely affect the political situation. Two, once Frank Hsieh, who advocates Conciliation and Co-existence, becomes the DPP presidential candidate, he will control developments within the the party and the ruling government. Chen Shui-bian will no longer be unable to manipulate the strategic picture and may become a lame duck.

Frank Hsieh had to move mountains to win his victory, at least four mountains. One, he affirmed the One China Constitution, Conciliation and Co-existence with mainland China, yet managed to retain the support of a majority within his party. Two, he is involved in the Kaohsiung Rapid Transit scandal and many other scandals. On the day of the vote, Su Tseng-chang even ran an ad proclaiming that Hsieh "may try to shift the focus away from himself, but he cannot change the reality of his involvement." Three, without the support of other factions within the DPP, exclusive reliance on "dummy voters" would not have assured Hsieh his landslide victory. Four, most importantly, Chen Shui-bian obviously supported Su Tseng-chang. Seven DPP mayors and county magistrates publicly supported Su. Every one of these four mountains was intimidating. Frank Hsieh unexpectedly moved them all, achieving a surprising and resounding victory.

On the eve of the vote, it was generally thought that Su Tseng-chang's momentum would increase, and that he would win by at least 15,000 votes. It was reasonable to assume that Su's offensive would draw blood. He attacked Hsieh's affirmation of a "One China Constitution," giving Hsieh more problems than he could handle. He attacked Hsieh's scandals, demanding that party members not vote for Hsieh, arguing that although Hsieh might be able to win the party primaries, he couldn't win the presidential election. These arguments had considerable substance. So why did Su Tseng-chang lose so badly?

The reasons are manifold, but Chen Shui-bian is without a doubt the key factor in Su Tseng-chang's downfall and defeat. In 2000, Lee Teng-hui dragged down Lien Chan. Today, Chen Shui-bian has dragged down Su Tseng-chang. Actually, everyone knows that this party primary was not merely a choice between Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. The fact that Frank Hsieh could unexpectedly win a victory over an alliance between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and seven DPP mayors and county magistrates, reveals the discontent within the DPP, and changes within the hearts and minds of the DPP rank and file.

Given such developments, allow us to offer a guarded insight: Mainstream thinking within the Democratic Progressive Party since Chen Shui-bian's corruption scandals blew up in the party's face has been: "To rescue the party, we must rescue Chen." However, even after being rescued, Chen Shui-bian continued holding the DPP hostage. Therefore, during this primary election most party members supported Frank Hsieh, even though he is also implicated in numerous scandals, because they can no longer tolerate being held hostage by Chen Shui-bian. Only this can explain why most party members voted Chen out.

Some in the Green Camp believe that Su Tseng-chang's downfall and defeat is the fault of the New Tide Faction. They want to absolve Chen Shui-bian of responsibility. But even if the New Tide Faction was a factor, it was not the result of Chen, Su, and the New Tide Faction forming an alliance during the primary election. One need only look at Su Tseng-chang's rout in Chen Shui-bian's hometown -- Tainan City and Tainan County, to see the whole picture.

Frank Hsieh was not Chen Shui-bian's designated successor. From the beginning, Frank Hsieh maintained considerable distance between himself and Chen. This was Frank Hsieh's opportunity to "build his own brand." This was also the DPP's opportunity to begin its "Post-Chen" era. Chen Shui-bian has proclaimed that "In my remaining year in office, I still have many, many matters to attend to." We say it is time for Chen Shui-bian to stand down and give Frank Hsieh, the DPP, and Taiwan a way out.

The turnout for yesterday's election was only 55%, lower than anticipated. This shows that bloody infighting discouraged many party members from voting. Even more worth noting is how the candidates set up stalls in front of the polling booths, issuing party membership cards on the spot. These "voter brigages" marched in and out of the polling booths en masse. They didn't even bother concealing their actions. The problem of dummy voters inflating vote counts within the DPP was laid out under the sun for all to see. These dummy voters performed remarkably well during this party primary, engaging in "split voting."

During the national presidential primary race, the individual consciences of party members kicked in. This resulted in "Hsieh In, Su Out." It also had a significant influence on the DPP's ideological path and body politic. But in the local legislative primary race, the same voters unexpectedly reverted to the status of dummy voters. This led to machine politicians winning by landslides, and candidates who ran on idea-based platforms being overshadowed. The election result amounted to a test of dummy voter loyalty to political bosses. This did not help the DPP improve its image or clarify its political path.

Bloc voting by dummy voters is a congenital defect of the DPP. Instead of trying to reform this system of patronage, the party leadership has institutionalized this perverse system for primary elections, making the problem worse. In certain electoral districts, as long as some candidates are able to win because they control a several hundred dummy voters, they can demand a "Blues Excluded Opinion Poll." Isn't such a system a case of Gresham's Law, of bad currency driving out the good?

Dummy voters voted for legislators. Independent voters voted for the president. This reveals a bizarre self-contradiction within the DPP. Absent a spirit of reform, party members would not have rejected Chen and Su in favor of Frank Hsieh. But at the same time, Lin Cho-shui, Hsiao Bi-khim, Lee Wen-chung, Cheng Yun-peng, and Lin Shu-shan, who have been labeled the "Eleven Bandits" for having the temerity to demand internal reform, brought up the rear in the same election. This is not because party members displayed a commitment to reform only in the presidential primary race. This is because dummy voters were hijacked by legislators during the legislative elections.

This was not merely a DPP primary election. It was a civil war in which no quarter was given and no prisoners taken. Chen Shui-bian could have maintained neutrality. He could also have publicly supported Su Tseng-chang. Instead Chen Shui-bian made a pretense of neutrality, while in fact supporting Su Tseng-chang. As a result, Su Tseng-chang resorted to any and all means to attack Frank Hsieh. The grass roots within the party, not surprisingly, regarded Chen Shui-bian's indifference to Su's excesses as collusion. Chen Shui-bian and Su Tseng-chang used the same ruthless methods they used against the Blue Camp against their own comrade Frank Hsieh. This provoked a reaction against the Chen/Shu alliance, and won sympathy and support for Frank Hsieh.

Chen Shui-bian and seven mayors and county magistrates supported Su. They monopolized all power and resources. Yet they were trounced by Frank Hsieh, who had no resources whatsoever. This was a case of the rank and file lashing out at the high command. This was a case of of the will of the people delivering a knock-out blow to the will of their masters. Because of this, the DPP party hierarchy is now split. The rank and file within the DPP have revealed their desire for rebirth and reform. But the bizarre paradox of "dummy voters voting for legislators, independent voters voting for the president" has left the DPP mired in confusion.

When Frank Hsieh won, he said "Those with the least resources turned out to be those with the most resources." Chen Shui-bian lost. He needs to realize that "Those who abuse their power and resources, may well end up with no resources!"

Frank Hsieh's win was a surprise. Chen Shui-bian's loss was a certainty.

Original Chinese below:

謝長廷贏得意外，陳水扁輸得當然
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.07 03:39 am

兩大意外。一，謝長廷居然以近一萬六千票的巨幅領先而大勝；二，蘇貞昌放棄進入民調，宣布退出初選。

選前，連謝長廷陣營也自估至少會輸一萬五千票，結果反而乾坤逆轉，大贏近一萬六千票；昨日開票過半之時，曾傳出蘇貞昌陣營仍以簡訊宣示將爭取民調勝出，不料稍後竟宣布退選。

謝長廷可望代表民進黨競選二○○八年總統。接下來值得注意的發展有二：一，由於陳水扁在投票前夕否定了「第一名要與第二名搭配」的說法，且蘇貞昌亦曾宣示「不當副手」，如今更極可能主動或被動地辭去行政院長；未來與此相關的情勢變化，必將牽動政局。二，主張和解共生的謝長廷成為民進黨的總統候選人後，勢須掌握黨政情勢的發展，陳水扁恐難再恣意左右大局，甚至可能跛腳。

謝長廷不啻是移走了四座大山，才能贏得如此漂亮。一，他主張憲法一中、和解共生，居然未動搖多數黨員對他的支持。二，他涉及高捷案等多件弊案，投票當日蘇貞昌甚至還登廣告指謝「轉移焦點不能改變涉案事實」。三，初選以人頭黨員為主體，非獲得超派系之支持，無可能獲此大勝。四，最重要的是，陳水扁明顯支持蘇貞昌，七縣市長亦公開挺蘇。這四座大山，無一不是巍峨險峻，謝長廷居然將之移去，贏得令人拍案驚奇。

投票前夕，一般認為蘇貞昌的聲勢看漲，至少會在黨員投票中贏謝一萬五千票。因為，就情理而論，蘇的攻勢確有打動人心之處。他痛擊謝的「憲法一中」，讓謝捉襟見肘；猛攻謝的弊案，要黨員勿投給即使初選過關、大選也過不了關的謝長廷。這些訴求皆是極其凌厲，但為何票開出來，蘇貞昌輸得如此難看？

原因很多，但陳水扁無疑是造成蘇貞昌落敗的核心因素。二○○○年李登輝拖垮了連戰，如今陳水扁則拖垮了蘇貞昌。其實，無人不知，此次初選不啻是要黨員在謝長廷與扁蘇之間作一選擇。而謝長廷居然能在「四座大山」壓頂之下，勝過扁蘇與七縣市長的聯盟，可見民進黨內的不平之氣，與民進黨內的人心思變。

情勢發展至此，或許可以審慎地提出一種想像：民進黨內自陳水扁貪腐弊案爆發以來的主流思想其實是：「為了救黨，才要救扁！」然而，陳水扁在獲救後竟仍想繼續挾持民進黨；因而，此次初選多數黨員寧可挺弊案纏身、爭議不斷的謝長廷，也要斷然擺脫陳水扁的操弄與挾持。倘非如此，不能解釋為何多數選票棄陳水扁而去。

綠營有人認為，蘇貞昌落敗是受新潮流之累，欲藉此開脫陳水扁的責任。但即使有新潮流的因素，亦因為扁蘇與新潮流於初選結盟所致。只要看蘇貞昌在陳水扁故鄉台南縣市大敗，已可一葉知秋。

謝長廷不是陳水扁所選擇與支持的接班人，而謝長廷自始即與扁維持相當的距離；這正是謝長廷自創品牌的契機，亦是民進黨真正開創「後扁時代」的空間。口口聲聲「在未來一年任期，還有很多很多事要做」的陳水扁，應當已到了放謝長廷、民進黨與台灣一條生路的時刻了！

昨天的選舉，五成五的投票率，較原先預期為低，顯示刀光血影的競爭廝殺，影響了黨員投票的意願。更值得注意的是，候選人在投票所前各自擺攤發證，「投票部隊」毫不避諱地團進團出，也將民進黨「人頭黨員」充斥的問題赤裸裸暴露在陽光下。然而，這些人頭黨員在此次初選中竟然演出了奇妙的「分離投票」。

在全國選區的總統初選部分，黨員的自主意識發揮了作用，這使得「謝上蘇下」，亦對民進黨的路線與體質皆有重大影響；但在地方選區的立委選舉中，同一批選民竟又回復到「人頭黨員」的角色，使金牛型人物遙遙領先，理念型人物黯然失色，選舉結果只是表達了「人頭黨員」的忠貞，對民進黨的體質改善與路線釐清並無幫助。

人頭黨員充斥，是民進黨的先天不良；黨中央不思設法導正，反而設計出這套畸形的初選制度，愈發使之惡化。試想，在若干選區中，有些候選人只要掌握數百張人頭黨員票即可勝出，然後順利獲得「排藍民調」的護送；這樣的制度，不是在進行劣幣驅逐良幣的反淘汰嗎？

「人頭黨員」選立委，「自主黨員」選總統；其間透露出自相矛盾的弔詭。倘若黨員不具改革精神，不可能棄扁蘇而選謝長廷；但是，包括林濁水、蕭美琴、李文忠、鄭運鵬、林樹山等被貼上「十一寇」罪名的黨內改革派，卻在這次黨員投票均吊車尾。這不能說「黨員」只在總統初選中才有改革精神，而是「人頭」被立委選舉挾持所致。

這不只是一場民進黨的「初選」，更是一場砍殺見骨的民進黨「內戰」。陳水扁原本可以維持中立，也可以公開支持蘇貞昌；但陳水扁卻謊稱中立，實際上則挺蘇。因此，蘇貞昌攻擊謝長廷之不擇手段，勢必被基層黨員視為陳水扁所包庇縱容。陳水扁以對付泛藍陣營的殘忍手法，與蘇貞昌用來鬥爭黨內同志謝長廷；這使扁蘇同盟遭到反彈，亦使謝長廷獲得了同情與支持。

陳水扁與七縣市長挺蘇，匯集了一切權力與資源，卻被自稱「最沒有資源」的謝長廷擊敗。這是基層擊倒高層，也是民意擊倒上意。民進黨的高層因此分裂，民進黨的基層卻透露出重生再造的期待。但是，「自主黨員選總統，人頭黨員選立委」的矛盾弔詭，亦將使民進黨陷於錯亂。

謝長廷贏了，他說：「最沒有資源，也就是最有資源。」陳水扁輸了，他應知：「最有權力資源，濫用權力資源，就可能變成最無資源！」

謝長廷贏得意外，陳水扁輸得當然。