Key to Cross-Strait Development: Seize the Moment, Work Together

Key to Cross-Strait Development: Seize the Moment, Work Together
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 3, 2013

Summary: When officials from Taipei and Beijing discuss cross-Strait relations, they often attempt to seize the moral high ground. They often make carefully worded but undecipherable responses, out of fear that the other side will take advantage of them, or that they will lose face. In fact, opportunities can be created. Our attitudes and perspectives determine the future. We must seize opportunities and ensure cooperation, in order to improve cross-Strait relations. This is the key to the ROC's future. We must give it all we have.

Full text below:

When officials from Taipei and Beijing discuss cross-Strait relations, they often attempt to seize the moral high ground. They often make carefully worded but undecipherable responses, out of fear that the other side will take advantage of them, or that they will lose face. Why? Perhaps this happens because they share the same language and national character. Perhaps it is due to the uniquely ambiguous nature of the Chinese language. Perhaps it can be chalked up to pragmatic political considerations. Everyone is reluctant to put speak plainly. Often they leave things half said. Those outside the loop often assume it is nothing more than political rhetoric, and must not be taken seriously. But sometimes these responses are loaded with subtext. Changing a single word may radically change the meaning. Those in the know often take the hint. But other times the ambiguity leads to misunderstandings, miscalculations, and confusion regarding another's intentions. Experts may need to decipher them.

For example, are relations between Taipei and Beijing international relations, domestic relations, or "cross-Strait relations?" Are delegations from the ROC "Zhongguo Taipei" or "Zhonghua Taipei?" Were the talks Koo-Wang talks or Wang-Koo talks? Were the talks an end point, or a hiatus? Were they political negotiations or political dialogues? Was their consensus "one China, shared interpretation," or "different interpretations?" The two sides quarrel endlessly. Every time Lien and Hu meet, Wu and Hu meet, Siew and Hu meet, or Wu and Xi meet, they issue a 16 word declaration,one that bowls everyone over. Even Hu Jintao joked about these 16 word declarations with visiting VIPs from Taiwan. The two sides rearrange the order of these 16 words constantly. They ponder the meaning of every word. Reporters and officials outside the loop often find their heads spinning. They conclude that the two sides are engaged merely in sophistry or word games, that they are concerned merely with appearances, with saving face, and have forgotten the substance.

Several interesting developments have taken place recently. The first of course, is rumors of a Ma Xi Summit. These are apparently more than mere rumors. Will there be a ground-breaking development in the near future? That would be something worth anticipating. The second is the ongoing interaction between the Red Camp and the Green Camp. Can the DPP successfully restructure? Can it accept the one China Constitution? Can it change its fundamentally anti-China, separatist orientation? This major variable will affect the political situation on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations. The third is the upcoming cross-Strait peace forum. This will be an important event. Can the two sides' think tanks and academics make a breakthrough, enabling cross-Strait political dialogue? Can they identify the obstacles and a way out of the stalemate?

News reports from Taiwan say that officials from the two sides may meet. These reports have a basis in fact. The officials in question may have domestic elections to consider. They may be attempting to ensure their place in history, or to consolidate long-term cross-Strait relations. President Ma wants to meet with Xi Jinping. At the very least, he does not reject such a meeting. This is widely known. President Ma has repeatedly implied that the only obstacle is current conditions, which must be improved. This of course includes where Ma and Xi would meet, how they would meet, and how they would address each other. The problems are real but not insoluble. The two sides, working together, can overcome any obstacles. Seizing the opportunities and working together is the key.

Ma Ying-jeou does not oppose, and may even want a meeting between himself and Xi Jinping. Beijing is  already aware of this. If the rumors are true, it will impact more than Ma Ying-jeou as an individual. It will impact the future of the ROC and cross-Strait relations. It may help Xi Jinping consolidate his power and ensure his legacy. Such a meeting would be the biggest event since the KMT and the CCP shook hands in 2005. It would be the focus of world attention. All research, all officials and academics charged with Taiwan-related business, would have the opportunity to establish their reputations and leave behind legacies. From a strategic perspective, the CCP is likely to see this as a rare and fleeting historical opportunity. It is likely to clear away the tactical obstacles in its way. We can only wait and see.

CCP Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu and Foreign Ministry spokesman recently. He addressed officials from both sides during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. He was clear and specific. Beijing still insists that the two sides cannot meet in an international venue. This accords with customary practice. On the surface, he has already rejected an informal meeting next year at the APEC leadership summit. But as Sun Yafu said, the APEC meeting and any meeting between Ma and Xi would be different things. Outsiders should not conflate the two by talking about them in the same breath. Did his words carry some unknown meaning or subtext? Also, just because the two sides met in Singapore, it did not mean that the Koo Wang Meeting was an international negotiation. If Ma and Xi meet in a third country, that does not mean they are meeting in an international venue. This too should be considered.

Consider Red Camp dialogue with the Green Camp. The CCP is reluctant to use the term "CCP-DPP dialogue." It is reluctant to leave the wrong impression. It remains unwilling to engage in party to party interaction until the DPP forsakes Taiwan independence. Beijing has practical considerations. It is attempting to increase contacts and improve understanding. For the CCP, the purpose of the Peace Forum is to facilitate cross-Strait political dialogue and negotiations, in the search for solutions. Will future developments lead to the formation of a mechanism for this? That remains to be seen. Beijing may have some thoughts on this. But for now it is a case of catch as catch can, feeling the stones while crossing the river. These two things are reflected in the CCP's determination to bring about comprehensive improvements in cross-Strait relations.

In fact, opportunities can be created. Our attitudes and perspectives determine the future. We must seize opportunities and ensure cooperation, in order to improve cross-Strait relations. This is the key to the ROC's future. We must give it all we have.

社論－兩岸發展關鍵：把握機遇、共同合作
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中國時報 本報訊
2013年09月03日 04:10

或許出於同文同種的民族性格關係，或許由於中國文字特有的朦朧性質，更或許出於現實政治的考量，兩岸領導人在談論雙邊關係的時候常常高來高去，字斟句酌的專講一些摸不著邊際的話；就怕給對方占了便宜或丟了自己的面子，大家都不願意把話講絕，常常是話到嘴邊留半句。不知情的人認為這些都是一些門面的政治語言，當真不得，但有時候卻也真是話中有話，一字之別但卻含有深意；知情的人有時固然能夠心領神會，但有時也還是會誤解、誤判，搞不清對方的真實意圖，還要專人點撥。

比如說兩岸到底是國際、國內或兩岸關係，到底是中國台北或中華台北，到底是辜汪、汪辜會談或會面，到底是句點或逗點，到底是政治談判或政治對話，到底是一中共表或各表，雙方都要吵個半天。連胡、吳胡、蕭胡、吳習會面每次都來個十六字訣，搞得大家人仰馬翻，連胡錦濤後來都要對到訪台灣貴賓笑稱又是十六個字，雙方對這十六個字排列的先後順序字字琢磨，不知情的外國媒体和代表官員常常被搞得暈頭轉向，認為兩岸簡直就是在玩弄玄學或文字藝術，只重表象和面子，有時反而忘了關鍵性的實質問題。

話說最近發生的幾樁引人注意的事情，首先當然是甚囂塵上的所謂馬習會問題，事情看來並非空穴來風，未來是否會有石破天驚的發展，特別值得留意；其次則是進行中的紅綠互動問題，民進黨能否成功轉型，接受憲法一中的主張，調整其反中及分離主義的基本立場，這將是牽動台灣政局及兩岸關係的一大變數；第三則是即將舉行的兩岸和平論壇問題，由於這將是一個極為重要的活動，試看雙方能否透過民間智庫及所謂的重量級學者，先行為兩岸未來政治對話與談判找出問題及破解之道。

就目前看來，台灣媒体報導兩岸領導人可能會面一事可以說是事出有因，不管是出於內政選舉的需要，自己的歷史定位問題或固化兩岸關係的長遠考量，馬總統有意或至少是不排除與習近平見面一事已是眾所皆知的事情。馬總統已多次明示、暗示，當前問題只是會面的條件並不具備，仍然有待加強，而這其中當然涉及馬習見面的地點、方式、稱謂、場合等各種不同的問題。事情當然難解，但也不是無解，端看雙方能否把握機遇，共同合作來克服其中可能存在的障礙。把握機遇和共同合作將是關鍵之所在。

北京對於馬英九不排斥，或希望能夠促成雙方領導人見面的意圖應該早已心領神會。如果此事一旦成真，這將不只是對馬英九個人，台灣的未來發展及兩岸關係產生重大影響，也可進一步鞏固習近平的領導權威，確立他的歷史地位；畢竟這將是繼2005年國共握手言歡後的頭等大事，必然是全世界矚目的焦點，而所有研究、處理涉台業務的官員、學者這都將是建立事功，歷史留名的大好機會。從戰略的高度出發，中共應該會積極把握這種難得、稍縱即逝的歷史機遇，然後在戰術上努力為此創造條件，排除各種障礙，對此我們或可拭目以待。

中共國台辦副主任孫亞夫及外交部發言人日前都對兩岸領導人在亞太經濟合作會議會面一事表達明確而且具體的立場。北京仍然堅持雙方不能在國際場合會面，主張按照慣例辦理，表面上已經拒絕了明年雙方在APEC非正式領袖峰會見面的可能；但就像孫亞夫所說，APEC會議和兩人會面可以是兩件不同的事情，外界不應將其混為一談，他的話中是否有些不為人知的意涵或所謂的潛台詞，值得玩味。另外，就像當年在新加坡舉行的兩岸的辜汪會談並不等於國際談判，馬習兩人若在第三國見面是否也並不意味著國際場合，同樣不無思考的空間。

有關紅綠對話，中共不願直接使用民共對話二字就是不願給外界不當聯想，誤認願意在民進黨並未放棄台獨的主張下與其進行黨際互動，北京只是基於現實的考量，試圖加強彼此的接觸與了解；有關和平論壇一事，中共的目的基本上還是為了破解將來兩岸政治對話與談判難題，預為尋求解決之道，至於未來到底會發展成何種樣貌，最後是否能夠形成一種機制，仍待觀察。北京心中或許有些構想，但目前恐怕也還是在且戰且走，摸著石頭過河的階段。這兩件事情都反映出中共試圖深化發展、全面推動兩關係的決心。

事實上，機會可以是創造的，而態度與視野則會決定未來的結果。把握機遇、共同合作、深化發展、全面推動兩岸關係，這才是影響台灣未來的關鍵，我們必須全力以赴！