Chang'e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development

Chang'e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2007

On the morning of October 24, the Green camp launched its "Join the UN Torch Relay." The Blue camp launched its "Return to the UN Bicycle Tour." On the evening of the same day, the Red Camp, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, launched its Chang'e-1 satellite, which successfully orbited the moon. While political parties on Taiwan were mired in endless national identity struggles, the Chinese mainland's strategic might took a quantum leap.

The Chinese Communist Party succeeded in launching its Chang'e-1 satellite. However it did not characterize it as a "Great Leap Forward" for the military, the way it did for nuclear bombs, incontinental ballistic missiles, and man-made satellites a number of years ago. Now it faces international concerns about the militarization of outer space. Therefore it constantly emphasizes its peaceful uses. To claim that Chang'e-1 has no military function would be a lie. The Chang'e-1's exploration of the moon is a prelude to the construction of a space station. It will be followed by an outer space control center and outer space weapons deployment.

What's noteworthy is not the Chang'e-1's military implications, but the Chinese Communist Party's change in international and cross-Straits strategy. The Chinese Communist Party no longer bluffs and blusters. It now emphasizes the soft power exemplified by its exploration of the moon. This does not mean the Chinese Communist Party no longer values military development. Its military expenditures have increased in double digits for the past 20 years. Obviously it is continuing to develop its military capability, It is merely doing so at a lower key. For example, early this year the Chinese Communist Party successfully test-fired its first antisatellite missile, becoming the third nation besides America and Russia with this capability. Over the course of last year it introduced the J-10 multirole fighter plane, the nuclear powered Type 094 ballistic missile submarine and Type 093 attack submarine, the East Wind 20 medium range ballistic missile and other new weapons. These reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is also increasing its hard power.

By contrast, during this year's National Day celebration, the Democratic Progressive Party government held a troop review that was not a troop review. It showed off the new generation Hsiung Feng HF-3 anti-ship missile and Tien Kung TK-3 surface-to-air missile. It also planned to debut the Hsiung Feng HF-2 cruise missile, but the US expressed concerns and exercised its veto. A few days later word spread of Taipei's intent to develop nuclear weapons. The international media considered these moves toward Taiwan independence by the Democratic Progressive Party as acts of defiance against the Chinese Communist Party. But to everyones' surprise, Hu Jintao not only did not reply in kind, he offered Taipei an olive branch, in the form of a peace agreement. This immediately created the impression that the CCP was pursuing peace, while Taiwan was rattling its sabers. Chen Shui-bian seemed to be making a public declaration that he had decided to rely on military force to promote Taiwan independence.

This sudden contrast left the impression that the Chinese Communist Party was promoting peace and discouraging militarism, that Taiwan was the party escalating the conflict, promoting militarism, and discouraging peace. The Democratic Progressive Party's "troop review that was not a troop review" and the Chinese Communist Party's "Chang'e's Flight to the Moon" make us wonder. Should Taiwan adopt a strategic posture of "Taiwan independence/balance of military terror?" Or should it adopt a strategic posture of "Non Taiwan independence/military assistance?"

If one wants Taiwan independence, one must increase one's military might. About this one need have no doubt. If, on the other hand, one eschews Taiwan independence, then military force can be relegated to a secondary role. About this one also need have no doubt. If one wants to adopt a strategic posture of "Taiwan independence political strategy/balance of military terror," one has two choices: The first is the US's Cold War strategy. Escalate the cost of the Balance of Terror. Bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of arms race. The second is North Korea's current strategy of "nuclear blackmail." Trade peace gestures for international aid and US recognition. But the ROC's wealth is diminishing day by day. It can't even pay for educational reform. Where is it going to find the means to engage in an arms race with the Chinese Communist Party? If it chooses to adopt North Korea's strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, when the US won't even allow the open display of two ballistic missiles, how can it possibly allow Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons?

Besides, due to conflicting views of national identity, troops on Taiwan "don't know whom they're fighting for, or what they're fighting for." Politicians have been shortening soldiers' terms of enlistment in response the public's anti-war psychology. Under such conditions, Taiwan lacks the wherewithal for a military solution. Political infighting in recent years has deeply wounded public morale. This has dealt national defense a grievous blow from which it will not soon recover.

The government on Taiwan cannot possibly carry on an arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. A policy of nuclear confronation would be an unwise move. Taiwan should return to its "seven tenths politics, three tenths military development" cross-Straits policy framework. It should rely primarily upon enlightened policies, and only secondarily on military might. Put plainly, if the government pursues Taiwan independence, it must begin an arms race. Merely playing at Taiwan independence, merely screaming Taiwan independence while not actually implementing Taiwan independence, is highly disadvantageous. By contrast, if one eschews Taiwan independence, one might need to increase one's armaments, but one can at least avoid a suicidal arms race.

Seven tenths politics, and three tenths military development is still the ROC's best strategy for dealing with cross-Straits relations.

解讀嫦娥：台灣仍應七分政治三分軍事
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.30 03:54 am

十月二十四日晨，藍綠陣營在博愛特區分別發起入聯聖火及返聯鐵馬活動；是日傍晚，中共發射「嫦娥一號」繞月衛星成功。當台灣仍陷於連國家認同都無共識的困境，中共的國際勢位又見升高了一個台階。

中共成功發射「嫦娥一號」繞月球衛星，但不似當年將「兩彈一星」喻為軍事躍進的具體指標，如今面對國際質疑其太空軍事化意圖，卻反而不斷強調和平用途。若謂「嫦娥一號」沒有軍事目的，那是欺世的外交語言。「嫦娥一號」對月探測，實係中共未來建立太空站的前奏，續曲則是太空指揮中心及太空武器的部署。

值得關注的不是「嫦娥」的軍事意圖，而是中共國際戰略與兩岸戰略的變化。中共不再「耀武揚威」，改而強調探勘月球能源的「軟實力」；但這不表示中共不重視軍事發展，近二十年兩位數增加的軍事預算，顯見其持續發展軍力，只不過轉向檯面下低調進行。例如，今年初中共成功試射反衛星導彈，成為美、俄之外，第三個具備此一能力的國家，並在去年底以來陸續公布殲十戰機、○九四及○九三型核動力潛艦、東風廿一型中程導彈等新型武器，凸顯中共也在大幅擴張「硬實力」。

相對而言，民進黨政府也在今年國慶，辦了一場沒有大閱官的閱兵，並秀出雄風三型和天弓三型等新一代武器，原先要露臉的雄二Ｅ巡弋飛彈，則因美國關切臨時喊卡；不數日更傳出準備發展核武的消息。這一連串動作被不少國際媒體解讀為民進黨為推動台獨，向中共展示姿態；但是，未料胡錦濤非但未作針對性的回應，反而丟出兩岸簽署「和平協議」的橄欖枝，頓時在國際上形成中共追求和平，台灣卻炫示武力的對比。陳水扁似在向國際宣示，他已有憑藉武力推動台獨的決心。

此一對照，相當突兀。似乎呈現出中共「揚和抑武」的姿態；但台灣卻有升高衝突、「揚武抑和」的意味。如今，在台灣「國防表演」及中共「嫦娥奔月」後，似應冷靜思考：台灣究竟應採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的戰略架構，或採「非台獨政略／軍力輔佐」的戰略架構？

欲台獨，必須加強軍力，此點不必置疑；倘採「非台獨」的政略，軍事即可居輔佐角色，這也是情理中事。若欲採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的架構，或有兩種模式可採：一是冷戰時期美國以升高「恐怖平衡」成本，拖垮蘇聯的「軍備競賽」模式；另一則是北韓以「核訛詐」換取國際援助與美國承認的模式。但台灣綜合國力相對日下，連教改經費都吃緊，哪來與中共軍備競賽的足夠國力？若採北韓戰爭邊緣的「核訛詐」模式，則美國連雄二飛彈都不准露臉，豈會同意台灣發展核武？

何況，由於國家認同分裂，台灣軍隊充滿不知「為何而戰，為誰而戰」的低迷氛圍；且政客又不斷縮短役期，亦反映民間反戰、避戰心理。在這樣的社會因素下，台灣實在已無挑起軍事解決的條件；而近年政客內鬥對士氣民心造成的莫大傷害，更儼然已成國防上的不治之症，恐已復原無日。

台灣沒有可能與中共進行「軍備競賽」，台灣若走持有核武的偏鋒亦顯非明智之舉。台灣的兩岸政策，仍應回歸「七分政治、三分軍事」的比例與架構。以正確的「政略」為主，以必要軍備的「軍略」為輔。明白地說，倘採台獨政略，即必須走向軍備競賽之途，否則即是「鬧台獨／不敢台獨」的假台獨，對台灣極為不利；相對而言，若採「非台獨」的「政略」，固然仍須加強必要軍備，卻可避免走上軍備競賽的自殺之途。

七分政治，三分軍事，仍是台灣在處理兩岸關係時的最佳戰略。