The DPP is under Greater Pressure to change its Mainland Policy than the KMT

The DPP is under Greater Pressure to change its Mainland Policy than the KMT
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2009

Some people say the KMT's election defeat was the result of voter skepticism about its Mainland policy. They say the KMT will therefore change its Mainland policy. But other people say the Democratic Progressive Party has shown signs of turning itself around during this election. Therefore it has an even greater need to change its Mainland policy than the KMT.

The KMT formulated its current mainland policy for two main reasons. First, the eight year long DPP government's mainland policy was a total failure. It had to be jettisoned. Secondly, the international balance of power has changed. Taipei's Mainland policy had to change accordingly. In other words, to label the KMT's current policy as the "Ma Ying-jeou Path" is political rhetoric for domestic consumption. The reason Taipei arrived at its current position, is that the Democratic Progressive Party government's Mainland policy already proved to be a dead end. The international balance of power has left Taipei with no other options. No matter who assumes office, he or she can no longer return to the Chen Shui-bian Path. Instead, he or she must take the path currently taken by the Kuomintang. It makes no difference whether Ma Ying-jeou is in charge. If Ma Ying-jeou had a better alternative, he himself might not be taking his current path. He too is at the mercy of circumstances. It is a choice he had to make. This is not to say that the KMT's Mainland policy cannot be more circumspect and cautious. But the basic framework has already has been forced upon it by a radically changing international situation. It is not subject to the will of any one individual.

By contrast, if the DPP wants to interpret this election as foreshadowing the DPP's return to power in 2012, then it must change its Mainland policy. The better its chances of returning to power, the more it must change. If the DPP wants to return to power, it cannot possibly relate to Beijing on the basis of its demands for the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," or "one country on each side," or "de jure Taiwan independence." It must re-establish the framework of the "Five Noes" or the "1992 Consensus." Even its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution" and its "Resolution for a Normal Nation" must be changed or scrapped. The DPP cannot possibly stop cross-Strait direct flights, prohibit Mainland tourists from coming to Taiwan, or re-impose a "No Haste, Be Patient" policy. The triangular relationship between Washington, Tokyo and Beijing remains unchanged. As such, the Democratic Progressive Party cannot return relations between Taipei and Washington to what they were during the Cold War era. The DPP should probably change its stand on ECFA from outright opposition to demands for "amendment and reinforcement" and the addition of "safety measures." Otherwise, if one day it returns to power, it will be forced to renege on its promises. One can say with certainty that the more likely the Democratic Progressive Party is to return to power, the more it will have to change its policy toward the Mainland. For one, if it fails to change its policy, mainstream society cannot possibly support the Democratic Progressive Party's return to power. Also, if it fails to change its policy, once it returns to power it will precipitate a national disaster.

Beijing's interpretation of the recent elections on Taiwan and its reactions are worth pondering. If Beijing considers the DPP's return to power a possibility, this will naturally influence its cross-Strait policy thinking. If the DPP changes its Mainland policy, Beijing will draw certain conclusions. If the DPP doesn't change its Mainland policy. Beijing will draw different conclusions. This could well lead to a showdown between the DPP and Beijing. Beijing may make preparations for that day. The DPP should naturally make preparations as well. The election is forcing Beijing to consider other factors when formulating cross-Strait policy. This may affect the future of cross-Strait relations. Relations may become increasingly tense, or increasingly relaxed, increasingly amicable, or increasingly hostile. We will simply have to wait and see.

The KMT's cross-Strait policy had an impact on the current election. But it was not as significant as implied by some of the foreign media. For example, the impact of The Ilan Children's Festival was clearly greater than the impact of cross-Strait policy. The impact of loosened restrictions on US beef imports and the government response to the 8/8 Floods were also greater. Chen Tsung-ming's refusal to step down was also a source of public discontent. Even assuming voters have reservations about the KMT's cross-Strait policy, they are hardly demanding a return to Chen era cross-Strait policy. Besides, even though support for the KMT fell dramatically, and support for the DPP rose dramatically, the KMT and the Pan Blue Camp is still in the majority. It is too early to predict the overturning of cross-Strait policies in 2012. Most importantly, current and future cross-Strait relations are fully embedded within and subject to the larger international balance of power. Even the DPP cannot defy it. It can only capitalize on the trend.

Voters may have reservations about the KMT's cross-Strait policy. But the DPP is unlikely to be so deluded as to think that it if returns to power it can completely overturn the ruling Kuomintang's policy and the win-win cross-Strait relationship. The KMT's cross-Strait policy must be more mindful of public sentiment. But the KMT must not allow itself to be caught on the horns of a dilemma, not knowing whether to advance or retreat. It must not feel as if it is walking a tightrope. The international balance of power has left Taipei no choice. Beijing however, after observing this election, should realize that the right to speak on behalf of Taipei does not belong to either the KMT or the DPP, but an intelligent and flexible electorate.

Some people say this election will force the KMT to change its cross-Strait policy. The KMT must of course be circumspect and vigilant. But in the wake of this election, the Democratic Progressive Party is actually under greater pressure to change its Mainland policy than the KMT.

民進黨比國民黨更須調整大陸政策
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.09 03:57 am

有一種解讀，將國民黨此次選舉的挫敗說成是大陸政策受到選民質疑，因而猜測國民黨將調整其大陸政策。但另一種見解則認為，民進黨在此次選舉有了翻身的跡象，更須調整其中國政策。

國民黨形成今日大陸政策的主因有二：一、民進黨政府執政八年的大陸政策徹底失敗，必須改弦易轍。二、整個國際情勢的推移變化，更使台灣不得不調整大陸政策。也就是說，將國民黨現行政策說成是「馬英九路線」，這只是國內政爭的用語；其實，台灣走到今日關口，民進黨扁政府的那套大陸政策已證實為死路，且國際大局大勢亦已迫使台灣難有其他選擇，是以任何人執政都不可能再回返陳水扁路線，而必定會採取類如國民黨今日所採路線，不論是否馬英九主政。馬英九若有其他更好的選擇，他也未必會採今日路線；形格勢禁，這其實是不得不然的選擇。絕不是說國民黨今日的大陸政策沒有更求周延細緻的空間，但大經大緯已因迫於國際情勢的丕變而受到制約，非任何個人主觀的情感意志所能轉移。

相對而言，民進黨若將此次選舉視為可能在二○一二年重返執政的前兆，其必須調整大陸政策的壓力，必然隨其重返執政機會的升高而等比例增加。民進黨若再執政，不可能再用「正名制憲」、「一邊一國」、「法理台獨」與中國互動，勢須重新建立「四不一沒有」或「九二共識」之類的論述架構；甚至《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》皆須修或廢。民進黨也無可能停止兩岸直航或關閉陸客來台，或再採「戒急用忍」。在美日中三邊關係丕變的趨勢下，民進黨亦無可能使台美日的政治聯結重回冷戰時代的情態。或許，民進黨現在就應把對ＥＣＦＡ的立場，從「完全反對」，改成「修正補強」及關注「防衛機制」，否則若有一日執政，恐怕就必須面對廢約毀約的難題。可以斷言，民進黨愈有重返執政的可能性，其調整大陸政策的必要性也就愈大。一方面，若不調整，主流社會不可能支持民進黨重返執政；二方面，若不調整，執政後必釀成國家災難。

中共方面對台灣此次選舉的解讀與反應值得玩味。北京若認為民進黨有重返執政的可能，自會影響其兩岸政策的考慮；民進黨若有調整大陸政策的表現，北京是一種考慮，若無則是另一種考慮。民進黨若再執政，即形同民進黨與北京的再攤牌；北京會為可能到臨的那一天進行準備，民進黨自也應預作準備。這次選舉必已為北京的兩岸政策增添了考慮因素，勢會影響今後兩岸關係的發展變化；趨緊趨鬆、趨友趨敵，可待觀察。

國民黨兩岸政策對這次選舉的影響是有的，但未必如有些外國媒體所說的那麼大。比如，宜蘭童玩節的影響顯然大於兩岸政策，美牛事件及八八水災的影響也不遑多讓，甚至陳聰明未下台也是「民怨」；且即使選民對兩岸政策有疑慮，亦非主張回到扁政府時代的兩岸政策。何況，雖然國民黨的選票大落而民進黨大起，但國民黨及泛藍畢竟仍佔多數；若謂二○一二年會因兩岸政策翻盤變天，恐怕目前尚難作此論斷。最重要的是：兩岸關係在如今及未來，已經完全嵌入並受制約於國際情勢的大格局，即使民進黨也不可能逆勢而為，只能因勢利導。

所以，選民或許對國民黨的兩岸政策有疑慮，但民進黨應不至於昏瞶到認為，若再執政將全盤推翻國民黨的政策及兩岸雙贏共生的想像；而國民黨雖在兩岸政策上必須更加照顧民意，但也不可能自陷於進退失據的「瓦倫達走鋼絲效應」，何況國際情勢也使台灣別無選擇。倒是北京方面，經過觀察此次選舉，應當更能感知台灣的話語權，並非握在國民黨或民進黨手中，而是操在靈活且明智的選民手中。

有人說，這次選舉會使國民黨調整兩岸政策，當然，國民黨應有必須處理得更周延細緻的警惕；但我們卻認為民進黨經此選舉，其調整大陸政策的戰略壓力及時間壓力，都應當更逾於國民黨。