Tsai Ing-wen, Listen to Kin Moy

Tsai Ing-wen, Listen to Kin Moy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2016

Executive Summary: Everyone knows Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 Consensus. But no one knows exactly why she is refusing to accept it. The United States acknowledges that today's cross-Strait achievements are based on the 1992 Consensus. Can Tsai Ing-wen truly afford to ignore AIT Director Kin Moy? Can she truly afford to ignore what he was polite enough not to spell out?

Full Text Below:

On Januar 20, Tsai Ing-wen posted an article in the Liberty Times entitled, "The Historical Facts behind 1992: Promoting Cross-Strait Relations". On January 27, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Ma Xiaoguang repeated 13 times that Beijing "remains firm on the 1992 Consensus". More recently, on February 24, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman An Fengshan repeated 16 times that Beijing "remains firm on the 1992 consensus". As Ma and An have made clear, the 1992 Consensus is the “magic talisman” in cross-Strait relations.

This makes it clear that the conflict between Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing over the 1992 Consensus remains unresolved.

On February 4, American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Kin Moy told UDN TV News that everyone's attention is focused on the 1992 Consensus. His message can be summarized as follows.

One. He praised the Ma government's eight year long promotion of cross-Strait exchanges for reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. He affirmed the Tsai government's pledge “to ensure the continuance of current exchanges, and to maintain constructive cross-Strait dialogue".

Two. Moy said the United States has taken note of the important role the 1992 Consensus has played in cross-Strait exchanges over the past eight years under President Ma. He affirmed President Ma's contribution to cross-Strait exchanges, and the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, based on the 1992 Consensus. Kin Moy acknowledged the causal relationship between the 1992 consensus and Ma's cross-Strait policy achievements. He acknowledged that Ma's achievements were the practical result of the 1992 Consensus.

Three. Kin Moy said the US has not taken any position on the 1992 Consensus in the past, but it believes that the 1992 Consensus has been the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. He reaffirmed yet again the role of the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue.

Four. Kin Moy Mei stressed that the US took no position on the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. He said the basis for cross-Strait exchanges should be determined jointly by the leaders and people from the two sides.

Let us sum up Kin Moy's remarks. One. He  acknowledged the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements. He hoped that the Tsai government would maintain current exchanges. Two. He acknowledged the causal relationship between the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements and the 1992 Consensus. He acknowledged that the 1992 Consensus has been the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. In other words, he affirmed the status quo in cross-Strait relations, and the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. Three. He also said that the US took no position on the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. In other words, the 1992 Consensus is the basis for dialogue established by the Ma administration and Beijing. The US does not take a position on that. But it affirms and admires the cross-Strait policy results. The US takes no position on the basis by which the Tsai government and Beijing establish dialogue. It hopes however, that the Tsai government will continue current exchanges.

To sum up Kin Moy's remarks, the United States affirms the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements rooted in the 1992 Consensus. It hopes the Tsai government will continue current exchanges. Should Tsai Ing-wen accept the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue? The United States takes no position. As a matter of courtesy, it respects the Tsai government's policy decisions.

Moy put the ball in Tsai Ing-wen's court. Tsai now faces a dilemma. She wants to continue benefiting from Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy achievements, which are based on the 1992 Consensus. As she put it, she wants to “maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations”. But at the same time, she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. Alas, Beijing insists on the 1992 Consensus. On this, it is immovable as bedrock. Tsai Ing-wen must ask herself whether Taiwan can withstand the political and economic consequences of her refusal? Kin Moy understands Beijing's position. Is he offering Tsai Ing-wen a word to the wise?

Tsai Ing-wen must pay attention. The United States hopes that the Tsai government will maintain the cross-Strait status quo established by Ma government, based on the 1992 Consensus. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus and fails to maintain the status quo? Will the United States apply behind the scenes pressure forcing Tsai Ing-wen to accept the 1992 Consensus? If so, will the courtesy afforded Tsai Ing-wen with these kind words, become a thing of the past?

Everyone knows Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 Consensus. But no one knows exactly why she is refusing to accept it. The United States acknowledges that today's cross-Strait achievements are based on the 1992 Consensus. Can Tsai Ing-wen truly afford to ignore Kin Moy? Can she truly afford to ignore what he was polite enough not to spell out?

且聽梅健華說些什麼
2016-03-01 聯合報社論

蔡英文在一月廿日經自由時報發表「九二歷史事實／推動兩岸關係」；一月廿七日，國台辦發言人馬曉光在記者會上十三次提到「堅持九二共識」；最近，二月廿四日，國台辦發言人安峰山在記者會上，又十六次提到「堅持九二共識」。馬安二人皆強調，九二共識是兩岸關係和平發展的定海神針。

由此可見，蔡英文與北京在「九二共識」上的對峙尚未化解。

在這段期間中，二月四日，美國在台協會台北辦事處處長梅健華接受udn TV專訪，論及九二共識，頗受各方注意。他的相關談話，可以歸納並引伸如下：

一、他肯定馬政府八年來在推動兩岸交流、降低台海緊張的貢獻。並支持蔡英文新政府「延續目前交流成果，持續進行兩岸建設性對話」。

二、他說：「美國留意到九二共識在馬總統過去八年任內在推動兩岸交流過程中扮演的重要角色」，並肯定馬總統過去八年「在九二共識的基礎上」推動兩岸交流、降低台海緊張的貢獻。這些論述，應可解釋為：梅健華承認，馬總統八年來在兩岸政策上的成就，與九二共識有因果關係，在一定意義上可視為「在九二共識的基礎上」所實現的成就。

三、梅健華表示，美方長久以來對九二共識沒有抱持觀點，「但我們相信，（過去八年）雙方的（九二）共識是對話基礎」。這段話，似又在表達他對「九二共識是（過去八年）兩岸對話基礎」的觀察與評論。

四、但是，梅健華強調：「兩岸對話基礎為何，美方並無立場。」他說：「兩岸交流的基礎為何，應該由兩岸領導人與人民共同決定。」

試將梅健華的論述略作整理。一、他承認馬政府在兩岸政策上的成就，並希望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」。二、他也承認馬政府在兩岸政策上的成就，與「九二共識」有因果關係，並認知「九二共識是（過去八年）兩岸對話基礎」。也就是說，他肯定兩岸關係的現狀，也對「九二共識為（過去八年）對話基礎」表示接納。三、但是，他說：「兩岸對話基礎為何，美方並無立場。」也就是說，「九二共識」是馬政府與北京共構的「對話基礎」，美國不持立場，但對因此而實現的兩岸成就表達肯定與讚賞。未來，蔡政府與北京將共構何種「對話基礎」，美國亦不持立場，只是寄望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」。

歸結梅健華的看法，可解讀為：美方肯定馬府在九二共識上實現的兩岸關係成就，並希望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」；至於對蔡英文是否接受九二共識為「對話基礎」，美方不持立場。這是對蔡政府的政策選擇表達尊重，是梅健華表示的禮貌。

如此一來，球就到了蔡英文的手裡。她的處境是：又要延續馬政府因九二共識而實現的兩岸成果（她說「要維持兩岸關係現狀」），卻似又不願接受「九二共識」。但若北京仍然「堅持九二共識／意志堅如磐石」，蔡英文就必須理智斟酌：台灣的政經情勢能否挺得過去？梅健華的弦外之音，有無可能是在知悉或揣度北京的立場後，給蔡英文的善意示警？

更值得蔡英文注意的是：美國希望蔡政府能「維持馬政府（因九二共識）實現的兩岸現狀」，但若因蔡英文不接受九二共識而致無以維持，美國有無可能回過頭來幕後施壓，要蔡英文接受九二共識？屆時，梅健華如今因維護蔡英文政治尊嚴的這些客氣話，會不會成了明日黃花？

國人只知道蔡英文不願接受「九二共識」，但迄今完全不知她何以拒絕接受。如果美國也承認今日兩岸成就是建立在九二共識的基礎之上，蔡英文難道不該認真聽一聽梅健華究竟說了什麼？及其因禮貌而保留了什麼沒說？