Expedite the Cross-Strait Agreement: DPP Do Not Cocoon Yourself

Expedite the Cross-Strait Agreement: DPP Do Not Cocoon Yourself
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 2, 2014

Summary: The heads of the two cross-Strait associations, Lin Join-sane and Chen Deming, met in Huai An. They did not mention the Chang Hsien-yao incident in public. They did however issue a joint declaration, saying that cross-Strait relations "will not be affected by minor problems." The two sides also agreed to "accelerate the cross-Strait negotation process." Lin Join-sane said, "Cross-Strait relations will not be affected by minor ripples." Chen Deming said, "I see no storm, I feel only the radiance of the sun."

Full Text Below:

The heads of the two cross-Strait associations, Lin Join-sane and Chen Deming, met in Huai An. They did not mention the Chang Hsien-yao incident in public. They did however issue a joint declaration, saying that cross-Strait relations "will not be affected by minor problems." The two sides also agreed to "accelerate the cross-Strait negotation process." Lin Join-sane said, "Cross-Strait relations will not be affected by minor ripples." Chen Deming said, "I see no storm, I feel only the radiance of the sun."

Regarding the "acceleration of the cross-Strait agreement process," MTA talks will resume on the 10th of this month in Taipei. The two cross-Strait associations will hold their 11th round of high-level talks at the end of the year or next spring. They may sign six agreements in one fell swoop, including agreements pertaining to the MTA, dispute settlement, avoidance of double taxation, the establishment of offices on both sides, environmental protection, aviation safety, and standards for airworthiness.

The two associations' declaration showed that the Sunflower Student Movement and Chang Hsien-yao incident failed to disrupt the two sides' agenda. In other words, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations and STA may be stuck in the Legislative Yuan. But the two associations have decided to sign six agreements which were largely settled under the current legal system. They will then send the STA to the Legislative Yuan for review.

This being the case, the cross-Strait bills and other agreements stalled in the Legislative Yuan can still proceed, minimizing the delay. We think this is a legitimate solution. But the ball is now back in the Legislature's court, i.e., in the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen's court. The DPP is determined to "refuse to legislative, refuse to review." Tsai Ing-wen therefore faces a dilemma.

One. The Chang incident failed to derail cross-Strait negotiations. As a result, the DPP lost its political leverage. Two. The STA, plus six other agreements, add up to seven agreements. If all seven agreements are sent to the Legislative Yuan and wind up awaiting review during 2015, an election year, the internal and external pressures on the DPP will be increased commensurately. Three. Consider the impact on the DPP. Suppose the 1992 consensus, plus the Taiwan independence party platform, plus seven stalled cross-Strait agreements become the big issue during the 2016 presidential election? The impact on the election will be even more unpredictable. Faced with such a development, the DPP can no longer cocoon itself.

When the Chang incident erupted, this newspaper called on the blue, green and red camps to work together to salvage cross-Strait relations. We said Beijing must not stand on the sidelines, the DPP must not take advantage of the situation, and the Ma government must remedy the situation. The two sides say they "will not be affected by minor problems" and have agreed to "accelerate cross-Strait negotiations." How then will the DPP will respond to this new situation? Tsai Ing-wen knows that given the global situation and cross-Strait relations, DPP obstruction of cross-Strait agreements will marginalize Taiwan both politically and economically. Taiwan's survival strategy requires globalization. DPP obstruction will marginalize the DPP in the cross-Straits power game. A marginalized DPP will find it hard to win the 2016 presidential election. Even if it does win, it will find it hard to govern. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must not imagine she can get away with blind obstructionism. The one she will be obstructing will be herself.

For example, Tsai Ing-wen posed "Ten Questions for the Ma Administration." Her questions pertained to a stifled economy, scarce job opportunities, declining wages, exorbitant real estate prices, being left behind by South Korea, and why Taiwan long ago ceased being an "Asian Tiger." But these all come back to the same question. Whither Taiwan's economy? Tsai Ing-wen must ask herself whether she intends oppose the 1992 Consensus, champion the Taiwan independence party platform, and obstruct the seven pending cross-Strait agreements? Does she imagine she can win the 2016 presidential election this way? Suppose people ask a Tsai government the same ten questions? How will Tsai answer?

Take just one example. Tsai Ing-wen asked why Taiwan has been left behind by Korea. The reasons are varied. But Tsai Ing-wen knows South Korea will sign a PRC-ROK FTA by the end of the year. This will give Korea a major boost in the Mainland market. Yet the DPP suicidally persists in obstructing the STA. And Tsai Ing-wen has the temerity to ask why Taiwan has been left behind by South Korea. One has to wonder whether she is being ironic?

Taiwan's political and economic challenges require global solutions. But politically or economically, Taiwan cannot achieve what the DPP advocates, "globalization without [Mainland] China." Nor can it connect with [Mainland] China through the world. Taiwan faces an "FTA cliff." Tsai must find a way to connect with the world through [Mainland] China. Otherwise the DPP will find itself excluded from the cross-Strait power game. The DPP's plan is to protest these agreements today, in the hope that if they are subsequently passed, the DPP can "unconditionally accept" them when it returns to power tomorrow.

We urge the Ma government to conclude all six agreements, then together with the STA, send all seven cases to the Legislative Yuan for review. Each and every one of these agreements is conducive to peaceful development. Should the DPP help pass the "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" to control subsequent agreements? Should it cling to its "refuse to legislate, refuse to review" stance? Should it leave the seven pending cross-Strait agreements, the Taiwan independence party platform, and the 1992 consensus for the public to pass judgment on during the 2016 presidential election? The DPP must exercise discretion. Only it can decide whether to cocoon itself or wriggle free from its self-made quagmire.

兩岸加速簽約 民進黨勿作繭自縛
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.09.02 01:59 am

兩岸兩會首長林中森與陳德銘在淮安會面，兩人未公開談論張顯耀事件，但共同宣示，兩岸關係「不受枝節小事影響」，雙方並同意「加快兩岸協議進程」。林中森說：「兩岸關係不受風風雨雨的小小波瀾影響。」；陳德銘則說：「我看不到風雨，只感覺陽光燦爛。」

所謂「加快兩岸協議進程」，本月十日《貨貿協議》將在台北復談，另在年底或明春舉行的兩岸兩會第十一次高層會談中，可能一舉完成簽署六項協議，包括貨品貿易、爭端解決、避免雙重課稅、兩會互設辦事處、環保及飛航安全與適航標準合作協議等。

兩會的這項宣示，是在顯示雖經太陽花及張顯耀兩事件，但兩岸的既定議程不會中止。也就是說，儘管《兩岸協議監督條例》及《服貿協議》卡在立法院，但兩岸兩會決定將談得差不多的六項協議仍在現行法制下完成簽署，然後送交立法院與《服貿協議》一起排隊待審。

倘係如此，則在立法院兩岸法案停擺之際，其他協議的簽署仍能進行，可減低時機的空耗，我們覺得這是一個正當的做法。然而，如此一來，球就拍回了立法院，也就是拍回了民進黨及蔡英文的球場，因為民進黨正是兩岸法案如今落得「不立法／不審查」的主要因素。蔡英文如今面對的情勢是：

一、張案未停斷兩岸兩會續簽協議的動作，使民進黨失去了繼續杯葛的政治槓桿。二、如果形成服貿協議及後續六協議一共加起來七項協議一起送立法院排隊待審的場面，而這個場景又出現在明年二○一五年大選年，民進黨的內外壓力將相對增加。三、對民進黨來說，如果因此使得二○一六總統選舉的議題變成「九二共識加台獨黨綱加七項待審兩岸協議」，其選情變數必更形複雜。面對此一可能的發展，民進黨不可作繭自縛。

張案發生後，本報社論呼籲，兩岸藍綠紅三黨應共同挽救修補兩岸關係；北京不要隔岸觀火，民進黨不要落井下石，馬政府必須亡羊補牢。如今，兩岸政府共持「不受枝節影響／加快協議進程」的立場，但看民進黨將如何回應此一新局。蔡英文必須深切認知：在世局及兩岸關係的大架構下，民進黨對兩岸正當協議的杯葛，不但會使台灣在世界政經情勢中更趨邊緣化，以致與全球化的台灣生存戰略漸行漸遠，亦將使民進黨在兩岸博弈中更加邊緣化，而邊緣化將使民進黨不易通過二○一六的總統大選，縱使獲勝亦不可能平順執政。所以，蔡英文別以為一味杯葛即可以卡住兩岸，因為，這其實是卡住她自己。

比如說，蔡英文「十問馬政府」，包括悶經濟、工作難找、薪資倒退、房價高、被南韓超越、為何早已沒有四小龍等等，總歸一個問題：未來台灣經濟將何去何從？但蔡英文也必須自問：如果她將帶著「反對九二共識／主張台獨黨綱／抵制七項待審兩岸協議」的立場贏得了二○一六總統大選，而若屆時國人以同樣的十個問題「十問蔡政府」，蔡英文將如何回答？

僅舉一例，蔡英文問台灣何以被韓國超越。原因很多，但在明知韓國將因年底中韓ＦＴＡ簽定而在大陸市場如虎添翼之際，民進黨仍焦土杯葛服貿協議，則蔡英文竟仍問台灣為何被南韓超越，豈非是另一種的何不食肉糜？

台灣政經難題的解決方案在全球化，但無論就政治或經濟言，台灣不可能實現一個如民進黨主張的「沒有中國的全球化」，亦無可能「由世界走向中國」。在台灣面臨「ＦＴＡ懸崖」的邊緣，蔡英文如果找不到一個「由中國走向世界」的政經方案，終究將使民進黨在兩岸弈局中出局。民進黨為今之計，是在抗議的姿態下，設法參與後續各項協議的實現，以備為未來若執政時「概括承受」的兩岸資產。

我們主張，馬政府應堅定完成六項後續協議，並與服貿協議一併七案送立院排隊待審，因為這每一項協議皆有益於和平發展。至於民進黨究竟應先完成《兩岸協議監督條例》，以節制後續協議的簽署，抑或仍堅持「不立法／不審查」的立場，將「七項兩岸待審協議／台獨黨綱／九二共識」一併留待二○一六大選交社會公評，自是眾所矚目的抉擇。在作繭自縛與跳脫泥淖之間，民進黨誠應善加斟酌。