Cross-Strait Intrigue: Deceive, Subsidize, Capture, Kill vs. Pretend, Take, Escape,

Cross-Strait Intrigue: Deceive, Subsidize, Capture, Kill vs. Pretend, Take, Escape, Survive
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 19, 2008

Before Chen Yunlin left Taiwan, he said, "You will find it more difficult to do the same things we are doing."

His remark was dead on, and reflected empathy for our plight. If cross-Strait relations can be based on such an understanding, we have reason to be optimistic about Chen Yunlin's goal of "peaceful development."

Why should the Taiwan side find it more difficult to do the same things as the Mainland side? The reasons are manifold. But the main reason is that the Mainland side is autocratic, while the Taiwan side is democratic. When Beijing's leaders adopt a new policy, they can immediately mobilize the nation's resources to implement that policy. Leaders in Taipei on the other hand, must push their policy through the democratic system. They cannot mobilize society's resources any way they desire.

In fact, Chen's observation that, "You will find it more difficult to do the same things we are doing" can be extended. One. If cross-Strait exchanges are conducted via consultation, within a framework of peaceful development, then any difficulties encountered by the Taipei authorities will also be Beijing's difficulties. If the two sides cannot work together to fulfill the expectations of the public on Taiwan, and to resolve their concerns, then Taipei's difficulties will remain difficulties for both sides. Two. Difficulties arising out of Taiwan's democratic institutions are important bargaining chips and security guarantees for Taipei in its negotiations with Beijing. The Taipei authorities must give Taiwan priority. Any agreements must benefit the the public on Taiwan. If the Beijing authorities cannot persuade the public on Taiwan of their sincerity, then those difficulties will be impossible to resolve.

The storm-tossed Chiang/Chen Meeting lasted five days. The two sides now have a better understanding of each other. The difficulties encountered have to do with public psychology. The Chiang/Chen Meeting has helped the two sides, particularly Beijing, to understand that good faith is more important than three links. Cross-Strait exchanges must be based on good faith, and not on trickery. No one should be thinking about who will swallow up whom. They must benefit the public on Taiwan, and convince the public on Taiwan of the viability of Chen Yunlin's framework for peaceful and stable development.

It is hard to avoid thoughts of Machiavellian intrigue when discussing cross-Strait negotiations. Beijing's strategy is "deceive, subsidize, capture, kill." It is to use the vague generalizations of the 1992 Consensus to deceive Taiwan. It is to use three links and Mainland tourism to subsidize Taiwan, to make Taiwan dependent upon the Mainland, in order to capture Taiwan and kill Taiwan. Taipei's strategy is "pretend, take, escape, survive." It is to use the vague generalizations of the 1992 Consensus to pretend to address the problem of reunification instead of actually addressing the problem of reunification. It is to use three links to take what resources it can from the Mainland, then use the resources to escape from Beijing's trap, and survive by seeking cross-Strait co-existence and mutual prosperity.

Such intrigues are transparently obvious to all. Some members of the public on Taiwan oppose the Ma administration's policy of exchanges for fear of falling into Beijing's "deceive, subsidize, capture, kill" trap. Other members of the public on Taiwan support the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy because they hope Taiwan will be able to "pretend, take, escape, survive."

If the two sides really wish to establish a mutually beneficial win-win arrangement, and to coexist and prosper, they must find a way to develop peacefully amidst "deceive, subsidize, capture, kill," without resort to either [immediate] reunification, independence, or war.

The issues bedeviling Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland are unlikely to be resolved by political means. They can only be resolved by winning over the hearts and minds of the people. Mainland China must accelerate its political and economic liberalization. Taiwan must place its trust in its democratic institutions. The public on Taiwan cannot agree on cross-Strait issues for many reasons. These include a lack of practical advantages, a lack of dignity, or the lack of a cross-Strait policy framework. But none of these are the root of the problem. Cross-Strait peaceful development cannot be advanced by means of transparent deception. It can only be advanced by winning over people's hearts and minds. The issues bedeviling Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland can only be resolved by means of democracy and concern for the public welfare.

Machievellians believe that if Beijing allows Taiwan independence to create chaos on Taiwan, it can take over Taiwan without spilling blood. But if Taiwan independence tears Taiwan apart, cross-Strait relations will be even more difficult to resolve. Beijing may find it difficult to extend formal recognition to the Republic of China. But it ought to respond to the Republic of China's calls for Beijing to respect its interests and dignity. Assuring the Republic of China's political and economic stability is the best assurance of cross-Strait stability.

The five day Chiang/Chen Meeting was likely an eye-opener for the Beijing authorities. Peaceful development should replace peaceful reunification. It should form the core for cross-Strait interaction. Without peaceful development there can be no reunification. Any reunification would be uncontrollable, because Taiwan is not Hong Kong, and not Tibet.

兩岸大鬥法：騙養套殺vs.裝吃閃活
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.11.19 03:17 am

陳雲林離台前有感而發地說：「做相同的事，你們做會比我們做來得更困難。」

這是一針見血之言，也是設身處地之論。兩岸未來交涉，倘若皆能以這一句話所呈現的思維與情懷為準據，兩岸之「和平發展」（陳雲林語）容可寄以樂觀。

為何台灣方面做會比大陸方面做來得更困難？原因很多，但主要因大陸是專制體制，而台灣是民主體制。北京主政者只須在決策階層拍板即可，而且可以全盤調控舉國資源；但台灣方面卻必須通過民主體制的激盪，主政者亦無可能任意調度社會資源。

其實，陳雲林的「你比我困難說」亦可稍作延伸或修正。一、兩岸若要透過交流協商來建立「和平發展架構」，則台北當局的「困難」，其實也正是北京當局的「困 難」；雙方當局若不能共同努力來回饋台灣人民的期待，及化解台灣人民的疑慮，「困難」將不只在台灣，而其實是兩岸共同之「困難」。二、台灣因民主機制而產 生的「困難」，其實也正是台灣與大陸交涉的重要折衝籌碼與安全憑藉；台北當局必須堅守「以台灣為主／對人民有利」的底線，而北京當局若不能以真誠實效來說 服感動台灣民眾，即不可能解決「困難」。

經歷這次江陳會的五日風潮，兩岸當局皆應已深刻體認，「困難」的關鍵是在「民心」。因此，江陳會後，兩岸當局（尤其是北京）應當領悟：真誠比三通機制重 要，兩岸交往必須化權謀為真誠；亦即，不宜再有「誰吃掉誰」的念頭，而應先營造一個能夠回饋及說服多數台灣民意的「和平穩定發展架構」。

兩岸今日角力，難謂沒有爾虞我詐的權謀思考。北京方面的權謀是「騙／養／套／殺」：用「九二共識」之類的籠統語言「騙」住台灣，再以開放三通、陸客來台等 「養」台灣，在建立傾斜的依賴關係後「套」住台灣，最後則生殺由之。台灣方面的權謀則是「裝／吃／閃／活」：對「九二共識」等籠統語言「裝」作解決了問題 而不深究，設法促成三通並「吃」大陸的養分，再用養分來建立台灣的主體地位以「閃」避北京的套結，進而謀求兩岸共存共榮的「活」路。

這種權謀角力，可謂有目共睹。台灣部分民意之所以反對馬政府的交流政策，就是恐懼會墜入「騙養套殺」的陷阱；而台灣部分民意之所以支持馬政府的兩岸政策，就是寄望台灣能「裝吃閃活」。

然而，兩岸若要真正實現「互利雙贏」、「共存共榮」，卻應是在「騙養套殺／裝吃閃活」之間，找到「不統／不獨／不武」的「和平發展」之路。

台灣問題、中國問題及兩岸問題，皆不可能以權謀解決，而必須訴諸真誠實效來贏得民心。就中國問題言，應當加速中國內部政治與經濟的改革開放；就台灣問題 言，應將兩岸問題的解決寄託於台灣的民主機制；就兩岸問題言，則台灣民眾不能同意，或沒有實惠，或認為有失尊嚴的兩岸政策架構，皆非務本治本之道。這就是 本文想要表達的主旨：兩岸之「和平發展」，不能靠一眼即可識破的「權謀」，而要真能感動及贏得「民心」。且台灣問題、中國問題與兩岸問題必須在「民主／民 生」上，找到一脈貫通的全盤解決之道。

權謀者的看法甚至認為：北京只要放任台獨亂台，即可兵不血刃地取下台灣；但是，一個若是被台獨撕裂與毀滅的台灣，恐對兩岸關係將是更難以收拾的災難。正確 的道路是，北京即使暫不能「法理承認」中華民國，亦應在「利益議題」及「尊嚴議題」上，回應中華民國。中華民國政治經濟穩定，則兩岸關係自然穩定。

江陳會五日風潮給北京當局的啟示應是：「和平發展」應可修補或取代「和平統一」，成為兩岸互動的核心理念；不能「和平發展」，不可能「統一」；即使統一，亦絕無可能治理。因為，台灣不是香港，也不是西藏。