Why the US Approves of President Ma's Cross-Strait Policy

Why the US Approves of President Ma's Cross-Strait Policy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2010

The cross-Strait situation has changed. The most important factor in Taipei's security is no longer military might. Instead it is the restoration of Taiwan's regional economic status. Rather than buying arms from Washington, Taipei would be better off upgrading Taiwan's economy. Doing so would attract international trade. International companies, including US companies, would increase economic and trade relations with Taiwan, and thereby transform Taiwan into an international trade platform.

This is one reason why Taipei should sign ECFA. It is also the reason Washington wants Taipei and Beijing to sign ECFA.

Taipei faces a new global and cross-Strait scenario. The only way for Taiwan to survive is for Taipei to open Taiwan up. Taipei must transform Taiwan into an "island of free trade" or an "Asian Pacific Platform." Actually ECFA is merely one of any number of ways of transforming Taiwan into an "island of economic freedom." Doing so will improve exports for businesses that have kept their roots on Taiwan. But this is hardly the only benefit. Even more important, doing so will attract foreign and mainland companies, encouraging them to develop trade relations with Taiwan. If capital from Taiwan, the mainland, and abroad can come together on Taiwan, creating common interests, not only will Taiwan's economy be reborn, the Republic of China's national security will be reinforced. This is something we have consistently advocated for over a decade. If Taiwan's economic role can be internationalized, the "Taiwan problem" can also be internationalized.

Tsai Ing-wen issued a strategic assessment of ECFA. She said that if Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA, East Asia will become a "Sino-centric East Asia." The result would be a weakening and marginalization of the US. Her unspoken implication was that [mainland] China's "rise" and the United States' "decline" must not be allowed. What is this but turning the clock back? What is this but a Cold War mentality? Tsai Ing-wen tried to play the America card. Unfortunately her play was inconsistent with US interests. As a result Washington gave her a sharp slap across the face. The American Institute in Taiwan issued a statement saying that the United States would be happy to see Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA.

Washington's cross-Strait policy naturally includes strategic considerations. But these are not considerations Tsai Ing-wen can readily manipulate. Washington of course has interests in East Asia. But obviously they are not what Tsai Ing-wen imagined them to be. In recent years, Washington has held the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy in high regard. Clearly Washington's strategic thinking has changed. Washington wants Taipei to move from violent confrontation with Beijing, to peaceful relations with Beijing. Washington wants Taipei to move from military and political confrontation to economic coopetition. Therefore ECFA is consistent with Washington's strategic thinking. It is also consistent with Washington's interests.

Any sensible person can see that the most pressing national security concern Taipei faces is not any military threat from Beijing, but Taiwan's economic plight. Taipei cannot eliminate the military threat from Bejing by force. It must use economic and trade coopetition to blunt the threat and transform the crisis. The Ma administration's policy uses economics and trade to change Taipei's strategic circumstances. Washington holds this policy in high regard. Washington is well aware it can no longer determine the direction of cross-Strait relations through military intervention. It knows the best way to balance cross-Strait relations is to help Taipei turn Taiwan into a regional economic platform. Given this thinking, Washington will naturally want Taipei and Beijing to sign ECFA. American, Japanese, and European companies will naturally be happy to see Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA. They consider it beneficial to the development of trade with Taiwan.

Opposition to ECFA is in effect opposition to foreign and mainland business interests entering the gateway to Taiwan. Opposition to ECFA prevents Taiwan from becoming a "island of free trade" or and "Asian Pacific Platform." Taipei has a strategic goal -- to establish a national security system based on international trade. Opposition to ECFA runs counter to this goal. In other words, Tsai Ing-wen's strategic proposal was not merely incompatible with the Ma administration's strategic thinking. It was diametrically opposed to the strategic thinking of the U.S. government, and the economic interests of American, Japanese, and European businesses. Is it any wonder Tsai Ing-wen received a slap in the face?

Given globalization and the G2 framework, Washington may still wish to help Taipei. But it can only do so by means of economics and trade. If Taipei wants to defuse cross-Strait tensions, it must deal with cross-Strait trade and economic coopetition. What else is there? Opposition to ECFA effectively slams the door in the face of US and foreign investors. Opposition to ECFA will also force cross-Strait economic and political relations to spiral out of control. Opposition to ECFA may deliver a fatal blow to Taipei's security. Even Washington objects to it. Is Tsai Ing-wen the only one who fails to see this? Tsai Ing-wen boasted that she hoped to "join the world in its march into [mainland] China." But why not let the world march into Taiwan first?

Washington may sell Taipei F-16Cs and F-16Ds. But such sales are mere political symbolism. Besides, Washington has been quite hesitant about such sales. Taipei can and must commit to opening its doors, post haste. It must rescind its Closed Door Policy. It must improve Taiwan's international trade environment. It must allow capital from Taiwan, the mainland, the US, and other nations to create a deeply-rooted community of interests. This community of interests will be Taipei's security system. Time is not on our side. Circumstances are not on our side. It is not enough to sign ECFA. Far more must be done, and time is running out.

Rather than buying F-16s, why not sign an FTA with Washington? Why not transform Taiwan into an "island of free trade?" Signing ECFA is merely a tiny step. But without this tiny step, nothing else is possible.

美國為何贊同馬總統的兩岸政策
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.05 03:17 am

兩岸情勢丕變，台灣最重要的安全憑藉不是軍事，而在整建台灣的區域經貿角色。或許可以這麼說：台灣與其向美國採購軍火，不如致力於改善台灣吸引國際經貿往來的環境，使得包括美資在內的國際廠商，與台灣加深放大經貿關係，將台灣建設成一個國際經貿平台。

這是台灣為何要簽ＥＣＦＡ的理由之一，也應是美國樂見兩岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ的理由之一。

面對全球及兩岸新局，台灣唯一的生存之道就是開放，朝向「經貿自由島」或「亞太平台」的目標邁進；就此以言，ＥＣＦＡ其實只是邁向「經貿自由島」的條件之一而已，其效益絕非僅在便利根留台灣的台商出口，而更重要的是期能吸引外商及陸商加強發展對台經貿關係；若能使台資、陸資、外資在台灣因而發生盤根錯節的利害關係，台灣非但在經濟上得以脫胎換骨，在國家安全上也可獲得保障。這就是我們十餘年來所一貫主張的：台灣的經貿角色若能國際化，「台灣問題」就能國際化。

蔡英文對ＥＣＦＡ發表「戰略」評價，她說，台灣與中國簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，將使東亞變成「以中國為中心的東亞」，更將造成美國的弱化與邊緣化。言外之意是，不能讓中國「崛起」，不能將美國「弱化」；這其實是倒撥時鐘的冷戰思維。然而，蔡英文借箸代籌為美國謀，卻顯不符合美國的利益，故挨了美國火辣辣的一耳光。在台協會發布聲明稱：美國樂見兩岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ。

美國的台海兩岸政策，自然有「戰略」思維，但不是蔡英文所能左右；美國在東亞當然有「利益」關懷，但也顯非蔡英文所想像。近年來，美國對馬政府的兩岸政策持高度的肯定評價，可見美國的相關戰略與利益思考已經轉向，亦即：台灣對中國必須由對抗走向和平，由軍事及政治角力走向經貿競合。準此以論，ＥＣＦＡ符合美國此種「戰略」思維，亦即符合美國的利益。

任何明理者皆可看出，台灣如今面臨的最直接且最嚴重的國家安全顧慮，不是對岸的軍事威脅，而在經濟困局；且台灣亦無可能靠武力來解決對岸的軍事威脅，而必須以經貿競合手段來柔化情勢、轉化危機。美國對馬政府所採「以經貿手段改變台灣戰略角色」的政策持高度肯定態度，亦當是深知，美國已無可能以軍事手段介入兩岸關係；而平衡兩岸關係最好的方法，應是協助台灣建立其在區域經濟上的平台角色。在此種思考下，美國當然樂見兩岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ；因為，美商、日商、歐商都樂見兩岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，皆認為有益於他們發展對台經貿。

就此以論，反對ＥＣＦＡ，其實是阻擋了外商、陸商進入台灣的門徑，使得台灣成為「經貿自由島」或「亞太平台」的可能性趨低，因而也傷損了台灣欲以國際經貿網絡來建構國家安全體系的「戰略」目標。也就是說，蔡英文所提出的「戰略」主張，非但與馬政府冰炭不容，甚至亦與美國政府及美商、日商和歐商的戰略與利益背道而馳，豈能不挨一巴掌？

在全球化及Ｇ２的世局架構下，美國縱然仍有協助台灣之心，但也只能從經貿門徑入手；而台灣若欲化解兩岸危機，倘連雙邊經貿競合問題亦無能力處理，遑論其他？反對ＥＣＦＡ，其實形同在經貿門徑上對美國及外資關門，也將使得兩岸經貿及政治關係更形失控。這些皆可能形成對台灣安全的致命性傷害，連美國都不贊成，何獨蔡英文的「戰略觀」見不及此？蔡英文誇稱要「由世界走向中國」，但為何不先讓世界走進台灣？

美國即使賣給台灣Ｆ十六／ＣＤ，那主要也只是政治象徵意義，何況美國對此頗見猶豫；台灣如今能夠作與應當作的，就是致力於全速打開大門，勿再鎖國，改善台灣的國際經貿環境，使得台資、陸資、美資，及其他外資在台灣形成一個盤根錯節的「利益共同體」，化作台灣的安全體系。就此以言，時不我予，勢不我予，只簽ＥＣＦＡ還不夠，要作的事還多著、急著呢！

與其買Ｆ十六，不如與美國簽ＦＴＡ，更不如將台灣建設為「自由貿易島」。就此而言，簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，其實只是很小很小的一步而已；但若無此一小步，就沒有其他。