China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
February 21, 2016
Executive Summary: The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.
Full Text Below:
Talking heads in the media and specialists in academia have long categorized Mainland strategy toward Taiwan as either “hawkish” or “dovish”. They have even labeled specific agencies, officials, and scholars as such. But these so-called hawkish and dovish strategies all fall under category of peaceful reunification. Beijing has different strategies for different groups at different times. It has used both hawkish and dovish strategies simultaneously. Sometimes it tightens its grip with one hand, while relaxing it with the other.
The Taiwan Affairs Office, the Shanghai Taiwan Research Institute, and the Xiamen Taiwan Research Institute, are usually considered dovish. Doves hope to increase cross-Strait trade exchanges, and gradually increase cooperation in culture, media, and education. They hope this will lead the two sides to suspend hostilities, and ultimately lead to peaceful reunification. This approach reached its peak when President Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou held an historic summit last December.
The military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hardline official media, are usually considered hawkish. The hawks take national sovereignty very seriously. They hold high the banner of national revival and patriotism. Specific policies include a diplomatic blockade, propaganda war, and military intimidation, including the 1995 and 1996 military exercises held during the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law passed in response to the 2000 “two-states” theory.
Coincidentally, “Sinologists” in Washington are also categorized as reds or blues, and doves or hawks. Doves advocate exchanges to promote the evolution of democracy on Mainland China. Hawks advocate containment, to force Mainland China to collapse from within. The debate has continued for years. More recently, the call has been for both exchanges and containment. The two strategies alternate. Doves and hawks in Washington and Beijing are a fluid phenomenon. They leave visible tracks. When relations between Beijing and Washington warm, doves prevail. When major disputes arise, doves are attacked and hawks make a rapid comeback.
Many young people have returned to the Mainland. Mainland economic and military might have consequently grown by leaps and bounds. Mainland China has gained unprecedented self-confidence and self-esteem. This has led to a firm foundation of public opinion. No leader can defy the century-long "China Dream", the political objective announced by Xi Jingping at the 18th Central Committee. Mainland China is re-emerging after enduring a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. It is increasingly powerful, both diplomatically and military. It is no longer maintaining a low profile. In South China Sea and Diaoyutai Island clashes, it often rattles swords.
But the system on the Chinese mainland differs from the system on Taiwan and the United States. One cannot understand Mainland hawks and doves by referring to the US. Michael Pillsbury is a former Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and a longtime US defense policy adviser. Last year Pillsbury published a book entitled "The Hundred Year Marathon". This outspoken American moderate has long believed that hawkish rhetoric on the Mainland is confined to the margins, and that nationalism is not mainstream. That is a serious mistake. Hardliners now command policymaking in Beijing. They represent mainstream geo-strategic thinking. They rarely speak in public, but whenever they do, their remarks represent official policy.
The 2012 DPP election defeat taught the party a lesson about the "final mile”. The DPP began making visits to the Mainland. It began making contact with the Taiwan Affairs Office, Taiwan-related think tanks, and financial research organizations. It probably established links with certain officials. Beijing probably did not allow them close to military and diplomatic circles, or the party's propaganda wing. Green camp members were limited to contacts with United Front agencies, and financial and Taiwan-related sectors. Piecemeal contacts may have provided the DPP with piecemeal information that will lead to misunderstandings and mistaken judgments. DPP policy makers may have listened only to Mainland doves, and come away with false impressions.
The DPP cannot afford to misunderstand Beijing. It cannot afford to think it can refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus after 5/20. It cannot afford to assume that “the horses will continue running, and the party-goers will continue dancing”. It must reach an understanding with the Mainland on the cross-Strait political relationship. Still less can it afford to assume that clashes with the US in the South China Sea will elevate the Taiwan issue to the level of a core US strategic interest, replace the US-China relationship, and make Washington join with Taipei to oppose Beijing. When core interests are at stake, neither Beijing nor Washington distinguishes between doves and hawks. This is especially true for the Mainland. When the issue is sovereignty and opposition to Taiwan independence, neither doves nor hawks are going to compromise. Who the leader happens to be will make no difference.
Only dialogue and cooperation can ensure peaceful relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Only dialogue and cooperation can manage differences and minimize harm. To achieve win-win, all three parties must reduce conflict, seek dialogue, and reach consensus. They must not reverse course and make dispute resolution more difficult. The DPP government will play an important role.
The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.
鷹派」分類北京對台兩種不同的策略或手段， 甚至定位涉台單位或官員、學者。但所謂鴿、鷹， 只是北京在推動兩岸和平統一基本方針前提下，針對台灣不同群體、 或不同時期所採取的不同策略。北京從來都是鴿、鷹兩手抓， 有時一手用力些，另一手放鬆些，有時相反。
鴿派希望透過擴大兩岸經貿交流與合作，逐步深化成文化、媒體、 教育等全方位的交流合作，最終實現兩岸中止敵對， 再進展到完成和平統一。 這個路線在大陸國家主席習近平和馬英九總統去年12月實現兩岸最 高領導人的歷史性會晤後，達到階段性的高峰。
鷹派強調嚴肅看待國家主權利益，高舉民族復興和愛國主義傳統。 落實在具體對台政策上就是台灣一般稱的外交封鎖和文攻武嚇。 這個路線在1995、1996年台海飛彈軍演危機、2000年兩 國論和2005年大陸制訂《反分裂國家法》期間，都曾出現。
主張透過積極交流以促成中國民主演變的鴿派，和主張強勢圍堵、 逼中國從內部瓦解的鷹派，長期爭論不休， 近年又形成既交流又圍堵、既圍堵又交流的折衷派。 而北京和華府間鴿鷹派的浮沉，不但方向高度連動， 而且有軌跡可循。當中美關係和緩，鴿派就有出頭的機會；反之， 如果雙方關係起了重大爭執，鴿派就會被打擊，鷹派重新抬頭。
經濟發展成就和軍事力量飛躍成長， 讓中國的民族自信和自尊不但空前，而且具有厚實的民意基礎， 任何一個國家領導人都無法違逆百年來的「中國夢」， 也是以習近平在十八大所揭示的政治目標。 也因為中國大陸正處於近代中國遭受百年列強侵侮之後的重新崛起， 外交、軍事作為轉趨強勢，不再韜光養晦， 甚至在釣島爭議和南海問題上，經常選擇性「亮劍」。
不能用美國的鷹派與鴿派來理解大陸的鴿與鷹。 曾任美國防部助理副部長、 長期擔任美國國防政策顧問的白邦瑞去年出版新作《百年馬拉松》 中，直言美國溫和派長期以來認為大陸鷹派言論只是邊緣主張、 民族主義不是主流，這是嚴重的錯誤。 現在不但強硬派在北京政府的決策圈當道， 而且是中國地緣戰略思想的主流，他們很少公開說話， 一旦公開站出來說話，就代表了決策者真實的聲音。
與台辦、涉台智庫及財經研究單位多所接觸， 可能也與特定官方人士建立某種聯繫管道。不過，我們可以推測， 大陸不會容許他們與軍方、外交圈或黨的宣傳單位有任何交往， 綠營人士接觸的對象應局限於統戰、財經及涉台領域。其結果是， 局部的接觸與訊息得到局部的訊息理解，很容易導致錯誤的判斷。 我們非常憂心，民進黨決策人士因偏聽而對大陸產生誤判， 甚至對大陸所謂「鴿派」有錯誤的期待。
，或不與大陸就兩岸政治基礎達成基本共識，兩岸能「馬照跑、 舞照跳」；更不能誤以為美、中兩國因南海問題交惡， 台灣問題就能成為美國戰略利益的核心而取代美中關係， 甚至冀望華府會倒向台北來和北京對抗。事實上， 一旦面臨到國家核心利益，無論北京或美國，都沒有鴿鷹之分。 尤其大陸，一旦涉及主權和反台獨大前題， 無論鴿派或鷹派都寸步不讓，誰當最高領導人都一樣。
台三邊關係中的溫和主張抬頭，讓分歧有效控管， 讓爭端危害極小化。要達到三贏，三方都必須採取降低衝突、 尋求對話、達成協議，而非反向而行，讓爭端更難化解， 民進黨政府是其中重要因素。