Wang Jin-pyng and the Taipei District Court's 80/20 Ruling

Wang Jin-pyng and the Taipei District Court's 80/20 Ruling
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 17, 2013

Summary: We have repeatedly argued that the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan's influence peddling within the Judicial Yuan necessitates his removal from office. Even if Wang Jin-pyng wins in the courts, even if public opinion sympathizes with Wang Jin-pyng, that does not change our opinion. We may not be able to change this "80%/20%" situation. But both our intellects and our consciences find it intolerable.

Full text below:

The following is an actual conversation that took place between two political appointees a few years ago, before the current influence peddling scandal erupted.

Political Appointee A: "Why does Wang Jin-pyng never object to paying an 80% price to get a mere 20% return on the investment in the Legislative Yuan? I don't get it."

Political Appointee B: "You need to look at it from a different perspective. The 80% price is the price paid by the tax-paying public. It comes out of the national treasury. The 20% return is in the form of favors repayable to Wang Jin-pying personally."

Recently, this newspaper commented on the influence peddling scandal. It called a spade a spade. It refrained from mentioning Wang Jin-pyng's bag of political tricks. Now however, let us examine Wang Jin-pyng's bag of political tricks more closely, so that we may better understand the nature of his influence peddling. For Wang Jin-pyng, the influence peddling scandal is merely the tip of the iceberg .

Some legislators say that under Wang Jin-pyng, the Legislative Yuan ceased being a "collegial system," and has turned into an "executive system." It is no longer a "political system controlled by political parties," but rather a "political system controlled by Wang Jin-pyng alone." Under this framework, individual lawmakers spend almost no time deliberating pending bills. All they care about is demagoguing controversial political issues. All bills are subject o "ruling and opposition party consultations." Translation: under the table deals in smoke filled back rooms. Wang Jin-pyng decides how the parties divide the spoils. He decides who gets what. He decides which party's illegal antics he will tolerate, such as the DPP's occupation of the Legislative Yuan podium. It's all up to him. The so-called "ruling and opposition party consultations" between party whips burn the midnight oil. The next morning when the vote is taken, just before the legislative session is about to adjourn, the parties instruct their legislators to toe the party line.

This is a Legislative Yuan which almost never consults over [pending bills. This is a Legislative Yuan which tramples over majority rule. Under Wang Jin-pyng's Legislative Yuan, an 80% price paid by the public, brings a 20% return. From another perspective, Wang Jin-pyng trades that 80% price paid by taxpayers, for a 20% return, payable to him personally, in the form of personal debts owed to him and the bolstering of his personal image. Wang Jin-pyng takes this 20% return, and uses it to maintain his iron grip over the Legislative Yuan. He takes the 80% price paid by the public to bolster his status as the "capo di tutti capi of the Legislative Yuan."

Wang Jin-pyng peddled influence on behalf of Ker Chien-ming. This was a textbook case of an 80% price paid by the public. It was the tip of the iceberg. Many have wondered why Wang Jin-pyng never invoked his police power to impose order when the Legislative Yuan succumbed to chaos. We now have the answer. Why would he need to invoke his police power? The fact is, no one has ever demanded that Wang Jin-pyng invoke his police power. Anyone who understands what has been going on, who realizes Wang's sole aim is to perpetuate the "Wang Regime" within the Legislative Yuan. will find his "80%/20%" power plays intolerable.

Rumors have recently emerged from the cabinet that high officials within the Legislative Yuan have peddled influence in the Executive Yuan. This can be included in the 80% price the public has paid in the Legislative Yuan. What constitutes influence peddling in the Executive Yuan may depend upon whom one asks. But influence peddling in the Justice Yuan impacts constitutional rule and criminal justice. It cannot be tolerated. Hence the question, just how badly has Wang Jin-pyng's 80% price, underwritten by the taxpayer, undermined constitutional rule and the criminal justice system?

Wang Jin-pyng peddled influence within the Judicial Yuan, undermining constitutional rule and criminal justice. He refuses to admit wrongdoing. He hijacks the political system. He hijacks the Legislative Yuan. He incites social divisions. He incites powerful but unjustified protests. What is this, if not another instance of "80% public price / 20% private gain?"

The Taipei District Court has been forced to render a civil ruling. In general, its ruling failed to see the forest for the trees. It was an outrageous ruling. It was an outrage to constitutional rule and jurisprudence.

One. A legislator without portfolio is a legislator appointed by a political party. which is answerable to the public. For example, recently the TSU stripped Simon Lin of his party membership as well as his post as legislator without portfolio, for "acting contrary to the party's decisions." Stripping Simon Lin of his party membership and his legislator without portfolio position, was the prerogative of the political party. If a political party lacks such a prerogative, how can it compel its legislators without portfolio to answer to the party? How in turn, can the party answer to the public? How can the court interfere with the already concluded party disciplinary proceedings? Is the judge an overlord who outranks the party chairman?

Two. The President is also a party chairman. As the president he cannot tolerate the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan peddling influence within the Judicial Yuan. As party chairman he must impose party discipline. In terms of constitutional law and jurisprudence, these are one and the same. Yet the court ruled that the president may not voice objections regarding constitutional rule and criminal of justice, or what constitute appropriate legal dispositions. If that is the case, how can the president possibly govern the nation? If that is the case, how can he possibly remain politically answerable? Is the judge an overlord who outranks the president?

Three. Wang Jin-pyng is no ordinary legislator. He is the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan. The court knows this. Yet it considered only Wang's "civil interests." It approved the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan's continued exercise of legislative authority. It failed to recuse itself. It even refused to accept a letter from the Election Commission. If Wang loses his appeal, how cam the harm inflicted upon constitutional rule by his illegal oversight of the legislative Yuan be remedied? Does this ruling, which misses the the forest for the trees, accord with the principle of proportionality?

If this scandal had occurred in a typical business firm, the guilty parties would have been suspended or compelled to recuse themselves. Never mind a Speaker of the Legislative Yuan. The Taipei District Court's ruling valued Wang Jin-pyng's 20% private interest over the 80% public price in undermined constitutional rule.

We have repeatedly argued that the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan's influence peddling within the Judicial Yuan necessitates his removal from office. Even if Wang Jin-pyng wins in the courts, even if public opinion sympathizes with Wang Jin-pyng, that does not change our opinion. We may not be able to change this "80%/20%" situation. But both our intellects and our consciences find it intolerable.

王金平與台北地院的「80／20法則」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.17 02:59 am

以下是兩位政務官之間的對話，談話時間在幾年前，亦即在關說案風暴發生之前。

政務官甲：「王金平在立法院，為何總是以八十％的代價，換取二十％的收穫？我看不懂！」

政務官乙：「你可以換個角度看：八十％的點點滴滴皆是社會成本、國家資源付出的代價，二十％則點點滴滴皆是王金平個人的人情收穫。」

本報近日在評論關說風暴時，秉持就案論案，而未觸及王金平的政治手法與風格；但若能從王金平的整個政治風格與手法來解析，更能理解關說案的底蘊。因為，對於王金平來說，關說案其實只是冰山一角。

有立法委員說：在王金平主持下的立法院，已非「合議制」，而是「首長制」；亦非「政黨政治」，而是「王金平制」。在此一架構下，個別的立法委員平日幾乎無由參與法案研議，因此只想炒作政爭話題；至於法案的一切過程均在「朝野政黨協商」的密室黑箱中進行，而主要由王金平決定各方的法案利益如何分配，包括他也可決定將接受任何黨派的抗爭（如霸占主席台）表演到何種程度；然後，黨鞭步出所謂的「朝野協商」，各自到閉會前夕、挑燈夜戰的議場舉牌，命黨籍立委投票。

這是一個幾乎沒有法案辯論的立法院，也是一個多數原則受到高度摧殘的立法院。於是，在王金平主持下的立法院，就一直是以八十％的社會成本，換得二十％的議事表現；換個角度看，也可以說以八十％的社會成本，換來王金平二十％的開明形象與人情收穫。而王金平就以這二十％的人情收穫，創造了「立法院是首長制」的異象；並又繼續以八十％的社會成本，來鞏固他的「立法院首長制」。

王金平為柯建銘司法關說，正是十分經典式地顯露了這八十％的社會成本的冰山一角。因此，若曾有人質疑，王金平為何在立院脫序時不動用警察權？如今即可知，他豈有動用警察權的必要？其實，亦無人強要王金平動用警察權，但若明此底蘊，恐怕也無人能接受他用這樣的「八十／二十」操作，來維持他在立法院的「王氏首長制」。

內閣近日流傳立院高層許多駭人聽聞的「行政關說」，那些亦可列在維持立院運作的八十％社會成本的帳單上。然而，行政關說容可見仁見智，但司法關說卻攸關憲政正義，絕無寬縱餘地；且由此亦可質疑：王金平的八十％社會成本中，究竟耗損了多少憲政正義？

如今犯下司法關說憲政天條的王金平，非但不認錯，反而挾持政局、挾持立法院、撕裂社會，進行有力無理的抗爭。這豈不又是一場「八十％社會代價／二十％個人收穫」法則的極致演出？

行文至此，亦不能不對台北地方法院的民事裁定表達一些看法。總的來說，這是一個見樹不見林的裁定，也是一個豈有此「理」的裁定。此處所稱之「理」，是指「憲政法理」。

一、不分區立委是政黨為了向社會負政治責任的政治任命，即如近日台聯僅以「違背黨的決策」便撤銷了林世嘉的黨籍及不分區立委資格，這本就是一個政黨的政治決策。如果政黨無此權力，如何使其不分區立委對黨負責？而黨又如何向社會負責？法院豈能干涉已完成黨內程序的黨紀處分案？法官難道是太上黨主席？

二、總統兼任黨主席，以總統身分不接受立法院長關說司法，又以黨主席立場訴諸黨紀，這在憲政法理上應視為一體的事件。法院的裁定，不啻使總統不能對憲政正義及政治風氣提出主張，並為合法正當之處置，則教總統如何治理國家？又如何負起政治責任？難道法官是太上總統？

三、明知王金平不是一般立法委員，而是立法院長；卻只顧全王個人的「民事利益」，使繫訟的立法院長繼續行使職權，未能迴避，甚至拒收中選會函文；試問，一旦王若敗訴，他「非法」主持議事的「憲政損害」當如何補救？此種見樹不見林的裁定，豈符比例原則？

此事若發生在一般公司，亦應考酌當事人應否停權或迴避，何況是立法院長？台北地院的裁定，不啻亦是以王金平二十％的個人利益，而將八十％的憲政利害置於莫大的風險之下。

近日我們一再主張，立法院長涉及司法關說即無留任的正當性。即使王金平在法院勝訴，即使民意傾向同情王金平，也不致改變我們的此一立場。我們或許無力改變這個「八十／二十」的局面，但我們仍要說：我們在理智及良知上，不能同意。