Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Sophistry

Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Sophistry
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 24, 2011

Summary: DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on "national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges." In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?

Full Text below:

DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on "national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges." In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Key points include: The DPP will accept the already signed cross-Strait trade and economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). If the DPP returns to power, it will deal with any related issue in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. But the "1992 Consensus" does not exist. Therefore the DPP has no need to either accept it or reject it. Superficially Tsai Ing-wen's argument may seem sound. But in fact it is self-contradictory and cannot withstand close scrutiny.

Take ECFA for example, The two sides signed a framework agreement in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. First, the agreement was approved by the Legislative Yuan, Second, the agreement between the two sides accorded with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, and was even submitted to the WTO after signing. Tsai Ing-wen proposes to redo everything the Ma administration already did. She then intends to make it part of her campaign platform. She even intends to make it part of the DPP's political principles.

Tsai Ing-wen has accused the Ma administration of turning a blind eye to the long term effects of ECFA on Taiwan's development. She accuses the Ma administration of ignoring the "China Factor." She says doing so could make it impossible for Taiwan to sign free trade agreements with other important trading partners. But the truth is just the reverse. The Chen regime ruled for eight years. Apart from a handful of diplomatic allies, no other nations signed FTAs with Taipei. By contrast, the Ma administration successfully signed FTAs with many non-allies, all in three short years. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with Washington. But the sticking point is not any alleged "China Factor." It is the still unresolved dispute between Taipei and Washington over US beef imports and Clenbuterol.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP blasted ECFA, both before and after it was signed. They said it seriously harmed industries on Taiwan. During an interview with the SET channels's "Taiwan Yes" talk show, Tsai publicly proclaimed that the DPP would launch a referendum drive and allow the people to decide whether they still wanted ECFA. The facts have shown that ECFA has benefitted industries on Taiwan. Beneficiaries include counties headed by the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen must reconcile her current position with past statements. Unfortunately for her, she cannot erase what she said before.

The 1992 Consensus is of supreme importance to cross-Strait relations. But Tsai Ing-wen considers the 1992 Consensus "non-existent." To her, the 1992 Consensus does not exist. But the 1991 National Unification Guidelines and the 1992 Consensus made the 1993 Koo-Wang Summit possible. This is historical fact. The two sides have set aside their differences, and each side adheres to its own definition of "One China." Because the two sides had this consensus, peaceful cross-Strait exchanges prevail today.

In fact, the two sides have already held six Chiang-Chen Summits, and signed 15 agreements, including the most important agreement of all, ECFA. Every one of these agreements are predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. To repudiate the 1992 Consensus is to repudiate the very basis of these cross-Strait agreements. Repudiation would threaten existing agreements. Repudiation would also threaten future cross-strait consultations, Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus would repudiate everything that went before. What kind of leader indulges in such myopic thinking?

Tsai Ing-wen told interviewers that "[Mainland] China must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Taiwan. If [Mainland] China insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Taiwan. Would this be a good thing for [Mainland] China? " But the reverse is equally true, Tsai Ing-wen should ask herself, "Taiwan must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Mainland China. If Taiwan insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Mainland China. Would this be a good thing for Taiwan?"

Cross-Strait relations affect both sides. Neither side can expect the other to acquiesce totally to its demands. The 1992 Consensus is the balance point between these two interests. Both sides adhere to their own positions, while setting aside their differences. The DPP insists on rejecting the 1992 Consensus, and butting heads with the Mainland, What good will this do Taiwan? What good will this do peaceful cross-strait exchanges?

Tsai Ing-wen rejects the 1992 Consensus. She says that once she is elected president, she will use the democratic process to establish a new "Taiwanese Consensus" as a basis for cross-Strait talks. She said that creating a domestic consensus is the responsibility of the president. "The president cannot consider only his own party's interests, nor can he cling to a predetermined position. Quite true. A presidential election is the important democratic institution of all. In 2008, the people elected Ma Ying-jeou president. By doing so, they voted in favor of across the board, peaceful, pragmatic cross-Strait relations, predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. How can Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP consider only her own party's interests? How can she cling to a predetermined position? How can she presume that the DPP alone represents "mainstream thinking" on Taiwan?

If Tsai Ing-wen is merely confused, then she should refer to former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh's statement. "After half a century of living together, we already have a consensus!" [As Shih Ming-teh sees it] the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?

闡釋兩岸政策 蔡英文近乎詭辯
2011-08-24 中國時報

民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文發表十年政綱「國家安全、兩岸經貿篇」,以一貫近乎詭辯的言詞闡釋她的兩岸政策立場;其重點包括:對已簽署的兩岸經貿合作框架協議(ECFA)概括承受,若執政後將會遵循民主程序及國際規範來處理相關事宜;至於「九二共識」,既不存在,即無接受或否認的問題。表面上看,蔡英文的說法彷彿言之成理,實際上卻前後矛盾,根本無法自圓其說。

以ECFA為例,兩岸簽署此一合作框架協議,是遵循民主程序與國際規範辦理;首先,協議係經立法院認可,其次兩岸依世界貿易組織(WTO)原則簽定,且簽定後也已經WTO報備。蔡英文重複馬政府已經做完的事,能成為競選政見、乃至民進黨的政綱嗎?

蔡英文又說,馬政府不願面對兩岸簽署ECFA對台灣發展的深遠影響,忽視中國因素可能導致台灣無法與其他重要貿易伙伴洽簽自由貿易協定的事實。但,恰恰相反,扁政府執政八年,除了少數邦交國,同樣簽不成任何FTA;反而馬政府三年多來與多個非邦交國的友邦開始協商簽署FTA事宜,與美國之間尚未談攏,不是中國因素,而是美國牛與瘦肉精爭議。

兩岸簽署ECFA前後,蔡英文與民進黨舉黨批判,強調對台灣產業危害至深,並在接受三立《大話新聞》訪問時,公開宣示民進黨執政後要發動公投,讓全民決定是否還要ECFA。事實證明,ECFA確實讓台灣產業受惠,受惠者還包括民進黨執政縣市,蔡英文此刻含糊面對她曾經表達過的立場,卻無法抹去她曾經說過的話。

更重要的,對於維繫兩岸關係最重要的「九二共識」,蔡英文認定是「不存在的」。在她的認知中或許沒有「九二共識」這個名詞,但是因為一九九一年的國統綱領和一九九二年的共識,才促成了一九九三的「辜汪會談」,這是「歷史事實」。就內涵上而言,這是兩岸擱置爭議,各自表述「一個中國」;因為有這樣的「共識」,兩岸才能建構出目前和平交流的關係。

事實上,兩岸迄今舉辦六次江陳會談,簽署了十五項協議,包括最重要的ECFA,都是以「九二共識」為基礎、為前提。否認「九二共識」,就是否定了兩岸協議的基礎和前提,不但對現有協議如何繼續執行產生困擾,就未來兩岸可能的協商,形同一筆勾銷,這算什麼領導者的戰略思考?

蔡英文接受媒體訪問時,進一步強調「中國必須思考要跟台灣維持什麼關係?如果中國堅持自己的原則最重要,不惜與台灣人民的主流思想與意志衝突,對中國是不是一件好事」?這個說法反過來同樣成立,蔡英文必須思考,「什麼是對台灣最有利的事,如果堅持自己的想法最重要,不惜與台灣主流思考與利益衝突,對台灣、對民進黨是不是一件好事?」

兩岸關係繫乎兩端,對任何一方來說,都不可能要求對方全面退讓;「九二共識」就是在這樣的互利思考中得到的平衡點,各執立場但放下爭端。拒絕九二共識,堅持爭端,對台灣有什麼好處?對兩岸後後續的和平交流有什麼利基?

否定九二共識的蔡英文要宣示,當選總統後要透過民主機制凝聚的新的「台灣共識」,做為兩岸對談的基礎;她還說,國內共識是總統的責任,「總統不能宥於自己政黨的利益與思考,也不能預設立場。」有道理,總統選舉就是最重要的民主機制,當二○○八年馬英九當選總統的那一刻開始,全民已經用實際行動要求兩岸務實地在九二共識的基礎下全面開展和平關係。蔡英文和民進黨豈能宥於自己政黨的利益和思考,預設立場地認為只有民進黨的主張才是台灣的「主流思想」?

如果蔡英文還是想不清楚,或許應該參考民進黨前主席施明德的論述:「歷經半世紀的共同生活,我們早已磨合出共識了!」中華民國就是台灣,台灣就是中華民國。執著於台灣前途決議文的蔡英文和民進黨,到底承不承認中華民國一直是主權獨立的國家?台灣還需要困在獨立建國的魔咒中,反覆陷入無謂的政治爭議,破壞兩岸已經和平交流的繁榮局面嗎?

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