China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 31, 2015
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen may be able to hijack the public on Taiwan. She may be able to craft a shrewd election strategy. She may be able to survive the election debate. She may even be able to win the ultimate prize. But if she is elected, she must deal with the 1992 Consensus. She must be pragmatic in her diplomacy and her cross-Strait policy. She must win the Mainland's trust and stabilize cross-Strait and Taipei-Washington relations. Anything less is self-deception.
Full Text Below:
Did the presidential debate clarify the 1992 consensus or not? Will the Mainland buy Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric or not?
Mainland China is too big. Taiwan is too small. The 1992 Consensus may be nothing more than a word. Nevertheless it has served as the political foundation for cross-Strait relations for the past eight years. These two questions are too important. The election must not present any surprises. The voters' choices must be made clear. Only then will they be able to make the right choice. Only then will Taiwan enjoy a stable external environment, and address its multitude of intractable political, economic and social problems.
During the recent TV debate, Eric Chu cross-examined Tsai Ing-wen face to face. He demanded to know "Do you recognize the 1992 Consensus or not?" He hoped to pin Tsai Ing-wen down. But Tsai Ing-wen adroitly replied, "Isn't my attitude clear enough?" She implied that she her position was already abundantly clear. She implied that her opponent's endless questioning was unreasonable. She did not forget to take a jab at Eric Chu, who at one time endorsed the two-states theory.
Tsai Ing-wen is skilled at debating. But has she in fact made her position on the 1992 Consensus clear? Let us summarize her past speeches, policy statements, and answers during live question and answer sessions. One. She concedes the fact that talks were held in 1992, but refuses to accept the term “1992 Consensus”. She argues that "It's a question of how the term is used and interpreted". Essentially she has reverted to the Chen Shui-bian era "1992 Spirit". Two. She argues that the KMT decision to adhere to the 1992 Consensus is an option, but not the only option. She argues that the DPP seeks to "maintain the status quo" to ensure that the public on Taiwan retains its options. Three. She pledges to conduct cross-Strait relations within the "framework of the ROC”. She intends to use past relations as a foundation, and conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with public opinion and the democratic process.
Chen Shui-bian used the term "1992 Spirit". He stressed "mutual understanding, seeking common ground and shelving differences". This is exactly what Tsai Ing-wen is saying today. As former Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council during the Chen Shui-bian era, Tsai Ing-wen knows full well that the 1992 Consensus is not a word game. Besides “mutual understanding, seeking common ground and shelving differences", far more important matters loom, specifically the matter of “China”.
According to Mainland understanding, the 1992 Consensus means that “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of one China. Cross-Strait relations are not international relations”. During an address at the Ma Xi summit, Ma Ying-jeou proclaimed to the entire world that “The consensus reached on the One China Principle by the two sides of the Strait in November 1992, is what we refer to, in shortened form, as the 1992 Consensus". In other words, Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the KMT's definition of the 1992 Consensus. But the real question is “Does she accept one China?" Has Tsai Ing-wen made that clear or not?
When questioned by Eric Chu and reporters, Tsai Ing-wen said “The 1992 Consensus is an option, but not the only option". She persisted in claiming that there were other options.
But for the Mainland, Taiwan has only one future -- reunification. Flip open the DPP's Taiwan Independence Party Platform, its Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and its Resolution for a Normal Nation. First the DPP sought an independent state. Later it argued that Taiwan is already independent, but “according to its current constitution it is known as the Republic of China”. Eventually however, its bottom line became clear. The DPP publicly proclaimed that the two sides of the Strait are separate nations, neither belongs to the other, and neither governs the other. So, the question arises: Is the status quo in cross-Strait relations "one country on each side"? If the public on Taiwan and on the Mainland choose to reunify one day, how will the DPP respond? The Mainland has consistently opposed Taiwan independence. Taiwan has struggled long and hard over reunification vs. independence. Will Tsai Ing-wen return to the point and make her position clear?
Tsai Ing-wen hopes to complete her final mile on the road to the presidency. She has forsaken her "Republic of China is a government in exile" argument. She has consciously reverted to the ROC constitutional framework, to legitimize her arguments, and to win over swing voters and even blue camp voters. But as we all know, the blue and green camps have very different interpretations of the term "Republic of China". Ma Ying-jeou has publicly proclaimed that the Republic of China includes both Taiwan and the Mainland. During the Ma Xi summit press conference, he put it even more bluntly: Two Chinas, one China and one Taiwan, and Taiwan independence, all violate the Republic of China Constitution. The DPP equates the Republic of China with Taiwan. It misuses the term in order to engage in backdoor listing.
As cross-Strait relations expert Shao Tsung-hai noted, in Tsai Ing-wen's mind "the Republic of China's current constitutional framework" is not the same as "the ROC constitutional framework". The 1991 "Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China" provides for regular presidential and legislative elections in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu area. Lee Teng-hui argued that "Since 1991, the two sides have in fact been two countries." Tsai Ing-wen's terminology tells us she is a follower of Lee Teng-hui's path toward Taiwan independence.
So the question arises, yet again. Article Four of the Constitution clearly refers to the "Republic of China's long-held territory". But the preamble of the "Upgraded Provisions to the Constitution" includes the phrase "to respond to the needs of the nation prior to reunification". So does the territory of the Republic of China prior to reunification include the Mainland? Are the two sides two countries, or not? Is Tsai Ing-wen willing to speak plainly, or not?
Tsai Ing-wen may brim with confidence. Her responses may reek of glibness. Yet she persists in evading the most crucial issue in cross-Strait relations -- the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen has offered some degree of goodwill to the Mainland. For example, she occasionally uses the term “Mainland”, instead of “China”. She has pledged to continue cross-Strait exchanges following the election. But these alone fail to demonstrate a sincere belief in the concept of China. They cannot gain the trust of either the Mainland or the public on either side.
Tsai Ing-wen may be able to hijack the public on Taiwan. She may be able to craft a shrewd election strategy. She may be able to survive the election debate. She may even be able to win the ultimate prize. But if she is elected, she must deal with the 1992 Consensus. She must be pragmatic in her diplomacy and her cross-Strait policy. She must win the Mainland's trust and stabilize cross-Strait and Taipei-Washington relations. Anything less is self-deception.
蔡英文的最後一哩路仍未跨越
2015年12月31日 中國時報
九二共識究竟辯論清楚沒有？大陸會接受蔡英文的論述嗎？
大陸太大、台灣太小，九二共識雖然只是一個名詞，卻是過去8年兩
日前電視辯論會上，朱立倫當面詰問蔡英文：「
蔡英文的辯論技巧高明，但她真的說清楚了九二共識嗎？
陳水扁時代使用「九二精神」，強調的就是蔡英文現在的說語：「
具言之，大陸對九二共識的詮釋是「兩岸同屬一個中國，
蔡英文面對朱立倫的詰問和記者的追問，表示「
但在大陸看來，台灣的前途只有一個，就是實現統一。
希望順利走完最後一哩路的蔡英文，一改「中華民國是流亡政府」
兩岸學者邵宗海曾提醒，蔡英文口中的「中華民國『現行』
那麼，問題又來了：憲法本文第四條明定「中華民國依其固有疆域」
蔡英文雖然自信滿滿，巧舌如簧，
蔡英文或可挾民意支持與高超的選舉策略，
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