ECFA Negotiations Should Accord with an Industry-Based Strategic Blueprint

ECFA Negotiations Should Accord with an Industry-Based Strategic Blueprint
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 21, 2009

Taipei and Beijing have recently signed and exchanged memoranda of understanding regarding financial supervision. This of course is beneficial to the financial industry on Taiwan. But as FSC chairman Sean Chen said, the MOU merely gets us into the ball park. Our seats may not be in the best spot. We may not get the best view of the game. Mainland China imposes tight restrictions the services local branches of foreign financial institutions may offer. In earlier years, the government on Taiwan maintained a "San Guan Wu Ka" policy. As a result we got a late start on the Mainland. Getting tickets this late means we only get to see half the game. No wonder Sean Chen characterized our situation the way he did.
Industry insiders say the financial MOU is merely an appetizer. The main course is ECFA. Media reports indicate that ECFA will be signed no later than next spring. An early harvest can take effect immediately. Only the outlines for dispute resolution, investment protection, and industry cooperation have been signed. The starting time for negotiations, the table of contents, and even the detailed contents remain unclear. The two sides are still bargaining over the early harvest items. The situation is complete chaotic. Will the projects expected by the financial sector be included in the early harvest list? Even that is uncertain.

Here we must remind the ruling administration that ECFA negotiations must look to the future. They must not remain obsessed with the present. Financial sector businesses able to establish themselves on the Mainland are businesses already in existence. Many of them are family-owned consortiums. When the government on Taiwan uses its authority to help private financial industry consortiums expand their operations, the other side is bound to demand concessions from other industries. Other industries will either be forced to take less, or to give more. When the FSC negotiates an MOU and ECFA on behalf of our industries, it should offer the public a financial sector blueprint for Taiwan's future. This blueprint should include hostile takeovers and acquisitions, corporate governance goals, and company management objectives. It should practice goal management, and incorporate the requisite negotiating strategy. Only that qualifies as a future-oriented strategy.

In corporate governance, for example, if family-owned consortiums drag their feet in establishing audit committees, if their operations remain opaque, it makes no sense for the government help them expand their operations into regions where supervision would be difficult. Therefore, while the government expands future operations for the financial sector, it should simultaneously establish a healthier financial order on Taiwan. Take cross-Strait cooperation in the energy industry for example. Taiwan's crystalline silicon solar cell producers account for much of the world's output. But they may not have any advantage in thin film production techniques, or modules and systems development. The Mainland has a huge market for solar power generation. It is subject to international market pressure regarding carbon dioxide emissions. These are bound to provide considerable opportunities for cross-Strait cooperation. How should businesses on Taiwan cooperate with businesses on the Mainland? First, they should make use of each other's market advantages. Secondly, they should expand their scientific and technological leads. They should create a "smiling curve" in the energy industry. Only then will they have a future worth looking forward to. Based on such projections, it is easy to see what Taiwan's energy industry must fight for during ECFA negotiations.

Take the complex biotechnology industry, for example. The R&D capabilities of biotech companies on Taiwan are still superior to those of companies on Mainland China. Companies on Taiwan are still in a dominant position in the research and development of new medicines and medical supplies and capital market support for follow-up promotion. But Mainland China has a huge population and vast territory. Its clinical trials costs are relatively low. In the medical materials field, ICT industries on Taiwan have the advantage of a long-established foundation conducive to R&D breakthroughs. Can the two sides cooperate to develop new medicines and medical materials with the potential to dominate the world market? This is what the biomedical industry urgently needs to consider. Such projections allow one to get a handle on requisite negotiating strategy for talks in the field of biotechnology.

In sum, from a public welfare perspective, ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement that should be signed for the sake of Taiwan's industries. That being the case, one must envision all sorts of scenarios as the basis for the formulation of strategy. Therefore, the government's ECFA strategy team must have a view of industry extending decades into the future. It must not think in terms of past eras, past frameworks, past industries, past industrialists, and past conflicts of interests. The other side is still fundamentally authoritarian. It is exempt from existing fetters. It is able to meet the terms of its agreements. Society on Taiwan is pluralistic. Traditional influences abound. Given such an environment, the administration faces real challenges during negotiations over ECFA. First, it must seek a niche within tradition. Next, it must not confine itself to the traditional mold. It must rely on negotiations to open up new horizons.

ＥＣＦＡ談判該以產業策略藍圖為依據
2009-11-21
中國時報

兩岸金融監理備忘錄日前換文簽訂，這對於台灣金融產業發展，當然是有助益的。但誠如金管會主委陳?所言，這份備忘錄只是看球賽入場券，且座位角度不佳，看起比賽也不會有多精彩。如所周知，中國大陸對外國金融機構在當地分行設立、業務內容等有極為嚴格限制，而台灣在早年政府「三管五卡」管制之下，赴對岸布局起步甚晚，如今即使拿到球賽入場券，都只能看下半場比賽，也難怪陳?有此描述了。

業界人士都說，金融ＭＯＵ只是餐前小菜，真正的主食還是要靠ＥＣＦＡ的簽署。媒體報導顯示，ＥＣＦＡ至遲將於明年春天簽定，除了早期收穫可以立即生效之外，其餘關於爭端解決、投資保障、產業合作等等，都只是簽下各章的目錄、啟動談判時間、與內容摘要；至於內容細目皆仍不明朗。即使是早期收穫項目，雙方似亦仍在討價還價階段，情勢混沌一片。即使以金融界所期待的項目而言，究竟能不能列入早期收穫清單，也未可知。

在此要再一次提醒府院當局：ＥＣＦＡ的談判一定要著眼未來，而不要執著於現在。台灣金融業現在能夠去中國大陸布局的，都是現有的業者，其中不乏許多財團家族。在台灣當局以公權力努力為私人金融業財團擴張地盤時，其實必然要在其他產業的談判條件上有所退讓：或則少要些對方條件，或則多給些對方要求。當金管會為我們的業者以ＭＯＵ與ＥＣＦＡ等談判開展一個願景時，也該向國人提出一個台灣未來的金融業藍圖，包括產業結構、敵意併購、公司治理等目標，再以目標管理的精神反推應有的談判策略；這才是未來取向的應有策略舖陳。

以公司治理為例，財團家族如遲遲不設立審計委員會、公司極不透明，政府實沒有道理為他們在監理不易的地區再開疆闢土。因此，在拓展金融業明日地盤同時，也該同時建立更健康的台灣金融秩序。再以能源產業兩岸合作為例，台灣在矽晶電池單位產製上已占全世界相當規模，但在薄膜生產技術、及模組與系統開發上，則未必有其優勢。由於中國大陸太陽能發電系統市場極大，且其受國際市場二氧化碳排放壓力，必然會有相當的兩岸合作契機。台灣要如何與對岸產業合作，一則善用對方市場優勢、二則拓展我方科技先機，串連起能源產業的微笑曲線，那才是值得期待的前景。由這樣的前景回推，就不難得知我們該在ＥＣＦＡ談判中為台灣能源產業爭取些什麼。

復以生技產業為例，台灣的生技研發實力約略還在中國大陸之上，不論從事新藥與醫材研發的科研實力，或是支援後續推動的資本市場，台灣應該都處於優勢。但是中國大陸由於人口多、幅員廣，其執行臨床實驗的成本也比較低。在醫材領域，台灣ＩＣＴ產業的累積基礎與優勢，也有利於我們的研發突破。兩岸該如何在新藥與醫材上密切合作，發展出具有潛力的產品，雄霸部分世界市場，是生醫產業亟待思考的課題。由這樣的預期反推回當下，就可以掌握在生技領域的談判策略。

總之，從民生福祉的角度觀之，ＥＣＦＡ應為台灣產業未來而簽署的兩岸協定。既然如此，就要設想種種未來情境，做為當下策略的擬定出發點。因此，政府研擬ＥＣＦＡ策略的團隊，必須要有產業視野與數十年的前瞻預期，而不能以舊時代、舊框架、舊產業、舊業者、舊利益瓜葛去構思。對岸基本上還是威權體制，他們可以不受既有的羈絆，執行他們的談判任務。台灣卻是個多元社會，傳統勢力的影響無所不在。如何在這個環境下，一則從傳統中尋找利基、再則又不自限於傳統窠臼，進而靠談判而開創新局，是當局ＥＣＦＡ談判面對的真正挑戰。