A Careful Reading of the Joint Declaration

A Careful Reading of the Joint Declaration
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 19, 2009

U.S. President Barack Obama may have left Beijing. But the Joint Declaration he and Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao signed has shaken Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The aftershocks are still being felt. This Joint Declaration may be the most important document in Sino-US relations since the Three Communiques. To refer to it as the Fourth Communique may be an overstatement. But the Joint Declaration will surely guide Beijing-Washington relations during the Barack Obama administration.

Beijing and Washington have signed communiques and agreements in the past. But the Joint Declaration issued by Obama and Hu differs from previous documents. The portion pertaining to Taiwan contains several clear differences.

First of all, it specified and emphasized core interests. In particular, it emphasized that the key to healthy bilateral relations is for Beijing and Washington to respect each other's core interests. Leave aside for the moment the core interests of Washington, and concentrate on the core interests of Beijing. Consider their relation to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Whatever the reasons might be for not making these core interests explicit, President Hu Jintao made clear at a press conference that "on the issue of Taiwan, the US must respect China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Obama said he respected the fact that "Tibet is a part of China." These made Beijing's core interests explicit. The United States must respect the fact that it is not entitled to intervene in matters concerning Taiwan and Tibet.

Secondly, there was no mention of Taiwan's security. Whenever the United States issued any statement or conducted any conversation concerning cross-Strait issues in the past, it always mentioned the Taiwan Relations Act, or its "security commitment to Taiwan." It mentioned them in the same breath as the Three Communiques. Yet it was not mentioned at all in this current, official document. The United States may mention them later. But the overall impact will be less than the impact of the Joint Declaration by the two heads of state.

The day before yesterday Barack Obama met with students in Shanghai. He did not mention the Taiwan Relations Act. That was a warning sign. After the Joint Declaration was signed, Obama mentioned it belatedly at a press conference. He seemed to be attempting to strike a balance. But Mainland Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei immediately rebutted Obama's statement. He said the Joint Declaration is the document that supplies the guiding principles for bilateral relations. Beijing firmly opposes the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales to Taipei. "On this point, there is no ambiguity."

Third, Washington's expectations in political negotiations are gradually converging with Beijing's. In the past, Washington would merely say that it looked forward to cross-Strait dialogue and a reduction in tensions. By contrast, the Joint Declaration clearly states that Washington and Beijing "look forward to increased bilateral (Taipei and Beijing) dialogue and interaction in economic, political, and other areas," consistent wtih Beijing's latest policies vis a vis Taipei.

Recently President Hu Jintao met with Lien Chan in Singapore. Zheng Bijian lead a mission to Taiwan. Both times Beijing raised the issue of political dialogue or negotiations. But the Ma administration has always insisted upon "economics first, politics last." Scholars with close ties to agencies responsible for national security have suggested three conditions for the initiation of political dialogue. One of these conditions is that "they must be acceptable to the international community." But now that Washington's attitude is consistent with Beijing's, it may violate its past six assurances not to pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.

That Obama has tilted this far is part of a larger pattern. The Financial Times invoked a metaphor. When a debtor visits a creditor, he cannot possibly adopt a tough attitude. Mainland China holds 600 billion in U.S. government debt. Besides, Washington needs Beijing's cooperation on issues such as climate change, the economic crisis, and even global security. It must acknowledge China's rise, and accept the reality of shared global leadership.

The United States can no longer dominate the world. But it is unwilling to allow Mainland China to eject it from the Western Pacific. On the contrary, it wants even more active participation. During a speech in Tokyo, Barack Obama openly declared that "The United States is a Pacific nation." U.S. forces will stay in Okinawa. The United States will become an ASEAN partner. It will not be absent from any new Asia-Pacific free trade bodies.

Under the influence of these factors, Washington has made concessions regarding Beijing's core interests, in exchange for Beijing's agreement not to oppose a continued U.S. presence in the Western Pacific, and for active cooperation with Washington in global affairs. This is regarded as a cost-effective transaction. Washington is satisfied, Beijing is happy, and Asia-Pacific nations are at ease. The only ones sacrificed have been Taiwan and Tibet.

The Joint Declaration amounts to a major change in Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations. Although international power arrangements are a factor, the Ma administration's national security team has a responsibility to understand the circumstances surrounding this development. First of all, if Washington informed the Ma administration in advance, but the agencies responsible for national security failed to react prudently, solemnly, then they were derelict in their duty. If on the other hand, Washington did not even bother to give us a heads-up, or if our side failed to catch wind of these developments, that is cause for even greater concern.

According to reports Washington will send someone to Taipei next week to explain the situation. Our side should take the opportunity to let Washington know we do not agree with its position. We would like high-ranking U.S. officials to make a public statement, or reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan's security through concrete actions such as arms sales, gradually amending the gist of the Joint Declaration. Following the Joint Declaration Beijing soon began demanding peace talks. Beijing, as one can imagine, will surely link ECFA with peace negotiations. Handled improperly, ECFA could run aground. Or it could trigger a confrontation between the government and the opposition. At the very least it could influence the elections. At worst it could divide the country. Those in authority must respond prudently.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.11.19
審慎解讀歐胡聯合聲明的訊息
本報訊

美國總統歐巴馬雖已離開北京，但是他與中共國家主席胡錦濤所簽署的聯合聲明，在美中台三地所引發的動盪，依舊餘波未息。這項聯合聲明或許是繼美中三個公報之後，規範中美關係最重要的文件，稱它為第四公報，也許有人認為言過其實，但這項聯合聲明絕對會是歐巴馬執政期間，中美關係的指導綱領。

中美兩國過去也曾簽署過公報與協議，但歐胡聯合聲明中的台灣部分，卻與過去所有文件，有幾點明顯不同：

首先，是核心利益的提出與確認。聲明中特別強調，中美尊重彼此的核心利益是確保兩國關係健康發展的關鍵所在；在此，美國的核心利益並不是重點，重點在確立中國的核心利益是主權與領土完整原則。儘管所指為何沒有明講，但胡錦濤在記者會上進一步表示，「在台灣等問題上尊重中國的主權和領土完整」，而歐巴馬表示尊重「西藏是中國的一部分」，都明確化了核心利益，指的就是台灣與西藏事務，而美國必須尊重，無權干預。

其次是，沒有提台灣安全。過去任何關於兩岸的聲明或談話中，美國向來把《台灣關係法》、或「對台灣的安全承諾」，與美中三公報並提，可是竟然在這個正式文件中沒有，雖然也許美方會在稍後重申，但是效力總不及兩國元首的聯合聲明。

前一天歐巴馬與上海學生見面時，未提《台灣關係法》，已經是個警訊，聯合聲明簽署後，歐巴馬在記者會上補提，似想求得平衡，但馬上被中國外交部副部長何亞非駁斥，他表示「聯合聲明」才是指導兩國關係發展的原則文件，中國堅決反對《台灣關係法》，以及反對售台軍備，「這一點沒什麼好含糊的」。

其三是，美國對政治談判的期待，與中國的態度逐步趨同。過去美方期待兩岸對話云云，只是希望降低緊張，但在聯合聲明中，明確提出「期待兩岸加強經濟、政治及其他領域的對話與互動」，正符合大陸對台的最新政策。

近日，無論是連戰在新加坡與胡錦濤見面，或是鄭必堅所率領的來台訪問團，大陸都提出政治對話或談判，但是馬政府向來堅持先經後政，與國安單位有密切關係的學者提出啟動政治對話三條件說，其中之一就有「國際社會接受」的前提，可是現在美國態度如果與大陸一致，將有違華盛頓過去六項對台保證中「不會促談」的承諾。

歐巴馬會傾斜到這個程度，其實有跡可循；《金融時報》比喻此行有如負債人上債主家拜訪，態度不可能硬得起來，除了中國手中持有六千億美國政府公債之外，從氣候變化、經濟危機、甚至全球安全等等議題，美國都必須與中國合作，承認中國的崛起，接受共治全球的事實。

另一方面，雖然美國獨霸已不可能，但不甘被中國推出亞太，相反的，更想要積極參與，歐巴馬在東京演講時公開宣示：「美國是太平洋國家」，駐日美軍堅持要留在沖繩，美國開始成為東協對話夥伴，亞太自由貿易新機制更不會缺席。

在這些因素交錯之下，美國以退讓出中國核心利益，來交換中國不反對美國繼續留在亞太，在全球事務上與美國積極配合，這算是個合算的交易，美國滿意、大陸高興、亞太各國安心，唯一被犧牲的，恐怕就只有台灣與西藏了。

聯合聲明是美中台關係的重大變化，雖然有國際結構的因素，但馬政府的國安團隊有責任了解造成此情勢的前因後果，首先，如果美國事先通報內容，而國安決策單位沒有慎重以對、嚴正反應，顯有失職之嫌，如果美國事先連招呼都沒有打，或是我方沒有聽到風聲，那就更令人擔心了。

據說下周美國要派人來台說明，我方應該藉機向美國表達不同意的立場，讓美方經由高層公開發言，或如軍售等實際行動，確認對台灣的安全承諾，以逐步修正聯合聲明的方向。同時在聯合聲明之後，大陸要求和平談判的壓力將接踵而來，可以想見北京一定會把ＥＣＦＡ與談判掛勾，處理的不好，不是讓ＥＣＦＡ觸礁，就是將會引發朝野對立，小則影響選情，大則造成國內分裂，當政者不可不審慎因應。