The DPP should critique its Policies, not the System

The DPP should critique its Policies, not the System
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 23, 2008

After the KMT won nearly three-fourths of all the seats during the Legislative Yuan elections, political blame began to fall on the electoral system. Allegations that a single party in control of the Presidency, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan, might lead to a dangerous concentration of power began to surface. Worrying about the concentration of power is a good thing. But experience has shown that the ROC lacks a mature understanding of the rule of law. How can one conclude from the outcome of a single election that the system ought to be changed? Such an attitude fails to understand that an electoral system is not an instrument to ensure a certain election outcome. It is a mechanism that provides checks on power. The results of the ROC Legislative Yuan elections demonstrate that the system is functioning quite well.

Two years ago, the ruling and opposition parties, under intense pressure from Deep Green elders Lin I-hsiung and Nobel Laureate Lee Yuan-tseh, adopted the single member district, two ballot electoral system for the ROC Legislative Elections. One of greatest benefits from a single member district electoral system is that it helps moderates gain entry to the legislature. The fact is, the Democratic Progressive Party adopted precisely the wrong strategy in the Legislative Yuan elections. During its party primaries it adopted a "Blues Excluded" provision, keeping moderates and centrists within the party out of the running. During the election campaign its underlying tone was not "reconciliation and coexistence," but the shrill "us vs. them" rhetoric of Taiwan independence fundamentalism. That this led to the total alienation of moderate voters is not at all surprising. The result was entirely consistent with the new, smaller voting districts. People were surprised with the results merely because they lacked experience with the "winner takes all" system. Once they familiarize themselves with its operating principles, they will find that the system encourages moderate social policies. They will find that it leads to increasing social consensus. This will have a positive effect on the behavior of political candidates.

The same principle applies in the presidential election. If the voters don't want a single party to control both the presidency and the legislature, that is their choice. It is not a crime to win a landslide majority. Voters may prefer a moderate political party in control of the legislature. Any candidate who understands the voters' preferences, and who adopts a moderate, centrist political path, has a chance of winning. Candidates who adopt extreme policies will alienate or anger a majority of voters. If voters want a political party with moderate policies to win both a majority in the legislature and also the presidency, that is their prerogative. It is hardly a result that needs to be prohibited by a constitutional republic.

Put plainly, the Constitution does not prohibit any one party receiving a majority in the legislature. Nor does it prohibit the same party from winning both the presidency and a majority in the legislature. This is true not only of the Republic of China. This is true all over the world. No constitution in the world prohibits the same political party from controlling both the legislative and executive branches.

If we are going to demand that the electoral system be changed merely because the results of the legislative elections surprised some of us, are we going prohibit voters from casting "too many" votes for any particular political party? Are any "extra votes" to be nullified? Are we going to prohibit political parties from offering election platforms that a majority of voters find appealing? Are we going to find ways to ensure that political parties are positioned at opposite ends of the political spectrum, staring each other down?

To say that the system must be changed merely because the presidency and legislature are controlled by the same political party, is the same as saying that the constitution must not allow a single political party to control both the legislature and the executive. That is the same as saying that if a party wins a landslide victory in the legislature, then it must not be permitted to field a candidate for the presidency. We need to understand that for a single political party to receive an overwhelming majority in both legislative and presidential elections is perfectly normal. A political party that champions extreme positions cannot survive. Other political parties will fill the vacuum by advocating policies more acceptable to the voters.

A more fundamental reason is that under a constitutional republic checks and balances do not depend upon political parties, but upon the separation of powers among the different branches of government. Political parties must not behave like criminal gangs. A political party that achieves power must not refuse to check and balance another branch of government merely because it is controlled by its own party. For example, the Executive Yuan must not refuse to check and balance the president merely because he or she belongs to the same party. The Legislative Yuan must not refuse to check and balance the Executive Yuan merely because it is controlled by the same party. Conversely, the different branches of government must transcend partisan loyalties. They must refrain from engaging in purely partisan political battles. This will enable the nomination of political appointees to cease being a partisan power struggle. If a ruling party that controls both the legislature and executive ignores constitutional checks and balances, it cannot escape public condemnation. It cannot escape opposition party condemnation. It cannot escape judicial review for unconstitutional conduct. In the next election will be rejected by the electorate. It will be forced to surrender its legislative majority and even its executive authority.

The people have relegated a extremist political party to the scrap heap of history. This is hardly a defect in the constitution. It is not the public that should be engaging in soul-searching. It is not the winning political party that should be apologizing. It is the losing political party that should be deciding what kind of attitude it should adopt and what kind of policies it should advocate. The voters will be the arbiters during the next election. This is the norm under a constitutional republic. This is hardly a reason to change the system.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.01.23
敗選該檢討的是政策路線，不是制度！
中時社論

　國民黨在立委選舉中取得了近四分之三的席次後，政壇近日歸咎選制不當的說法甚囂塵上；而單一黨獨大，同時掌握總統、行政院與立法院可能形成權力集中的風險，也成為論辯的焦點。擔心權力的集中是一件好事，但此中也顯示出台灣法治發展過程中有欠成熟的部分，那就是只從選舉甚或一次選舉的勝負推敲制度應否改變的道理，尚不能體會制度存在的意義，不在成為選舉勝負的工具，而是提供一種可以控制權力的機制。台灣此次立委選舉的結果，可能正是制度有效運作的證明。

　兩年前朝野政黨因林義雄與李遠哲兩位兩位先生強力推動形成共識，立委選舉改採單一選區兩票制，而單一選區的最大好處，就是會使得立場較為溫和而非趨於極端者進入議會。平心而論，民進黨在此次立委選舉恰是反向操作，提名階段就利用「排藍」機制排除了黨內較為溫和而具有中間傾向的競爭者出線，在選舉期間的基調訴求，不是和解共生的慈眉善目，而是從基本教義發展的敵我意識與戰鬥語言，造成中間選民全然疏離的後果，其實並不令人意外，而且原本就符合小選舉區制的設計預期。大家普遍對結果感到意外，不過是因為缺乏經驗而不習慣「贏者通吃」而已。一旦熟悉制度的運作原理，制度上鼓勵溫和政策以提升社會趨同的用意，就會引導候選人的行為而發生效果。

　同樣的道理也在總統選舉上存在。如果選民不願意總統與國會多數同黨，本來即可自為選擇，國會中一黨獲壓倒性多數，不是民主憲政禁止的罪惡，如果選民欣賞的是政策溫和的政黨而使之掌控國會，瞭解選民取向而在總統選舉中採取溫和中間路線的候選人，其實都有獲勝的機會。如果因為候選人執意採取極端政策路線，而在總統大選中疏離或觸怒多數選民，選民的抉擇是要政策溫和的政黨同時取得總統與國會的掌握權，那也是選民自由意志的決定，並非民主憲政中禁止的現象。

　說得更清楚一些，憲法並未禁止任何一個政黨在國會中取得多數，也未禁止總統與國會在經過選舉之後由同一個政黨掌握。不僅我國如此，世界各國的憲法大概沒有明文規定單一政黨可以獲得國會席次上限或是禁止由單一政黨同時掌握立法與行政兩權的例子。

　如果因為立委選舉的結果出人意表就要改制，難道要憲法規定人民不得投票給單一政黨過多，超過一定額度的選票不算；還是要讓選舉制度不可鼓勵政黨提出可讓多數選民認同的政策，而必須設法讓政黨各走極端，互相視如寇仇？

　如果因為總統與國會由同一政黨掌握就要改變制度，難道說要憲法規定不允許單一政黨同時掌握立法與行政兩權，國會裡獲得壓倒性勝利的政黨，不許推出候選人選上總統？要知道，國會由單一政黨取得壓倒性多數，總統與國會多數屬於同一政黨，本來就是民主憲政中預設的結果之一。一個政黨在選舉中因立場極端而無法生存，還會有其他的政黨繼之而起，用更能為選民接受的政策贏得選舉而執政。

　更深層的道理，其實在於民主憲政存在的價值並不在於政黨間的制衡，而是在於權力部門分立的制衡。政黨不該是幫派，取得政權的政黨，不能只是因為黨籍相同，就放棄憲法上應該堅持的制衡關係，例如不能因為屬相同的政黨，行政院就不去制衡總統，或是立法院就不去制衡行政院；也不能只是因為黨籍相異，就超越應有的制衡關係而從事政黨惡鬥，例如怠於行使應該行使的人事同意權，讓政黨鬥爭使得憲法機關停擺。同時掌握了立法與行政兩權的執政黨，如果完全不按制衡關係運行而脫離憲法規定的軌道，必然不能逃脫輿論的聲討，在野政黨的反對，司法的違憲審查，而會在下一次的選舉中受到選民唾棄，交出席次多數或是整個政權。

　人民用選舉淘汰極端的政黨，絕非憲政的罪惡，應該檢討的不是人民，應該道歉的不是勝選的政黨，敗選的政黨應該在下一場選舉中採取什麼態度與政策路線，是自己的選擇，選民會在下一場選舉中給予裁判。這是民主政治的常態，不是改變制度的理由！