Retaining Capital, Now and for a Generation
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 31, 2007
The Central Bank recently engaged in a show of strength. It called in its markers in an all out effort to reverse the new lows in NT Dollar interest rates and long-term exchange rates. It attempted to stem the outflow of capital and to keep it on Taiwan. NT Dollar / US Dollar exchange rates have increased rapidly. Judging by key indicators such as the rapid rise in the Interbank Call Loan Rate, the Central Bank has indeed made a real effort in the money market and commodities market. But the Central Bank can do only so much. Its efforts may yield short term results, temporarily damping social discontent. But over the long term, capital flow will eventually revert to basics, to the hard reality of Taiwan's investment value.
Beginning with the loosening of intermediate term foreign exchange controls during the 1980s, Taiwan began experiencing an outflow of capital. Capital outflow was the result of by overseas investment by domestic industry. Taiwan was facing its first wave of industrial restructuring pressure, caused by insufficient land, rising wages, environmental protection pressures, a major revaluation of the NT Dollar, changes to investment incentives, and other overhead cost issues. Mainland economic reform, liberalization, and the development of cross-Straits economic and trade relations added fuel to the flames. Under combined internal and external pressures, offshoring accelerated, leading to debate over the causes of the hollowing out of the manufacturing industry which have continued until today.
This wave of capital outflow is different. In addition to businesses engaging in ongoing offshoring, it includes managed funds seeking higher returns. The scale is larger than ever before, and is now the norm. According to Central Bank estimates, individual investment in foreign securities exceeded overseas business investment in 1996, but generally speaking held steady at approximately 5 billion US dollars. The political regime changed in 2000. Capital flight doubled that year. The year after it exceeded 10 billion US dollars. Last year it amounted to 41 billion US dollars, equal to 14 trillion NT Dollars, over 10% of this year's GDP. The trend continues. During the first quarter of this year the amount of capital outflow was 11.2 billion US dollars, establishing a new quarterly high. Capital flight is getting out of control.
The phenomenon of capital flow seeking maximum advantage along with the new wave of large scale capital flight is closely related to new lows in both NT Dollar interest rates and exchange rates. These new lows harm earnings from NT Dollar denominated assets, leading to capital flight to high rate of return overseas commodities. They also impact public confidence in NT Dollar denominated assets, causing everyone to abandon NT Dollars like worn-out slippers. Financial institutions, businesses, and individuals with the ability to freely allocate their capital can speculate in NT Dollar and foreign currency interest rates and exchange rates, causing a vicious cycle of continued capital flight, falling interest and exchange rates. In fact, for the middle class, whose income growth has remained stagnant in recent years, these new lows are the culprits that are pushing them toward the "M-shaped Society."
Facing ever thornier circumstances, the Central Bank finally acted. Beginning last week, the Central Bank tightened capital supply on the open market. It engaged in large scale selling on the foreign exchange market. It attempted to persuade banks to strengthen their foreign currency hedges, to implement foreign currency trade reporting mechanisms, to synchronize overseas fund collection and applications, to increase interest rates and exchange rates. By the sheerest coincidence, the Interbank Call Loan Rate and NT Dollar exchange rate showed obvious increases, and those playing unscrupulous arbitrage games were punished.
But Taiwan, after all, is still a free market economy. The Central Bank may have a fistful of silver bullets. The Executive Yuan may have a tall stack of chips. But it can only moderate the deviation of interest rates and exchange rates from the market rate, and moderate capital flight. To truly prevent capital flight, it is necessary to increase Taiwan's core competitiveness. Besides interest rates and exchange rates, the key is the market's evaluation of Taiwan's economic potential, including rate of growth, effectiveness of management, social stability, consistency in government policy. These give capital a reason to settle in Taiwan. Otherwise, it's a losing battle. Market driven capital flow is a force of nature, akin to flood waters. The Central Bank may be able to stem the flight of capital for the moment, but not forever.
Furthermore, in an era of economic globalization, capital recognizes no borders, capital flow both in and out is the norm. Taiwan's capital however is subject to a special cross-Straits lock that either stops capital from flowing out once it has entered, or subjects it to burdensome restrictions. This leads to capital unwilling to return once it has left. This weakens the nation's ability to raise capital, and undermines the economy's long term development. The key to allowing capital that has taken flight to return, is a government with a pragmatic and flexible cross-Straits policy.
Original Chinese below:
留住資金：留一時也要留一世
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.05.31 03:49 am
中央銀行近來發威，運用各種可能的籌碼，全力扭轉新台幣利率、匯率長期雙低的局面，企圖減緩資金外流的腳步，把錢留下來。從近日的成果看，新台幣兌美元匯 率連邁升值大步，具指標性的隔夜拆款利率亦飆升，央行在匯市、貨市、行政指導三面出手，果真展現無人能攖其鋒的巨大威力。然而，央行所為畢竟有限，短期或 能收效，暫抑社會不滿氛圍；但長期而言，資金流動趨向終究還是要回到基本面，亦即回到台灣投資價值的現實問題。
遠自一九八○年代中期外匯管制逐步解除起，台灣就已出現資金外流現象。在一開始，資金外流是由企業對外投資帶動，那時台灣正面臨經濟高速成長後的第一波產 業結構調整壓力，例如土地不足、工資上漲、環保抗爭、新台幣大幅升值、獎勵投資條例屆期修正等成本加壓課題；加以大陸經濟改革開放、兩岸經貿關係開展的推 波助瀾，產業在內推外拉下加速外移，也由此引發產業空洞化抑或經濟力延伸的爭論，至今未休。
這一波的資金外流與前一階段不同，除了企業未曾間斷的海外投資布局，還包含眾多追求報酬率的理財性資金，且其規模愈來愈大，已成主流。央行統計，國人對外 證券投資金額於一九九六年超過企業對外投資，但大抵仍維持五○億美元的溫和水準；二○○○年政黨輪替，此一流出規模當年倍增，次年突破百億美元，去年更達 四一○億美元，相當於新台幣一點四兆元，超過台灣今年國內生產毛額的一成。然而，流出趨勢未歇，今年第一季再流出一一二億美元，創下單季最高，資金外流之 勢顯有失控之虞。
從資金流動逐利而居的特性，新一波資金大舉外流的成因，當與近年來新台幣利率、匯率長期「雙低」息息相關；「雙低」不僅傷害了民眾持有各項新台幣資產的收 益，促使資金流向海外的高報酬率商品，更重擊了民眾持有新台幣資產的信心，導致人人棄新台幣如敝屣，且予擁有國際資金調度優勢的金融機構及企業、個人，得 以運用新台幣與外國貨幣間的利差、匯差興風作浪，反向又回來壓抑新台幣雙率的走勢，形成資金持續外流、雙率盤低的惡性循環。事實上，對近年已苦於所得成長 停滯的廣大中產階級而言，「雙低」更無異於將其推往Ｍ型社會下層的新凶手。
面對愈趨棘手的情勢，央行終於出手了。上周起，央行透過公開市場操作緊縮資金供給、在外匯市場大舉賣匯、以道德勸說銀行強化外匯避險、落實外匯交易申報機 制、調控海外基金募集申請進度等行政措施多管齊下，同步拉升利率及匯率，並已奏效，隔夜拆款利率及新台幣匯率都出現明顯的升幅，之前肆無忌憚大玩資金套利 遊戲的業者也慘遭修理。
然而，台灣畢竟仍是自由市場經濟，儘管央行手握銀彈、行政裁量等籌碼，也僅能適度扭轉雙率過度偏離市場常軌的現況，緩和資金外流的腳步。想要真正留下資 金，仍需以強健台灣投資價值為核心，除了雙率環境，最關鍵的還是市場對台灣經濟發展潛力的評價，包括經濟成長實力、企業經營效率、社會制度穩定性、政策一 致性等各個面向的努力，讓資金有駐足台灣的理由。否則，雙拳難敵四手，面對市場決定去留的資金洪水，央行留得了一時，留不了一世。
進一步言，在經濟全球化時代，資金無國界，流進流出本屬常態；只不過，台灣的資金流動平台因加了兩岸關係的特殊閘門，讓資金的流動多了進得來、可能出不去 或運用受限的另層顧忌，以致流出去的資金不願再回來，這是資金外流失衡情勢令人惶惶不安的另一隱憂。長此以往，不僅將削弱國家支付能力，也將衝擊台灣經濟 長期發展所需動能；而讓外流的資金願意回流，關鍵則在於政府必須有務實而靈活的兩岸政策。
Thursday, May 31, 2007
Wednesday, May 30, 2007
Presidential Leadership in Violating the Law
Presidential Leadership in Violating the Law
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 30, 2007
During the past week, the presidential office has trotted out an endless series of new financial policies. The newly formed Chang Chun-hsiung cabinet meanwhile, has aggressively carried out President Chen's orders. These new policies include: One, no limits on the number of times the land value incremental tax and the preferential tax rate for buildings for personal use may be applied within one's lifetime. Two, the government hopes, like Hong Kong, to eliminate inheritance taxes and gift taxes. Three, the government will continue promoting its Orwellian "Second Financial Reform" program. Four, suburbs, science parks, and farm land adjacent to high-speed rail line stations may be reclassified for residential use. These policies may sound innovative, but they are nothing more than the tired old game of reducing taxes while increasing spending, and "stealing from the taxpayers to buy off the voters." They amount to plugging new numbers into the same old formulas. They are exactly the same as the Welfare Subsidies for the Elderly and the Welfare Subsidies for Farmers trotted out a month ago, motivated entirely by election considerations.
In the past this kind of pork barrel vote buying tactic followed a fixed pattern. Usually ruling and opposition party lawmakers would submit a bill within the legislature, offering either expanded benefits or reduced taxes, while demanding an outrageous quid pro quo. Then the Ministry of Finance and the Executive Yuan would promptly respond. You demand a dollar? They offer fifty cents, cash on the barrel head. This time the situation is different. This time the ruling administration initiated the bidding process. The Ministry of Finance knew nothing about it in advance. After it received instructions from the Presidential Office, all it could do was improvise. The bargaining process however remained unchanged.
Chen Shui-bian says: No limits on the number of times the land value incremental tax and the preferential tax rate for buildings for personal use may be applied within one's lifetime. The Ministry of Finance responds by saying: It can be increased to three times within one's lifetime. Chen Shui-bian says: The government hopes, like Hong Kong, to eliminate inheritance taxes and gift taxes. The Ministry of Finance responds by saying: Inheritance tax and gift tax exemption rates may be raised to 10,000NT, and may be invoked before death.
Tax policy is complex. Forget major tax cuts, even minor changes in tax rates must normally undergo thorough study and debate. The professionalism of the Ministry of Finance is not the issue. The problem is these tax experts have been reduced to the status of Monday morning quarterbacks, kept in the dark until after the fact. Chen Shui-bian tosses out a tax cut or tax elimination bombshell, and all they can do is scramble in response.
We have analyzed the pros and cons many times. We have explained how inheritance and gift taxes are easily reduced but not so easily eliminated, how property taxes held reduce the gap between rich and poor, how annuities should not be increased each time an election rolls around. We have repeatedly stressed how reducing tax revenues while increasing social benefits can never successfully buy votes through pork barrel spending measures. The reason being that regardless which political party makes the proposal, the opposing political party can always raise the ante. In the end, they cancel each other out. The sole loser in the process is financial stability. Chen Shui-bian's proposals for the inheritance tax, for the reduction and even elimination of the land value incremental tax, will still have to undergo revision by the Legislative Yuan. It should be obvious that if the Executive Yuan sends the bill to the Legislative Yuan, Blue camp lawmakers will simply up the ante, and the DPP won't necessarily profit.
From the standpoint of ordinary people, recent financial and economic policies benefit the rich and harm the poor. They offer a multitude of advantages to the rich, but none to the ordinary wage earner. The amount of property held by the ordinary wage earner is limited. For them, current inheritance tax laws are appropriate. They aren't required to pay inheritance taxes anyway. Eliminating or reducing inheritance taxes benefits only the rich. Likewise, the price of housing has surged. Ordinary people are lucky to have a place to live. Even if they are able to change homes, they can't do so repeatedly. Therefore relaxing the standards for the preferential tax rate for buildings for personal use benefits only the rich.
Meanwhile, ordinary wage earners must pay income taxes on every penny they've earned with their blood, sweat, and tears. Tomorrow is the deadline for declaring one's Year 2006 income tax. Millions of ordinary taxpayers, despite government incompetence, rampant corruption, rising crime, and falling wages, will obediently turn their hard-earned money over to the Internal Revenue Service.
The ruling authorities repeatedly trample over the ordinary citizen. Not only does their tax reduction policy benefit only the rich, the government intends to use the taxpayers' hard-earned money to make up the shortfall caused by an improper increase in the minimum wage. The Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) has already decided to subsidize businesses that hire part-time workers. Workers who work at least three months, whose hourly wage is less than 95NT, will each receive a subsidy of 10NT per hour, for up to a year. The decision-making process was crude beyond belief, and as usual those victimized are ordinary citizens.
In the face of such pork barrel vote-buying tactics, will those in charge at the Ministry of Finance have the courage to stand their ground as professionals, and refuse to assume the role of puppets? Chen Shui-bian's bombshells have thrown Minister of Finance Ho Chih-chin for a loop. Will Minister Ho maintain his professionalism, and inform his superior in no uncertain terms that he cannot treat finance as a partisan benefit at the expense of the nation as a whole? If one's superior persists in irresponsible behavior, and if a minister of finance dares not speak the truth, is such a minister really worth having? The question is, will the Ministry of Finance stand its ground, or will it capitulate?
Lastly, as Chen Shui-bian trots out all sorts of tax cuts along with spending increases, we must remind those in charge to flip through the law books, and take a look at Article 91 of the Budget Law, and at Article 38-1 of the Financial Revenue and Expenditure Law. Merely flipping to these two laws and comparing them to Chen Shui-bian's orders the other day, what can we can say except: "Mr. President, you are in violation of the law!"
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.30
總統正帶頭違反預算法與財政收支劃分法
中時社論
過去一周，總統府不斷拋出財經新政策，而甫成軍的張俊雄內閣，則積極承接陳總統指示，忙著兌現支票。這些新政策包括︰一、土地增值稅自用住宅優惠稅率，畢生不限適用次數；二、希望像香港一樣，全免遺產贈與稅﹔三、繼續推動二次金改；四、都市周邊、科學園區、高鐵車站路邊農地，能改作住宅用地。這幾項政策，儘管手法翻新，但仍不脫「減少稅收，擴大支出，慷國庫慨，買選民心」的老路數，等於是拿新數字，填入舊公式，和一個多月前的提高敬老年金、提高老農年金，如出一轍，都是選舉考量。
過去，這類政策買票招數，基本上還是有某種固定模式。通常都是朝野立委先在立法院主動提案，或擴大支出，或減少稅收，以漫天要價的方式獅子大開口；然後財政部與行政院才慌忙回應，要一塊給五毛，就地還錢。這次情況卻不同，換由國家領導人主動開價，財政部事前毫無所悉，接到指示之後，只好倉皇回應，但還是不改討價還價模式。
陳水扁說，自用住宅優惠稅率不限適用次數，財政部說，可放寬為一生三次；陳水扁說，希望能像香港那樣，全免遺贈稅，財政部說，把遺贈稅免稅額調高到一千萬元，而且，生前就能使用。
租稅政策經緯萬端，莫說大刀闊斧刪砍稅源，就算是微幅調整，向來都要經過精密研議。這方面財政部本身的專業職能不在話下，然而，現在這批稅務專家，全成了事後諸葛亮，事前啥事不知，等到陳水扁突然扔出減稅、廢稅震撼彈，也只能倉卒提出因應方案。
記得我們曾數度剖析利害，說明遺贈稅宜減不宜廢、土增稅有助於抑制社會貧富差距擴大、各種年金不應每逢選舉就加碼。我們也一再強調，減免租稅收入及增加社福支出，不可能達到買票效果。因為，無論哪個政黨提案，對手政黨立刻能加碼跟進，結果雙方形成「零和」拉鋸，平白損及財政安定。上述陳水扁所提遺贈稅、土增稅減免案，將來仍須經由立法院修法實施。可以想見，倘若行政院真的將全案轉送立法院，那麼，立法院的藍營立委必然會加碼喊價，民進黨未必能得利。
站在民間立場看，最近所拋出的一系列財經政策，全屬「利富害貧」性質，便宜了富豪鉅室，受薪階級市井小民根本占不到多少便宜。小老百姓家產有限，適用現行遺贈稅法，本來就不必繳稅。廢了遺贈稅，或者降低遺贈稅，受惠的畢竟還是富人。同樣，現在房價高漲，一般社會大眾有屋可住已屬萬幸，就算換屋，也不可能頻頻為之，因此，放寬自用住宅優惠稅率適用標準，真正獲利的，也還是富人。
在此同時，領薪水苦哈哈過日子的基層社會大眾，辛辛苦苦好不容易賺得的每一分錢，都要繳納所得稅。明天，就是九十五年度綜合所得稅結算申報截止日，全國幾百萬基層納稅人眼看著政府無能、貪官橫行、治安敗壞、收入滑落，卻還是乖乖把血汗錢交給國稅局。
在此同時，當局卻一再踐踏基層民眾，不但減稅政策獨厚富人，更過分的是，政府還打算動用全體納稅人的辛苦錢，去填補基本工資不當調漲所產生的缺口。勞委會已經決定，對聘僱部分工時勞工的企業進行補貼，針對工作滿三個月、時薪不足九十五元者，補貼業者每人每小時十元，最久長達一年。決策粗糙歸粗糙，倒楣的還是社會基層民眾。
面對這股政策買票歪風，財政部的主事者敢不敢堅持專業立場，拒當傀儡呢？陳水扁幾記震撼彈，敲得何志欽部長暈頭轉向之際，何部長又會不會秉持專業理念，明白告訴他的長官，不能以財政為壑，禍害國家根基。畢竟長官堅持胡搞，這樣窩囊的財政部長，不幹也罷！問題是，財政部是會堅持，還是會配合呢？
最後，在陳水扁不斷扔出各種減少財源收入、增加預算支出之際，我們還是要提醒主事者先翻翻六法全書，看看預算法第九十一條、財政收支劃分法第三十八條之一。只要翻出這兩條法律，再對照陳水扁日前幾項指示，我們不得不說﹕總統先生，你違法了！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 30, 2007
During the past week, the presidential office has trotted out an endless series of new financial policies. The newly formed Chang Chun-hsiung cabinet meanwhile, has aggressively carried out President Chen's orders. These new policies include: One, no limits on the number of times the land value incremental tax and the preferential tax rate for buildings for personal use may be applied within one's lifetime. Two, the government hopes, like Hong Kong, to eliminate inheritance taxes and gift taxes. Three, the government will continue promoting its Orwellian "Second Financial Reform" program. Four, suburbs, science parks, and farm land adjacent to high-speed rail line stations may be reclassified for residential use. These policies may sound innovative, but they are nothing more than the tired old game of reducing taxes while increasing spending, and "stealing from the taxpayers to buy off the voters." They amount to plugging new numbers into the same old formulas. They are exactly the same as the Welfare Subsidies for the Elderly and the Welfare Subsidies for Farmers trotted out a month ago, motivated entirely by election considerations.
In the past this kind of pork barrel vote buying tactic followed a fixed pattern. Usually ruling and opposition party lawmakers would submit a bill within the legislature, offering either expanded benefits or reduced taxes, while demanding an outrageous quid pro quo. Then the Ministry of Finance and the Executive Yuan would promptly respond. You demand a dollar? They offer fifty cents, cash on the barrel head. This time the situation is different. This time the ruling administration initiated the bidding process. The Ministry of Finance knew nothing about it in advance. After it received instructions from the Presidential Office, all it could do was improvise. The bargaining process however remained unchanged.
Chen Shui-bian says: No limits on the number of times the land value incremental tax and the preferential tax rate for buildings for personal use may be applied within one's lifetime. The Ministry of Finance responds by saying: It can be increased to three times within one's lifetime. Chen Shui-bian says: The government hopes, like Hong Kong, to eliminate inheritance taxes and gift taxes. The Ministry of Finance responds by saying: Inheritance tax and gift tax exemption rates may be raised to 10,000NT, and may be invoked before death.
Tax policy is complex. Forget major tax cuts, even minor changes in tax rates must normally undergo thorough study and debate. The professionalism of the Ministry of Finance is not the issue. The problem is these tax experts have been reduced to the status of Monday morning quarterbacks, kept in the dark until after the fact. Chen Shui-bian tosses out a tax cut or tax elimination bombshell, and all they can do is scramble in response.
We have analyzed the pros and cons many times. We have explained how inheritance and gift taxes are easily reduced but not so easily eliminated, how property taxes held reduce the gap between rich and poor, how annuities should not be increased each time an election rolls around. We have repeatedly stressed how reducing tax revenues while increasing social benefits can never successfully buy votes through pork barrel spending measures. The reason being that regardless which political party makes the proposal, the opposing political party can always raise the ante. In the end, they cancel each other out. The sole loser in the process is financial stability. Chen Shui-bian's proposals for the inheritance tax, for the reduction and even elimination of the land value incremental tax, will still have to undergo revision by the Legislative Yuan. It should be obvious that if the Executive Yuan sends the bill to the Legislative Yuan, Blue camp lawmakers will simply up the ante, and the DPP won't necessarily profit.
From the standpoint of ordinary people, recent financial and economic policies benefit the rich and harm the poor. They offer a multitude of advantages to the rich, but none to the ordinary wage earner. The amount of property held by the ordinary wage earner is limited. For them, current inheritance tax laws are appropriate. They aren't required to pay inheritance taxes anyway. Eliminating or reducing inheritance taxes benefits only the rich. Likewise, the price of housing has surged. Ordinary people are lucky to have a place to live. Even if they are able to change homes, they can't do so repeatedly. Therefore relaxing the standards for the preferential tax rate for buildings for personal use benefits only the rich.
Meanwhile, ordinary wage earners must pay income taxes on every penny they've earned with their blood, sweat, and tears. Tomorrow is the deadline for declaring one's Year 2006 income tax. Millions of ordinary taxpayers, despite government incompetence, rampant corruption, rising crime, and falling wages, will obediently turn their hard-earned money over to the Internal Revenue Service.
The ruling authorities repeatedly trample over the ordinary citizen. Not only does their tax reduction policy benefit only the rich, the government intends to use the taxpayers' hard-earned money to make up the shortfall caused by an improper increase in the minimum wage. The Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) has already decided to subsidize businesses that hire part-time workers. Workers who work at least three months, whose hourly wage is less than 95NT, will each receive a subsidy of 10NT per hour, for up to a year. The decision-making process was crude beyond belief, and as usual those victimized are ordinary citizens.
In the face of such pork barrel vote-buying tactics, will those in charge at the Ministry of Finance have the courage to stand their ground as professionals, and refuse to assume the role of puppets? Chen Shui-bian's bombshells have thrown Minister of Finance Ho Chih-chin for a loop. Will Minister Ho maintain his professionalism, and inform his superior in no uncertain terms that he cannot treat finance as a partisan benefit at the expense of the nation as a whole? If one's superior persists in irresponsible behavior, and if a minister of finance dares not speak the truth, is such a minister really worth having? The question is, will the Ministry of Finance stand its ground, or will it capitulate?
Lastly, as Chen Shui-bian trots out all sorts of tax cuts along with spending increases, we must remind those in charge to flip through the law books, and take a look at Article 91 of the Budget Law, and at Article 38-1 of the Financial Revenue and Expenditure Law. Merely flipping to these two laws and comparing them to Chen Shui-bian's orders the other day, what can we can say except: "Mr. President, you are in violation of the law!"
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.30
總統正帶頭違反預算法與財政收支劃分法
中時社論
過去一周，總統府不斷拋出財經新政策，而甫成軍的張俊雄內閣，則積極承接陳總統指示，忙著兌現支票。這些新政策包括︰一、土地增值稅自用住宅優惠稅率，畢生不限適用次數；二、希望像香港一樣，全免遺產贈與稅﹔三、繼續推動二次金改；四、都市周邊、科學園區、高鐵車站路邊農地，能改作住宅用地。這幾項政策，儘管手法翻新，但仍不脫「減少稅收，擴大支出，慷國庫慨，買選民心」的老路數，等於是拿新數字，填入舊公式，和一個多月前的提高敬老年金、提高老農年金，如出一轍，都是選舉考量。
過去，這類政策買票招數，基本上還是有某種固定模式。通常都是朝野立委先在立法院主動提案，或擴大支出，或減少稅收，以漫天要價的方式獅子大開口；然後財政部與行政院才慌忙回應，要一塊給五毛，就地還錢。這次情況卻不同，換由國家領導人主動開價，財政部事前毫無所悉，接到指示之後，只好倉皇回應，但還是不改討價還價模式。
陳水扁說，自用住宅優惠稅率不限適用次數，財政部說，可放寬為一生三次；陳水扁說，希望能像香港那樣，全免遺贈稅，財政部說，把遺贈稅免稅額調高到一千萬元，而且，生前就能使用。
租稅政策經緯萬端，莫說大刀闊斧刪砍稅源，就算是微幅調整，向來都要經過精密研議。這方面財政部本身的專業職能不在話下，然而，現在這批稅務專家，全成了事後諸葛亮，事前啥事不知，等到陳水扁突然扔出減稅、廢稅震撼彈，也只能倉卒提出因應方案。
記得我們曾數度剖析利害，說明遺贈稅宜減不宜廢、土增稅有助於抑制社會貧富差距擴大、各種年金不應每逢選舉就加碼。我們也一再強調，減免租稅收入及增加社福支出，不可能達到買票效果。因為，無論哪個政黨提案，對手政黨立刻能加碼跟進，結果雙方形成「零和」拉鋸，平白損及財政安定。上述陳水扁所提遺贈稅、土增稅減免案，將來仍須經由立法院修法實施。可以想見，倘若行政院真的將全案轉送立法院，那麼，立法院的藍營立委必然會加碼喊價，民進黨未必能得利。
站在民間立場看，最近所拋出的一系列財經政策，全屬「利富害貧」性質，便宜了富豪鉅室，受薪階級市井小民根本占不到多少便宜。小老百姓家產有限，適用現行遺贈稅法，本來就不必繳稅。廢了遺贈稅，或者降低遺贈稅，受惠的畢竟還是富人。同樣，現在房價高漲，一般社會大眾有屋可住已屬萬幸，就算換屋，也不可能頻頻為之，因此，放寬自用住宅優惠稅率適用標準，真正獲利的，也還是富人。
在此同時，領薪水苦哈哈過日子的基層社會大眾，辛辛苦苦好不容易賺得的每一分錢，都要繳納所得稅。明天，就是九十五年度綜合所得稅結算申報截止日，全國幾百萬基層納稅人眼看著政府無能、貪官橫行、治安敗壞、收入滑落，卻還是乖乖把血汗錢交給國稅局。
在此同時，當局卻一再踐踏基層民眾，不但減稅政策獨厚富人，更過分的是，政府還打算動用全體納稅人的辛苦錢，去填補基本工資不當調漲所產生的缺口。勞委會已經決定，對聘僱部分工時勞工的企業進行補貼，針對工作滿三個月、時薪不足九十五元者，補貼業者每人每小時十元，最久長達一年。決策粗糙歸粗糙，倒楣的還是社會基層民眾。
面對這股政策買票歪風，財政部的主事者敢不敢堅持專業立場，拒當傀儡呢？陳水扁幾記震撼彈，敲得何志欽部長暈頭轉向之際，何部長又會不會秉持專業理念，明白告訴他的長官，不能以財政為壑，禍害國家根基。畢竟長官堅持胡搞，這樣窩囊的財政部長，不幹也罷！問題是，財政部是會堅持，還是會配合呢？
最後，在陳水扁不斷扔出各種減少財源收入、增加預算支出之際，我們還是要提醒主事者先翻翻六法全書，看看預算法第九十一條、財政收支劃分法第三十八條之一。只要翻出這兩條法律，再對照陳水扁日前幾項指示，我們不得不說﹕總統先生，你違法了！
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Frank Hsieh vs. Chen Shui-bian
Frank Hsieh vs. Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 29, 2007
Lin Chung-sheng, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) "Green Six Group," said that "The DPP's victories in last year's Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections were an unfortunate beginning."
This is precisely what this newspaper said in a "Black and White Collection" editorial. Chen Chu, the candidate endorsed by the reformist oriented New Tide Faction in the DPP, narrowly won by 1,114 votes. After the election, Chen Shui-bian successfully spun this as a victory for Taiwan independence, a victory for Chen Shui-bian, a victory for corruption, and a victory for counter-reformation. Chen Shui-bian then intervened in the presidential primary race, dragging Su Tseng-chang down and discrediting the New Tide Faction. Dummy voters and the "Exclude Blue" opinion poll led to a case of Gresham's Law, of bad money driving out the good, of Wang Shih-chien driving out Hsiao Bi-khim, and Lin Chin-hsing driving out Lee Kuen-tse. The DPP's victories in last year's Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections truly were an unfortunate beginning.
But were the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections really a victory for counter-reformation? Following the election, Chen Shui-bian and Yu Hsi-kuen monopolized spin control over the election, pandering to Deep Green perspectives, deliberately distorting the meaning of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections. Calmly reviewing last year's Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections, the calls for reform were no less forceful than the calls for counter-reformation.
The underlying themes of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections were not the same. In Taipei, Frank Hsieh maintained his distance from Chen Shui-bian, preventing Chen from grabbing the media spotlight, eventually winning 40% of the vote, during which the winds of "revolution" began to blow. In the Kaohsiung mayoral race, even though Chen Chu eventually played the "president card," her reformist image, which she shared with Lin Yi-hsiung, was an important factor in her win. Therefore if the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections are spun as "pro independence / pro Chen / pro corruption," and as a victory for "counter-reformation," that will disappoint the many Pan Green voters who, with tears in their eyes, reluctantly cast their votes for DPP candidates.
The Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories undoubtedly received Deep Green support. But they must be also be regarded as an attempt by some Green voters to buy time for the DPP, in the hope that it would reform itself. But those election victories have been spun by Chen Shui-bian and Yu Hsi-kuen as a victory for "counter-reform." They have even been cited as the pretext for a wholesale purge of reformist elements within the party. Is this really the correct meaning of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories? Is this the DPP's unfortunate beginning?
The critical question is whether Frank Hsieh, in his upcoming bid for president, going to adopt the "Kaohsiung Model" by playing the president card, or is he going to adopt the "Taipei Model," and refuse to allow Chen Shui-bian to grab the spotlight?
If he chooses the "Kaohsiung Model" and plays the president card, then even if his victory is not primarily the result of Chen Shui-bian's endorsement, Frank Hsieh will probably be unable to oppose and prevent Chen Shui-bian from becoming the power behind the throne after Hsieh assumes office. Besides, playing the president card in today's circumstances could turn out to be a liability rather than an asset. if, on the other hand, Hsieh chooses the "Taipei Model," and keeps Chen at a respectful distance, will he be able to hold out? Will Chen Shui-bian allow him to do so?
For the past half year, the DPP has viewed the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections as a great victory for "counter-reform" or "pro independence / pro Chen / pro corruption," and based on such an interpretation, engaged in all sorts of partisan political maneuvers. But based on developments since, the DPP should treat Frank Hsieh's victory in the presidential primary as its underlying theme, and adjust its policy accordingly. The political significance of Frank Hsieh's presidential primary victory is even clearer than the political significance of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories, revealing as it does a considerable degree of anti-Chen, pro reformation, and "Reconciliation and Coexistence" sentiment.
Chen, Yu, and others who have monopolized spin-control over the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories are about to clash with Frank Hsieh, who received a new mandate in the presidential primary race. Chen Shui-bian's rampant corruption has caused the DPP and the entire island immense pain. Yu Hsi-kuen's political path and political style were repudiated during the presidential primary. Yet Chen and Yu have usurped the right to spin the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories to suit themselves, denying Frank Hsieh the right to explain his presidential primary race victory in his own terms.
This is an internal struggle over "Transitional Justice within the DPP." It is also a struggle between Chen Shui-bian and Frank Hsieh over the right to control the spin of political developments as they see fit. Chang Chun-hsiung has already declared that he will fight for Chen Shui-bian's right to control the party's spin. If Frank Hsieh allows Chen Shui-bian to control the spin over the presidential primary race and the presidential election, then even if Frank Hsieh is elected president in 2008, it will still be another unfortunate beginning.
Frank Hsieh is like a traveler walking through the forest, who suddenly finds himself strangled from behind by a monkey. Curious onlookers will of course be more concerned about the monkey than the traveler. The traveler however knows that unless he can free himself from the monkey's clutches, he will soon suffocate. The traveler also knows that if he yanks the monkey from his face, his face will be be scratched beyond recognition by the monkey's fingernails. Gentle reader, do you know who the monkey is?
Original Chinese below:
謝長廷VS.陳水扁：森林、旅人與猴子
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.05.29 03:53 am
民進黨「綠六組」組員林琮盛說：「去年北高市長民進黨的勝利，是不幸的開始。」
這正是本報《黑白集》說過的話。民進黨內的改革派新潮流推舉陳菊選上了高雄市長，險勝一一一四票；選後，這場勝利被陳水扁奪占了「詮釋權」，視為挺獨挺扁挺貪的勝利，亦即視為「反改革」的勝利。接下來的情勢演變是：陳水扁介入總統初選，蘇貞昌被拖垮，新潮流被鬥臭；人頭黨員及排藍民調，更掀起「王世堅打敗蕭美琴」、「林進興打敗李昆澤」的劣幣逐良幣風潮。北高選舉的「勝利」，確實是民進黨不幸的開始。
然而，北高選舉真的是一場「反改革」的勝利嗎？選後，陳水扁及游錫?奪占了「詮釋權」，挾深綠以自重，刻意扭曲變造了北高選舉的意義；如今平心靜氣回顧去年的北高選舉，其實「改革」的呼聲未必低於「反改革」的力量。
當時，北高選舉的基調頗不相同。在台北市，謝長廷與陳水扁保持距離，拒絕「許純美效應」，結果開出了百分之四十的得票率，其間當然有「改革」的訊息；至於高雄市長選舉，最後雖打出了「總統牌」，但陳菊本身的「改革」形象，與林義雄一貫的「改革」號召，應當也是高雄勝利的重要因素。因而若將北高選舉片面解釋為「挺獨／挺扁／挺貪」，將之視為「反改革」的勝利，恐怕就要辜負了不少綠色選民含淚投票的苦心！
北高選舉的勝利，固然得自深綠的支持，但相當程度地也應當視為有些綠色選民在為民進黨爭取改革的時空。可是，如今那場選舉的勝利，卻被陳水扁、游錫?等「反改革派」一古腦兒「全碗捧去」；並風捲殘雲般地對改革派進行大清黨大整肅的動作。這是不是北高選舉的正確詮釋？這是不是民進黨不幸的開始？
接下來更嚴重的問題是：謝長廷競選總統，將要採取「高雄模式」（打「總統牌」），或「台北模式」（拒絕「許純美效應」）？
若採「高雄模式」，打「總統牌」，即使未來勝選並非主要緣於阿扁助選所致，謝長廷恐怕也無法抗阻陳水扁在選後可能變成「太上總統」；何況，在現今情勢下打「總統牌」，對謝長廷的選情也許反而成了包袱。反過來說，若採「台北模式」，對「許純美」敬而遠之，謝長廷辦得到嗎？陳水扁又會善罷甘休嗎？
這半年來，民進黨確實是將北高選舉視作「反改革」、「挺獨挺扁挺貪」的大勝利，並在此種「詮釋」下，進行各種黨政的操作。但是，情勢演化至今日，民進黨其實應以「謝長廷在總統初選的勝利」為詮釋政局的基調，並在這個基調上進行黨政的操作。眾所共見，「謝長廷贏得總統初選的勝利」，其所反映的政治意義，顯較「北高選舉的勝利」明朗得多，甚至透露出相當程度的「反扁」、「維新」及「和解共生」的政治期待。
於是，挾持了「北高選舉勝利」詮釋權的扁游等人，勢將與在總統初選獲得了新令狀的謝長廷發生衝撞。陳水扁的貪腐無狀，使民進黨及整個國家遭受極大創痛，游錫?的路線與風格亦在總統初選中被否決；但扁游二人卻仍強占「北高選舉勝利」的詮釋權，不容謝長廷對其「總統初選的勝利」作出自由的詮釋。這是一個多麼荒謬絕倫的場景！
這是「民進黨內轉型正義」的鬥爭，更是陳水扁與謝長廷「詮釋權」的鬥爭。君不聞，張俊雄已宣稱將為陳水扁的「詮釋權」而戰；謝長廷若再被陳水扁強奪了總統初選及總統大選的「詮釋權」，則即使謝長廷當選總統，亦將是另一場不幸的開始。
現在的謝長廷，猶如走入森林的旅人，突然被一隻猴子從背後掐住了脖子；眾人的目光必然對那隻猴子較對那名旅人更好奇。旅人若不甩掉猴子，將被勒得窒息；若想甩掉猴子，又必被猴爪抓得面目全非。讀者先生小姐們，您知道那隻猴子是誰嗎？
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 29, 2007
Lin Chung-sheng, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) "Green Six Group," said that "The DPP's victories in last year's Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections were an unfortunate beginning."
This is precisely what this newspaper said in a "Black and White Collection" editorial. Chen Chu, the candidate endorsed by the reformist oriented New Tide Faction in the DPP, narrowly won by 1,114 votes. After the election, Chen Shui-bian successfully spun this as a victory for Taiwan independence, a victory for Chen Shui-bian, a victory for corruption, and a victory for counter-reformation. Chen Shui-bian then intervened in the presidential primary race, dragging Su Tseng-chang down and discrediting the New Tide Faction. Dummy voters and the "Exclude Blue" opinion poll led to a case of Gresham's Law, of bad money driving out the good, of Wang Shih-chien driving out Hsiao Bi-khim, and Lin Chin-hsing driving out Lee Kuen-tse. The DPP's victories in last year's Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections truly were an unfortunate beginning.
But were the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections really a victory for counter-reformation? Following the election, Chen Shui-bian and Yu Hsi-kuen monopolized spin control over the election, pandering to Deep Green perspectives, deliberately distorting the meaning of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections. Calmly reviewing last year's Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections, the calls for reform were no less forceful than the calls for counter-reformation.
The underlying themes of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections were not the same. In Taipei, Frank Hsieh maintained his distance from Chen Shui-bian, preventing Chen from grabbing the media spotlight, eventually winning 40% of the vote, during which the winds of "revolution" began to blow. In the Kaohsiung mayoral race, even though Chen Chu eventually played the "president card," her reformist image, which she shared with Lin Yi-hsiung, was an important factor in her win. Therefore if the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections are spun as "pro independence / pro Chen / pro corruption," and as a victory for "counter-reformation," that will disappoint the many Pan Green voters who, with tears in their eyes, reluctantly cast their votes for DPP candidates.
The Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories undoubtedly received Deep Green support. But they must be also be regarded as an attempt by some Green voters to buy time for the DPP, in the hope that it would reform itself. But those election victories have been spun by Chen Shui-bian and Yu Hsi-kuen as a victory for "counter-reform." They have even been cited as the pretext for a wholesale purge of reformist elements within the party. Is this really the correct meaning of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories? Is this the DPP's unfortunate beginning?
The critical question is whether Frank Hsieh, in his upcoming bid for president, going to adopt the "Kaohsiung Model" by playing the president card, or is he going to adopt the "Taipei Model," and refuse to allow Chen Shui-bian to grab the spotlight?
If he chooses the "Kaohsiung Model" and plays the president card, then even if his victory is not primarily the result of Chen Shui-bian's endorsement, Frank Hsieh will probably be unable to oppose and prevent Chen Shui-bian from becoming the power behind the throne after Hsieh assumes office. Besides, playing the president card in today's circumstances could turn out to be a liability rather than an asset. if, on the other hand, Hsieh chooses the "Taipei Model," and keeps Chen at a respectful distance, will he be able to hold out? Will Chen Shui-bian allow him to do so?
For the past half year, the DPP has viewed the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections as a great victory for "counter-reform" or "pro independence / pro Chen / pro corruption," and based on such an interpretation, engaged in all sorts of partisan political maneuvers. But based on developments since, the DPP should treat Frank Hsieh's victory in the presidential primary as its underlying theme, and adjust its policy accordingly. The political significance of Frank Hsieh's presidential primary victory is even clearer than the political significance of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories, revealing as it does a considerable degree of anti-Chen, pro reformation, and "Reconciliation and Coexistence" sentiment.
Chen, Yu, and others who have monopolized spin-control over the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories are about to clash with Frank Hsieh, who received a new mandate in the presidential primary race. Chen Shui-bian's rampant corruption has caused the DPP and the entire island immense pain. Yu Hsi-kuen's political path and political style were repudiated during the presidential primary. Yet Chen and Yu have usurped the right to spin the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Election victories to suit themselves, denying Frank Hsieh the right to explain his presidential primary race victory in his own terms.
This is an internal struggle over "Transitional Justice within the DPP." It is also a struggle between Chen Shui-bian and Frank Hsieh over the right to control the spin of political developments as they see fit. Chang Chun-hsiung has already declared that he will fight for Chen Shui-bian's right to control the party's spin. If Frank Hsieh allows Chen Shui-bian to control the spin over the presidential primary race and the presidential election, then even if Frank Hsieh is elected president in 2008, it will still be another unfortunate beginning.
Frank Hsieh is like a traveler walking through the forest, who suddenly finds himself strangled from behind by a monkey. Curious onlookers will of course be more concerned about the monkey than the traveler. The traveler however knows that unless he can free himself from the monkey's clutches, he will soon suffocate. The traveler also knows that if he yanks the monkey from his face, his face will be be scratched beyond recognition by the monkey's fingernails. Gentle reader, do you know who the monkey is?
Original Chinese below:
謝長廷VS.陳水扁：森林、旅人與猴子
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.05.29 03:53 am
民進黨「綠六組」組員林琮盛說：「去年北高市長民進黨的勝利，是不幸的開始。」
這正是本報《黑白集》說過的話。民進黨內的改革派新潮流推舉陳菊選上了高雄市長，險勝一一一四票；選後，這場勝利被陳水扁奪占了「詮釋權」，視為挺獨挺扁挺貪的勝利，亦即視為「反改革」的勝利。接下來的情勢演變是：陳水扁介入總統初選，蘇貞昌被拖垮，新潮流被鬥臭；人頭黨員及排藍民調，更掀起「王世堅打敗蕭美琴」、「林進興打敗李昆澤」的劣幣逐良幣風潮。北高選舉的「勝利」，確實是民進黨不幸的開始。
然而，北高選舉真的是一場「反改革」的勝利嗎？選後，陳水扁及游錫?奪占了「詮釋權」，挾深綠以自重，刻意扭曲變造了北高選舉的意義；如今平心靜氣回顧去年的北高選舉，其實「改革」的呼聲未必低於「反改革」的力量。
當時，北高選舉的基調頗不相同。在台北市，謝長廷與陳水扁保持距離，拒絕「許純美效應」，結果開出了百分之四十的得票率，其間當然有「改革」的訊息；至於高雄市長選舉，最後雖打出了「總統牌」，但陳菊本身的「改革」形象，與林義雄一貫的「改革」號召，應當也是高雄勝利的重要因素。因而若將北高選舉片面解釋為「挺獨／挺扁／挺貪」，將之視為「反改革」的勝利，恐怕就要辜負了不少綠色選民含淚投票的苦心！
北高選舉的勝利，固然得自深綠的支持，但相當程度地也應當視為有些綠色選民在為民進黨爭取改革的時空。可是，如今那場選舉的勝利，卻被陳水扁、游錫?等「反改革派」一古腦兒「全碗捧去」；並風捲殘雲般地對改革派進行大清黨大整肅的動作。這是不是北高選舉的正確詮釋？這是不是民進黨不幸的開始？
接下來更嚴重的問題是：謝長廷競選總統，將要採取「高雄模式」（打「總統牌」），或「台北模式」（拒絕「許純美效應」）？
若採「高雄模式」，打「總統牌」，即使未來勝選並非主要緣於阿扁助選所致，謝長廷恐怕也無法抗阻陳水扁在選後可能變成「太上總統」；何況，在現今情勢下打「總統牌」，對謝長廷的選情也許反而成了包袱。反過來說，若採「台北模式」，對「許純美」敬而遠之，謝長廷辦得到嗎？陳水扁又會善罷甘休嗎？
這半年來，民進黨確實是將北高選舉視作「反改革」、「挺獨挺扁挺貪」的大勝利，並在此種「詮釋」下，進行各種黨政的操作。但是，情勢演化至今日，民進黨其實應以「謝長廷在總統初選的勝利」為詮釋政局的基調，並在這個基調上進行黨政的操作。眾所共見，「謝長廷贏得總統初選的勝利」，其所反映的政治意義，顯較「北高選舉的勝利」明朗得多，甚至透露出相當程度的「反扁」、「維新」及「和解共生」的政治期待。
於是，挾持了「北高選舉勝利」詮釋權的扁游等人，勢將與在總統初選獲得了新令狀的謝長廷發生衝撞。陳水扁的貪腐無狀，使民進黨及整個國家遭受極大創痛，游錫?的路線與風格亦在總統初選中被否決；但扁游二人卻仍強占「北高選舉勝利」的詮釋權，不容謝長廷對其「總統初選的勝利」作出自由的詮釋。這是一個多麼荒謬絕倫的場景！
這是「民進黨內轉型正義」的鬥爭，更是陳水扁與謝長廷「詮釋權」的鬥爭。君不聞，張俊雄已宣稱將為陳水扁的「詮釋權」而戰；謝長廷若再被陳水扁強奪了總統初選及總統大選的「詮釋權」，則即使謝長廷當選總統，亦將是另一場不幸的開始。
現在的謝長廷，猶如走入森林的旅人，突然被一隻猴子從背後掐住了脖子；眾人的目光必然對那隻猴子較對那名旅人更好奇。旅人若不甩掉猴子，將被勒得窒息；若想甩掉猴子，又必被猴爪抓得面目全非。讀者先生小姐們，您知道那隻猴子是誰嗎？
Monday, May 28, 2007
Taiwan needs a Party of Social Reconciliation and National Unity
Taiwan needs a Party of Social Reconciliation and National Unity
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 28, 2007
Comment: The following China Times editorial is a must read. It is a must read not because it is good. It is a must read because it is bad. The following China Times editorial is a mind-numbingly obtuse compendium of all the short-sighted, opportunistic, and counterproductive arguments for "ben tu hua" i.e., "nativization" ever advanced by the pro-nativization faction in the KMT.
China Times: The Kuomintang (KMT) wants to revise its party constitution to read, "identification with Taiwan, peaceful development." Because it has been simplified as "eliminating reunification, adding Taiwan," it is said to have provoked considerable internal controversy. But apparently everyone from presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou, to Party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, to Party Secretary General Wu Deng-yi was on the same page. Even Ma Ying-jeou's mantra, "Taiwan first, for the good of the people," was written into the party constitution. Judging by the trend, any backlash during the Party Convention in late June will probably not be able to reverse this direction. Rather than say that the KMT is following the Democratic Progressive Party's path, one might say instead that the KMT is simply being more pragmatic.
The KMT had better not imagine it can shake itself free of the reunification vs. independence issue during the year end elections. The reason is the DPP has no alternative. First, it has no achievements to brag about. Second, its record of corruption is abysmal. For it to claim that it is fighting corruption isn't terribly persuasive. Playing the "Recover KMT Assets!" card is beating a dead horse. How much political mileage can be gotten out of that is debatable. The cheapest, most effective expedient is to return to the reunification vs. independence issue. To cast the KMT as a "foreign political authority," as the "China Party," as the "Reunification Party," to kick off another "Purge Chiang Influences" campaign and rehash the 228 Incident. As long as it is possible to create the impression of a dichotomy between the KMT and "Taiwan," this tactic will have considerable political force. But the KMT can neither neutralize these impressions, nor shake off these issues. All it can do is passively take the blows. Add to this Ma Ying-jeou's "mainlander" background. Not only could Chen Shui-bian play the "Ma Ying-jeou is a Hong Konger, therefore not Taiwanese" card, even Wang Jyn-ping can play the provincial origin card. To expect the DPP not to make an issue of this in future elections is to expect the impossible. Therefore neither the KMT nor Ma Ying-jeou has any choice except to confront the issue head on.
The simplest, most direct method is to escape from this dichotomy and underscore one's identification with Taiwan. Rhetorically speaking, "peaceful development" is more neutral than "eventual reunification" or "Taiwan independence is also an option." For the KMT reunification vs. independence is question for history. It is an issue it will have to face only in a remote future. For now, it is basically a phony issue. If mainstream public opinion from beginning to end is "maintain the status quo," why fall into the Green camp's trap by adopting a position opposed to independence? Some might say that "eliminating reunification" amounts to a change in political position, but it would be better to say that it is a kind of escape, a kind of liberation from a problem that can't be solved currently. For today's KMT, defending the "Republic of China" is enough. This a permanent legacy. Those attempting to change this status quo are the Green camp and Beijing, not the KMT.
Based on former KMT Chairman Lien Chan's visits to Beijing, followed by a succession of cross-Straits economics and trade fora, the KMT's cross-Straits strategic thinking is already quite clear. It is a "win/win" economic and trade policy. Taiwan's original strength was its economic and trade advantages. Within the East Asian economic sphere, Taiwan's economic advantages gave it plenty of maneuvering room. Unfortunately the DPP has adopted a Closed Door Policy while in power. It has fixated on the independence issue, attempting to author a new constitution and to "rectify names," aggravating internal and cross-Straits opposition. Not only has it enlarged fissures on Taiwan, it has also reduced itself to the status of international "troublemaker." Taiwan's neighbors are struggling to improve their economies. Taiwan, by contrast, is immersed in an internal political struggle. The result, needless to say, is that all international maneuvering room is being "managed" by Washington and Beijing. Its international economic situation within East Asia has been marginalized. Its economic competitiveness ratings have plummeted. This is a danger signal.
Why strive for "peaceful development," if not for the greater good of Taiwan? If a political party based on Taiwan still needs to hesitate about identifying with Taiwan, embracing Taiwan, then what else is there to discuss? The KMT must acknowledge it hasn't been sufficiently diligent in developing its rationale for nativization. Whereas the DPP has advanced toward the "Republic of China" via its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," the KMT has not made much of an effort to advance toward "Taiwan." Amending the party constitution is merely making up for this deficit.
Especially when the KMT, as opposed to the DPP, is so much more diverse in its composition and and tolerant in its ideology. We have never heard of any calls for the "Exclusion of Greens" from within the party. The KMT's distinguishing characteristic ought to be an advantage. Yet it has become a lever by which the Green camp can create divisions within the party. Today's KMT has undergone one form of factional strife after another: the New Party, the People First Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union. By now it should realize that its flexibility is its best asset.
Income distribution on Taiwan has become polarized over the years. Taiwan is becoming an "M-shaped Society" in which the middle class has disappeared. Taiwan's political culture has also become polarized. Taiwan is marching toward a politically "M-shaped Society" in which the middle way has disappeared, and one is either Blue or Green. Today's Taiwan needs a party of social reconciliation and national unity. It does not need a party that invents internal enemies and increases internal opposition. When the DPP resorts to "Exclusion of Blues" and "Exclusion of the Eleven Brigands" to establish its own credentials, for the KMT to establish its credentials by "ben tu hu" nativization of its party constitution, would seem to be a smart move!
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.28
台灣需要一個讓社會和解、讓人民團結的政黨
中時社論
國民黨有意朝「認同台灣、和平發展」的方向修改黨章，因為被外界簡化為是要「去統加台灣」，據說還引發內部路線上的不小爭執，但看樣子從總統參選人馬英九、黨主席吳伯雄到秘書長吳敦義幾乎都口徑一致了。甚至馬英九常掛在嘴邊講的「以台灣為主，對人民有利」都被寫進黨章裡了，照這個勢頭看，就算六月底的全代會前還有人想反彈什麼，大概也扭轉不了大勢了。而與其說這是國民黨向民進黨的路線跟進，倒不如說是國民黨較之先前更務實了。
對國民黨而言，年底這場選戰根本休想擺脫統獨操作的泥淖。理由是民進黨也沒什麼選擇，一沒啥政績好宣揚，二是自己的貪腐紀錄一籮筐，打黑金沒說服力，打「黨產」嘛，只能算冷飯熱炒，動員能量究竟有多大還有爭議。最廉價的當然還是回歸統獨，持續將國民黨停格在外來政權、中國黨、統一黨等的意象上，再配合去蔣、二二八等的操作即可。而只要操作得宜，還是很容易在意象上讓國民黨與「台灣」對立起來，如此在動員能量上還是挺可觀。而國民黨既抹不去這些意象，也甩不掉這些議題，只有陷入一路挨打的境地。再加上馬英九的身分背景，不要說當年陳水扁操作過「香港腳」，連月前王金平都操作過省籍議題，要民進黨未來選舉時不在這上面做文章，怕是門都沒有。所以不論是國民黨或是馬英九，除了選擇直接面對，恐怕也沒其他更好的法子了。
而最直接、也最簡單的做法，就是一方面跳脫統獨二元的論述，另一方面大量加註「台灣」。「和平發展」在修辭上屬於一種過程的、狀態表述，形式上當然比「終極統一」或「以台獨做選項」等偏向目的論的表述要更中性。對國民黨而言，統獨與否一直是歷史問題，也是遙遠未來才需面對的課題，現階段根本是個「假命題」，如果民意主流從頭到尾一直都是「維持現狀」，它又何苦在綠營的相激下自陷「獨立」選項的另一邊？「去統」與其說是一種立場改變，還不如說是一種解套、一種鬆綁，不必再為一個現階段不可能解決、也解決不了的問題綁死自己。現今的國民黨，守住「中華民國」這個底線就已經足夠，這是個一直都存在的固有資產，企圖要改變這個現狀的是綠營、是北京，不是國民黨。
更何況，從國民黨前主席連戰訪問北京，到一連串兩岸經貿論壇下來，國民黨這幾年有關兩岸的戰略思考已經很清晰，就是以經貿交往為主軸的「雙贏論述」。台灣的強項本來就是經貿實力，在東亞大經濟體的整合過程中，以台灣地緣經濟位置的優勢，原本擁有很大的活動空間。無奈在民進黨執政的這幾年，一路採取鎖國政策不說，還獨沽「統獨」一味，不斷地企圖藉由制憲、正名等的操作擴大內部與兩岸的對立，結果不僅台灣內部的裂痕加大，在國際社會上也淪為「麻煩製造者」的處境。特別是現階段台灣所有鄰邦都在迫不及待地拚經濟，台灣卻是埋首拚內鬥，結果不要說國際活動空間被美中聯手「管理」，國際經濟處境也在東亞經貿整合中被一路邊緣化，這幾年國家競爭力的國際評比一路下挫，難道不是警訊？
爭取「和平發展」所為何來？不就是為了追求台灣的最大利益！一個要立足台灣的政黨，對認同台灣、擁抱台灣還要遲疑，那就不必再去談其他了。國民黨必須承認它自己在發展「本土論述」上的努力並不夠，當民進黨透過「國家前途決議文」向「中華民國」推進的時候，國民黨並沒有讓自己在論述上向「台灣」的推進上做太多努力，如今修黨章的舉動只是補足這個缺憾而已。更何況，國民黨相對於民進黨，在成員結構與理念路線上本來就多元包容，內部從未聞有什麼「排綠」的爭議，這種特質本該是個優勢，奈何過去卻一直淪為被對手操作分化的槓桿。如今的國民黨，在走過流派傾軋陣痛，度過新黨、親民黨、台聯的分裂危機後，應該更懂得將自己的異質性，視為是一種彈性，甚至是一種「資產」了吧？
台灣社會這幾年在所得分配上日趨兩極化，正在形成一種中間階層消逝的「Ｍ型社會」，同樣的在無休止的政治動員下，台灣的政治社會也日趨兩極化，同樣也正在邁向一個中道消逝、藍綠站兩旁的「Ｍ型社會」。現時的台灣，需要的是一個讓社會和解、讓人民團結的政黨，而不是持續在社會內部生產敵人，讓人民擴大對立的政黨。當民進黨用「排藍」、「排十一寇」證明它自己的時候，國民黨藉由黨章的本土化證明它自己，應該是個聰明的舉動吧！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 28, 2007
Comment: The following China Times editorial is a must read. It is a must read not because it is good. It is a must read because it is bad. The following China Times editorial is a mind-numbingly obtuse compendium of all the short-sighted, opportunistic, and counterproductive arguments for "ben tu hua" i.e., "nativization" ever advanced by the pro-nativization faction in the KMT.
China Times: The Kuomintang (KMT) wants to revise its party constitution to read, "identification with Taiwan, peaceful development." Because it has been simplified as "eliminating reunification, adding Taiwan," it is said to have provoked considerable internal controversy. But apparently everyone from presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou, to Party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, to Party Secretary General Wu Deng-yi was on the same page. Even Ma Ying-jeou's mantra, "Taiwan first, for the good of the people," was written into the party constitution. Judging by the trend, any backlash during the Party Convention in late June will probably not be able to reverse this direction. Rather than say that the KMT is following the Democratic Progressive Party's path, one might say instead that the KMT is simply being more pragmatic.
The KMT had better not imagine it can shake itself free of the reunification vs. independence issue during the year end elections. The reason is the DPP has no alternative. First, it has no achievements to brag about. Second, its record of corruption is abysmal. For it to claim that it is fighting corruption isn't terribly persuasive. Playing the "Recover KMT Assets!" card is beating a dead horse. How much political mileage can be gotten out of that is debatable. The cheapest, most effective expedient is to return to the reunification vs. independence issue. To cast the KMT as a "foreign political authority," as the "China Party," as the "Reunification Party," to kick off another "Purge Chiang Influences" campaign and rehash the 228 Incident. As long as it is possible to create the impression of a dichotomy between the KMT and "Taiwan," this tactic will have considerable political force. But the KMT can neither neutralize these impressions, nor shake off these issues. All it can do is passively take the blows. Add to this Ma Ying-jeou's "mainlander" background. Not only could Chen Shui-bian play the "Ma Ying-jeou is a Hong Konger, therefore not Taiwanese" card, even Wang Jyn-ping can play the provincial origin card. To expect the DPP not to make an issue of this in future elections is to expect the impossible. Therefore neither the KMT nor Ma Ying-jeou has any choice except to confront the issue head on.
The simplest, most direct method is to escape from this dichotomy and underscore one's identification with Taiwan. Rhetorically speaking, "peaceful development" is more neutral than "eventual reunification" or "Taiwan independence is also an option." For the KMT reunification vs. independence is question for history. It is an issue it will have to face only in a remote future. For now, it is basically a phony issue. If mainstream public opinion from beginning to end is "maintain the status quo," why fall into the Green camp's trap by adopting a position opposed to independence? Some might say that "eliminating reunification" amounts to a change in political position, but it would be better to say that it is a kind of escape, a kind of liberation from a problem that can't be solved currently. For today's KMT, defending the "Republic of China" is enough. This a permanent legacy. Those attempting to change this status quo are the Green camp and Beijing, not the KMT.
Based on former KMT Chairman Lien Chan's visits to Beijing, followed by a succession of cross-Straits economics and trade fora, the KMT's cross-Straits strategic thinking is already quite clear. It is a "win/win" economic and trade policy. Taiwan's original strength was its economic and trade advantages. Within the East Asian economic sphere, Taiwan's economic advantages gave it plenty of maneuvering room. Unfortunately the DPP has adopted a Closed Door Policy while in power. It has fixated on the independence issue, attempting to author a new constitution and to "rectify names," aggravating internal and cross-Straits opposition. Not only has it enlarged fissures on Taiwan, it has also reduced itself to the status of international "troublemaker." Taiwan's neighbors are struggling to improve their economies. Taiwan, by contrast, is immersed in an internal political struggle. The result, needless to say, is that all international maneuvering room is being "managed" by Washington and Beijing. Its international economic situation within East Asia has been marginalized. Its economic competitiveness ratings have plummeted. This is a danger signal.
Why strive for "peaceful development," if not for the greater good of Taiwan? If a political party based on Taiwan still needs to hesitate about identifying with Taiwan, embracing Taiwan, then what else is there to discuss? The KMT must acknowledge it hasn't been sufficiently diligent in developing its rationale for nativization. Whereas the DPP has advanced toward the "Republic of China" via its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," the KMT has not made much of an effort to advance toward "Taiwan." Amending the party constitution is merely making up for this deficit.
Especially when the KMT, as opposed to the DPP, is so much more diverse in its composition and and tolerant in its ideology. We have never heard of any calls for the "Exclusion of Greens" from within the party. The KMT's distinguishing characteristic ought to be an advantage. Yet it has become a lever by which the Green camp can create divisions within the party. Today's KMT has undergone one form of factional strife after another: the New Party, the People First Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union. By now it should realize that its flexibility is its best asset.
Income distribution on Taiwan has become polarized over the years. Taiwan is becoming an "M-shaped Society" in which the middle class has disappeared. Taiwan's political culture has also become polarized. Taiwan is marching toward a politically "M-shaped Society" in which the middle way has disappeared, and one is either Blue or Green. Today's Taiwan needs a party of social reconciliation and national unity. It does not need a party that invents internal enemies and increases internal opposition. When the DPP resorts to "Exclusion of Blues" and "Exclusion of the Eleven Brigands" to establish its own credentials, for the KMT to establish its credentials by "ben tu hu" nativization of its party constitution, would seem to be a smart move!
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.28
台灣需要一個讓社會和解、讓人民團結的政黨
中時社論
國民黨有意朝「認同台灣、和平發展」的方向修改黨章，因為被外界簡化為是要「去統加台灣」，據說還引發內部路線上的不小爭執，但看樣子從總統參選人馬英九、黨主席吳伯雄到秘書長吳敦義幾乎都口徑一致了。甚至馬英九常掛在嘴邊講的「以台灣為主，對人民有利」都被寫進黨章裡了，照這個勢頭看，就算六月底的全代會前還有人想反彈什麼，大概也扭轉不了大勢了。而與其說這是國民黨向民進黨的路線跟進，倒不如說是國民黨較之先前更務實了。
對國民黨而言，年底這場選戰根本休想擺脫統獨操作的泥淖。理由是民進黨也沒什麼選擇，一沒啥政績好宣揚，二是自己的貪腐紀錄一籮筐，打黑金沒說服力，打「黨產」嘛，只能算冷飯熱炒，動員能量究竟有多大還有爭議。最廉價的當然還是回歸統獨，持續將國民黨停格在外來政權、中國黨、統一黨等的意象上，再配合去蔣、二二八等的操作即可。而只要操作得宜，還是很容易在意象上讓國民黨與「台灣」對立起來，如此在動員能量上還是挺可觀。而國民黨既抹不去這些意象，也甩不掉這些議題，只有陷入一路挨打的境地。再加上馬英九的身分背景，不要說當年陳水扁操作過「香港腳」，連月前王金平都操作過省籍議題，要民進黨未來選舉時不在這上面做文章，怕是門都沒有。所以不論是國民黨或是馬英九，除了選擇直接面對，恐怕也沒其他更好的法子了。
而最直接、也最簡單的做法，就是一方面跳脫統獨二元的論述，另一方面大量加註「台灣」。「和平發展」在修辭上屬於一種過程的、狀態表述，形式上當然比「終極統一」或「以台獨做選項」等偏向目的論的表述要更中性。對國民黨而言，統獨與否一直是歷史問題，也是遙遠未來才需面對的課題，現階段根本是個「假命題」，如果民意主流從頭到尾一直都是「維持現狀」，它又何苦在綠營的相激下自陷「獨立」選項的另一邊？「去統」與其說是一種立場改變，還不如說是一種解套、一種鬆綁，不必再為一個現階段不可能解決、也解決不了的問題綁死自己。現今的國民黨，守住「中華民國」這個底線就已經足夠，這是個一直都存在的固有資產，企圖要改變這個現狀的是綠營、是北京，不是國民黨。
更何況，從國民黨前主席連戰訪問北京，到一連串兩岸經貿論壇下來，國民黨這幾年有關兩岸的戰略思考已經很清晰，就是以經貿交往為主軸的「雙贏論述」。台灣的強項本來就是經貿實力，在東亞大經濟體的整合過程中，以台灣地緣經濟位置的優勢，原本擁有很大的活動空間。無奈在民進黨執政的這幾年，一路採取鎖國政策不說，還獨沽「統獨」一味，不斷地企圖藉由制憲、正名等的操作擴大內部與兩岸的對立，結果不僅台灣內部的裂痕加大，在國際社會上也淪為「麻煩製造者」的處境。特別是現階段台灣所有鄰邦都在迫不及待地拚經濟，台灣卻是埋首拚內鬥，結果不要說國際活動空間被美中聯手「管理」，國際經濟處境也在東亞經貿整合中被一路邊緣化，這幾年國家競爭力的國際評比一路下挫，難道不是警訊？
爭取「和平發展」所為何來？不就是為了追求台灣的最大利益！一個要立足台灣的政黨，對認同台灣、擁抱台灣還要遲疑，那就不必再去談其他了。國民黨必須承認它自己在發展「本土論述」上的努力並不夠，當民進黨透過「國家前途決議文」向「中華民國」推進的時候，國民黨並沒有讓自己在論述上向「台灣」的推進上做太多努力，如今修黨章的舉動只是補足這個缺憾而已。更何況，國民黨相對於民進黨，在成員結構與理念路線上本來就多元包容，內部從未聞有什麼「排綠」的爭議，這種特質本該是個優勢，奈何過去卻一直淪為被對手操作分化的槓桿。如今的國民黨，在走過流派傾軋陣痛，度過新黨、親民黨、台聯的分裂危機後，應該更懂得將自己的異質性，視為是一種彈性，甚至是一種「資產」了吧？
台灣社會這幾年在所得分配上日趨兩極化，正在形成一種中間階層消逝的「Ｍ型社會」，同樣的在無休止的政治動員下，台灣的政治社會也日趨兩極化，同樣也正在邁向一個中道消逝、藍綠站兩旁的「Ｍ型社會」。現時的台灣，需要的是一個讓社會和解、讓人民團結的政黨，而不是持續在社會內部生產敵人，讓人民擴大對立的政黨。當民進黨用「排藍」、「排十一寇」證明它自己的時候，國民黨藉由黨章的本土化證明它自己，應該是個聰明的舉動吧！
Thursday, May 24, 2007
Is a Legislature that is not allowed to legislate still a Legislature?
Is a Legislature that is not allowed to legislate still a Legislature?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 24, 2007
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has resorted to brute force to prevent the Republic of China legislature from taking a vote on pending legislation. Legislative Speaker Wang Jyn-ping has declared that he "absolutely will not make use of police power" to enforce order within the legislature, ensuring that the General Budget and the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission will remain stalled and without hope of resolution.
Legislative Speaker Wang Jyn-ping's unwillingness to use "police power" to maintain order within the legislature is naturally motivated by personal political calculations. But when he says he has no legal basis for invoking "police power" within the legislature, and that for him to do would amount to the imposition of a police state, that is highly questionable.
First of all, the term "police power" cannot be found in the current laws. But Article 7 of the Legislator's Conduct Act prohibits occupying the chairman's podium and obstructing the conduct of official business and other such behavior. If that happens, Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan stipulates that the Legislative Speaker has the legal obligation to maintain order within the legislature. How is the Legislative Speaker to maintain order? Naturally he cannot rule out the option of ordering Legislative Yuan Security Guards to prevent the occupation of the chairman's podium and the obstruction of official business. Otherwise, how will the question of whether legislation will be voted on to be settled? By physical combat between ruling and opposition party legislators?
If, as chairman of the legislature, the Legislative Speaker finds it necessary to order Legislative Yuan Security Guards to prevent the occupation of the chairman's podium and the obstruction of official business, does that really amount to the imposition of a "police state?" Of course not. Legislative Yuan Security Guards would merely be fulfilling their duty under the direction of the Legislative Speaker to maintain order within the legislature. This is fully consistent with the principle of legislative autonomy and self-regulation, and the spirit of a constitutional republic. The "police powers" entrusted to the legislative speakers of other democratic nations, in accordance with the rule of law, is if anything, considerably greater. Current law does not contain the term "police power." But based on the Legislator's Conduct Act, the Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan, not to mention the rule of law conventions of democratic nations the world over, for a legislative speaker to maintain order by mobilizing Legislative Yuan Security Guards is a legitimate action. By contrast, if a legislative speaker abets behavior such as occupying the chairman's podium and obstructing official business, if he sits and watches as the legislature is paralyzed and legislators are denied the opportunity to vote on pending legislation, that amounts to an affront to constitutionalism and the rule of law, and a dereliction of duty.
The mobilization of Legislative Yuan Security Guards to maintain order, must of course accord with due process and the principle of proportionality. This is hardly a matter of controversy. The only real issue is timing. The Legislative Yuan must not be paralyzed. Nor should security guards be called in as a matter of routine. If a controversial bill has been introduced, and the ruling and opposition parties cannot reach agreement through negotiation and compromise, the next step is to put the bill to a vote, and allow the public to deliver their verdict during the next election. If any political party or political camp insists on preventing a vote by means of brute force, then it has already departed from democratic norms. If those who have resorted to brute force repeatedly ignore warnings to cease and desist, then the legislative speaker must not rule out the use of security guards to maintain order. Otherwise, those who prevent a vote on a bill by means of brute force because they oppose its passage, will be hijacking the legislature, hijacking democracy, hijacking the entire nation and its citizenry. Is a legislature that is not allowed to legislate still a legislature?
The deadlock over the Organic Law for the Central Election Committee and the General Budget is a perfect example. The opposition party has clearly indicated that it cannot trust the Central Election Committee (CEC) as it is currently constituted, that it cannot expect fairness from a wholly owned tool of the executive branch. The ruling party, meanwhile, has indicated that absolutely will not make any concessions. If the ruling party genuinely believes that the opposition party's bill is unconstitutional, it can demand a constitutional interpretation. The National Communications Commission Bill is just such an example. The opposition party is using traditional means of checking and balancing the government, by exercising its constitutionally delegated budgetary authority to bargain for a fair and impartial Central Election Committee. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on the other hand, is determined to prevent the passage of the Organic Law for the Central Election Committee, even if it means preventing passage of the General Budget. Both sides have put their cards on the table. The next step should be to allow the legislature to vote on the measures, and to allow voters to make a political judgment about who was right during the next election. At this point, what reason can the DPP have to not put the measures to a vote? The ruling and opposition parties have reached an impasse. To defend democracy and constitutionalism, the legislative speaker must do everything in his power to ensure that the legislature functions normally. This is the normal and reasonable response. If he sits and looks on idly at a legislature in paralysis, then that is a dereliction of duty.
Over the past several months the Legislative Speaker has repeatedly failed to uphold the right of the legislature to vote on legislation. Can he still be considered qualified for the role of Legislative Speaker? The Legislative Speaker can of course choose not to invoke "police powers." But he remains under obligation to uphold the right of the legislature to vote on legislation. How can he cite a "refusal to make use of police power" as a pretext to nullify the legislature's right to vote on legislation?
Wang Jyn-ping said that "Rather than invoke police powers, I would rather resign as legislative speaker." What Wang Jyn-ping should have said is "If cannot uphold the legislature's right to legislate, I should resign as legislative speaker."
Not allowing the legislature to legislate is to nullify the legislature. It is to nullify democracy and constitutionalism. The situation is clear. The ruling party has paralyzed the legislature for a reason. The legislative speaker has aided and abetted the ruling party's paralysis of the legislature for a reason. In addition to an incompetent and corrupt government, we now have a paralyzed legislature. Is this the political reality the people must endure?
Original Chinese below:
不能表決的立法院還是立法院嗎？
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.24 04:04 am
民進黨以「行動」阻擾立院表決，立法院長王金平宣示「絕不動用警察權」，總預算案和中選會組織法的政治僵局仍然無解。
王金平院長願不願意動用「警察權」，自有其個人的考量及判斷；但他指立法院議場內動用「警察權」於法無據，並稱動用警察即成了警察國家云云，卻有商榷餘地。
首先，純以「警察權」這個名詞而言，確實並未出現於現行法律中。但立法委員行為法第七條明文禁止占據主席台、阻擾議事進行等行為；倘若發生這種情況，立法院組織法第三條亦規範了院長維持立法院秩序之法定義務。院長如何善盡維持秩序的法定義務？當然不能排除指揮議場警衛制止占據主席台、干擾議事等行為；否則，難道聽憑朝野立委打架定勝負，以決定議案表決能否進行？
立法院長擔任議事主席，必要時指揮議場警衛制止占據主席台、干擾議事等行為，是否即成警察國家？答案當然是否定的。因為，議場警衛是在院長指揮之下行使職務，且目的僅在維持議場秩序，符合國會自律原則，自亦符合民主憲政的精神。世界各民主法治國家賦予國會議長的「警察權」，相較於我國，恐怕尚有過之。因此，現行法律雖無「警察權」這個名詞，但從憲政法理乃至立法委員行為法、立法院組織法等法律的規定，以及世界民主法治國家的慣例等等以觀，議長維持議事秩序不得已時動用國會警衛，乃是合法的舉措；反之，議長放任占據主席台、阻擾議事的行為不管，坐視國會癱瘓而喪失表決機制，恰是違反憲政民主、怠忽職守的表現。
動用議場警衛以維持秩序，在程序上自須注意手段合乎比例原則，此為當然之理，無待深論。有待探究者，乃是時機問題。聽憑立法院癱瘓固然不應該，但議場經常警衛充斥當然也很不正常。以目前立法院運作實況而言，當某項政治性議案，朝野已盡協商之能事，雙方已無妥協的空間時，唯有付諸表決，然後各自接受選民判斷一途；此際，倘若有某黨或某陣營卻堅持阻撓表決，這已經脫離了民主的軌道，主席一再勸解，歷經多次院會仍然無解時，就應當是不排除動用警衛維持秩序的時機。否則，反對並阻撓表決的一方，豈不是以暴力挾持了國會、挾持了民主，也就等於挾持了整個國家和人民？試問：不能表決的國會還能稱作國會嗎？
中選會組織法和總預算案的僵局正是最佳案例。關於中選會，在野黨已充分表明對於目前中選會由行政權一手主導的組織方式不信任、不能期待其公平；執政黨亦表明堅不退讓。其實，執政黨主張在野黨的立法違憲，並非沒有救濟管道，亦即聲請釋憲（如國家通訊傳播委員會之先例）。現今的情勢卻是：在野黨以國會制衡政府的傳統手段，亦即杯葛預算，以求換取中選會案；民進黨則不容中選會案通過，於是寧可使預算案不能通過。如此，雙方的立場已至底線，並皆願意、且已經訴諸選民政治判斷；到此地步，民進黨又有什麼理由干擾議事不讓議案付諸表決？而立法院長盱衡朝野協商以及院會的僵局，為求民主憲政的實現，必須盡一切可能以維持國會表決機制之運作，始為正常合理的反應；若坐視立院癱瘓，不能表決，則是有失職守。
試問：立法院長竟在連續幾個月數次院會中不能維護立院的表決權，這還算是稱職的立法院長嗎？立法院長當然可以不動用「警察權」，但他亦當然必須為維護國會的表決權負責，又豈能以「不動用警察權」為藉口而斷送了國會的表決權？
王金平說：「若要我動用警察權，我寧可辭任院長。」其實，王金平應說：「若不能維護國會表決權，我就辭任院長。」
不容表決，就是否定國會，就是否定民主憲政。情勢已十分清楚，執政黨癱瘓立院有其目的，立法院長放任癱瘓當然也有其目的。而既有無能又貪腐的政府，如今再加上癱瘓的國會，難道這就是國人必須忍受的政治現實！
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 24, 2007
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has resorted to brute force to prevent the Republic of China legislature from taking a vote on pending legislation. Legislative Speaker Wang Jyn-ping has declared that he "absolutely will not make use of police power" to enforce order within the legislature, ensuring that the General Budget and the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission will remain stalled and without hope of resolution.
Legislative Speaker Wang Jyn-ping's unwillingness to use "police power" to maintain order within the legislature is naturally motivated by personal political calculations. But when he says he has no legal basis for invoking "police power" within the legislature, and that for him to do would amount to the imposition of a police state, that is highly questionable.
First of all, the term "police power" cannot be found in the current laws. But Article 7 of the Legislator's Conduct Act prohibits occupying the chairman's podium and obstructing the conduct of official business and other such behavior. If that happens, Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan stipulates that the Legislative Speaker has the legal obligation to maintain order within the legislature. How is the Legislative Speaker to maintain order? Naturally he cannot rule out the option of ordering Legislative Yuan Security Guards to prevent the occupation of the chairman's podium and the obstruction of official business. Otherwise, how will the question of whether legislation will be voted on to be settled? By physical combat between ruling and opposition party legislators?
If, as chairman of the legislature, the Legislative Speaker finds it necessary to order Legislative Yuan Security Guards to prevent the occupation of the chairman's podium and the obstruction of official business, does that really amount to the imposition of a "police state?" Of course not. Legislative Yuan Security Guards would merely be fulfilling their duty under the direction of the Legislative Speaker to maintain order within the legislature. This is fully consistent with the principle of legislative autonomy and self-regulation, and the spirit of a constitutional republic. The "police powers" entrusted to the legislative speakers of other democratic nations, in accordance with the rule of law, is if anything, considerably greater. Current law does not contain the term "police power." But based on the Legislator's Conduct Act, the Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan, not to mention the rule of law conventions of democratic nations the world over, for a legislative speaker to maintain order by mobilizing Legislative Yuan Security Guards is a legitimate action. By contrast, if a legislative speaker abets behavior such as occupying the chairman's podium and obstructing official business, if he sits and watches as the legislature is paralyzed and legislators are denied the opportunity to vote on pending legislation, that amounts to an affront to constitutionalism and the rule of law, and a dereliction of duty.
The mobilization of Legislative Yuan Security Guards to maintain order, must of course accord with due process and the principle of proportionality. This is hardly a matter of controversy. The only real issue is timing. The Legislative Yuan must not be paralyzed. Nor should security guards be called in as a matter of routine. If a controversial bill has been introduced, and the ruling and opposition parties cannot reach agreement through negotiation and compromise, the next step is to put the bill to a vote, and allow the public to deliver their verdict during the next election. If any political party or political camp insists on preventing a vote by means of brute force, then it has already departed from democratic norms. If those who have resorted to brute force repeatedly ignore warnings to cease and desist, then the legislative speaker must not rule out the use of security guards to maintain order. Otherwise, those who prevent a vote on a bill by means of brute force because they oppose its passage, will be hijacking the legislature, hijacking democracy, hijacking the entire nation and its citizenry. Is a legislature that is not allowed to legislate still a legislature?
The deadlock over the Organic Law for the Central Election Committee and the General Budget is a perfect example. The opposition party has clearly indicated that it cannot trust the Central Election Committee (CEC) as it is currently constituted, that it cannot expect fairness from a wholly owned tool of the executive branch. The ruling party, meanwhile, has indicated that absolutely will not make any concessions. If the ruling party genuinely believes that the opposition party's bill is unconstitutional, it can demand a constitutional interpretation. The National Communications Commission Bill is just such an example. The opposition party is using traditional means of checking and balancing the government, by exercising its constitutionally delegated budgetary authority to bargain for a fair and impartial Central Election Committee. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on the other hand, is determined to prevent the passage of the Organic Law for the Central Election Committee, even if it means preventing passage of the General Budget. Both sides have put their cards on the table. The next step should be to allow the legislature to vote on the measures, and to allow voters to make a political judgment about who was right during the next election. At this point, what reason can the DPP have to not put the measures to a vote? The ruling and opposition parties have reached an impasse. To defend democracy and constitutionalism, the legislative speaker must do everything in his power to ensure that the legislature functions normally. This is the normal and reasonable response. If he sits and looks on idly at a legislature in paralysis, then that is a dereliction of duty.
Over the past several months the Legislative Speaker has repeatedly failed to uphold the right of the legislature to vote on legislation. Can he still be considered qualified for the role of Legislative Speaker? The Legislative Speaker can of course choose not to invoke "police powers." But he remains under obligation to uphold the right of the legislature to vote on legislation. How can he cite a "refusal to make use of police power" as a pretext to nullify the legislature's right to vote on legislation?
Wang Jyn-ping said that "Rather than invoke police powers, I would rather resign as legislative speaker." What Wang Jyn-ping should have said is "If cannot uphold the legislature's right to legislate, I should resign as legislative speaker."
Not allowing the legislature to legislate is to nullify the legislature. It is to nullify democracy and constitutionalism. The situation is clear. The ruling party has paralyzed the legislature for a reason. The legislative speaker has aided and abetted the ruling party's paralysis of the legislature for a reason. In addition to an incompetent and corrupt government, we now have a paralyzed legislature. Is this the political reality the people must endure?
Original Chinese below:
不能表決的立法院還是立法院嗎？
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.24 04:04 am
民進黨以「行動」阻擾立院表決，立法院長王金平宣示「絕不動用警察權」，總預算案和中選會組織法的政治僵局仍然無解。
王金平院長願不願意動用「警察權」，自有其個人的考量及判斷；但他指立法院議場內動用「警察權」於法無據，並稱動用警察即成了警察國家云云，卻有商榷餘地。
首先，純以「警察權」這個名詞而言，確實並未出現於現行法律中。但立法委員行為法第七條明文禁止占據主席台、阻擾議事進行等行為；倘若發生這種情況，立法院組織法第三條亦規範了院長維持立法院秩序之法定義務。院長如何善盡維持秩序的法定義務？當然不能排除指揮議場警衛制止占據主席台、干擾議事等行為；否則，難道聽憑朝野立委打架定勝負，以決定議案表決能否進行？
立法院長擔任議事主席，必要時指揮議場警衛制止占據主席台、干擾議事等行為，是否即成警察國家？答案當然是否定的。因為，議場警衛是在院長指揮之下行使職務，且目的僅在維持議場秩序，符合國會自律原則，自亦符合民主憲政的精神。世界各民主法治國家賦予國會議長的「警察權」，相較於我國，恐怕尚有過之。因此，現行法律雖無「警察權」這個名詞，但從憲政法理乃至立法委員行為法、立法院組織法等法律的規定，以及世界民主法治國家的慣例等等以觀，議長維持議事秩序不得已時動用國會警衛，乃是合法的舉措；反之，議長放任占據主席台、阻擾議事的行為不管，坐視國會癱瘓而喪失表決機制，恰是違反憲政民主、怠忽職守的表現。
動用議場警衛以維持秩序，在程序上自須注意手段合乎比例原則，此為當然之理，無待深論。有待探究者，乃是時機問題。聽憑立法院癱瘓固然不應該，但議場經常警衛充斥當然也很不正常。以目前立法院運作實況而言，當某項政治性議案，朝野已盡協商之能事，雙方已無妥協的空間時，唯有付諸表決，然後各自接受選民判斷一途；此際，倘若有某黨或某陣營卻堅持阻撓表決，這已經脫離了民主的軌道，主席一再勸解，歷經多次院會仍然無解時，就應當是不排除動用警衛維持秩序的時機。否則，反對並阻撓表決的一方，豈不是以暴力挾持了國會、挾持了民主，也就等於挾持了整個國家和人民？試問：不能表決的國會還能稱作國會嗎？
中選會組織法和總預算案的僵局正是最佳案例。關於中選會，在野黨已充分表明對於目前中選會由行政權一手主導的組織方式不信任、不能期待其公平；執政黨亦表明堅不退讓。其實，執政黨主張在野黨的立法違憲，並非沒有救濟管道，亦即聲請釋憲（如國家通訊傳播委員會之先例）。現今的情勢卻是：在野黨以國會制衡政府的傳統手段，亦即杯葛預算，以求換取中選會案；民進黨則不容中選會案通過，於是寧可使預算案不能通過。如此，雙方的立場已至底線，並皆願意、且已經訴諸選民政治判斷；到此地步，民進黨又有什麼理由干擾議事不讓議案付諸表決？而立法院長盱衡朝野協商以及院會的僵局，為求民主憲政的實現，必須盡一切可能以維持國會表決機制之運作，始為正常合理的反應；若坐視立院癱瘓，不能表決，則是有失職守。
試問：立法院長竟在連續幾個月數次院會中不能維護立院的表決權，這還算是稱職的立法院長嗎？立法院長當然可以不動用「警察權」，但他亦當然必須為維護國會的表決權負責，又豈能以「不動用警察權」為藉口而斷送了國會的表決權？
王金平說：「若要我動用警察權，我寧可辭任院長。」其實，王金平應說：「若不能維護國會表決權，我就辭任院長。」
不容表決，就是否定國會，就是否定民主憲政。情勢已十分清楚，執政黨癱瘓立院有其目的，立法院長放任癱瘓當然也有其目的。而既有無能又貪腐的政府，如今再加上癱瘓的國會，難道這就是國人必須忍受的政治現實！
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Ma Ying-jeou 's Remarks
Ma Ying-jeou 's Remarks
IEFA Banquet
May 22, 2007
I am deeply honored be invited to the 2007 NTU International Conference on Economics, Finance and Accounting (IEFA) Banquet, and to be asked to say a few words before such distinguished guests. This subject of this conference is financial institutions and the capital market, with the emphasis on finance.
As everyone knows, economics and finance are closely related. The so-called Real Economy is the body, while financial operations are the flow of blood through the body's blood vessels. If financial institutions and capital markets are operating properly, and the movement of capital is unobstructed, then the economy functions normally. Therefore ensuring that capital flows properly is a key concern.
Financial systems, like other systems, are man-made. If man-made systems are improperly managed, even assuming one is not attempting to enrich oneself, problems can easily multiply.
Take financial mergers during the past two or three years for example. Rampant fraud has destabilized the financial market. This has resulted not only in the firing of Ministry of Finance officials, but also in public skepticism concerning the incorruptibility of government leaders and their family members. It has provoked confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties, and unrest within society.
From this we can see the impact of stable finances and rational policies on the economy. These are lessons that deserve our attention. For the past two or three years, the government's financial reforms have been concerned primarily with financial mergers and fights for a controlling interest. Government manipulation and a lack of transparency have provided special interests with abundant opportunities to exploit, and paved the way for collusion between the ruling government and favored cronies.
In particular, the government's "Financial Supervisory Board," recently established under the auspices of the ruling government's ironically-named "Financial Reform Policy," was supposed to provide independent financial oversight. Instead of becoming an objective referee however, it became an obedient tool of the executive branch.
Financial mergers and acquisitions have been scandal-ridden, and the public offering of government owned shares has lacked transparency. Financial institutions the board is supposed to oversee have witnessed runs on the bank, and public funds have been squandered.
Given the wave of liberalization and globalization of the financial industry, we should allow financial institutions that have survived stiff competition to connect with the world, establishing branches abroad with direct investment. However, due to the ruling party’s conservative and isolationist cross-Strait policies, Taiwan’s financial industry has not been able to expand freely overseas, creating over supply in the financial market. It is natural that in recent years the revenue of financial institutions in Taiwan has been diminishing, even hitting bottom. What’s more, because businesses could not freely choose the location of their investment and production, it has become increasingly common for Taiwan businesses to list in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Due to its conservative financial policy, the DPP government has advocated mergers of financial institutions in order to resolve over competition, the principal objective being the buyout of other financial institutions by financial holding corporations. The government did not adopt a more liberal financial policy, instead it merely increased corruption.
It is true that the current consolidation and merger measures by financial holding corporations constitute a policy direction toward globalization, but the process should be determined by market mechanisms. When the government uses executive power to steer mergers of financial institutions as well as the privatization of state-run banks, distorting the structure of the financial market and the financial industry, it is a clear case of not respecting market mechanisms, and producing many corruption cases. Looking back, the government contradicted its original intention of encouraging privatization of state-run banks when it demanded that ChinaTrust Financial Holding Corporation release the shares of Mega Financial Holding Corporation that it owned. Likewise, the Finance Ministry contradicted its earlier policy of privatizing the China Development Financial Holding Corporation when it fought with the latter for a controlling interest. Also, the shares of the state-run Chang Hwa Bank were released to a private financial holding corporation. The latter invited a private fund, and this fund secured loans using shares of the financial holding corporation as collateral.
This ignited the current financial confusion and created misgivings over the concentration of financial institutions in the hands of a few conglomerates, simultaneously causing potential instability in the financial market. The foregoing is the result of the government’s improper financial policies.
Taiwan’s financial industry and capital market now face a bottleneck. Some scholars and experts even even believe these difficulties could marginalize Taiwan. How can we expand our capital market, increasing the number of listed companies? How can we enable the financial industry to expand the scope of its business and raise its revenue? These issues deserve study by scholars and experts here today. I sincerely hope that important conclusions will be reached for the benefit of our fellow citizens.
馬英九市長
演講稿
96.5.22
本人非常榮幸能受邀參加2007 NTU International Conference on Economics, Finance and Accounting (IEFA)晚宴貴賓致詞。本次會議主題為金融機構與資本市場。亦即為以金融為討論重點。
眾所週知，金融與經濟是一體的。所謂實質經濟之運行為軀體，而金融之運作猶如體中之血脈。金融機構與資本市場運行順暢，則資金流動順暢，經濟運行乃能正常如序。因此如何使金融健全運行，實為重要課題。
然而誠如各種制度一樣，金融制度之建立均為人為組織。因此若人為管理操作不當，甚至人謀不贓，則常常容易滋生問題。
就以最近兩三年之金融合併而言，由於金融弊端頻仍，使得金融市場穩定受到衝擊。不但因此造成金融主管官員去職，而且還引發人民對於政府領導人及其家庭成員之清廉度的質疑。終於引發政府對立及社會不安情勢。
由此可見，金融穩定及金融政策之合法性、合理性，對於社會經濟影響至鉅。這些都是值得我們警惕的教訓。
回顧過去兩三年來，政府所推動的金融改革，以金融整併及股權併購為主。由於政策強力主導，並且缺乏透明化，以致於讓財團有機可乘，形成官商勾結的局面。
尤其是金融改革下新成立的金融監督管理委員會，本應兼負獨立金融監理及發展責任，然而卻無法超然獨立，終於受制於行政當局。不但金融整併工作不順利，官股釋出欠缺透明化機制，甚至連列管的金融機構都出現擠兌風潮，浪費公帑甚鉅。
而 在金融業自由化及全球化的浪潮下，原已過度競爭之金融業應該讓它們走出國門，赴 海外直接投資設立分支機構。然而，執政黨之兩岸政策保守孤立，以致於使台灣之金融業無法自由往外發展，造成金融市場超額供給現象。近幾年台灣金融機構收入 遞減，甚至居於谷底，其來有自。尤有甚者，由於企業無法自由選擇投資生產地點，以致於台灣企業出走至香港上市掛牌者日甚。
由於當前金融政策的保守，金融改革為解決金融業過度競爭現象，政府主張金融業合併。其中尤以金控公司併購其他金融機構為主要目標。而未採取金融開放政策，因此引起多項弊端。
目 前金控公司整併的作法固然是邁向國際化的一個政策方向，但應該由市場機能來決 定。政府用行政權主導金融機構合併及公營銀行民營化，造成金融市場及金融產業的結構扭曲，此乃不尊重市場機能，因此自然而然產生諸多弊端。從事後的現象來 看，政府要求中信金釋出兆豐金股權即與當初鼓勵公營銀行民營化的本意相違背；而財政部與開發金爭奪股權則與當年開放開發金民營化的政策相牴觸。此外公營之 彰化銀行釋股給民營金控，而民營金控引入私募基金後，該基金又以金控之股票抵押借款，引發當前金融混亂及金融財團化的隱憂，同時造成金融市場潛在不安定， 這些都是政府金融政策不當所致。
當前我國金融業及資本市場之發展正瀕臨瓶頸局面。有些專家學者更直指這種困境有惡化為邊緣化之危險。如何進一步擴大資本市場，使上市公司家數增加；如何讓金融業擴大業務範圍以提高收益能力。這些都是值得與會學者專家研究課題。希望能夠獲得重要結論，提供國人參考。
IEFA Banquet
May 22, 2007
I am deeply honored be invited to the 2007 NTU International Conference on Economics, Finance and Accounting (IEFA) Banquet, and to be asked to say a few words before such distinguished guests. This subject of this conference is financial institutions and the capital market, with the emphasis on finance.
As everyone knows, economics and finance are closely related. The so-called Real Economy is the body, while financial operations are the flow of blood through the body's blood vessels. If financial institutions and capital markets are operating properly, and the movement of capital is unobstructed, then the economy functions normally. Therefore ensuring that capital flows properly is a key concern.
Financial systems, like other systems, are man-made. If man-made systems are improperly managed, even assuming one is not attempting to enrich oneself, problems can easily multiply.
Take financial mergers during the past two or three years for example. Rampant fraud has destabilized the financial market. This has resulted not only in the firing of Ministry of Finance officials, but also in public skepticism concerning the incorruptibility of government leaders and their family members. It has provoked confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties, and unrest within society.
From this we can see the impact of stable finances and rational policies on the economy. These are lessons that deserve our attention. For the past two or three years, the government's financial reforms have been concerned primarily with financial mergers and fights for a controlling interest. Government manipulation and a lack of transparency have provided special interests with abundant opportunities to exploit, and paved the way for collusion between the ruling government and favored cronies.
In particular, the government's "Financial Supervisory Board," recently established under the auspices of the ruling government's ironically-named "Financial Reform Policy," was supposed to provide independent financial oversight. Instead of becoming an objective referee however, it became an obedient tool of the executive branch.
Financial mergers and acquisitions have been scandal-ridden, and the public offering of government owned shares has lacked transparency. Financial institutions the board is supposed to oversee have witnessed runs on the bank, and public funds have been squandered.
Given the wave of liberalization and globalization of the financial industry, we should allow financial institutions that have survived stiff competition to connect with the world, establishing branches abroad with direct investment. However, due to the ruling party’s conservative and isolationist cross-Strait policies, Taiwan’s financial industry has not been able to expand freely overseas, creating over supply in the financial market. It is natural that in recent years the revenue of financial institutions in Taiwan has been diminishing, even hitting bottom. What’s more, because businesses could not freely choose the location of their investment and production, it has become increasingly common for Taiwan businesses to list in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Due to its conservative financial policy, the DPP government has advocated mergers of financial institutions in order to resolve over competition, the principal objective being the buyout of other financial institutions by financial holding corporations. The government did not adopt a more liberal financial policy, instead it merely increased corruption.
It is true that the current consolidation and merger measures by financial holding corporations constitute a policy direction toward globalization, but the process should be determined by market mechanisms. When the government uses executive power to steer mergers of financial institutions as well as the privatization of state-run banks, distorting the structure of the financial market and the financial industry, it is a clear case of not respecting market mechanisms, and producing many corruption cases. Looking back, the government contradicted its original intention of encouraging privatization of state-run banks when it demanded that ChinaTrust Financial Holding Corporation release the shares of Mega Financial Holding Corporation that it owned. Likewise, the Finance Ministry contradicted its earlier policy of privatizing the China Development Financial Holding Corporation when it fought with the latter for a controlling interest. Also, the shares of the state-run Chang Hwa Bank were released to a private financial holding corporation. The latter invited a private fund, and this fund secured loans using shares of the financial holding corporation as collateral.
This ignited the current financial confusion and created misgivings over the concentration of financial institutions in the hands of a few conglomerates, simultaneously causing potential instability in the financial market. The foregoing is the result of the government’s improper financial policies.
Taiwan’s financial industry and capital market now face a bottleneck. Some scholars and experts even even believe these difficulties could marginalize Taiwan. How can we expand our capital market, increasing the number of listed companies? How can we enable the financial industry to expand the scope of its business and raise its revenue? These issues deserve study by scholars and experts here today. I sincerely hope that important conclusions will be reached for the benefit of our fellow citizens.
馬英九市長
演講稿
96.5.22
本人非常榮幸能受邀參加2007 NTU International Conference on Economics, Finance and Accounting (IEFA)晚宴貴賓致詞。本次會議主題為金融機構與資本市場。亦即為以金融為討論重點。
眾所週知，金融與經濟是一體的。所謂實質經濟之運行為軀體，而金融之運作猶如體中之血脈。金融機構與資本市場運行順暢，則資金流動順暢，經濟運行乃能正常如序。因此如何使金融健全運行，實為重要課題。
然而誠如各種制度一樣，金融制度之建立均為人為組織。因此若人為管理操作不當，甚至人謀不贓，則常常容易滋生問題。
就以最近兩三年之金融合併而言，由於金融弊端頻仍，使得金融市場穩定受到衝擊。不但因此造成金融主管官員去職，而且還引發人民對於政府領導人及其家庭成員之清廉度的質疑。終於引發政府對立及社會不安情勢。
由此可見，金融穩定及金融政策之合法性、合理性，對於社會經濟影響至鉅。這些都是值得我們警惕的教訓。
回顧過去兩三年來，政府所推動的金融改革，以金融整併及股權併購為主。由於政策強力主導，並且缺乏透明化，以致於讓財團有機可乘，形成官商勾結的局面。
尤其是金融改革下新成立的金融監督管理委員會，本應兼負獨立金融監理及發展責任，然而卻無法超然獨立，終於受制於行政當局。不但金融整併工作不順利，官股釋出欠缺透明化機制，甚至連列管的金融機構都出現擠兌風潮，浪費公帑甚鉅。
而 在金融業自由化及全球化的浪潮下，原已過度競爭之金融業應該讓它們走出國門，赴 海外直接投資設立分支機構。然而，執政黨之兩岸政策保守孤立，以致於使台灣之金融業無法自由往外發展，造成金融市場超額供給現象。近幾年台灣金融機構收入 遞減，甚至居於谷底，其來有自。尤有甚者，由於企業無法自由選擇投資生產地點，以致於台灣企業出走至香港上市掛牌者日甚。
由於當前金融政策的保守，金融改革為解決金融業過度競爭現象，政府主張金融業合併。其中尤以金控公司併購其他金融機構為主要目標。而未採取金融開放政策，因此引起多項弊端。
目 前金控公司整併的作法固然是邁向國際化的一個政策方向，但應該由市場機能來決 定。政府用行政權主導金融機構合併及公營銀行民營化，造成金融市場及金融產業的結構扭曲，此乃不尊重市場機能，因此自然而然產生諸多弊端。從事後的現象來 看，政府要求中信金釋出兆豐金股權即與當初鼓勵公營銀行民營化的本意相違背；而財政部與開發金爭奪股權則與當年開放開發金民營化的政策相牴觸。此外公營之 彰化銀行釋股給民營金控，而民營金控引入私募基金後，該基金又以金控之股票抵押借款，引發當前金融混亂及金融財團化的隱憂，同時造成金融市場潛在不安定， 這些都是政府金融政策不當所致。
當前我國金融業及資本市場之發展正瀕臨瓶頸局面。有些專家學者更直指這種困境有惡化為邊緣化之危險。如何進一步擴大資本市場，使上市公司家數增加；如何讓金融業擴大業務範圍以提高收益能力。這些都是值得與會學者專家研究課題。希望能夠獲得重要結論，提供國人參考。
Monday, May 21, 2007
Taiwan's Next Step in the Face of Globalization
Taiwan's Next Step in the Face of Globalization
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 21, 2007
Last weekend, the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation held an important two day seminar, examining and analyzing the impact of globalization on Taiwan. Over the past two years, the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation has also addressed tax policy and fiscal policy. But the topic of "Development and Distribution under Globalization" has special significance for us. First of all, globalization affects a wide range of other issues, including legislation, government administration, finance, education, and systems, therefore its scope will be broader than any other single topic. Secondly, the potential impact and influence of globalization upon Taiwan is not fully apparent. Therefore one cannot simply examine the evidence and arrive at a conclusion the way one normally would. Globalization is a broad topic. Finding a focus is not easy. That makes this seminar, which solicits opinions from a wide variety of sources, especially significant. Nearly everyone who attended the two day event benefited.
Prior to 2006, two of the best known books on globalization were Thomas Friedman's "The World Is Flat -- A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century," and Kenichi Ohmae's "The M-shaped Society." Friedman stresses competition, product flow, and the annihilation of geographical distance by means of information technology. With roadblocks to global competition removed, one might characterize globalization as smooth sailing all the way. But Friedman lives the US, which occupies a position of power and wields overwhelming advantages in resources and knowledge. Therefore he sees a competitive powerhouse engaging in "creative destruction." He doesn't see a resource poor place like Taiwan, facing a future of tough competition. If a weaker nations' systemic barriers and long-term abuses have not been eliminated, then convenient and rapid product flow and information systems for supply chain management merely help the economically powerful to gain a long term foothold and take whatever they want. For weaker nations, not only is the Earth not flat; it is even less flat than it used to be. Which of Taiwan's systems and mechanisms are disadvantageous to global competition? Which of them are ticking bombs? How can one eliminate long term abuses? The audience and speakers have offered us analysis and explanations.
The main point of Kenichi Ohmae's "The M-shaped Society" is the impact of globalization on Japan's domestic distribution of wealth, not Japan's international competitiveness. Taiwan's situation is different from Japan's. The gap between rich and poor on Taiwan has increased. The gap between high-tech professionals and low-tech laborers, between wealthy entrepreneurs and those on society's margins, is the difference between night and day. But this phenomenon has occurred on Taiwan for different reasons. Most people can understand injustices arising out of unfair resource allocation, "sweetheart" deals, and "favor the rich" tax policies. But this is not Japan's problem. Even assuming the impact of globalization is the same the world over, solutions must be found that address each country's unique circumstances. Only such an approach can offer the proper diagnoses and the proper cures.
Based on actual data, the distribution of wealth on Taiwan hasn't actually turned it into an "M-shaped Society." But Taiwan's per capita income is definitely falling, and the age of the heads of low income households is definitely rising. The number of single parent and single mother households is also increasing. When someone in these borderline households becomes unemployed, the potential for suicide jumps. Obviously this is a troubling problem.
Take education for example - Friedman thinks that globalization must emphasize education in science and technology. This remark is obviously directed at the inadequacies in America's science and technology education. Kenichi Ohmae also emphasizes the importance of educational reform. But he wants merely to free education from artificial constraints, so that it is no longer confined within the framework of standard answers. This is directed at conditions specific to Japan. According to The Economist, educational reform in Britain and Europe should emphasize liberal education. Educational debates on Taiwan have arrived at entirely different conclusions. The former prime minister wants to promote 12 years of compulsory education, under the aegis of a comprehensive social welfare policy. In reality, each nation's educational environment is different. Only educational policies that address the characteristics unique to each region can solve its unique problems.
This two day seminar included a wide range of topics, but a narrow focus. The weather may have been chilly, but the atmosphere inside was warm. The topics may have been unfamiliar, but the participants were eager. Above all, they were not cold abstractions, but matters that intimately affect our lives.
When the poor on Taiwan become poorer, and the rich become richer, we must not confine ourselves to talking about "M-shaped Societies." We must also demonstrate our heartfelt concern for others. When unsound public policy on leads to lost opportunities in a globalized world, we feel frustration and regret. The earnest discussion that has taken place is everything the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation hoped for. We all are citizens of the Republic of China. The challenge of globalization is our our common challenge. At such moments, the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation has never gone missing. Citizens of the Republic of China must show no fear, and confront this challenge.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.21
全球化趨勢下台灣的下一步
中時社論
在上個周末，時報文教基金會一連兩天舉辦了一場重要的研討會，檢視並分析「全球化」給台灣帶來的衝擊。過去兩年，時報文教基金會也曾分別對我國的租稅政策與金融政策做過討論，但相較之下，此次「全球化下發展與分配」的主題，卻有其特殊的意義。第一，全球化議題牽涉極多，立法、行政、金融、教育、制度等面向盡皆涵蓋，故其對話範圍較以往單一議題的會議為廣。第二，全球化對台灣的可能衝擊與影響尚未完全浮現，這與以往「看證據做分析」的討論方式不同。正因為全球化議題觸角廣、聚焦不易，這次研討會集思廣益的意義也就格外重大。兩天下來，幾乎所有的與會者都感到獲益良多。
在二○○六年之前，坊間與全球化有關最著名的書籍有湯瑪士．弗里曼所著《世界是平的》與大前研一所著《Ｍ型社會》兩冊。弗氏所論強調全球化時代競爭、物流、資訊之無遠弗屆，故全球競爭的路障皆已排除，可以「一路平坦」形容之。但弗氏身處美國，居強權之地、握有資源與知識的絕對優勢，所以能看到競爭強者前途之摧枯拉朽，卻不見資源技術處不利地位如台灣者，其競爭前景之坎坷。對於弱勢國家而言，若自己的制度障礙與積弊未除，則物流資訊技術之便捷只是便利經濟強權者長驅直入、予取予求而已；地球非但不平坦，反而比以往更為崎嶇。究竟台灣社會存在哪些不利於全球競爭的制度與機制？有哪些潛在的危機？要如何才能改善這些制度積弊？與會者與評論人都提出了仔細的分析與解說。
至於大前研一的《Ｍ型社會》一書，其著眼點則為全球化對日本國內資源分配的影響，而非日本面臨的國際競爭。就此分配議題而言，台灣的情形又與日本截然不同。雖然台灣也有分配惡化、高技術人才與低技術勞工間薪資差異擴大、大企業家與社會邊緣人境遇有如天壤等兩極化的現象，但台、日之間形成此種現象的原因卻各異。大多數人民比較能切身體會的不公平分配政策，多與金融併購、租稅公平有關，但這卻不是日本當前的問題。簡言之，即使全球化的衝擊因子相同，但必須要搭配各國的特殊情境，才能理出病因，找出解決問題的方法。
以實際數據來看，台灣資源分配並沒有真正呈現Ｍ型，但是不可否認的，台灣的所得分配確實在惡化，且低所得家庭的戶長年齡在上升，戶長處於單身或女性狀態的比例也都在增加。當失業發生在這些邊緣家庭時，資料顯示，自殺的可能性就大幅增加。這顯然是一個大家憂慮的問題。
再以教育問題為例─弗里曼認為全球化下應著重理工教育；這顯然是針對美國理工教育不彰的特殊處方。大前研一也強調全球化時代教育改革的重要，但他只是期待教育要破除拘束，不再受限於「標準答案」的框架；這又像是針對日本國情而發。至於《經濟學人》分析英國與歐洲在全球化時代的教改，則認為應加強通識教育。台灣談教育又與以上三種論述不同；前內閣希望在整套社會福利政策的勾勒下，推動十二年國教上路。事實上，各國的教育環境多少有些不同，也唯有納入具有情境特性的地域思維，才有可能得出真正具有意義的解決方案。
兩天的研討會，雖然議題很多，但是焦點卻很集中。場外時陰時雨，場內卻是氣氛持續熱烈。研討的主題或許看似生硬，但與會者都是熱情而積極的參與。最重要的是：這兩天所討論的內容並不是冰冷生硬的政策或趨勢，而是與我們未來生活息息相關的願景與鋪陳。
當台灣社會向貧者愈貧、富者愈富的兩極化發展時，與會者不僅是以英文字母Ｍ去做形象的描述，更是以將心比心的真誠，流露出人文關懷。當論及台灣公共政策之失當而錯過因應全球化之良機時，研討會場也有相當的感慨與無奈。這樣真誠的會議討論，其實也正是時報文教基金會舉辦這次研討會所期望的。我們都是台灣的公民；台灣面對的全球化挑戰，當然也就是我們共同的挑戰。在台灣的關鍵時刻，時報文教基金會從不缺席；在面對全球化挑戰的關鍵時刻，我們也希望台灣不要畏懼，勇敢的面對挑戰。
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 21, 2007
Last weekend, the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation held an important two day seminar, examining and analyzing the impact of globalization on Taiwan. Over the past two years, the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation has also addressed tax policy and fiscal policy. But the topic of "Development and Distribution under Globalization" has special significance for us. First of all, globalization affects a wide range of other issues, including legislation, government administration, finance, education, and systems, therefore its scope will be broader than any other single topic. Secondly, the potential impact and influence of globalization upon Taiwan is not fully apparent. Therefore one cannot simply examine the evidence and arrive at a conclusion the way one normally would. Globalization is a broad topic. Finding a focus is not easy. That makes this seminar, which solicits opinions from a wide variety of sources, especially significant. Nearly everyone who attended the two day event benefited.
Prior to 2006, two of the best known books on globalization were Thomas Friedman's "The World Is Flat -- A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century," and Kenichi Ohmae's "The M-shaped Society." Friedman stresses competition, product flow, and the annihilation of geographical distance by means of information technology. With roadblocks to global competition removed, one might characterize globalization as smooth sailing all the way. But Friedman lives the US, which occupies a position of power and wields overwhelming advantages in resources and knowledge. Therefore he sees a competitive powerhouse engaging in "creative destruction." He doesn't see a resource poor place like Taiwan, facing a future of tough competition. If a weaker nations' systemic barriers and long-term abuses have not been eliminated, then convenient and rapid product flow and information systems for supply chain management merely help the economically powerful to gain a long term foothold and take whatever they want. For weaker nations, not only is the Earth not flat; it is even less flat than it used to be. Which of Taiwan's systems and mechanisms are disadvantageous to global competition? Which of them are ticking bombs? How can one eliminate long term abuses? The audience and speakers have offered us analysis and explanations.
The main point of Kenichi Ohmae's "The M-shaped Society" is the impact of globalization on Japan's domestic distribution of wealth, not Japan's international competitiveness. Taiwan's situation is different from Japan's. The gap between rich and poor on Taiwan has increased. The gap between high-tech professionals and low-tech laborers, between wealthy entrepreneurs and those on society's margins, is the difference between night and day. But this phenomenon has occurred on Taiwan for different reasons. Most people can understand injustices arising out of unfair resource allocation, "sweetheart" deals, and "favor the rich" tax policies. But this is not Japan's problem. Even assuming the impact of globalization is the same the world over, solutions must be found that address each country's unique circumstances. Only such an approach can offer the proper diagnoses and the proper cures.
Based on actual data, the distribution of wealth on Taiwan hasn't actually turned it into an "M-shaped Society." But Taiwan's per capita income is definitely falling, and the age of the heads of low income households is definitely rising. The number of single parent and single mother households is also increasing. When someone in these borderline households becomes unemployed, the potential for suicide jumps. Obviously this is a troubling problem.
Take education for example - Friedman thinks that globalization must emphasize education in science and technology. This remark is obviously directed at the inadequacies in America's science and technology education. Kenichi Ohmae also emphasizes the importance of educational reform. But he wants merely to free education from artificial constraints, so that it is no longer confined within the framework of standard answers. This is directed at conditions specific to Japan. According to The Economist, educational reform in Britain and Europe should emphasize liberal education. Educational debates on Taiwan have arrived at entirely different conclusions. The former prime minister wants to promote 12 years of compulsory education, under the aegis of a comprehensive social welfare policy. In reality, each nation's educational environment is different. Only educational policies that address the characteristics unique to each region can solve its unique problems.
This two day seminar included a wide range of topics, but a narrow focus. The weather may have been chilly, but the atmosphere inside was warm. The topics may have been unfamiliar, but the participants were eager. Above all, they were not cold abstractions, but matters that intimately affect our lives.
When the poor on Taiwan become poorer, and the rich become richer, we must not confine ourselves to talking about "M-shaped Societies." We must also demonstrate our heartfelt concern for others. When unsound public policy on leads to lost opportunities in a globalized world, we feel frustration and regret. The earnest discussion that has taken place is everything the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation hoped for. We all are citizens of the Republic of China. The challenge of globalization is our our common challenge. At such moments, the Times Cultural and Educational Foundation has never gone missing. Citizens of the Republic of China must show no fear, and confront this challenge.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.21
全球化趨勢下台灣的下一步
中時社論
在上個周末，時報文教基金會一連兩天舉辦了一場重要的研討會，檢視並分析「全球化」給台灣帶來的衝擊。過去兩年，時報文教基金會也曾分別對我國的租稅政策與金融政策做過討論，但相較之下，此次「全球化下發展與分配」的主題，卻有其特殊的意義。第一，全球化議題牽涉極多，立法、行政、金融、教育、制度等面向盡皆涵蓋，故其對話範圍較以往單一議題的會議為廣。第二，全球化對台灣的可能衝擊與影響尚未完全浮現，這與以往「看證據做分析」的討論方式不同。正因為全球化議題觸角廣、聚焦不易，這次研討會集思廣益的意義也就格外重大。兩天下來，幾乎所有的與會者都感到獲益良多。
在二○○六年之前，坊間與全球化有關最著名的書籍有湯瑪士．弗里曼所著《世界是平的》與大前研一所著《Ｍ型社會》兩冊。弗氏所論強調全球化時代競爭、物流、資訊之無遠弗屆，故全球競爭的路障皆已排除，可以「一路平坦」形容之。但弗氏身處美國，居強權之地、握有資源與知識的絕對優勢，所以能看到競爭強者前途之摧枯拉朽，卻不見資源技術處不利地位如台灣者，其競爭前景之坎坷。對於弱勢國家而言，若自己的制度障礙與積弊未除，則物流資訊技術之便捷只是便利經濟強權者長驅直入、予取予求而已；地球非但不平坦，反而比以往更為崎嶇。究竟台灣社會存在哪些不利於全球競爭的制度與機制？有哪些潛在的危機？要如何才能改善這些制度積弊？與會者與評論人都提出了仔細的分析與解說。
至於大前研一的《Ｍ型社會》一書，其著眼點則為全球化對日本國內資源分配的影響，而非日本面臨的國際競爭。就此分配議題而言，台灣的情形又與日本截然不同。雖然台灣也有分配惡化、高技術人才與低技術勞工間薪資差異擴大、大企業家與社會邊緣人境遇有如天壤等兩極化的現象，但台、日之間形成此種現象的原因卻各異。大多數人民比較能切身體會的不公平分配政策，多與金融併購、租稅公平有關，但這卻不是日本當前的問題。簡言之，即使全球化的衝擊因子相同，但必須要搭配各國的特殊情境，才能理出病因，找出解決問題的方法。
以實際數據來看，台灣資源分配並沒有真正呈現Ｍ型，但是不可否認的，台灣的所得分配確實在惡化，且低所得家庭的戶長年齡在上升，戶長處於單身或女性狀態的比例也都在增加。當失業發生在這些邊緣家庭時，資料顯示，自殺的可能性就大幅增加。這顯然是一個大家憂慮的問題。
再以教育問題為例─弗里曼認為全球化下應著重理工教育；這顯然是針對美國理工教育不彰的特殊處方。大前研一也強調全球化時代教育改革的重要，但他只是期待教育要破除拘束，不再受限於「標準答案」的框架；這又像是針對日本國情而發。至於《經濟學人》分析英國與歐洲在全球化時代的教改，則認為應加強通識教育。台灣談教育又與以上三種論述不同；前內閣希望在整套社會福利政策的勾勒下，推動十二年國教上路。事實上，各國的教育環境多少有些不同，也唯有納入具有情境特性的地域思維，才有可能得出真正具有意義的解決方案。
兩天的研討會，雖然議題很多，但是焦點卻很集中。場外時陰時雨，場內卻是氣氛持續熱烈。研討的主題或許看似生硬，但與會者都是熱情而積極的參與。最重要的是：這兩天所討論的內容並不是冰冷生硬的政策或趨勢，而是與我們未來生活息息相關的願景與鋪陳。
當台灣社會向貧者愈貧、富者愈富的兩極化發展時，與會者不僅是以英文字母Ｍ去做形象的描述，更是以將心比心的真誠，流露出人文關懷。當論及台灣公共政策之失當而錯過因應全球化之良機時，研討會場也有相當的感慨與無奈。這樣真誠的會議討論，其實也正是時報文教基金會舉辦這次研討會所期望的。我們都是台灣的公民；台灣面對的全球化挑戰，當然也就是我們共同的挑戰。在台灣的關鍵時刻，時報文教基金會從不缺席；在面對全球化挑戰的關鍵時刻，我們也希望台灣不要畏懼，勇敢的面對挑戰。
Thursday, May 17, 2007
A Foreign Policy rooted in Defeat
A Foreign Policy rooted in Defeat
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 17, 2007
The ruling party's attempt to join the WHO under the name of "Taiwan" has encountered unprecedented setbacks amounting to a national humiliation. This is not the first time the ruling party has humiliated itself in the international community. Every September the ruling party attempts to join the United Nations in the name of "Taiwan." Every time Chen Shui-bian embarks on a state visit to an ally, he practices "transit diplomacy." Every action is calculated to exploit international humiliations for domestic political gain at the polls, to spin Chinese Communist Party countermeasures as outrageous humiliations, and the Democratic Progressive Party as the champion of Taiwan's dignity. This has been the ruling party's standard operating procedure for the past seven years.
If one had to sum up their strategy in one or two sentences, it would be "domestically, electoral triumph; abroad, international humiliation." That the DPP is adept at electioneering is not in question. But why does it deliberately seek international humiliation? Jin Yong, famed author of traditional Chinese knight-errant "wu xia" novels, wrote about a master swordsman named Du Gu. So skilled that no one was his match, Du Gu sought to be defeated at least once, and adopted the ironic nickname, "He who seeks Defeat." The DPP's policy of deliberately courting international humiliation turns the story of Du Gu on its head. Confusing cause and effect, the DPP aspires to become Du Gu by obsessively seeking defeat.
For the past several years, the DPP and Taiwan independence fundamentalists have been using each other. They have used the ruling government's lapdog media and pirate radio stations to demand the "upholding of Taiwan's dignity," the "Rectification of Names," and the "authoring of a new constitution." Adopting a bull in a china shop attitude, and giving no thought to international repercussions, they have encouraged the ruling regime to butt heads with ROC allies. Anyone who dares to raise rational objections is promptly denounced as "pro reunification" and pigeonholed as someone who "doesn't love Taiwan." The ruling regime has given its blessing to this sort of shrill demagoguery. This sort of intemperate bluster and headlong blundering is the hallmark of the Taiwan independence hardliner.
When the ruling regime engages in heedless brinksmanship, our international allies abandon us, and we become international orphans. Take this year's WHA for example. The ruling regime invested vast sums mobilizing, strategizing, and lobbying. In the end, even the US, Japan, and the European Union cast nay votes. Even "allies" bought and paid for, switched their votes. All that the ruling regime's senseless bravado achieved was to test the patience of larger European nations and the US, and to encourage them to work hand in glove with Beijing to teach the ruling DPP a lesson. Over time, the Taiwan authorities have been demoted to the status of Asian-Pacific region trouble-maker. Not only can it not gain admission to the UN and the WHO, its role in APEC and the WTO are threatened, making it look more and more like the Orphan of Asia.
Because cross-Straits relations remain volatile, businesses refuse to invest, growth in domestic consumption slows, and the economy shrinks. The negative consequences show up in economic statistics again and again. To cover up its incompetence in the marketplace, the ruling regime compensates with victories in the political arena, by provoking confrontations between pro reunification and pro independence forces, and by inciting communal strife. Every time the ruling regime is humiliated on the international stage, the DPP transforms that humiliation into domestic political capital, into "Chinese Communist affronts to Taiwan's dignity" and heated controversies over "Taiwanese national identity." Take the attempt to gain membership in the WHO for example. The ruling regime knew perfectly well that its chances of joining the WHO were zero, yet it deliberately courted defeat in order to create pathos in the face of international persecution. They knew perfectly well they could not win, yet deliberately and relentlessly courted defeat. In short, the ruling DPP policy is hardline Taiwan independence. Its relationship with its allies is self-imposed isolation. Its goal in seeking membership in international organizations is to deliberately court defeat in order to elicit sympathy for its status as a downtrodden "victim," and to parlay that victimization into domestic political capital on election day. That is the significance of the four characters, "Du Gu seeks Defeat."
The problem is, this kind of "Dugu seeks Defeat" foreign policy not only infuriates allies, it harms Taiwan's economic development. The significance of whether the ruling regime can join organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank in the name of "Taiwan" is half symbolic and half substantive. This is true even of the WHO. Probably the only time its members will feel a difference is during the outbreak of a global infectious disease. But organizations such as ASEAN, regional trade organizations, and Free Trade Agreements between the ROC and South Korea, Japan, the US, and Europe, are organizations to which the ROC must aggressively seek participation or membership, and whose substance far outweighs symbolism. This newspaper has repeatedly pointed out that once ASEAN Plus Three takes shape in 2010, and ASEAN members sign free trade agreements with the EU, the US, and others, the ROC will be left in the cold. It will rapidly lose the comparative advantages of bilateral and multilateral trade, and this constitutes a major crisis of economic marginalization. As everyone knows, whether the ROC is able to participate in or be a signatory to these regional trade agreements may hinge on US influence. If our "Du Gu seeks Defeat" policy antagonizes Uncle Sam, this will inevitably be disadvantageous to Taiwan's economic future. This is not "loving Taiwan." This is "harming Taiwan."
The ROC has endured repeated humiliations over the past five years. It finally succeeded in joining the WTO under the name of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kimmen, and Matsu." Several decades ago, we also joined the International Olympic Committee under the name "Chinese Taipei." According to the "Du Gu seeks Defeat" logic of the DPP, shouldn't it first withdraw from the WTO and the IOC, then apply for readmission under the name of the "Nation of Taiwan?" Only this would qualify as "Rectification of Names." According to the DPP's perverse logic, only this would qualify as "upholding Taiwan's dignity." Only this would demonstrate that "Taiwan is a sovereign nation." In short, the substantive interests of the ROC must never be equated with the partisan electoral interests of the DPP.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.17
外交政策能夠一意「獨孤求敗」嗎？
中時社論
執政黨這次操作以台灣的名義加入世衛遭到空前挫敗，幾乎是以「喪權辱國」的處境收場。而回顧台灣近年來在國際社會所遭到的羞辱，這已經不是第一次了；每年 九月所推動的台灣加入聯合國運動，陳水扁每回出訪操作的「過境」外交，無一不是「國際招辱轉內銷」，試圖以中共打壓／台灣羞辱／民進黨維護尊嚴的標準公 式，來動員台灣人民的選票。這種操作模式，過去七年好像都是如此。
如果要以一兩句話彙整這種操作策略，那就是「對內選舉至上、對外獨孤求敗」。民進黨對內精於選舉已是社會共識，不需贅言；至於為什麼對外是「獨孤求敗」？ 著名武俠小說家金庸曾在作品中描述了一位絕世劍術高手，複姓獨孤，但一生難逢敵手，欲求一敗而不可得，是故取名「求敗」。但民進黨在外交政策上的所謂「獨 孤求敗」，卻是「求敗」而自陷「獨孤」。
民進黨這幾年來與若干基本教義派互為牽引利用，一方面利用御用媒體及地下電台不斷宣揚尊嚴、正名、制憲的絕對正當性，再以完全不顧國際情勢的莽夫姿態，鼓 勵當局在諸多友邦之間橫衝直撞。只要任何人提出理性的批評，都可能遭到御用媒體以「統派」、「不愛台灣」等語言加以羞辱或質疑；久而久之，這類躁進的瓦釜 之音，居然也得到了當局黃鐘般的肯定。所謂急「獨」，指的正是這種瓦釜喧嘩、莽衝亂撞的不理性狀態。
當台灣不斷在外交的緩衝區與灰色地帶橫衝直撞之際，我們國際上的友人開始日漸減少，實質上是更為「孤」立。以今年世衛案為例，台灣事前耗費資源去動員、布 局、遊說，最後卻連美、日、歐盟都投反對票，甚至連砸大錢買來的友邦也紛紛倒戈。當局如此暴虎馮河般地嗆聲，換來的卻是歐美等大國的不耐，而頻頻與中共聯 手教訓台灣。久而久之，台灣在國際眼中淪為亞太地區麻煩製造者，不但聯合國與世衛進不去，連在ＡＰＥＣ、ＷＴＯ的角色扮演都陸續開始受到擠壓，愈來愈像是 亞細亞的孤兒。
由於兩岸情勢不穩，企業在台投資卻步，國內消費成長遲緩，經濟內需萎靡不振，其惡果已在經濟統計數字上陸續呈現。但執政黨為了掩飾其經濟施政之無能，就只 好在一次次的選舉競逐中，激化統獨對立與族群摩擦。每當台灣在國際上遭受一次挫敗，民進黨就可以在國內將之轉化為中共對台灣尊嚴的羞辱，進而激化認同爭 議，以利其選舉操作。以此次世衛入會案為例，我方明知台灣成功入會之機率為零，卻硬是要塑造國際打壓的悲壯氣氛。這就是明知其必敗，卻樂此不疲的「求 敗」。總之，民進黨當局在政策上急獨、在友邦間孤立、在國際組織上力求壯烈敗北，以營造其國內選舉之資本─這就是「獨孤求敗」四字所刻畫的意義。
問題是，這種「獨孤求敗」的外交政策不僅觸怒友邦，更不利於台灣的經濟發展。像聯合國、世銀這樣的組織，台灣加入與否可能形式意義與實質意義參半。即便是 世界衛生組織，大概也只有在傳染病來襲的時候其會員才會真正感受到差別。但是像東協 (ＡＳＥＡＮ) 等區域貿易組織，或是台灣與韓、日、美歐之間可能的自由貿易區協定，卻是台灣必須要奮力尋求參與或加入的組織，其實質意義遠大於形式意義。本報社論曾一再 指出，一旦二○一○年東協加三成形，而東協諸國又與歐美等加簽自由貿易協定，屆時被排除在外的台灣，將快速喪失雙邊貿易與多邊貿易的比較優勢，形成經濟邊 緣化的重大危機。如所周知，台灣能否加入或簽署這些區域貿易協定，美國的影響力極大。我們獨孤求敗的政策若一再觸怒老美，將來必然會不利於台灣的經濟布 局；這不是愛台灣，而是害台灣。
台灣在五年前忍辱負重，終於以「獨立關稅領域」的名義加入ＷＴＯ。數十年前，我們也以「中華台北」的名義加入國際奧會。如果照民進黨獨孤求敗的邏輯，是不 是該先退出ＷＴＯ與國際奧會，再以「台灣國」名義重新申請加入，如此才算正名、才有尊嚴、才能展現台灣是主權國家？外交上實質的國家利益，終究不能與民進 黨勝選與否的政黨利益，完全畫上等號吧！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 17, 2007
The ruling party's attempt to join the WHO under the name of "Taiwan" has encountered unprecedented setbacks amounting to a national humiliation. This is not the first time the ruling party has humiliated itself in the international community. Every September the ruling party attempts to join the United Nations in the name of "Taiwan." Every time Chen Shui-bian embarks on a state visit to an ally, he practices "transit diplomacy." Every action is calculated to exploit international humiliations for domestic political gain at the polls, to spin Chinese Communist Party countermeasures as outrageous humiliations, and the Democratic Progressive Party as the champion of Taiwan's dignity. This has been the ruling party's standard operating procedure for the past seven years.
If one had to sum up their strategy in one or two sentences, it would be "domestically, electoral triumph; abroad, international humiliation." That the DPP is adept at electioneering is not in question. But why does it deliberately seek international humiliation? Jin Yong, famed author of traditional Chinese knight-errant "wu xia" novels, wrote about a master swordsman named Du Gu. So skilled that no one was his match, Du Gu sought to be defeated at least once, and adopted the ironic nickname, "He who seeks Defeat." The DPP's policy of deliberately courting international humiliation turns the story of Du Gu on its head. Confusing cause and effect, the DPP aspires to become Du Gu by obsessively seeking defeat.
For the past several years, the DPP and Taiwan independence fundamentalists have been using each other. They have used the ruling government's lapdog media and pirate radio stations to demand the "upholding of Taiwan's dignity," the "Rectification of Names," and the "authoring of a new constitution." Adopting a bull in a china shop attitude, and giving no thought to international repercussions, they have encouraged the ruling regime to butt heads with ROC allies. Anyone who dares to raise rational objections is promptly denounced as "pro reunification" and pigeonholed as someone who "doesn't love Taiwan." The ruling regime has given its blessing to this sort of shrill demagoguery. This sort of intemperate bluster and headlong blundering is the hallmark of the Taiwan independence hardliner.
When the ruling regime engages in heedless brinksmanship, our international allies abandon us, and we become international orphans. Take this year's WHA for example. The ruling regime invested vast sums mobilizing, strategizing, and lobbying. In the end, even the US, Japan, and the European Union cast nay votes. Even "allies" bought and paid for, switched their votes. All that the ruling regime's senseless bravado achieved was to test the patience of larger European nations and the US, and to encourage them to work hand in glove with Beijing to teach the ruling DPP a lesson. Over time, the Taiwan authorities have been demoted to the status of Asian-Pacific region trouble-maker. Not only can it not gain admission to the UN and the WHO, its role in APEC and the WTO are threatened, making it look more and more like the Orphan of Asia.
Because cross-Straits relations remain volatile, businesses refuse to invest, growth in domestic consumption slows, and the economy shrinks. The negative consequences show up in economic statistics again and again. To cover up its incompetence in the marketplace, the ruling regime compensates with victories in the political arena, by provoking confrontations between pro reunification and pro independence forces, and by inciting communal strife. Every time the ruling regime is humiliated on the international stage, the DPP transforms that humiliation into domestic political capital, into "Chinese Communist affronts to Taiwan's dignity" and heated controversies over "Taiwanese national identity." Take the attempt to gain membership in the WHO for example. The ruling regime knew perfectly well that its chances of joining the WHO were zero, yet it deliberately courted defeat in order to create pathos in the face of international persecution. They knew perfectly well they could not win, yet deliberately and relentlessly courted defeat. In short, the ruling DPP policy is hardline Taiwan independence. Its relationship with its allies is self-imposed isolation. Its goal in seeking membership in international organizations is to deliberately court defeat in order to elicit sympathy for its status as a downtrodden "victim," and to parlay that victimization into domestic political capital on election day. That is the significance of the four characters, "Du Gu seeks Defeat."
The problem is, this kind of "Dugu seeks Defeat" foreign policy not only infuriates allies, it harms Taiwan's economic development. The significance of whether the ruling regime can join organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank in the name of "Taiwan" is half symbolic and half substantive. This is true even of the WHO. Probably the only time its members will feel a difference is during the outbreak of a global infectious disease. But organizations such as ASEAN, regional trade organizations, and Free Trade Agreements between the ROC and South Korea, Japan, the US, and Europe, are organizations to which the ROC must aggressively seek participation or membership, and whose substance far outweighs symbolism. This newspaper has repeatedly pointed out that once ASEAN Plus Three takes shape in 2010, and ASEAN members sign free trade agreements with the EU, the US, and others, the ROC will be left in the cold. It will rapidly lose the comparative advantages of bilateral and multilateral trade, and this constitutes a major crisis of economic marginalization. As everyone knows, whether the ROC is able to participate in or be a signatory to these regional trade agreements may hinge on US influence. If our "Du Gu seeks Defeat" policy antagonizes Uncle Sam, this will inevitably be disadvantageous to Taiwan's economic future. This is not "loving Taiwan." This is "harming Taiwan."
The ROC has endured repeated humiliations over the past five years. It finally succeeded in joining the WTO under the name of "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kimmen, and Matsu." Several decades ago, we also joined the International Olympic Committee under the name "Chinese Taipei." According to the "Du Gu seeks Defeat" logic of the DPP, shouldn't it first withdraw from the WTO and the IOC, then apply for readmission under the name of the "Nation of Taiwan?" Only this would qualify as "Rectification of Names." According to the DPP's perverse logic, only this would qualify as "upholding Taiwan's dignity." Only this would demonstrate that "Taiwan is a sovereign nation." In short, the substantive interests of the ROC must never be equated with the partisan electoral interests of the DPP.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.17
外交政策能夠一意「獨孤求敗」嗎？
中時社論
執政黨這次操作以台灣的名義加入世衛遭到空前挫敗，幾乎是以「喪權辱國」的處境收場。而回顧台灣近年來在國際社會所遭到的羞辱，這已經不是第一次了；每年 九月所推動的台灣加入聯合國運動，陳水扁每回出訪操作的「過境」外交，無一不是「國際招辱轉內銷」，試圖以中共打壓／台灣羞辱／民進黨維護尊嚴的標準公 式，來動員台灣人民的選票。這種操作模式，過去七年好像都是如此。
如果要以一兩句話彙整這種操作策略，那就是「對內選舉至上、對外獨孤求敗」。民進黨對內精於選舉已是社會共識，不需贅言；至於為什麼對外是「獨孤求敗」？ 著名武俠小說家金庸曾在作品中描述了一位絕世劍術高手，複姓獨孤，但一生難逢敵手，欲求一敗而不可得，是故取名「求敗」。但民進黨在外交政策上的所謂「獨 孤求敗」，卻是「求敗」而自陷「獨孤」。
民進黨這幾年來與若干基本教義派互為牽引利用，一方面利用御用媒體及地下電台不斷宣揚尊嚴、正名、制憲的絕對正當性，再以完全不顧國際情勢的莽夫姿態，鼓 勵當局在諸多友邦之間橫衝直撞。只要任何人提出理性的批評，都可能遭到御用媒體以「統派」、「不愛台灣」等語言加以羞辱或質疑；久而久之，這類躁進的瓦釜 之音，居然也得到了當局黃鐘般的肯定。所謂急「獨」，指的正是這種瓦釜喧嘩、莽衝亂撞的不理性狀態。
當台灣不斷在外交的緩衝區與灰色地帶橫衝直撞之際，我們國際上的友人開始日漸減少，實質上是更為「孤」立。以今年世衛案為例，台灣事前耗費資源去動員、布 局、遊說，最後卻連美、日、歐盟都投反對票，甚至連砸大錢買來的友邦也紛紛倒戈。當局如此暴虎馮河般地嗆聲，換來的卻是歐美等大國的不耐，而頻頻與中共聯 手教訓台灣。久而久之，台灣在國際眼中淪為亞太地區麻煩製造者，不但聯合國與世衛進不去，連在ＡＰＥＣ、ＷＴＯ的角色扮演都陸續開始受到擠壓，愈來愈像是 亞細亞的孤兒。
由於兩岸情勢不穩，企業在台投資卻步，國內消費成長遲緩，經濟內需萎靡不振，其惡果已在經濟統計數字上陸續呈現。但執政黨為了掩飾其經濟施政之無能，就只 好在一次次的選舉競逐中，激化統獨對立與族群摩擦。每當台灣在國際上遭受一次挫敗，民進黨就可以在國內將之轉化為中共對台灣尊嚴的羞辱，進而激化認同爭 議，以利其選舉操作。以此次世衛入會案為例，我方明知台灣成功入會之機率為零，卻硬是要塑造國際打壓的悲壯氣氛。這就是明知其必敗，卻樂此不疲的「求 敗」。總之，民進黨當局在政策上急獨、在友邦間孤立、在國際組織上力求壯烈敗北，以營造其國內選舉之資本─這就是「獨孤求敗」四字所刻畫的意義。
問題是，這種「獨孤求敗」的外交政策不僅觸怒友邦，更不利於台灣的經濟發展。像聯合國、世銀這樣的組織，台灣加入與否可能形式意義與實質意義參半。即便是 世界衛生組織，大概也只有在傳染病來襲的時候其會員才會真正感受到差別。但是像東協 (ＡＳＥＡＮ) 等區域貿易組織，或是台灣與韓、日、美歐之間可能的自由貿易區協定，卻是台灣必須要奮力尋求參與或加入的組織，其實質意義遠大於形式意義。本報社論曾一再 指出，一旦二○一○年東協加三成形，而東協諸國又與歐美等加簽自由貿易協定，屆時被排除在外的台灣，將快速喪失雙邊貿易與多邊貿易的比較優勢，形成經濟邊 緣化的重大危機。如所周知，台灣能否加入或簽署這些區域貿易協定，美國的影響力極大。我們獨孤求敗的政策若一再觸怒老美，將來必然會不利於台灣的經濟布 局；這不是愛台灣，而是害台灣。
台灣在五年前忍辱負重，終於以「獨立關稅領域」的名義加入ＷＴＯ。數十年前，我們也以「中華台北」的名義加入國際奧會。如果照民進黨獨孤求敗的邏輯，是不 是該先退出ＷＴＯ與國際奧會，再以「台灣國」名義重新申請加入，如此才算正名、才有尊嚴、才能展現台灣是主權國家？外交上實質的國家利益，終究不能與民進 黨勝選與否的政黨利益，完全畫上等號吧！
Wednesday, May 16, 2007
Taiwan is farther from the WHO than ever
Taiwan is farther from the WHO than ever
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 16, 2007
The Chen administration seeks membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) under the name of "Taiwan." This year it adopted a more aggressive posture than ever. The result was a bigger setback than ever. Not only did the US, Japan, and European Union cast nay ballots, seven nations which recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate government of China, switched their votes. The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, who meets annually with our delegation as a matter of routine, not only held a press conference publicly declaring that the US does not support Taiwan's entry, he went to the unprecedented length of refusing to meet with our delegation. Not only were the Chen administration's efforts to gain membership in the WHO frustrated once more, the treatment it received this year was even worse than in years past. The ruling regime's handiwork was a negative example of the Chinese addage, "If you eat too fast, you'll break your bowl." Is anything is worse than incompetent leaders bringing disaster down upon their nations?
Based on campaign considerations, the Chen regime has chosen to fight a "Rectification of Names" war, first domestically, then internationally. This year the Chen regime once again demanded the right to attend the 14th WHA as an observer. Adopting an aggressive posture, and with much fanfare, it declared that it intended to apply for membership in the WHO under the name "Taiwan." Chen Shui-bian even sent a letter to the Secretary General of the WHO expressing this desire.
The Chen regime was not even able to gain membership in the WHA as an observer under the name of the "Republic of China." What chance does it have of gaining membership in the WHO under the name of "Taiwan?" And yet the Chen administration has chosen to undertake this Impossible Mission. Anyone with an eye can see that this is a political gesture intended for domestic consumption. First, it makes a great show of demanding the "Rectification of Names" and admission to the WHO on the international stage. It takes advantage of the opportunity to spin the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the guardian of "Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity." Then when it encounters the inevitable setbacks, it incites hatred against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and alleged "foreign political authorities" (i.e., the Kuomintang, or KMT), transforming this hatred into votes for DPP candidates. Since such gestures are focused entirely on internal concerns, they naturally neglect external constraints.
Less adept at foreign diplomacy than at domestic partisan infighting, most variables are not under the Chen regime's control. Under pressure from Beijing, finding itself at an international disadvantage. With limited chips to play, it has no way of controlling the battlefield. The reasonable approach would be to acknowledge reality and adopt the most pragmatic strategy for survival. The Chen administration's behavior runs completely counter to this. The reality is that mainland China's international stature is rapidly rising. Its ability to undermine Taipei's diplomacy is rapidly growing. The US is mired in the Iraqi war, and is unwilling to get into a conflict with Beijing in the Taiwan Straits. Chen Shui-bian's political gestures in recent years have repeatedly crossed a line in the sand. From his "One Country, Each Side" to his "Rectification of Names" to his "Abolition of the National Unification Council" to his recent "Four Demands." Not only has he not valued the mutual confidence established over the years with the US, neither has he considered the standpoint of allied nations, leaving the US with the feeling that its goodwill has been abused. Worse still, Taiwan has come to be regarded as a troublemaker responsible for the undermining of Asian-Pacific security. The US has been compelled to establish a total exclusion zone and collaborate with Beijing on "managing" the Taiwan problem. Any reckless actions by the Chen administration that do not consider international reality, will be subjected to even more severe constraints than before, to avoid making trouble for the US.
Chen Shui-bian's myopic quest for short term advantage in cross-Straits policy and international diplomacy over the past seven years has not improved the ROC's international standing or created new "living room." It has merely set back the ROC and impugned its dignity. Grey areas in which the ROC still had some wiggle room, have now been preemptively defined by the US as forbidden zones, diminishing the ROC's room to maneuver. Participation in the WHO is particularly so, because it involves public health and global disease prevention.
Past demands for Taiwan's participation in the WHO received more international sympathy than demands to join the United Nations. The US, Japan, and European Union repeatedly expressed support for Taiwan's participation in WHO activities. But this year, when Chen adopted an aggressive posture, and shrilly declared our intention to join the WHO using the name "Taiwan," the US, Japan, and European Union cast nay votes at the WHA convention. They could have abstained, but instead they chose to cast nay votes, leaving an official record and setting the tone for future policy decisions. This severely impacts Taiwan, and erects unprecedented roadblocks in the way of future efforts to join the WHO.
Taiwan's suddenly aggressive posture, on top of a string of diplomatic provocations, not only wore out our allies' patience and goodwill, it pushed allies who sympathized with Taiwan to stand on the same battleline with Beijing. More serious is the fact that the international community has gradually established a consensus that working with Beijing to rein in the Taiwan independence movement is a choice they must make to maintain regional stability. The international breathing space acquired with such difficulty over the years has been gambled away in a reckless roll of the dice. Taiwan's opportunities for the future have also withered on the vine, with nothing to show for the sacrifice. What kind of stupid foreign policy is this? Knowing perfectly well that the ROC would be seriously harmed, the Chen regime nevertheless shoved Taiwan into the arena to be slaughtered. What is the point of gestures such as this? "If you eat too fast, you'll break your bowl." The harm inflicted upon the ROC by the Chen regime far exceeds any harm inflicted upon the ROC by the Chinese Communist Party.
When WHO members voted at their annual meeting this year, seven allies switched their votes. This is of course is Beijing's doing.
In the cross-Straits tug of war, the WHO vote battle and the UN General Assembly vote battle are the ones that hold the most potential for gains. Seven members switching their votes, including important Central America allies, demonstrates Beijing's increased influence over these nations. This is a danger signal for ROC diplomacy.
Judging from our setback in the WHO vote, the ROC is not running in place, it is moving backwards. We are even farther from the front door of the WHO than we were when we started. Beijing's pressure is of course unforgivable. But the Chen regime should also apologize to the people for its reckless errors in policy, which have seriously harmed the nation's interests.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.16
台灣與世衛的距離更遠了
中時社論
我國尋求參與世界衛生組織（ＷＨＯ），今年姿態拉到前所未有地高，結果挫敗竟是前所未有地大。不只美、日、歐盟都投下了反對票，更有七個友邦跑票。每年都例行性與我國代表團晤面的美國衛生部長，不僅開記者會公開表態不支持台灣入會，更罕見地拒絕與代表團晤面。可以說，台灣今年爭取參與世衛的努力，不僅是再度挫敗，而且還比往年所受的待遇更行倒退。執政當局的操作，完全是一場「呷緊弄破碗」的錯誤示範。昏庸誤國，莫此為甚！
在選戰策略考量下，台灣政府最近一再強打「正名」之戰，戰場更從國內打到國際。對於十四日召開的世衛大會（ＷＨＡ），我國除再度要求以觀察員身分出席，今年更大張旗鼓地拉高姿態，宣示要以台灣名義申請加入世衛組織，陳水扁也去函世衛秘書長表達意願。
想也知道，沒有任何理由，能讓人相信過去連ＷＨＡ觀察員都當不成，改以台灣名義尋求加入ＷＨＯ會有任何機會，但政府還是決定向更高難度的目標挑戰。明眼人都看得出來，這是一個供內部消費的政治操作。先在國際舞台上大玩台灣正名、入會的動作，藉此讓民進黨成為捍衛台灣主權尊嚴的代言人。待遭到必然的衝突與挫折後，再激化台灣內部對中共及「外來政權」的仇視，轉而成為支持民進黨候選人的選票。這樣的操作，既是一心著眼於內部，當然就完全無視外在環境的制約。
對外關係終究不比內政，大部分變數不能操之在我，遭受中共打壓、處於國際劣勢的台灣，尤其籌碼有限，沒辦法主控局面。最合理的作法，應是認清現實抓準趨勢，選擇最務實有效的生存策略，偏偏陳水扁政府的作為是完全逆勢操作。國際現實是中國迅速崛起，挖台灣外交牆腳的籌碼大增；美國則陷於伊戰泥沼，不願在台海與中共發生衝突。相對的近年來陳水扁的操作卻是不斷在兩岸關係上踩紅線，從「一邊一國」、「正名」、「終統」到最近喊出「四要」，不僅毫不珍惜台美長期建立的友好互信，也未曾替盟邦的立場考慮，以致讓美方有善意遭到濫用甚至利用之感。更糟的是，台灣因此被視為破壞亞太安全的麻煩製造者，美國索性主動設定封鎖區，與中共聯手「管理」台灣問題。台灣任何不顧國際現實的冒進舉動，都會遭到比過去更嚴厲的箝制，以免給美國惹出更大麻煩。
回顧過去七年，陳水扁多次在兩岸及外交上短視近利的躁進政策，不但沒有改善台灣的國際地位、開拓更多生存空間，反而讓台灣的處境更為倒退，國家尊嚴受到諸多不必要的折損。原本可以讓台灣稍許迴旋的模糊地帶，已經被美國預防性地畫為禁區，平白喪失了重要的活動空間。世衛的參與尤其是如此，由於涉及民眾健康與全球防疫，過去台灣參與世衛的訴求一直比加入聯合國更能得到國際同情，美、日、歐盟也多次表達支持台灣參與世衛活動的態度。但是今年當我們拉高姿態，宣布要以台灣名義加入世衛後，這次ＷＨＡ大會上，美、日、歐盟竟然全部投下反對票，他們原本可以不表態的，但卻決定在表決時立下反對紀錄，成為各國將來的政策基調。這不僅對台灣是一記重擊，更會為台灣日後的入會努力設下前所未有的高聳路障。
台灣這次突兀的拉高姿態，加上之前一連串地的外交挑釁，不僅把盟友的善意與耐心耗損殆盡，更將許多對台灣同情的友邦被推向與北京站在同一陣線。更嚴重的是，國際社會已逐漸建立一種共識，認為配合中共壓抑台灣的台獨動作，是維護區域安定必須做的選擇。多年來好不容易開拓出來的國際空間，這下等於自己全部倒賠回去；台灣將來可能的機會與空間，也毫無代價地萎縮流失，這是怎樣愚蠢錯誤的外交政策？明知台灣會嚴重受傷，還是把台灣推到國際間遭受宰割，如此的操作的意義究竟在哪裡？「呷緊弄破碗」對國家生存的傷害，甚至超過了中共片面打壓所能做到的程度。
這次的年會在表決時，我們還有七個友邦跑票，這當然又是中共搞的鬼。兩岸的友邦拉鋸戰，最派得上用場的，就是在世衛大會和聯合國大會上的表決攻防發揮作用。如今跑了七票，其中還不乏中美洲重要友邦，顯示中共對這些國家的影響力增加，這更是台灣外交的一大警訊。
從我們向ＷＨＯ出發，到現在的表決挫敗，台灣的處境根本不是在原地踏步，而是一路往後倒退，甚至如今離世衛之門比出發時還遠。而釀成這一切，北京的打壓當然不可原諒，但執政當局也該為決策的錯誤與冒進，導致國家利益受到嚴重傷害，向全民道聲歉吧！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 16, 2007
The Chen administration seeks membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) under the name of "Taiwan." This year it adopted a more aggressive posture than ever. The result was a bigger setback than ever. Not only did the US, Japan, and European Union cast nay ballots, seven nations which recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate government of China, switched their votes. The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, who meets annually with our delegation as a matter of routine, not only held a press conference publicly declaring that the US does not support Taiwan's entry, he went to the unprecedented length of refusing to meet with our delegation. Not only were the Chen administration's efforts to gain membership in the WHO frustrated once more, the treatment it received this year was even worse than in years past. The ruling regime's handiwork was a negative example of the Chinese addage, "If you eat too fast, you'll break your bowl." Is anything is worse than incompetent leaders bringing disaster down upon their nations?
Based on campaign considerations, the Chen regime has chosen to fight a "Rectification of Names" war, first domestically, then internationally. This year the Chen regime once again demanded the right to attend the 14th WHA as an observer. Adopting an aggressive posture, and with much fanfare, it declared that it intended to apply for membership in the WHO under the name "Taiwan." Chen Shui-bian even sent a letter to the Secretary General of the WHO expressing this desire.
The Chen regime was not even able to gain membership in the WHA as an observer under the name of the "Republic of China." What chance does it have of gaining membership in the WHO under the name of "Taiwan?" And yet the Chen administration has chosen to undertake this Impossible Mission. Anyone with an eye can see that this is a political gesture intended for domestic consumption. First, it makes a great show of demanding the "Rectification of Names" and admission to the WHO on the international stage. It takes advantage of the opportunity to spin the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the guardian of "Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity." Then when it encounters the inevitable setbacks, it incites hatred against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and alleged "foreign political authorities" (i.e., the Kuomintang, or KMT), transforming this hatred into votes for DPP candidates. Since such gestures are focused entirely on internal concerns, they naturally neglect external constraints.
Less adept at foreign diplomacy than at domestic partisan infighting, most variables are not under the Chen regime's control. Under pressure from Beijing, finding itself at an international disadvantage. With limited chips to play, it has no way of controlling the battlefield. The reasonable approach would be to acknowledge reality and adopt the most pragmatic strategy for survival. The Chen administration's behavior runs completely counter to this. The reality is that mainland China's international stature is rapidly rising. Its ability to undermine Taipei's diplomacy is rapidly growing. The US is mired in the Iraqi war, and is unwilling to get into a conflict with Beijing in the Taiwan Straits. Chen Shui-bian's political gestures in recent years have repeatedly crossed a line in the sand. From his "One Country, Each Side" to his "Rectification of Names" to his "Abolition of the National Unification Council" to his recent "Four Demands." Not only has he not valued the mutual confidence established over the years with the US, neither has he considered the standpoint of allied nations, leaving the US with the feeling that its goodwill has been abused. Worse still, Taiwan has come to be regarded as a troublemaker responsible for the undermining of Asian-Pacific security. The US has been compelled to establish a total exclusion zone and collaborate with Beijing on "managing" the Taiwan problem. Any reckless actions by the Chen administration that do not consider international reality, will be subjected to even more severe constraints than before, to avoid making trouble for the US.
Chen Shui-bian's myopic quest for short term advantage in cross-Straits policy and international diplomacy over the past seven years has not improved the ROC's international standing or created new "living room." It has merely set back the ROC and impugned its dignity. Grey areas in which the ROC still had some wiggle room, have now been preemptively defined by the US as forbidden zones, diminishing the ROC's room to maneuver. Participation in the WHO is particularly so, because it involves public health and global disease prevention.
Past demands for Taiwan's participation in the WHO received more international sympathy than demands to join the United Nations. The US, Japan, and European Union repeatedly expressed support for Taiwan's participation in WHO activities. But this year, when Chen adopted an aggressive posture, and shrilly declared our intention to join the WHO using the name "Taiwan," the US, Japan, and European Union cast nay votes at the WHA convention. They could have abstained, but instead they chose to cast nay votes, leaving an official record and setting the tone for future policy decisions. This severely impacts Taiwan, and erects unprecedented roadblocks in the way of future efforts to join the WHO.
Taiwan's suddenly aggressive posture, on top of a string of diplomatic provocations, not only wore out our allies' patience and goodwill, it pushed allies who sympathized with Taiwan to stand on the same battleline with Beijing. More serious is the fact that the international community has gradually established a consensus that working with Beijing to rein in the Taiwan independence movement is a choice they must make to maintain regional stability. The international breathing space acquired with such difficulty over the years has been gambled away in a reckless roll of the dice. Taiwan's opportunities for the future have also withered on the vine, with nothing to show for the sacrifice. What kind of stupid foreign policy is this? Knowing perfectly well that the ROC would be seriously harmed, the Chen regime nevertheless shoved Taiwan into the arena to be slaughtered. What is the point of gestures such as this? "If you eat too fast, you'll break your bowl." The harm inflicted upon the ROC by the Chen regime far exceeds any harm inflicted upon the ROC by the Chinese Communist Party.
When WHO members voted at their annual meeting this year, seven allies switched their votes. This is of course is Beijing's doing.
In the cross-Straits tug of war, the WHO vote battle and the UN General Assembly vote battle are the ones that hold the most potential for gains. Seven members switching their votes, including important Central America allies, demonstrates Beijing's increased influence over these nations. This is a danger signal for ROC diplomacy.
Judging from our setback in the WHO vote, the ROC is not running in place, it is moving backwards. We are even farther from the front door of the WHO than we were when we started. Beijing's pressure is of course unforgivable. But the Chen regime should also apologize to the people for its reckless errors in policy, which have seriously harmed the nation's interests.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.05.16
台灣與世衛的距離更遠了
中時社論
我國尋求參與世界衛生組織（ＷＨＯ），今年姿態拉到前所未有地高，結果挫敗竟是前所未有地大。不只美、日、歐盟都投下了反對票，更有七個友邦跑票。每年都例行性與我國代表團晤面的美國衛生部長，不僅開記者會公開表態不支持台灣入會，更罕見地拒絕與代表團晤面。可以說，台灣今年爭取參與世衛的努力，不僅是再度挫敗，而且還比往年所受的待遇更行倒退。執政當局的操作，完全是一場「呷緊弄破碗」的錯誤示範。昏庸誤國，莫此為甚！
在選戰策略考量下，台灣政府最近一再強打「正名」之戰，戰場更從國內打到國際。對於十四日召開的世衛大會（ＷＨＡ），我國除再度要求以觀察員身分出席，今年更大張旗鼓地拉高姿態，宣示要以台灣名義申請加入世衛組織，陳水扁也去函世衛秘書長表達意願。
想也知道，沒有任何理由，能讓人相信過去連ＷＨＡ觀察員都當不成，改以台灣名義尋求加入ＷＨＯ會有任何機會，但政府還是決定向更高難度的目標挑戰。明眼人都看得出來，這是一個供內部消費的政治操作。先在國際舞台上大玩台灣正名、入會的動作，藉此讓民進黨成為捍衛台灣主權尊嚴的代言人。待遭到必然的衝突與挫折後，再激化台灣內部對中共及「外來政權」的仇視，轉而成為支持民進黨候選人的選票。這樣的操作，既是一心著眼於內部，當然就完全無視外在環境的制約。
對外關係終究不比內政，大部分變數不能操之在我，遭受中共打壓、處於國際劣勢的台灣，尤其籌碼有限，沒辦法主控局面。最合理的作法，應是認清現實抓準趨勢，選擇最務實有效的生存策略，偏偏陳水扁政府的作為是完全逆勢操作。國際現實是中國迅速崛起，挖台灣外交牆腳的籌碼大增；美國則陷於伊戰泥沼，不願在台海與中共發生衝突。相對的近年來陳水扁的操作卻是不斷在兩岸關係上踩紅線，從「一邊一國」、「正名」、「終統」到最近喊出「四要」，不僅毫不珍惜台美長期建立的友好互信，也未曾替盟邦的立場考慮，以致讓美方有善意遭到濫用甚至利用之感。更糟的是，台灣因此被視為破壞亞太安全的麻煩製造者，美國索性主動設定封鎖區，與中共聯手「管理」台灣問題。台灣任何不顧國際現實的冒進舉動，都會遭到比過去更嚴厲的箝制，以免給美國惹出更大麻煩。
回顧過去七年，陳水扁多次在兩岸及外交上短視近利的躁進政策，不但沒有改善台灣的國際地位、開拓更多生存空間，反而讓台灣的處境更為倒退，國家尊嚴受到諸多不必要的折損。原本可以讓台灣稍許迴旋的模糊地帶，已經被美國預防性地畫為禁區，平白喪失了重要的活動空間。世衛的參與尤其是如此，由於涉及民眾健康與全球防疫，過去台灣參與世衛的訴求一直比加入聯合國更能得到國際同情，美、日、歐盟也多次表達支持台灣參與世衛活動的態度。但是今年當我們拉高姿態，宣布要以台灣名義加入世衛後，這次ＷＨＡ大會上，美、日、歐盟竟然全部投下反對票，他們原本可以不表態的，但卻決定在表決時立下反對紀錄，成為各國將來的政策基調。這不僅對台灣是一記重擊，更會為台灣日後的入會努力設下前所未有的高聳路障。
台灣這次突兀的拉高姿態，加上之前一連串地的外交挑釁，不僅把盟友的善意與耐心耗損殆盡，更將許多對台灣同情的友邦被推向與北京站在同一陣線。更嚴重的是，國際社會已逐漸建立一種共識，認為配合中共壓抑台灣的台獨動作，是維護區域安定必須做的選擇。多年來好不容易開拓出來的國際空間，這下等於自己全部倒賠回去；台灣將來可能的機會與空間，也毫無代價地萎縮流失，這是怎樣愚蠢錯誤的外交政策？明知台灣會嚴重受傷，還是把台灣推到國際間遭受宰割，如此的操作的意義究竟在哪裡？「呷緊弄破碗」對國家生存的傷害，甚至超過了中共片面打壓所能做到的程度。
這次的年會在表決時，我們還有七個友邦跑票，這當然又是中共搞的鬼。兩岸的友邦拉鋸戰，最派得上用場的，就是在世衛大會和聯合國大會上的表決攻防發揮作用。如今跑了七票，其中還不乏中美洲重要友邦，顯示中共對這些國家的影響力增加，這更是台灣外交的一大警訊。
從我們向ＷＨＯ出發，到現在的表決挫敗，台灣的處境根本不是在原地踏步，而是一路往後倒退，甚至如今離世衛之門比出發時還遠。而釀成這一切，北京的打壓當然不可原諒，但執政當局也該為決策的錯誤與冒進，導致國家利益受到嚴重傷害，向全民道聲歉吧！
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
Seven Years, Six Prime Ministers
Seven Years, Six Prime Ministers
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 15, 2007
After following the headlines and assembling the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, the reason Prime Minister Su abruptly resigned has become clear. It was not that Su wanted to help Chen arrange a new strategic scenario. It was that Chen wanted to organize a "wartime cabinet" as quickly as possible. If Su had insisted on remaining premier, he would have become an obstacle in Chen's way. But if Su's presence disturbed Chen and Frank Hsieh so much, what kind of premier can Chang Chun-hsiung be?
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been in power for seven years. Accounts of how one prime minister after another left office could fill volumes. Most provocative is the fact that besides Tang Fei, the very first prime minister appointed by Chen Shui-bian, who resigned over Chen's order to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant, every prime minister has been replaced in accordance with the requirements of power struggles. The offices of the prime minister, the party chairman, and the secretary general of the presidential office have become seats in a game of musical chairs. Members of the nomenklatura who have been anointed the "princes" of the party have been swapping places. This does not mean that Chen Shui-bian is a modern day Machiavelli, but that the status of these offices have been thoroughly debased.
Besides Chen Shui-bian, nearly all of the DPP's princes have had their turn as prime minister, including Chang Chun-hsiung, who was just appointed prime minister for the second time. What is interesting is that none of these princes received much support during their terms of office. Instead they have been victims caught in the crossfire between the president and the legislature, rapidly eroding whatever prestige or charisma they might once have enjoyed.
Think back to the euphoria when Frank Hsieh resigned as mayor of Kaohsiung in order to serve as prime minister. One year later, when Su replaced Hsieh, compare the dramatically altered status of the two rivals. Su's popularity ratings were once so low he was almost omitted from the list of "potential successors." Compare that to Hsieh's desolation and humble posture as he was pushed to the margins of power. Who would have guessed that a year later their situations would be reversed? That Su Tseng-chang, despite his advantages as prime minister, would see his popularity ratings plummet? That Frank Hsieh, despite his low popularity ratings, would climb out of his hole, and go from someone with nothing to Green Camp presidential candidate? As far as Su and Hsieh are concerned, assuming the position of prime minister did not allow them to get closer to the presidency, it merely pushed them farther away.
In other words, under Chen Shui-bian's reign, assuming the duties of prime minister has become a kind of Faustian bargain. On the one hand, the prime minister enjoys enormous resources, making it difficult to resist the seduction of the office. But everyone who has assumed the position of prime minister has been abused and devalued. For the past seven years, the reality of a ruling minority in the legislature has never changed. Chen Shui-bian, the real wielder of power, has never given back any of the power he illegally usurped from the prime minister. Add to this a media which seizes upon every opportunity to play up the issue, and you have a situation in which the office of Prime Minister of the Republic of China is the swiftest means of destroying the future of Taiwan's political elite.
Few worry about the fact that according to the constitution the prime minister and not the president is the nation's highest executive, and that according to the constitution he must answer to the legislature. If Su Tseng-chang should resign, he should resign over the five month old deadlock in the legislature over the general budget. He should not resign to help Chen Shui-bian prepare a new strategic scenario. The problem is that everyone is eager to participate in this game of musical chairs. Nobody cares about constitutionalism and the rule of law.
In other words, changing prime ministers six times in seven years has never been about anything but power. The least important consideration is the continuity of policy. The one question we most want to ask is: If Chang Chun-hsiung is returning, does that mean that his "8100, Taiwan Starts Moving Economic Stimulus Plan" is going to be resurrected? Members of Su's cabinet are busy packing and leaving. Su had just kicked off his "Great Investments, Great Warmth" plan. Is all activity about to cease in light of the change in prime ministers? Is everything going to be treated as if it never happened?
Six prime ministers in seven years, like a carousel lantern going around and around, up and down, all the while changing teams. Each and every one promoting his own master plan. Each and every one offering matching slogans. Cabinet members no sooner learn the ropes, than they are forced out of office by regime change. Presidents of the five yuan and ministers seem to be "just passing through." Every prime minister upon arrival declares that he will "explore new possibilities." Every prime minister upon departure declares that he has "other plans in life." No one shoulders any responsibility for the fact that policies and plans are endlessly undermined and overturned. When the replacement of prime ministers is treated as child's play, how can Taiwan's competitiveness not plummet year after year, until it is trailing the mainland's? When everyone pays attention only to power struggles between Chen and Hsieh, who really cares about such matters?
Original Chinese below:
中國時報
2007.05.15
七年六閣揆，有誰在乎政策賡續的成本？
中時社論
隨著新聞幕後一塊塊拼圖的重組，蘇揆突然請辭的緣由已大致明朗。事實真相當然不是蘇要讓扁「展布」什麼「新局」，而是扁謝想要盡快共組「選戰內閣」，蘇若還要留任閣揆，就成了攔路的石頭了！而有趣的地方也就在這裡：如果蘇的存在讓扁謝兩人感到礙眼，那麼張俊雄又能成為怎樣的閣揆呢？
民進黨執政的七年來，閣揆的「下台學」已經可以寫一本厚厚的專書了。而最耐人尋味的地方也就在於，除了首任的唐飛是為了反對核四停建的政策而負責下台外，之後所有的閣揆都是為了因應權力布局需要而替換。這期間，閣揆、黨主席與總統府秘書長三個職位，彷彿是在一個三角棋盤上的三顆棋子輪流對換，幾個被封為「天王」的執政黨精英，就在這幾個位置上挪來挪去，這般頻繁的輪轉，並未凸顯出陳水扁操作權位的手法有多高明，倒是同時把三個位置都做小了！
或者講得更直接一點，民進黨檯面上的天王級的菁英，除了陳水扁以外，幾乎都輪過一次閣揆，甚至此刻又輪回到了張俊雄。而有趣的是這幾位天王竟沒有一個在閣揆任內獲得充分養望，反而都在立院與總統的相互牽制困局中，迅速挫磨掉原有的聲望與人氣。
遙想當年，謝長廷由港都轉進行政院之際，是何等的意氣風發！待一年後蘇上謝下，兩人懸殊的人氣指數，又豈是今日所能比擬？以當時蘇的氣勢，就差沒被點名為「準接班人」，而相對照的則是謝的落寞與低調，幾近被擠到權力邊緣徘徊。一年之後誰又能預料竟然形勢互易，占有閣揆優勢的蘇貞昌，竟在人氣聲望上一路下挫，反倒是氣勢低檔的謝長廷逆勢崛起，從一無所有一躍而為綠營總統候選人。對蘇謝兩人而言，接任閣揆並沒讓他們距離總統大位更近，反而是被推得更遠。
換言之，在陳水扁的操作下，閣揆一職彷彿成了某種「浮士德的交易」。一方面閣揆所享有的龐大資源，讓所有人都很難抗拒這個職位的誘惑，但不論是誰接任了閣揆，卻也都擺脫不了被糟蹋而迅速貶值的宿命。過去七年，立院「朝小野大」的情勢沒一天變過，位居幕後的陳總統也從未真正下放過權力，加上相關媒體的見縫插針，「閣揆」在中華民國的體制中，竟成為摧毀政治菁英最快速的位置。
談到這裡，似乎很少人還會驚覺，在現行憲政體制上，行政院長一直都是政府最高的行政首長，在體制上也一直都應要向立法院負責。換言之衡情論理，此際就算蘇貞昌該當下台，為的也該是年度預算被卡在立院數月之久不得動彈而下台，而不該是為了成全陳水扁「展布新局」而下台。問題是，大伙上上下下，卻沒一個人願意要從這個角度思考。
也就是說，七年替換六個閣揆，永遠是權力邏輯凌駕一切，選舉考量蓋過其它，最不受重視的反而是政策的賡續。我們在此刻還真想直接了當的問一句：如果要換張俊雄上台，是不是說他當年所大力推動的「八一○○，全民啟動」又要大復活了？而蘇的核心團隊陸續打包走人，是不是他才剛開始推動的「大投資、大溫暖」計畫，就此偃旗息鼓，當「一切全都沒發生過」？
七年不到，六位閣揆像是走馬燈般的上上下下，在此同時也換了六組團隊，先後推出過六套施政大計畫，也都搭配著六句華麗的施政口號。許多閣員對部務才剛上手，就被迫在改組中倉卒下台，院長部長彷彿都只是「到此一遊」一樣。風光上台的時候都說要「開創新局」，狼狽下台的時候也都說另有「生涯規畫」，卻沒有那個人需要對政策規畫不斷被顛覆翻轉擔負過任何責任。這般地視閣揆替換形同兒戲，試問台灣的競爭力排名，怎麼不會年年下滑，甚至還被大陸給趕了過去？問題是當大家如今都只注意扁謝怎麼玩權力平衡，有誰還會真在乎這些呢！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 15, 2007
After following the headlines and assembling the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, the reason Prime Minister Su abruptly resigned has become clear. It was not that Su wanted to help Chen arrange a new strategic scenario. It was that Chen wanted to organize a "wartime cabinet" as quickly as possible. If Su had insisted on remaining premier, he would have become an obstacle in Chen's way. But if Su's presence disturbed Chen and Frank Hsieh so much, what kind of premier can Chang Chun-hsiung be?
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been in power for seven years. Accounts of how one prime minister after another left office could fill volumes. Most provocative is the fact that besides Tang Fei, the very first prime minister appointed by Chen Shui-bian, who resigned over Chen's order to halt construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant, every prime minister has been replaced in accordance with the requirements of power struggles. The offices of the prime minister, the party chairman, and the secretary general of the presidential office have become seats in a game of musical chairs. Members of the nomenklatura who have been anointed the "princes" of the party have been swapping places. This does not mean that Chen Shui-bian is a modern day Machiavelli, but that the status of these offices have been thoroughly debased.
Besides Chen Shui-bian, nearly all of the DPP's princes have had their turn as prime minister, including Chang Chun-hsiung, who was just appointed prime minister for the second time. What is interesting is that none of these princes received much support during their terms of office. Instead they have been victims caught in the crossfire between the president and the legislature, rapidly eroding whatever prestige or charisma they might once have enjoyed.
Think back to the euphoria when Frank Hsieh resigned as mayor of Kaohsiung in order to serve as prime minister. One year later, when Su replaced Hsieh, compare the dramatically altered status of the two rivals. Su's popularity ratings were once so low he was almost omitted from the list of "potential successors." Compare that to Hsieh's desolation and humble posture as he was pushed to the margins of power. Who would have guessed that a year later their situations would be reversed? That Su Tseng-chang, despite his advantages as prime minister, would see his popularity ratings plummet? That Frank Hsieh, despite his low popularity ratings, would climb out of his hole, and go from someone with nothing to Green Camp presidential candidate? As far as Su and Hsieh are concerned, assuming the position of prime minister did not allow them to get closer to the presidency, it merely pushed them farther away.
In other words, under Chen Shui-bian's reign, assuming the duties of prime minister has become a kind of Faustian bargain. On the one hand, the prime minister enjoys enormous resources, making it difficult to resist the seduction of the office. But everyone who has assumed the position of prime minister has been abused and devalued. For the past seven years, the reality of a ruling minority in the legislature has never changed. Chen Shui-bian, the real wielder of power, has never given back any of the power he illegally usurped from the prime minister. Add to this a media which seizes upon every opportunity to play up the issue, and you have a situation in which the office of Prime Minister of the Republic of China is the swiftest means of destroying the future of Taiwan's political elite.
Few worry about the fact that according to the constitution the prime minister and not the president is the nation's highest executive, and that according to the constitution he must answer to the legislature. If Su Tseng-chang should resign, he should resign over the five month old deadlock in the legislature over the general budget. He should not resign to help Chen Shui-bian prepare a new strategic scenario. The problem is that everyone is eager to participate in this game of musical chairs. Nobody cares about constitutionalism and the rule of law.
In other words, changing prime ministers six times in seven years has never been about anything but power. The least important consideration is the continuity of policy. The one question we most want to ask is: If Chang Chun-hsiung is returning, does that mean that his "8100, Taiwan Starts Moving Economic Stimulus Plan" is going to be resurrected? Members of Su's cabinet are busy packing and leaving. Su had just kicked off his "Great Investments, Great Warmth" plan. Is all activity about to cease in light of the change in prime ministers? Is everything going to be treated as if it never happened?
Six prime ministers in seven years, like a carousel lantern going around and around, up and down, all the while changing teams. Each and every one promoting his own master plan. Each and every one offering matching slogans. Cabinet members no sooner learn the ropes, than they are forced out of office by regime change. Presidents of the five yuan and ministers seem to be "just passing through." Every prime minister upon arrival declares that he will "explore new possibilities." Every prime minister upon departure declares that he has "other plans in life." No one shoulders any responsibility for the fact that policies and plans are endlessly undermined and overturned. When the replacement of prime ministers is treated as child's play, how can Taiwan's competitiveness not plummet year after year, until it is trailing the mainland's? When everyone pays attention only to power struggles between Chen and Hsieh, who really cares about such matters?
Original Chinese below:
中國時報
2007.05.15
七年六閣揆，有誰在乎政策賡續的成本？
中時社論
隨著新聞幕後一塊塊拼圖的重組，蘇揆突然請辭的緣由已大致明朗。事實真相當然不是蘇要讓扁「展布」什麼「新局」，而是扁謝想要盡快共組「選戰內閣」，蘇若還要留任閣揆，就成了攔路的石頭了！而有趣的地方也就在這裡：如果蘇的存在讓扁謝兩人感到礙眼，那麼張俊雄又能成為怎樣的閣揆呢？
民進黨執政的七年來，閣揆的「下台學」已經可以寫一本厚厚的專書了。而最耐人尋味的地方也就在於，除了首任的唐飛是為了反對核四停建的政策而負責下台外，之後所有的閣揆都是為了因應權力布局需要而替換。這期間，閣揆、黨主席與總統府秘書長三個職位，彷彿是在一個三角棋盤上的三顆棋子輪流對換，幾個被封為「天王」的執政黨精英，就在這幾個位置上挪來挪去，這般頻繁的輪轉，並未凸顯出陳水扁操作權位的手法有多高明，倒是同時把三個位置都做小了！
或者講得更直接一點，民進黨檯面上的天王級的菁英，除了陳水扁以外，幾乎都輪過一次閣揆，甚至此刻又輪回到了張俊雄。而有趣的是這幾位天王竟沒有一個在閣揆任內獲得充分養望，反而都在立院與總統的相互牽制困局中，迅速挫磨掉原有的聲望與人氣。
遙想當年，謝長廷由港都轉進行政院之際，是何等的意氣風發！待一年後蘇上謝下，兩人懸殊的人氣指數，又豈是今日所能比擬？以當時蘇的氣勢，就差沒被點名為「準接班人」，而相對照的則是謝的落寞與低調，幾近被擠到權力邊緣徘徊。一年之後誰又能預料竟然形勢互易，占有閣揆優勢的蘇貞昌，竟在人氣聲望上一路下挫，反倒是氣勢低檔的謝長廷逆勢崛起，從一無所有一躍而為綠營總統候選人。對蘇謝兩人而言，接任閣揆並沒讓他們距離總統大位更近，反而是被推得更遠。
換言之，在陳水扁的操作下，閣揆一職彷彿成了某種「浮士德的交易」。一方面閣揆所享有的龐大資源，讓所有人都很難抗拒這個職位的誘惑，但不論是誰接任了閣揆，卻也都擺脫不了被糟蹋而迅速貶值的宿命。過去七年，立院「朝小野大」的情勢沒一天變過，位居幕後的陳總統也從未真正下放過權力，加上相關媒體的見縫插針，「閣揆」在中華民國的體制中，竟成為摧毀政治菁英最快速的位置。
談到這裡，似乎很少人還會驚覺，在現行憲政體制上，行政院長一直都是政府最高的行政首長，在體制上也一直都應要向立法院負責。換言之衡情論理，此際就算蘇貞昌該當下台，為的也該是年度預算被卡在立院數月之久不得動彈而下台，而不該是為了成全陳水扁「展布新局」而下台。問題是，大伙上上下下，卻沒一個人願意要從這個角度思考。
也就是說，七年替換六個閣揆，永遠是權力邏輯凌駕一切，選舉考量蓋過其它，最不受重視的反而是政策的賡續。我們在此刻還真想直接了當的問一句：如果要換張俊雄上台，是不是說他當年所大力推動的「八一○○，全民啟動」又要大復活了？而蘇的核心團隊陸續打包走人，是不是他才剛開始推動的「大投資、大溫暖」計畫，就此偃旗息鼓，當「一切全都沒發生過」？
七年不到，六位閣揆像是走馬燈般的上上下下，在此同時也換了六組團隊，先後推出過六套施政大計畫，也都搭配著六句華麗的施政口號。許多閣員對部務才剛上手，就被迫在改組中倉卒下台，院長部長彷彿都只是「到此一遊」一樣。風光上台的時候都說要「開創新局」，狼狽下台的時候也都說另有「生涯規畫」，卻沒有那個人需要對政策規畫不斷被顛覆翻轉擔負過任何責任。這般地視閣揆替換形同兒戲，試問台灣的競爭力排名，怎麼不會年年下滑，甚至還被大陸給趕了過去？問題是當大家如今都只注意扁謝怎麼玩權力平衡，有誰還會真在乎這些呢！
Saturday, May 12, 2007
Parliamentary Deadlock, National Paralysis
Parliamentary Deadlock, National Paralysis
United Daily New editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 12, 2007
Taiwan Independence "lawmakers" demonstrate their "respect for democracy" by assaulting Pan Blue legislators inside the Legislature
Taiwan Independence Zealots egg them on from outside the Legislature
Confrontations occurred both inside and outside the Legislative Yuan yesterday. On the surface it merely looks like a deadlock in the parliament. A closer look reveals that it is a nation in paralysis.
The Legislative Yuan has been deadlocked for months over the general budget and the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission (CEC). The root of the problem is neither the confrontation between a small ruling party and a large opposition party, nor the confrontation between the Green camp and the Blue camp. The real problem is that the ruling authorities lack any awareness of what it means to govern. The democratic structures that this nation built by means of parliamentary procedure have basically collapsed.
Which is more important? The central government's general budget, or the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission? Actually this is not a question of either/or, how but a question of checks and balances and mediation. A responsible government will always choose to pass a general budget. It will exhaust all legal means to find relief for other deadlocked legislation. But the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) attitude is to allow the general budget to become collateral damage in its effort to kill the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission. It would rather allow local development to come to a halt, than relinquish its monopoly on the appointment of Central Election Commission members. It blames opposition party boycotts for the five month long delay in passing the general budget. It would be more accurate to blame the ruling party for adopting "scorched earth" tactics, deliberately treating the general budget as cannon fodder.
If the Kuomintang version of the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission contains "constitutional violations," then the DPP government should propose a more persuasive version to win over the public and its opponents. But what the people are seeing is the ruling party laying its dirty hands on what is supposed to be an independent election mechanism, and unwilling to let go. Instead it turns around and accuses the the opposition parties, the long-suffering victims of flagrant Central Election Commission injustice, of "barbarism." In fact, any Central Election Commission bills pending within the legislature are merely "potentially" in violation of the constitution, whereas delaying the passage of the general budget by five months is already in violation of the constitution. The DPP is using the Republic of China Consitution, for which it has never shown one iota of respect, as a pretext to prevent the passage of a bill establishing a neutral and unbiased Central Election Commission. Now how funny is that?
According to ruling party reasoning, the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission and the general budget are of of equal importance. The general budget doesn't worry the DPP. What worries the DPP is its magic talisman, the Central Election Commission. Now that is something over which it will never relinquish control. From this perspective, the rumbles within the legislature and the protests outside the legislature are all too easy to understand. Because what the DPP cares about is not the promotion of sound governance, but merely the gaining of partisan electoral advantage.
A look at actual developments confirms this assessment. The Executive Yuan has declared that the budget delay will reduce economic growth by 0.64%, and prevent the the implementation of 70 billion NT in new development. Yet neither the Chen administration nor the DPP have shown the slightest concern, or attempted to negotiate with the political opposition. Chen Shui-bian upped the ante on Welfare Subsidies to Elderly Farmers, as usual. Prime Minister Su traveled to Yunling, Chiayi, and Tainan counties in southern Taiwan, issuing checks exceeding 20 billion NT. So what if the general budget hasn't passed? What does that have to do with them?
In power for seven years, the DPP is still unwilling to face the necessity of consultations and compromise. Its political accomplishments add up to a big zero, and yet it has not learned to respect the parliamentary majority in the legislature. This is the reality behind governmental gridlock and national stagnation. A look at the vicious dog eat dog behavior of the DPP's "Four Princes" and rival factions during the DPP primaries reveals the party's true colors. But what really brings a chill to the heart is that apart from being adept at campaigning, electioneering, and infighting, this political party has completely forgotten its responsibility to rule. This is why the DPP has the effrontery to deny the legislature its right to vote, destroying the very roots of democracy and constitutional government!
What the Chen administration is most adept at is packaging the ruling party's electioneering requirements in the guise of government policies. Any policy that doesn't correspond with what the ruling party needs, may be replaced or abolished. Therefore they can flip-flop on the Suhua Freeway project as election circumstances demand. The demolition of the Losheng Sanatorium can start or stop on a dime. Mainland tourists can suddenly be allowed in or kept out on a whim. The Orwellian "rectification of names" for China Petroleum, the Chunghua Postal Service, and even the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, are nothing more than means of diverting public attention in order to trumpet their "achievements." Can this really satifsy the individual aspirations of the public?
In a democratic nation, elections are merely a means. The end is for the ruling party solve society's problems. But on Taiwan, what the people see every day is endless political rallies and political struggles. Political figures have no sooner finished campaigning for this election, than they begin campaigning for the next. Who has a mind to govern? Chen Shui-bian has forsaken the responsibility of being a leader to the nation as a whole for seven years. The ruling party considers political struggle as its highest priority. What policy on Taiwan is not motivated at its root by selfish partisan interest?
Over the past several years, the DPP has earned its reputation as a party that "knows only how to campaign, not how to govern." It has degenerated into a party that "only worries about campaigning, and not about governing." Over two bills, the Legislative Yuan has enacted a series of world-class political farces. This is Taiwan's democracy in retreat. The reason is our "ruling party" is in reality "a party that doesn't rule."
Original Chinese below:
社論》
國會癱瘓，國家癱瘓：只問選舉，不要治國！
社論
立法院昨天院內院外的雙線對峙，表面上看是一個癱瘓的國會，深一層看，其實是一個癱瘓的國家。
立法院為了總預算和中選會組織條例連續衝撞數月，問題的根源，其實已不在朝小野大或藍綠對峙；真正的問題在主政當局完全缺乏執政意識。這個國家透過國會機制實踐民主的機制，基本上已經崩毀。
中央政府總預算與中選會組織條例，孰重？這其實不是「二選一」的問題，而是如何權衡和折衝的問題。如果是一個負責任的民主政府，一定會選擇以維護總預算為重，對其他法案的僵局則另外窮盡合法手段尋求救濟。但民進黨的態度，卻是寧可讓總預算陪葬，也要卡死中選會條例；寧可地方建設停頓，也不放棄自己壟斷中選會委員的任命特權。總預算延宕五個月未通過，與其說是在野黨杯葛，不如說是執政黨採取焦土戰略，蓄意把總預算當砲灰所致。
如果國民黨版的中選會條例有「違憲之虞」，那麼民進黨政府應設法提出一個更具說服力的版本，爭取民眾和對手的認同。但人們看到的，卻是執政黨把髒手深深伸進這個理應獨立的選舉機構，硬是不肯鬆手，卻還反咬屢因中選會不公而吃盡悶虧的在野黨野蠻。事實上，尚未通過立法的中選會只不過是有違憲「之虞」，而總預算案延宕五個月未能通過卻是「既遂」的違憲；民進黨拿它從來不尊重的中華民國憲法為藉口來阻擋中選會條例，豈不可笑之至？
在執政黨的天平上，中選會條例和總預算居然被放在等量齊觀的位置，也極耐人咀嚼：若非民進黨太不把總預算放在心上，便是中選會對它而言是太珍貴的政治法寶了，一點都不可鬆手。從這個角度看，立院的群毆、院外的群眾包圍，也就變得比較容易理解：因為民進黨在乎的不是施政的推展，它在乎的只是本黨能從中獲取多少選舉利益罷了！
觀察現實情況的發展，也確乎如此。行政院雖宣稱總預算延宕將影響百分之零點六四的經濟成長，使七百億元新興計畫無法進行；但我們看不出扁政府或民進黨對此有何焦慮，亦無意設法調解朝野矛盾。陳水扁照樣對老農津貼喊價加碼，蘇揆南下雲嘉南建設支票一開就是兩百多億；總預算過不過，於他們何有哉？
執政七年，還不肯面對協商妥協之必要；政績零蛋，還學不會尊重國會多數，這就是政府癱瘓、國家停滯的真相。試看民進黨四大天王及各派系在初選中的殘酷撕咬，是如何地顯露了一個政黨的兇狠本色。但真正令人心寒的是，這個政黨除了長於選舉、造勢和鬥爭，已完全不記得自己還有執政的責任。也正因如此，民進黨連國會的「表決機制」也敢悍然剝奪，不啻根本摧毀了民主憲政！
扁政府最厲害的本事，是將一切政策或措施均配合執政黨造勢的需要進行包裝，凡是不符政黨需要的政策，隨時可以抽換廢除。所以，蘇花高可以視選舉情勢反反覆覆，樂生的去留可以忽左忽右，大陸觀光客可以忽開忽停；包括對中油、中華郵政、乃至中正紀念堂的改名，目的也只是在轉移焦點以浮報自己的「業績」罷了，這能滿足民眾什麼獨立的渴望嗎？
在民主國家，選舉是手段，執政黨透過施政為社會大眾解決問題，才是政治的目的。但在台灣，人民每天看到的是無止盡的選舉造勢和政治鬥爭，政治人物忙完了這場選舉，立即開始忙下一場選舉，誰有心施政？試想，陳水扁放棄國家領導人的超然角色已經七年，執政黨既一切以政治鬥爭為首要，台灣還有什麼政策不是從一黨之私出發？
前幾年，民進黨被認為「只會選舉、不會治國」，如今，它更自我退化至「只問選舉，不要治國」。立法院為了兩個法案，幾度上演世界級的政治鬧劇，這是台灣的民主退化。原因在於，我們的執政黨其實是一個「不執政黨」。
United Daily New editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 12, 2007
Taiwan Independence "lawmakers" demonstrate their "respect for democracy" by assaulting Pan Blue legislators inside the Legislature
Taiwan Independence Zealots egg them on from outside the Legislature
Confrontations occurred both inside and outside the Legislative Yuan yesterday. On the surface it merely looks like a deadlock in the parliament. A closer look reveals that it is a nation in paralysis.
The Legislative Yuan has been deadlocked for months over the general budget and the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission (CEC). The root of the problem is neither the confrontation between a small ruling party and a large opposition party, nor the confrontation between the Green camp and the Blue camp. The real problem is that the ruling authorities lack any awareness of what it means to govern. The democratic structures that this nation built by means of parliamentary procedure have basically collapsed.
Which is more important? The central government's general budget, or the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission? Actually this is not a question of either/or, how but a question of checks and balances and mediation. A responsible government will always choose to pass a general budget. It will exhaust all legal means to find relief for other deadlocked legislation. But the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) attitude is to allow the general budget to become collateral damage in its effort to kill the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission. It would rather allow local development to come to a halt, than relinquish its monopoly on the appointment of Central Election Commission members. It blames opposition party boycotts for the five month long delay in passing the general budget. It would be more accurate to blame the ruling party for adopting "scorched earth" tactics, deliberately treating the general budget as cannon fodder.
If the Kuomintang version of the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission contains "constitutional violations," then the DPP government should propose a more persuasive version to win over the public and its opponents. But what the people are seeing is the ruling party laying its dirty hands on what is supposed to be an independent election mechanism, and unwilling to let go. Instead it turns around and accuses the the opposition parties, the long-suffering victims of flagrant Central Election Commission injustice, of "barbarism." In fact, any Central Election Commission bills pending within the legislature are merely "potentially" in violation of the constitution, whereas delaying the passage of the general budget by five months is already in violation of the constitution. The DPP is using the Republic of China Consitution, for which it has never shown one iota of respect, as a pretext to prevent the passage of a bill establishing a neutral and unbiased Central Election Commission. Now how funny is that?
According to ruling party reasoning, the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission and the general budget are of of equal importance. The general budget doesn't worry the DPP. What worries the DPP is its magic talisman, the Central Election Commission. Now that is something over which it will never relinquish control. From this perspective, the rumbles within the legislature and the protests outside the legislature are all too easy to understand. Because what the DPP cares about is not the promotion of sound governance, but merely the gaining of partisan electoral advantage.
A look at actual developments confirms this assessment. The Executive Yuan has declared that the budget delay will reduce economic growth by 0.64%, and prevent the the implementation of 70 billion NT in new development. Yet neither the Chen administration nor the DPP have shown the slightest concern, or attempted to negotiate with the political opposition. Chen Shui-bian upped the ante on Welfare Subsidies to Elderly Farmers, as usual. Prime Minister Su traveled to Yunling, Chiayi, and Tainan counties in southern Taiwan, issuing checks exceeding 20 billion NT. So what if the general budget hasn't passed? What does that have to do with them?
In power for seven years, the DPP is still unwilling to face the necessity of consultations and compromise. Its political accomplishments add up to a big zero, and yet it has not learned to respect the parliamentary majority in the legislature. This is the reality behind governmental gridlock and national stagnation. A look at the vicious dog eat dog behavior of the DPP's "Four Princes" and rival factions during the DPP primaries reveals the party's true colors. But what really brings a chill to the heart is that apart from being adept at campaigning, electioneering, and infighting, this political party has completely forgotten its responsibility to rule. This is why the DPP has the effrontery to deny the legislature its right to vote, destroying the very roots of democracy and constitutional government!
What the Chen administration is most adept at is packaging the ruling party's electioneering requirements in the guise of government policies. Any policy that doesn't correspond with what the ruling party needs, may be replaced or abolished. Therefore they can flip-flop on the Suhua Freeway project as election circumstances demand. The demolition of the Losheng Sanatorium can start or stop on a dime. Mainland tourists can suddenly be allowed in or kept out on a whim. The Orwellian "rectification of names" for China Petroleum, the Chunghua Postal Service, and even the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, are nothing more than means of diverting public attention in order to trumpet their "achievements." Can this really satifsy the individual aspirations of the public?
In a democratic nation, elections are merely a means. The end is for the ruling party solve society's problems. But on Taiwan, what the people see every day is endless political rallies and political struggles. Political figures have no sooner finished campaigning for this election, than they begin campaigning for the next. Who has a mind to govern? Chen Shui-bian has forsaken the responsibility of being a leader to the nation as a whole for seven years. The ruling party considers political struggle as its highest priority. What policy on Taiwan is not motivated at its root by selfish partisan interest?
Over the past several years, the DPP has earned its reputation as a party that "knows only how to campaign, not how to govern." It has degenerated into a party that "only worries about campaigning, and not about governing." Over two bills, the Legislative Yuan has enacted a series of world-class political farces. This is Taiwan's democracy in retreat. The reason is our "ruling party" is in reality "a party that doesn't rule."
Original Chinese below:
社論》
國會癱瘓，國家癱瘓：只問選舉，不要治國！
社論
立法院昨天院內院外的雙線對峙，表面上看是一個癱瘓的國會，深一層看，其實是一個癱瘓的國家。
立法院為了總預算和中選會組織條例連續衝撞數月，問題的根源，其實已不在朝小野大或藍綠對峙；真正的問題在主政當局完全缺乏執政意識。這個國家透過國會機制實踐民主的機制，基本上已經崩毀。
中央政府總預算與中選會組織條例，孰重？這其實不是「二選一」的問題，而是如何權衡和折衝的問題。如果是一個負責任的民主政府，一定會選擇以維護總預算為重，對其他法案的僵局則另外窮盡合法手段尋求救濟。但民進黨的態度，卻是寧可讓總預算陪葬，也要卡死中選會條例；寧可地方建設停頓，也不放棄自己壟斷中選會委員的任命特權。總預算延宕五個月未通過，與其說是在野黨杯葛，不如說是執政黨採取焦土戰略，蓄意把總預算當砲灰所致。
如果國民黨版的中選會條例有「違憲之虞」，那麼民進黨政府應設法提出一個更具說服力的版本，爭取民眾和對手的認同。但人們看到的，卻是執政黨把髒手深深伸進這個理應獨立的選舉機構，硬是不肯鬆手，卻還反咬屢因中選會不公而吃盡悶虧的在野黨野蠻。事實上，尚未通過立法的中選會只不過是有違憲「之虞」，而總預算案延宕五個月未能通過卻是「既遂」的違憲；民進黨拿它從來不尊重的中華民國憲法為藉口來阻擋中選會條例，豈不可笑之至？
在執政黨的天平上，中選會條例和總預算居然被放在等量齊觀的位置，也極耐人咀嚼：若非民進黨太不把總預算放在心上，便是中選會對它而言是太珍貴的政治法寶了，一點都不可鬆手。從這個角度看，立院的群毆、院外的群眾包圍，也就變得比較容易理解：因為民進黨在乎的不是施政的推展，它在乎的只是本黨能從中獲取多少選舉利益罷了！
觀察現實情況的發展，也確乎如此。行政院雖宣稱總預算延宕將影響百分之零點六四的經濟成長，使七百億元新興計畫無法進行；但我們看不出扁政府或民進黨對此有何焦慮，亦無意設法調解朝野矛盾。陳水扁照樣對老農津貼喊價加碼，蘇揆南下雲嘉南建設支票一開就是兩百多億；總預算過不過，於他們何有哉？
執政七年，還不肯面對協商妥協之必要；政績零蛋，還學不會尊重國會多數，這就是政府癱瘓、國家停滯的真相。試看民進黨四大天王及各派系在初選中的殘酷撕咬，是如何地顯露了一個政黨的兇狠本色。但真正令人心寒的是，這個政黨除了長於選舉、造勢和鬥爭，已完全不記得自己還有執政的責任。也正因如此，民進黨連國會的「表決機制」也敢悍然剝奪，不啻根本摧毀了民主憲政！
扁政府最厲害的本事，是將一切政策或措施均配合執政黨造勢的需要進行包裝，凡是不符政黨需要的政策，隨時可以抽換廢除。所以，蘇花高可以視選舉情勢反反覆覆，樂生的去留可以忽左忽右，大陸觀光客可以忽開忽停；包括對中油、中華郵政、乃至中正紀念堂的改名，目的也只是在轉移焦點以浮報自己的「業績」罷了，這能滿足民眾什麼獨立的渴望嗎？
在民主國家，選舉是手段，執政黨透過施政為社會大眾解決問題，才是政治的目的。但在台灣，人民每天看到的是無止盡的選舉造勢和政治鬥爭，政治人物忙完了這場選舉，立即開始忙下一場選舉，誰有心施政？試想，陳水扁放棄國家領導人的超然角色已經七年，執政黨既一切以政治鬥爭為首要，台灣還有什麼政策不是從一黨之私出發？
前幾年，民進黨被認為「只會選舉、不會治國」，如今，它更自我退化至「只問選舉，不要治國」。立法院為了兩個法案，幾度上演世界級的政治鬧劇，這是台灣的民主退化。原因在於，我們的執政黨其實是一個「不執政黨」。
Thursday, May 10, 2007
Frank Hsieh's First Challenge: Transitional Justice within the DPP
Frank Hsieh's First Challenge: Transitional Justice within the DPP
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 10, 2007
Frank Hsieh has won a major victory in the primary election, and will represent the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in its bid for president in 2008. But now he faces his first major challenge, how to implement transitional justice within his own party.
At this time and place transitional justice within the DPP means negotiating the transition from the Chen Shui-bian Era to the Frank Hsieh Era by reestablishing justice within the DPP.
But even though the Five Princes vowed to uphold party unity the day after the primary, Frank Hsieh's situation within his own party remains precarious. Chen Shui-bian has publicly declared that he "will not be a lame duck, and still has many matters to attend to." This remark was clearly directed at Frank Hsieh, warning him against acting rashly. Su Tseng-chang still occupies the position of prime minister, and surely intends to shield Chen Shui-bian and to check Frank Hsieh. Su and Hsieh became foes during the primary election. If Su continues to control the cabinet, he will remain a thorn in Hsieh's side. Yu Hsi-kuen, who persists in advocating formal independence, remains DPP chairman. Hsieh, who advocates a Conciliation and Coexistence cross-Straits policy, has become a square peg in a round hole. Therefore, even though Frank Hsieh has won the party primary, he now finds himself in the crosshairs of a Chen/Su/Yu trio.
If Su Tseng-chang had won this primary, Su would merely be obediently fulfilling Chen's wishes. Chen and Su would be be as one, and transitional justice would not be an issue. But Frank Hsieh is not Chen Shui-bian's political heir. The gap between his ideology and direction and Chen's is increasing. Naturally transitional justice is going to be problem. The role Chen Shui-bian has assigned Su Tseng-chang is to clean up after Chen, to polish the image of the Chen Shui-bian Era. The role Frank Hsieh has assigned himself is to establish an innovative Frank Hsieh Era. Therefore, the first challenge Frank Hsieh faces is transitional justice within the DPP.
Even after the results of the primary became known, Chen Shui-bian continued lying. He said he maintained neutrality during the primary election, and that since he had never intervened on behalf of Su, Hsieh's win didn't mean that the presidential trump card had lost any of its magic. Chen Shui-bian, for whom lying has long been second nature, has given the public yet another reason to loathe him. This primary was a watershed vote of confidence within the DPP. On the one hand it was a vote of non-confidence in the Chen/Su alliance. On the other hand it was a vote of confidence in the nation's path and cross-Straits policy.
As matters stand, Chen Shui-bian, who lost a vote of confidence, says "I am not a lame duck." Su Tseng-chang, who lost a vote of confidence, remains prime minister. Yu Hsi-kuen,who failed to win the primary, remains DPP party chairman. Frank Hsieh, who won a vote of confidence, finds himself surrounded and under attack by Chen/Su/Yu. What an absurd and dangerous situation.
In both political ideology and political style, Chen and Hsieh are very different people. That is why transitional justice is an issue. Frank Hsieh supports the Resolution on Taiwan's Future and advocates amending the constitution only in accordance with procedures laid out in the constitution. Hsieh's differences with Chen Shui-bian, who is anxious to rewrite the constitution, and Yu Hsi-kuen, who proposes to do away with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, are obvious. Furthermore, Frank Hsieh's ideas about Conciliation and Coexistence are at odds with Chen Shui-bian's cutthroat political tactics. The most important difference is that Chen Shui-bian's political aim is to use Taiwan independence ideology as cover for massive corruption, and to continue controlling the political scene even after leaving office, whereas Frank Hsieh's declared goals are to become "a president to all the people" and to promote "ethnic coexistence and cross-Straits peace." Chen Shui-bian must ensure that he remains a "power behind the throne" even after leaving office. Frank Hsieh must guard against the possibility of Chen Shui-bian becoming a "king of kings" above him. Chen Shui-bian hopes that the status quo within the DPP, which champions independence, champions Chen, champions graft, remains just as it is, and not be subjected to transitional justice. But Frank Hsieh must implement transitional justice, otherwise he cannot mark the transition from a Chen Shui-bian Era to a Frank Hsieh Era. To sum up, the confrontation between Chen and Hsieh hinges on whether the DPP will implement transitional justice within its own party.
One could say that Frank Hsieh is the person most consciously committed to transitional justice within the DPP in 20 years. He is also the first person to win the system's endorsement and vote of confidence. Others who have advocated transitional justice within the DPP, such as Hsu Hsing-liang , Shih Ming-teh, and Lin Yi-hsiung, were not as fortunate. On May 6, the DPP party primary made Frank Hsieh the party's presidential candidate. It also endorsed transitional justice within the party.
But if Chen Shui-bian, who champions independence as cover for his corruption, is not willing to be a lame duck, if Chen Shui-bian's agent Su Tseng-chang still occupies the Prime Minister's office, if Yu Hsi-kuen, who demands Taiwan independence remains DPP chairman, how is Frank Hsieh to promote transitional justice within the DPP? How will he win over swing voters during the presidential election? Even if he wins the election, he may be held hostage by those who haven't transitioned, in which case, how is he to rule the nation?
The day after the primary, when Chen Shui-bian stood in front of Frank Hsieh and told him to his face that "I am not a lame duck," is the day the struggle over transitional justice within the DPP began.
Original Chinese below:
謝長廷的第一課：完成民進黨內的「轉型正義」
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.10 03:17 am
謝長廷初選大勝，將代表民進黨競選總統；但他面臨的第一個課題與挑戰，卻是必須儘速完成「民進黨內」的「轉型正義」。
此時此際，所謂「民進黨內的轉型正義」，就是對「陳水扁時代」換軌至「謝長廷時代」之黨內正義的重建。
但是，縱使「五大天王」在初選翌日即聯袂宣示團結，謝長廷在黨內的處境卻仍相當凶險。陳水扁公開宣示「不會跛腳」、「還有很多事要做」，這當然是衝著謝長廷而發，命他不得輕舉妄動。蘇貞昌仍居閣揆之位，則亦可確定是獲陳水扁授意，意在牽制謝長廷；而蘇謝在初選中已成仇敵，蘇續掌內閣，謝不啻芒刺在背。至於堅持「法理台獨」的游錫?回任黨主席，與謝「和解共生」的兩岸政策亦成圓鑿方枘，遂成雞兔共籠之局。於是，謝長廷看似初選勝出，其實卻仍陷於扁蘇游三人的層層包夾之中，凶險莫測。
倘若此次初選是蘇貞昌勝出，蘇承扁意，扁蘇一體，自然不會有「轉型正義」的問題。但是，謝長廷卻不是陳水扁的政治後裔，且在政治境界與政策路線上與陳水扁的區隔愈來愈大，自然就有「轉型正義」的問題。簡單而言，蘇貞昌被授予的角色是為「陳水扁時代」擦屁股，謝長廷自許的角色則是為「謝長廷時代」創新機。因此，謝長廷面臨的第一個課題，就是「黨內轉型正義」。
陳水扁直至初選揭曉後仍在說謊。他說，他在初選中維持中立，「總統牌既然沒有出，所以也就沒有總統牌失靈的問題」。說謊成性的陳水扁之令人厭惡，又增一例。但是，此次初選卻無疑是一次重大且慘烈的黨內信任投票。一方面是對扁蘇聯盟的信任投票，另一方面亦是對國家路線兩岸政策的信任投票。
如今的情勢卻是：輸掉信任投票的陳水扁說「我未跛腳」，輸掉信任投票的蘇貞昌則仍掌內閣，未贏得初選的游錫?亦仍占據黨主席的職位。謝長廷贏得了這場信任投票，竟仍身陷扁蘇游的圍堵之中；荒謬莫甚於此，凶險亦莫甚於此。
無論從政治理念及政治操作上來看，扁謝皆不屬同一「型」；因此，遂有「轉型正義」的問題。謝長廷的「台灣前途決議文」立場，及「循憲定修憲程序修憲」，與急欲操弄正名制憲的陳水扁頗有差異，亦與主張廢除「台灣前途決議文」的游錫?顯有區隔；再者，謝長廷的「和解共生」理念與陳水扁擅長的割喉手段亦大異其趣。最重要的差別是，陳水扁的政治目標在「用台獨漂染貪腐」，俾在卸任後繼續操縱政局；謝長廷的政治目標，卻是成為「全民總統」，創造「族群共生，兩岸和平」的憧憬。陳水扁現在必須部署在離任後「垂簾聽政」的條件，謝長廷則自今日始就應防範陳水扁未來成為「太上總統」的風險。陳水扁希望民進黨內「挺獨挺扁挺貪」的「正義」繼續維持，不可「轉型」；但謝長廷則必須創造「轉型正義」，否則即不可能由「陳水扁時代」轉軌至「謝長廷時代」。總而言之，扁謝二人的一切矛盾，皆在是否實現「黨內轉型正義」
或許可以這麼說：謝長廷是二十年來民進黨內有意識地提倡「黨內轉型正義」、且竟能贏得體制背書及信任投票的第一人。其他曾主張「黨內轉型正義」者，如許信良、施明德及林義雄，皆無此福緣。因此，五月六日這場黨內總統初選，不只是為謝長廷成為民進黨總統候選人頒授令狀，更不啻是民進黨對處理「黨內轉型正義」作了背書。
但是，如果「挺獨遮貪」的陳水扁不肯「跛腳」，如果陳水扁的代理人蘇貞昌仍占據內閣，如果「台獨真堅定」的游錫?亦留任不去，謝長廷將如何體現內外對「黨內轉型正義」的期待？將如何爭取中間選民以贏得大選？即使贏得大選恐亦仍被「未轉型者」挾持，則又將如何治國？
初選翌日，陳水扁當面向謝長廷宣稱「我未跛腳」之時，民進黨「應否實現黨內轉型正義」的鬥爭已告爆發！
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 10, 2007
Frank Hsieh has won a major victory in the primary election, and will represent the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in its bid for president in 2008. But now he faces his first major challenge, how to implement transitional justice within his own party.
At this time and place transitional justice within the DPP means negotiating the transition from the Chen Shui-bian Era to the Frank Hsieh Era by reestablishing justice within the DPP.
But even though the Five Princes vowed to uphold party unity the day after the primary, Frank Hsieh's situation within his own party remains precarious. Chen Shui-bian has publicly declared that he "will not be a lame duck, and still has many matters to attend to." This remark was clearly directed at Frank Hsieh, warning him against acting rashly. Su Tseng-chang still occupies the position of prime minister, and surely intends to shield Chen Shui-bian and to check Frank Hsieh. Su and Hsieh became foes during the primary election. If Su continues to control the cabinet, he will remain a thorn in Hsieh's side. Yu Hsi-kuen, who persists in advocating formal independence, remains DPP chairman. Hsieh, who advocates a Conciliation and Coexistence cross-Straits policy, has become a square peg in a round hole. Therefore, even though Frank Hsieh has won the party primary, he now finds himself in the crosshairs of a Chen/Su/Yu trio.
If Su Tseng-chang had won this primary, Su would merely be obediently fulfilling Chen's wishes. Chen and Su would be be as one, and transitional justice would not be an issue. But Frank Hsieh is not Chen Shui-bian's political heir. The gap between his ideology and direction and Chen's is increasing. Naturally transitional justice is going to be problem. The role Chen Shui-bian has assigned Su Tseng-chang is to clean up after Chen, to polish the image of the Chen Shui-bian Era. The role Frank Hsieh has assigned himself is to establish an innovative Frank Hsieh Era. Therefore, the first challenge Frank Hsieh faces is transitional justice within the DPP.
Even after the results of the primary became known, Chen Shui-bian continued lying. He said he maintained neutrality during the primary election, and that since he had never intervened on behalf of Su, Hsieh's win didn't mean that the presidential trump card had lost any of its magic. Chen Shui-bian, for whom lying has long been second nature, has given the public yet another reason to loathe him. This primary was a watershed vote of confidence within the DPP. On the one hand it was a vote of non-confidence in the Chen/Su alliance. On the other hand it was a vote of confidence in the nation's path and cross-Straits policy.
As matters stand, Chen Shui-bian, who lost a vote of confidence, says "I am not a lame duck." Su Tseng-chang, who lost a vote of confidence, remains prime minister. Yu Hsi-kuen,who failed to win the primary, remains DPP party chairman. Frank Hsieh, who won a vote of confidence, finds himself surrounded and under attack by Chen/Su/Yu. What an absurd and dangerous situation.
In both political ideology and political style, Chen and Hsieh are very different people. That is why transitional justice is an issue. Frank Hsieh supports the Resolution on Taiwan's Future and advocates amending the constitution only in accordance with procedures laid out in the constitution. Hsieh's differences with Chen Shui-bian, who is anxious to rewrite the constitution, and Yu Hsi-kuen, who proposes to do away with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, are obvious. Furthermore, Frank Hsieh's ideas about Conciliation and Coexistence are at odds with Chen Shui-bian's cutthroat political tactics. The most important difference is that Chen Shui-bian's political aim is to use Taiwan independence ideology as cover for massive corruption, and to continue controlling the political scene even after leaving office, whereas Frank Hsieh's declared goals are to become "a president to all the people" and to promote "ethnic coexistence and cross-Straits peace." Chen Shui-bian must ensure that he remains a "power behind the throne" even after leaving office. Frank Hsieh must guard against the possibility of Chen Shui-bian becoming a "king of kings" above him. Chen Shui-bian hopes that the status quo within the DPP, which champions independence, champions Chen, champions graft, remains just as it is, and not be subjected to transitional justice. But Frank Hsieh must implement transitional justice, otherwise he cannot mark the transition from a Chen Shui-bian Era to a Frank Hsieh Era. To sum up, the confrontation between Chen and Hsieh hinges on whether the DPP will implement transitional justice within its own party.
One could say that Frank Hsieh is the person most consciously committed to transitional justice within the DPP in 20 years. He is also the first person to win the system's endorsement and vote of confidence. Others who have advocated transitional justice within the DPP, such as Hsu Hsing-liang , Shih Ming-teh, and Lin Yi-hsiung, were not as fortunate. On May 6, the DPP party primary made Frank Hsieh the party's presidential candidate. It also endorsed transitional justice within the party.
But if Chen Shui-bian, who champions independence as cover for his corruption, is not willing to be a lame duck, if Chen Shui-bian's agent Su Tseng-chang still occupies the Prime Minister's office, if Yu Hsi-kuen, who demands Taiwan independence remains DPP chairman, how is Frank Hsieh to promote transitional justice within the DPP? How will he win over swing voters during the presidential election? Even if he wins the election, he may be held hostage by those who haven't transitioned, in which case, how is he to rule the nation?
The day after the primary, when Chen Shui-bian stood in front of Frank Hsieh and told him to his face that "I am not a lame duck," is the day the struggle over transitional justice within the DPP began.
Original Chinese below:
謝長廷的第一課：完成民進黨內的「轉型正義」
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.10 03:17 am
謝長廷初選大勝，將代表民進黨競選總統；但他面臨的第一個課題與挑戰，卻是必須儘速完成「民進黨內」的「轉型正義」。
此時此際，所謂「民進黨內的轉型正義」，就是對「陳水扁時代」換軌至「謝長廷時代」之黨內正義的重建。
但是，縱使「五大天王」在初選翌日即聯袂宣示團結，謝長廷在黨內的處境卻仍相當凶險。陳水扁公開宣示「不會跛腳」、「還有很多事要做」，這當然是衝著謝長廷而發，命他不得輕舉妄動。蘇貞昌仍居閣揆之位，則亦可確定是獲陳水扁授意，意在牽制謝長廷；而蘇謝在初選中已成仇敵，蘇續掌內閣，謝不啻芒刺在背。至於堅持「法理台獨」的游錫?回任黨主席，與謝「和解共生」的兩岸政策亦成圓鑿方枘，遂成雞兔共籠之局。於是，謝長廷看似初選勝出，其實卻仍陷於扁蘇游三人的層層包夾之中，凶險莫測。
倘若此次初選是蘇貞昌勝出，蘇承扁意，扁蘇一體，自然不會有「轉型正義」的問題。但是，謝長廷卻不是陳水扁的政治後裔，且在政治境界與政策路線上與陳水扁的區隔愈來愈大，自然就有「轉型正義」的問題。簡單而言，蘇貞昌被授予的角色是為「陳水扁時代」擦屁股，謝長廷自許的角色則是為「謝長廷時代」創新機。因此，謝長廷面臨的第一個課題，就是「黨內轉型正義」。
陳水扁直至初選揭曉後仍在說謊。他說，他在初選中維持中立，「總統牌既然沒有出，所以也就沒有總統牌失靈的問題」。說謊成性的陳水扁之令人厭惡，又增一例。但是，此次初選卻無疑是一次重大且慘烈的黨內信任投票。一方面是對扁蘇聯盟的信任投票，另一方面亦是對國家路線兩岸政策的信任投票。
如今的情勢卻是：輸掉信任投票的陳水扁說「我未跛腳」，輸掉信任投票的蘇貞昌則仍掌內閣，未贏得初選的游錫?亦仍占據黨主席的職位。謝長廷贏得了這場信任投票，竟仍身陷扁蘇游的圍堵之中；荒謬莫甚於此，凶險亦莫甚於此。
無論從政治理念及政治操作上來看，扁謝皆不屬同一「型」；因此，遂有「轉型正義」的問題。謝長廷的「台灣前途決議文」立場，及「循憲定修憲程序修憲」，與急欲操弄正名制憲的陳水扁頗有差異，亦與主張廢除「台灣前途決議文」的游錫?顯有區隔；再者，謝長廷的「和解共生」理念與陳水扁擅長的割喉手段亦大異其趣。最重要的差別是，陳水扁的政治目標在「用台獨漂染貪腐」，俾在卸任後繼續操縱政局；謝長廷的政治目標，卻是成為「全民總統」，創造「族群共生，兩岸和平」的憧憬。陳水扁現在必須部署在離任後「垂簾聽政」的條件，謝長廷則自今日始就應防範陳水扁未來成為「太上總統」的風險。陳水扁希望民進黨內「挺獨挺扁挺貪」的「正義」繼續維持，不可「轉型」；但謝長廷則必須創造「轉型正義」，否則即不可能由「陳水扁時代」轉軌至「謝長廷時代」。總而言之，扁謝二人的一切矛盾，皆在是否實現「黨內轉型正義」
或許可以這麼說：謝長廷是二十年來民進黨內有意識地提倡「黨內轉型正義」、且竟能贏得體制背書及信任投票的第一人。其他曾主張「黨內轉型正義」者，如許信良、施明德及林義雄，皆無此福緣。因此，五月六日這場黨內總統初選，不只是為謝長廷成為民進黨總統候選人頒授令狀，更不啻是民進黨對處理「黨內轉型正義」作了背書。
但是，如果「挺獨遮貪」的陳水扁不肯「跛腳」，如果陳水扁的代理人蘇貞昌仍占據內閣，如果「台獨真堅定」的游錫?亦留任不去，謝長廷將如何體現內外對「黨內轉型正義」的期待？將如何爭取中間選民以贏得大選？即使贏得大選恐亦仍被「未轉型者」挾持，則又將如何治國？
初選翌日，陳水扁當面向謝長廷宣稱「我未跛腳」之時，民進黨「應否實現黨內轉型正義」的鬥爭已告爆發！
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