The Strategic Considerations behind Beijing's Cross Straits Peace Accord

The Strategic Considerations behind Beijing's Cross Straits Peace Accord
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 17, 2007

Beijing recently convened its 17th National People's Congress. At home and abroad, attention was focused on three points. The first was the reshuffling of personnel, especially the composition of the standing committee of the Politibureau. The second was political reform. The third was cross Straits relations. Observers on Taiwan were of course most concerned about cross Straits relations. Especially when controversy over the "Plebsicite to Join the UN" has reached a fever pitch. The Olympic Flame could have reduced cross Straits tensions. But it is now a bust. Naturally everyone was waiting to see what the Beijing authorities would say about cross Straits relations at its 17th National People's Congress.

As it turned out, the cross Straits portion of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao's report never once mentioned the "Plebsicite to Join the UN." Nor did it invoke the "Anti-Secession Law" or any need to resort to "non-peaceful means." Besides reiterating past policy, the text appealed to the ruling party on Taiwan to negotiate a peace accord on the basis of the "One China" principle, and to establish a framework for peaceful cross Straits cooperation. This is the first time the Chinese Communist Party has incorporated such language into the party's official documents. This means the tone has officially been set. This will be the Chinese Communist Party's Taiwan policy for the next five to ten years.

Beijing has cited a "Cross Straits Peace Agreement" as its framework for future cross Straits relations. This confirms what many commentators have said, that "preventing independence" is more urgent than "promoting reunification." It has a number of other implications. These implications should not be ignored by anyone who follows cross Straits relations. First, let's look at the revised language. In the past, the Chinese Communist Party leadership always spoke of "peaceful reunification" and "peaceful negotiations." This is the first time it has spoken of "signing a peace agreement." This is the first time it has emphasized process and procedure over results. This reveals a significant change in the manner in which Beijing intends to deal with cross Straits issues. This change has been expressed at another level. It is actively responding to the Democratic Progressive Party's "Memorandum of Understanding for Stable Cross Straits Interaction." It also incorporates the content of several communiques issued by Lien Chan and James Soong during their visits to Beijing. In other words, their proposal is seeking the greatest common denominator in cross Straits relations.

Beijing's strategic consideration for its proposal is clear. It no longer wishes to dance to the tune of Taiwan's electoral topics. So it is quietly applying the brakes and proposing a larger framework. This larger framework doesn't stress any "Anti-Secession Law" but makes a direct appeal for a peace agreement. For Beijing the "One China" premise is a given. The "Anti-Secession Law" is implied. This framework allows Beijing to affirm its commitment to cross Straits reconciliation and dialogue by means of proposals for a peace accord, with preconditions. This kind of declaration is aimed not at Taiwan, but at the international community. Beijing knows the entire world is watching to see how it responds to the DPP's "Plebsicite to Join the UN." As the DPP cranks up the volume on its "Plebsicite to Join the UN" campaign, Beijing not only eschews harsh language, it champions peace and urges dialogue. It creates a positive image for itself on the international stage. Washington's initital, positive response shows that it is working. In other words, Beijing is engaged in international image building, The trouble-maker in cross Straits relations is Taiwan, not the Chinese Communist Party. The seeker of cross Straits reconciliation and dialogue is the Chinese Communist Party, not Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party has already gained the upper hand internationally. If it can establish its credentials as peacemaker in the Taiwan Straits, why should it fear the DPP's "Plebiscite to Join the UN?"

Beijing did not once mention the "Plebsicite to Join the UN." It put the signing of a peace accord into writing. These constitute an expression of goodwill towards the ROC government on Taiwan. but the response of the Executive Yuan, the Mainland Affairs Council, and the DPP Legislative committee was uniformly negative. Their reaction to the peace accord was chilly. President Chen bluntly referred to it as a "surrender agreement." Their response is not hard to understand. The party and the government have just kicked off their "Plebsicite to Join the UN." They have no intention of responding to any offer of a peace accord.

As we can see, the authorities on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits aren't on the same page. The Democratic Progressive Party is revving up its "Plebsicite to Join the UN." It is concerned exclusively with winning the upcoming elections. It is concerned exclusively with checkmating its political opponent in a game of Xiang Qi (Chinese Chess). Beijing, meanwhile, is concerned with establishing a cross Straits framework for future interaction. It is concerned with surrounding its opponent in a game of Wei Qi (Go). The game may proceed more slowly, but the encirclement is taking shape. These games have different rules and different strategies. For the moment each side may be able to play its own game. But with the passage of time, which side should be more worried?

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.10.17
北京倡議兩岸和平協議的戰略思考
中時社論

　面對北京召開的第十七屆全國代表大會，海內外關注焦點，多集中在三個焦點上，第一部分是人事改組，特別是政治局常委的接班梯隊誰屬；第二部分是政治改革，第三部分則是兩岸關係。當然台灣最關注的還是兩岸關係部分，特別是此刻台灣「入聯公投」吵得震天價響，原本可能緩和兩岸關係的奧運聖火登台又破局，因而北京當局會在十七大中怎麼論述兩岸關係，自然令人矚目。

　結果在中共總書記胡錦濤的政治報告中，有關兩岸關係的部分不僅隻字未提「入聯公投」，也未出現任何要啟動《反分裂國家法》使用「非和平手段」的條文，文字表述除了重申以往的政策方針外，主要就是呼籲台灣的執政黨在「一個中國」原則的基礎上，協商和平協議，構建兩岸和平發展架構。而如果要說這份政治報告在對台政策上有所謂任何的「新意」，應該就是中共首度將這段文字寫進了黨的正式文件中，這也等於是將中共未來五至十年的對台政策的框架，正式定了調。

　對北京而言，將「兩岸簽署和平協議」做為未來兩岸關係的指導框架，除了彰顯一般評論所指陳的，意在「防獨」重於「促統」外，也包含了其它諸多的意涵，這些意涵是所有關注兩岸關係者都不應輕忽的。先就文字修辭部分論，中共領導人過去對兩岸關係的提法，一直維持在「和平統一」、「和平談判」等類似終局狀態的語言風格，而「簽署和平協議」則是首度在語言風格上，改以過程與程序的形式加以論述，這種從「終局論述」到「過渡論述」的改變，相當程度上透露了北京對兩岸思維風格的改變。這種改變同時也表現在另一個層面，即此一倡議不僅積極回應了民進黨所提過的「兩岸簽署穩定互動架構說帖」，也參考了連宋在北京參訪期間所發表的幾個公報內容，也等於說，這個倡議是有在尋求兩岸在這個課題上的最大公約數。

　北京提出這個倡議的戰略思考很清楚，一方面它不再隨台灣內部選舉議題的操作起舞，而是「以靜制動」，揭示出一個更大的框架，這個架構並不強調要啟動什麼《反分裂國家法》，而是正面呼籲簽署和平協議。對北京而言，反正「一個中國」的大前提已先定在那，《反分裂國家法》只須隱身幕後，在這個前提下藉由「簽署和平協議」的倡議，可以充分宣示北京對兩岸的基本立場是要和解的、要對話的，但也絕不是沒有底線的。某種角度說，這種宣示所訴求的對象不全是針對台灣，而是向國際社會訴求，因為他們知道全世界都在關注北京會怎麼回應台灣的「入聯公投」攻勢。結果在面對台灣不斷升高「入聯公投」的強度下，北京不但沒有說出任何重話，反而擺出追求「和平」的姿態，並提出尋求對話的架構，在國際社會上所塑造的當然就會是正面的形象，美國華府第一時間給予正面肯定即是顯例。換言之，它等於是在國際社會間營造一種意象：在兩岸製造麻煩的是台灣不是中共，而在兩岸追求和解對話的是中共而不是台灣。要知道，中共在國際社會宣傳競爭中已經享有絕對的優勢，如果能再在兩岸問題上搶得「和平締造者」的國際印象，試問北京又何懼台灣升高「入聯公投」的攻勢呢？

　儘管北京隻字未提「入聯公投」，也將簽署和平協議載入文件，算是對台灣表達了某種善意，但台灣這邊不論是行政院、陸委會還是立院民進黨黨團的反應都是負面的，對「簽署和平協議」的反應也相當冷淡，陳總統甚至直指其為「投降協議」。這個反應不難理解，在黨政部門此刻全面啟動「入聯公投」之際，根本沒有任何氛圍足以去回應「簽署和平協議」的任何內容。

　看得出來，當下兩岸當局對議題操作的模式，其實是展示了兩套不同的棋局。民進黨「入聯公投」鬧得再大，意也只在贏得明年初的兩項選舉，彷彿是在下一盤攻勢凌厲的象棋，意只在吃掉將帥棋子而已；而北京則意在架構全新的兩岸互動模式，下的彷彿是全方位布局的圍棋，落子或許緩慢，但圍局則正在形成。這兩套不同的棋法與棋局，目前也許各行其是，但若拉開時間與空間的視野，哪一邊該更有警覺心呢？