Japanese Feel Shame, Taiwanese Feel Nothing

Japanese Feel Shame, Taiwanese Feel Nothing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 26, 2013

Summary: The Japanese feel no sense of guilt. But at least they feel a sense of shame. Japan has been wracked by one political scandal after another. But public opinion and public vigilance provides a strong line of defense. On Taiwan, the people's sense of shame remains entangled with rank sentimentality. It is distorted and deficient. Whatever collective constraints Taiwan society might once have had, have evaporated amidst Blue vs. Green political struggles.

Full text below:

Tokyo Governor Naoki Inose is suspected of accepting 50 million yen in illegal campaign contributions from the Tokushukai medical group. Under intense public pressure, he announced his resignation. This is not the first time something like this has happened in Japan, nor will it be the last.

Japan has a culture that stresses shame, but not guilt. Guilt originates from within oneself. Heartfelt moral convictions constrain one's behavior. Shame, by contrast, is the result of pressure exerted by others. External forces constrain one's behavior. Over the years many Japanese politicians have accepted illegal campaign contributions. Buty they step down only after being shamed. For the Japanese, until others discover their wrongdoing, or until a wave of condemnation appears, they have not sinned. This is a characteristic peculiar to Japan's culture of shame.

Once the Japanese culture of shame asserts itself however, it is like opening Pandora's Box. Society then blows it up all out of proportion. The masses go into a collective trance. They hear the rumblings, and undergo mass induction into a shared faith resembling unspoken dogma. It is sublimated and transformed into collective social pressure.

Naoki Inose once hurried about amidst the dust and confusion of Tokyo. Even when his wife died he worked around the clock. He succeeded in his bid to become the Hero of Tokyo. His popularity among Japanese politicians was second only to that of Shinzo Abe. But the moment his bribery scandal erupted, everything changed overnight. He became Public Enemy Number One. People demaned that he be pilloried. The Japanese media demanded his resignation. The consensus was that every day Seto remained in office dishonored the Tokyo Olympics with the international community. This illustrates the Japanese peoples' exaggerated sense of shame. Their intense emphasis on shame, and cavalier indifference to friendship, is clear to see. This was the reason for Naoki Seto's rise, and it was also the reason for his fall. .

The Japanese feel an intense sense of shame. It is a reflection of Japanese society's collective social constraints. The Japanese are cavalier about personal friendships. They make fine legal distinctions. Japanese often talk about how someone's conduct violated a certain law. But they seldom complain about systemic injustices. The Japanese often talk about how someone broke a certain rule. They rarely condemn a referee for being selfish and heartless. This is why the Japanese can make such an startling about face, and not feel any guilt. This is why when the Japanese make such an abrupt about face, they need not concern themselves with matters of friendship.

Once a climate of shame has taken formed, the Japanese never give "venial sins" a free pass. For example, former Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara was another rising star in the Democratic Party. He accepted a measly 200,000 yen in political contributions from an ethnic Korean woman he had known for years. When discovered, he hastily resigned. The Japanese public expressed no regret over his fall from grace.

Once someone has crossed an invisible line within Japan's culture of shame, the Japanese will no compromise merely because he holds high office. For example Democratic Party Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was under pressure to resign for falsifying his list of political contributors. The prosecutor never actually indicted him. But the Japanese political stage no longer had a place for him. For Japanese politicians, political contributions are their daily bread and butter. But step across the line and one ends up like Naoki Seto.

As we can see, Japan's political game has its own set of rules. There is the law. There are also social constraints and public pressure. These let politicians know that in addition to obeying the law, they must also have high ethical standards. There is no room for sentimentality. These social constraints also let Japanese politicians know that once their fig leaf has been snatched away, they must bear the full weight of political responsibility. They cannot skate by on personal connections.

Compare Naoki Seto's case to Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling scandal. The contrast is stark. When Seto's bribery scandal first emerged, he argued that he "merely borrowed some money from a friend." He produced a signed IOU and considered himself cleared. But public opinion, the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, and the Tokusou Group eventually forced Seto to resign to save face. Compare this to Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-pyng's influence peddling scandal. The domestic media and the public wallowed in sentimentality. They spun the Ma government's prosecution of Wang's wrongdoing as "political persecution." The Pan Green opposition waved banners and shouted support. They went after the officials who investigated Wang's wrongdoing with a vengeance. As we can see, Taiwan's politicians lack any sense of guilt. They also lack any sense of shame.

In short, the Japanese feel no sense of guilt. But at least they feel a sense of shame. Japan has been wracked by one political scandal after another. But public opinion and public vigilance provides a strong line of defense. On Taiwan, the people's sense of shame remains entangled with rank sentimentality. It is distorted and deficient. Whatever collective constraints Taiwan society might once have had, have evaporated amidst Blue vs. Green political struggles.

Some say that Japan ten years ago reflects what Taiwan is today. But politicians should know when to hold and know when to fold. Today's Taiwan lacks even this iota of shame.

日本的恥感，台灣的無感
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.26 03:40 am

日本東京都知事豬瀨直樹，因涉嫌收受醫療團體「德州會」的五千萬日圓非法政治獻金，在強大輿論壓力下，宣布辭職下台。這在日本既非空前，也非絕後！

日本是一個講究「恥感」的民族，但不具有「罪感」的文化。「罪感」是來自本我的要求，發自內心的道德信仰來約束自己的行為；而「恥感」卻是來自他人的壓力，依靠外來強制的力量來約束自己的行為。這也難怪，長久以來，許多日本政治人物因為違法收受政治獻金，在「恥感」的催迫下紛紛被迫下台。對日本人來說，在不被外人發現之前，或者外界未出現譴責的聲浪時，都不能算是一種罪過，這是日本人恥感文化的特殊性。

然而，日本人的恥感一旦被掀開，就如同打開潘朵拉的盒子，就會被社會無限膨脹與放大。這像是一種集體催眠，在聽到和鳴的聲音之後，便會轉化成為共同的信仰；更像是一種無形的教條，在潛移默化下，便會轉化成集體的社會壓力。

先前，豬瀨直樹風塵僕僕為東京申奧奔忙，其間連妻子過世時都不眠不休，不僅成為東京申奧成功的最大英雄，更成為僅次於安倍的高人氣日本政治家。然而，在收賄事件爆發後，霎時有如豬羊變色，豬瀨如同過街的老鼠，人人喊打。日本輿論要求他下台的聲浪，如排山倒海而來，彷彿只要豬瀨繼續在任一天，便會使東京奧運在國際社會蒙羞。日本人對於恥感的無限上綱，於此可見一斑；日本人的重恥感、輕人情，更是有目共睹。對豬瀨直樹來說，可謂成也申奧，敗也申奧。

日本人的重恥感，來自於社會集體的約束力；而日本人的輕人情，來自於清楚的法律分際。我們看到，日本人通常會說誰的行為是不符合哪條法律，卻甚少抱怨制度不公不義；我們也看到，日本人會說誰違反哪一項規範，卻極少譴責裁判者自私不仁。這使得日本人能夠在這種極大的心態的轉換下，不會產生任何的陰影；這也使得日本人在這種急遽的行為轉變上，而不用背負任何的人情包袱。

一旦恥感形成了特定氛圍，日本絕對不會因為事屬「微罪」而輕輕放過。例如，前日本外務大臣、也是民主黨時期的明日之星前原誠司，便曾經收受家鄉相識多年的韓裔女性區區二十萬日圓的政治獻金，被發現後，便倉促宣告辭職下台，日本輿論界對他亦不表任何惋惜。

一旦犯行超越恥感的界線，日本也絕不會因為某人職位崇高，而有所妥協。例如，民主黨執政後的首任首相鳩山由紀夫，便曾因假造政治獻金名冊，而面臨辭職壓力；最後雖未被檢察官起訴，但日本政壇亦未作任何挽留。政治獻金無疑是日本政治人物的慣常遊戲，但稍有逾越卻成為豬瀨直樹致命的悲劇。

由此可見，在日本政治的遊戲規則中，除了法律，社會約束力以及輿論壓力仍是一道重要的防線。這種輿論壓力，讓政治人物在法律之外必須要以高道德標準來檢視自我，而沒有理盲濫情的空間。同時，這道社會的約束力，也讓日本政治人物在被掀開遮羞布之後，必須負起該有的政治責任，不可能因人情世故而脫逃。

從豬瀨直樹的辭職看王金平的關說案，儼然形成強烈的對照。豬瀨在收賄事件爆發之初，曾辯稱是單純的朋友「借款」，同時也提出借據及簽名自清；但在輿論、東京都議會及特搜組的強大壓力下，豬瀨最後選擇辭職下台，以保住自己最後顏面。反觀王金平院長關說案，在國內媒體的理盲及民眾的濫情下，竟被無限上綱成馬政府的政治追殺，在野黨更搖旗吶喊助陣，嚴厲討伐偵辦關說的司法人員。由此可見，台灣的政治人物不但沒有罪感，更喪失了恥感。

簡言之，日本人雖然沒有「罪感」，但終究還保有「恥感」；日本雖然政治弊案層出不窮，但社會輿論的注視和約束卻成為最有力的一道防線。反觀台灣人的恥感，在濫情的人情世故糾纏下，扭曲不全；台灣社會的集體約束力，也在藍綠的政治對決下，蕩然無存。

有人說，十年前的日本就是現今的台灣寫照；但是，從政治人物的知所進退看，現今台灣就連這點恥感也看不到。