Do Not Allow CECA to Become an Ideological Struggle

Do Not Allow CECA to Become an Ideological Struggle
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2009

Six large labor and business organizations recently asked the government to sign a "Comprehensive Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Agreement" (CECA) with Beijing, as soon as possible. National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi and Minister of Economic Affairs Ying Chi-ming responded positively to such suggestions. Since the Beijing and Taipei have few disagreements on this issue, it can probably be incorporated into cross-Strait consultations between SEF and ARATS this year. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's immediately response was that it was "inadvisable." Clearly a consensus with the opposition DPP has yet to be reached.

Labor and business organizations' intense desire for CECA is not surprising. In recent years, ASEAN has accelerated the pace of regional integration. Taipei meanwhile, has been excluded. It has been left standing outside the door. On top of which, during the DPP's eight-year rule, not one single neighboring government signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with us. The DPP demagogued political issues, perpetuating cross-Strait political confrontation. The result was a period crucial to economic recovery was squandered on political struggle. This wasted time will be difficult to make up. Much of the KMT's cross-strait consultations after resuming office are in fact an effort to make up for lost time.

An even more pressing issue is the global economic crisis. Everyone knows Taiwan's economic lifeline is exports. This year the sector that shrank the fastest was the export sector. This is why not long ago many foreign institutions were pessimistic about Taiwan's economic performance this year. Taiwan's exports account for over 40% of total cross-Strait trade. The ASEAN plus three countries are gradually moving toward zero trade tariffs. Taipei does not enjoy such privileges. Taiwan's comparative advantage and competitive edge will be lost. This will accelerate its current marginalization, especially given the current situation. Europe and the United States, two major economies, are in serious recession, with no evidence of improvement in the short term. Protectionist sentiment simmers just beneath the surface. Taipei is caught in the middle. In the event Taipei comes up with "heads you win, tails I lose," its plight can be imagined.

When the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry responded to the six labor and business groups, it specifically referred to domestic sentiment in favor of CECA. And yet disagreement persists regarding the name of the agreement, how it is promoted, and its timing. Needless to say, this disagreement comes from the Green Camp. It worries that signing CECA will lead to the loss of "Taiwan's" sovereignty, and economic over-reliance on the mainland. In fact, when President Ma proposed that the two sides sign CECA, his chief concern was the potential diminution of ROC sovereignty. That is why he focused on abolishing cross-strait tariffs, trade and investment barriers, and on further liberalizing the free movement of high tech labor, investment funds, labor services, and merchandise. This gradually brings them in line with WTO norms, and with cross-strait economic and trade cooperation norms. Given Taiwan's past economic and trade flexibility in the global arena, such openness will provide increased opportunities. This will allow Taiwan-based businesses to position themselves in the new era of competitive trade. If they remain bound hand and foot, as they are currently, they will find themselves unable to advance or retreat. Much of Taiwan's current trade is heavily tilted toward the mainland. Over half of this tilt occurred under Democratic Progressive Party rule. Given the high degree of trade dependency, isn't the lack of even the most basic investment and trade agreements a serious problem, and the result of DPP dereliction?

The Ministry of Economic Affairs is not concerned about cross-strait political differences. It is concerned about ruling and opposition party differences. It is concerned particularly that the Democratic Progressive Party will persist in politicizing CECA. No matter how carefully the ruling KMT avoids sovereignty issues, the opposition DPP will sooner or later turn them into ideological issues. It did that last year, during the presidential election, by deliberately relabeling the "Cross-Strait Common Market" the "One China Market." A number of distorted interpretations of CECA have already been floated. If the ruling authorities wish to avoid a senseless debate over reunification vs independence between the ruling and opposition parties, it will have to make a real effort.

If the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA, it should not sing the same old ideological tune. Instead, it should offer its most convincing alternative. The public on Taiwan gave the Democratic Progressive Party an eight year opportunity. What did it get in return? East Asian regional economic integration is just around the corner. The global financial crisis has yet to subside. Taiwan's economy, dependent upon on the growth of exports, remains besieged on all sides. Signing CECA is merely one way to break through this seige. Besides, all cases involving tariff agreements must be approved by the Legislative Yuan. At that time all concerns will be addressed. If after all we have endured over the past eight years, we still cannot get past ideological struggles, that will be the real tragedy.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.16
別讓CECA再陷意識形態爭議
中時社論

六大工商團體日前建請政府盡快與對岸洽簽「兩岸綜合經貿協議（ＣＥＣＡ）」，針對此一呼籲，不論是國安會祕書長蘇起或是經濟部長尹啟銘等都立即給予了正面的回應，由於兩岸在這個議題上已沒有太大的分歧，可預見今年之內就有機會納入兩岸兩會的協商。然而從民進黨主席蔡英文第一時間就以「不宜」的反應看來，顯然這個議題在內部共識的營造上，還有許多變數。

工商團體會對兩岸洽簽ＣＥＣＡ懷有強烈的焦慮，並不令人意外。這幾年，隨著東協區域整合的步伐加快，台灣卻一直被排除參與門欄之外，再加上民進黨執政八年期間，不僅與鄰近國家洽簽自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）的成績掛零，更一再藉政治操作讓兩岸持續處於對立狀態，導致最該要拚經濟的時刻，全耗在拚政治上，這中間所蹉跎掉的歲月，是很難再彌補回來的。國民黨執政後所恢復的兩岸協商，有很大一部分其實是在趕進度。

當然更緊迫的因素，還是當下全球經濟的嚴峻形勢。誰都知道，台灣經濟的命脈在出口，而今年以來萎縮最快也是出口部門，前不久會有那麼多外資機構看衰台灣今年的經濟表現，關鍵也就在這裡。由於兩岸的貿易的比重，占台灣總出口的四成以上，一旦東協加三諸國間貿易逐漸走向零關稅，而台灣又享受不到這個優惠，可預見台灣所有比較有利的競爭優勢都將喪失，屆時只有加速被推向邊緣化。特別是碰到目前的局面，歐美兩大經濟體嚴重衰退，短期內根本看不到有好轉的跡象，貿易保護主義的誘惑也在暗中醞釀，台灣夾在這中間，萬一陷入兩頭落空的局面，處境之困頓可想而知。

經濟部在回應六大工商團體呼籲時，曾特別提到國內目前對洽簽ＣＥＣＡ的議題，不論就協定名稱、推動方式或是時機都還存有不同的聲音。這個「不同的聲音」，應該就是綠營的反應，擔心洽簽ＣＥＣＡ會導致台灣喪失主權、經濟過度依賴大陸等等。講實在話，馬總統當初會提出兩岸洽簽ＣＥＣＡ的擬議，著眼點之一正是在讓台灣規避主權被矮化的疑慮，將重點完全放在取消兩岸間包括關稅、經貿、投資等障礙，進一步開放技術人員、資金、勞務、商品等的自由流動，使其逐漸形成一個既符合ＷＴＯ準則，又符合兩岸現狀經貿合作的形態。以台灣過往在全球經貿布局的靈活度，這種開放將提供更多的機會，讓台灣在未來全新的經貿戰國時代中，尋找自己的定位，假如像目前這樣綁手綁腳下去，勢必自陷進退失據。要知道，台灣目前貿易比重會嚴重向大陸傾斜，有大半正是在民進黨執政期間發生，這麼大比例的貿易依存度，雙方連最起碼的投資與經貿互動協定都沒有，難道不是執政的怠惰？

可以說，經濟部的顧慮，並不在於兩岸立場的分歧，而是在於朝野立場的對立，特別是民進黨假如還是執著於從政治面去解讀ＣＥＣＡ，很可能在未來的時日，不論這個協議怎麼小心閃躲主權的爭議，終究還是會發展成意識形態的議題，正如同去年大選期間「兩岸共同市場」被曲解成「一中市場」一樣。而目前許多曲解ＣＥＣＡ的論述已經陸續出爐，執政當局如果要避免這個議題再次陷入無謂的統獨之爭，在爭取朝野對話的步伐上，恐怕要多加一把勁了。

當然，民進黨如果反對這個政策，除了重彈意識形態的老調外，最好也能提出足夠令人信服的論述，台灣人民已經給了民進黨八年的機會，結果又如何呢？如今東亞區域經濟整合在即，全球金融海嘯肆虐未退，台灣這個依賴貿易出口推動成長的經濟體，已經陷入四面楚歌的困境，爭取洽簽ＣＥＣＡ，也只是爭取突破困境的途徑之一而已。更何況所有涉及關稅的協議，本來就要經過立法院這一關，屆時該顧慮的因素都會有所考量，如果最後仍不免還是淪為意識形態的角力，那就真的令人非常遺憾了。