Cross-Strait Security Cooperation Should Begin with Dialogue

Cross-Strait Security Cooperation Should Begin with DialogueChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2010

Beijing issued another statement yesterday. Its national defense sector explored the possibility of cross-Strait military confidence-building measures. It suggested "proceeding step by step, doing the easy things first," predicated upon the One China Principle. Because the five cities elections are approaching, the Ma administration will probably respond cautiously, hoping to minimize any negative effect on the year-end elections. But in the wake of ECFA and direct links, the two sides will find it difficult to avoid "non-traditional security cooperation." The government may wish to look at the issue of cross-Strait military confidence-building measures from this perspective.

The cross-Strait military confidence-building measures members of the public are most concerned about have to do with "traditional security." They worry about undermined sovereignty, Washington/Taipei arms sales, a reduced ability to defend Taiwan and Penghu, and a lowering of our guard. But merely initiating a dialogue on security cooperation involves none of the above risks. It can be both easy and gradual. Based on three links, it would consist mainly of "non-traditional security measures" such as humanitarian relief, maritime rescue, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, and environmental protection issues. It is referred to as the SCFA, or Cross-Strait Security Cooperation Framework, and is a matter of considerable urgency, since maritime accidents can occur at any moment.

In October 2008, for the first time since three mini-links between Kinmen and Xiamen were established, the two sides held joint martime rescue exercises. The main impetus was the fire which broke out on the mainland vessel Tongan, while it was docking at Kinmen. At the time there was no cross-Strait cooperation mechanism. Panic ensued. Only after Xiamen deployed emergency firefighters was a tragedy averted. In order to prevent any further such eventualities, the two sides finally decided to hold maritime rescue exercises. Unfortunately they ran out of steam, and cross-Strait cooperation has yet to be normalized.

In January 2001, the two sides implemented "mini three links" between Kinmen and Xiamen. Over the next seven years, 2.55 million passengers crossed over. During all that time, not a single major shipwreck occurred. But with increased exchanges, who can say that nothing will go wrong in the future? In particular, now that ECFA has been signed, the volume of traffic between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Mainland is likely to exceed expectations. The slightest carelessness could lead to an accident at any time. If the two sides fail to establish a cross-Strait mechanism for maritime cooperation, the consequences could be unimaginable.

The worst case scenario would be a maritime or air disaster involving one of our ships or planes. Suppose the other side arrives on scene first. It completes rescue operations, safely returns our disaster victims, then engages in wholesale self-promotion, while our side is seen as having done nothing. What will the public on Taiwan think? They might begin asking why they should pay for such a vast yet useless defense establishment. Such an incident would have a greater impact on public morale than guided missiles.

In addition to maritime security, the two sides must face the challenges posed by pirate attacks and terrorism. On June 16, the International Maritime Bureau issued warnings about piracy in the South China Sea. Pirates frequently hijack vessels in the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia. The Strait of Malacca has become a "Second Gulf of Aden." Many waters in the South China Sea are not patrolled. They have become pirate havens. Some coastal countries turn a blind eye to rampant piracy. This encourages even greater lawlessness on the part of the pirates. The situation is now out of control.

To combat piracy, the International Maritime Bureau expects Mainland China to do something similar to what has been done in the Gulf of Aden -- send warships to escort commercial vessels in the South China Sea. There is reason to believe that once Mainland China acts, it will be even more aggressive than in the Gulf of Aden. Such escort operations could encroach on sovereign waters.

Failure to reach a prior understanding and establish a mechanism for maritime humanitarian relief is likely to marginalize us on security issues in the South China Sea. Once a mechanism for cross-Strait cooperation is established, emergency rescue can no longer be one-way. It will require two-way communications, consultation, and decision-making. At most distinctions will be made between first and second responders. But neither side will be completely shut out.

The Ma administration desperately needs to reach an agreement over ECFA. Above all, ECFA will enable us to sign FTAs with other countries. Similarly, the establishment of a cross-Strait maritime security mechanism will enable Taipei to participate in regional security operations. The establishment of cross-Strait "non-traditional security" will help strengthen direct links. It may also reduce concerns in neighboring countries.

How should we proceed? We have three paths before us. First, we have "mini three links" maritime and air traffic safety. The two sides can hold regular cross-Strait search and rescue exercises. Vessels at the local government level can participate in joint operations, transitioning later to paramilitary operations. ROC Coast Guard vessels can participate in joint operations with the other side's public safety vessels and other armed vessels. We can move toward normalization, and promote cross-Strait confidence.

Secondly, we have "three links" maritime and air traffic safety. The two sides can dispatch paramilitary vessels to high seas not in dispute, or the Western Taiwan Strait SAR, to monitor from the sidelines, building cross-strait trust.

Thirdly, we have South China Sea maritime safety. The South China Sea contains economic zones around islands held by the two sides. The two sides can work together to protect marine ecological resources. They can participate in humanitarian relief efforts, anti-piracy efforts, and anti-terrorism efforts. They can maintain the smooth flow of maritime traffic, and reduce the concerns of neighboring countries. The two sides can work together on fisheries policy. Paramilitary vessels can provide backup and escort for fishing vessels. The two sides can set up an information exchange support center. They can resort to a two-pronged approach, moving from cross implementation to parallel implementation.

So-called "non-traditional security" has become an important aspect of international security. It also offers opportunities for cross-Strait security cooperation. Time waits for no man. Cross-Strait maritime rescue exercises can be staged at any time. We urge the government to make advance preparations.

兩岸在「安全協作」上應啟動對話了
2010-07-31
中國時報

北京國防部門日昨就兩岸探討建立軍事互信機制再度發言，呼籲在「一個中國」原則的基礎上，按「先易後難、循序漸進」的方式進行。由於五都選舉逼近，相信馬政府會謹慎回應，避免衝擊年底選情。但隨著ＥＣＦＡ後大三通的全面交往，兩岸在「非傳統安全」領域的協作難以避免，政府不妨從這個角度看待兩岸軍事互信的問題。

目前最讓民眾疑慮的兩岸軍事互信，主要在「傳統安全」領域，擔心主權受損，動搖美台軍售，削弱台澎防衛能力，進而卸我心防。但「安全協作」啟動對話，沒有以上顧慮，既「先易」又「漸進」，主要以三通為基礎，以「非傳統安全」（人道救援、海上應急救難、反恐、反海盜和環境生態保護等）為主要內涵，姑且稱之 SCFA（兩岸安全Security協作框架）。這在時空上不僅有緊迫感，海上意外也隨時可能發生。

二○○八年十月，兩岸首次在金廈小三通航線舉行海上救難協作演練，主要起於該年二月大陸同安輪停靠金門碼頭時發生大火，當時兩岸並無協作機制，一陣慌亂，廈門緊急調派消防力量增援，才免去一場悲劇。為預防起見，雙方終於促成年底的海上救難協作演練，可惜後繼無力，兩岸協作並未常態化。

二○○一年元月兩岸實施金廈小三通，七年內運載旅客達二五五萬多人次，期間未發生大的船難事件，今後隨人員往來的增加，誰能擔保萬無一失？尤其，ＥＣＦＡ通過後，兩岸大三通的人員流量和航線之多，都有可能超過預期規畫，稍有不慎，意外隨時可能發生，兩岸若不及早建立海上協作機制，後果難以想像。

最糟糕情況是，我方船（空）難萬一發生，對岸早先掌握，並搶先一步救援，再把我方受難人員安然送返，大肆宣傳，而我方毫無作為。國內民眾會怎麼想？民意何須支持龐大而無用的國防開支！這種影響對台灣民心士氣打擊，尤勝於飛彈。

除了航運安全問題，兩岸同時面對海盜襲擊和反恐考驗。六月十六日，國際海事局發布南海海盜警報，麻六甲海峽及東南亞海域船隻頻遭海盜劫持，成為「第二個亞丁灣」，且南海的很多海域處於真空地帶，淪為海盜天堂，一些沿海國家對海盜橫行視若無睹，助長海盜的氣燄，情勢有失控之虞。

為打擊海盜，國際海事局有關負責人期待中國能有所作為，如亞丁灣做法，派艦隊到南海護航。有理由相信，中國一旦出手，必將扮演比亞丁灣更為積極的角色，有可能主導某個關鍵並涉及主權海域的護航行動。

在此之前，我方若不能和對岸取得默契，建立海上人道救援機制，日後很可能在南海安全議題上被邊緣化。兩岸一旦建立協作機制，應援救急就不能單向而為，需雙方通聯、協商並決定救援處理方式，頂多有主從之分，另一方不會被完全孤立。

馬政府亟需與對岸達成ＥＣＦＡ，考慮之一是便於與他國簽署ＦＴＡ；同樣的，兩岸達成某種程度的海上安全協作機制，亦可作為台灣參與地區安全協作的一種中介，雙方以「非傳統安全」為內涵，既有助於強固兩岸三通，又可降低周邊國家的疑慮。

怎麼做？眼前就有三條路徑。其一、以「小三通」航線安全為主，兩岸定期舉行海上救難搜救演練，雙方參與船隻由地方政府向準軍事層級過渡，我方派海巡署船隻與對岸公安或武警船隻協力演練，使其常態化，增進兩岸互信。

其二、以「大三通」航線安全為主，雙方選定不具敏感性公海，或先以海西特區往返船隻為主，雙方派準軍事船隻從旁監護，累積兩岸互信。

其三、以「南海」航線安全為主，地點在南海範圍內，兩岸掌握島嶼周邊的經濟海域，進行人道救援、反海盜及反恐，保持海上生命線暢通等演練，兩岸亦可協力維護海洋生態資源。為減少周邊國家疑慮，兩岸協力以漁政船隻為主，準軍事船隻擔任後勤與監護為輔，雙方設立訊息互通暨支援中心，由交叉實施到併行實施，雙管齊下。

「非傳統安全」逐漸成為國際安全領域的重要議題，亦為兩岸的安全協作提供契機。時不我待，兩岸海上救難協作隨時可能上演。在此呼籲政府，應及早因應準備。