Can the DPP Win in 2012?

Can the DPP Win in 2012?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 25, 2010

"Without a victory in the five mayoral elections, there can be no victory in 2012." This is the DPP's strategic perspective. Today Tsai Ing-wen is personally participating in the five mayoral elections, turning it into a showdown. But whether the DPP will win in 2012 is another story.
If the Democratic Progressive Party wants to win the 2012 presidential election, it must pass three tests. It must also deal successfully with Beijing.

Let us first address the three tests it must pass. One. This amounts to a showdown over the nation's political and economic path. Tsai Ing-wen has said that if the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. She also said that "[the DPP] has no intention of removing the Taiwan independence clause from its party constitution." In other words, it has no intention of transforming the party with regards national identity and cross-Strait policy. But the question is, will the public on Taiwan allow a Democratic Progressive Party that holds such views to control the levers of the nation? Two. The DPP may take advantage of the five mayoral elections to revise its political and economic path in accordance with Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." But does the public on Taiwan believe a DPP subject to being hijacked from within offer the possibility of genuine reform? Three. Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen are enacting out the "Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers." If Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen win the Taipei City and Xinbei City mayoral elections, they will of course take advantage of the victory to run for president in 2012. If they lose they will have no choice but to enter the presidential race. In other words, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen's entry into the five mayoral races merely confirm that for the Democratic Progressive Party the five mayoral elections are merely a springboard for the presidential election. But will the public on Taiwan condone the Democratic Progressive Party's manipulation of the elections in such a manner?

Now let us talk about how the DPP will tackle Beijing. The DPP has yet to effectively transform itself from within. Now suddenly it wants to participate in a higher level political battle for control of the ROC government. It has already complicated cross-Strait relations. Signs suggest the Democratic Progressive Party may return to power. Will Beijing continue to adopt liberal policies toward Taipei? Or will it adopt more stringent policies? The hour of decision approaches. Opposition to ECFA will be perceived as a "hate [mainland] China" stance. If the DPP persists in its "hate [mainland] China" stance, Beijing will of course retaliate against it. Such pressures will naturally be felt by a large part of the political and economic spectrum on Taiwan. This will land the DPP in a dilemma. If it fails to incite hatred of mainland China, it will forfeit it election theme. If it incites hatred of mainland China, It will find it difficult to deal with the repercussions.

If Tsai Ing-wen had not entered the mayoral race, she might have had a buffering effect. But now that Tsai has entered the race, the Blue and Green camps on Taiwan will have to lay their cards on the table in advance. The DPP will also have to have a showdown with Beijing ahead of schedule. The two years leading up to 2012 will probably be filled with of tension, internally and across the Taiwan Strait. Will the so-called "cross-Strait opportunity" be aborted? Will the "Window of opportunity" be closed? The answer requires close observation.

The DPP has taken a final stand. It has painted itself into a corner. Its back is against the wall. It has also painted everyone else on Taiwan into the same corner. As mentioned earlier, the Democratic Progressive Party has yet to alter its policies regarding national identity and cross-Strait relations. It has adopted an anti-ECFA election theme shot through with hatred for mainland China. It has In effect, decided to have a showdown with both the public on Taiwan and the authorities in Beijing. It has effectively painted itself and the public on Taiwan into a corner. Furthermore, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have entered the five mayoral races. They stand shoulder to shoulder. They have made clear that win or lose, the two will help each other out in the 2012 presidential race. This too has effectively painted them and the public on Taiwan into the same corner.

For the DPP, the five mayoral elections will be a battle rife with contradictions. On the one hand, it must keep hatred of mainland China and ECFA at a boil. On the other hand it must peddle a credible political and economic vision to the voters. What is this, if not a self-contradiction? What is this, if not flagrant deceit? On the one hand it must attempt to win all five cities. On the other hand, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen intend to run in the 2012 presidential election whether they win or lose. Their political and economic path is self-contradictory. It is flagrantly deceitful. It will grossly distort the five mayoral races and their aftermath. They will subject Taiwan to internal divisions. Upsets in the cross-Strait situation will be unavoidable.

The KMT must treat the five mayoral races as a battle to retain political power in 2012. One might say the only way the KMT can win is to persuade the public to see ECFA as a symbol of the nation's political and economic path. Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen are reasonably well-respected by the public on Taiwan. If the KMT cannot win the hearts and minds of the public on the basis of its political and economic path, it may well lose the election. Practically speaking, the KMT cannot afford to bungle the ECFA signing in June. It cannot afford to give the DPP any openings.

The DPP has a chance to win the 2012 presidential election. After all, the Democratic Progressive Party is a political party that won in 2000 and 2004. It lost power because it brought disaster upon the nation, and caused the entire nation to turn against it. It has now painted itself into a corner. For the moment it should not ask whether it will win in 2012. Instead, it should ask itself whether a victory for the DPP in 2012 would be a blessing or a curse? Would it be a way out, or a dead end?

民進黨有沒有二○一二？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.25 02:10 am

「沒有五都，就沒有二○一二」這是民進黨的戰略思維。然而，如今民進黨雖因蔡英文親征而將五都之戰推向極致，但有無二○一二，卻又另當別論。

想贏得二○一二總統大選，民進黨在台灣內部仍須通過三項考驗，且尚待通過與北京的角力。

先談在台灣內部的三項考驗。一、這是一場國家政經總路線的對決，蔡英文已稱，民進黨若執政，將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，又稱「沒有廢止台獨黨綱的問題」；也就是說，在國家認同及兩岸政策上皆無轉型改革的意向。但問題是：台灣主流社會接不接受這樣的民進黨再掌國柄？二、或許，民進黨亦可能藉五都選舉，以蔡英文的「十年政綱」修正前述路線。但台灣主流社會相不相信內部相互挾持裹脅的民進黨有轉型改革的真誠與可能性？三、蘇蔡演成「雙城奇謀」，在北二都選舉若勝，蘇蔡當然會趁勝直指二○一二總統大選；若敗，也當然會別無選擇地再打總統大選一戰。也就是說，蘇蔡一同投入五都，愈發證實五都選舉只是民進黨總統大選的工具或跳板。但台灣主流社會同不同意民進黨如此操作？

再談與北京的角力。民進黨在內部的轉型改革尚無成效的此際，突然將政局升高至中華民國政權的爭奪戰，已使兩岸關係平添變數。民進黨出現可能重掌政權的跡象，北京對台灣將續採寬鬆政策，或改採緊縮政策，又面臨抉擇時刻。民進黨若繼續採取仇中立場（反ＥＣＦＡ被北京解讀為仇中），北京自會對民進黨以牙還牙，而此種壓力亦自會轉移至台灣社會廣泛的政經領域。這將使民進黨陷於兩難：不煽動仇中，選戰失去主軸；若鼓動仇中，則後效難以收拾。

蔡英文若未投入選戰，應可發揮緩衝效果。但如今蔡一旦投入，非但在台灣內部提早催發了藍綠攤牌的局面，且形同亦造成了民進黨必須與北京提早攤牌的情勢。自今至二○一二的兩年之間，台灣內部及兩岸關係恐將重現高度緊繃及懸疑的情勢，而所謂的「兩岸機遇」是否將會流產，「機會之窗」是否將會關閉，皆待密切觀察。

民進黨背水一戰，已將自己逼到牆角，亦儼然使整個台灣被逼到牆角。如前所述，民進黨在國家認同與兩岸政策尚未轉型的時際，以高度仇中意識的反ＥＣＦＡ為選舉主軸，不啻是與台灣社會及北京當局攤牌，豈不是把自己與台灣一起逼到了牆角？再者，蘇蔡並肩投入五都選戰，且擺明了無論輸贏，二人皆將相互解套，轉戰二 ○一二，這豈不亦是將自己與台灣一起逼到了牆角？

對於民進黨而言，五都選舉將是高度自相矛盾的一戰。一方面必須維持仇中及反ＥＣＦＡ的溫度，另一方面又要向選民推銷可資信賴的政經憧憬。豈不矛盾？再者，亦是高度權謀的一戰。一方面必須在五都全力求勝，另一方面蘇蔡又要盤算不論勝敗皆將過水轉戰二○一二總統大選。路線的矛盾，與過水的權謀，皆將使五都選舉及其後續效應高度扭曲；如此一來，台灣內部的撕裂，與兩岸情勢的震盪，似皆已是難以避免。

面對五都選舉，國民黨勢須將之打成二○一二的政權保衛戰；甚至可以這麼說，國民黨唯一可能贏得選戰的條件，是使全民接受以ＥＣＦＡ為指標象徵的國家政經總路線。其實，蘇蔡個人條件的社會評價都不差；國民黨若不能在國家政經總路線上贏得民心，即有輸掉選戰的可能性。實事求是而言，國民黨至少在六月將簽訂的ＥＣＦＡ，不能有任何差錯，也不能留下任何把柄。

民進黨不是沒有贏得二○一二總統大選的可能性；畢竟，民進黨是曾經贏得二○○○年及二○○四年兩次大選的政黨，只是最後在舉國咒罵中又告失去政權，且對台灣造成大災難。現在，把自己逼到牆角的民進黨，暫不要問能否贏得二○ 一二，且先自問：倘若贏了二○一二大選，將對台灣是福是禍？是活路還是死路？