1992 Consensus: Can It be Dispensed With? And Should It Be?

1992 Consensus: Can It be Dispensed With? And Should It Be?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 12, 2015

Executive Summary: If Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will soon be forced to cope with the 1992 Consensus, and lay her cards on the table in front of Beijing. She must consider two factors. One. Can she dispense with the 1992 Consensus? Two. Should she dispense with the 1992 Consensus?

Full Text Below:

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will soon be forced to cope with the 1992 Consensus, and lay her cards on the table in front of Beijing. She must consider two factors. One. Can she dispense with the 1992 Consensus? Two. Should she dispense with the 1992 Consensus?

Our view is that the 1992 Consensus is indispensable, and that even it could be dispensed with, it should not be dispensed with.

Dispensing with the 1992 Consensus appears to be Tsai Ing-wen's strongest move. But is is also a move that could leave her totally vulnerable. One wrong move, and all bets will be off.

First consider whether the 1992 Consensus can be dispensed with. Whether the 1992 Consensus can be dispensed with depends on whether Beijing is willing to dispense with the term "1992 Consensus". The term “1992 Consensus” appears in the 18th CCP political report. The Ma Xi summit also enshrined it as the "shared cross-Strait political foundation". Xi Jinping said “If the foundation is not secure, the earth will move and the mountains will shake”. He said that without it, “the ship of peace will capsize".  Therefore how can Xi Jinping possibly back down on the 1992 Consensus? As Richard Bush noted, how can he possibly rationalize such a cross-Strait policy flip-flop to Washington, to 1.3 billion Mainland Chinese, and to the blue and green parties on Taiwan? If Xi Jinping stands firm and insists on the 1992 Consensus, how can Tsai Ing-wen possibly dispense with it?

Now consider whether Tsai Ing-wen should dispense with the 1992 Consensus. The time to lay her cards on the table is near. Lately green camp supporters have appealed to Tsai Ing-wen, citing remarks made during the Ma Xi summit that make them think Beijing will yield on the 1992 Consensus. They cite Zhang Zhijun, who said “As long as Taipei acknowledges the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus, and affirm its core meaning... ".

They argue that as long as Tsai Ing-wen acknowledges that the 1992 Consensus was an agreement, and amounts to an "historical fact", Beijing will cease insisting that the DPP use this "term from history". They think Beijing is offering Tsai Ing-wen a face-saving way out.

But as noted earlier, it is highly unlikely Xi Jinping will take back the term “1992 Consensus”. Doing so would undermine his political credibility. If Tsai Ing-wen is mistaken in her belief that Xi Jinping will back down, all will be lost. Tsai Ing-wen will then find herself mired in an even more dangerous situation. If Beijing takes back the 1992 Consensus, it will expect Tsai Ing-wen to recognize the “essence of the 1992 Consensus”. That would paint Tsai Ing-wen into an even tighter corner. If Beijing is given an inch, then takes a mile, what will Tsai be forced to do to satisfy Beijing?

For Beijing, the essence of the 1992 consensus is "opposition to Taiwan independence” and “both sides of the Strait are part of one China". For the Ma government, the essence of the 1992 Consensus is "one China, different interpretations". Is Tsai Ing-wen really prepared to dispense with the 1992 Consensus and accept its essence – "opposition to Taiwan independence” and “both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of one China"?

Besides, the Ma government has struggled with this question for the past eight years. It has linked the 1992 Consensus to the ROC Constitution, and to “no [immeditate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force”. It has linked it to “one China, different interpretations”. The Ma government may not have persuaded authorities on the two sides to formally accept "one China, different interpretations”. But for eight years Beijing has refrained from repudiating this condition. This constitutes progress for “one China, different interpretations”. One China, different interpretations is unquestionably the key to cross-Strait relations. If Tsai Ing-wen rejects the 1992 consensus, she will lose a strategic foothold in cross-Strait relations. Beijing will then demand that she explicitly "oppose Taiwan independence” and agree that “both sides are part of one China”. She will have shot herself in the foot. 

One China, different interpretations is the strategic framework by which the two sides promote peaceful cross-Strait relations. If the 1992 Consensus is jettisoned, then “one China, different interpretations” will be lost as well, to the detriment of both sides.

Before Tsai Ing-wen lays her cards out in front of Beijing, she should throw open her "black box". One. Will she jettison the 1992 Consensus? Two. Should she jettison the 1992 Consensus? Tsai Ing-wen cannot say “The reason I want to jettison the 1992 consensus, is that I want to jettison the 1992 consensus.”

The 1992 Consensus includes three points. One. It "opposes Taiwan independence”. Two. It affirms that both sides of the Strait are part of one China. Three. It affirms that both sides of the Strait agree that they are part of one China, and differ only on whether one China is the ROC or the PRC. Even if the 1992 Consensus is jettisoned, Beijing's insistence on "opposition to Taiwan independence” and “both sides of the Strait are part of one China” is going to change. Does anyone believe that absent the 1992 Consensus, Beijing will tolerate Taiwan independence? That the DPP will be allowed to promote one nation on each side?

If the 1992 Consensus is dispensed with, the two sides will lose “one China, different interpretations”. That is acceptable to Beijing. In fact, the hawks in Beijing would applaud it. After all, eliminating “one China, different interpretations” would allow Beijing to apply direct pressure on Taipei. It would paint Taiwan into an even tighter corner. Therefore, even if she intends to dispense with the term “1992 Consensus”, Tsai Ing-wen would be well advised to weigh the pros and cons first, and not act precipitously. Tsai Ing-wen must not dispense with one China, different interpretations. If anything, she should reaffirm it.

In short, Taiwan independence is something Tsai Ing-wen can never achieve. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen has no reason to advocate Taiwan independence, or oppose a constitutional one China, or refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. One China, different interpretations is already linked to the 1992 consensus strategic framework. In the event it is lost, reaffirming it will be well nigh impossible. Tsai Ing-wen must not dispense with the constitutional safeguard offered by “one China, different interpretations”, merely for a Taiwan independence pipe dream. As we can see, the question is not merely whether to dispense with the 1992 Consensus. The question is whether we should dispense with the 1992 Consensus.

九二共識：丟不丟得掉與應不應該丟
2015-12-12 聯合報

蔡英文如果當選總統，將馬上面對為「九二共識」與北京攤牌。她應有兩個考慮：一、九二共識丟不丟得掉？二、九二共識應不應該丟？

我們的觀點是：九二共識不易丟得掉；且即使丟得掉，也不應該丟。

「否定九二共識」如今看似蔡英文最強勢的一手棋，但反過來看，卻也是她最脆弱的一手棋。這著棋一旦走錯，就可能全盤皆輸。

先談不易丟得掉。九二共識甩不甩得掉，要看北京是否放棄「九二共識」四個字。「九二共識」四字已見諸中共十八大政治報告，又經馬習會夯實其「兩岸共同政治基礎」的地位。習近平先有「基礎不牢／地動山搖」之說，又有「和平之舟徹底傾覆」之喻。依情理而論，若是習近平吞回了九二共識，他以後如何再就兩岸政策對美國、中國十三億人及台灣藍綠兩方「說話算話」（卜睿哲語）？如果習近平不肯吞回九二共識，蔡英文如何甩得掉？

再談如果甩得掉「九二共識」四字，蔡英文應不應該甩掉？隨著攤牌時刻迫近，近日見到一些傾綠人士向蔡英文獻策。有些人根據北京在馬習會的一段論述，揣測北京可能在九二共識讓步。張志軍說：「（只要）承認『九二共識』的歷史事實，認同其核心意涵（即可）」。

這段論述被解釋為：蔡英文只要承認九二共識是曾經發生及存在的「歷史事實」即可，北京就不會再強求民進黨沿承九二共識這個「歷史名詞」。此被視為北京明示蔡英文的「出路」。

但如前所論，要習近平吞回九二共識四字恐怕非易，這牽涉他「說話算話」的政治威信。蔡英文若誤判習會讓步，一旦失算，恐將滿盤皆輸。更凶險的情勢是：北京即使吞回「九二共識」，卻已言明必然會要蔡英文「認同其（九二共識的）核心意涵」，這就可能陷蔡英文於更加艱危的境地。北京若得寸進尺，蔡要如何表態始能讓北京滿意？

九二共識，在北京的核心內涵是「反對台獨／兩岸一中」，在馬政府的核心內涵是「一中各表」。蔡英文難道願意丟掉九二共識四字，而直接「認同（北京的）核心內涵」，即「反對台獨／兩岸一中」？

何況，經歷馬政府近八年的努力，對內，已將九二共識與中華民國憲法鏈接（不統／不獨／不武）；對兩岸，亦已與一中各表鏈接。馬政府雖迄未使兩岸當局共同正式接納「一中各表」的政策架構，但近八年來北京向未正面否定此說，再經此次馬習會呈現「一中定義處於爭議狀態」，更可視為一中各表的推進。而「一中各表」無疑是台灣在兩岸關係中進退攻守的最重要及最後的戰略據點。蔡英文若甩掉九二共識，也將失去一中各表的攻防要塞，其後果將直接面對北京「反對台獨／兩岸一中」的正面攤牌，豈不是自毀長城？

「一中各表」對兩岸皆是必要的戰略架構，為兩岸互留餘地以推進和平發展。如果失去九二共識，將使兩岸皆失一中各表的發展餘地與過渡空間，將對雙方皆是難以彌補的損失。

蔡英文在與北京攤牌前，須對國人打開她的「黑箱」：一、甩不甩得掉九二共識？二、應不應該甩掉九二共識？蔡英文總不能說：我要甩掉九二共識的唯一理由，就是我要甩掉九二共識。

對於蔡英文來說，九二共識的三大內涵「反對台獨／兩岸一中／一中各表」，其中北京所堅持的「反對台獨／兩岸一中」，即使沒有九二共識四字，也不會消失。難道沒有九二共識，北京就會同意台獨了？或民進黨即可推動一邊一國了？

但如果沒有了九二共識，兩岸失去一中各表，那是北京可以面對的局面，更是北京鷹派所拍手樂見；因為，撤去一中各表的屏障，北京對台灣的壓力將更直接且緊迫。相對而言，則必將陷台灣於更加凶險的境地。因此，即使九二共識這四個字甩得掉，蔡英文若慎計吉凶得失，亦不可輕言丟棄。蔡英文不但不應丟掉一中各表，且應努力補強。

簡言之，台獨是蔡英文一定做不到的，所以蔡英文沒有理由因主張台獨或反對憲法一中而否定九二共識。但一中各表卻是已然鏈接在九二共識上的戰略架構，一旦失去就不易回復。蔡英文不能為了不能實現的台獨思維，而賠上「一中各表」的憲政天險。由此可知，九二共識不只是甩不甩得掉的問題，更是應不應該丟掉的問題。