Goodwill and Creativity Ensure Continued Cross-Strait Win/Win

Goodwill and Creativity Ensure Continued Cross-Strait Win/Win
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2010

Now that the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed, the KMT-CCP Forum is opening in Guangzhou. President Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, met with Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung in Beijing. Hu did not follow-up. He did not clarify the one question Taipei is most concerned about -- FTAs with other countries. But what remains unchanged is closer relations and mutual goodwill. Wu Poh-hsiung publicly conveyed President Ma Ying-jeou's best wishes, and a 16 character statement of principle. This shows that cross-Strait relations have emerged from the fog of "secret emissaries." They have been institutionalized and are moving towards normalization.
It is widely known that during the Lee Teng-hui era, cross-Strait relations remained shaky. When Taipei and Beijing wanted close interactions, KMT and CCP higher-ups dispatched their most trusted emissaries. These secret emissaries added an air of intrigue to cross-Strait relations. But they really didn't improve cross-Strait relations. When Ah-Bian was in office he too sent secret emissaries. But the infamous "note" in Chen Shui-bian's suit pocket did nothing to increase trust between the Chen regime and Beijing. In 2005, People First Party Chairman James Soong visited the Mainland. His main consideration before departure, was how to normalize cross-Strait relations. He communicated with the Chen regime repeatedly in order to set up a Soong/Hu meeting. To win Soong's confidence, Chen Shui-bian presented him with a framed work of caligraphy reading "trust." But in the end it was all for naught.

The biggest difference between the Ma Ying-jeou era and the Lee and Chen eras is that Ma does not believe in secret emissaries. He insists on a transparent standard operating procedures agreed upon by the MAC, SEF, or other cross-Strait entities. Once he even considered allowing the KMT/CCP Forum to morph into a role besides cross-Strait policy trailblazer. In fact, Ma's thinking has already been incorporated into current cross-Strait policy. The rituals of the KMT/CCP Forum have been reinforced, even as its decision-making authority has been weakened. Apart from the two associations (MAC and ARATS), all cross-Strait agreements and consultations have been assigned to the government officials and agencies responsible. As for the KMT-CCP Forum, on Mainland China the party leads the government. All representatives are both party officials and key players assigned to Taiwan affairs. But none of the KMT representatives are officials of the Ma administration. None of them are charged with decision-making on Mainland affairs. They lack the right to speak. The most they can do is offer advice through party channels.

Ma Ying-jeou is not keen to participate in the KMT/CCP Forum. For Beijing, this has remained a nagging concern. But Ma has an intense desire to improve cross-Strait relations. That is an indisputable fact. The high-level KMT/CCP dialogue began when the KMT was out of office. KMT leaders occupied no official positions. In recent years, they have shuttled back and forth between Beijing and Shanghai, attending various activities and forums, increasing mutual trust and understanding. Now they have returned to power. The party can continue to conduct such a dialogue. But Ma Ying-jeou is president and party chairman. Obviously it is too early for him to meet with leaders of the other side.

The 16 character statement of principles Ma Ying-jeou asked Wu Poh-hsiung to convey to Hu Jintao reads: "Face up to reality. Increase mutual trust. Seek common ground. Ensure win-win." There is nothing special about it. The KMT-CCP Forum has reiterated this theme for years. The tune may be old. But it has not diminished in importance. Especially since cross-Strait relations have warmed so rapidly. "Face up to reality" cannot be a unilateral demand. Both sides must understand and accept it. Beijing's bottom line is that our side must oppose Taiwan independence, and adhere to the 1992 Consensus. Only this can "remove the obstacles standing in the way of improved cross-Strait relations, and help the two sides arrive at a feasible solution," Taipei must acknowledge this reality when dealing with Beijing. Taipei's bottom line is that Beijing must accept the reality of the Republic of China on Taiwan. If President Ma Ying-jeou cannot meet and speak with leaders from the other side at an international forum, how can he rise above internal conflict, and arrange a Ma/Hu Summit?"

When can Ma and Hu meet? That perhaps is not Ma Ying-jeou's most pressing concern. For Taipei, the most urgent question in the post-ECFA era, concerns FTAs. Will Taipei encounter resistance or assistance when it attempts to sign FTAs with foreign governments? Hu did not respond to this question directly. Wu Po-hsiung however did cite Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. Wu said that President Hu endorsed Wang Yi's advocacy of "fair and reasonable treatment, pragmatic and proper handling." Cross-Strait relations are special and sensitive. Many issues can be mentioned only in passing. One must adopt a wait and see attitude. ECFA has increased cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. The Ma administration now needs FTAs to make the progress more real. Only then can he reduce internal pressures, and assuage internal concerns.

On a more positive note, Beijing is willing to meet Taipei's calls for "fair and reasonable treatment." It is willing to take actions that are "pragmatic and appropriate." Basically Taipei has been presented with a golden opportunity. It should be able to sign FTAs with other governments in the foreseeable future. Taipei however, must be realistic. It cannot expect to sign FTAs with scores of governments. Beijing has certain conditions. For example, Taipei cannot start by attempting to sign FTAs with the Beijing's diplomatic allies, Only after Beijing has signed FTAs with them will Taipei be given the chance to follow up. These are all matters about which Taipei must be psychologically prepared. Following Mainland China's lead, the two sides can study the regional economy. How much latitude is there on Taiwan to express one's views on political reality? This must be addressed in advance. The two sides need goodwill. They also need creativity. Only then can they continue to create a win-win situation.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2010.07.14
社論－用善意、創意 為兩岸續創雙贏
本報訊

兩岸簽署經濟合作架構協議「ＥＣＦＡ」後，國共論壇在廣州召開。中共總書記、國家主席胡錦濤依例在北京接見國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄一行人，儘管胡錦濤並未對台灣最關切的後續與他國簽署ＦＴＡ之事，做出更明確而具體的表示，但不變的是兩岸善意和密切交流更堅實地推動下去；吳伯雄也高調、公開地傳達馬英九總統的致意和十六字原則，這也顯示兩岸關係已經走出「密使」陰霾，朝制度化、正常化邁進。

眾所皆知，李登輝執政時期，兩岸互動仍處於不穩定狀態，雙方互動密切時，國共最高層皆派出最親信的密使傳話，密使讓兩岸關係平添想像，卻無助於兩岸關係的正面發展；即使如此，扁政府執政時期也曾有意建立密使管道，但陳水扁西裝口袋的一張紙條，也無助於扁政府與北京方面互信往來；二○○五年，親民黨主席宋楚瑜赴大陸訪問，行前主要考量還是在於兩岸關係如何正常化，因此多次與扁政府溝通，建立宋、胡會的對話方向和原則，陳水扁贈字「誠信」以取信於宋，但結果依舊落空。

馬英九和李、扁時期的執政者最大不同是，他不相信密使管道這種事。他堅持執政下的海陸兩會或任何與兩岸相關的協商，在透明、正常的機制下運行；他甚至一度動念要讓國共論壇轉型，不再扮演兩岸政策先行者的角色。事實上，馬的想法部分也落實在目前兩岸關係和政策上，國共論壇的儀式性漸強，決策性趨弱，所有兩岸協議、磋商，除兩岸兩會外也納入政府相關官員、甚至機關。至於國共論壇，大陸以黨領政，所有與談代表，既有黨職也都是對台工作的要角，但國民黨方面出席者，無一在馬政府大陸決策體系中扮演任何角色，遑論發言權，充其量他們可以透過黨的管道提供建議。

馬英九不熱衷參與國共對話，是北京方面對馬一直存在的疑慮，但是，馬英九有強烈企圖心改善兩岸關係卻是不爭事實。國共高層對話，始自國民黨在野之後，無官一身輕的國民黨人，在這幾年往來北京、上海，出席各種活動與論壇，建立互信與了解，重新執政後，這樣的對話，在黨依舊可以進行，但身兼總統與黨主席的馬英九，顯然一時半刻還不可能與對岸領導人面對面對話。

馬英九這次請吳伯雄帶給胡錦濤的十六字：「正視現實，累積互信，求同存異、續創雙贏」，並不特殊，只是國共論壇數年來一談再談的論調，雖為老調，卻極為重要，特別是在兩岸關係直線升溫後，「正視現實」不能只是單方面的要求，必須為兩岸共同認知和接納。就北京方面而言，很難打破他們的原則；反對台獨、堅持九二共識，唯其如此才能為「解決制約兩岸關係發展的難題，找到可行的辦法」，這也是台灣面對北京必須認清的現實；就台灣方面而言，則是要對岸接受中華民國在台灣的現實，馬英九總統如果不可能在國際場合與對岸領導人對話，他又如何可能突破內部矛盾，創造「馬胡會」？

馬胡何時能會，還未必是馬英九最急迫的關切重點，對台灣而言，最重要的，反而是後ＥＣＦＡ時代，台灣尋求對外簽署ＦＴＡ，可能遭遇的是阻力或助力？胡錦濤並未正面回應這個問題，吳伯雄則以國台辦主任王毅的說法指，胡主席贊同王毅所提「合情合理對待，務實妥善處理」的說法。兩岸關係特殊、敏感，很多事點到為止，只能靜觀後續進展，ＥＣＦＡ讓兩岸經貿合作更緊密，馬政府就更需要在對外簽署ＦＴＡ取得實質進展，才能化解內部的壓力和疑慮。

從好的方面看，大陸願意「合情合理對待」台灣的需求，「務實妥善處理」台灣的行動，基本上，應該暗示台灣有很大機會，在可預見的時間內，與他國簽成ＦＴＡ。但是，台灣也不能不切實際地期待舖天蓋地簽成許許多多ＦＴＡ，大陸方面有前提的制約，比方說，大陸的邦交國，台灣不能先簽；大陸簽成ＦＴＡ者，台灣才有機會跟進等等，都是台灣必須做好心理準備的；至於在大陸領頭下，兩岸共同參考區域經濟，台灣還有多大的對政治現實各自表述的空間？也得提前因應，兩岸需要善意，也需要創意，才能真正續創雙贏。