Technology and National Defense Transform in Lockstep
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 31, 2013
Summary: The New Year is almost here. But last year's problems linger. Can a stifled economy be revived? Can a new industrial policy be found? Can a strategy for peaceful development be implemented, despite manpower shortages under a volunteer military? Some demand the restoration of military conscription or increasing pay for military volunteers. We recommend an integrated national strategy. We recommend high-tech industrial transformation and high-tech national defense, combined with industrial policy, to transform the military.
Full text below:
The New Year is almost here. But last year's problems linger. Can a stifled economy be revived? Can a new industrial policy be found? Can a strategy for peaceful development be implemented, despite manpower shortages under a volunteer military? Some demand the restoration of military conscription or increasing pay for military volunteers. We recommend an integrated national strategy. We recommend high-tech industrial transformation and high-tech national defense, combined with industrial policy, to transform the military.
Since the 1980s, the strategy of the Republic of China government has been to make massive investments in the information, semiconductor, communications, and flat panel industries. These have made us critical to the global technology industry. These industries focus on the manufacture of hardware and the training of large numbers of hardware professionals. They have enabled Taiwan to become a leading manufacturer of high-tech products. They have significantly reduced the cost of hardware manufacture. They have enabled consumers around the world to purchase a wide range of inexpensive yet high quality 3C products.
But Taiwan's technology industry is export-oriented. This makes it susceptible to fluctuations in the international economy. The U.S. financial crisis erupted in 2008, then spread. The recession impacted the major countries of Europe and America. Dramatically reduced demand led to a serious decline in technology industry exports and to corporate layoffs. Unpaid leave resulted in massive unemployment. Meanwhile, vendors on Taiwan have sought to reduce costs by increasing production efficiency. This means reducing direct labor costs, plant costs, and pollution control costs. The result has been the migration of large numbers of industries westward, to the Mainland. Some of the industries that stayed have discharged untreated sewage undergroundsewage. The documentary film "Beyond Beauty: Taiwan from Above" was heart-breaking. As a result, Taiwan has lost many job opportunities. Those remaining are not enough to go around. Once beautiful rivers have become polluted. Taiwan's preoccupation with hardware must be changed.
The International Information Corporation (IDC) recently issued its technology industry forecast for the coming year. The industry will focus on the four pillars of "third platform" development. They are mobile computing, cloud based services , Big Data, and social networking. The first platform was mainframes. The second platform was terminals, PCs, and platforms for the Internet Age. The third platform is today's tablets and mobile phone network applications. Coincidentally, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) recently announced its "five technologies for the next five years." They include future classrooms, combined online and bricks and mortar retailing, DNA tailored health care, digital security, and smart cities. These five technologies will change our lives. They will be connected to Internet clouds and Big Data. Viat management and interactive sensors they will integrate learning, trade, health, safety, and services. They will create a more efficient, more convenient environment in which we can live our lives.
As we all know, IBM once sold machines, including computers. Now it sells software and services. Its business is thriving. IBM believes that when software evolves to where it can think like the human brain, computing power and cloud data storage will enable Big Data to provide omnipresent creative power. In other words, the computer will no longer be just a computer. It will be smarter and more customized. It will interact with people, helping us to deal with problems and providing us with advice. The current IOT (Internet of Things) is merely a starting point. Smart sensors, biometric technology, and ubiquitous computing, will do more than string together a network to exchange information. It will enable hardware and hardware and hardware and people to communicate with each other. It will increasingly automate the environment.
Now let us return to the matter of national defense. Gulf War air strikes began on January 17, 1991. The 28 countries of the US-led coalition conducted 38 days of air attacks. They used missiles and smart bombs with unparalleled precision. Iraq's military facilities, tanks, air-raid shelters, bunkers, and airports were destroyed. The era of precision munitions was upon us. War no longer hingee on large-scale ground war manpower. It hinged on information. Attack required the use of precision-guided weapons technology to automatically identify their targets. The trend was toward increased target variety and improved strike accuracy. Defense required a variety of reconnaissance and surveillance technologies, advanced radar, space electronic defensive warfare, and electromagnetic pulse technology. These automatically counter enemy threats, increase self-defense capability, and create an integrated defense network.
National defense requires state of the art "short, small, light, thin" networked, automated, precision, stealth, unmanned technologies. It does not require spending money supporting legions of dumb grunts.
This is where high-tech industries and national defense are headed. Industrial policy and national defense must be integrated. We urgently need software talent to undertake high-tech software and defense management, We must enter the new world of man machine integration. These trends will provide job opportunities on Taiwan. IT hardware is the ROC's national strength. Taiwan lacks talent in software applications and services. Taiwan must not fixate on hardware at the expense of software. It must do both. This is the proper strategy for our future development.
社論－科技與國防同步轉型：軟硬通吃
2013-12-31 01:15
中國時報
本報訊
新年即將來到，過去一年惱人的問題卻依然揮不去。悶經濟應如何突破？產業政策如何找到新方向？實現國家和平發展策略的國防募兵制找不足夠兵源，怎麼辦？在各方紛紛主張恢復徵兵制或大力砸錢提高志願役待遇之時，我們提出一個整合性的國家戰略建議：推動高科技產業轉型軟體，及高科技國防力量，結合產業政策實現國軍轉型。
台灣自1980年代後在政府策略性政策的導引下，投入大量資源發展資訊、半導體、通訊及面板等產業，在全世界科技產業取得關鍵性地位，尤其這些產業側重硬體的製造，培養大量的硬體人才，讓台灣廠商成為高科技產品製造業的龍頭，有效的大量減低硬體製造成本，讓全世界的消費者享用各式廉價但品質優異的3C產品。
但正因為台灣科技產業為外銷導向，易受國際景氣波動影響。2008年美國金融海嘯爆發並擴大蔓延，歐美主要國家經濟衰退，有效需求大減，造成我國科技產業出口嚴重萎縮，企業裁員、實施無薪假造成大量失業等問題。另方面，為講求效率生產，我們的廠商一直尋找如何降低成本的方法：減低直接人工成本、土地廠房的租金成本，並盡量規避汙染防治成本的內部化。造成大量的產業西進到中國大陸；沒有走的有些甚至利用暗管排放未處理的汙水。《看見台灣》紀錄片真是道盡了無比的傷痛。因此台灣的勞工就業機會減少了，僧多粥少地搶食碩果僅存的工作機會，有些美好的河川也就變了色。這些結果，在在顯示台灣產業注重硬體的思維亟需進行調整。
國際資訊公司（IDC）近日對明年科技產業提出趨勢預測，認為整個產業的前景將環繞在行動運算、雲端服務、海量資料、社群網站這四大支柱所形成的「第三平台」發展。所謂的第三平台是指相對於第一平台的大型主機及終端機的平台，個人PC以及互聯網為主的網路時代的第二平台，演變到今天的平板、手機網路行動App的新模式。無獨有偶，國際商業機器公司（IBM）最近公布未來5年的五大科技：未來的教室、虛實一體商店、DNA客製化醫療、數位警衛與智慧城市將改變我們的生活。這5項科技都是結合連接網路的雲端及海量資料庫，再透過管理及各式感應器互動，將學習、交易、健康、安全與服務融合一起，創造更有效率、更方便的環境，讓我們享受生活。
眾所周知，IBM過去是賣機器、賣電腦，但現在是賣軟體、賣服務，業績還蒸蒸日上。IBM認為，當軟體進化到以類似人腦方式「思考」的同時，電腦的運算能力與儲存於雲端的大量資訊將使機器得以在各處各地無所不在地提供創意動力。換句話說，未來電腦不再是計算機，而是變得越來越聰明與客製化，與人互動，進而幫助我們處理難題，並給予正確建議。也因此現在正在發展的物聯網（Internet of Things）只是個起點。通過智慧感應、識別辨認技術與普適計算，不只是把東西串成一個網路交換資料而已，而是要讓設備和設備之間，設備與人之間可以互相溝通，更可以讓生活環境更加自動化。
回到國防的討論上面，我們知道，從1991年1月17日的波斯灣戰爭空中攻擊開始，以美國為首的28國聯軍在38天的空中攻擊中，用精準無比的飛彈、炸彈和各式武器，把伊拉克的軍事建築、戰車、防空洞、堡壘、機場等一一摧毀，開啟精準武器時代的來臨。現在的戰爭，已經不是大規模人力的地面部隊打仗，而是全面資訊化作戰。打擊上要利用精確導引武器技術自動判讀目標，朝向增大射種、提高命中精度；防衛上要採偵察與監視技術的多種探測模式，利用先進雷達、太空電子防衛戰、電磁脈衝等技術，進行自動對敵威脅反制，增加自我防衛的能力及建立整合性的防禦網。
可見國防的發展一定要符合網路化、自動化、精確化、隱形化、無人化、短小輕薄的時代趨勢，絕不是花大錢養一大堆傳統頭腦空空的肌肉男女大兵。
準此，可以看到高科技產業與國防的趨勢有多類似。我們認為未來的產業政策及國防一定要結合。我們急需各式的軟體人才，做高科技軟體與國防管理，來搶進人機合一的新世界。從這些趨勢，我們也看到台灣的機會。IT硬體是我們國家的強項，台灣所欠缺的是應用程式及服務的軟體人才。台灣不該再吃硬不吃軟，「軟硬通吃」是台灣未來發展的好策略。
Monday, December 30, 2013
Sunday, December 29, 2013
Should Public Policy Lead or Follow Public Opinion?
Should Public Policy Lead or Follow Public Opinion?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 30, 2013
Summary: The government must listen to the public. But it must not blindly rely on public opinion. Public opinion is an indicator of society's sentiments. The government must respect it. But that does not mean allowing it to run amok. Public opinion is often fragmented. The government must exercise professionalism and impartiality in its decision making. It must sell the public. It must lead the public. It must not become an example of the blind leading the blind.
Full text below:
Beginning today, the freeways will be metered on a pay per kilometer basis. Under conflicting pressures from the public, the long and short distance rates and the free mileage allotment have been adjusted repeatedly. But the government has been unable to quell public discontent. Ilan residents object to tolls on the plains portion of National Toll Road Number 5. They persist in their protests. Electronic toll collection will reduce bottlenecks. This is a benefit of the information age. But public opinion remains divided. A progressive policy continues to falter. This is surprising.
The popularity of the Internet has enabled people to express their opinions. Government policies are constantly subject to public scrutiny. Diversity of opinion has made it impossible for the government to formulate policies that please everyone. In order to reduce criticism, the government tends to wait until the public has announced its preferences first. Respect for public opinion is a good thing. Nevertheless the government must make decisions concerning complex issues that require professionalism. If government policies merely regurgitate public opinion, the result will be confusion and chaos.
The referendum on Nuclear Power Plant Number 4 is a good example. A public referendum is the most direct expression of public opinion. It is an important way to resolve major controversies. The government has repeatedly attempted to hold referenda. But the referendum process and the wording of referenda merely provoke additional controversy. This makes it impossible for referenda to resolve problems. Take Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster for example. The Executive Yuan decided to respond to DPP appeals. It decided to support a referendum on whether to finish construction on the Nuclear Power Plant Number 4. But nearly a year later, the issue remains unresolved by any referendum. Instead, the ruling and opposition parties have become increasingly polarized. Social groups have become mired in irrational disputes. Obviously referenda are not a panacea for resolving major public policy disagreements.
Another way of determining whether the public approves of a government policy is opinion polls. Recently the Tourism Bureau Taipei Tourism Office said it would conduct a poll to decide whether it should use scientific methods to preserve Yehliu's famous "Queen's Head" rock formation. Proponents and opponents remain deadlocked. On one hand, the rock formation has tourism value. The public loves it. On the other hand, the environment must be protected and natural processes must be respected. The two camps have no common ground. The Taipei Tourism Office decision revealed its reluctance to offend either camp. But the real question is do opinion polls constitute an objective and accurate measure of public opinion? Would an opinion poll really lead to an informed decision?
Those who implement policy often use the following approach. Whenever a major policy controversy erupts, the government establishes an "ad hoc inter-agency task force." For example, suppose people complain about rising prices? The government establishes an "ad hoc price stability task force." Suppose people complain about food safety? The government establishes a "food safety task force." When Hung Chung-chiu was murdered, the government established an "ad hoc military human rights task force." When the documentary film "Beyond Beauty: Taiwan from Above" became popular, the government established an "ad hoc land conservation task force." The government invariably waits until public discontent boils over, before seriously tackling any problem.
Reliance on referenda, polls, or ad hoc inter-agency task forces to decide policy is neither good nor bad. It all depends on how one uses them. Some may hide behind public opinion. They may use it to cover up inept government policies. This merely proves that they have no idea what they should do. Many decisions require difficult and complex professional judgments. They may involve fiscal, security, and technical considerations, even risk evaluations. If the government fails to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons, but instead rushes to consult opinion polls, it is not acting responsibly.
Take the Nuclear Power Plant Number 4 construction issue. This requires highly professional decision making. The government has billions of dollars invested. Should construction continue? The government must consider every aspect of the issue, including science, economics, and security On the one hand, the government boasts that it will arrive at a professional decision. On the other hand it swears it will abide by the results of a public referendum. This is obviously self-contradictory. Take the preservation of the "Queen's Head" rock formation. Some scholars have argued that the accelerated weathering of the Queen's Head was the result of considerable human impact. It was not entirely the result of natural factors. Today however, the Taipei Tourism Bureau wants to resort to the expediency of an opinion poll to determine what it should do. As one can imagine, no matter what result the poll yields people will not be persuaded.
This is true also for freeway metering on a pay per kilometer basis. In order to ensure a smooth transition, the government is offering a free milage grace period. This is a necessary concession. But it does not need to be permanent. Otherwise, satisfying short distance freeway users will invite resentment among long distance freeway users. The government can never please everyone. These "ad hoc task forces" reflect long accumulated problems, and the failure to address problems at their source -- policy implementation. Here a task force. There a task force. This merely shows that the government may have authority, but it lacks ability. Problems worsen and elude solution .
The government must listen to the public. But it must not blindly rely on public opinion. Public opinion is an indicator of society's sentiments. The government must respect it. But that does not mean allowing it to run amok. Public opinion is often fragmented. The government must exercise professionalism and impartiality in its decision making. It must sell the public. It must lead the public. It must not become an example of the blind leading the blind.
政策應該領導民意，或追隨民意？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.30 03:49 am
高速公路今起改採計程收費，在各方民意壓力下，長短途計程費率及免費里程幾經來回更易，仍無法平息不同民眾的不滿。其中，宜蘭居民反對國道五號平原段收費，仍在抗爭。電子收費有助減少高速公路行車瓶頸，也是資訊時代的大勢所趨；但在不同民意的拉扯下，一項進步決策仍推得步履蹣跚，讓人意外。
網路普及帶動言論市場的百家爭鳴，政府政策隨時都受到民意的檢視與批評；而民意的多元，也讓政府愈來愈難找到「面面俱到」的政策。在這種情況下，政府決策越來越傾向讓民意先行，以求減少批評。尊重民意當然是好事，但這仍要取決於議題的複雜度與專業性；否則，若凡事流為民意至上取向，最後可能反陷於無所適從的混亂境地。
核四公投就是一例。全民公投是最直接的民意呈現，也是解決國家重大爭議的重要手段；然而，台灣幾次推動公投的經驗，卻是在程序和議題擬訂上激發更多紛爭，而無法有效解決問題。日本福島核災後，行政院決定呼應民進黨訴求，由公投決定核四續建與否；但迄今一年，核四問題並未因將訴諸公投而得以化解，反而是朝野攻防愈發緊繃，社會不同群體也被捲入非理性的爭議。很顯然，做為解決重大民意分歧的最終手段，公投並非萬靈丹。
另一個民意常常被拿來為政策背書的模式，是民意調查。最近觀光局「北觀處」宣布將用民調方式，決定是否要用科學手段來保護野柳著名的「女王頭」蕈狀風化岩。主要原因，就在正反兩方僵持不下，一方訴諸觀光價值與民眾情感，另一方則訴諸環保和自然，兩者毫無交集。北觀處的決定，顯示它不願冒犯兩方的立場。問題是，要做多大範圍的民調，才能產生客觀而有代表性的民意呢？而這個民調真能做出明智的決定嗎？
行政部門還有一個常見的手法，是在發生政策爭議或重大事件時，成立所謂「跨部會專案小組」。諸如，民眾抱怨物價上漲，成立「穩定物價專案小組」；食安出狀況，成立「食安小組」；洪仲丘冤死案發生後，成立「軍中人權專案小組」；最近紀錄片「看見台灣」火紅，也成立「國土保育」專案小組。總是等到民怨沸騰，才想到要認真面對問題。
事實上，無論公投、民調或跨部會專案小組，做為決策選擇的手段，都無所謂好壞，而是要看如何運用。若只是想假藉民意來「補破網」，或掩蓋政府的施政無能，那只證明無技可施。尤其，許多政策涉及高難度及高複雜的專業判斷，諸如財務評估、安全考量、技術評比、乃至風險預測等，政府如果不謹慎依序做好全盤利弊分析，卻貿然把問題交給民調決定，豈是負責的作法？
以核四為例，這是個高度專業的決策，且政府已經投入數千億元，無論續建與否，政府都要把科學、經濟、安全各方面的論述攤開來。若一面宣稱找「最專業的團隊評估」，一面又說要訴諸公投，根本是自相矛盾。再談「女王頭」的維護，早在多年前，就有學者主張女王頭風化速度加快有相當程度的人為影響，並非完全自然因素造成；如今，北觀處卻只想用最廉價的民調決定。可以想見，未來無論民調結果如何，都難以服人。
高速公路計程收費也一樣，為求過渡期的平順，提供免費旅程作為緩衝，自是必要手段，卻未必要永遠採行。否則，滿足了這端的短程民眾，又招惹了那端中長程民眾的忿懣，永難擺平。再如各種臨時性的「專案小組」，反映的都是長年積累的問題，不從行政體系執行力的源頭去下功夫，東一個小組、西一個小組，只是暴露政府公權力欲振乏力，結果是事倍功半。
簡言之，政府不能不把民意放在心上，但也不能一味把民意掛在嘴邊。民意是社會人心的綜合指標，政府給予適當的尊重，它就不會變成一頭失控的野獸；然而，許多時候民意是四分五裂的，這就需要政府拿出專業能力與公正決斷來說服大眾、領導人民，而不是盲人瞎馬般地被帶著走。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 30, 2013
Summary: The government must listen to the public. But it must not blindly rely on public opinion. Public opinion is an indicator of society's sentiments. The government must respect it. But that does not mean allowing it to run amok. Public opinion is often fragmented. The government must exercise professionalism and impartiality in its decision making. It must sell the public. It must lead the public. It must not become an example of the blind leading the blind.
Full text below:
Beginning today, the freeways will be metered on a pay per kilometer basis. Under conflicting pressures from the public, the long and short distance rates and the free mileage allotment have been adjusted repeatedly. But the government has been unable to quell public discontent. Ilan residents object to tolls on the plains portion of National Toll Road Number 5. They persist in their protests. Electronic toll collection will reduce bottlenecks. This is a benefit of the information age. But public opinion remains divided. A progressive policy continues to falter. This is surprising.
The popularity of the Internet has enabled people to express their opinions. Government policies are constantly subject to public scrutiny. Diversity of opinion has made it impossible for the government to formulate policies that please everyone. In order to reduce criticism, the government tends to wait until the public has announced its preferences first. Respect for public opinion is a good thing. Nevertheless the government must make decisions concerning complex issues that require professionalism. If government policies merely regurgitate public opinion, the result will be confusion and chaos.
The referendum on Nuclear Power Plant Number 4 is a good example. A public referendum is the most direct expression of public opinion. It is an important way to resolve major controversies. The government has repeatedly attempted to hold referenda. But the referendum process and the wording of referenda merely provoke additional controversy. This makes it impossible for referenda to resolve problems. Take Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster for example. The Executive Yuan decided to respond to DPP appeals. It decided to support a referendum on whether to finish construction on the Nuclear Power Plant Number 4. But nearly a year later, the issue remains unresolved by any referendum. Instead, the ruling and opposition parties have become increasingly polarized. Social groups have become mired in irrational disputes. Obviously referenda are not a panacea for resolving major public policy disagreements.
Another way of determining whether the public approves of a government policy is opinion polls. Recently the Tourism Bureau Taipei Tourism Office said it would conduct a poll to decide whether it should use scientific methods to preserve Yehliu's famous "Queen's Head" rock formation. Proponents and opponents remain deadlocked. On one hand, the rock formation has tourism value. The public loves it. On the other hand, the environment must be protected and natural processes must be respected. The two camps have no common ground. The Taipei Tourism Office decision revealed its reluctance to offend either camp. But the real question is do opinion polls constitute an objective and accurate measure of public opinion? Would an opinion poll really lead to an informed decision?
Those who implement policy often use the following approach. Whenever a major policy controversy erupts, the government establishes an "ad hoc inter-agency task force." For example, suppose people complain about rising prices? The government establishes an "ad hoc price stability task force." Suppose people complain about food safety? The government establishes a "food safety task force." When Hung Chung-chiu was murdered, the government established an "ad hoc military human rights task force." When the documentary film "Beyond Beauty: Taiwan from Above" became popular, the government established an "ad hoc land conservation task force." The government invariably waits until public discontent boils over, before seriously tackling any problem.
Reliance on referenda, polls, or ad hoc inter-agency task forces to decide policy is neither good nor bad. It all depends on how one uses them. Some may hide behind public opinion. They may use it to cover up inept government policies. This merely proves that they have no idea what they should do. Many decisions require difficult and complex professional judgments. They may involve fiscal, security, and technical considerations, even risk evaluations. If the government fails to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons, but instead rushes to consult opinion polls, it is not acting responsibly.
Take the Nuclear Power Plant Number 4 construction issue. This requires highly professional decision making. The government has billions of dollars invested. Should construction continue? The government must consider every aspect of the issue, including science, economics, and security On the one hand, the government boasts that it will arrive at a professional decision. On the other hand it swears it will abide by the results of a public referendum. This is obviously self-contradictory. Take the preservation of the "Queen's Head" rock formation. Some scholars have argued that the accelerated weathering of the Queen's Head was the result of considerable human impact. It was not entirely the result of natural factors. Today however, the Taipei Tourism Bureau wants to resort to the expediency of an opinion poll to determine what it should do. As one can imagine, no matter what result the poll yields people will not be persuaded.
This is true also for freeway metering on a pay per kilometer basis. In order to ensure a smooth transition, the government is offering a free milage grace period. This is a necessary concession. But it does not need to be permanent. Otherwise, satisfying short distance freeway users will invite resentment among long distance freeway users. The government can never please everyone. These "ad hoc task forces" reflect long accumulated problems, and the failure to address problems at their source -- policy implementation. Here a task force. There a task force. This merely shows that the government may have authority, but it lacks ability. Problems worsen and elude solution .
The government must listen to the public. But it must not blindly rely on public opinion. Public opinion is an indicator of society's sentiments. The government must respect it. But that does not mean allowing it to run amok. Public opinion is often fragmented. The government must exercise professionalism and impartiality in its decision making. It must sell the public. It must lead the public. It must not become an example of the blind leading the blind.
政策應該領導民意，或追隨民意？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.30 03:49 am
高速公路今起改採計程收費，在各方民意壓力下，長短途計程費率及免費里程幾經來回更易，仍無法平息不同民眾的不滿。其中，宜蘭居民反對國道五號平原段收費，仍在抗爭。電子收費有助減少高速公路行車瓶頸，也是資訊時代的大勢所趨；但在不同民意的拉扯下，一項進步決策仍推得步履蹣跚，讓人意外。
網路普及帶動言論市場的百家爭鳴，政府政策隨時都受到民意的檢視與批評；而民意的多元，也讓政府愈來愈難找到「面面俱到」的政策。在這種情況下，政府決策越來越傾向讓民意先行，以求減少批評。尊重民意當然是好事，但這仍要取決於議題的複雜度與專業性；否則，若凡事流為民意至上取向，最後可能反陷於無所適從的混亂境地。
核四公投就是一例。全民公投是最直接的民意呈現，也是解決國家重大爭議的重要手段；然而，台灣幾次推動公投的經驗，卻是在程序和議題擬訂上激發更多紛爭，而無法有效解決問題。日本福島核災後，行政院決定呼應民進黨訴求，由公投決定核四續建與否；但迄今一年，核四問題並未因將訴諸公投而得以化解，反而是朝野攻防愈發緊繃，社會不同群體也被捲入非理性的爭議。很顯然，做為解決重大民意分歧的最終手段，公投並非萬靈丹。
另一個民意常常被拿來為政策背書的模式，是民意調查。最近觀光局「北觀處」宣布將用民調方式，決定是否要用科學手段來保護野柳著名的「女王頭」蕈狀風化岩。主要原因，就在正反兩方僵持不下，一方訴諸觀光價值與民眾情感，另一方則訴諸環保和自然，兩者毫無交集。北觀處的決定，顯示它不願冒犯兩方的立場。問題是，要做多大範圍的民調，才能產生客觀而有代表性的民意呢？而這個民調真能做出明智的決定嗎？
行政部門還有一個常見的手法，是在發生政策爭議或重大事件時，成立所謂「跨部會專案小組」。諸如，民眾抱怨物價上漲，成立「穩定物價專案小組」；食安出狀況，成立「食安小組」；洪仲丘冤死案發生後，成立「軍中人權專案小組」；最近紀錄片「看見台灣」火紅，也成立「國土保育」專案小組。總是等到民怨沸騰，才想到要認真面對問題。
事實上，無論公投、民調或跨部會專案小組，做為決策選擇的手段，都無所謂好壞，而是要看如何運用。若只是想假藉民意來「補破網」，或掩蓋政府的施政無能，那只證明無技可施。尤其，許多政策涉及高難度及高複雜的專業判斷，諸如財務評估、安全考量、技術評比、乃至風險預測等，政府如果不謹慎依序做好全盤利弊分析，卻貿然把問題交給民調決定，豈是負責的作法？
以核四為例，這是個高度專業的決策，且政府已經投入數千億元，無論續建與否，政府都要把科學、經濟、安全各方面的論述攤開來。若一面宣稱找「最專業的團隊評估」，一面又說要訴諸公投，根本是自相矛盾。再談「女王頭」的維護，早在多年前，就有學者主張女王頭風化速度加快有相當程度的人為影響，並非完全自然因素造成；如今，北觀處卻只想用最廉價的民調決定。可以想見，未來無論民調結果如何，都難以服人。
高速公路計程收費也一樣，為求過渡期的平順，提供免費旅程作為緩衝，自是必要手段，卻未必要永遠採行。否則，滿足了這端的短程民眾，又招惹了那端中長程民眾的忿懣，永難擺平。再如各種臨時性的「專案小組」，反映的都是長年積累的問題，不從行政體系執行力的源頭去下功夫，東一個小組、西一個小組，只是暴露政府公權力欲振乏力，結果是事倍功半。
簡言之，政府不能不把民意放在心上，但也不能一味把民意掛在嘴邊。民意是社會人心的綜合指標，政府給予適當的尊重，它就不會變成一頭失控的野獸；然而，許多時候民意是四分五裂的，這就需要政府拿出專業能力與公正決斷來說服大眾、領導人民，而不是盲人瞎馬般地被帶著走。
Thursday, December 26, 2013
Beijing Must Not Cavalierly Say No to a Ma-Xi Meeting
Beijing Must Not Cavalierly Say No to a Ma-Xi Meeting
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 27, 2013
Summary: One may look and see ten thousand mountains standing in one's way. Or one look and see only a sheet of paper. Ma Ying-jeou must overcome daunting domestic obstacles. Yet he openly expressed his willingness to take part in a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC. He must in fact cross ten thousand mountains. By contrast, Beijing has vastly more resources and enjoys vastly more favorable conditions. For Beijing, the only barrier it must penetrate is a sheet of paper. If Ma Ying-jeou says yes, but Beijing says no, would that be just?
Full text below:
During an interview with Asiaweek President Ma said that he was of course willing to attend next year's APEC meeting in Beijing. He said, "If I can go, I am willing."
This is the first time President Ma has expressed his willingness to attend in such a straightforward manner. In the past, he usually beat around the bush, saying, "We must first create the proper conditions." President Ma added, "But on this point, Beijing has already announced its interest [in meeting with me] at APEC." Interestingly enough, when Asiaweek published the exclusive interview, it apparently omitted Beijing's denial, on purpose. The presidential office however retained the full text in its own announcement.
Asiaweek is a private sector Hong Kong-based media organization. It omitted Beijing's denial. Perhaps it was too aggressive in its attempt to promote such a meeting. Ma Ying-jeou explicitly expressed the desire to attend. The Beijing authorities should consider its decision carefully. They must not lightly reject the possibility.
The coming May and June may determine whether a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC is possible. Beijing's initial response was favorable. Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi said, "The problems that visits by leaders from the two sides pose... [can be resolved by] creating the proper conditions, including appropriate consultation regarding their official status." Later however, Beijing's tone hardened. Spokesman Fan Liqing said, One. A meeting of the leaders from the two sides does not require an international conference as its venue. Two. The Taiwan side's participation in an informal APEC leadership meeting should be handled in accordance with the provisions of the MOU. (i.e., it should be confined to officials responsible for fiscal and economic policy). This may have been what President Ma was referring to when he said Beijing denied making any such offer.
The APEC meeting to be held at Beijing's Huairou Yanqi Lake enables a Ma-Xi meeting. It would make possible a huge advance in cross-Strait relations. APEC is not really an "international conference." It is not a conference between "sovereign states." It is a conference between "economic entities." The two sides already have a "one China framework." President Ma could attend as the "economic leader" of "Chinese Taipei." This would fall entirely within the "one China framework." This conference between "economic entities" is being held in Beijing. Ma Ying-jeou needs to legitimize his presence in Beijing to the public on Taiwan. He can use Beijing's own language, "leaders from both sides of the Strait' to legitimize meeting with Xi in Beijing. Is this not an historic opportunity to improve cross-Strait relations?
Suppose we pass up this golden opportunity? How long will it be before APEC once meets again in Beijing? By then it will no longer be an opportunity for Ma and Xi. Taiwan's political situation may change at any moment. We must use the Ma Xi meeting to reduce obstacles to cross-Strait relations. The political situation on Taiwan is volatile. Cross-Strait relations could swiftly degenerate. Who knows when they could be straightened out?
Ma Ying-jeou has stated publicly that "for his part, he is certainly willing to attend." The APEC meeting inevitably raises the possibility of a Ma-Xi meeting. The ball is now in Beijing's court. As the saying goes, "Reject heaven's blessing, suffer heaven's wrath." We have been presented with a golden opportunity. If Beijing casually allows it to slip between its fingers, will it not be rejecting heaven's blessing and inviting heaven's wrath?
Cross-Strait relations have long alternated between "theory first" and "practice first." The annual APEC meeting in Beijing is a conference of economic entities. Theoretically it falls within the "one China framework." A Ma-Xi meeting at APEC in Beijing would be theory put into practice. It would be a case of theory and practice complementing each other. On the one hand, theory would be given a practical basis. On the other hand, practice would promote advances in theory. What reason do the Beijing authorities have to dither over a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC?
A Beijing think-tank says a Ma-Xi meeting depends on cross-Strait political trust. This was an insightful comment. More precisely, a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC would be a new achievement that would boost cross-Strait political trust. Recent developments such as the cross-Strait diplomatic truce, WHA, ICAO, and Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun referring to each other by their official titles both reflect and promote cross-Strait trust. A Ma-Xi meeting would advance cross-Strait mutual trust past a point of no return. The two sides can no longer afford the consequences of a rupture in mutual trust. Only a willingness to fling open the doors can raise cross-Strait relations to new heights.
One may look and see ten thousand mountains standing in one's way. Or one look and see only a sheet of paper. Ma Ying-jeou must overcome daunting domestic obstacles. Yet he openly expressed his willingness to take part in a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC. He must in fact cross ten thousand mountains. By contrast, Beijing has vastly more resources and enjoys vastly more favorable conditions. For Beijing, the only barrier it must penetrate is a sheet of paper. If Ma Ying-jeou says yes, but Beijing says no, would that be just?
"Reject heaven's blessings, suffer heaven's wrath." Beijing must not cavalierly say not to a Ma-Xi meeting.
北京不可輕率對馬習會說不
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.27 03:25 am
馬總統接受《亞洲周刊》專訪表示，他在主觀上當然有意願參加明年北京ＡＰＥＣ會議。他說：「如果能去，我願意。」
這是馬總統首次直白表示願意參加此會，過去他的說法，則大多是在「必須努力創造一些條件」上繞圈子。不過，馬總統在此次專訪中也說，「但這一點，中共已宣布不透過ＡＰＥＣ（與我見面）」。有意思的是，亞洲周刊在刊出專訪紀錄時，似乎刻意刪略了「北京否定」這一段，但總統府在公布的完整內容中保留了此語。
亞洲周刊作為以香港為基地的自由媒體，刪略了「北京否定」這一段，或許有為兩岸各留餘地的思考。因為，在馬英九已正面表達與會意願後，北京當局理當審慎斟酌，不可輕率說不。
今年五、六月間，有關能否促成來年ＡＰＥＣ馬習會成為兩岸熱議。北京起初的回應相當開放，國台辦發言人楊毅說：「兩岸領導人互訪的問題……雙方可以為此創造條件，包括協商互訪的適當身分問題。」不過，後來北京的口氣漸漸轉涼變硬，發言人范麗青的新台詞是：一、兩岸領導人會面，不需要借助國際會議場合；二、台灣方面人士參加ＡＰＥＣ領導人非正式會議，應根據ＡＰＥＣ有關諒解備忘錄的規定處理（即只能由經濟官員與會）。這或許即是馬總統所說「北京否定」的出處。
北京懷柔雁棲湖ＡＰＥＣ年會創造了「馬習會」的可能性，這可謂是巨幅躍升兩岸關係的一個不二機遇。因為，ＡＰＥＣ其實不是「國際會議」，亦即不是「主權國家」之間的會議，而是「經濟體」之間的「體際會議」；即使以兩岸之間現存「一中架構」的認知而言，馬總統若以中華台北「經濟體領袖」的身分出席，亦是在「一中架構」內。如今，這場「經濟體際會議」在北京召開，使得馬英九在台灣內部取得了前往北京與會的正當性，且正可藉此實現「兩岸領導人」在北京的會晤，這豈不是躍升兩岸關係的歷史機遇？
試問：倘若錯過這樣的良機佳遇，什麼時候再有「ＡＰＥＣ在北京」？若有，那也不會再是習近平與馬英九的機遇；何況，台灣政局的變異已在眉睫，若不及時藉馬習會墊高兩岸關係的門檻，一旦台灣政局出現反覆，兩岸關係勢必又陷入亂麻堆裡，不知何年何月才能理出頭緒。
馬英九已公開表明「主觀上當然有意願參加」ＡＰＥＣ年會與必然引伸的馬習會，如今輪到北京方面表態。語云：「天授不取，反受其殃。」面對如此天造地設的良機佳遇，倘若北京方面輕易讓它在指縫流失，豈非暴殄天機？
兩岸關係一直都在「理論先行」或「實踐先行」的交替運動中前進。如前所述，ＡＰＥＣ北京年會，在實質上可以視作「各經濟體際的會議」，是則在理論上仍在「一中架構」之內；未來若能在北京ＡＰＥＣ促成馬習會，其實也亦可視為此一理論的實踐。因而，ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，即可視為「理論」與「實踐」的相輔相成；一方面在理論上可以找到實踐的依據，另一方面亦以實踐推進理論的發展。北京當局若能據此看待ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，有什麼裹足不前的理由？
北京方面的智囊說：馬習會的議題如何演化，將取決於兩岸政治互信發展的水準。此語有其見地，不過，若更確切地說，尤當共同以促成ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，作為推進兩岸政治互信發展的新動力與新成就。其實，近年來，兩岸在外交休兵、ＷＨＡ、ＩＣＡＯ，及王郁琦與張志軍互稱官銜上的進展，一方面是源自兩岸已經累積的互信，另一方面又推進了兩岸的互信水準；因而，ＡＰＥＣ馬習會若能實現，必可將兩岸互信推至不可逆反的水準，因為雙方皆愈來愈承受不起「互信」破裂的後果。這種大開大闔的胸襟與氣魄，才有推動兩岸關係更上層樓的可能性。
從難處看是萬重山，從易處看是一層紙。馬英九在內部治理陷入極端困難之時，仍能公開表示願意面對ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，他其實是處於必須推開「萬重山」的局面。相對而言，北京方面的資源與條件闊綽得多，這種一念之間的舉措不啻只是撕開「一層紙」而已。然則，馬英九若說是，北京卻說否，豈是相當？
「天授不取，反受其殃。」北京不可輕率對馬習會說不。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 27, 2013
Summary: One may look and see ten thousand mountains standing in one's way. Or one look and see only a sheet of paper. Ma Ying-jeou must overcome daunting domestic obstacles. Yet he openly expressed his willingness to take part in a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC. He must in fact cross ten thousand mountains. By contrast, Beijing has vastly more resources and enjoys vastly more favorable conditions. For Beijing, the only barrier it must penetrate is a sheet of paper. If Ma Ying-jeou says yes, but Beijing says no, would that be just?
Full text below:
During an interview with Asiaweek President Ma said that he was of course willing to attend next year's APEC meeting in Beijing. He said, "If I can go, I am willing."
This is the first time President Ma has expressed his willingness to attend in such a straightforward manner. In the past, he usually beat around the bush, saying, "We must first create the proper conditions." President Ma added, "But on this point, Beijing has already announced its interest [in meeting with me] at APEC." Interestingly enough, when Asiaweek published the exclusive interview, it apparently omitted Beijing's denial, on purpose. The presidential office however retained the full text in its own announcement.
Asiaweek is a private sector Hong Kong-based media organization. It omitted Beijing's denial. Perhaps it was too aggressive in its attempt to promote such a meeting. Ma Ying-jeou explicitly expressed the desire to attend. The Beijing authorities should consider its decision carefully. They must not lightly reject the possibility.
The coming May and June may determine whether a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC is possible. Beijing's initial response was favorable. Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi said, "The problems that visits by leaders from the two sides pose... [can be resolved by] creating the proper conditions, including appropriate consultation regarding their official status." Later however, Beijing's tone hardened. Spokesman Fan Liqing said, One. A meeting of the leaders from the two sides does not require an international conference as its venue. Two. The Taiwan side's participation in an informal APEC leadership meeting should be handled in accordance with the provisions of the MOU. (i.e., it should be confined to officials responsible for fiscal and economic policy). This may have been what President Ma was referring to when he said Beijing denied making any such offer.
The APEC meeting to be held at Beijing's Huairou Yanqi Lake enables a Ma-Xi meeting. It would make possible a huge advance in cross-Strait relations. APEC is not really an "international conference." It is not a conference between "sovereign states." It is a conference between "economic entities." The two sides already have a "one China framework." President Ma could attend as the "economic leader" of "Chinese Taipei." This would fall entirely within the "one China framework." This conference between "economic entities" is being held in Beijing. Ma Ying-jeou needs to legitimize his presence in Beijing to the public on Taiwan. He can use Beijing's own language, "leaders from both sides of the Strait' to legitimize meeting with Xi in Beijing. Is this not an historic opportunity to improve cross-Strait relations?
Suppose we pass up this golden opportunity? How long will it be before APEC once meets again in Beijing? By then it will no longer be an opportunity for Ma and Xi. Taiwan's political situation may change at any moment. We must use the Ma Xi meeting to reduce obstacles to cross-Strait relations. The political situation on Taiwan is volatile. Cross-Strait relations could swiftly degenerate. Who knows when they could be straightened out?
Ma Ying-jeou has stated publicly that "for his part, he is certainly willing to attend." The APEC meeting inevitably raises the possibility of a Ma-Xi meeting. The ball is now in Beijing's court. As the saying goes, "Reject heaven's blessing, suffer heaven's wrath." We have been presented with a golden opportunity. If Beijing casually allows it to slip between its fingers, will it not be rejecting heaven's blessing and inviting heaven's wrath?
Cross-Strait relations have long alternated between "theory first" and "practice first." The annual APEC meeting in Beijing is a conference of economic entities. Theoretically it falls within the "one China framework." A Ma-Xi meeting at APEC in Beijing would be theory put into practice. It would be a case of theory and practice complementing each other. On the one hand, theory would be given a practical basis. On the other hand, practice would promote advances in theory. What reason do the Beijing authorities have to dither over a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC?
A Beijing think-tank says a Ma-Xi meeting depends on cross-Strait political trust. This was an insightful comment. More precisely, a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC would be a new achievement that would boost cross-Strait political trust. Recent developments such as the cross-Strait diplomatic truce, WHA, ICAO, and Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun referring to each other by their official titles both reflect and promote cross-Strait trust. A Ma-Xi meeting would advance cross-Strait mutual trust past a point of no return. The two sides can no longer afford the consequences of a rupture in mutual trust. Only a willingness to fling open the doors can raise cross-Strait relations to new heights.
One may look and see ten thousand mountains standing in one's way. Or one look and see only a sheet of paper. Ma Ying-jeou must overcome daunting domestic obstacles. Yet he openly expressed his willingness to take part in a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC. He must in fact cross ten thousand mountains. By contrast, Beijing has vastly more resources and enjoys vastly more favorable conditions. For Beijing, the only barrier it must penetrate is a sheet of paper. If Ma Ying-jeou says yes, but Beijing says no, would that be just?
"Reject heaven's blessings, suffer heaven's wrath." Beijing must not cavalierly say not to a Ma-Xi meeting.
北京不可輕率對馬習會說不
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.27 03:25 am
馬總統接受《亞洲周刊》專訪表示，他在主觀上當然有意願參加明年北京ＡＰＥＣ會議。他說：「如果能去，我願意。」
這是馬總統首次直白表示願意參加此會，過去他的說法，則大多是在「必須努力創造一些條件」上繞圈子。不過，馬總統在此次專訪中也說，「但這一點，中共已宣布不透過ＡＰＥＣ（與我見面）」。有意思的是，亞洲周刊在刊出專訪紀錄時，似乎刻意刪略了「北京否定」這一段，但總統府在公布的完整內容中保留了此語。
亞洲周刊作為以香港為基地的自由媒體，刪略了「北京否定」這一段，或許有為兩岸各留餘地的思考。因為，在馬英九已正面表達與會意願後，北京當局理當審慎斟酌，不可輕率說不。
今年五、六月間，有關能否促成來年ＡＰＥＣ馬習會成為兩岸熱議。北京起初的回應相當開放，國台辦發言人楊毅說：「兩岸領導人互訪的問題……雙方可以為此創造條件，包括協商互訪的適當身分問題。」不過，後來北京的口氣漸漸轉涼變硬，發言人范麗青的新台詞是：一、兩岸領導人會面，不需要借助國際會議場合；二、台灣方面人士參加ＡＰＥＣ領導人非正式會議，應根據ＡＰＥＣ有關諒解備忘錄的規定處理（即只能由經濟官員與會）。這或許即是馬總統所說「北京否定」的出處。
北京懷柔雁棲湖ＡＰＥＣ年會創造了「馬習會」的可能性，這可謂是巨幅躍升兩岸關係的一個不二機遇。因為，ＡＰＥＣ其實不是「國際會議」，亦即不是「主權國家」之間的會議，而是「經濟體」之間的「體際會議」；即使以兩岸之間現存「一中架構」的認知而言，馬總統若以中華台北「經濟體領袖」的身分出席，亦是在「一中架構」內。如今，這場「經濟體際會議」在北京召開，使得馬英九在台灣內部取得了前往北京與會的正當性，且正可藉此實現「兩岸領導人」在北京的會晤，這豈不是躍升兩岸關係的歷史機遇？
試問：倘若錯過這樣的良機佳遇，什麼時候再有「ＡＰＥＣ在北京」？若有，那也不會再是習近平與馬英九的機遇；何況，台灣政局的變異已在眉睫，若不及時藉馬習會墊高兩岸關係的門檻，一旦台灣政局出現反覆，兩岸關係勢必又陷入亂麻堆裡，不知何年何月才能理出頭緒。
馬英九已公開表明「主觀上當然有意願參加」ＡＰＥＣ年會與必然引伸的馬習會，如今輪到北京方面表態。語云：「天授不取，反受其殃。」面對如此天造地設的良機佳遇，倘若北京方面輕易讓它在指縫流失，豈非暴殄天機？
兩岸關係一直都在「理論先行」或「實踐先行」的交替運動中前進。如前所述，ＡＰＥＣ北京年會，在實質上可以視作「各經濟體際的會議」，是則在理論上仍在「一中架構」之內；未來若能在北京ＡＰＥＣ促成馬習會，其實也亦可視為此一理論的實踐。因而，ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，即可視為「理論」與「實踐」的相輔相成；一方面在理論上可以找到實踐的依據，另一方面亦以實踐推進理論的發展。北京當局若能據此看待ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，有什麼裹足不前的理由？
北京方面的智囊說：馬習會的議題如何演化，將取決於兩岸政治互信發展的水準。此語有其見地，不過，若更確切地說，尤當共同以促成ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，作為推進兩岸政治互信發展的新動力與新成就。其實，近年來，兩岸在外交休兵、ＷＨＡ、ＩＣＡＯ，及王郁琦與張志軍互稱官銜上的進展，一方面是源自兩岸已經累積的互信，另一方面又推進了兩岸的互信水準；因而，ＡＰＥＣ馬習會若能實現，必可將兩岸互信推至不可逆反的水準，因為雙方皆愈來愈承受不起「互信」破裂的後果。這種大開大闔的胸襟與氣魄，才有推動兩岸關係更上層樓的可能性。
從難處看是萬重山，從易處看是一層紙。馬英九在內部治理陷入極端困難之時，仍能公開表示願意面對ＡＰＥＣ馬習會，他其實是處於必須推開「萬重山」的局面。相對而言，北京方面的資源與條件闊綽得多，這種一念之間的舉措不啻只是撕開「一層紙」而已。然則，馬英九若說是，北京卻說否，豈是相當？
「天授不取，反受其殃。」北京不可輕率對馬習會說不。
Wednesday, December 25, 2013
Japanese Feel Shame, Taiwanese Feel Nothing
Japanese Feel Shame, Taiwanese Feel Nothing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 26, 2013
Summary: The Japanese feel no sense of guilt. But at least they feel a sense of shame. Japan has been wracked by one political scandal after another. But public opinion and public vigilance provides a strong line of defense. On Taiwan, the people's sense of shame remains entangled with rank sentimentality. It is distorted and deficient. Whatever collective constraints Taiwan society might once have had, have evaporated amidst Blue vs. Green political struggles.
Full text below:
Tokyo Governor Naoki Inose is suspected of accepting 50 million yen in illegal campaign contributions from the Tokushukai medical group. Under intense public pressure, he announced his resignation. This is not the first time something like this has happened in Japan, nor will it be the last.
Japan has a culture that stresses shame, but not guilt. Guilt originates from within oneself. Heartfelt moral convictions constrain one's behavior. Shame, by contrast, is the result of pressure exerted by others. External forces constrain one's behavior. Over the years many Japanese politicians have accepted illegal campaign contributions. Buty they step down only after being shamed. For the Japanese, until others discover their wrongdoing, or until a wave of condemnation appears, they have not sinned. This is a characteristic peculiar to Japan's culture of shame.
Once the Japanese culture of shame asserts itself however, it is like opening Pandora's Box. Society then blows it up all out of proportion. The masses go into a collective trance. They hear the rumblings, and undergo mass induction into a shared faith resembling unspoken dogma. It is sublimated and transformed into collective social pressure.
Naoki Inose once hurried about amidst the dust and confusion of Tokyo. Even when his wife died he worked around the clock. He succeeded in his bid to become the Hero of Tokyo. His popularity among Japanese politicians was second only to that of Shinzo Abe. But the moment his bribery scandal erupted, everything changed overnight. He became Public Enemy Number One. People demaned that he be pilloried. The Japanese media demanded his resignation. The consensus was that every day Seto remained in office dishonored the Tokyo Olympics with the international community. This illustrates the Japanese peoples' exaggerated sense of shame. Their intense emphasis on shame, and cavalier indifference to friendship, is clear to see. This was the reason for Naoki Seto's rise, and it was also the reason for his fall. .
The Japanese feel an intense sense of shame. It is a reflection of Japanese society's collective social constraints. The Japanese are cavalier about personal friendships. They make fine legal distinctions. Japanese often talk about how someone's conduct violated a certain law. But they seldom complain about systemic injustices. The Japanese often talk about how someone broke a certain rule. They rarely condemn a referee for being selfish and heartless. This is why the Japanese can make such an startling about face, and not feel any guilt. This is why when the Japanese make such an abrupt about face, they need not concern themselves with matters of friendship.
Once a climate of shame has taken formed, the Japanese never give "venial sins" a free pass. For example, former Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara was another rising star in the Democratic Party. He accepted a measly 200,000 yen in political contributions from an ethnic Korean woman he had known for years. When discovered, he hastily resigned. The Japanese public expressed no regret over his fall from grace.
Once someone has crossed an invisible line within Japan's culture of shame, the Japanese will no compromise merely because he holds high office. For example Democratic Party Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was under pressure to resign for falsifying his list of political contributors. The prosecutor never actually indicted him. But the Japanese political stage no longer had a place for him. For Japanese politicians, political contributions are their daily bread and butter. But step across the line and one ends up like Naoki Seto.
As we can see, Japan's political game has its own set of rules. There is the law. There are also social constraints and public pressure. These let politicians know that in addition to obeying the law, they must also have high ethical standards. There is no room for sentimentality. These social constraints also let Japanese politicians know that once their fig leaf has been snatched away, they must bear the full weight of political responsibility. They cannot skate by on personal connections.
Compare Naoki Seto's case to Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling scandal. The contrast is stark. When Seto's bribery scandal first emerged, he argued that he "merely borrowed some money from a friend." He produced a signed IOU and considered himself cleared. But public opinion, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, and the Tokusou Group eventually forced Seto to resign to save face. Compare this to Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling scandal. The domestic media and the public wallowed in sentimentality. They spun the Ma government's prosecution of Wang's wrongdoing as "political persecution." The Pan Green opposition waved banners and shouted support. They went after the officials who investigated Wang's wrongdoing with a vengeance. As we can see, Taiwan's politicians lack any sense of guilt. They also lack any sense of shame.
In short, the Japanese feel no sense of guilt. But at least they feel a sense of shame. Japan has been wracked by one political scandal after another. But public opinion and public vigilance provides a strong line of defense. On Taiwan, the people's sense of shame remains entangled with rank sentimentality. It is distorted and deficient. Whatever collective constraints Taiwan society might once have had, have evaporated amidst Blue vs. Green political struggles.
Some say that Japan ten years ago reflects what Taiwan is today. But politicians should know when to hold and know when to fold. Today's Taiwan lacks even this iota of shame.
日本的恥感，台灣的無感
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.26 03:40 am
日本東京都知事豬瀨直樹，因涉嫌收受醫療團體「德州會」的五千萬日圓非法政治獻金，在強大輿論壓力下，宣布辭職下台。這在日本既非空前，也非絕後！
日本是一個講究「恥感」的民族，但不具有「罪感」的文化。「罪感」是來自本我的要求，發自內心的道德信仰來約束自己的行為；而「恥感」卻是來自他人的壓力，依靠外來強制的力量來約束自己的行為。這也難怪，長久以來，許多日本政治人物因為違法收受政治獻金，在「恥感」的催迫下紛紛被迫下台。對日本人來說，在不被外人發現之前，或者外界未出現譴責的聲浪時，都不能算是一種罪過，這是日本人恥感文化的特殊性。
然而，日本人的恥感一旦被掀開，就如同打開潘朵拉的盒子，就會被社會無限膨脹與放大。這像是一種集體催眠，在聽到和鳴的聲音之後，便會轉化成為共同的信仰；更像是一種無形的教條，在潛移默化下，便會轉化成集體的社會壓力。
先前，豬瀨直樹風塵僕僕為東京申奧奔忙，其間連妻子過世時都不眠不休，不僅成為東京申奧成功的最大英雄，更成為僅次於安倍的高人氣日本政治家。然而，在收賄事件爆發後，霎時有如豬羊變色，豬瀨如同過街的老鼠，人人喊打。日本輿論要求他下台的聲浪，如排山倒海而來，彷彿只要豬瀨繼續在任一天，便會使東京奧運在國際社會蒙羞。日本人對於恥感的無限上綱，於此可見一斑；日本人的重恥感、輕人情，更是有目共睹。對豬瀨直樹來說，可謂成也申奧，敗也申奧。
日本人的重恥感，來自於社會集體的約束力；而日本人的輕人情，來自於清楚的法律分際。我們看到，日本人通常會說誰的行為是不符合哪條法律，卻甚少抱怨制度不公不義；我們也看到，日本人會說誰違反哪一項規範，卻極少譴責裁判者自私不仁。這使得日本人能夠在這種極大的心態的轉換下，不會產生任何的陰影；這也使得日本人在這種急遽的行為轉變上，而不用背負任何的人情包袱。
一旦恥感形成了特定氛圍，日本絕對不會因為事屬「微罪」而輕輕放過。例如，前日本外務大臣、也是民主黨時期的明日之星前原誠司，便曾經收受家鄉相識多年的韓裔女性區區二十萬日圓的政治獻金，被發現後，便倉促宣告辭職下台，日本輿論界對他亦不表任何惋惜。
一旦犯行超越恥感的界線，日本也絕不會因為某人職位崇高，而有所妥協。例如，民主黨執政後的首任首相鳩山由紀夫，便曾因假造政治獻金名冊，而面臨辭職壓力；最後雖未被檢察官起訴，但日本政壇亦未作任何挽留。政治獻金無疑是日本政治人物的慣常遊戲，但稍有逾越卻成為豬瀨直樹致命的悲劇。
由此可見，在日本政治的遊戲規則中，除了法律，社會約束力以及輿論壓力仍是一道重要的防線。這種輿論壓力，讓政治人物在法律之外必須要以高道德標準來檢視自我，而沒有理盲濫情的空間。同時，這道社會的約束力，也讓日本政治人物在被掀開遮羞布之後，必須負起該有的政治責任，不可能因人情世故而脫逃。
從豬瀨直樹的辭職看王金平的關說案，儼然形成強烈的對照。豬瀨在收賄事件爆發之初，曾辯稱是單純的朋友「借款」，同時也提出借據及簽名自清；但在輿論、東京都議會及特搜組的強大壓力下，豬瀨最後選擇辭職下台，以保住自己最後顏面。反觀王金平院長關說案，在國內媒體的理盲及民眾的濫情下，竟被無限上綱成馬政府的政治追殺，在野黨更搖旗吶喊助陣，嚴厲討伐偵辦關說的司法人員。由此可見，台灣的政治人物不但沒有罪感，更喪失了恥感。
簡言之，日本人雖然沒有「罪感」，但終究還保有「恥感」；日本雖然政治弊案層出不窮，但社會輿論的注視和約束卻成為最有力的一道防線。反觀台灣人的恥感，在濫情的人情世故糾纏下，扭曲不全；台灣社會的集體約束力，也在藍綠的政治對決下，蕩然無存。
有人說，十年前的日本就是現今的台灣寫照；但是，從政治人物的知所進退看，現今台灣就連這點恥感也看不到。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 26, 2013
Summary: The Japanese feel no sense of guilt. But at least they feel a sense of shame. Japan has been wracked by one political scandal after another. But public opinion and public vigilance provides a strong line of defense. On Taiwan, the people's sense of shame remains entangled with rank sentimentality. It is distorted and deficient. Whatever collective constraints Taiwan society might once have had, have evaporated amidst Blue vs. Green political struggles.
Full text below:
Tokyo Governor Naoki Inose is suspected of accepting 50 million yen in illegal campaign contributions from the Tokushukai medical group. Under intense public pressure, he announced his resignation. This is not the first time something like this has happened in Japan, nor will it be the last.
Japan has a culture that stresses shame, but not guilt. Guilt originates from within oneself. Heartfelt moral convictions constrain one's behavior. Shame, by contrast, is the result of pressure exerted by others. External forces constrain one's behavior. Over the years many Japanese politicians have accepted illegal campaign contributions. Buty they step down only after being shamed. For the Japanese, until others discover their wrongdoing, or until a wave of condemnation appears, they have not sinned. This is a characteristic peculiar to Japan's culture of shame.
Once the Japanese culture of shame asserts itself however, it is like opening Pandora's Box. Society then blows it up all out of proportion. The masses go into a collective trance. They hear the rumblings, and undergo mass induction into a shared faith resembling unspoken dogma. It is sublimated and transformed into collective social pressure.
Naoki Inose once hurried about amidst the dust and confusion of Tokyo. Even when his wife died he worked around the clock. He succeeded in his bid to become the Hero of Tokyo. His popularity among Japanese politicians was second only to that of Shinzo Abe. But the moment his bribery scandal erupted, everything changed overnight. He became Public Enemy Number One. People demaned that he be pilloried. The Japanese media demanded his resignation. The consensus was that every day Seto remained in office dishonored the Tokyo Olympics with the international community. This illustrates the Japanese peoples' exaggerated sense of shame. Their intense emphasis on shame, and cavalier indifference to friendship, is clear to see. This was the reason for Naoki Seto's rise, and it was also the reason for his fall. .
The Japanese feel an intense sense of shame. It is a reflection of Japanese society's collective social constraints. The Japanese are cavalier about personal friendships. They make fine legal distinctions. Japanese often talk about how someone's conduct violated a certain law. But they seldom complain about systemic injustices. The Japanese often talk about how someone broke a certain rule. They rarely condemn a referee for being selfish and heartless. This is why the Japanese can make such an startling about face, and not feel any guilt. This is why when the Japanese make such an abrupt about face, they need not concern themselves with matters of friendship.
Once a climate of shame has taken formed, the Japanese never give "venial sins" a free pass. For example, former Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara was another rising star in the Democratic Party. He accepted a measly 200,000 yen in political contributions from an ethnic Korean woman he had known for years. When discovered, he hastily resigned. The Japanese public expressed no regret over his fall from grace.
Once someone has crossed an invisible line within Japan's culture of shame, the Japanese will no compromise merely because he holds high office. For example Democratic Party Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was under pressure to resign for falsifying his list of political contributors. The prosecutor never actually indicted him. But the Japanese political stage no longer had a place for him. For Japanese politicians, political contributions are their daily bread and butter. But step across the line and one ends up like Naoki Seto.
As we can see, Japan's political game has its own set of rules. There is the law. There are also social constraints and public pressure. These let politicians know that in addition to obeying the law, they must also have high ethical standards. There is no room for sentimentality. These social constraints also let Japanese politicians know that once their fig leaf has been snatched away, they must bear the full weight of political responsibility. They cannot skate by on personal connections.
Compare Naoki Seto's case to Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling scandal. The contrast is stark. When Seto's bribery scandal first emerged, he argued that he "merely borrowed some money from a friend." He produced a signed IOU and considered himself cleared. But public opinion, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, and the Tokusou Group eventually forced Seto to resign to save face. Compare this to Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling scandal. The domestic media and the public wallowed in sentimentality. They spun the Ma government's prosecution of Wang's wrongdoing as "political persecution." The Pan Green opposition waved banners and shouted support. They went after the officials who investigated Wang's wrongdoing with a vengeance. As we can see, Taiwan's politicians lack any sense of guilt. They also lack any sense of shame.
In short, the Japanese feel no sense of guilt. But at least they feel a sense of shame. Japan has been wracked by one political scandal after another. But public opinion and public vigilance provides a strong line of defense. On Taiwan, the people's sense of shame remains entangled with rank sentimentality. It is distorted and deficient. Whatever collective constraints Taiwan society might once have had, have evaporated amidst Blue vs. Green political struggles.
Some say that Japan ten years ago reflects what Taiwan is today. But politicians should know when to hold and know when to fold. Today's Taiwan lacks even this iota of shame.
日本的恥感，台灣的無感
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.26 03:40 am
日本東京都知事豬瀨直樹，因涉嫌收受醫療團體「德州會」的五千萬日圓非法政治獻金，在強大輿論壓力下，宣布辭職下台。這在日本既非空前，也非絕後！
日本是一個講究「恥感」的民族，但不具有「罪感」的文化。「罪感」是來自本我的要求，發自內心的道德信仰來約束自己的行為；而「恥感」卻是來自他人的壓力，依靠外來強制的力量來約束自己的行為。這也難怪，長久以來，許多日本政治人物因為違法收受政治獻金，在「恥感」的催迫下紛紛被迫下台。對日本人來說，在不被外人發現之前，或者外界未出現譴責的聲浪時，都不能算是一種罪過，這是日本人恥感文化的特殊性。
然而，日本人的恥感一旦被掀開，就如同打開潘朵拉的盒子，就會被社會無限膨脹與放大。這像是一種集體催眠，在聽到和鳴的聲音之後，便會轉化成為共同的信仰；更像是一種無形的教條，在潛移默化下，便會轉化成集體的社會壓力。
先前，豬瀨直樹風塵僕僕為東京申奧奔忙，其間連妻子過世時都不眠不休，不僅成為東京申奧成功的最大英雄，更成為僅次於安倍的高人氣日本政治家。然而，在收賄事件爆發後，霎時有如豬羊變色，豬瀨如同過街的老鼠，人人喊打。日本輿論要求他下台的聲浪，如排山倒海而來，彷彿只要豬瀨繼續在任一天，便會使東京奧運在國際社會蒙羞。日本人對於恥感的無限上綱，於此可見一斑；日本人的重恥感、輕人情，更是有目共睹。對豬瀨直樹來說，可謂成也申奧，敗也申奧。
日本人的重恥感，來自於社會集體的約束力；而日本人的輕人情，來自於清楚的法律分際。我們看到，日本人通常會說誰的行為是不符合哪條法律，卻甚少抱怨制度不公不義；我們也看到，日本人會說誰違反哪一項規範，卻極少譴責裁判者自私不仁。這使得日本人能夠在這種極大的心態的轉換下，不會產生任何的陰影；這也使得日本人在這種急遽的行為轉變上，而不用背負任何的人情包袱。
一旦恥感形成了特定氛圍，日本絕對不會因為事屬「微罪」而輕輕放過。例如，前日本外務大臣、也是民主黨時期的明日之星前原誠司，便曾經收受家鄉相識多年的韓裔女性區區二十萬日圓的政治獻金，被發現後，便倉促宣告辭職下台，日本輿論界對他亦不表任何惋惜。
一旦犯行超越恥感的界線，日本也絕不會因為某人職位崇高，而有所妥協。例如，民主黨執政後的首任首相鳩山由紀夫，便曾因假造政治獻金名冊，而面臨辭職壓力；最後雖未被檢察官起訴，但日本政壇亦未作任何挽留。政治獻金無疑是日本政治人物的慣常遊戲，但稍有逾越卻成為豬瀨直樹致命的悲劇。
由此可見，在日本政治的遊戲規則中，除了法律，社會約束力以及輿論壓力仍是一道重要的防線。這種輿論壓力，讓政治人物在法律之外必須要以高道德標準來檢視自我，而沒有理盲濫情的空間。同時，這道社會的約束力，也讓日本政治人物在被掀開遮羞布之後，必須負起該有的政治責任，不可能因人情世故而脫逃。
從豬瀨直樹的辭職看王金平的關說案，儼然形成強烈的對照。豬瀨在收賄事件爆發之初，曾辯稱是單純的朋友「借款」，同時也提出借據及簽名自清；但在輿論、東京都議會及特搜組的強大壓力下，豬瀨最後選擇辭職下台，以保住自己最後顏面。反觀王金平院長關說案，在國內媒體的理盲及民眾的濫情下，竟被無限上綱成馬政府的政治追殺，在野黨更搖旗吶喊助陣，嚴厲討伐偵辦關說的司法人員。由此可見，台灣的政治人物不但沒有罪感，更喪失了恥感。
簡言之，日本人雖然沒有「罪感」，但終究還保有「恥感」；日本雖然政治弊案層出不窮，但社會輿論的注視和約束卻成為最有力的一道防線。反觀台灣人的恥感，在濫情的人情世故糾纏下，扭曲不全；台灣社會的集體約束力，也在藍綠的政治對決下，蕩然無存。
有人說，十年前的日本就是現今的台灣寫照；但是，從政治人物的知所進退看，現今台灣就連這點恥感也看不到。
Tuesday, December 24, 2013
Mystery of the Time Capsule: Is the Trade in Services Agreement a Gift?
Mystery of the Time Capsule:
Is the Trade in Services Agreement a Gift?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 25, 2013
Summary: The trade in services agreement has been sealed in a "time capsule." That is not merely a metaphor. It is an accurate description of reality. Have we not seen more and more of Taiwan being stuffed into time capsules, unable to change with the times while the outside world moves on? The trade in services agreement has become a cryogenically frozen frog. It has become a runaway experiment. The Legislative Yuan has turned the ROC into a nation without a direction. This has been true for years.
Full text below:
Has the cross-Strait trade in services agreement been consumed by fire within the legislature? One may be relieve to hear that it has not. The agreement lives. Over the past two days, the legislature has experienced major clashes over the agreement. KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung hoped to add the agreement to the Internal Affairs Committee agenda. This would allow the case to undergo substantive review tomorrow. But Green Camp legislators threatened to block approval of the central government budget. As a result, the Blue Camp Whip stepped forward and stopped Chang Ching-chung.
Members of the public hope the cross-Strait trade in services agreement can be revived. But they must not be overly optimistic. The frog's legs may still be twitching. It may survive. But it may be crippled for life. The frog is now more dead than alive. This apparently was the intention of both ruling and opposition party legislators. No one appears concerned about its survival.
The trade in services agreement has been stalled in the legislature for over six months. The supposedly sacred principle of "interparty consultation," means substantive review must be delayed until March 10 next year, when the DPP completes its last public hearing. In other words, it cannot be passed during the current session. Yesterday Blue Camp legislator Chang Ching-chung attempted to add it to the agenda. Alas, he found himself beseiged by both ruling and opposition party legislators: The TSU threatened a "bloody struggle." The DPP warned the Blue Camp not to view the trade in services agreement as a "souvenir" for MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi when he visits the Mainland in February of next year. Otherwise, they would set the Legislative Yuan ablaze. Wang Jin-pyng reiterated that unless the ruling and opposition parties reach an agreement, the bill will not be reviewed.
In effect, the trade in services agreement has been sealed in a Legislative Yuan "time capsule." The DPP resorts to delaying tactics in negotiations with the ruling KMT. The trade in services agreement may be a panacea or a poison. Either way it will remain in stasis until March of next year. After such a long delay, even assuming it is a panacea, it will not be able to save Taiwan. Conversely, even assuming it is a poison, it will not be able to harm Taiwan. The DPP claims that Wang Yu-chi would treat the agreement as a "souvenir." The DPP views national policy as private material assets. It even views them as "favors" one politician grants another. Such a mindset reflects the selfish nature of politics on Taiwan. It explains why the ruling and opposition parties are fighting over the trade in services agreement.
Whom does the trade in services agreement benefit the most? Beijing originally saw the cross-Strait trade in services agreement as a "concession" to Taipei, one that would benefit Taiwan. The Ma administration also stressed that the agreement was the result of Beijing's "concession." The two sides intentionally or otherwise characterized the agreement as a "gift." The Green Camp opposes anything having to do with the Mainland. Alas, spinning the agreement as a "gift" handed the Green Camp an excuse to relentlessly smear it and exaggerate its "hidden dangers." It enabled the Green Camp to inflame emotions within the service sector. As a result, the trade in services agreement became a "gift" to the opposition Green Camp parties. It gave them license to accuse the ruling party of "selling out Taiwan." What about the facts? What about all those public hearings? How many people give a damn?
Legislative Yuan inter-party consultation rules have turned the trade in services agreement into another kind of "gift." Wang Jin-pying has assumed the role of the Wise Peacemaker. The ruling and opposition parties agreed to hold sixteen public hearings. But they forget to stipulate when these public hearings must be concluded. This has enabled the DPP to drag the hearings out indefinitely. This has left the Ma administration anxiously wringing its hands. Wang Jin-pyng meanwhile, remains utterly indifferent. As he put it, "ruling and opposition party harmony above all." He firmly backed opposition DPP influence peddling. He froze the trade in services agreement. These too were "gifts" to the Green Camp from Wang Jin-pying.
Did Beijing in facdt offer a concession? Did the Ma administration fight for concessions and win them? Are the concessions a pretext for DPP obstructionism? Are they a tool for Wang Jin-pying to use in his political maneuvers? The fact is, all parties seee the trade in services agreement as a gift from heaven. What will happen when the time capsule is finally opened? The trade in services agreement will be birthed by the Legislative Yuan. Will it survive the eight months long "inter-party consultations?" Will it emerge unscathed from the bloodbath? It will not. The opposition Green Camp will resort to scorched earth tactics. The eight months of obstructionism may be filled with empty posturing. But in the end it will mean death. So why not begin the war now and get it over with? Why not use the time to debate it? Why waste eight months waiting for an inevitable massacre?
The answer is simple. These are politicians we are talking about. All they see is immediate gratification. That is all that matters. Peoples' valuable time, the nation's success or failure, the industrial sector's rise or fall mean nothing to them. The trade in services agreement most certainly was a gift. But the politicians have descended upon it like vultures. How much will be left for the people? What can one expect?
The trade in services agreement has been sealed in a "time capsule." That is not merely a metaphor. It is an accurate description of reality. Have we not seen more and more of Taiwan being stuffed into time capsules, unable to change with the times while the outside world moves on? The trade in services agreement has become a cryogenically frozen frog. It has become a runaway experiment. The Legislative Yuan has turned the ROC into a nation without a direction. This has been true for years.
時光膠囊之謎：服貿是誰的禮物？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.25 03:58 am
對於以為《兩岸服貿協議》已經命喪國會火場的民眾，這裡可以提供一點寬慰：並沒有！服貿協議一息尚存。這兩天，立法院仍在為此事大動干戈，國民黨立委張慶忠原有意將服貿案排入內政委員會議程，讓該案明天進入實質審查；但在綠營立委揚言杯葛中央政府總預算加以反制下，由藍營黨鞭出面將張慶忠擋下。
但是，對於以為《兩岸服貿協議》將有望起死回生的民眾，我們也要提醒：毋需過度樂觀！因為，僅雙腿仍在抽搐的青蛙，就算活得下來，大概也只剩半條命了。何況，把這隻青蛙弄到半死不活，似乎就是目前朝野立委最大的共識，沒人關切它存在的意義。
服貿協議已經在立法院躺了超過半年，依照「朝野協商」的神聖原則，須等到明年三月十日民進黨辦完最後一場公聽會，才可以進入實質審查程序。亦即，本會期已注定不可能過關。藍委張慶忠日昨試圖提早將它排入議程，竟遭朝野立委雙雙圍攻：台聯揚言不惜「流血抗爭」，民進黨則警告藍軍勿將服貿過關當成陸委會主委王郁琦明年二月登陸訪問的「伴手禮」，否則立院將烽火連天。王金平則繼續重申：朝野沒協商好，不可能審查。
簡單地說，服貿協議被封存在立法院的「時光膠囊」裡，由於民進黨在朝野協商中的拖延戰術運用，無論它是仙丹或是毒藥，明年三月中前都將維持原封不動。經過冗長的封存，即使是仙丹，它救不了台灣；如果是毒藥，它也害不了人。值得玩味的是，民進黨認為服貿過關可能變成王郁琦的「伴手禮」的想法，不僅把一項國家協議個人化、物質化，甚至想像為人際間的「小恩小惠」；這樣的思維，除頗能反映台灣政治由「私利」出發的態度，也解釋了朝野競相榨取服貿協議的心情。
服貿是誰的禮物？一開始，中國大陸將兩岸服貿協議的簽訂形容為「惠台」措施，馬政府對內則亦強調了這是北京對台「讓利」的結果，雙方即有意無意地渲染了這項「禮物」的遐思。然而，「讓利說」正好給了逢中必反的綠營一個扣帽子的藉口，不斷誇大其間可能潛藏的陰謀，並煽起一些民間業者的反對情緒。至此，服貿已搖身變成了反對黨的「禮物」，可以免費無限暢飲地攻擊執政黨存心「賣台」；至於事實如何，辦了那麼多場公聽會，又有多少人在乎？
不僅如此，在立院「朝野協商」的遊戲規則下，服貿協議又變質成另一種形式的「禮物」。在這個遊戲裡，王金平扮演和事佬恩主公，朝野同意辦十六場公聽會，卻忘了約束公聽會應該何時辦完；於是，民進黨可以將日子一天拖過一天，讓馬政府急得跳腳。對此，王金平無動於衷，他說「朝野和諧」最重要。對在野黨在關說案中的力挺，冷凍櫃裡的服貿協議，也算是王金平的一點小小心意吧。
不論是北京的讓利，是馬政府的爭取，是民進黨的杯葛工具，或是王金平的手段，總而言之，服貿協議被各方當成禮物送來送去；然而，當時光膠囊最後要拆封，服貿協議要通過立法院的產道降生時，能因為熬過八個月「朝野協商」而免去一場屠殺並順利問世嗎？絕無可能！因為，在野黨屆時若不焦土抗爭，就表示他們這八個月的杯葛完全是無理取鬧，假戲一場。那麼，既然終將難免一戰，為什麼不把開戰的進程推前，或者利用這段時間好好進行討論，卻要白白浪費八個月的時間等待一場勢所難免的屠殺？
答案很簡單，對政治人物而言，只有眼前可以點收並即時享用的禮物，才能算是進帳。至於人民的時間、國家的成敗、產業的興衰，率皆與他們無關。服貿協議當然是一項禮物，但經過政客層層沾手剝削，會留下多少殘渣供人民分享，你能期待嗎？
服貿協議被封存在「時光膠囊」，不只是一個隱喻，也是一種現實的描述。豈不見，近幾年，整個台灣已有越來越多部門都像是被裝進了時光膠囊，無法再隨外在世界的變化而移動，只能留在原地。服貿協議變成冷凍青蛙，只是一場失控的實驗；而立法院把台灣變成一個沒有目標的國家，則已經多年了。
Is the Trade in Services Agreement a Gift?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 25, 2013
Summary: The trade in services agreement has been sealed in a "time capsule." That is not merely a metaphor. It is an accurate description of reality. Have we not seen more and more of Taiwan being stuffed into time capsules, unable to change with the times while the outside world moves on? The trade in services agreement has become a cryogenically frozen frog. It has become a runaway experiment. The Legislative Yuan has turned the ROC into a nation without a direction. This has been true for years.
Full text below:
Has the cross-Strait trade in services agreement been consumed by fire within the legislature? One may be relieve to hear that it has not. The agreement lives. Over the past two days, the legislature has experienced major clashes over the agreement. KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung hoped to add the agreement to the Internal Affairs Committee agenda. This would allow the case to undergo substantive review tomorrow. But Green Camp legislators threatened to block approval of the central government budget. As a result, the Blue Camp Whip stepped forward and stopped Chang Ching-chung.
Members of the public hope the cross-Strait trade in services agreement can be revived. But they must not be overly optimistic. The frog's legs may still be twitching. It may survive. But it may be crippled for life. The frog is now more dead than alive. This apparently was the intention of both ruling and opposition party legislators. No one appears concerned about its survival.
The trade in services agreement has been stalled in the legislature for over six months. The supposedly sacred principle of "interparty consultation," means substantive review must be delayed until March 10 next year, when the DPP completes its last public hearing. In other words, it cannot be passed during the current session. Yesterday Blue Camp legislator Chang Ching-chung attempted to add it to the agenda. Alas, he found himself beseiged by both ruling and opposition party legislators: The TSU threatened a "bloody struggle." The DPP warned the Blue Camp not to view the trade in services agreement as a "souvenir" for MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi when he visits the Mainland in February of next year. Otherwise, they would set the Legislative Yuan ablaze. Wang Jin-pyng reiterated that unless the ruling and opposition parties reach an agreement, the bill will not be reviewed.
In effect, the trade in services agreement has been sealed in a Legislative Yuan "time capsule." The DPP resorts to delaying tactics in negotiations with the ruling KMT. The trade in services agreement may be a panacea or a poison. Either way it will remain in stasis until March of next year. After such a long delay, even assuming it is a panacea, it will not be able to save Taiwan. Conversely, even assuming it is a poison, it will not be able to harm Taiwan. The DPP claims that Wang Yu-chi would treat the agreement as a "souvenir." The DPP views national policy as private material assets. It even views them as "favors" one politician grants another. Such a mindset reflects the selfish nature of politics on Taiwan. It explains why the ruling and opposition parties are fighting over the trade in services agreement.
Whom does the trade in services agreement benefit the most? Beijing originally saw the cross-Strait trade in services agreement as a "concession" to Taipei, one that would benefit Taiwan. The Ma administration also stressed that the agreement was the result of Beijing's "concession." The two sides intentionally or otherwise characterized the agreement as a "gift." The Green Camp opposes anything having to do with the Mainland. Alas, spinning the agreement as a "gift" handed the Green Camp an excuse to relentlessly smear it and exaggerate its "hidden dangers." It enabled the Green Camp to inflame emotions within the service sector. As a result, the trade in services agreement became a "gift" to the opposition Green Camp parties. It gave them license to accuse the ruling party of "selling out Taiwan." What about the facts? What about all those public hearings? How many people give a damn?
Legislative Yuan inter-party consultation rules have turned the trade in services agreement into another kind of "gift." Wang Jin-pying has assumed the role of the Wise Peacemaker. The ruling and opposition parties agreed to hold sixteen public hearings. But they forget to stipulate when these public hearings must be concluded. This has enabled the DPP to drag the hearings out indefinitely. This has left the Ma administration anxiously wringing its hands. Wang Jin-pyng meanwhile, remains utterly indifferent. As he put it, "ruling and opposition party harmony above all." He firmly backed opposition DPP influence peddling. He froze the trade in services agreement. These too were "gifts" to the Green Camp from Wang Jin-pying.
Did Beijing in facdt offer a concession? Did the Ma administration fight for concessions and win them? Are the concessions a pretext for DPP obstructionism? Are they a tool for Wang Jin-pying to use in his political maneuvers? The fact is, all parties seee the trade in services agreement as a gift from heaven. What will happen when the time capsule is finally opened? The trade in services agreement will be birthed by the Legislative Yuan. Will it survive the eight months long "inter-party consultations?" Will it emerge unscathed from the bloodbath? It will not. The opposition Green Camp will resort to scorched earth tactics. The eight months of obstructionism may be filled with empty posturing. But in the end it will mean death. So why not begin the war now and get it over with? Why not use the time to debate it? Why waste eight months waiting for an inevitable massacre?
The answer is simple. These are politicians we are talking about. All they see is immediate gratification. That is all that matters. Peoples' valuable time, the nation's success or failure, the industrial sector's rise or fall mean nothing to them. The trade in services agreement most certainly was a gift. But the politicians have descended upon it like vultures. How much will be left for the people? What can one expect?
The trade in services agreement has been sealed in a "time capsule." That is not merely a metaphor. It is an accurate description of reality. Have we not seen more and more of Taiwan being stuffed into time capsules, unable to change with the times while the outside world moves on? The trade in services agreement has become a cryogenically frozen frog. It has become a runaway experiment. The Legislative Yuan has turned the ROC into a nation without a direction. This has been true for years.
時光膠囊之謎：服貿是誰的禮物？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.25 03:58 am
對於以為《兩岸服貿協議》已經命喪國會火場的民眾，這裡可以提供一點寬慰：並沒有！服貿協議一息尚存。這兩天，立法院仍在為此事大動干戈，國民黨立委張慶忠原有意將服貿案排入內政委員會議程，讓該案明天進入實質審查；但在綠營立委揚言杯葛中央政府總預算加以反制下，由藍營黨鞭出面將張慶忠擋下。
但是，對於以為《兩岸服貿協議》將有望起死回生的民眾，我們也要提醒：毋需過度樂觀！因為，僅雙腿仍在抽搐的青蛙，就算活得下來，大概也只剩半條命了。何況，把這隻青蛙弄到半死不活，似乎就是目前朝野立委最大的共識，沒人關切它存在的意義。
服貿協議已經在立法院躺了超過半年，依照「朝野協商」的神聖原則，須等到明年三月十日民進黨辦完最後一場公聽會，才可以進入實質審查程序。亦即，本會期已注定不可能過關。藍委張慶忠日昨試圖提早將它排入議程，竟遭朝野立委雙雙圍攻：台聯揚言不惜「流血抗爭」，民進黨則警告藍軍勿將服貿過關當成陸委會主委王郁琦明年二月登陸訪問的「伴手禮」，否則立院將烽火連天。王金平則繼續重申：朝野沒協商好，不可能審查。
簡單地說，服貿協議被封存在立法院的「時光膠囊」裡，由於民進黨在朝野協商中的拖延戰術運用，無論它是仙丹或是毒藥，明年三月中前都將維持原封不動。經過冗長的封存，即使是仙丹，它救不了台灣；如果是毒藥，它也害不了人。值得玩味的是，民進黨認為服貿過關可能變成王郁琦的「伴手禮」的想法，不僅把一項國家協議個人化、物質化，甚至想像為人際間的「小恩小惠」；這樣的思維，除頗能反映台灣政治由「私利」出發的態度，也解釋了朝野競相榨取服貿協議的心情。
服貿是誰的禮物？一開始，中國大陸將兩岸服貿協議的簽訂形容為「惠台」措施，馬政府對內則亦強調了這是北京對台「讓利」的結果，雙方即有意無意地渲染了這項「禮物」的遐思。然而，「讓利說」正好給了逢中必反的綠營一個扣帽子的藉口，不斷誇大其間可能潛藏的陰謀，並煽起一些民間業者的反對情緒。至此，服貿已搖身變成了反對黨的「禮物」，可以免費無限暢飲地攻擊執政黨存心「賣台」；至於事實如何，辦了那麼多場公聽會，又有多少人在乎？
不僅如此，在立院「朝野協商」的遊戲規則下，服貿協議又變質成另一種形式的「禮物」。在這個遊戲裡，王金平扮演和事佬恩主公，朝野同意辦十六場公聽會，卻忘了約束公聽會應該何時辦完；於是，民進黨可以將日子一天拖過一天，讓馬政府急得跳腳。對此，王金平無動於衷，他說「朝野和諧」最重要。對在野黨在關說案中的力挺，冷凍櫃裡的服貿協議，也算是王金平的一點小小心意吧。
不論是北京的讓利，是馬政府的爭取，是民進黨的杯葛工具，或是王金平的手段，總而言之，服貿協議被各方當成禮物送來送去；然而，當時光膠囊最後要拆封，服貿協議要通過立法院的產道降生時，能因為熬過八個月「朝野協商」而免去一場屠殺並順利問世嗎？絕無可能！因為，在野黨屆時若不焦土抗爭，就表示他們這八個月的杯葛完全是無理取鬧，假戲一場。那麼，既然終將難免一戰，為什麼不把開戰的進程推前，或者利用這段時間好好進行討論，卻要白白浪費八個月的時間等待一場勢所難免的屠殺？
答案很簡單，對政治人物而言，只有眼前可以點收並即時享用的禮物，才能算是進帳。至於人民的時間、國家的成敗、產業的興衰，率皆與他們無關。服貿協議當然是一項禮物，但經過政客層層沾手剝削，會留下多少殘渣供人民分享，你能期待嗎？
服貿協議被封存在「時光膠囊」，不只是一個隱喻，也是一種現實的描述。豈不見，近幾年，整個台灣已有越來越多部門都像是被裝進了時光膠囊，無法再隨外在世界的變化而移動，只能留在原地。服貿協議變成冷凍青蛙，只是一場失控的實驗；而立法院把台灣變成一個沒有目標的國家，則已經多年了。
Monday, December 23, 2013
Absurd Concept of "Government-Opposition Harmony"
Absurd Concept of "Government-Opposition Harmony"
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 24, 2013
Summary: The cross-Strait trade in services agreement has been long delayed. Recently reports emerged that the KMT legislative caucus would ask Internal Affairs Committee members to review the trade in services agreement, and would "fully mobilize to ensure its passage." But as soon as the news broke, the Green Camp lashed out. It said, "If [the KMT] insists on forcing the issue and reviewing the agreement, it will destroy government-opposition harmony, and probably lead to bloodshed!" The "harmony above all" concept may be the final straw that destroys Taiwan's chances of survival and prosperity.
Full text below:
The cross-Strait trade in services agreement has been long delayed. Recently reports emerged that because KMT Chairman Ma had "high expectations," the KMT legislative caucus would ask Internal Affairs Committee members to review the trade in services agreement, and would "fully mobilize to ensure its passage." But as soon as the news broke, the Green Camp lashed out. It said, "If [the KMT] insists on forcing the issue and reviewing the agreement, it will destroy government-opposition harmony, and probably lead to bloodshed!" DPP legislative caucus chief convener Ker Chien-ming declared that "We'll see whether they dare!"
Many initially assumed that the KMT legislative caucus had grown a spine. After all, President Ma Ying-jeou is genuinely concerned about the status of the trade in services agreement in the legislature. He has repeatedly expressed hope that it be passed before the current legislature adjourns. President Ma is deeply concerned about the trade in services agreement, but not because he is afraid of losing face. Nor is he bending to alleged "CCP pressure." He is concerned because the trade in services agreement is vital to Taiwan's regional economic integration. It bolsters Taiwan's competitiveness among the major economies of East Asia.
Alas, much thunder was followed by little rain. Two days later, the ruling and opposition legislative caucuses announced a compromise. They agreed to hold a final public hearing on March 10 of next year. Only then would the Internal Affairs Committee examine the agreement in detail. This confirmed that the agreement cannot even be reviewed during the current session.
Rumors emerged that the KMT was finally growing a spine. Hopes were that the trade in services agreement could be reviewed during the current session. But Wang Jin-pyng disagreed. He said "It is unlikely that it can go forward without talks. Ruling and opposition party harmony is important. Better that we coordinate first, and deal with it later." "Without coordination there will always be many problems." It is understandable that the Speaker of the Legislature would stress ruling and opposition harmony and public consultations. But should harmony really trump all else? That is debatable.
First, take party politics. The basic principle of party politics is that the majority party governs, while the minority party provides oversight. The ruling party does what it can to persuade people to support its policies. It courageously and resolutely promotes its policies. The opposition party provides oversight. It also offers policy alternatives and manpower. This helps it win future elections. This relationship between governing and oversight is fundamental to political competition, free expression, democratic decision-making, majority rule, and respect for the minority. There is, in truth, no room for the "harmony above all" concept. We are not advocating conflict. We are rejecting deceit. The "harmony above all" concept undermines party politics. It weakens the ability of those in power to promote its policies. It prevents legislative review and a vote on bills. It undermines the democratic principle of majority rule.
Secondly, examine the Legislative Yuan from a practical perspective. The ruling and opposition parties previously reached an agreement. But the trade in services agreement is subject to legislative review and approval. It should not be a package deal. Until it has been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan, the provisions must not take effect. The ruling and opposition parties consulted in August. They agreed that the Internal Affairs Committee would hold 16 public hearings. The agreement would then undergo detailed review. The DPP is adept at obstructionism. It exploits the KMT's foolish concessions and carelessness regarding the circumstances under which public hearings will be held. The DPP continues to delay public hearings.
Faced with DPP delaying tactics, Wang Jin-pyng said the DPP public hearing schedule is too piecemeal. He said he would coordinate with the DPP legislative caucus to advance the public hearing schedule and allow the agreement to undergo early review. Speaker of the Legislature Wang is ostensibly a man of his word. He is chummy with Green Camp legislators. But the so-called coordination never happened. Instead, under the rubric of "harmony" between the ruling and opposition parties, the agreement was delayed from one session to the next. The review cannot take place before mid-March next year. Nor does the uncertainty end there. Politics at home are troubled. We have no assurance the DPP will not raise new objections, invoke new excuses, and resort to new tactics to delay review of the trade in services agreement. Will this be the result of Speaker Wang's "harmony above all" concept?
In fact, those opposed to the agreement already have a new proposal. They are preparing to thwart all cross-strait economic and trade agreements, including the trade in services agreement. They are arguing that the legislature should first hammer out "cross-Strait agreement oversight regulations." and a "[Mainland] Chinese Investments in Taiwan Act." They also want to amend the Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Regulations, the Employment Services Act, and the Mergers and Acquisitions Law. They insist that until the relevant legal procedures have been completed, the trade in services agreement may not undergo review. They have concocted all manner of plausible pretexts, including the prior establishment of an employment safety net. In fact, they are merely erecting obstacles to cross-Strait exchanges. They are merely putting Mainland investments in a special category and stigmatizing them. They are merely attempting to suppress the development of cross-Strait economic and trade relations.
Many DPP legislators now echo this sentiment. The KMT is inept. The DPP is narrow minded. The "harmony above all" concept may be the final straw that destroys Taiwan's chances of survival and prosperity.
社論－荒唐的朝野和諧至上論
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月24日 04:10
跟隨 @tw_chinatimes
關於千呼萬喚出不來的兩岸服貿協議，最近又有了幾則新聞。首先，媒體報導，在國民黨馬主席的「高度期許」下，國民黨立院黨團一度宣稱將要在內政委員會安排審查兩岸服務貿易協議，同時會「全力動員，務必拚過關」。消息一出，綠營立刻強烈反應，表示「若硬闖、硬審，撕裂朝野決議，恐上演流血事件！」民進黨團總召柯建銘更是嗆聲，聲言「那就看他們敢不敢排！」
原本，不少人還誤以為國民黨團真的硬了起來，畢竟，馬英九總統十分在意服貿協議的審查進度，更多次表達盼能在立法院本會期結束前通過。馬總統重視服貿協議的問題，恐怕不是因為面子問題，也不是在野黨所說的「中共施壓」，其根本原因還在於服貿協議對台灣加入經濟區域整合相當重要，對於維持、強化台灣與東亞各大經濟體的競爭態勢也有很大幫助。
只不過，雷聲大、雨點小，所謂國民黨「硬闖」的新聞傳出沒兩天，立法院朝野協商就傳出國民黨再度妥協的消息，根據協商結果，要到明年3月10日前辦完最後一場公聽會後，內政委員會才能安排服貿協議的實質審查，確定服貿協議本會期連進入實質審查都不可得。
在傳出國民黨準備「硬起來」，希望在本會期開始審查服貿協議時，立法院長王金平則表達了不同意的態度，他表示「不太可能沒談好就進行，朝野和諧很重要，應盡量協調再處理較好」，「沒協調好就處理總是問題多多」。身為國會議長，重視朝野協商的共識，重視朝野的和諧，當然可以理解，問題是，這樣的「和諧至上論」是否成立，是否不容質疑，還有很大的討論空間。
首先，從政黨政治的原理來看，政黨政治的基本原則是多數黨執政，少數黨監督，執政者就是要窮盡各種辦法，讓民眾支持其政策，同時也要勇敢的、堅定的推動政策，而監督者除了善盡監督之責外，也要提出政策對案和儲備人才，以便在未來的選舉中求取勝利，爭取執政。在這種執政與監督的關係中，本質是政黨競爭、自由討論、民主決策，少數服從多數，多數尊重少數，至於所謂的「和諧至上論」其實不應有存在的空間，這不是鼓吹衝突，而是不該用虛假的、違反政黨政治原理的朝野和諧論，來削弱執政者的政策推動權，來牽制國會的法案審查與表決，來否定多數決的基本民主原理。
其次，從立法院的實際運作來看，固然先前朝野協商的結果，服貿協議須在立法院逐條審查、表決，不得全案包裹表決，同時非經立法院實質審查通過，不得啟動生效條款。另一方面，8月立法院朝野協商的結果則是需先於內政委員會召開16場公聽會後，服貿方可進入實質審查。善於議事杯葛的民進黨，就利用國民黨愚蠢讓步、又粗心大意未明定公聽會舉辦期限的情況下，不斷拖延公聽會的舉辦。
面對民進黨的拖延戰術，王金平院長自己都曾表示，民進黨排定公聽會時程過於零散，他將與民進黨立院黨團協調縮短公聽會排程，讓服貿協議及早審查。以王院長在立法院一言九鼎的地位、又與眾多綠營立委交情匪淺的情況下，所謂的協調竟然完全未能發生任何作用，反而是在朝野和諧的大帽子下，任由服貿協議一個會期拖過一個會期，最快要到明年3月中才能進入審查。更充滿不確定因素的是，以國內政壇如今處於多事之秋的局面，難保民進黨屆時不會再以新的議題、新的藉口、新的戰術來拖延服貿審查。難道，這就是王院長力主「和諧至上論」的結局嗎？
事實上，打著反服貿旗幟的團體已經提出新的主張，準備釜底抽薪來阻撓包括服貿在內的所有兩岸經貿協議，他們主張國會應先制訂「兩岸協議簽訂與監督條例」和「中資來台投資條例」，還要著手修改《華僑及外人投資條例》、《就業服務法》、《企業併購法》等等法案，而宣稱在未完備相關法制前，服貿協議不應進入審議程序。他們拿出建構就業安全網等美好的理由，實際上是要搭設重重障礙，將兩岸關係、大陸投資等徹底「特殊化」、「汙名化」，企圖箝制兩岸經貿關係的發展。
目前已經不少民進黨立委呼應這樣的主張，面對如此束手無策的國民黨和心態偏狹的民進黨，所謂的「朝野和諧至上論」難道不是拖垮台灣生存發展機會的最後一根稻草嗎！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 24, 2013
Summary: The cross-Strait trade in services agreement has been long delayed. Recently reports emerged that the KMT legislative caucus would ask Internal Affairs Committee members to review the trade in services agreement, and would "fully mobilize to ensure its passage." But as soon as the news broke, the Green Camp lashed out. It said, "If [the KMT] insists on forcing the issue and reviewing the agreement, it will destroy government-opposition harmony, and probably lead to bloodshed!" The "harmony above all" concept may be the final straw that destroys Taiwan's chances of survival and prosperity.
Full text below:
The cross-Strait trade in services agreement has been long delayed. Recently reports emerged that because KMT Chairman Ma had "high expectations," the KMT legislative caucus would ask Internal Affairs Committee members to review the trade in services agreement, and would "fully mobilize to ensure its passage." But as soon as the news broke, the Green Camp lashed out. It said, "If [the KMT] insists on forcing the issue and reviewing the agreement, it will destroy government-opposition harmony, and probably lead to bloodshed!" DPP legislative caucus chief convener Ker Chien-ming declared that "We'll see whether they dare!"
Many initially assumed that the KMT legislative caucus had grown a spine. After all, President Ma Ying-jeou is genuinely concerned about the status of the trade in services agreement in the legislature. He has repeatedly expressed hope that it be passed before the current legislature adjourns. President Ma is deeply concerned about the trade in services agreement, but not because he is afraid of losing face. Nor is he bending to alleged "CCP pressure." He is concerned because the trade in services agreement is vital to Taiwan's regional economic integration. It bolsters Taiwan's competitiveness among the major economies of East Asia.
Alas, much thunder was followed by little rain. Two days later, the ruling and opposition legislative caucuses announced a compromise. They agreed to hold a final public hearing on March 10 of next year. Only then would the Internal Affairs Committee examine the agreement in detail. This confirmed that the agreement cannot even be reviewed during the current session.
Rumors emerged that the KMT was finally growing a spine. Hopes were that the trade in services agreement could be reviewed during the current session. But Wang Jin-pyng disagreed. He said "It is unlikely that it can go forward without talks. Ruling and opposition party harmony is important. Better that we coordinate first, and deal with it later." "Without coordination there will always be many problems." It is understandable that the Speaker of the Legislature would stress ruling and opposition harmony and public consultations. But should harmony really trump all else? That is debatable.
First, take party politics. The basic principle of party politics is that the majority party governs, while the minority party provides oversight. The ruling party does what it can to persuade people to support its policies. It courageously and resolutely promotes its policies. The opposition party provides oversight. It also offers policy alternatives and manpower. This helps it win future elections. This relationship between governing and oversight is fundamental to political competition, free expression, democratic decision-making, majority rule, and respect for the minority. There is, in truth, no room for the "harmony above all" concept. We are not advocating conflict. We are rejecting deceit. The "harmony above all" concept undermines party politics. It weakens the ability of those in power to promote its policies. It prevents legislative review and a vote on bills. It undermines the democratic principle of majority rule.
Secondly, examine the Legislative Yuan from a practical perspective. The ruling and opposition parties previously reached an agreement. But the trade in services agreement is subject to legislative review and approval. It should not be a package deal. Until it has been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan, the provisions must not take effect. The ruling and opposition parties consulted in August. They agreed that the Internal Affairs Committee would hold 16 public hearings. The agreement would then undergo detailed review. The DPP is adept at obstructionism. It exploits the KMT's foolish concessions and carelessness regarding the circumstances under which public hearings will be held. The DPP continues to delay public hearings.
Faced with DPP delaying tactics, Wang Jin-pyng said the DPP public hearing schedule is too piecemeal. He said he would coordinate with the DPP legislative caucus to advance the public hearing schedule and allow the agreement to undergo early review. Speaker of the Legislature Wang is ostensibly a man of his word. He is chummy with Green Camp legislators. But the so-called coordination never happened. Instead, under the rubric of "harmony" between the ruling and opposition parties, the agreement was delayed from one session to the next. The review cannot take place before mid-March next year. Nor does the uncertainty end there. Politics at home are troubled. We have no assurance the DPP will not raise new objections, invoke new excuses, and resort to new tactics to delay review of the trade in services agreement. Will this be the result of Speaker Wang's "harmony above all" concept?
In fact, those opposed to the agreement already have a new proposal. They are preparing to thwart all cross-strait economic and trade agreements, including the trade in services agreement. They are arguing that the legislature should first hammer out "cross-Strait agreement oversight regulations." and a "[Mainland] Chinese Investments in Taiwan Act." They also want to amend the Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Regulations, the Employment Services Act, and the Mergers and Acquisitions Law. They insist that until the relevant legal procedures have been completed, the trade in services agreement may not undergo review. They have concocted all manner of plausible pretexts, including the prior establishment of an employment safety net. In fact, they are merely erecting obstacles to cross-Strait exchanges. They are merely putting Mainland investments in a special category and stigmatizing them. They are merely attempting to suppress the development of cross-Strait economic and trade relations.
Many DPP legislators now echo this sentiment. The KMT is inept. The DPP is narrow minded. The "harmony above all" concept may be the final straw that destroys Taiwan's chances of survival and prosperity.
社論－荒唐的朝野和諧至上論
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月24日 04:10
跟隨 @tw_chinatimes
關於千呼萬喚出不來的兩岸服貿協議，最近又有了幾則新聞。首先，媒體報導，在國民黨馬主席的「高度期許」下，國民黨立院黨團一度宣稱將要在內政委員會安排審查兩岸服務貿易協議，同時會「全力動員，務必拚過關」。消息一出，綠營立刻強烈反應，表示「若硬闖、硬審，撕裂朝野決議，恐上演流血事件！」民進黨團總召柯建銘更是嗆聲，聲言「那就看他們敢不敢排！」
原本，不少人還誤以為國民黨團真的硬了起來，畢竟，馬英九總統十分在意服貿協議的審查進度，更多次表達盼能在立法院本會期結束前通過。馬總統重視服貿協議的問題，恐怕不是因為面子問題，也不是在野黨所說的「中共施壓」，其根本原因還在於服貿協議對台灣加入經濟區域整合相當重要，對於維持、強化台灣與東亞各大經濟體的競爭態勢也有很大幫助。
只不過，雷聲大、雨點小，所謂國民黨「硬闖」的新聞傳出沒兩天，立法院朝野協商就傳出國民黨再度妥協的消息，根據協商結果，要到明年3月10日前辦完最後一場公聽會後，內政委員會才能安排服貿協議的實質審查，確定服貿協議本會期連進入實質審查都不可得。
在傳出國民黨準備「硬起來」，希望在本會期開始審查服貿協議時，立法院長王金平則表達了不同意的態度，他表示「不太可能沒談好就進行，朝野和諧很重要，應盡量協調再處理較好」，「沒協調好就處理總是問題多多」。身為國會議長，重視朝野協商的共識，重視朝野的和諧，當然可以理解，問題是，這樣的「和諧至上論」是否成立，是否不容質疑，還有很大的討論空間。
首先，從政黨政治的原理來看，政黨政治的基本原則是多數黨執政，少數黨監督，執政者就是要窮盡各種辦法，讓民眾支持其政策，同時也要勇敢的、堅定的推動政策，而監督者除了善盡監督之責外，也要提出政策對案和儲備人才，以便在未來的選舉中求取勝利，爭取執政。在這種執政與監督的關係中，本質是政黨競爭、自由討論、民主決策，少數服從多數，多數尊重少數，至於所謂的「和諧至上論」其實不應有存在的空間，這不是鼓吹衝突，而是不該用虛假的、違反政黨政治原理的朝野和諧論，來削弱執政者的政策推動權，來牽制國會的法案審查與表決，來否定多數決的基本民主原理。
其次，從立法院的實際運作來看，固然先前朝野協商的結果，服貿協議須在立法院逐條審查、表決，不得全案包裹表決，同時非經立法院實質審查通過，不得啟動生效條款。另一方面，8月立法院朝野協商的結果則是需先於內政委員會召開16場公聽會後，服貿方可進入實質審查。善於議事杯葛的民進黨，就利用國民黨愚蠢讓步、又粗心大意未明定公聽會舉辦期限的情況下，不斷拖延公聽會的舉辦。
面對民進黨的拖延戰術，王金平院長自己都曾表示，民進黨排定公聽會時程過於零散，他將與民進黨立院黨團協調縮短公聽會排程，讓服貿協議及早審查。以王院長在立法院一言九鼎的地位、又與眾多綠營立委交情匪淺的情況下，所謂的協調竟然完全未能發生任何作用，反而是在朝野和諧的大帽子下，任由服貿協議一個會期拖過一個會期，最快要到明年3月中才能進入審查。更充滿不確定因素的是，以國內政壇如今處於多事之秋的局面，難保民進黨屆時不會再以新的議題、新的藉口、新的戰術來拖延服貿審查。難道，這就是王院長力主「和諧至上論」的結局嗎？
事實上，打著反服貿旗幟的團體已經提出新的主張，準備釜底抽薪來阻撓包括服貿在內的所有兩岸經貿協議，他們主張國會應先制訂「兩岸協議簽訂與監督條例」和「中資來台投資條例」，還要著手修改《華僑及外人投資條例》、《就業服務法》、《企業併購法》等等法案，而宣稱在未完備相關法制前，服貿協議不應進入審議程序。他們拿出建構就業安全網等美好的理由，實際上是要搭設重重障礙，將兩岸關係、大陸投資等徹底「特殊化」、「汙名化」，企圖箝制兩岸經貿關係的發展。
目前已經不少民進黨立委呼應這樣的主張，面對如此束手無策的國民黨和心態偏狹的民進黨，所謂的「朝野和諧至上論」難道不是拖垮台灣生存發展機會的最後一根稻草嗎！
Sunday, December 22, 2013
Ideological Inflexibility Means Economic Suffocation
Ideological Inflexibility Means Economic Suffocation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 20, 2013
Summary: Taiwan's economy has long been suffocated. It must not become the victim of DPP ideology. The business community and the general public are interested in Taiwan's future. They must speak up. The political deadlock must be broken.
Full text below:
The trade in services agreement has been stalled in the legislature for six months. The Blue and Green camps have resumed fighting. The KMT hopes to reach an agreement before the legislature adjourns in January. It hopes to pave the way for other cross-Strait economic and trade agreements. But the trade in services agreement has gradually become an ideological war. The Blue Camp wants to convene an emergency session and pass it. Chaos may be inevitable. Sure enough, in the end the KMT legislative caucus withdrew. Everything has now returned to square one.
President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly said he wants the Legislative Yuan to pass the trade in services agreement, as soon as possible. But the legislature is about to adjourn. The KMT legislative caucus intended to hold an internal affairs committee review this week. But the Green Camp got wind of this and voiced strong objections. DPP Policy Committee Chief Joseph Wu warned the KMT not to misjudge the situation, and not to underestimate DPP determination. He accused Ma Ying-jeou of being too eager to pass the trade in services agreement. He accused the KMT legislative caucus of destroying the results of interparty consultation. He demanded to know what the urgency was.
Consider the Blue and Green camp approaches to dialogue and rhetoric. The two camps have are fundamentally different goals and motivations. Expecting the ruling and opposition parties to reach a compromise on the trade in services agreement is a pipe dream.
The Blue Camp is in a hurry to pass the trade in services agreement, primarily for economic motives. It hopes to introduce Mainland capital into Taiwan and to help Taiwan's service sector break into the Mainland market. Taiwan's service sector investment environment is deteriorating year by year. For years no major investments have been made. Introducing large inflows of Mainland capital will not be easy. Introducing capital from Mainland based SMEs to Taiwan can be another source of Mainland capital.
The Green Camp does not care about this. As they see it, large inflows of Mainland capital will eat away at local Taiwan service industries. The market will gradually be turned over to Mainland capital. That is why Joseph Wu stresses the need to "safeguard Taiwan's industrial and labor employment rights." The DPP insists that its concern is the middle and lower classes. The DPP also claims that the cross-Strait trade in services agreement is an unequal agreement. It compares it to the "unequal treaties" and alleges that Taiwan simply cannot withstand the invasion of Mainland capital.
Behind all these economic rationales of course, lie politically motivated partisan and election interests. The Blue and Green camps each have their own spin on the matter. They show no sign of willingness to compromise. The trade in services agreement has become an ideological dispute. The battlefield may gradually expand from the legislature to the streets. The two sides have less and less room for compromise.
Consider a more rational point of view. Grassroots level service industries on Taiwan probably cannot be persuaded that the trade in services agreement will not harm them, and that their impact will be limited. Mainland businesses have the opportunity to invest anywhere in the world. Taiwan's investment environment is not necessarily their best option. Moreover, Taiwan's investment environment is deteriorating. In the end, how much attraction will it actually have for Mainland capital? People probably have a pretty good idea.
Late last year the Mainland's CCTV network broadcast the "Wenzhou Family" TV series. Li Li-chun from Taiwan was cast in the lead. The series depicted the father of a family who goes to northern Shaanxi to drill for oil. The son goes to Heilongjiang to sell eyeglasses. The daughter goes to Italy to open a garment factory. This may be a fiction, but it underscores the Mainland's rapid economic growth. It highlights the many opportunities to make one's fortune. A single family does not put all its economic eggs in one basket. Over the past 30 years, the Mainland has maintained an annual growth rate of approximately 10%. This year it is undergoing economic transition. Justin Yifu Lin is a former vice president of the World Bank. Lin estimates that the Mainland will continue to grow rapidly for at least 20 more years. The Mainland is growing rapidly. Taiwan's protected grassroots level service industries are non-competitive. It would be better to open the sector up to both Mainland capital and Mainland personnel. Doing so would enhance Taiwan's economic competitiveness.
A little more market opening and a little less protectionism. would make Taiwan an investment haven. An Academia Sinica report clearly pointed this out. Taiwan's problem is that it has too much private capital and no place to invest it. Funds go into real estate speculation or into the bank as savings. This is why Taiwan's investment environment now trails the other Asian Tigers.
The DPP is using protectionism to thwart Mainland investment in Taiwan. It is denying Taiwan's service industries the opportunity to expand into the Mainland market. Does this really help Taiwan? Or does it hinder it? The DPP has many economic experts. They should to be able to conduct a rational analysis. The DPP must not allow ideology to determine cross-Strait economic policy. That is not what responsible political parties do.
Taiwan's economy has long been suffocated. It must not become the victim of DPP ideology. The business community and the general public are interested in Taiwan's future. They must speak up. The political deadlock must be broken.
社論－解開服貿協議死結 系列一 意識型態打結 台灣經濟更悶
2013-12-23 01:26
中國時報
【本報訊】
在立法院躺了半年的《服貿協議》，藍綠雙方又開始叫戰，國民黨希望在立法院一月份休會前能有一個好的結果，為後續兩岸其他經貿談判打開活路。但是服貿協議已經逐漸變成意識型態的戰爭，藍營想在臨時會中通過，恐怕難免一場亂局，最後立法院國民黨團果然退縮，一切重回原點。
馬英九總統多次表態希望立法院盡速審查通過兩岸服貿協議，但是立法院本會期已經進入尾聲，國民黨團原本有意安排本周在內政委員會進入審查，綠營聽聞消息後表示強烈反對，民進黨政策會執行長吳釗燮警告國民黨，不要誤判情勢，低估民進黨的決心。他甚至質疑馬英九為了急於通過服貿協議，訓令國民黨立院黨團撕毀朝野協商結論，到底在急什麼？
從藍綠雙方的對話與議題操作手法，可以看出雙方的著重點與動機根本不同，想透過朝野協商來解決服貿協議的困局，根本是緣木求魚。
藍營急著讓服貿協議過關，主要出於經濟動機，希望把大陸資金活水引進台灣，同時把台灣服務業優勢帶進大陸。但台灣投資環境逐年惡化，多年已無大型投資案，要引進大陸大型資金並不容易，能引進大陸的中小型企業資金進入台灣，也可以成為大陸資金的活水。
但是綠營最擔心的就在此，他們認為，如果大量的陸資進入台灣，會吃盡台灣基層服務業的地盤，慢慢把市場讓出給陸資。所以，吳釗燮強調要「守護台灣產業及勞工就業權益」，民進黨堅持站在關懷中下層民眾最重要的市場，民進黨也認為，服貿協議兩岸所開放的項目並不對等，類似「不平等條約」，台灣根本抵擋不住陸資的侵蝕。
當然這一切經濟理由的背後，還充滿對國共兩黨政治動機的懷疑與選舉政治利益的盤算。藍綠雙方各有說詞，而且都沒有讓步的跡象下，兩岸服貿協議已經變成雙方的意識型態之爭，隨戰場可能漸漸從立法院擴散到街頭，使得雙方協商的空間越來越小。
其實，如果從一個比較理性的選擇來看，儘管不能說服貿協議不會影響台灣的基層服務業，但衝擊其實非常有限。大陸企業能到世界各地投資的機會多得是，台灣的投資環境，不一定會是他們最好選擇。何況台灣的投資環境每下愈況，到底對陸資還有多少吸引力，大家心裡應該有數。
去年底由大陸中央電視台所播放的《溫州一家人》電視連續劇，在台灣演員李立群領銜主演下，描寫這一家人父親到陝北挖石油，男孩到黑龍江賣眼鏡，女兒則到義大利開服裝工廠，雖然這只是一部虛構的電視劇，但也顯現經濟快速成長的大陸，發財機會非常多，同一家人都不會把家人放到同樣一個籃子裡。過去30年，大陸每年經濟成長率大致都可以維持10％，今年開始進入經濟轉型期，世界銀行前副總裁林毅夫估計，中國至少將維持20年的中速成長。面對快速成長的中國，台灣與其保護競爭力不足的低階服務業，不如開放包括大陸在內的全球資金與人才進入，提升經濟競爭力。
多一點開放，少一點阻撓，台灣才會變成投資天堂。中研院經濟所的一份報告中明顯指出，台灣經濟的問題是民間資金太多，卻找不到可以投資項目，資金不是去炒房地產，就是放在銀行當成儲蓄資金，這也是台灣投資環境越來越居於4小龍之末的緣故。
民進黨使用「保護主義」的想法阻撓陸資來台，更阻擾服務業進入大陸成長中大市場的機會，到底對台灣是加分，還是減分，民進黨那麼多經濟專家，應該可以做出合理的分析，民進黨不應該把兩岸經貿行為意識型態化，這絕對不是一個負責任的政黨所該做的。
台灣經濟已經很悶了，不能再讓民進黨的意識形態困住台灣，企業界及關心台灣經濟前途的大眾，要勇於發聲，這個政治死結一定要打開。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 20, 2013
Summary: Taiwan's economy has long been suffocated. It must not become the victim of DPP ideology. The business community and the general public are interested in Taiwan's future. They must speak up. The political deadlock must be broken.
Full text below:
The trade in services agreement has been stalled in the legislature for six months. The Blue and Green camps have resumed fighting. The KMT hopes to reach an agreement before the legislature adjourns in January. It hopes to pave the way for other cross-Strait economic and trade agreements. But the trade in services agreement has gradually become an ideological war. The Blue Camp wants to convene an emergency session and pass it. Chaos may be inevitable. Sure enough, in the end the KMT legislative caucus withdrew. Everything has now returned to square one.
President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly said he wants the Legislative Yuan to pass the trade in services agreement, as soon as possible. But the legislature is about to adjourn. The KMT legislative caucus intended to hold an internal affairs committee review this week. But the Green Camp got wind of this and voiced strong objections. DPP Policy Committee Chief Joseph Wu warned the KMT not to misjudge the situation, and not to underestimate DPP determination. He accused Ma Ying-jeou of being too eager to pass the trade in services agreement. He accused the KMT legislative caucus of destroying the results of interparty consultation. He demanded to know what the urgency was.
Consider the Blue and Green camp approaches to dialogue and rhetoric. The two camps have are fundamentally different goals and motivations. Expecting the ruling and opposition parties to reach a compromise on the trade in services agreement is a pipe dream.
The Blue Camp is in a hurry to pass the trade in services agreement, primarily for economic motives. It hopes to introduce Mainland capital into Taiwan and to help Taiwan's service sector break into the Mainland market. Taiwan's service sector investment environment is deteriorating year by year. For years no major investments have been made. Introducing large inflows of Mainland capital will not be easy. Introducing capital from Mainland based SMEs to Taiwan can be another source of Mainland capital.
The Green Camp does not care about this. As they see it, large inflows of Mainland capital will eat away at local Taiwan service industries. The market will gradually be turned over to Mainland capital. That is why Joseph Wu stresses the need to "safeguard Taiwan's industrial and labor employment rights." The DPP insists that its concern is the middle and lower classes. The DPP also claims that the cross-Strait trade in services agreement is an unequal agreement. It compares it to the "unequal treaties" and alleges that Taiwan simply cannot withstand the invasion of Mainland capital.
Behind all these economic rationales of course, lie politically motivated partisan and election interests. The Blue and Green camps each have their own spin on the matter. They show no sign of willingness to compromise. The trade in services agreement has become an ideological dispute. The battlefield may gradually expand from the legislature to the streets. The two sides have less and less room for compromise.
Consider a more rational point of view. Grassroots level service industries on Taiwan probably cannot be persuaded that the trade in services agreement will not harm them, and that their impact will be limited. Mainland businesses have the opportunity to invest anywhere in the world. Taiwan's investment environment is not necessarily their best option. Moreover, Taiwan's investment environment is deteriorating. In the end, how much attraction will it actually have for Mainland capital? People probably have a pretty good idea.
Late last year the Mainland's CCTV network broadcast the "Wenzhou Family" TV series. Li Li-chun from Taiwan was cast in the lead. The series depicted the father of a family who goes to northern Shaanxi to drill for oil. The son goes to Heilongjiang to sell eyeglasses. The daughter goes to Italy to open a garment factory. This may be a fiction, but it underscores the Mainland's rapid economic growth. It highlights the many opportunities to make one's fortune. A single family does not put all its economic eggs in one basket. Over the past 30 years, the Mainland has maintained an annual growth rate of approximately 10%. This year it is undergoing economic transition. Justin Yifu Lin is a former vice president of the World Bank. Lin estimates that the Mainland will continue to grow rapidly for at least 20 more years. The Mainland is growing rapidly. Taiwan's protected grassroots level service industries are non-competitive. It would be better to open the sector up to both Mainland capital and Mainland personnel. Doing so would enhance Taiwan's economic competitiveness.
A little more market opening and a little less protectionism. would make Taiwan an investment haven. An Academia Sinica report clearly pointed this out. Taiwan's problem is that it has too much private capital and no place to invest it. Funds go into real estate speculation or into the bank as savings. This is why Taiwan's investment environment now trails the other Asian Tigers.
The DPP is using protectionism to thwart Mainland investment in Taiwan. It is denying Taiwan's service industries the opportunity to expand into the Mainland market. Does this really help Taiwan? Or does it hinder it? The DPP has many economic experts. They should to be able to conduct a rational analysis. The DPP must not allow ideology to determine cross-Strait economic policy. That is not what responsible political parties do.
Taiwan's economy has long been suffocated. It must not become the victim of DPP ideology. The business community and the general public are interested in Taiwan's future. They must speak up. The political deadlock must be broken.
社論－解開服貿協議死結 系列一 意識型態打結 台灣經濟更悶
2013-12-23 01:26
中國時報
【本報訊】
在立法院躺了半年的《服貿協議》，藍綠雙方又開始叫戰，國民黨希望在立法院一月份休會前能有一個好的結果，為後續兩岸其他經貿談判打開活路。但是服貿協議已經逐漸變成意識型態的戰爭，藍營想在臨時會中通過，恐怕難免一場亂局，最後立法院國民黨團果然退縮，一切重回原點。
馬英九總統多次表態希望立法院盡速審查通過兩岸服貿協議，但是立法院本會期已經進入尾聲，國民黨團原本有意安排本周在內政委員會進入審查，綠營聽聞消息後表示強烈反對，民進黨政策會執行長吳釗燮警告國民黨，不要誤判情勢，低估民進黨的決心。他甚至質疑馬英九為了急於通過服貿協議，訓令國民黨立院黨團撕毀朝野協商結論，到底在急什麼？
從藍綠雙方的對話與議題操作手法，可以看出雙方的著重點與動機根本不同，想透過朝野協商來解決服貿協議的困局，根本是緣木求魚。
藍營急著讓服貿協議過關，主要出於經濟動機，希望把大陸資金活水引進台灣，同時把台灣服務業優勢帶進大陸。但台灣投資環境逐年惡化，多年已無大型投資案，要引進大陸大型資金並不容易，能引進大陸的中小型企業資金進入台灣，也可以成為大陸資金的活水。
但是綠營最擔心的就在此，他們認為，如果大量的陸資進入台灣，會吃盡台灣基層服務業的地盤，慢慢把市場讓出給陸資。所以，吳釗燮強調要「守護台灣產業及勞工就業權益」，民進黨堅持站在關懷中下層民眾最重要的市場，民進黨也認為，服貿協議兩岸所開放的項目並不對等，類似「不平等條約」，台灣根本抵擋不住陸資的侵蝕。
當然這一切經濟理由的背後，還充滿對國共兩黨政治動機的懷疑與選舉政治利益的盤算。藍綠雙方各有說詞，而且都沒有讓步的跡象下，兩岸服貿協議已經變成雙方的意識型態之爭，隨戰場可能漸漸從立法院擴散到街頭，使得雙方協商的空間越來越小。
其實，如果從一個比較理性的選擇來看，儘管不能說服貿協議不會影響台灣的基層服務業，但衝擊其實非常有限。大陸企業能到世界各地投資的機會多得是，台灣的投資環境，不一定會是他們最好選擇。何況台灣的投資環境每下愈況，到底對陸資還有多少吸引力，大家心裡應該有數。
去年底由大陸中央電視台所播放的《溫州一家人》電視連續劇，在台灣演員李立群領銜主演下，描寫這一家人父親到陝北挖石油，男孩到黑龍江賣眼鏡，女兒則到義大利開服裝工廠，雖然這只是一部虛構的電視劇，但也顯現經濟快速成長的大陸，發財機會非常多，同一家人都不會把家人放到同樣一個籃子裡。過去30年，大陸每年經濟成長率大致都可以維持10％，今年開始進入經濟轉型期，世界銀行前副總裁林毅夫估計，中國至少將維持20年的中速成長。面對快速成長的中國，台灣與其保護競爭力不足的低階服務業，不如開放包括大陸在內的全球資金與人才進入，提升經濟競爭力。
多一點開放，少一點阻撓，台灣才會變成投資天堂。中研院經濟所的一份報告中明顯指出，台灣經濟的問題是民間資金太多，卻找不到可以投資項目，資金不是去炒房地產，就是放在銀行當成儲蓄資金，這也是台灣投資環境越來越居於4小龍之末的緣故。
民進黨使用「保護主義」的想法阻撓陸資來台，更阻擾服務業進入大陸成長中大市場的機會，到底對台灣是加分，還是減分，民進黨那麼多經濟專家，應該可以做出合理的分析，民進黨不應該把兩岸經貿行為意識型態化，這絕對不是一個負責任的政黨所該做的。
台灣經濟已經很悶了，不能再讓民進黨的意識形態困住台灣，企業界及關心台灣經濟前途的大眾，要勇於發聲，這個政治死結一定要打開。
Thursday, December 19, 2013
Ko Wen-je: A Lion Agrees to be Caged
Ko Wen-je: A Lion Agrees to be Caged
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 20, 2013
Summary: For the DPP, Ko Wen-je did not represent a chance to win, but a model for reform. Alas, the DPP has missed the mark. Ko Wen-je had an opportunity to throw open the DPP's cages. Instead he chose to walk into them, shattering his "Ko Wen-je as lion" myth. for Taipei voters, Ko had an opportunity to rise above stereotypical Blue vs. Green conflict, to wage a different kind of election campaign. Now alas, everything has reverted to the same tired old form.
Full text below:
Ko Wen-je may not deserve to be perceived as a lion. The DPP may not deserve to be perceived as a cage. But in order to run in the Taipei Mayoral Election, Ko Wen-je has been forced to join the DPP. Malleable clay has been forced into a standardized Green mold. Ko has now lost his grass roots appeal as a non-partisan doctor and political outsider.
Ko Wen-je resisted joining the DPP. He asked, "Why must a lion be shut up in a cage?" But after some persuasion and waffling, he chose to enter the cage. The lion compromised. Worse, inside and outside the cage, numerous lion tamers stood, whips in hand, ready to teach him the rules he would have obey within the cage.
Consider the DPP perspective on Ko Wen-je becoming a party member. Every day, they were forced to watch him being touted as the ideal challenger among the political opposition. Everywhere he went, Green Camp voters flocked around him. Even more embarrassingly. Ko Wen-je had charisma. Declared candidates such as Ku Li-hsiung and Annette Lu were resentful and unhappy. Other party comrades were humiliated. To them, party nomination rules designed to ensure fairness had been ignored. Ko Wen-je donned Green Camp garb. This at least eliminated one tough to swallow objection. Internal regrouping may still enable the DPP to wage a successful Taipei mayorial campaign.
In fact, the DPP primary nominations for Taipei City and Xinbei City suggest no grander strategic plan. Inviting Ko Wen-je to run was clearly more a means of pacifying internal dissent than a mens of allowing outside participation. Its purpose was to win by not losing face. Its purpose was to avoid fielding a DPP candidate who might lose to a Pan Green comrade as an independent. By caging the lion, the DPP avoided a future debacle.
Can Ko Wen-je win on behalf of the DPP? Consider his recent poll numbers. He has provided the DPP a mirror by which it can reflect on itself. Consider his political orientation. Ko Wen-je clearly belongs in the Green Camp. Other DPP politicians are veterans. As a political outsider, Ko Wen-je paradoxically appeals to more voters of all ages in the capitol city.
Consider this from two perspectives. Consider Ko Wen-je's personal qualifications. He has certain specific political attributes. But when commenting on politics, he is not overly dogmatic. He supports Ah-Bian, but criticizes him as well. He criticizes the Blue Camp, but not to the extent of blasting Ma at every available opportunity. He is a doctor and a politician, but more doctor than politician. This is the source of his appeal as a political outsider. Ko Wen-je is reportedly an Asperger's Syndrome sufferer. Perhaps because of this, Ko Wen-je differs from most DPP politicians, and comes across as somewhat exotic.
Consider the DPP's own characteristics. Two ruling party changes have taken place. During its time in office, the DPP wallowed in corruption. In the eyes of the public, the DPP's image is fixed. DPP obstructionism worsens by the day. DPP opportunism leaves the impression that it has no principles whatsoever. DPP populism may still give it some influence at the local level. But Taipei is a major metropolis. Its voters are more rational. To them the DPP long ago lost any charm it might have had. This is why the DPP did not field any strong candidates for Taipei City and Xinbei City. This is why Ko Wen-je is so popular. He has yet to be tested in the field. In any event, his speeches and his responses, unlike those of DPP insiders, defy stereotyping. For moderate voters weary of Blue vs. Green political struggles, this offers considerable appeal.
In short, Ko Wen-je has the appeal of a political outsider. He is an atypical candidate. He could have been an inspiration for DPP reform. He could have been an "improved model" for the Green Camp as it moves toward the political center. Unfortunately the monolithic DPP refused to have anything to do with "exotic." It refused to accept the notion that it must reform itself. Instead, Ko Wen-je has been forced to join the Green Camp, to wear the same uniform, to march to the same drummer. Only by doing so, was he able to win the blessing of the Green Camp. Now consider Ko Wen-je. The more he campaigns, the more he becomes assimilated by the DPP, the more he adopts the outmoded habits of the Green Camp. As a result, his personal charisma, his uncensored declarations, his onstage performance are likely to suffer.
For the DPP, Ko Wen-je did not represent a chance to win, but a model for reform. Alas, the DPP has missed the mark. Ko Wen-je had an opportunity to throw open the DPP's cages. Instead he chose to walk into them, shattering his "Ko Wen-je as lion" myth. for Taipei voters, Ko had an opportunity to rise above stereotypical Blue vs. Green conflict, to wage a different kind of election campaign. Now alas, everything has reverted to the same tired old form.
柯文哲命題：獅子選擇走入鐵籠
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.20 01:57 am
柯文哲未必稱得上是「獅子」，民進黨當然也不能說是「鐵籠」一個；但是，柯文哲為參選台北市長被逼著加入民進黨，就如同一塊可塑的黏土被送進綠模子壓製成統一規格，正好讓他失掉無黨籍醫師及政治素人的親切感和想像力。
柯文哲曾經極力抗拒加入民進黨，他說：「何必一定要把獅子關進籠裡？」但經過一番勸誘和拉鋸，現在是他自己走進籠子裡，獅子畢竟妥協了。不僅如此，籠子內外還有許多馴獸師站在那裡，手持皮鞭，準備隨時教導他一點籠子裡的規矩。
對民進黨而言，若不要求柯文哲入黨，每天卻看著他以在野「最佳挑戰者」的姿態趴趴走，到處接受綠營支持者的簇擁，其實更加難堪。柯文哲的活躍，除了已表態參選的顧立雄和呂秀蓮等人忿恨不平，許多黨內同志也覺得顏面無光，黨內提名規則的公平性及神聖性更受到嚴重挑戰。因此，讓柯文哲披上綠袍，至少先減去一個心腹之患，再透過內部的整合，或者能徐圖台北市長之役的翻盤也說不定。
事實上，民進黨在北二都的初選提名，皆看不出積極的布局意圖；可見，要求柯文哲入黨基本上是「安內」的成分多於「攘外」，打的是「不丟臉為贏」的戰術。其目的，是避免民進黨自己提出正式人選，最後卻敗給單兵作戰的泛綠戰友；於是，引獅入籠，至少可免後患。
無論柯文哲最後能不能披綠袍代表民進黨出征甚至取勝，以他近期在民調上的表現看，恰好提供民進黨一面自我檢視的鏡子。就政治取向看，柯文哲歸屬綠營自無疑義；但比起其他民進黨資深政治人物，作為「政治素人」的柯文哲為何反而能獲得更多首都選民的青睞，則耐人尋味。
這或可分成兩方面來談。就柯文哲本身的條件看，他雖有其特定政治屬性，但在評論時政時，他不會過度「教條化」，他挺扁也能批扁，批藍卻不致逢馬必反。在「醫師」與「政治人」之間，他保存的醫師成分似乎多一些，這是他「政治新鮮人」的紅利所在。據稱柯文哲是亞斯柏格症患者，或許正因如此，柯文哲不像一般民進黨人物那樣裝模作樣地雕塑角色，反而能顯現出一種「異類」的特色。
就民進黨本身的因素看，歷經兩次政黨輪替及執政貪腐，民進黨留給社會大眾的角色形象已經極為固定，甚至可以說它的在野杯葛立場一天比一天狹隘，有時甚至投機到毫無原則的地步。這種民粹訴求，在地方上或仍具有一定影響，但對大台北都會區的理性選民而言，則已完全失去魅力。民進黨在雙北推不出強有力的人選，這正是主要原因。柯文哲的高人氣，主要是仍未經深入檢驗所致；但無論如何，他的言語和應對，比起民進黨?面人物均相對不刻板，這對厭倦了藍綠惡鬥的中間選民而言，自然有其吸引力。
簡單地說，柯文哲所展現的素人魅力，基本上營造的是一種「非典型」的想像，原本可當成民進黨轉型的啟發，作為綠營朝政治中間地帶推進的一種「改良模式」。遺憾的是，鐵板一塊的民進黨，既拒絕與「異類」為伍，也拒絕接受自己必須改良轉型的想法；在這種情況下，柯文哲被迫必須加入綠色軍團，和其他人穿一色的軍服、受一樣的軍規管束，才能贏得綠袍加身的祝福。反觀柯文哲，他愈投入選戰，也就愈受到民進黨的同化，愈走上綠營經營布局的老套。如此一來，他擁有的個人魅力、不受框架的發言，表演空間至此大概也就難有可觀了。
對民進黨而言，柯文哲代表的其實不是一個贏的機會，而是一個轉型的指標，但民進黨卻錯過了這個標誌。對柯文哲而言，他本來有機會打開民進黨的鐵籠閘門，但他最後卻選擇自己走進去，塗銷了自己的雄獅神話。對台北市民而言，本來有機會跳脫刻板的藍綠對決，來場不一樣的選舉，現在全部想像又都落回舊軌道上了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 20, 2013
Summary: For the DPP, Ko Wen-je did not represent a chance to win, but a model for reform. Alas, the DPP has missed the mark. Ko Wen-je had an opportunity to throw open the DPP's cages. Instead he chose to walk into them, shattering his "Ko Wen-je as lion" myth. for Taipei voters, Ko had an opportunity to rise above stereotypical Blue vs. Green conflict, to wage a different kind of election campaign. Now alas, everything has reverted to the same tired old form.
Full text below:
Ko Wen-je may not deserve to be perceived as a lion. The DPP may not deserve to be perceived as a cage. But in order to run in the Taipei Mayoral Election, Ko Wen-je has been forced to join the DPP. Malleable clay has been forced into a standardized Green mold. Ko has now lost his grass roots appeal as a non-partisan doctor and political outsider.
Ko Wen-je resisted joining the DPP. He asked, "Why must a lion be shut up in a cage?" But after some persuasion and waffling, he chose to enter the cage. The lion compromised. Worse, inside and outside the cage, numerous lion tamers stood, whips in hand, ready to teach him the rules he would have obey within the cage.
Consider the DPP perspective on Ko Wen-je becoming a party member. Every day, they were forced to watch him being touted as the ideal challenger among the political opposition. Everywhere he went, Green Camp voters flocked around him. Even more embarrassingly. Ko Wen-je had charisma. Declared candidates such as Ku Li-hsiung and Annette Lu were resentful and unhappy. Other party comrades were humiliated. To them, party nomination rules designed to ensure fairness had been ignored. Ko Wen-je donned Green Camp garb. This at least eliminated one tough to swallow objection. Internal regrouping may still enable the DPP to wage a successful Taipei mayorial campaign.
In fact, the DPP primary nominations for Taipei City and Xinbei City suggest no grander strategic plan. Inviting Ko Wen-je to run was clearly more a means of pacifying internal dissent than a mens of allowing outside participation. Its purpose was to win by not losing face. Its purpose was to avoid fielding a DPP candidate who might lose to a Pan Green comrade as an independent. By caging the lion, the DPP avoided a future debacle.
Can Ko Wen-je win on behalf of the DPP? Consider his recent poll numbers. He has provided the DPP a mirror by which it can reflect on itself. Consider his political orientation. Ko Wen-je clearly belongs in the Green Camp. Other DPP politicians are veterans. As a political outsider, Ko Wen-je paradoxically appeals to more voters of all ages in the capitol city.
Consider this from two perspectives. Consider Ko Wen-je's personal qualifications. He has certain specific political attributes. But when commenting on politics, he is not overly dogmatic. He supports Ah-Bian, but criticizes him as well. He criticizes the Blue Camp, but not to the extent of blasting Ma at every available opportunity. He is a doctor and a politician, but more doctor than politician. This is the source of his appeal as a political outsider. Ko Wen-je is reportedly an Asperger's Syndrome sufferer. Perhaps because of this, Ko Wen-je differs from most DPP politicians, and comes across as somewhat exotic.
Consider the DPP's own characteristics. Two ruling party changes have taken place. During its time in office, the DPP wallowed in corruption. In the eyes of the public, the DPP's image is fixed. DPP obstructionism worsens by the day. DPP opportunism leaves the impression that it has no principles whatsoever. DPP populism may still give it some influence at the local level. But Taipei is a major metropolis. Its voters are more rational. To them the DPP long ago lost any charm it might have had. This is why the DPP did not field any strong candidates for Taipei City and Xinbei City. This is why Ko Wen-je is so popular. He has yet to be tested in the field. In any event, his speeches and his responses, unlike those of DPP insiders, defy stereotyping. For moderate voters weary of Blue vs. Green political struggles, this offers considerable appeal.
In short, Ko Wen-je has the appeal of a political outsider. He is an atypical candidate. He could have been an inspiration for DPP reform. He could have been an "improved model" for the Green Camp as it moves toward the political center. Unfortunately the monolithic DPP refused to have anything to do with "exotic." It refused to accept the notion that it must reform itself. Instead, Ko Wen-je has been forced to join the Green Camp, to wear the same uniform, to march to the same drummer. Only by doing so, was he able to win the blessing of the Green Camp. Now consider Ko Wen-je. The more he campaigns, the more he becomes assimilated by the DPP, the more he adopts the outmoded habits of the Green Camp. As a result, his personal charisma, his uncensored declarations, his onstage performance are likely to suffer.
For the DPP, Ko Wen-je did not represent a chance to win, but a model for reform. Alas, the DPP has missed the mark. Ko Wen-je had an opportunity to throw open the DPP's cages. Instead he chose to walk into them, shattering his "Ko Wen-je as lion" myth. for Taipei voters, Ko had an opportunity to rise above stereotypical Blue vs. Green conflict, to wage a different kind of election campaign. Now alas, everything has reverted to the same tired old form.
柯文哲命題：獅子選擇走入鐵籠
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.20 01:57 am
柯文哲未必稱得上是「獅子」，民進黨當然也不能說是「鐵籠」一個；但是，柯文哲為參選台北市長被逼著加入民進黨，就如同一塊可塑的黏土被送進綠模子壓製成統一規格，正好讓他失掉無黨籍醫師及政治素人的親切感和想像力。
柯文哲曾經極力抗拒加入民進黨，他說：「何必一定要把獅子關進籠裡？」但經過一番勸誘和拉鋸，現在是他自己走進籠子裡，獅子畢竟妥協了。不僅如此，籠子內外還有許多馴獸師站在那裡，手持皮鞭，準備隨時教導他一點籠子裡的規矩。
對民進黨而言，若不要求柯文哲入黨，每天卻看著他以在野「最佳挑戰者」的姿態趴趴走，到處接受綠營支持者的簇擁，其實更加難堪。柯文哲的活躍，除了已表態參選的顧立雄和呂秀蓮等人忿恨不平，許多黨內同志也覺得顏面無光，黨內提名規則的公平性及神聖性更受到嚴重挑戰。因此，讓柯文哲披上綠袍，至少先減去一個心腹之患，再透過內部的整合，或者能徐圖台北市長之役的翻盤也說不定。
事實上，民進黨在北二都的初選提名，皆看不出積極的布局意圖；可見，要求柯文哲入黨基本上是「安內」的成分多於「攘外」，打的是「不丟臉為贏」的戰術。其目的，是避免民進黨自己提出正式人選，最後卻敗給單兵作戰的泛綠戰友；於是，引獅入籠，至少可免後患。
無論柯文哲最後能不能披綠袍代表民進黨出征甚至取勝，以他近期在民調上的表現看，恰好提供民進黨一面自我檢視的鏡子。就政治取向看，柯文哲歸屬綠營自無疑義；但比起其他民進黨資深政治人物，作為「政治素人」的柯文哲為何反而能獲得更多首都選民的青睞，則耐人尋味。
這或可分成兩方面來談。就柯文哲本身的條件看，他雖有其特定政治屬性，但在評論時政時，他不會過度「教條化」，他挺扁也能批扁，批藍卻不致逢馬必反。在「醫師」與「政治人」之間，他保存的醫師成分似乎多一些，這是他「政治新鮮人」的紅利所在。據稱柯文哲是亞斯柏格症患者，或許正因如此，柯文哲不像一般民進黨人物那樣裝模作樣地雕塑角色，反而能顯現出一種「異類」的特色。
就民進黨本身的因素看，歷經兩次政黨輪替及執政貪腐，民進黨留給社會大眾的角色形象已經極為固定，甚至可以說它的在野杯葛立場一天比一天狹隘，有時甚至投機到毫無原則的地步。這種民粹訴求，在地方上或仍具有一定影響，但對大台北都會區的理性選民而言，則已完全失去魅力。民進黨在雙北推不出強有力的人選，這正是主要原因。柯文哲的高人氣，主要是仍未經深入檢驗所致；但無論如何，他的言語和應對，比起民進黨?面人物均相對不刻板，這對厭倦了藍綠惡鬥的中間選民而言，自然有其吸引力。
簡單地說，柯文哲所展現的素人魅力，基本上營造的是一種「非典型」的想像，原本可當成民進黨轉型的啟發，作為綠營朝政治中間地帶推進的一種「改良模式」。遺憾的是，鐵板一塊的民進黨，既拒絕與「異類」為伍，也拒絕接受自己必須改良轉型的想法；在這種情況下，柯文哲被迫必須加入綠色軍團，和其他人穿一色的軍服、受一樣的軍規管束，才能贏得綠袍加身的祝福。反觀柯文哲，他愈投入選戰，也就愈受到民進黨的同化，愈走上綠營經營布局的老套。如此一來，他擁有的個人魅力、不受框架的發言，表演空間至此大概也就難有可觀了。
對民進黨而言，柯文哲代表的其實不是一個贏的機會，而是一個轉型的指標，但民進黨卻錯過了這個標誌。對柯文哲而言，他本來有機會打開民進黨的鐵籠閘門，但他最後卻選擇自己走進去，塗銷了自己的雄獅神話。對台北市民而言，本來有機會跳脫刻板的藍綠對決，來場不一樣的選舉，現在全部想像又都落回舊軌道上了。
Wednesday, December 18, 2013
Su Tseng-change Does Not and Cannot Lead
Su Tseng-change Does Not and Cannot Lead
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 19, 2013
Summary: Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office twice blasted the Su Tseng-chang led Democratic Progressive Party. Once over the "constitutional governance consensus" issue, and once over the ADIZ issue. Beijing will of course not discontinue exchanges with the DPP. But under Su Tseng-chang's leadership, political dialogue between the two parties will remain difficult. The Chinese mainland conducts exchanges with the DPP. But it also refuses to hold talks. It continues to divide the DPP from within. As a result, the DPP has lost its voice on cross-Strait issues. Is this really what DPP insiders want to see?
Full text below:
The DPP Taipei Mayoral primaries underwent a major direction change. Ko Wen-je, who vigorously supports the "Opposition Alliance," has expressed willingness to join the DPP. He has not made a firm commitment yet. But his preference is now known. Ko Wen-je is a major player. He is now halfway into the DPP cage. The prospects for the Opposition Alliance suddenly look bleak. It is unlikely to be much of a threat to the KMT in the future.
The dispute over Ko Wen-je joining the party provides a clear example of Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership. For months, Su Tseng-chang refused to take a stand on the Opposition Alliance strategy, and what rights and obligations Ko Wen-je would have upon becoming a party member. He allowed pro-Su elements to attack Ko Wen-je, even as he remained ambiguous about the Taipei mayoral candidate issue. He turned the process into a farce. Voters became increasingly weary. Grassroots DPP supporters grew ever more anxious. The main reason was that Su Tseng-chang was a reluctant leader. He was unwilling to take on the burden of waging a campaign in Taipei City. His strategy remained unclear. The DPP candidate has yet to be named. It will probably be Ko Wen-je. But his chances for victory are gradually diminishing.
Su Tseng-chang was reluctant to run for Taipei Mayor even before his nomination. As a result, the DPP missed an opportunity to expand is support base. This of course also undermined DPP reform. But Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership involves an even bigger problem. The DPP's biggest weakness has to do with cross-Strait policy.
Since its defeat in 2012, the public on Taiwan knows full well that the DPP must change its cross-Strait policy. It must win the trust of the public on Taiwan, of Beijing, and of Washington. Otherwise the chance of victory in 2016 will remain slim. This is why the China Affairs Committee has become the focus of attention within the party. Despite repeated urging, Su Tseng-chang rejected Frank Hsieh as committee chairman. Hsieh's cross-Strait policy thinking is flexible and pragmatic. The purpose of the committee is to clarify DPP party policy toward the Chinese mainland. Su Tseng-chang decided to "lead" this important platform himself. But by "lead" Su Tseng-tsang really meant "drag his feet." The Huashan Conference engaged in nothing more than armchair strategizing. It refused to open the doors to debate. It bore no resemblance to the China Policy Debate sponsored by Hsu Hsin-liang many years ago.
The Huashan Conference went on for some time. The DPP apparently concluded that a "constitutional governance consensus" would form the basis for exchanges with the Chinese mainland. This was the result of a compromise between Hsieh supporters and the New Tide faction. As it turned out, it was the result of Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership. It made Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership on cross-Strait policy abundantly clear.
On the surface, the "constitutional governance consensus" differs from Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" by only one word. In fact, the difference is enormous. The "constitutional consensus" refers to the two sides' "two constitutions." The ROC Constitution governs Taiwan. The PRC Constitution governs the Mainland. The two sides are equal. They are not subordinate to each other. But according to their constitutions they have a special relationship with each other. The constitutional consensus is not quite the same as the "one China Constitution." It is less clear about the two sides' sovereignty and connection to each other. But at least it moves in the direction of the "constitutional one China" concept. It also keeps its distance from the Taiwan independence party platform, and one nation on each side.
Now consider the meaning of "constitutional governance consensus." According to the DPP, it means the party must actively promote constitutionalism, implement national sovereignty, enhance awareness of the nation's constitution, and use Taiwan's constitutional consensus as the basis for cross-strait dialogue.
The "constitutional governance consensus" make no attempt whatsoever to deal with the 1992 consensus and one China framework that Beijing is most concerned about. It clings to the Taiwan independence path. Its "national sovereignty" and "constitutional consciousness" refers to a newly authored constitution and a newly founded Nation of Taiwan. The DPP's political rhetoric is merely old wine in new bottles. Obviously this is completely unacceptable to Beijing. Any sort of dialogue is unlikely.
Su Tseng-chang cannot lead when it comes to cross-Strait policy reform. He cannot lead on major political issues that involve in cross-Strait relations. The most obvious is the East China Sea ADIZ issue. No sooner had controversy erupted, than Su Tseng-chang denounced the Ma government for failing to attack, while simultaneously advocating an "alliance of democracies." He attempted to return to joint US-Japan Cold War containment of the Chinese mainland. Su Tseng-chang deliberately evaded the issues regarding "constitutional consensus." He ignored Beijing's line in the sand. On the East China Sea ADIZ and Diaoyutai Islands issues, he challenged the Mainland authorities on territorial sovereignty and national dignity, again ignoring Beijing's line in the sand.
These moves did Su Tseng-chang no good whatsoever. During his meeting with Raymond Burghardt he blasted the Ma administration for weakness on the ADIZ issue. But the AIT publicly affirmed the Ma government's response as "constructive." It said Taipei and Washington enjoyed a good working relationship. Basically it issued Su Tseng-tsang a resounding slap in the face. As one can imagine, if Su Tseng-chang continues demonstrating a failure of leadership on cross-Strait and international issues, the Democratic Progressive Party is unlikely to recapture the presidency. And even if it did recapture the presidency, it would continue to be regarded as a troublemaker, and bring even greater disaster to Taiwan.
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office twice blasted the Su Tseng-chang led Democratic Progressive Party. Once over the "constitutional governance consensus" issue, and once over the ADIZ issue. Beijing will of course not discontinue exchanges with the DPP. But under Su Tseng-chang's leadership, political dialogue between the two parties will remain difficult. The Chinese mainland conducts exchanges with the DPP. But it also refuses to hold talks. It continues to divide the DPP from within. As a result, the DPP has lost its voice on cross-Strait issues. Is this really what DPP insiders want to see?
社論－蘇貞昌不領導 不能領導 不會領導
2013-12-19 01:32
中國時報
【本報訊】
吵吵鬧鬧的民進黨台北市長初選，有了大轉彎，力倡「在野大聯盟」的柯文哲表露加入民進黨的意願，雖然話沒有說死，但方向大致確定，柯文哲這頭獅子，上半身被關入了民進黨的鐵籠子，「在野大聯盟」頓時黯淡無光，未來對國民黨還有多大威脅性，實在並不樂觀。
柯文哲入黨爭議，是蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學的一大案例。幾個月來，蘇貞昌一方面在柯文哲所提「在野大聯盟」戰略和「入黨後的權利義務」等問題上不清楚表態，同時放任親蘇派系攻擊柯文哲，一方面對於台北市長人選的問題又曖曖昧昧，搞得整齣提名大戲是歹戲拖棚，選民日見厭煩，民進黨基層萬分焦慮。核心原因就是蘇貞昌「不願領導」，不願扛起台北市選戰的重責，戰略不清，人選未定，如今雖是框住了柯文哲，但勝選的可能性也一點一滴的在流失之中。
蘇貞昌在台北市長提名問題上的「不願領導」，是錯失了民進黨擴大社會基盤的良機，當然也影響到民進黨的轉型，但蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學更大的問題、對民進黨更致命的傷害還是在兩岸政策上。
2012敗選以來，全社會都知道民進黨不在兩岸政策上改弦更張，並獲得台灣社會、北京方面以及美國的信賴，2016年大選的勝選機率還是無法樂觀。於是中國事務委員會的議題首先成為黨內焦點，在千呼萬喚之後，蘇貞昌排除在兩岸論述調整的準備上較為完整、思考靈活務實的謝長廷，決定自己主導該委員會，但蘇貞昌所謂的「主導」，就是讓這個宣稱是「整合黨內中國政策的重要平台」先是運作長期陷入停擺，而後的「華山會議」則竟是「坐而論劍」，沒有大開大闔的氣勢，也沒有大鳴大放的爭論，和許信良當年主導下的中國政策大辯論，其距離不可以道里計。
華山會議開了半天，據說結論上民進黨將以「憲政共識」作為與中國大陸交流的基礎，這是謝系與新潮流系較勁之後的妥協結果，原來，這還是蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學下的產物，而且充分顯示了蘇貞昌在兩岸政策轉型上的「不能領導」。
表面上，「憲政共識」與謝長廷力主的「憲法共識」只有一字之差，但是差別卻極其之大。「憲法共識」講的是兩岸「兩個憲法」，中華民國憲法治理台灣，中華人民共和國憲法治理大陸，兩岸對等，互不隸屬，但依憲法有特殊關係。憲法共識雖然不完全等同於「憲法一中」，在兩岸主權的連接與兩岸共屬一中的問題上比較模糊，但是至少是朝向「憲法一中」概念發展的論述方向，也看的出嘗試遠離台獨黨綱、一邊一國的善意。
至於「憲政共識」的內涵，就民進黨的解釋來看，講的是該黨「應積極推動憲政，落實國民主權的精神，提升國民的憲政意識，並以台灣的憲政共識做為兩岸對話基礎」。
坦白說，既完全沒有嘗試處理大陸最關心的九二共識、一中框架問題，更隱含著繼續堅持台獨路線的意涵，所謂的國民主權、憲政意識，在民進黨的政治語彙裡，還是接近於新憲法、新國家等舊論述舊思維的「新瓶舊酒」，自然完全為大陸方面所不能容忍，連對話的空間都難以存在。
蘇貞昌在兩岸政策調整上「不能領導」，更在許多涉及兩岸關係的重大政治議題上「不會領導」，最明顯的就是東海防空識別區的問題。在爭議爆發之後，蘇貞昌一面對馬政府進行不實攻擊，一面則是重提所謂「民主同盟」，企圖回到冷戰時代聯合美日圍堵中國的局面。如果說，蘇貞昌在「憲政共識」問題上是刻意迴避、無視大陸的紅線，那麼，在東海防空識別區和釣魚台問題上則完全是選擇在領土主權和民族尊嚴問題上挑戰大陸當局，跨越了大陸的紅線。
然而，蘇貞昌的作為完全沒有撈到任何好處，在他會見薄瑞光並痛批馬政府在防空識別區問題上軟弱之後，美國在台協會公開發表聲明，肯定馬政府在此議題上的回應具「建設性」，並表示台美之間擁有良好合作關係，結結實實打了蘇貞昌一個響亮的耳光。可以想見，蘇貞昌如果繼續在兩岸和國際問題上如此地「不會領導」，民進黨要嘛是執政無望，要嘛是執政後繼續被視為麻煩製造者，給台灣帶來更大的災難。
大陸國台辦在「憲政共識」和防空識別區議題上兩度嚴批蘇貞昌領導下的民進黨，大陸當局當然不會就此放棄和民進黨人士進行交流，但在蘇的領導之下，兩黨的政治對話之門已經難以打開。如此，大陸方面一手交流，一手拒談的結果，就是民進黨內繼續拉扯、裂變，就是民進黨越來越在兩岸問題上喪失話語權，這是民進黨內有識之士所樂見的嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 19, 2013
Summary: Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office twice blasted the Su Tseng-chang led Democratic Progressive Party. Once over the "constitutional governance consensus" issue, and once over the ADIZ issue. Beijing will of course not discontinue exchanges with the DPP. But under Su Tseng-chang's leadership, political dialogue between the two parties will remain difficult. The Chinese mainland conducts exchanges with the DPP. But it also refuses to hold talks. It continues to divide the DPP from within. As a result, the DPP has lost its voice on cross-Strait issues. Is this really what DPP insiders want to see?
Full text below:
The DPP Taipei Mayoral primaries underwent a major direction change. Ko Wen-je, who vigorously supports the "Opposition Alliance," has expressed willingness to join the DPP. He has not made a firm commitment yet. But his preference is now known. Ko Wen-je is a major player. He is now halfway into the DPP cage. The prospects for the Opposition Alliance suddenly look bleak. It is unlikely to be much of a threat to the KMT in the future.
The dispute over Ko Wen-je joining the party provides a clear example of Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership. For months, Su Tseng-chang refused to take a stand on the Opposition Alliance strategy, and what rights and obligations Ko Wen-je would have upon becoming a party member. He allowed pro-Su elements to attack Ko Wen-je, even as he remained ambiguous about the Taipei mayoral candidate issue. He turned the process into a farce. Voters became increasingly weary. Grassroots DPP supporters grew ever more anxious. The main reason was that Su Tseng-chang was a reluctant leader. He was unwilling to take on the burden of waging a campaign in Taipei City. His strategy remained unclear. The DPP candidate has yet to be named. It will probably be Ko Wen-je. But his chances for victory are gradually diminishing.
Su Tseng-chang was reluctant to run for Taipei Mayor even before his nomination. As a result, the DPP missed an opportunity to expand is support base. This of course also undermined DPP reform. But Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership involves an even bigger problem. The DPP's biggest weakness has to do with cross-Strait policy.
Since its defeat in 2012, the public on Taiwan knows full well that the DPP must change its cross-Strait policy. It must win the trust of the public on Taiwan, of Beijing, and of Washington. Otherwise the chance of victory in 2016 will remain slim. This is why the China Affairs Committee has become the focus of attention within the party. Despite repeated urging, Su Tseng-chang rejected Frank Hsieh as committee chairman. Hsieh's cross-Strait policy thinking is flexible and pragmatic. The purpose of the committee is to clarify DPP party policy toward the Chinese mainland. Su Tseng-chang decided to "lead" this important platform himself. But by "lead" Su Tseng-tsang really meant "drag his feet." The Huashan Conference engaged in nothing more than armchair strategizing. It refused to open the doors to debate. It bore no resemblance to the China Policy Debate sponsored by Hsu Hsin-liang many years ago.
The Huashan Conference went on for some time. The DPP apparently concluded that a "constitutional governance consensus" would form the basis for exchanges with the Chinese mainland. This was the result of a compromise between Hsieh supporters and the New Tide faction. As it turned out, it was the result of Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership. It made Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership on cross-Strait policy abundantly clear.
On the surface, the "constitutional governance consensus" differs from Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" by only one word. In fact, the difference is enormous. The "constitutional consensus" refers to the two sides' "two constitutions." The ROC Constitution governs Taiwan. The PRC Constitution governs the Mainland. The two sides are equal. They are not subordinate to each other. But according to their constitutions they have a special relationship with each other. The constitutional consensus is not quite the same as the "one China Constitution." It is less clear about the two sides' sovereignty and connection to each other. But at least it moves in the direction of the "constitutional one China" concept. It also keeps its distance from the Taiwan independence party platform, and one nation on each side.
Now consider the meaning of "constitutional governance consensus." According to the DPP, it means the party must actively promote constitutionalism, implement national sovereignty, enhance awareness of the nation's constitution, and use Taiwan's constitutional consensus as the basis for cross-strait dialogue.
The "constitutional governance consensus" make no attempt whatsoever to deal with the 1992 consensus and one China framework that Beijing is most concerned about. It clings to the Taiwan independence path. Its "national sovereignty" and "constitutional consciousness" refers to a newly authored constitution and a newly founded Nation of Taiwan. The DPP's political rhetoric is merely old wine in new bottles. Obviously this is completely unacceptable to Beijing. Any sort of dialogue is unlikely.
Su Tseng-chang cannot lead when it comes to cross-Strait policy reform. He cannot lead on major political issues that involve in cross-Strait relations. The most obvious is the East China Sea ADIZ issue. No sooner had controversy erupted, than Su Tseng-chang denounced the Ma government for failing to attack, while simultaneously advocating an "alliance of democracies." He attempted to return to joint US-Japan Cold War containment of the Chinese mainland. Su Tseng-chang deliberately evaded the issues regarding "constitutional consensus." He ignored Beijing's line in the sand. On the East China Sea ADIZ and Diaoyutai Islands issues, he challenged the Mainland authorities on territorial sovereignty and national dignity, again ignoring Beijing's line in the sand.
These moves did Su Tseng-chang no good whatsoever. During his meeting with Raymond Burghardt he blasted the Ma administration for weakness on the ADIZ issue. But the AIT publicly affirmed the Ma government's response as "constructive." It said Taipei and Washington enjoyed a good working relationship. Basically it issued Su Tseng-tsang a resounding slap in the face. As one can imagine, if Su Tseng-chang continues demonstrating a failure of leadership on cross-Strait and international issues, the Democratic Progressive Party is unlikely to recapture the presidency. And even if it did recapture the presidency, it would continue to be regarded as a troublemaker, and bring even greater disaster to Taiwan.
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office twice blasted the Su Tseng-chang led Democratic Progressive Party. Once over the "constitutional governance consensus" issue, and once over the ADIZ issue. Beijing will of course not discontinue exchanges with the DPP. But under Su Tseng-chang's leadership, political dialogue between the two parties will remain difficult. The Chinese mainland conducts exchanges with the DPP. But it also refuses to hold talks. It continues to divide the DPP from within. As a result, the DPP has lost its voice on cross-Strait issues. Is this really what DPP insiders want to see?
社論－蘇貞昌不領導 不能領導 不會領導
2013-12-19 01:32
中國時報
【本報訊】
吵吵鬧鬧的民進黨台北市長初選，有了大轉彎，力倡「在野大聯盟」的柯文哲表露加入民進黨的意願，雖然話沒有說死，但方向大致確定，柯文哲這頭獅子，上半身被關入了民進黨的鐵籠子，「在野大聯盟」頓時黯淡無光，未來對國民黨還有多大威脅性，實在並不樂觀。
柯文哲入黨爭議，是蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學的一大案例。幾個月來，蘇貞昌一方面在柯文哲所提「在野大聯盟」戰略和「入黨後的權利義務」等問題上不清楚表態，同時放任親蘇派系攻擊柯文哲，一方面對於台北市長人選的問題又曖曖昧昧，搞得整齣提名大戲是歹戲拖棚，選民日見厭煩，民進黨基層萬分焦慮。核心原因就是蘇貞昌「不願領導」，不願扛起台北市選戰的重責，戰略不清，人選未定，如今雖是框住了柯文哲，但勝選的可能性也一點一滴的在流失之中。
蘇貞昌在台北市長提名問題上的「不願領導」，是錯失了民進黨擴大社會基盤的良機，當然也影響到民進黨的轉型，但蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學更大的問題、對民進黨更致命的傷害還是在兩岸政策上。
2012敗選以來，全社會都知道民進黨不在兩岸政策上改弦更張，並獲得台灣社會、北京方面以及美國的信賴，2016年大選的勝選機率還是無法樂觀。於是中國事務委員會的議題首先成為黨內焦點，在千呼萬喚之後，蘇貞昌排除在兩岸論述調整的準備上較為完整、思考靈活務實的謝長廷，決定自己主導該委員會，但蘇貞昌所謂的「主導」，就是讓這個宣稱是「整合黨內中國政策的重要平台」先是運作長期陷入停擺，而後的「華山會議」則竟是「坐而論劍」，沒有大開大闔的氣勢，也沒有大鳴大放的爭論，和許信良當年主導下的中國政策大辯論，其距離不可以道里計。
華山會議開了半天，據說結論上民進黨將以「憲政共識」作為與中國大陸交流的基礎，這是謝系與新潮流系較勁之後的妥協結果，原來，這還是蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學下的產物，而且充分顯示了蘇貞昌在兩岸政策轉型上的「不能領導」。
表面上，「憲政共識」與謝長廷力主的「憲法共識」只有一字之差，但是差別卻極其之大。「憲法共識」講的是兩岸「兩個憲法」，中華民國憲法治理台灣，中華人民共和國憲法治理大陸，兩岸對等，互不隸屬，但依憲法有特殊關係。憲法共識雖然不完全等同於「憲法一中」，在兩岸主權的連接與兩岸共屬一中的問題上比較模糊，但是至少是朝向「憲法一中」概念發展的論述方向，也看的出嘗試遠離台獨黨綱、一邊一國的善意。
至於「憲政共識」的內涵，就民進黨的解釋來看，講的是該黨「應積極推動憲政，落實國民主權的精神，提升國民的憲政意識，並以台灣的憲政共識做為兩岸對話基礎」。
坦白說，既完全沒有嘗試處理大陸最關心的九二共識、一中框架問題，更隱含著繼續堅持台獨路線的意涵，所謂的國民主權、憲政意識，在民進黨的政治語彙裡，還是接近於新憲法、新國家等舊論述舊思維的「新瓶舊酒」，自然完全為大陸方面所不能容忍，連對話的空間都難以存在。
蘇貞昌在兩岸政策調整上「不能領導」，更在許多涉及兩岸關係的重大政治議題上「不會領導」，最明顯的就是東海防空識別區的問題。在爭議爆發之後，蘇貞昌一面對馬政府進行不實攻擊，一面則是重提所謂「民主同盟」，企圖回到冷戰時代聯合美日圍堵中國的局面。如果說，蘇貞昌在「憲政共識」問題上是刻意迴避、無視大陸的紅線，那麼，在東海防空識別區和釣魚台問題上則完全是選擇在領土主權和民族尊嚴問題上挑戰大陸當局，跨越了大陸的紅線。
然而，蘇貞昌的作為完全沒有撈到任何好處，在他會見薄瑞光並痛批馬政府在防空識別區問題上軟弱之後，美國在台協會公開發表聲明，肯定馬政府在此議題上的回應具「建設性」，並表示台美之間擁有良好合作關係，結結實實打了蘇貞昌一個響亮的耳光。可以想見，蘇貞昌如果繼續在兩岸和國際問題上如此地「不會領導」，民進黨要嘛是執政無望，要嘛是執政後繼續被視為麻煩製造者，給台灣帶來更大的災難。
大陸國台辦在「憲政共識」和防空識別區議題上兩度嚴批蘇貞昌領導下的民進黨，大陸當局當然不會就此放棄和民進黨人士進行交流，但在蘇的領導之下，兩黨的政治對話之門已經難以打開。如此，大陸方面一手交流，一手拒談的結果，就是民進黨內繼續拉扯、裂變，就是民進黨越來越在兩岸問題上喪失話語權，這是民進黨內有識之士所樂見的嗎？
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
Yu Tu Moon Landing: Chang'e Shock
Yu Tu Moon Landing: Chang'e Shock
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 15, 2013
Summary: In 1957 the Soviet Union's Sputnik became the first man made satellite ever launched into earth orbit. American pundits at the time referred to the domestic reaction as "Sputnik shock." Yesterday, the Chinese mainland's "Chang'e 3" lunar exploration vehicle enabled the "Yu Tu" (Jade Rabbit) lunar rover to make a soft landing on the moon. One might refer to the reaction from some quarters as "Chang'e shock."
Full text below:
In 1957 the Soviet Union's Sputnik became the first man made satellite ever launched into earth orbit. American pundits at the time referred to the domestic reaction as "Sputnik shock." Yesterday, the Chinese mainland's "Chang'e 3" lunar exploration vehicle enabled the "Yu Tu" (Jade Rabbit) lunar rover to make a soft landing on the moon. One might refer to the reaction from some quarters as "Chang'e shock."
Sputnik shock was a turning point in the Cold War. It lit a fire under the US. In 1969, the Apollo mission put a man on the moon. In 1983, President Reagan launched "Star Wars." Today, historians think the space race was one of the primary reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Will the Chinese mainland's "Chang'e shock" transform the Chinese mainland into another unsustainable Soviet Union? Or will the Chinese mainland continue its rise? This is where Chang'e's potential and Sputnik's reality part ways.
Today's Chinese mainland and yesterday's Soviet Union are different in many ways. Consider several examples. One. The Soviet Union's biggest problem was an unsound economy. But globalization saved the Chinese mainland. It has become the world's second largest economy. Living standards have improved accordingly. Two. The Soviet Union was burdened with the leadership of the Eastern Bloc socialist nations. It was eventually crushed beneath the Berlin Wall. The Chinese mainland, by contrast, long ceased "exporting revolution." Three. the Soviet Union had Gorbachev. Today's China is neither reverting to rigid feudalism nor putting old wine in new bottles. It is hard to imagine the appearance of a Gorbachev style leader. Such differences have led to widespread speculation. The Chinese mainlnand is also socialist. But the Chinese mainland and the Soviet Union have taken different paths. Where will they end up? In other words, should one apply stereotypical "China collapse theory" thinking to the Chinese mainland? That is the question.
The Chinese mainland truly has developed a system with "Chinese characteristics." Consider a few examples. One. The authoritarian windfall. Those in power are not afraid to talk the talk and walk the walk. They encounter little resistance to their plans. As a result they dare to imagine, and often succeed. Two. The space program windfall. Its impact has been far reaching, The Sichuan earthquake could not shake the entire nation. Bo Xilai could only shake up Chongqing. Differential development has created a vast hinterland. Three. The population windfall. A large population has mass. Industrial innovation creates wealth. It enables the Chinese mainland to become a global producer as well as a global consumer. It enables the Chinese mainland to become an industrial and commercial hub, with the economies of scale to become relatively self-sufficient. Such a Chinese mainland may lack political rights, but may continue to progress by virtue of economic and social rights. An authoritarian political system may nevertheless be able to make the right economic decisions. If so, can the world really cling to its assumption that "China must inevitably collapse?"
U.S. President Barack Obama referred to the rise of China and India in his 2011 State of the Union Address. He included India only because mentioning China alone would have embarrassed India. Obama said that the rise of China and India has changed the rules of game for the global economy. He said this was a Sputnik moment for the US. Obama's State of the Union Address voiced his concern over the comparative efficiency of Chinese mainland authoritarianism over US democracy. Obama's Sputnik moment might well be renamed the Chang'e moment.
One could expand on Obama's idea. Not only could the Chinese mainland not collapse, its authoritarian rule might be able to make the right decisions, and may survive. If so, how should the world view the Chinese mainland? This may be something anti-Communists are reluctant to consider. But it is a problem the world must face. Refusing to face it, hoping that "China will inevitably collapse" will not help one respond to the rise of the Chinese mainland.
Chang'e and Yu Tu have become world news. Meanwhile, three significant domestic events have taken place. One. Twenty-five provinces are choked by record levels of smog. This is a warning against unbalanced development. Two. News of Zhou Yongkang's arrest has broken. This is a result of authoritarian corruption. Three. The conflict over ADIZs has led to chaos in the East China Sea. This is the result of the end to the Chinese mainland's low profile policy. Beijing's current form of governance is merely a fascist cloak over a socialist body. From one perspective it is enlightened despotism. From another perspective, it is organized crime rent-seeking. This "socialism with Chinese characteristics" differs from the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian people recently smashed statues of Lenin. The Chang'e shock differs from Sputnik shock. Thirty-four years after Sputnik, the Soviet Union imploded. But the Chinese mainland and the world must wonder. What will the Chinese mainland look like 10, 20, or 30 years after the Chang'e shock?
During the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian eras, the "China collapse theory" formed the backbone of cross-Strait political and economic policy. But today, even the most rabid anti-Communist must have his doubts. Suppose the Chinese mainland does not collapse? Suppose it continues to rise? Can one really continue to use Taiwan independence and opposition to trade in services agreements to oppose Beijing? Or is some alternative needed?
Many may be skeptical about the Chang'e shock. How much substance to it is there? But the world must not imagine that the Chinese mainland will collapse like the Soviet Union. Obama invoked the term Sputnik moment.Today, on Taiwan, this is a Chang'e moment.
玉兔登月：如何解讀「嫦娥震撼」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.15 04:21 am
一九五七年，蘇聯的「史潑尼克一號」成為第一顆進入地球軌道的人造衛星，美國輿論當時稱之為「史潑尼克震撼」；昨天，中國大陸的「嫦娥三號」月球探測船，成功地攜送「玉兔號」月球車在月球表面軟著陸，也可說是「嫦娥震撼」。
「史潑尼克震撼」是冷戰的轉捩點，它激發了美國的憂患意識，至一九六九年阿波羅號載人登月成功，再至一九八三年雷根總統發動「星戰計劃」，如今歷史學家認為這場太空競賽是導致一九九一年蘇聯解體的主因之一。今天，若從中國大陸演出的這一場「嫦娥震撼」看向未來，將是一個如蘇聯一般在各方面逐漸撐持不住的中國？還是一個將繼續維持上升曲線的中國？這是「嫦娥號的想像」與「史潑尼克號的史實」不同之處。
今天的中國大陸與當年的蘇聯有頗多不同之處，例如：一、當年蘇聯的主病是在民生經濟的貧弱，但「全球化」卻救了中國，如今已成為世界第二大經濟體，民生經濟亦獲得相對改善。二、蘇聯背負著社會主義國家之「共同祖國」的包袱，終被柏林圍牆壓垮，但中國如今已不談「輸出革命」。三、蘇聯出了一個戈巴契夫，但今日的中國，卻是「不走封建僵化的老路／也不走改旗易幟的邪路」，不能想像會出現「戈巴契夫」那樣的角色。諸如此類的差異，帶給世人一個想像：同樣是「社會主義國家」，中國與蘇聯經由不同的路徑走到今日，今後會不會也有不同的結局？也就是說：世人能否再用「中國崩潰論」的刻板思想來看中國，大可斟酌。
此時的中國，確實發展出一套有「中國特色」的體制。例如：一、專制紅利：使主政者敢想敢作，由於調度能量幾無任何阻力，所以想作敢作的也大致都能作成。二、空間紅利：幅員廣闊，一場四川地震撼動不了全國，一個薄熙來只能攪動重慶，再因各地發展的差異形成了縱深廣大的腹地。三、人口紅利：這樣的人口「量體」，如果產業創新、人民富裕，不無可能成為一個世界「生產」與「消費」的工商樞紐及相對自給自足的規模經濟。換句話說，這樣的中國，可能會在背負一些「政治人權汙點」的情況下，經濟人權及社會人權皆有持續進步；也就是說，如果發展出一個能夠「以專制的能量／作出正確決策」的政經體制，世人還能以「中國必然崩潰論」來看中國嗎？
美國總統歐巴馬在二○一一年國情咨文中，對中國及印度（提及印度，只因不好意思只提中國）的崛起深感焦慮。歐巴馬說：中國與印度的崛起，「已經改變了世界經濟規則」；他說：「現在，正是美國在這個時代的『史潑尼克時刻』！」歐巴馬在那篇國情咨文中，對中國的「專制紅利」與美國「民主包袱」所表現的效率差異之憂慮溢於言表。如今，歐巴馬所說的「史潑尼克時刻」，已可改稱「嫦娥時刻」。
就本文的角度，或許可將歐巴馬的思想引伸為一個觀點，那就是：如果中國不但不會「崩潰」，而且能以「專制能量／正確決策」的表現繼續發展下去，世人應當如何看中國？這或許是反共反中者所不願想像之事，卻是世人不能不面對的問題。若不能面對這個問題，只是想像「中國必然崩潰論」，就找不到因應中國的正確方案。
然而，正當嫦娥玉兔成為世界話題之際，中國也正發生三件極具指標意義的內部事件。一、二十五省陷於空前的霾害，這是發展失衡的警訊；二、周永康被捕的消息甚囂塵上，這是專制腐敗的宿命；三、防空識別區攪渾了東海，這是韜光養晦的破局。中共如今這一套治理方式，不啻是用社會主義的外衣來包裹法西斯主義的身軀，橫看成開明專制，側看成幫派尋租。這套「有中國特色的社會主義」與蘇聯不同（烏克蘭群眾日前已砸爛列寧銅像），因此，「嫦娥震撼」亦與「史潑尼克震撼」不同。在「史潑尼克」後三十四年，蘇聯解體；但中國與世界都要想一想，在「嫦娥震撼」的十年、二十年、三十年後，中國將是怎樣的中國？
台灣在李登輝與陳水扁時代，是以「中國崩潰論」作為兩岸政經政策的脊樑，但今日即使最強烈的反共反中者也須自問：如果中國大陸不「崩潰」，反而在各方面繼續維持上升曲線，難道還能用台獨及反《服貿協議》來反共反中嗎？或者，必須另有方案？
不少人對「嫦娥震撼」的後繼能量有所存疑及保留，但世人也必須想像一個不會像蘇聯一樣「崩潰」的中國。借用歐巴馬「史潑尼克時刻」的語法：現在，也是台灣的「嫦娥時刻」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 15, 2013
Summary: In 1957 the Soviet Union's Sputnik became the first man made satellite ever launched into earth orbit. American pundits at the time referred to the domestic reaction as "Sputnik shock." Yesterday, the Chinese mainland's "Chang'e 3" lunar exploration vehicle enabled the "Yu Tu" (Jade Rabbit) lunar rover to make a soft landing on the moon. One might refer to the reaction from some quarters as "Chang'e shock."
Full text below:
In 1957 the Soviet Union's Sputnik became the first man made satellite ever launched into earth orbit. American pundits at the time referred to the domestic reaction as "Sputnik shock." Yesterday, the Chinese mainland's "Chang'e 3" lunar exploration vehicle enabled the "Yu Tu" (Jade Rabbit) lunar rover to make a soft landing on the moon. One might refer to the reaction from some quarters as "Chang'e shock."
Sputnik shock was a turning point in the Cold War. It lit a fire under the US. In 1969, the Apollo mission put a man on the moon. In 1983, President Reagan launched "Star Wars." Today, historians think the space race was one of the primary reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Will the Chinese mainland's "Chang'e shock" transform the Chinese mainland into another unsustainable Soviet Union? Or will the Chinese mainland continue its rise? This is where Chang'e's potential and Sputnik's reality part ways.
Today's Chinese mainland and yesterday's Soviet Union are different in many ways. Consider several examples. One. The Soviet Union's biggest problem was an unsound economy. But globalization saved the Chinese mainland. It has become the world's second largest economy. Living standards have improved accordingly. Two. The Soviet Union was burdened with the leadership of the Eastern Bloc socialist nations. It was eventually crushed beneath the Berlin Wall. The Chinese mainland, by contrast, long ceased "exporting revolution." Three. the Soviet Union had Gorbachev. Today's China is neither reverting to rigid feudalism nor putting old wine in new bottles. It is hard to imagine the appearance of a Gorbachev style leader. Such differences have led to widespread speculation. The Chinese mainlnand is also socialist. But the Chinese mainland and the Soviet Union have taken different paths. Where will they end up? In other words, should one apply stereotypical "China collapse theory" thinking to the Chinese mainland? That is the question.
The Chinese mainland truly has developed a system with "Chinese characteristics." Consider a few examples. One. The authoritarian windfall. Those in power are not afraid to talk the talk and walk the walk. They encounter little resistance to their plans. As a result they dare to imagine, and often succeed. Two. The space program windfall. Its impact has been far reaching, The Sichuan earthquake could not shake the entire nation. Bo Xilai could only shake up Chongqing. Differential development has created a vast hinterland. Three. The population windfall. A large population has mass. Industrial innovation creates wealth. It enables the Chinese mainland to become a global producer as well as a global consumer. It enables the Chinese mainland to become an industrial and commercial hub, with the economies of scale to become relatively self-sufficient. Such a Chinese mainland may lack political rights, but may continue to progress by virtue of economic and social rights. An authoritarian political system may nevertheless be able to make the right economic decisions. If so, can the world really cling to its assumption that "China must inevitably collapse?"
U.S. President Barack Obama referred to the rise of China and India in his 2011 State of the Union Address. He included India only because mentioning China alone would have embarrassed India. Obama said that the rise of China and India has changed the rules of game for the global economy. He said this was a Sputnik moment for the US. Obama's State of the Union Address voiced his concern over the comparative efficiency of Chinese mainland authoritarianism over US democracy. Obama's Sputnik moment might well be renamed the Chang'e moment.
One could expand on Obama's idea. Not only could the Chinese mainland not collapse, its authoritarian rule might be able to make the right decisions, and may survive. If so, how should the world view the Chinese mainland? This may be something anti-Communists are reluctant to consider. But it is a problem the world must face. Refusing to face it, hoping that "China will inevitably collapse" will not help one respond to the rise of the Chinese mainland.
Chang'e and Yu Tu have become world news. Meanwhile, three significant domestic events have taken place. One. Twenty-five provinces are choked by record levels of smog. This is a warning against unbalanced development. Two. News of Zhou Yongkang's arrest has broken. This is a result of authoritarian corruption. Three. The conflict over ADIZs has led to chaos in the East China Sea. This is the result of the end to the Chinese mainland's low profile policy. Beijing's current form of governance is merely a fascist cloak over a socialist body. From one perspective it is enlightened despotism. From another perspective, it is organized crime rent-seeking. This "socialism with Chinese characteristics" differs from the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian people recently smashed statues of Lenin. The Chang'e shock differs from Sputnik shock. Thirty-four years after Sputnik, the Soviet Union imploded. But the Chinese mainland and the world must wonder. What will the Chinese mainland look like 10, 20, or 30 years after the Chang'e shock?
During the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian eras, the "China collapse theory" formed the backbone of cross-Strait political and economic policy. But today, even the most rabid anti-Communist must have his doubts. Suppose the Chinese mainland does not collapse? Suppose it continues to rise? Can one really continue to use Taiwan independence and opposition to trade in services agreements to oppose Beijing? Or is some alternative needed?
Many may be skeptical about the Chang'e shock. How much substance to it is there? But the world must not imagine that the Chinese mainland will collapse like the Soviet Union. Obama invoked the term Sputnik moment.Today, on Taiwan, this is a Chang'e moment.
玉兔登月：如何解讀「嫦娥震撼」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.15 04:21 am
一九五七年，蘇聯的「史潑尼克一號」成為第一顆進入地球軌道的人造衛星，美國輿論當時稱之為「史潑尼克震撼」；昨天，中國大陸的「嫦娥三號」月球探測船，成功地攜送「玉兔號」月球車在月球表面軟著陸，也可說是「嫦娥震撼」。
「史潑尼克震撼」是冷戰的轉捩點，它激發了美國的憂患意識，至一九六九年阿波羅號載人登月成功，再至一九八三年雷根總統發動「星戰計劃」，如今歷史學家認為這場太空競賽是導致一九九一年蘇聯解體的主因之一。今天，若從中國大陸演出的這一場「嫦娥震撼」看向未來，將是一個如蘇聯一般在各方面逐漸撐持不住的中國？還是一個將繼續維持上升曲線的中國？這是「嫦娥號的想像」與「史潑尼克號的史實」不同之處。
今天的中國大陸與當年的蘇聯有頗多不同之處，例如：一、當年蘇聯的主病是在民生經濟的貧弱，但「全球化」卻救了中國，如今已成為世界第二大經濟體，民生經濟亦獲得相對改善。二、蘇聯背負著社會主義國家之「共同祖國」的包袱，終被柏林圍牆壓垮，但中國如今已不談「輸出革命」。三、蘇聯出了一個戈巴契夫，但今日的中國，卻是「不走封建僵化的老路／也不走改旗易幟的邪路」，不能想像會出現「戈巴契夫」那樣的角色。諸如此類的差異，帶給世人一個想像：同樣是「社會主義國家」，中國與蘇聯經由不同的路徑走到今日，今後會不會也有不同的結局？也就是說：世人能否再用「中國崩潰論」的刻板思想來看中國，大可斟酌。
此時的中國，確實發展出一套有「中國特色」的體制。例如：一、專制紅利：使主政者敢想敢作，由於調度能量幾無任何阻力，所以想作敢作的也大致都能作成。二、空間紅利：幅員廣闊，一場四川地震撼動不了全國，一個薄熙來只能攪動重慶，再因各地發展的差異形成了縱深廣大的腹地。三、人口紅利：這樣的人口「量體」，如果產業創新、人民富裕，不無可能成為一個世界「生產」與「消費」的工商樞紐及相對自給自足的規模經濟。換句話說，這樣的中國，可能會在背負一些「政治人權汙點」的情況下，經濟人權及社會人權皆有持續進步；也就是說，如果發展出一個能夠「以專制的能量／作出正確決策」的政經體制，世人還能以「中國必然崩潰論」來看中國嗎？
美國總統歐巴馬在二○一一年國情咨文中，對中國及印度（提及印度，只因不好意思只提中國）的崛起深感焦慮。歐巴馬說：中國與印度的崛起，「已經改變了世界經濟規則」；他說：「現在，正是美國在這個時代的『史潑尼克時刻』！」歐巴馬在那篇國情咨文中，對中國的「專制紅利」與美國「民主包袱」所表現的效率差異之憂慮溢於言表。如今，歐巴馬所說的「史潑尼克時刻」，已可改稱「嫦娥時刻」。
就本文的角度，或許可將歐巴馬的思想引伸為一個觀點，那就是：如果中國不但不會「崩潰」，而且能以「專制能量／正確決策」的表現繼續發展下去，世人應當如何看中國？這或許是反共反中者所不願想像之事，卻是世人不能不面對的問題。若不能面對這個問題，只是想像「中國必然崩潰論」，就找不到因應中國的正確方案。
然而，正當嫦娥玉兔成為世界話題之際，中國也正發生三件極具指標意義的內部事件。一、二十五省陷於空前的霾害，這是發展失衡的警訊；二、周永康被捕的消息甚囂塵上，這是專制腐敗的宿命；三、防空識別區攪渾了東海，這是韜光養晦的破局。中共如今這一套治理方式，不啻是用社會主義的外衣來包裹法西斯主義的身軀，橫看成開明專制，側看成幫派尋租。這套「有中國特色的社會主義」與蘇聯不同（烏克蘭群眾日前已砸爛列寧銅像），因此，「嫦娥震撼」亦與「史潑尼克震撼」不同。在「史潑尼克」後三十四年，蘇聯解體；但中國與世界都要想一想，在「嫦娥震撼」的十年、二十年、三十年後，中國將是怎樣的中國？
台灣在李登輝與陳水扁時代，是以「中國崩潰論」作為兩岸政經政策的脊樑，但今日即使最強烈的反共反中者也須自問：如果中國大陸不「崩潰」，反而在各方面繼續維持上升曲線，難道還能用台獨及反《服貿協議》來反共反中嗎？或者，必須另有方案？
不少人對「嫦娥震撼」的後繼能量有所存疑及保留，但世人也必須想像一個不會像蘇聯一樣「崩潰」的中國。借用歐巴馬「史潑尼克時刻」的語法：現在，也是台灣的「嫦娥時刻」。
Monday, December 16, 2013
Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee Dereliction: Control Yuan Must Impeach Chen Shou-huang
Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee Dereliction:
Control Yuan Must Impeach Chen Shou-huang
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 17, 2013
Summary: The Control Yuan is about to take on the Huang Shiming case once more. If it impeaches both Huang Shi-ming and Lin Hsiu-tao, their action will have important symbolic significance. It will prevent the nation's criminal justice system from sliding downhill. If Chen Shou-huang's influence peddling results in nothing more than a warning, if the Control Yuan sits by doing nothing, it will seriously undermine the prosecution of legislative influence peddling, civil litigation against Wang Jin-pyng, and the confirmation of party memberships. It would be tantamount to decriminalizing influence peddling, and surrendering the criminal justice system to the forces of corruption. It is time the Control Yuan acted.
Full text below:
The Ministry of Justice Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee has concluded that Chief Prosecutor Chen Shou-huang of the High Prosecutor's Office colluded with Wang Jin-pyng to peddle influence on behalf of Ker Chien-ming. The committee concluded that this was a serious case of dereliction of duty. But it said that Chen Shou-huang confessed during questioning and immediately resigned. It said "he was highly responsible," therefore would not be referred to the Control Yuan for punishment. It recommended that as punishment, the Ministry of Justice issue a "warning." As expected, once the evaluation was published, Chen Shou-huang reneged and refused to resign. This farce may be the result of confusion or incompetence. But it has already inflicted major damage to the reputation of the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee.
The influence peddling case is the first case to be handled by the committee since the "Judges Law" was passed, The system for internal discipline of officials within the criminal justice system has been strongly criticized. This is why members of the public were made part of the evaluation process. The purpose was to eliminate out of touch "dinosaur judges." The committee was supposed to represent professionalism and ethics. Who knew it would evince even less self-discipline than prosecutors, and leave people shaking their heads? It failed to distinguish between minor and major offenses. It allowed itself to be duped.
Influence peddling must be strictly forbidden. This is a given within any criminal justice system. Former Judicial Yuan President Shi Chi-yang said that anyone who peddles influence must step down. Criminal justice involves fairness. If power holders can intervene and change the verdict in a criminal trial, then fairness has disappeared. If the verdict in a criminal trial can be determined by those with more power or more wealth, we might as well determine the outcome behind closed doors. What do we need the criminal justice system for? If this is how it will be, then criminal justice will be reduced to a meaningless ritual.
Before the Judges' Law went into effect, Supreme Court Justice Hsiao Yang-kui peddled influence with the trial judge in a car accident case involving his son. The Supreme Court Internal Disciplinary Committee ruled that Hsiao Yang-kui was not guilty of influence peddling. But it also said that mentioning his son's case to the judge amounted to misconduct. It recommended that the Judicial Yuan refer him to the Control Yuan for impeachment. The Judicial Yuan adhered to more stringent standards in dealing with such cases. It concluded that Hsiao Yang-kui peddled influence. It immediately suspended him and referred his case to the Control Yuan for impeachment. The Commission on the Disciplinary Sanctions of Functionaries suspended him for six months. The Judicial Yuan voiced strong objections. Hsiao Yang-kui immediately resigned and retired. As this proves, the criminal justice system need not treat influence peddling lightly. Influence peddling is impermissible on behalf of a son. How can one make an exception for a legislator?
The Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee was established to provide external oversight, to compensate for the lack of self-discipline within the criminal justice system, and to eliminate judges who abuse the law. But the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee merely scolded Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. It merely gave them a slap on the wrist. It followed up harsh language with kid gloves. It clearly had no intention of upholding justice.
Since its establishment, the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee has evaluated two cases. One. Taitung District Prosecutor Liu Chung-hui was abusive toward a court clerk. He discriminated against people from Taitung and defamed religion. The committee recommended referring his case to the Control Yuan and relieving him of his job. Two. Taipei District Prosecutor Lin Kuang-you intimidated and mocked a defendant. He insulted the plaintiff and told him not to settle. The Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee recommended referring his case to the Control Yuan and suspending him for two years.
These two prosecutors were guilty of character assassination. The Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee found them guilty of dereliction of duty and recommended harsh penalties. It found that Chen Shou-huang's influence peddling set a bad example for prosecutors. It found that Lin Hsiu-tao's conduct cast doubt on the fairness of the criminal justice system. Both men seriously undermined the independent and objective image of the criminal justice system. Yet the committee recommend nothing more than a warning. Is this consistent with the principle of proportionality? Individual character is of course important. But can we tolerate such negative images of prosecutors as a whole? Is the committee brave only when taking on lower echelon prosecutors? Does its hand shake when faced with political cases?
The committee treated Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao with kid gloves. The reason they gave was that the two men admitted to wrongdoing and showed sincerity. Their reasoning was far too emotionalistic. In particular since Chen Shou-huang reneged on his promise to resign, denounced the committee's evaluation, and refused to admit that he was ever in the wrong. The committee was naive and credulous. Chen treated committee members like fools.
The committee established a negative precedent by letting those guilty of influence peddling off with wrist slaps. From an institutional perspective, the Ministry of Justice may find it difficult to overturn the committee resolution. But the situation is not irremediable. The Control Yuan can still impeach Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. It can still refer them to the disciplinary courts for punishment. Once the disciplinary courts impose disciplinary action, the two men's administrative sanctions or "warnings," will automatically lapse. There are many precedents for this.
The Control Yuan is about to take on the Huang Shiming case once more. If it impeaches both Huang Shi-ming and Lin Hsiu-tao, their action will have important symbolic significance. It will prevent the nation's criminal justice system from sliding downhill. If Chen Shou-huang's influence peddling results in nothing more than a warning, if the Control Yuan sits by doing nothing, it will seriously undermine the prosecution of legislative influence peddling, civil litigation against Wang Jin-pyng, and the confirmation of party memberships. It would be tantamount to decriminalizing influence peddling, and surrendering the criminal justice system to the forces of corruption. It is time the Control Yuan acted.
檢評會失職，監院應主動彈劾陳守煌
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.17 02:31 am
檢評會認定高檢署檢察長陳守煌接受王金平為柯案關說，違失情節重大；但因在約詢中陳守煌表明若經認定涉及關說便立刻辭職，故檢評會認為他「深具負責態度」，未將他移送監察院，僅建議法務部給予「警告」處分。詎料，陳守煌於評鑑報告出爐後當即反悔，拒絕辭職。這場鬧劇，無論是烏龍或失能，都已讓檢評會形象大傷。
此次關說事件之評鑑，是《法官法》實施後司法官評鑑法制化後的首件司法關說評鑑案。過去，由於司法人員的內部自律受到外界強烈批評，因而才有社會人士參與評鑑的設計，目的是希望藉此消滅恐龍司法官。誰知，檢評會所表現的專業與倫理，水準竟還不如過去的檢察官自律，讓人搖頭。檢評會的評鑑不僅輕重失衡，又昧於知人而集體遭欺蒙。
不容許關說，這是司法界的天條。司法院前院長施啟揚曾說：任何人若關說，就得下台。司法貴在公正，若權勢者能透過外力干預改變裁決，公正的防線潰堤，大家比權力、比財力、比後台決定勝負就好了，還需要司法作啥？果真如此，司法將淪為毫無價值的儀式性工具。
在《法官法》實施前，最高法院法官蕭仰歸為其子車禍肇逃案向承審法官關說。最高法院自律委員會審查後，認為蕭仰歸未關說，卻也認為他向其他法官提到其子之案件，行為不當，建議司法院將他移送監院彈劾。司法院採取更嚴格的標準處理此案，認定蕭仰歸關說，立刻將他停職並送監察院彈劾，公懲會並處以休職半年之處分。後經司法院積極勸退，蕭仰歸旋即退休離職。由此可見，司法界對待關說的標準絕不隨便，對自己的兒子也不行，難道立委可以例外？
檢評會的成立，原是希望引入外部的監督機制，彌補司法機關內部自律的不足，加速淘汰違法濫權司法官。但檢評會面對陳守煌、林秀濤的關說案，卻是「痛罵」而「輕罰」，嚴厲指責卻輕輕放下，完全看不出裁量的理路，也看不出維護司法價值的用心。
先檢視檢評會成立後評鑑過的兩個案件。其一，台東地檢署檢察官劉仲慧當庭辱罵書記官，並發表歧視台東人、汙衊宗教的言語；經檢評會評鑑，建議送監院免除其檢察官職務。其二，台北地檢署檢察官林冠佑開庭時恫嚇、怒罵被告，侮辱或要求告訴人不要和解，檢評會也建議送監察院將他休職兩年。
這兩位檢察官因損害他人人格，被檢評會認定失職而建議重懲；相形之下，檢評會認為陳守煌關說行為無法為檢察官表率，林秀濤的作為使司法的公正性受到質疑，均嚴重傷害檢察體系獨立客觀的形象，然而檢評會卻只建議警告處分，豈符合比例原則。個人人格當然重要，但檢察官整體形象豈會不足為意？或者，檢評會只會拿小檢察官開刀，但一碰到沾惹政治的議題，戒尺就拿捏不定了。
檢評會輕縱陳守煌和林秀濤，理由之一是兩人坦白事發經過，態度誠懇；這樣的說法，似流於感情用事。尤其，陳守煌隨即反悔，否定檢評會的報告，且拒絕承認自己有錯。如此一來，檢評會不僅犯了天真輕信的錯誤，也形同受到了愚弄。
檢評會創下輕放關說的惡例，從制度面看，法務部也不宜率爾推翻檢評會的決議；然而，事情並非毫無挽救餘地。關鍵在，監察院仍可主動對陳守煌和林秀濤提出彈劾，送職務法庭懲戒；一旦職務法庭作出懲戒處分，兩人的「警告」行政處分就會自動失效。這種作法，有不少前例可循。
監察院即將再度面臨黃世銘的處分案，如果同時也將涉及關說的陳守煌、林秀濤移送彈劾，將具有重要的象徵意義，防止國家的司法正義一路傾斜。否則，若陳守煌涉關說僅受警告處分，監院又置之不理，將嚴重影響立院處理關說案、民事訴訟處理王金平、確認黨籍案等連串案件的價值拉鋸，形同承認權勢階級關說有理，司法正義棄械投降。此刻，是監察院出手的時候了！
Control Yuan Must Impeach Chen Shou-huang
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 17, 2013
Summary: The Control Yuan is about to take on the Huang Shiming case once more. If it impeaches both Huang Shi-ming and Lin Hsiu-tao, their action will have important symbolic significance. It will prevent the nation's criminal justice system from sliding downhill. If Chen Shou-huang's influence peddling results in nothing more than a warning, if the Control Yuan sits by doing nothing, it will seriously undermine the prosecution of legislative influence peddling, civil litigation against Wang Jin-pyng, and the confirmation of party memberships. It would be tantamount to decriminalizing influence peddling, and surrendering the criminal justice system to the forces of corruption. It is time the Control Yuan acted.
Full text below:
The Ministry of Justice Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee has concluded that Chief Prosecutor Chen Shou-huang of the High Prosecutor's Office colluded with Wang Jin-pyng to peddle influence on behalf of Ker Chien-ming. The committee concluded that this was a serious case of dereliction of duty. But it said that Chen Shou-huang confessed during questioning and immediately resigned. It said "he was highly responsible," therefore would not be referred to the Control Yuan for punishment. It recommended that as punishment, the Ministry of Justice issue a "warning." As expected, once the evaluation was published, Chen Shou-huang reneged and refused to resign. This farce may be the result of confusion or incompetence. But it has already inflicted major damage to the reputation of the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee.
The influence peddling case is the first case to be handled by the committee since the "Judges Law" was passed, The system for internal discipline of officials within the criminal justice system has been strongly criticized. This is why members of the public were made part of the evaluation process. The purpose was to eliminate out of touch "dinosaur judges." The committee was supposed to represent professionalism and ethics. Who knew it would evince even less self-discipline than prosecutors, and leave people shaking their heads? It failed to distinguish between minor and major offenses. It allowed itself to be duped.
Influence peddling must be strictly forbidden. This is a given within any criminal justice system. Former Judicial Yuan President Shi Chi-yang said that anyone who peddles influence must step down. Criminal justice involves fairness. If power holders can intervene and change the verdict in a criminal trial, then fairness has disappeared. If the verdict in a criminal trial can be determined by those with more power or more wealth, we might as well determine the outcome behind closed doors. What do we need the criminal justice system for? If this is how it will be, then criminal justice will be reduced to a meaningless ritual.
Before the Judges' Law went into effect, Supreme Court Justice Hsiao Yang-kui peddled influence with the trial judge in a car accident case involving his son. The Supreme Court Internal Disciplinary Committee ruled that Hsiao Yang-kui was not guilty of influence peddling. But it also said that mentioning his son's case to the judge amounted to misconduct. It recommended that the Judicial Yuan refer him to the Control Yuan for impeachment. The Judicial Yuan adhered to more stringent standards in dealing with such cases. It concluded that Hsiao Yang-kui peddled influence. It immediately suspended him and referred his case to the Control Yuan for impeachment. The Commission on the Disciplinary Sanctions of Functionaries suspended him for six months. The Judicial Yuan voiced strong objections. Hsiao Yang-kui immediately resigned and retired. As this proves, the criminal justice system need not treat influence peddling lightly. Influence peddling is impermissible on behalf of a son. How can one make an exception for a legislator?
The Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee was established to provide external oversight, to compensate for the lack of self-discipline within the criminal justice system, and to eliminate judges who abuse the law. But the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee merely scolded Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. It merely gave them a slap on the wrist. It followed up harsh language with kid gloves. It clearly had no intention of upholding justice.
Since its establishment, the Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee has evaluated two cases. One. Taitung District Prosecutor Liu Chung-hui was abusive toward a court clerk. He discriminated against people from Taitung and defamed religion. The committee recommended referring his case to the Control Yuan and relieving him of his job. Two. Taipei District Prosecutor Lin Kuang-you intimidated and mocked a defendant. He insulted the plaintiff and told him not to settle. The Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee recommended referring his case to the Control Yuan and suspending him for two years.
These two prosecutors were guilty of character assassination. The Prosecutorial Evaluation Committee found them guilty of dereliction of duty and recommended harsh penalties. It found that Chen Shou-huang's influence peddling set a bad example for prosecutors. It found that Lin Hsiu-tao's conduct cast doubt on the fairness of the criminal justice system. Both men seriously undermined the independent and objective image of the criminal justice system. Yet the committee recommend nothing more than a warning. Is this consistent with the principle of proportionality? Individual character is of course important. But can we tolerate such negative images of prosecutors as a whole? Is the committee brave only when taking on lower echelon prosecutors? Does its hand shake when faced with political cases?
The committee treated Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao with kid gloves. The reason they gave was that the two men admitted to wrongdoing and showed sincerity. Their reasoning was far too emotionalistic. In particular since Chen Shou-huang reneged on his promise to resign, denounced the committee's evaluation, and refused to admit that he was ever in the wrong. The committee was naive and credulous. Chen treated committee members like fools.
The committee established a negative precedent by letting those guilty of influence peddling off with wrist slaps. From an institutional perspective, the Ministry of Justice may find it difficult to overturn the committee resolution. But the situation is not irremediable. The Control Yuan can still impeach Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. It can still refer them to the disciplinary courts for punishment. Once the disciplinary courts impose disciplinary action, the two men's administrative sanctions or "warnings," will automatically lapse. There are many precedents for this.
The Control Yuan is about to take on the Huang Shiming case once more. If it impeaches both Huang Shi-ming and Lin Hsiu-tao, their action will have important symbolic significance. It will prevent the nation's criminal justice system from sliding downhill. If Chen Shou-huang's influence peddling results in nothing more than a warning, if the Control Yuan sits by doing nothing, it will seriously undermine the prosecution of legislative influence peddling, civil litigation against Wang Jin-pyng, and the confirmation of party memberships. It would be tantamount to decriminalizing influence peddling, and surrendering the criminal justice system to the forces of corruption. It is time the Control Yuan acted.
檢評會失職，監院應主動彈劾陳守煌
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.17 02:31 am
檢評會認定高檢署檢察長陳守煌接受王金平為柯案關說，違失情節重大；但因在約詢中陳守煌表明若經認定涉及關說便立刻辭職，故檢評會認為他「深具負責態度」，未將他移送監察院，僅建議法務部給予「警告」處分。詎料，陳守煌於評鑑報告出爐後當即反悔，拒絕辭職。這場鬧劇，無論是烏龍或失能，都已讓檢評會形象大傷。
此次關說事件之評鑑，是《法官法》實施後司法官評鑑法制化後的首件司法關說評鑑案。過去，由於司法人員的內部自律受到外界強烈批評，因而才有社會人士參與評鑑的設計，目的是希望藉此消滅恐龍司法官。誰知，檢評會所表現的專業與倫理，水準竟還不如過去的檢察官自律，讓人搖頭。檢評會的評鑑不僅輕重失衡，又昧於知人而集體遭欺蒙。
不容許關說，這是司法界的天條。司法院前院長施啟揚曾說：任何人若關說，就得下台。司法貴在公正，若權勢者能透過外力干預改變裁決，公正的防線潰堤，大家比權力、比財力、比後台決定勝負就好了，還需要司法作啥？果真如此，司法將淪為毫無價值的儀式性工具。
在《法官法》實施前，最高法院法官蕭仰歸為其子車禍肇逃案向承審法官關說。最高法院自律委員會審查後，認為蕭仰歸未關說，卻也認為他向其他法官提到其子之案件，行為不當，建議司法院將他移送監院彈劾。司法院採取更嚴格的標準處理此案，認定蕭仰歸關說，立刻將他停職並送監察院彈劾，公懲會並處以休職半年之處分。後經司法院積極勸退，蕭仰歸旋即退休離職。由此可見，司法界對待關說的標準絕不隨便，對自己的兒子也不行，難道立委可以例外？
檢評會的成立，原是希望引入外部的監督機制，彌補司法機關內部自律的不足，加速淘汰違法濫權司法官。但檢評會面對陳守煌、林秀濤的關說案，卻是「痛罵」而「輕罰」，嚴厲指責卻輕輕放下，完全看不出裁量的理路，也看不出維護司法價值的用心。
先檢視檢評會成立後評鑑過的兩個案件。其一，台東地檢署檢察官劉仲慧當庭辱罵書記官，並發表歧視台東人、汙衊宗教的言語；經檢評會評鑑，建議送監院免除其檢察官職務。其二，台北地檢署檢察官林冠佑開庭時恫嚇、怒罵被告，侮辱或要求告訴人不要和解，檢評會也建議送監察院將他休職兩年。
這兩位檢察官因損害他人人格，被檢評會認定失職而建議重懲；相形之下，檢評會認為陳守煌關說行為無法為檢察官表率，林秀濤的作為使司法的公正性受到質疑，均嚴重傷害檢察體系獨立客觀的形象，然而檢評會卻只建議警告處分，豈符合比例原則。個人人格當然重要，但檢察官整體形象豈會不足為意？或者，檢評會只會拿小檢察官開刀，但一碰到沾惹政治的議題，戒尺就拿捏不定了。
檢評會輕縱陳守煌和林秀濤，理由之一是兩人坦白事發經過，態度誠懇；這樣的說法，似流於感情用事。尤其，陳守煌隨即反悔，否定檢評會的報告，且拒絕承認自己有錯。如此一來，檢評會不僅犯了天真輕信的錯誤，也形同受到了愚弄。
檢評會創下輕放關說的惡例，從制度面看，法務部也不宜率爾推翻檢評會的決議；然而，事情並非毫無挽救餘地。關鍵在，監察院仍可主動對陳守煌和林秀濤提出彈劾，送職務法庭懲戒；一旦職務法庭作出懲戒處分，兩人的「警告」行政處分就會自動失效。這種作法，有不少前例可循。
監察院即將再度面臨黃世銘的處分案，如果同時也將涉及關說的陳守煌、林秀濤移送彈劾，將具有重要的象徵意義，防止國家的司法正義一路傾斜。否則，若陳守煌涉關說僅受警告處分，監院又置之不理，將嚴重影響立院處理關說案、民事訴訟處理王金平、確認黨籍案等連串案件的價值拉鋸，形同承認權勢階級關說有理，司法正義棄械投降。此刻，是監察院出手的時候了！
Sunday, December 15, 2013
The Legislature and the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee Have Decriminalized Influence Peddling
The Legislature and the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee Have Decriminalized Influence Peddling
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 16, 2013
Summary: Blue and Green camp legislators have been eager to repay favors owed to Wang and Ker. Over the past three months, they have used Huang Shi-ming for target practice. The committee has lost all objectivity. It matters not who repaid whose favors. The criminal justice system has been gravely wounded. Influence peddling has been decriminalized. It has become a dagger plunged into the heart of the criminal justice system.
Full text below:
The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee issued a resolution yesterday calling for the Control Yuan to relieve Huang Shi-ming of his post. That was not the most noteworthy aspect of the resolution. The most noteworthy aspect was that the committee found Chief Prosecutor Chen Shou-huang and Prosecutor Lin Hsiu-tao guilty of influence peddling, yet dismissed their offenses as "procedural errors" and let them off with a slap on the wrist. The Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee have in essence decriminalized influence peddling. The negative consequences for criminal justice on Taiwan will be far reaching.
The influence peddling scandal erupted in September. Since then political considerations have reigned supreme. The Wang Jin-pying-Ker Chien-ming influence peddling case was swept under the rug, where it has remained. The committee resolution compared the testimony of Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. It was the first time the full story has been examined since the Special Investigation Unit conducted its investigation. The committee confirmed that Wang Jin-pyng, Chen Shou-huang, and Lin Hsiu-tao formed an "influence peddling iron triangle" that pressured Lin Hsiu-tao into not appealling the case. This was more than mere conspiracy with intent to engage in influence peddling. This was an actual case of influence peddling within the criminal justice system. This was a fait accompli.
The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee press release accurately detailed the Wang-Chen-Lin influence peddling iron triangle. It concluded that such practices undermined the neutrality and independence of the criminal justice system. It concluded that such practices violated Articles 11 and 12 of the Prosecutorial Ethics Law. Yet the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee absolved Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao of blame. It said that because they confessed, therefore "administrative disciplinary measures were sufficient. We need not turn them over to the Control Yuan." It recommended that the Ministry of Justice issue a "warning." In the same report, by contrast, it revealed a hate-filled attitude toward Huang Shi-ming, utterly at odds with the tolerant and forgiving attitude it showed towards Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. The treatment it accorded the different parties was like day and night.
One aspect of the resolution was particularly controversial. High Court Prosecutor Chen Shou-huang colluded with Wang Jin-pyng in influence peddling. He peddled influence with his own underling, Prosecutor Lin Hsiu-tao. Lin Hsiu-tao obeyed Chen's wishes. She changed her mind and did not appeal. The committee deliberately downplayed the two mens' offenses as merely "procedural errors." It claimed that their offenses were merely "failures to log their actions according to regulations." As a result, in the future any prosecutor indicted for influence peddling can simply argue that he or she merely failed to "log their actions according to regulations" and get off scot free.
This is where the Wang Ker influence peddling case now stands. Huang Shi-ming and the Special Investigation Unit have been punished for their procedural errors. President Ma's bungling further confused the issue. Before long, people forgot the real issue, influence peddling. Instead they chased after minor procedural matters. Add to this political smoke screens and infighting within the criminal justice system. Those who investigated the crime were labeled as criminals. Those who engaged in influence peddling were miraculously turned into heroes. Such developments were deeply disturbing.
Leave aside the personal ordeals undergone by those who were evaluated. One result of the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee resolutions has people especially worried. The resolutions virtually echoed Wang and Ker's political counterattack, verbatim. Their interaction essentially decriminalized influence peddling. From this day forward, those who wield power can reach into the criminal justice system and determine the verdict in criminal prosecutions. Officials within the criminal justice system can relax while currying favor with those who wield power. They can help each other settle lawsuits. Even if they are caught red-handed, there will be no serious consequences. They will run less risk than officials within the criminal justice system who investigate crimes with due diligence. This is the message that the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee resolution has sent the criminal justice system.
The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee resolution was based on an independent inspection agency established by the "Law for Judges." It covers prosecutors, scholars, attorneys and social activists. This is the first time it has been used. It is still experimental. Therefore it is difficult to judge it too harshly. But the resolution is biased in both its vision and its values. Observers have lost faith in its objectivity. Worse, it may mislead officials within the criminal justice system. It may create a rift between society and the criminal justice system. The danger this poses must not be minimized.
The Supreme Prosecutor felt that the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee has long exhibited a "prejudicial mindset." It long ago lost any objectivity. As a result its resolution was unreasonable. For example, Control Yuan Evaluation Committee Member Hong Tai-wen was Huang Shi-ming's aide. Therefore he recused himself. But other committee members, who were determined to prosecute, refused to recuse themselves. Instead, they remained and dominated the committee. This enabled them to take advantage of those who trusted the rule of law. They imitated ruling and opposition political party power struggles. The public television and NCC controveries have made such struggles commonplace. The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee's objectivity will now be suspect, colored as it is by Pan Green political affiliations.
Blue and Green camp legislators have been eager to repay favors owed to Wang and Ker. Over the past three months, they have used Huang Shi-ming for target practice. The committee has lost all objectivity. It matters not who repaid whose favors. The criminal justice system has been gravely wounded. Influence peddling has been decriminalized. It has become a dagger plunged into the heart of the criminal justice system.
至此，立院和檢評會合力把關說除罪化了
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.16 02:02 am
檢評會日昨所做出的決議，最讓人矚目之處，倒不是該會嚴厲要求監院將黃世銘撤職，而是它認定檢察長陳守煌和檢察官林秀濤確涉及關說與被關說，卻認為那只是「程序瑕疵」而輕輕放過。至此，在立法院和檢評會的唱和下，關說已形同被宣告「除罪化」了，這將為台灣司法埋下無盡惡果。
自九月爆發關說案以來，因政治勢力的喧賓奪主，王柯關說案的本質一直隱諱不彰，未受到充分檢視。這次檢評會的調查，透過陳守煌和林秀濤證詞之交叉比對，可謂在特偵組調查之外首度還原了其間來龍去脈，證實王金平—陳守煌—林秀濤之間的「三聯式關說」確實存在，且成功促使林秀濤改變原本打算上訴的心意。亦即，這不僅僅是一件意圖關說司法案，而且是一件司法關說「既遂」事件。
遺憾的是，檢評會在新聞稿上既如實詳述王—陳—林「三聯式關說」之存在，也認為兩人如此作法可能損及職務之公正、超然及獨立，分別違反《檢察官倫理規範》第十一條及第十二條；但檢評會卻隨即又替陳守煌和林秀濤開脫，說他們均已坦白、誠懇陳述事發經過，因此，「衡情予以行政懲處為已足，無移送監察院之必要」，僅建議法務部給予「警告」處分。在同一分報告中，檢評會對於黃世銘表現出必欲除之而後快的姿態，相形之下，對陳守煌、林秀濤卻是體貼寬容備至；兩者的待遇，直如天淵之別。
最滋爭議的一點是，高院檢察長陳守煌接受王金平關說，並轉而向屬下檢察官林秀濤關說，而林秀濤也如其指示做出違背自己原本意願的不上訴處分；在這種情況下，檢評會卻刻意淡化兩人的責任為「程序問題」，聲稱他們的違法只是「未依規定辦理登錄」。如此一來，日後任何檢察官關說或接受關說被查獲，豈非皆可援引此案辯稱只是「未辦登錄」而輕鬆脫罪？
王柯關說案演變至此地步，黃世銘及特偵組的諸多偵辦程序疏失自難辭其咎，馬總統笨拙的手腕則使問題愈發夾纏；然而，當事件演變成關說的本質無人聞問，反而是追究偵辦程序的枝節遍野蔓生，經過政治狼煙的助燃，再加上司法歧見的催化，不僅將辦案者打成罪犯，更使得關說及被關說者搖身變成英雄。這樣的發展，簡直令人毛骨悚然。
撇開被評鑑者的個人遭遇不談，檢評會做出的決議，最讓人擔心的後果之一，是呼應了立法院擁王柯人馬的政治反撲，彼此前呼後擁地將關說行為「除罪化」了。自今而後，權勢人物可以堂皇將手伸進司法機關，隨意影響案件判決；而司法人員也可以放心和權勢人物酬酢交好，甚至幫對方擺平官司，就算被查獲接受關說，也不致有何嚴重後果；甚至，要比司法官拚命認真辦案的「風險」要小得多。檢評會的決議，留給整個司法界的隱喻，不正是如此這般？
檢評會是根據《法官法》設置的獨立機構，成員涵蓋檢察官、學者、律師和社會公正人士等，由於是第一屆初次運作，仍帶有很強的實驗性質，自難過度苛責。然而，它這次決議在視野與價值上的偏倚，不僅有失外界對其公正超然之信任，它對司法人員可能造成的誤導，乃至對社會認知及司法正義可能造成的斲傷，都不可小覷。
就如最高檢的評論，認為檢評會的發言早有「預設立場」，因喪失客觀立場，而作出不合理的決議。其中，諸如檢評會主席洪泰文以身兼黃世銘幕僚而自請迴避，而部分評委為移送該案的民間司改會成員卻不主動迴避，反而居間主導。這類「君子可欺之以方」的情形，其實都複製了朝野的政治角力風格，人們在公視及ＮＣＣ之爭也已屢見不鮮，檢評會的公正性因染綠而招致質疑亦恐難免。
三個月來，藍綠立委為回報王、柯的人情，而將黃世銘當成箭靶。而檢評會這次的輕重失衡，不管是回報了誰，對司法都是大傷；將關說「除罪化」，正是刺殺正義的凶殘一刀。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 16, 2013
Summary: Blue and Green camp legislators have been eager to repay favors owed to Wang and Ker. Over the past three months, they have used Huang Shi-ming for target practice. The committee has lost all objectivity. It matters not who repaid whose favors. The criminal justice system has been gravely wounded. Influence peddling has been decriminalized. It has become a dagger plunged into the heart of the criminal justice system.
Full text below:
The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee issued a resolution yesterday calling for the Control Yuan to relieve Huang Shi-ming of his post. That was not the most noteworthy aspect of the resolution. The most noteworthy aspect was that the committee found Chief Prosecutor Chen Shou-huang and Prosecutor Lin Hsiu-tao guilty of influence peddling, yet dismissed their offenses as "procedural errors" and let them off with a slap on the wrist. The Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee have in essence decriminalized influence peddling. The negative consequences for criminal justice on Taiwan will be far reaching.
The influence peddling scandal erupted in September. Since then political considerations have reigned supreme. The Wang Jin-pying-Ker Chien-ming influence peddling case was swept under the rug, where it has remained. The committee resolution compared the testimony of Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. It was the first time the full story has been examined since the Special Investigation Unit conducted its investigation. The committee confirmed that Wang Jin-pyng, Chen Shou-huang, and Lin Hsiu-tao formed an "influence peddling iron triangle" that pressured Lin Hsiu-tao into not appealling the case. This was more than mere conspiracy with intent to engage in influence peddling. This was an actual case of influence peddling within the criminal justice system. This was a fait accompli.
The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee press release accurately detailed the Wang-Chen-Lin influence peddling iron triangle. It concluded that such practices undermined the neutrality and independence of the criminal justice system. It concluded that such practices violated Articles 11 and 12 of the Prosecutorial Ethics Law. Yet the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee absolved Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao of blame. It said that because they confessed, therefore "administrative disciplinary measures were sufficient. We need not turn them over to the Control Yuan." It recommended that the Ministry of Justice issue a "warning." In the same report, by contrast, it revealed a hate-filled attitude toward Huang Shi-ming, utterly at odds with the tolerant and forgiving attitude it showed towards Chen Shou-huang and Lin Hsiu-tao. The treatment it accorded the different parties was like day and night.
One aspect of the resolution was particularly controversial. High Court Prosecutor Chen Shou-huang colluded with Wang Jin-pyng in influence peddling. He peddled influence with his own underling, Prosecutor Lin Hsiu-tao. Lin Hsiu-tao obeyed Chen's wishes. She changed her mind and did not appeal. The committee deliberately downplayed the two mens' offenses as merely "procedural errors." It claimed that their offenses were merely "failures to log their actions according to regulations." As a result, in the future any prosecutor indicted for influence peddling can simply argue that he or she merely failed to "log their actions according to regulations" and get off scot free.
This is where the Wang Ker influence peddling case now stands. Huang Shi-ming and the Special Investigation Unit have been punished for their procedural errors. President Ma's bungling further confused the issue. Before long, people forgot the real issue, influence peddling. Instead they chased after minor procedural matters. Add to this political smoke screens and infighting within the criminal justice system. Those who investigated the crime were labeled as criminals. Those who engaged in influence peddling were miraculously turned into heroes. Such developments were deeply disturbing.
Leave aside the personal ordeals undergone by those who were evaluated. One result of the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee resolutions has people especially worried. The resolutions virtually echoed Wang and Ker's political counterattack, verbatim. Their interaction essentially decriminalized influence peddling. From this day forward, those who wield power can reach into the criminal justice system and determine the verdict in criminal prosecutions. Officials within the criminal justice system can relax while currying favor with those who wield power. They can help each other settle lawsuits. Even if they are caught red-handed, there will be no serious consequences. They will run less risk than officials within the criminal justice system who investigate crimes with due diligence. This is the message that the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee resolution has sent the criminal justice system.
The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee resolution was based on an independent inspection agency established by the "Law for Judges." It covers prosecutors, scholars, attorneys and social activists. This is the first time it has been used. It is still experimental. Therefore it is difficult to judge it too harshly. But the resolution is biased in both its vision and its values. Observers have lost faith in its objectivity. Worse, it may mislead officials within the criminal justice system. It may create a rift between society and the criminal justice system. The danger this poses must not be minimized.
The Supreme Prosecutor felt that the Control Yuan Evaluation Committee has long exhibited a "prejudicial mindset." It long ago lost any objectivity. As a result its resolution was unreasonable. For example, Control Yuan Evaluation Committee Member Hong Tai-wen was Huang Shi-ming's aide. Therefore he recused himself. But other committee members, who were determined to prosecute, refused to recuse themselves. Instead, they remained and dominated the committee. This enabled them to take advantage of those who trusted the rule of law. They imitated ruling and opposition political party power struggles. The public television and NCC controveries have made such struggles commonplace. The Control Yuan Evaluation Committee's objectivity will now be suspect, colored as it is by Pan Green political affiliations.
Blue and Green camp legislators have been eager to repay favors owed to Wang and Ker. Over the past three months, they have used Huang Shi-ming for target practice. The committee has lost all objectivity. It matters not who repaid whose favors. The criminal justice system has been gravely wounded. Influence peddling has been decriminalized. It has become a dagger plunged into the heart of the criminal justice system.
至此，立院和檢評會合力把關說除罪化了
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.16 02:02 am
檢評會日昨所做出的決議，最讓人矚目之處，倒不是該會嚴厲要求監院將黃世銘撤職，而是它認定檢察長陳守煌和檢察官林秀濤確涉及關說與被關說，卻認為那只是「程序瑕疵」而輕輕放過。至此，在立法院和檢評會的唱和下，關說已形同被宣告「除罪化」了，這將為台灣司法埋下無盡惡果。
自九月爆發關說案以來，因政治勢力的喧賓奪主，王柯關說案的本質一直隱諱不彰，未受到充分檢視。這次檢評會的調查，透過陳守煌和林秀濤證詞之交叉比對，可謂在特偵組調查之外首度還原了其間來龍去脈，證實王金平—陳守煌—林秀濤之間的「三聯式關說」確實存在，且成功促使林秀濤改變原本打算上訴的心意。亦即，這不僅僅是一件意圖關說司法案，而且是一件司法關說「既遂」事件。
遺憾的是，檢評會在新聞稿上既如實詳述王—陳—林「三聯式關說」之存在，也認為兩人如此作法可能損及職務之公正、超然及獨立，分別違反《檢察官倫理規範》第十一條及第十二條；但檢評會卻隨即又替陳守煌和林秀濤開脫，說他們均已坦白、誠懇陳述事發經過，因此，「衡情予以行政懲處為已足，無移送監察院之必要」，僅建議法務部給予「警告」處分。在同一分報告中，檢評會對於黃世銘表現出必欲除之而後快的姿態，相形之下，對陳守煌、林秀濤卻是體貼寬容備至；兩者的待遇，直如天淵之別。
最滋爭議的一點是，高院檢察長陳守煌接受王金平關說，並轉而向屬下檢察官林秀濤關說，而林秀濤也如其指示做出違背自己原本意願的不上訴處分；在這種情況下，檢評會卻刻意淡化兩人的責任為「程序問題」，聲稱他們的違法只是「未依規定辦理登錄」。如此一來，日後任何檢察官關說或接受關說被查獲，豈非皆可援引此案辯稱只是「未辦登錄」而輕鬆脫罪？
王柯關說案演變至此地步，黃世銘及特偵組的諸多偵辦程序疏失自難辭其咎，馬總統笨拙的手腕則使問題愈發夾纏；然而，當事件演變成關說的本質無人聞問，反而是追究偵辦程序的枝節遍野蔓生，經過政治狼煙的助燃，再加上司法歧見的催化，不僅將辦案者打成罪犯，更使得關說及被關說者搖身變成英雄。這樣的發展，簡直令人毛骨悚然。
撇開被評鑑者的個人遭遇不談，檢評會做出的決議，最讓人擔心的後果之一，是呼應了立法院擁王柯人馬的政治反撲，彼此前呼後擁地將關說行為「除罪化」了。自今而後，權勢人物可以堂皇將手伸進司法機關，隨意影響案件判決；而司法人員也可以放心和權勢人物酬酢交好，甚至幫對方擺平官司，就算被查獲接受關說，也不致有何嚴重後果；甚至，要比司法官拚命認真辦案的「風險」要小得多。檢評會的決議，留給整個司法界的隱喻，不正是如此這般？
檢評會是根據《法官法》設置的獨立機構，成員涵蓋檢察官、學者、律師和社會公正人士等，由於是第一屆初次運作，仍帶有很強的實驗性質，自難過度苛責。然而，它這次決議在視野與價值上的偏倚，不僅有失外界對其公正超然之信任，它對司法人員可能造成的誤導，乃至對社會認知及司法正義可能造成的斲傷，都不可小覷。
就如最高檢的評論，認為檢評會的發言早有「預設立場」，因喪失客觀立場，而作出不合理的決議。其中，諸如檢評會主席洪泰文以身兼黃世銘幕僚而自請迴避，而部分評委為移送該案的民間司改會成員卻不主動迴避，反而居間主導。這類「君子可欺之以方」的情形，其實都複製了朝野的政治角力風格，人們在公視及ＮＣＣ之爭也已屢見不鮮，檢評會的公正性因染綠而招致質疑亦恐難免。
三個月來，藍綠立委為回報王、柯的人情，而將黃世銘當成箭靶。而檢評會這次的輕重失衡，不管是回報了誰，對司法都是大傷；將關說「除罪化」，正是刺殺正義的凶殘一刀。
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)