United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 29, 2015
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen need not quibble over "1992 consensus" vs. "1992 fact". That is merely the skin of the dumpling. That is mere self-deception. After all, does Tsai Ing-wen really want to trade "one China, different interpretations”, the meat inside the dumpling, for the skin? Once again, we urge Tsai Ing-wen to bite the bullet. Tsai must ask herself how she can recognize then benefit from the 1992 consensus, within the framework of the ROC Constitution.
Full Text Below:
Following the Ma Xi summit, Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, addressed the DPP. He said, "Recognizing the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus and agreeing with its core meaning (is sufficient)". Tsai Ing-wen recently declared, "The DPP has not denied historical facts. The two sides held talks in 1992. The DPP also recognizes that the two sides sought common ground and shelved differences that year. It recognizes the fact of these consultations".
Tsai Ing-wen has flip-flopped on the 1992 Consensus yet again. But her flip-flop is not complete. This time, as we can see, Tsai Ing-wen yielded to Beijing. Beijing has not, as Tsai Ing-wen predicted, “yielded to the DPP because it won the general election".
Zhang Zhijun asked, and Tsai Ing-wen answered. Such terms as "historical facts" and "recognize", were all part of Zhang Zhijun's vocabulary. Tsai Ing-wen changed "1992 Consensus" to "1992 Cross-Strait Talks" and substituted the phrase "sought common ground while shelving differences through consultations” for "core meaning".
Tsai Ing-wen has long refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Now, however, she finds herself painted into a corner. She is now splitting “1992” off from “Consensus”. She acknowledges that a meeting was held in 1992. She refers to the “consultation” as “a fact”, one that “sought common ground while shelving differences". Since she cannot refer to the result of the meeting as the 1992 Consensus, can she refer to it as “the fact of a 1992 Consultation"? But the two are one and the same. So why has she made such a fuss over the 1992 Consensus up until now?
Tsai Ing-wen's retreat can be viewed from two perspectives: Beijing's and Tsai Ing-wen's.
Consider Beijing's perspective. Can Tsai Ing-wen accept the historical facts? Beijing has been monitoring her stealthy retreat. But she refuses to stick to the script. She refuses to come right out and recognize the 1992 Consensus. Cross-Strait relations remain unsettled. Tsai Ing-wen has substituted "1992 fact" for “1992 Consensus”. Has she reinforced the levee? Or is she merely fleeing before the flood waters?
Consider Tsai Ing-wen's perspective. She has substituted the “1992 fact” for "1992 Consensus". She has prolonged the cross-Strait stalemate and increased its cost. Chronic confrontations are not necessarily to her advantage. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen might as well recognize the 1992 Consensus outright, and make the most of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”.
Tsai Ing-wen has acknowledged that the 1992 consensus sought common ground while shelving differences. But she has not explained just what the common ground and differences are. The 1992 Consensus sought common ground and shelved differences by stipulating that, "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But they differ on the meaning of one China”. Accordingly, "Both sides agree to express their own position verbally". Based on this premise, Beijing has emphasized "opposition to Taiwan independence”, and reiterated that “both sides are part of one China". The Ma government has emphasized "one China, different interpretations", and "no (immediate) reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force". This is the framework of the 1992 Consensus. This is what enables "seeking common ground while shelving differences". If Tsai Ing-wen recognizes "seeking common ground" in the 1992 Consensus, she must affirm that pursuant to the ROC Constitution, she must recognize the "one China principle" and uphold "one China, different interpretations”.
The phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences" necessarily implies "one China, different interpretations". It necessarily precludes "one nation on each side" and the Taiwan independence party platform. In other words, "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is not empty rhetoric. One must specify “What common ground? What differences?”
Tsai Ing-wen says she wishes to "maintain the status quo". But her "status quo" is not Ma Ying-jeou's “status quo”. Tsai has held forth on “democracy vs. black box operations”, on “shared vs. monopolized”, on “selective vs. limited”. But that was mere rhetoric. She was invoking technical details, not fundamental principles. Tsai Ing-wen has said that her Republic of China and Ma Ying-jeou's Republic of China are different. Her Republic of China includes only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It includes only the Tamshui River and Tsoshui Creek, whereas Ma Ying-jeou's one China includes the Yangtze River and Heilongjiang. Tsai Ing-wen said that Ma Ying-jeou's one China is the same as Beijing's one China.
Does Tsai Ing-wen wish to affirm the 1992 Consensus? If so, she can no longer obfuscate in order to hide her true position. Her “status quo” is different. Her “ROC” is different. Her “China” is different. These are all matters of fundamental principle. The 1992 Consensus refers to “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. Does she really think the differences she refers to are the same as those referred to in the 1992 Consensus? Does she really think that her definition of the Republic of China will enable her to interact with Beijing?
Tsai Ing-wen has already yielded to Beijing on the 1992 consensus. This move is worth encouraging. It is also inevitable. Tsai must not say, "Ma Ying-jeou and I are not the same". If she is elected and assumes power, she will be the beneficiary of Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait legacy. That includes 23 cross-Strait agreements, Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, peaceful development, a diplomatic truce, one China, different interpretations, the consultation mechanism for cross-Strait laws, and the Ma Xi summit. She should be respectful and grateful. She should ask herself how she can be more like Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou blazed a trail for Tsai Ing-wen. From the 1992 consensus, he got one China, different interpretations.
Tsai Ing-wen need not quibble over "1992 consensus" vs. "1992 fact". That is merely the skin of the dumpling. That is mere self-deception. After all, does Tsai Ing-wen really want to trade "one China, different interpretations”, the meat inside the dumpling, for the skin?
Once again, we urge Tsai Ing-wen to bite the bullet. Tsai must ask herself how she can recognize then benefit from the 1992 consensus, within the framework of the ROC Constitution.
九二共識：蔡英文馬步鬆動
2015-12-29 聯合報
馬習會後，國台辦主任張志軍對民進黨喊話：「
至此，在九二共識上，蔡英文再次轉身，但仍未完全到位。
張志軍出題，蔡英文按題回答。其中，「歷史事實」、「認同」
蔡英文一路否定九二共識，現在卻陷於不能不尋求解套的尷尬境地。
蔡英文的轉身，不妨從對北京與對蔡英文自身的兩個角度分別略論：
對北京來說，蔡英文顯露了不能不接受「歷史事實」的態勢，
對蔡英文自己來說，將「九二共識」換成「九二事實」，
蔡英文認同九二共識的求同存異，卻未說明同者為何與異者為何？
「求同存異」必須包涵「一中各表」，但未必能包括「一邊一國」
蔡英文說要「維持現狀」，卻稱她的「現狀」與馬英九的「現狀」
但若回到九二共識，蔡英文就不能再用技術面來掩飾原則面。
蔡英文在九二共識上，正朝著北京的方向調整。
蔡英文不必糾纏在把餃子皮稱作「九二共識」或「九二事實」之爭，
我們再次建議，一步到位，蔡英文應當思考：「
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