Big Tent Theory: A De Facto rather than De Jure Solution?

Big Tent Theory: A De Facto rather than De Jure Solution?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 23, 2008

In his inaugural speech, President Ma Ying-jeou said "People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese." Together with Beijing's "both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China," the two statements have caught peoples' attention.

At a meeting chaired by Vincent Siew during April's Boao Forum, Beijing's Minister of Commerce Chen Deming said more than once that "under the premise that we are all part of the same family, everything is negotiable." To everyones' surprise however, a press release issued by the Ministry of Commerce changed Chen's wording to "under the the premise of One China, everything is negotiable." But after bilateral discussion the press release was amended and the passage "under the premise of One China" was deleted. These developments suggest that Beijing's official position is that "under the premise that we are all part of the same family" is interchangeable with "under the premise of One China," and that the Ministry of Commerce press release was in error.

Hu Jintao and Vincent Siew seem to have validated this notion during their talks. Hu told Hsiao "Compatriots on both sides of the strait are all part of the same family. They are all kinfolk, all part of the same community." What Beijing did was to replace "One China" with "One Family." Perhaps they were using "under the premise that we are all part of the same family" or "under the premise that we are all Chinese" interchangeably with "under the premise of One China." Chen Deming used "under the premise that we are all part of the same family" as a synonym for "under the premise of One China." Yesterday, during Chen Yunlin's remarks to Taiwan, he omitted any mention of "One China." Instead he referred to "the renaissance of the Chinese people and a brighter future." He also spoke of "safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese people" and of "allowing the spirit of the Chinese people to shine."

The two sides are distinct political entities. This is a political reality. Beijing initially maintained that "Taiwan is part of China" or that "Taiwan is a province of China." Such formulations have encountered resistance. Beijing now maintains that "both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China." This is a significant change from Beijing's original formulation. If "Taiwan is part of China," the "China" means "People's Republic of China." But if "both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China" then "China" refers something other than either the mainland or Taiwan.

This third definition is the underlying premise for the "Big Tent Theory." It means that although both Taiwan and the mainland sit beneath a "Big Tent" known as "China," this China is neither the People's Republic of China nor the Republic of China. It means that the mainland and Taiwan, as well as the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, fall under the aegis of a third entity, a Big Tent. This Big Tent may actually have more structure than the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. One China, Different Interpretations amounts to each side establishing its own political edifice. The Big Tent on the other hand, puts both political entities under the same roof.

But what precisely is this Big Tent? Is it a third definition of "China?" If so, perhaps the two sides can become a confederation? If not, then how can one maintain such a Big Tent? If a third, de jure definition of China as a Big Tent is infeasible, perhaps a de facto definition of China as a Big Tent would be more acceptable? Perhaps "the Chinese people" or "we are all part of the same family" would be more acceptable? Perhaps if we move in this direction, we can find a way out.

Hu Jintao said "compatriots on both sides are all part of the same family," Ma Ying-jeou said "people on both sides are Chinese." Chen Yunlin spoke of the "spirit of the Chinese people" and "the Chinese peoples' fundamental interests." That all three used such formulations at such a critical juncture is no accident. The two sides may be attempting to find a mutually acceptable Big Tent when "reunification, independence, and war" are all unacceptable.

Eight years ago, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. He presented floral wreaths before Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, acknowledging that he was heir to the Republic of China's legal system. He honored his ancestors from afar. He acknowledged his roots. He acknowledged that he had inherited the traditions of the Chinese people. Political solutions are one means of linking the two sides of the strait. But shared cultural traditions are also an important means. In fact, shared cultural traditions often kick in when political solutions are inadequate. The impact of shared cultural traditions may even be stronger than political solutions. The impact of the Sichuan earthquake on the two sides of the strait is a clear example.

Besides, according to Chinese tradition, political solutions involving the imposition of laws are predicated upon "Might makes Right." Social cohesion within a civil society, on the other hand, is predicated upon "The Way." Must the two sides be linked by political solutions involving the imposition of laws? Why not first promote a Big Tent based on mutual trust among the Chinese people. Why rush to impose a de jure political solution based on the imposition of laws?

Perhaps the substitution of a Big Tent for de jure political solutions amounts to a Big Tent Theory?

新屋頂理論：「軟屋頂」取代「硬屋頂」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.23 02:51 am

馬英九總統在就職演說中稱，「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」，與北京當局所主張的「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」，兩相形成對比的概念，頗受矚目。

可從四月的博鰲論壇談起。當時在蕭萬長主持的座談中，北京方面的商務部長陳德銘幾次談及「在一家人的前提下，沒有什麼問題不可協商」等語；不料，會後商務部所發新聞稿卻稱，「在一個中國的前提下」如何如何。後經雙方對證，在新華社的新聞稿中刪去了「在一個中國的前提下」等語。這一段曲折，似乎顯示，北京當局如今的官方口徑是：以「在一家人的前提下」代換了「在一個中國的前提下」；卻意外地在商務部的新聞稿中出了錯。

此一論斷，亦可在當時胡錦濤會蕭萬長的談話中獲得佐證。胡對蕭說：「兩岸同胞是一家人，是血脈相連的共同體。」如今可待觀察的發展是：北京當局倘不是以「一家人」取代了「一個中國」，或許是認為可將「一家人前提」或「中華民族前提」與「一個中國前提」相互替代使用。陳德銘就是用「一家人前提」替換了「一個中國前提」。昨天，陳雲林的對台談話，就未見「一個中國」，卻有「中華民族偉大復興的美好未來」、「維護中華民族根本利益」及「讓中華民族精神煥發新的光彩」等句，或許又是一個例證。

兩岸是分治的政治實體，這是政治現實。北京當局原本所持的兩岸聯結是「台灣是中國的一部分」，甚至稱「台灣是中國的一個省」，此類論述已難維持；事實上，最近幾年北京已改口稱「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」，此與原本的論述已有極大改變。因為，若稱「台灣是中國的一部分」，則「中國」即指「中華人民共和國」；但稱「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」，則「中國」應指超越大陸與台灣的「第三概念」。

「第三概念」是「屋頂理論」的前提。意指在台灣與大陸之上有一「屋頂」，雖稱作「中國」，卻不是中華人民共和國，也不是中華民國；而「大陸／台灣」或「中華人民共和國／中華民國」，就是靠這個「第三概念」的「屋頂」來聯結。若就程度而言，「屋頂理論」可能較「九二共識／一中各表」有規範性；因為，「一中各表」是分立門戶，而「屋頂理論」則是在同一屋頂之下。

問題是：這個「屋頂」究竟是什麼？是「第三概念」的「中國」嗎？那麼，兩岸有否可能成為「邦聯」？否則，這個「屋頂」如何維持？反過來說，既然不可能出現一個「法制化的第三概念中國」為兩岸的「硬屋頂」，則「中華民族」或「一家人」是否可能成為兩岸共同接受並維護的「軟屋頂」？若朝此一方向思考，兩岸也許可有新出路。

因而，值此關鍵時刻，胡錦濤強調「兩岸同胞是一家人」，馬英九表示「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」，陳雲林又稱「中華民族精神／中華民族根本利益」；恐怕未必只是巧合，而可能是雙方在「不（能）統／不（能）獨／不（能）武」的現狀之上，找到了可以共同接受的「軟屋頂」。

八年前，陳水扁首次當選總統，除了向孫中山、蔣介石獻花行禮，表示承繼了「中華民國」的法統外；尚且「遙祭黃陵」，意在宣示「認祖歸宗」，表示也承繼了「中華民族」的宗祧。可見，若欲聯結兩岸，政治體制固然是一工具，民族文化也是重要的憑藉；而且，民族文化的聯結，往往可在政治聯結闕如之時發生效應，且其效應更強於、大於、深於政治聯結。此次四川震災在兩岸之間產生的感應，即是鮮明的例證。

何況，就中國傳統言，政治法制的聯結是基於「霸道」，民族人心的聯結則是合於「王道」。兩岸若無使人心聯結的方法，豈可能出現以政治法制聯結的方法？準此以論，兩岸何妨先以「中華民族」的「軟屋頂」、「軟聯結」進行互勉互惠；而不應急於用「政治法制」的「硬屋頂」、「硬聯結」來強人所難。