Tuesday, May 1, 2007

Where is Taiwan's Response to the Mainland's Soft Offensive?

Where is Taiwan's Response to the Mainland's Soft Offensive?
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 1, 2007


Now: US controlled Puppet Regime on Taiwan poses Deadly Threat to China

Then: Soviet controlled Puppet Regime on Cuba posed Deadly Threat to America

Comment: The following China Times editorial astutely notes that the puppet regime illegally squatting in the Republic of China Presidential Palace has dropped the ball, big time. The Chen Shui-bian regime, like the Lee Teng-hui regime before it, has proven thoroughly incompetent at anything other than populist rabble-rousing.

Forget any hope that it can increase the nation's long term economic prosperity. The Chen regime doesn't even have the ability to slow the nation's precipitous decline in prosperity.

But when the author of this otherwise excellent editorial wrings his hands over this undisputed fact, and demands that the Chen regime do a better job of countering Beijing's "soft offensive," he is confessing that he can no longer see the forest for the trees.

The China Times, as its name implies, is a Chinese newspaper. It is not a "Taiwanese" newspaper. By that I mean that it is a newspaper in the nation of China. It is not a newspaper in any "Nation of Taiwan." It is not a newspaper in any "Nation of Taiwan" because there is no "Nation of Taiwan."

Since it is a newspaper in the nation of China, presumably concerned with the well-being of the nation it is a part of, should the China Times be wringing its hands over the failure of a puppet regime to advance its traitorous agenda of Balkanizing the Chinese nation?

It is one thing to wring one's hands over the economic plight of the Chinese people in the Taiwan region of the Republic of China.

It is another thing altogether to wring one's hands over the fact that a puppet regime is bungling its efforts to divide and conquer the Chinese nation on behalf of hostile governments in neighboring nations.

The mainland authorities are indeed attempting to use soft, i.e., economic, power to reunite the Chinese nation. Remembering that economic power is the power of persuasion, one can't help asking the author of the China Times editorial, how exactly is that a bad thing?

When did our "pro reunification media" become Taiwan independence fellow travelers?

Now, more than ever, our pro reunification media needs to be clear that the Republic of China is not "Taiwan." The Republic of China is China.

The author of the China Times editorial asks "Where is Taiwan's response to the mainland's soft offensive?"

Permit me to point out that "Taiwan" shouldn't have a response to the mainland's soft offensive. If anybody should have a response to the mainland's soft offensive, it is not "Taiwan," but the Republic of China.

As long as mainland authorities are striving to reunite China in a manner consistent with the values embodied in the Republic of China Constitution, such as free markets and property rights, the pro reunification media on Taiwan should welcome, not dread such soft offensives.

Otherwise Taiwan independence Quislings should stop giving the China Times and the United Daily News undeserved credit by referring to them as "pro reunification media," and begin referring to them as "pro independence media."

Where is Taiwan's Response to the Mainland's Soft Offensive?

China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 1, 2007

First problems arose with the introduction of the Olympic Flame to Taiwan. Next, the recent Kuomintang/Chinese Communist Party Forum announced its newest proposal for opening up the mainland to Taiwan. Finally, we saw the ruling regime's response, and we are more worried than ever. On the one hand we are witnessing wave upon wave of increasingly methodical soft offensives on the part of Beijing. On the other hand Taiwan's ruling regime seems to have no response other than sitting on its hands or mechanically repeating the word "No!"

To put it bluntly, the mainland's attitude is one of supreme confidence, throwing its doors wide open to anything and everything from Taiwan. Taiwan's response, by contrast, is to slam its doors shut on anything and everything from the mainland in an unseemly panic. As a result, pandas can't enter, mainland tourists can't enter, even the Olympic Flame can't enter. And judging by the ruling regime's initial reaction, mainland students probably won't be allowed to enter to study at universities on Taiwan either. This situation, in which one side opens up while the other side closes down, is one in which the Taiwan side is always the one dragging its feet, always the one whose position is problematic, and always the one responsible for any failure to reach an accommodation.

Take the current wave of mainland concessions for example. As the party granting concessions, the mainland can decide to give this, that, or the other to Taiwan. Whether Taiwan actually needs any particular concession is beside the point. Whether Taiwan accepts or rejects the concessions is no skin off the mainland's nose. If the Olympic Flame is not allowed to pass through Taiwan, does that mean the Olympics will no longer be held? Of course not! On the other hand, some people on Taiwan are worrying whether athletes from Taiwan will be allowed to participate in their events when the games begin. By the same token, if mainland students are not allowed to study at universities on Taiwan, universities from other nations will fall over each other competing for them. Those truly concerned will be universities on Taiwan already plagued by less than full enrollment.

One might say that these are two entirely different modes of strategic thinking. The mainland's focus is global public relations. By opening the mainland to Taiwan, they are demonstrating their sincere desire to improve cross-Straits relations. Based on global media coverage, they have surely succeeded. But how about Taiwan? Unfortunately, the ruling regime remains focused on internal elections. As a result, the ruling regime's kneejerk response to the mainland's soft offensive, besides saying "No!" is to angrily denounce both Beijing and the Blue Camp. The sole purpose of this kind of maneuver is to mobilize for elections. Even when an election is not pending, the ruling regime will choose to do nothing for fear of offending pro independence sensibilities. When one side is aggressively managing global perceptions, and the other side insists on haggling over short term internal advantage, which side do you imagine is going to gain the upper hand?

If truth be told, the concessions the mainland is granting Taiwan, such as allowing mainland students to attend universities on Taiwan, allowing mainland tourists to visit Taiwan, increasing the number of cities allowed to schedule direct cross-Straits charter flights, increasing the number of ports of entry for compatriots on Taiwan, all require complex negotiations by agencies from both sides of the Straits before they can become a reality. Without consultations, no matter how many concessions Beijing is willing to grant, they will remain nothing but lip service. Everyone knows the key is consultations. As long as the status of these issues is neither official nor unofficial, neither international or domestic, they will remain unresolved. Any discussions will be meaningless. A single technical detail can lead to deadlock. For the past several years, the Beijing authorities have not yielded on a single key issue. Taiwan's participation in the WHO is a clear example. Taiwan's maneuvering room on cross-Straits issues is becoming small and smaller. Under these circumstances, we can not only predict that direct flights will never happen, we can also predict that Taiwan will never be opened to mainland tourists. And you can forget about mainland students coming to Taiwan to attend university.

By contrast, the mainland, through its rapidly growing economy, has been beckoning to Taiwan's professional class. Last year the KMT/CCP Forum recognized diplomas issued by institutions of higher learning on Taiwan, and permitted doctors from Taiwan to practice on the mainland. This time the KMT/CPP Forum has opened the mainland to 15 different kinds of professionals from Taiwan, including economists, accountants, translators, auctioneers, real estate brokers, certified tax agents, and pharmacists. They are welcoming students from Taiwan to register for mainland commercial aviation schools. Aircraft maintenance technicians from Taiwan can also apply for mainland licenses. We should realize that these openings do not require any nod from agencies on Taiwan. The mainland merely needs to make a unilateral announcement to that effect. It takes little thought to realize that in the foreseeable future, these opening measures to Taiwan's specialized human resources will exert an intense magnetic attraction. Within a few years, after manufacturing industries have completed their massive westward migration, talented professionals will follow. In view of this trend, what strategy should Taiwan adopt? Don't ask the ruling regime.

With the exception of certain key industries, the euphemistically named "Exercise Patience, Avoid Haste" and "Aggressive Management, Effective Opening" policies imposed by Taiwan's ruling regime have not prevented the western migration of manufacturing industries. Those industries that have been blocked lost their chance to take the lead long ago. The very next step will be a wave of talented professionals from Taiwan following in their footsteps. Needless to say, we know exactly what the ruling regime is going to say and do. What we want to know is, in these challenges, where is Taiwan's strategic response?

Original Chinese below:

中時電子報
中國時報  2007.05.01
面對大陸軟性攻勢,台灣的總體戰略在哪?
中時社論

先是奧運聖火登台生變,接著國共論壇大陸對台灣拋出的最新開放項目,最後再看到執政當局的相關反應,不諱言說,我們的憂慮真的愈來愈深。因為一方面我們見識北京當局對台灣的軟性攻勢一波接一波,勢道也愈來愈綿密;另一方面台灣的執政當局這邊除了負面的制式反應外,就只剩下不斷的被動接招了。

講得再白一點,目前的態勢是,大陸對台灣擺出的姿態是自信滿滿,這也開放,那也開放,台灣這邊作出的回應也幾乎都是能擋則擋,這也不准,那也不行。於是從先前的熊貓來不成、陸客赴台觀光來不成,奧運聖火來不成,此番開放陸生來台念大學,從此間初步反應看來,看樣子多半也是來不成。這種一邊放、另一邊堵的景況,陷於被動的都是台灣這一邊,可能被檢討的也是台灣這一邊,這一來一往之間,等於巧妙地將兩岸和解破局的責任,都移轉到台灣的這一邊了。

就用送禮做比喻吧!做為送禮的一方,大陸可以選擇要送這個還是送那個給台灣,台灣是不是真的有需要倒不是重點。而台灣接受也好,就算全部都不要,對大陸也不會有任何損失。試問聖火如果確定不繞過台灣,會不會影響奧運的順利舉行?不會嘛!倒是台灣這邊已經開始有人焦慮會不會屆時連運動員都去不成。同樣的,陸生來不成台灣念大學,立即會有很多國家的大學積極爭搶著他們去念,真正會急的將是台灣那些已經面臨招生不足的大學。

可以說,這幾乎是兩條截然不同的戰略思維。大陸著眼的是全球的公關效應,藉由一系列的對台政策開放,向全球的輿論展示他們改善兩岸關係的誠意與努力,這一點從全球媒體報導的取向看來,他們確實做到了。而台灣這邊呢?很遺憾,所在乎的主要還是內部選舉造勢的效應,於是面對大陸的開放攻勢,我們看到最多的制式反應,除了「說不」之外,就是痛批北京外加痛擊藍軍,這種操作模式唯一著眼就是選舉動員。就算碰到非選舉期間,也會基於獨派可能不滿考量下選擇不作為。當一邊積極經營全球視聽的聲勢,一邊則只計較內部短線的消費,試問那一邊會站在較有利的位置呢?

講實在話,大陸提供給台灣的所謂利多,如開放陸生來台念大學、開放大陸人士赴台旅遊、增加兩岸直航包機城市、增設台胞簽注口岸等,幾乎大部分都需要兩岸相關主管部門的繁複協商後才算成局,未經「協商」就算北京釋出再多的利多,也只是停留在「口惠」的階段。而誰也都知道,問題的關鍵就在這個「協商」上,只要類似「官方/非官方」、「國際/國內」的定位爭執永遠理不出頭緒,談什麼都是假的,一個技術性的小細節都有可能讓正在進行中的協商全面陷入僵局。偏偏這幾年,北京當局在核心問題的立場上一步也沒讓過(台灣參與WHO即是顯例),台灣則在兩岸定位的立場上,彈性空間越來越少,這種情勢發展的態勢,預示未來不僅直航遙遙無期,連已經啟動協商的開放大陸客觀光也面臨破局,八字尚沒一撇開放陸生來台念大學,就更不必提了。

相對的,大陸也藉由其快速成長經濟環境,向台灣的專業人士全方位的招手。去年的國共論壇已經承認台灣高等院校學歷,並允許台灣醫生在大陸執業,這回更針對台灣相關領域的專業人士開放包括十五種專業技術人員的資格考試,包括經濟、會計、翻譯、拍賣師、房地產經紀人、註冊稅務師、藥師等。還歡迎台灣學生報考大陸民航學校,台灣的機務維修人員可考大陸執照等。要知道,這些開放是不需要台灣相關部門點頭的,大陸那邊只需片面宣布開放即可。而不用想都知道,在可預見的未來,這些開放措施將對台灣的專業人力資源,形成強烈的磁吸作用,不出幾年,繼產業大量西進之後,人才也要大量西進了。針對這個趨勢,台灣因應的策略是什麼?不知道。

台灣實施多年的戒急用忍、積極管理、有效開放等政策,除了關鍵產業外,其實並沒能封阻產業的西進,而被封阻住的產業則早已失去搶進布局的先機。很快的下一步將面臨台灣人才的西進浪潮,不諱言地說,執政當局會操作什麼批判論述我們已經很熟悉,我們在乎的是,因應這一波波的挑戰,台灣的總體戰略究竟在哪裡?

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